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6
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 January 28th, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed the following pleadings to be filed in the above-referenced case:

1) Defendant’s First-Amended Verified Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend

Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection;

2) Paul Maravelias’s Affidavit Certifying the Foregoing Verified Objection to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection;
and accompanying

3) First-Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection

The enclosed pleadings are first-amended altered resubmissions of my prior 1/21/19 filings.
They respond to Plaintiff’s resubmitted 1/24/19 Motion to Extend, which she meaningfully
altered in content from her original defective 1/11/19 Filing.

I have requested a hearing pursuant to statute. For scheduling purposes, please note that I
will be out of state until 2/5/19, and unavailable to attend any hearing before that date.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq. Paul J. Maravelias

12
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S FIRST-AMENDED VERIFIED OBJECTION TO

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND DURATION OF STALKING
FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) objects to Christina DePamphilis’s (“Plaintiff”) 1/24/19

Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, as resubmitted from her

defective 1/11/19 filing, and to this Court’s 1/24/19 preliminary granting thereof. Defendant

submits the following first-amended Objection in response to Plaintiff’s meaningfully revised

1/24/19 Motion to Extend. Defendant hereby demands a Hearing on the extension pursuant to

RSA 633:3-a, III-c.1 In support, Defendant asserts in this document the following argument on

the merits.i As a matter of law, the Stalking Order cannot be extended, as specified in

Defendant’s attached First-Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection

to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection.

I. PRIMER FOR NEW JUDGE REPLACING JOHN COUGHLIN:

December 2016 Etiology of DePamphilis’s False, Bad-Faith Stalking Petition
Purposed Solely to Harass and Abusively Defame Paul Maravelias

1
Defendant is scheduled to be out of state until 2/5/19 and requests the Hearing be held thereafter
according to statute.

13
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1. In December 2016, David DePamphilis got angry with Paul Maravelias. Paul had

asked-out David’s daughter to dinner on 12/12/16. (T27,276-277)ii Paul Maravelias never once

spoke to or communicated with her ever after that day. (T27,28,35-36,451:17-18) On 12/23/16,

after 11 days of frightening, harassing conduct by David DePamphilis central to Paul Maravelias

v. David DePamphilis (473-2017-CV-150), Maravelias texted David DePamphilis to “stop

harassing [Maravelias’s] parents please”. (Exhibit A) As a result of this text, David texted Paul’s

parents the same night, promising, “that’s the last straw”. Five days thereafter, on 12/28/16,

Maravelias was served a Stalking Temporary Order of Protection. But DePamphilis’s daughter

Christina, nominally, had filed a “stalking petition” against Maravelias. Maravelias hadn’t

interacted with her once since 12/12/16 weeks prior (T226:15,27,28,35-36,451:17-18), the first

and only time Maravelias expressed an interest in her.

II. DAVID DEPAMPHILIS AND CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS CONTINUE TO

STALK, HARASS, AND VICTIMIZE PAUL MARAVELIAS AND HIS FAMILY –
NOT THE REVERSE

2. Weeks after coming to Court by her father David’s vindictive scheme and baselessly

whining that she was “afraid” of Maravelias, Christina DePamphilis escalated her psychological

terrorism against Paul Maravelias even after receiving her unjust “stalking” order. She started

victimizing Maravelias over social media with cruel harassment, hoping he would do something

to violate the unjust restraining order, to get him in even more trouble falsely.

Christina DePamphilis’s Fearless Incitative Cyber-Bullying of Maravelias, Baiting Him to

Violate her Malicious, Bad-Faith “Stalking” Order

3. On 6/19/17, Christina posted a picture on her public social-media showing her new

college-age boyfriend Matt LaLiberte making challenging comments against “P M”. (T79-82)

She was barely 16, and her boyfriend was in his 20s.

14
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 4. Then, on 6/21/17 at 9:13pm, she posted a picture showing David DePamphilis,

herself, and her boyfriend standing together and middle-fingering the camera, with the caption,

“Did Dartmouth teach you how to do this? [middle-finger emoji]” (T69,70,72-77), which she

confessed was obviously targeted at Maravelias. (T74,76) This was days after she got Maravelias

arrested on 6/13/17 for trying to defend himself against her false stalking accusations with his

censored cell-phone voice recording. (T349) She and her father were rubbing-in the all their

legal abuse while taunting Maravelias with Christina’s new 21-year-old (T146,147) boyfriend –

Maravelias’s age – endeavoring to create an even more provocative aspect of jealousy. (T476)

15
3
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 5. Weeks prior to cyberbullying Paul Maravelias in this particularly cruel fashion,

Christina DePamphilis had whined under-oath she was “scared” of Maravelias and “afraid” “to

set him off” – that “it’s like walking on eggshells with him” (T67:10-11) – to get the stalking

order she later unsuccessfully baited him into violating. (T232:10-13)

David DePamphilis Has Been Contacting Teenage Girls at Windham High School,
Attacking Maravelias’s Teenage Sister’s Reputation and Attempting to Ruin her Social
Life at School

6. David DePamphilis has engineered the instant legal abuse against Paul Maravelias

out of filial jealousy and resentment, as explained in greater detail infra. Predictably, David

DePamphilis’s attacks have recently extended to Maravelias’s family members.

16
4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 7. For example, David DePamphilis has been waging a frightening campaign to

humiliate and defame Maravelias’s younger teenage sister Deborah. As a 49-year-old man,

David DePamphilis recently solicited communications with multiple teenage girls at Windham

High School and exhorted them to “not be friends” with Maravelias’s 17-year-old sister in a

cruel attempt to sabotage her social life out of bitter filial envy.

8. David DePamphilis is understandably frustrated by the comparison between

Maravelias’s honorable sister, and his own daughter Christina, who bragged on social media at

the age of 16 about having sex with her 20-something-year-old boyfriend energetically enough to

physically move the bed, as indicated in the following legal exhibit entered into this Court’s

record in a pleading dated 4/13/2018:

17
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
III. CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS IS A DOCUMENTED LIAR, DOCUMENTED
UNCONVICTED CRIMINAL PERJURER, AND SPEAKER OF SELF-
CONTRADICTIONS UNDER OATH

9. As indicated by the above-reproduced legal exhibit, it was wildly dishonest for

Christina DePamphilis to complain that a five-years-older guy respectfully inviting her to dinner

in front of her mommy (Maravelias’s final and only pre-stalking-order conduct with her) made

her “scared”. Apparently, Christina DePamphilis is so comfortable associating with older men

that she publicly brags on social media about having forceful sex with them.

10. Maravelias cross-examined DePamphilis at the 5/3/18 and 5/4/18 hearings.

Christina DePamphilis Was Caught Lying Under Oath about Her Cyber-Bullying Paul
Maravelias With Her Boyfriend

11. Christina DePamphilis lied multiple times: e.g., she first claimed she “was the only

one” “who knew” her harassing 6/21/17 middle-fingers post was directed at Maravelias.

(T72:16-17) Later, she admitted she “and [her] [five-years-older] boyfriend” also knew. (T79:23-

24) Another lie about the post was noted: initially, she claimed it was just to “let [Maravelias]

know” that she knew he was viewing her page. (T70:15) Then Maravelias pulled-out her 6/19/17

post which had already identified him. (T77:12-14,79:3-7,79:21-24)

The 2013 Turkey Trot Video Proved Christina DePamphilis Dramatically Lied in her
Stalking Petition and Testimony Thereon

12. Some of Christina DePamphilis’s vile lies were exposed spectacularly. Maravelias

played a cell-phone video for the Court his younger sister happened to be taking at the

11/28/2013 Windham Turkey Trot walk-run event. Christina had alleged in her stalking petition

and while testifying that Maravelias “came up to her” at this event and “tried to talk to [her]”,

making her “scared”. (T220:3-9) Coincidentally, the video captured this whole interactioniii:

Christina DePamphilis had actually noticed Maravelias from across the crowd along with his

18
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
sister, walked over to him with a premeditated intention to find him shared by Maravelias’s sister

(T215:15-17, Video 0:47-1:24), and interrupted Maravelias’s conversation with his friends,

assertively exclaiming “Hi Paul!” (Video at 1:24) Christina was even wearing a sweatshirt with

the name of Maravelias’s college on it and tried to win his approval by boasting, “I’m promoting

your college!” (Video at 1:28) Yet in her petition, this whole exchange was dramatized into a

delusional canard of Maravelias “stalking” DePamphilis!

Christina DePamphilis Confessed that She Falsely Put Alarming Words into Paul
Maravelias’s Mouth Which He Never Spoke, in Order to Obtain the “Stalking” Order

13. Christina DePamphilis effectively admitted to having lied in her original stalking

petition at the initial 2017 Hearing thereon. Paul Maravelias asked her on cross-examination if he

ever actually said the creepy, imposing “you will learn to love me” phrase that DePamphilis

claimed in her 12/28/16 petition. She responded, “no”, and “same-idea”. False statements on

stalking petitions are supposed to result in criminal penalties. See RSA 173-B:3, I.

IV. THIS COURT’S PAST PERJURER-ENABLING TYRANNY AGAINST

MARAVELIAS

14. DePamphilis’s first vindictive extension attempt in 2018 resulted in three Hearings in

this Court, in May and June 2018 which exposed DePamphilis’s falsity, willful lying, and

abusive antagonism against Paul Maravelias through a clearly illegitimate stalking order. Judge

Coughlin, perceiving the truth for himself but ostensibly terrified to act against David

DePamphilis and his lawyer-represented daughter, composed a libelous Order against Maravelias

on 6/15/18. In it, he cowardly granted the extension and dreamed-up a nonexistent reality by

saying things like Maravelias causes “reasonable fear” for her “safety”.

15. Shocked adults who read Coughlin’s libelous Order theorized for Maravelias that

Coughlin must have been “bought out” by David DePamphilis to write such a reality-disowning,

19
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
make-believe Order which contradicted Coughlin’s own honest impressions he declared at trial.

For detailed analysis of John Coughlin’s self-contradicting dishonesty, See 10/31/18 Motion to

Set Aside Judgement. Maravelias cannot say for certain why Judge Coughlin did this.

16. Judge John J. Coughlin is currently being sued by Paul Maravelias in Rockingham

Superior Court (Case No. 218-2019-CV-00090) for injunctive relief that will prohibit his other

lawbreaking, biased conduct, detailed therein. See 1/15/19 Petition for Writ of Mandamus and

Prohibition. Judge Coughlin is compelled to self-recuse by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

17. In summer 2018, the DePamphilis-Coughlin duo unilaterally slaughtered

Maravelias’s First Amendment rights by court-ordering him not to “possess”, directly or even

“through a third-party”, any “social media exhibits” by Christina DePamphilis which are legal

exhibits profitable to Maravelias’s self-defense. See DePamphilis’s 7/2/18 Motion to amend the

terms of the Stalking Order.

18. Maravelias composed extensive counter-pleadings indicating the unlawful and

unconstitutional tyranny of DePamphilis’s new motion. Judge Coughlin ignored those pleadings

and criminalized Maravelias’s possession of public legal exhibits profitable for his own self-

defense. Unfazed, Maravelias shall continue to defend himself in court.

19. After Coughlin’s fact-amnestic 6/15/18 Order, Maravelias composed a 10-page

Motion for Reconsideration (See Id., filed 6/25/18) wherein he pointed-out the Court needed to

dismiss the Order because it violated the within-30-days requirement for the first extension. See

RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Judge Coughlin denied Maravelias’s Motion with one word, scribbling

“Denied”, totally ignoring this issue and many other raised in Maravelias’s Motion.

20. The case law states that, because of the 30-day-Hearing violation, Judge Coughlin

acted without personal jurisdiction and is therefore liable for his reckless conduct to Maravelias

20
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
without the shield of judicial immunity. Paul Maravelias is preparing a federal lawsuit against

Judge Coughlin seeking redress for his other lawbreaking and willful violation of federal

constitutional rights not addressed by the current Superior Court mandamus/prohibition action.

V. DEPAMPHILIS ABSURD FEARMONGERING TACTICS:

The Recurring Firearms Theme

21. Christina DePamphilis’s 1/24/2019 Motion to extend the Stalking Order sets a new

record of falsity of absurdism, unsurprisingly. Since Paul Maravelias has never “stalked”

DePamphilis, such is her only possible course.

22. A few common themes of feminist-alarmist fearmongering have emerged throughout

the course of the DePamphilis family’s legal victimization of Paul Maravelias. One such absurd

theme has exploited firearms as a hot-button, emotional issue. She attempts to continue

assaulting Maravelias’s constitutional rights with these baseless dramatics which severely

damage her own credibility as follows.

23. The first memorable appearance of this theme, repeated in her 1/24/2019 Motion,

draws from an email Maravelias sent to his legal mentor on 12/10/2017. Mrs. Smith is a teacher

at Windham High School, Maravelias’s alma mater, who also runs the National Honor Society.

On 12/10/2017, Maravelias sent the following email to his law teacher informing her that

Christina DePamphilis, after committing perjury in this case and showcased her underage illegal

substance use/intoxication on her public social media, had violated the NHS constitution:

Mrs. Smith,

I write you coldly in your function as an employee of the Windham School District, for which I pay in taxes
and therefore demand accountability. In this message, I try to cast aside from my mind your role as one of the
most influential people in my life. This is a painful message for me to write.

21
9
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
With regards to your headship of the WHS National Honor Society chapter, I respectfully demand that
Christina DePamphilis be dismissed at once according to her rampant violation of Article IV, Section 1, Part
D of the NHS Constitution.

Christina is a delusional criminal who has committed felony Perjury (RSA 641:1) and misdemeanor False
Reports to Law Enforcement (RSA 641:4) at the behest of her abusive father David. She lied to a court to
obtain a “stalking” “protective” order against me in order to satiate her father’s vindictive lust to harass and
intimidate me with fraudulent legal abuse. As a result, I have lost my firearms with no due process
whatsoever. Even appearing at my own alma mater to give you Christmas chocolates would be an arrestable
offense.

Please see my attached criminal complaint PDF for proof of her crimes.

Christina is also an out-of-control abuser of alcohol and psychoactive substances. The attached PDF contains
proof for some of this, however if you need documentation on her addictive marijuana habits I shall happily
send further documentation.

Christina has also bullied and harassed me on her social media, engaging in slanderous criminal defamation
(RSA 644:11) that I am a “stalker” and openly middle-fingering me along with her father and 21-year-old
boyfriend in an attempt to provoke a disorderly response out of me (a violation of RSA 644:4, the
Harassment statute). Here is the link. The caption of this now-deleted post had identified me as recipient.

I cannot even begin to express in this one email the extent to which this psychotic criminal has broken the
law to destroy the young man which you, Mr. O’Connor, and all my other beloved mentors spent so much
effort building.

I have recently finished the manuscript for my new book about Mr. DePamphilis’s psychotic crusade of legal
abuse against me, “David the Liar”, wherein I analyze the numerous cultural, ethical, legal, and psychological
diseases which my story illuminates. I will send you a copy in January. I did a great job.

Please be welcomed to share any of this with your colleagues or contact me for further info regarding the
dismissal. Please do not relay this in any manner which could be construed an “indirect communication” to
Christina lest she and her vindictive father have me arrested.

It is an ongoing sore embarrassment to the National Honor Society that such a delinquent paragon of
dishonor has managed to fool her teachers into granting admittance thereunto.

Please follow-up with me when possible.

Kind regards, Paul Maravelias

24. When this private communication was illicitly intercepted by the Windham Police

Department and unfathomably forwarded to DePamphilis, she and Attorney Brown invented the

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following characterization, in varied form resembling: “Maravelias lamented to a public high

school that his firearms had been taken away from him”.

25. DePamphilis’s obsessive mischaracterization (of Maravelias noting the total

abrogation of due-process within this legal travesty) endeavors to capitalize on the loss of

innocent life in recent American public-school shootings to advance her deranged, abusive

crusade of defamatory retaliation against Maravelias through a falsified stalking order based on

nothing but her illegitimate, emotion-driven fearmongering tactics. This Court obviously should

not tolerate this disgusting behavior of the DePamphilis family and their unscrupulous attorney.

26. In her 1/24/2019 Motion, Christina DePamphilis’s fixation on her firearms-

fearmongering theme attains newfound levels of bizarre insanity. She complains about random

internet forum posters who purport to be firearms owners – strangers who could live thousands

of miles away – and apparently isn’t bothered to reveal that she has hacked into Maravelias’s

business’s private product support forum and kept stalking him thereon. She attributes verifiably

false statements to some of these forum posters, even mentioning an “AR-15” in a footnote,

although Paul Maravelias never owned such a firearm, nor has any idea who these internet

strangers are in real life.

27. Regardless of extension, this Court must dissolve the firearms prohibition against

Paul Maravelias – a safety-trained, licensed, responsible gun-owner, with no history of violence,

to whom Windham Police granted a discretionary concealed carry permit – for the reasons

explained in his pending 12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Order to Exclude Second-

Amendment-Protected Activity.

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VI. DEPAMPHILIS ABSURD FEARMONGERING TACTICS:
The Recurring “Driving/Vehicular Following” Theme

28. Another recurring theme in DePamphilis’s desperation to continue the legal abuse has

revolved around alleged incidents on the road which never in fact happened. This neurotic theme

had already appeared by the time of the winter 2018 Hearings wherein David DePamphilis

defended Paul Maravelias’s truthful stalking accusations against him. To wit, DePamphilis

complained to the Windham Police Department that Maravelias had been “following” Christina

in his vehicle at around 11:30pm on 1/20/18.

29. Maravelias submitted Google smartphone location history to the Windham Police

Department proving he had been at his house for over an hour before this alleged incident, and

remained domiciled until the following morning.

30. Even though the January 2018 DePamphilis vehicular “following” accusation against

Maravelias backfired and was proven to WPD as another one of DePamphilis’s brazen lies, these

perjurious antics have persisted into her 1/24/19 Motion, which even cites “10/23/18 at

approximately 7:00pm” as another alleged time when Maravelias “followed” Christina

DePamphilis.

31. Christina DePamphilis’s specious claims about being “followed” by Maravelias are

totally baseless and constitute criminal acts of fraud upon this Court.

VII. DEPAMPHILIS ABSURD FEARMONGERING TACTICS:

The Recurring “Lying Libeler Whines Falsely of Being Libeled” Theme

32. Christina DePamphilis has assaulted Paul Maravelias with a false restraining order

libeling Maravelias through a handful of claims subsequently shown totally false, hacked into his

online profiles to monitor and stalk his private communications, and then complained to this

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Court that Maravelias has dared to discuss her family’s unjust legal abuse against him with other

individuals in said private communications.

33. Christina DePamphilis and her attorney then foolishly whine that Maravelias has

libeled her, in a pathetic and psychologically disturbed attempt at reversing the facts of reality.

Clinically speaking, this conduct is consistent with various severe personality disorders.

34. For instance, Plaintiff’s Motion refers to Maravelias’s “libelous campaign concerning

Christina” (¶15). In reality, Paul Maravelias has defended his own reputation besieged by

DePamphilis’s unfettered “libel” against Maravelias. Maravelias has uploaded public court

documents in unaltered form to his webpage, many of them submitted by DePamphilis herself.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s 1/24/19 Motion offends the Court with the following lies, among others:

a. Christina DePamphilis falsely claims that Maravelias filed “baseless complaints”

with the police about her. In reality, in July 2018, Maravelias composed a rigorous
exposition and evidentiary proof packet documenting Christina DePamphilis’s
self-professed underage alcohol consumption as a 16-year-old, wild lies under
oath, self-contradicting statements, and libelous attacks against Maravelias.
Subsequent photographic and video evidence entered in the 2018 extension
hearings have completely debunked Christina DePamphilis’s libelous attacks.

b. Christina DePamphilis falsely states the willful lie that Maravelias submitted this
criminal complaint to the “Windham” and “Salem” police. While lying, she was
aware the complaint was sent only to the Derry Police Department. It is attached as
an exhibit on-file with this Court to Maravelias’s 7/14/2018 responsive pleading.

c. Christina DePamphilis falsely states the willful lie that “Maravelias has further
abused Christina and David DePamphilis by maintaining disparaging websites”,
listing three websites. Contrary to liar DePamphilis, two of the listed alleged
“websites” do not even exist, one being merely a domain name. One webpage,
davidtheliar.com, is not a “disparaging website” but a webpage for Maravelias’s
book. On said webpage, Maravelias uploads public court documents from this case

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 in which DePamphilis “disparages” Maravelias through acts of tortious and
criminal libel, “abusing” Paul Maravelias with false accusations of staking.

35. The DePamphilis actors stubbornly persist in portraying a nonexistent reality where

Maravelias has “libeled” Christina, even after Christina’s “libel” and wildly false accusations

have been disproven by troves of evidence. These include 1) her own testimony’s self-

contradictionsiv, 2) the 2013 video Maravelias’s sister took, 3) the contents of the 12/12/16 audio

recording, 4) Maravelias’s “photographs” and/or “social media images”, inter alia. This Court

cannot continue sponsoring such brazen falsification by failing to hold Christina DePamphilis

accountable for her documented abuse of process and perjury.

VIII. DEPAMPHILIS ABSURD FEARMONGERING TACTICS:

The Recurring “Collected/Maintained/Possessed Photos/Videos” Theme

36. One of the most bizarre strains of thematic absurdism by which DePamphilis and

Attorney Brown have continually maligned Maravelias is identified. To wit, this recurring theme

implements certain words (viz., “collected”, “possessed”, or “maintained”, most frequently) to

make it sound like Maravelias sits around all day looking at pictures or videos of David

DePamphilis’s chubby daughter on his “devices”, in response to whenever Paul Maravelias

submits photographic and/or video legal evidence in various court hearings and legal pleadings

to expose Christina DePamphilis’s shocking lies and extreme fabricated accusations.

37. One example occurred after Paul Maravelias introduced in court the 2013 Turkey

Trot cellphone video his sister happened to be taking at a November 2013 outdoor event.

Incidentally, it proved Christina DePamphilis dramatically lied about one key part of her stalking

petition written over three years after the videotaped exchange (See infra). After the

incriminating video exposed her lies, Attorney Brown wrote in a legal pleading that Maravelias

“made or possessed recordings of Christina without her knowledge since she was 12 years old”.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 38. As any non-psychotic person understands, Attorney Brown’s dramatized comment

maligning Maravelias, in reality, referred to Maravelias’s younger sister Deborah pulling-out her

iPhone at a public outdoor sporting event 5 years ago and taking a casual, random clip as might

any other normal 7th grader, and to the Maravelias family later recovering said video to

reproduce as a legal exhibit in court to combat DePamphilis’s criminal falsification.

39. Accordingly, the DePamphilis actors – having no actual stalking acts to complain of

in their cruel legal harassment against Paul Maravelias – necessarily stoop to this level of

misleading absurdism, desperately hoping to malign Maravelias even within his very acts of

proving Christina DePamphilis is a perjurious liar through said photo and video exhibits.

40. Another manifestation of this bizarre Kafkaesque theme occurred when Maravelias

indicated he was having the 2018 Hearing professionally videotaped, whereupon Christina

DePamphilis, by counsel, vehemently objected, hoping to spew her slanderous lies without being

videotaped. Persuading the Court to violate its own rule guaranteeing Maravelias’s right to video

every part of the Hearing, Attorney Brown proffered the nonsense that “[Maravelias] could

possess and retain footage of her which he could use for his own devices”. Crafted in poignant

Kafkaesque fashion, Attorney Brown’s subtle verbal antics have the effect of insinuating,

however indirectly, that Maravelias’s personal motivations in videotaping the accuser somehow

evidence a desire to view her [masculine] face. It is unsurprising that attention-seeker Christina

DePamphilis libels Maravelias with such deranged egotistical delusions, since she knows she

used to be attractive, and also knows Maravelias has lost all interest due to her subsequent

physical and moral degradation.

41. Embarrassingly, it is Christina DePamphilis who has “collected” and “possessed”

illicit photographic assets of Maravelias – privacy-violative images which were not consensually

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
shared – by obtaining photographs of his private bedroom and illegally entering them at the

6/8/18 Hearing, having advanced-noticed them nowhere in her 2018 Motion to Extend.

42. Plaintiff’s 1/24/19 Motion regurgitates this tiresome theme by falsely claiming

Maravelias “violated the order” by recovering an old screenshot proving she absolutely lied

about a particular incident in her stalking petition. It appears Paul Maravelias’s basic legal right

to defend himself intimidates Christina DePamphilis, especially where her own credibility is

destroyed by Maravelias’s various “social media images” she has attempted to censor.

43. It has been only through such illogical, patently unreasonable dramatization-

absurdism by which DePamphilis and her attorney have fooled this Court into continuing the

legal abuse against Maravelias with a false restraining order, and it must end.

IX. MARAVELIAS IS “OBSESSED” ONLY WITH THE RESTORATION OF HIS

BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

44. Perhaps the most embarrassing part of DePamphilis’s 1/24/19 attention-seeking

Motion appears where she reduces herself to asserting “Maravelias’s love obsession has turned

into a hate obsession”. Her own attorney previously acknowledged in April 2018 that Maravelias

does not have an “obsession”. But, ever the attention-seeker, Christina DePamphilis wishes to

fantasize she is the subject of an attractive older male’s “obsession” by legally abusing him.

45. Christina DePamphilis has gained a lot of weight since December 2016, when Paul

Maravelias asked her out. It has been basically years since he lost interest in her. Paul Maravelias

honestly could not even recognize her when seen in the Court parking lot on 5/3/18, she’s gotten

so large. (See T354) Extrapolating the trend, it is likely she has become even more unappealing

since the 6/8/2018 Hearing, the last time Maravelias saw her. Maravelias commented on that day

that “she deserves to be his girlfriend like Osama bin Laden deserves to be mayor of Manhattan”.

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(T357:14-16) As Judge Coughlin correctly put it before composing a shamefully dishonest

written order totally contradicting himself:

“it appears that you [talking to Paul Maravelias] do not want to have any contact and
that you’re going to do that on a voluntary basis.” (T479)

“you indicated that, you don’t want to have anything to do with the family, you don’t
want to have anything to do with this young woman, and you just want to be left alone
and you’re going to leave her alone. At least that’s my impression” (T480)

-Judge John J. Coughlin on 6/8/18, before libeling Maravelias 7-days later through a
shamefully dishonest Order self-contradicting his above accurate comments.

46. Maravelias clearly is not “obsessed” with someone who has nothing to offer him.

Perhaps Maravelias could become “obsessed” if David DePamphilis produces another daughter

who will be young and pretty enough for him, raises her properly, and doesn’t let her balloon-out

on excess of hormonal birth-control starting at age 15. But in the present circumstance,

Maravelias is only “obsessed” with ending the falsified defamatory legal abuse, this stalking

order, which the shameful feminist courts of New Hampshire have wrongfully enabled.

X. CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS’S NEUROTIC-TYPE, ACCUSATORY

PERSONALITY HAS INJURED OTHERS AND CAUSES REASONABLE
QUESTION ABOUT HER PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION

47. The parties used to be good friends. Maravelias’s sister goes to school with Christina

DePamphilis. Accordingly, Maravelias hears a lot about David DePamphilis’s troubled daughter.

The Effects of Christina DePamphilis’s Neurotic Personality on her Classmates

48. It appears Christina DePamphilis nowadays has no close friends. Upon information

and belief, absolutely all of the close friendships she used to have when she was younger have

invariably ended in the other person despising her, except where there is some quasi-family

relationship joining her parents and that of the nominal friend. The superficially identifiable

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
friends with whom she now associates in 12th grade are people she never used to be close friends

with, having burned all prior bridges.

49. Many of her former close friends have remarked to Maravelias or his sister about

Christina DePamphilis’s offensive, anti-social, neurotic-type personality – the same exact

psychological mechanism by which she continues to harass and victimize Paul Maravelias by

whining of non-existing grounds for a “stalking” restraining order.

50. For instance, Christina’s classmates have commented that she is “incapable of seeing

things other peoples’ way”, noting that it is “impossible to persuade her” that she is responsible

for her antisocial behaviors. Christina’s classmates have lamented that she “complains” to them

for allegedly not inviting her to social events, even though they would frequently begrudgingly

invite her, but she “is always too busy off [fornicating with] [expletive removed] her boyfriend”

instead. She then falsely accuses her peers of habitually excluding her, refusing to take

responsibility for her own conduct and its effect on her peers who have tried to tolerate her.

The Effects of Christina DePamphilis’s Victim-Delusional Neurosis on Paul Maravelias, his

Attacked Reputation, and his Abused Constitutional Rights

51. On 5/4/18, Christina DePamphilis testified she “has suspicions” Maravelias “flew a

remote-controlled surveillance drone” to her “bedroom window” during the stalking order.

(T171) Her basis was that, one night, she “was seeing lights in [her] window” around “12:30”

(T171), but when she “would open the window … nothing was there” (T172). She believed since

Maravelias “was the valedictorian” and “went to an Ivy League school” he could have been

“smart” enough to do this (T173,175), although she never saw any such flying device (T181).

She also checked to ensure Maravelias had not installed “very microscopic” “hidden cameras” in

her bedroom. (T194)

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 52. Christina DePamphilis confessed that Maravelias has never attempted to interact with

her since December 2016. (T27:18) Maravelias asked, “Please tell this Court the last time you

were stalked by me.” (T28:18-19) Christina memorably responded, “I continue to being [sic]

stalked every day.” (T28:20) Christina said she believes Maravelias making any in-public

comment she would consider defamatory is an instance of “stalking” her. (T34) Christina

clarified Maravelias’s third-party self-defensive speech-acts disagreeing with her stalking

accusations are themselves further acts of “stalking”, because he is “further talking about me

[her]”. (T58)

53. Concern for Christina DePamphilis’s mental condition was further heightened by her

reactions and comments after watching the 2013 Turkey Trot video when played in open court to

disprove her brazen lies.

54. She asserted Maravelias’s sister had said the words “will you come see him with me”

in the video she’d just watched. (T222) Maravelias corrected her, since his sister never spoke

those words (Video at 0:47), but Christina DePamphilis was so confident in her false, revisionist

memory that she challenged Maravelias, “you can replay it”. (T223) Maravelias later argued that

if she could “so extraordinarily contort and misremember something that she observed five

minutes prior, imagine, just imagine [her stalking accusations from up to] three years prior”.

(T343:1-9)

55. The telling Turkey Trot video elicited another indication of the teenage-girl-

Plaintiff’s capacity for creative, reconstructive memory. She was convinced Maravelias had

mentioned somewhere in the record he “had a friend” take the 2013 Turkey-Trot video, which

his sister incidentally happened to take. (T218,219) Maravelias later reminded he’d never said

anything like this anywhere, despite Christina DePamphilis’s steadfast certainty otherwise.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
(T341,342) When challenged to do so in Maravelias’s subsequent Supreme Court litigation,

Christina DePamphilis’s attorney failed to cite any part of the record which would indicate his

client Christina was not having symptoms of a psychosis delusional disorder with her “had a

friend”-comment false memory.

56. Nobody has a perfect memory, but psychologically healthy people do not have such

strikingly-specific false memories of which they are emphatically, emotively certain in Court.

XI. SIMON R. BROWN, ESQ., THE DEPAMPHILIS HENCHMAN- LAWYER:

A MASTER OF DECEPTION AND DISHONESTY

57. Maravelias attaches his 12/10/18 cease and desist letter (Exhibit B) to give this Court

a sense of Attorney Brown’s unmitigated spin-slandering, fact-tilting deception by which the

DePamphilis legal abuse has managed to come this far. This Court should not continue to

tolerate such misbehavior.

58. Attorney Brown has even invented libelous attacks against Maravelias which even his

expert slanderer clients never waged against Maravelias (e.g., calling Maravelias a likely sexual

assaulter in a Supreme Court brief). At other times, Simon has willfully mischaracterized facts

after being corrected and/or phrased facts in embarrassingly deceptive ways. See Exhibit B.

XII. PLAINTIFF’S IRRELEVANT, DISHONEST DIVERSIONS ON DAVID

DEPAMPHILIS

59. Plaintiff’s motion fixates upon irrelevant matters between Paul Maravelias and David

DePamphilis, validating Maravelias’s assertion to this Court that the instant stalking order exists

as part of David DePamphilis’s vindictive crusade to humiliate and legally abuse Paul

Maravelias, serving no other purpose. Maravelias identifies and exposes the falsehoods repeated

in these parts of Plaintiff’s Motion.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Christina DePamphilis’s False Claims about Maravelias’s Book Webpage and
Unwarranted Public Attacks against Maravelias’s Reputation

60. Plaintiff’s Motion complains of Maravelias webpage for his unpublished book, David

the Liar. On this web-page, Maravelias posts public legal documents and court updates regarding

this unfortunate case: DePamphilis’s continued bad-faith legal abuse against Maravelias.

61. Plaintiff’s Motion commits the following criminal acts of fraud upon the Court,

asserting falsely at Paragraph 14 as follows:

a. DePamphilis asserts, “[Maravelias] calls David a ‘Bi-Polar Criminal’ and ‘Sexual

Pervert’ on the Davidtheliar.com site”. This is a verifiable lie, as any person may
ascertain by going to davidtheliar.com and witnessing that the alleged text appears
nowhere, even though it would be a demonstrably true statement. Christina
DePamphilis should be arrested for making such willfully false claims in her motion.

b. DePamphilis asserts, “it appears that he has published the book as he posted the book
description on Google Books”. In reality, Paul Maravelias did not “publish” his book
nor any description thereof on Google Books, which is an automated search-engine-
generated website over which Maravelias has no direct control. Further, to extend a
destructive protective order because Paul Maravelias may or may not have exercised
free speech to publish a philosophy book is a deranged conundrum of feminist illogic.

c. DePamphilis asserts that Maravelias “posts the vile letter” on the website. In reality, it
is Christina DePamphilis herself who published this artifact in the public domain by
attaching it to her 1/5/18 Motion to Extend she filed in this Court. Maravelias simply
uploaded DePamphilis’s own defamatory legal-abuse motion accusing him, in its
entirety, in concessive fairness, so that the public can appreciate both sides of this
dispute. This unsurprisingly upsets DePamphilis, being the obvious false accuser.
DePamphilis now laughably complains that Maravelias has published her own
already-public court document that she herself submitted to harass and defame
Maravelias.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
David DePamphilis’s Stalking, Harassment, and Financial Extortion of Paul Maravelias

62. It is David DePamphilis and his family who have persecuted Paul Maravelias by

filing a frivolous Stalking Petition made in bad-faith, absent any true circumstance of stalking.

Plaintiff’s Motion is quick to remind that this biased, feminist Court forced Maravelias to pay

DePamphilis over $9,000 of attorney’s fees after Maravelias filed an honest and truthful Stalking

Petition against David DePamphilis – an award which the Supreme Court declined to reverse,

“[giving] enormous deference” to the trial court’s abusable discretion in such matters.

63. While assessing the honesty and fairness of this Court, the general public may

observe the following undeniable, evidence-corroborated facts from Maravelias’s said staking

case against David DePamphilisv:

a. David DePamphilis’s “senseless bullying” in December 2016 “caus[ing] [Maravelias]

mental anguish” by making telephone calls of such profanity and hostility to cause
Maravelias’s father Theodore to testify he “feared” for his son’s safety and felt
“threatened” (2017CV150Transcript166,182,205),
b. DePamphilis’s vulgar middle-finger social media post with his daughter against
Maravelias in June 2017, attempting to incite Maravelias to an unlawful response by
taunting him with her new boyfriend,
c. David DePamphilis’s profane 5/4/18 verbal explosion at Maravelias in the courtroom,
requiring Judge Coughlin to warn David DePamphilis by penalty of criminal
contempt, and
d. DePamphilis’s wild internet libel of Maravelias, calling Maravelias a “sexual
predator” himself or through a third party (2017CV150Transcript77), among many
other frightening acts.

64. Notwithstanding the above indisputable facts recorded within Paul Maravelias’s

stalking case against David DePamphilis, this Court nonetheless pronounced said petition as

“patently unreasonable” and granted a punitive fees award against an impecunious 22-year-old in

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
favor of his rich 49-year-old victimizer. This presents a clear picture to the New Hampshire

public of the extreme, irrefutable extent to which Judge Coughlin is wildly biased against

Maravelias, wont to screw-him-over legally every-which-way. Any average citizen reconciling

the above facts of the Maravelias v. DePamphilis case with this Court’s rulings thereon

appreciates the troubling level of blind feminist favoritism by which this restraining order case

against Maravelias has persisted, destroying the public’s faith in our misandrist judiciary.

Christina DePamphilis Falsely Cites Non-Existent Quotations From the Transcript in an

Attempt to Deceive this Court, While Making a Ridiculous Comparison Between
Maravelias’s Inquiry on Her Father David’s Known Criminal Acts and “Abuse” of David

65. Still discussing the Maravelias v. DePamphilis case, Plaintiff alleges in Paragraph 17

of her Motion that Paul Maravelias “alleged ‘rumors of sexual violence’ by David DePamphilis

against his son”, citing T429-431 of the Transcript in that case. The record proves Maravelias

never used the phrase “rumors of sexual violence”, which she falsely quotes, as it appears

nowhere in the cited transcript.

66. Maravelias’s cross-examination questions to David DePamphilis at this part of that

trial enjoyed an elaborate factual basis in Maravelias’s brother Luke’s personal knowledge of the

incidents. Further, Maravelias’s line of questioning was necessary and legally on-point to David

DePamphilis’s law-breaking propensity, a tendency Maravelias argued sustained his reasonable

fear of David. To wit, Maravelias knew that 1) DePamphilis had allowed an underage 15-year-

old boy, Jeremy Worden, to become intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness at David’s

Salisbury beach house in summer 2013, and that 2) David DePamphilis had once exposed his

testicles to his young son joking about their semblance to “bubble gum”. Since both of these acts

were unlawful, Maravelias’s appropriate cross-examination sought to establish that David

DePamphilis does not consider legality in his decision-making. Indeed, any ulterior purpose

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 solely to “embarrass” David, disconnected from legal relevancy, would have doubtlessly taken a

much different course, given the ample opportunity his homosexual son’s reputed conduct

affords. But Maravelias, in high-professionalism, limited his cross-examination to relevant

inquiry.

67. Maravelias had not only sound factual basis, but also thorough eye-witness

information, as Laurie DePamphilis had described the 2013 intoxicated, unconscious 15-year-old

situation to Maravelias’s sister, and as David’s son Nicolas had told Maravelias’s brother Luke

about the testicular incident. Therefore, by slandering Maravelias that he brought-up irrelevant,

frivolous content, Christina DePamphilis has only magnified scrutiny of these unlawful

infractions by her father, themselves of trivial severity when compared to his and her own

perjurious falsification crimes in this case.

XIII. THE REAL TRUTH FINALLY REVEALED:

THE EFFECTS OF DAVID DEPAMPHILIS’S ELDEST SON, NICOLAS
DEPAMPHILIS, AND RESENTFUL PATERNAL VINDICTIVENESS AS THE
REAL REASON FOR THIS WHOLE CASE SIN DALL’ INIZIO

68. For the benefit of the Court’s understanding, Maravelias is compelled to reveal

pertinent truths which have not heretofore appeared in the record, because of Maravelias’s

praiseworthy magnanimity.

69. On December 14th, 2016, when David DePamphilis and Paul Maravelias had their

second phone call after David’s verbally abusive outburst to Paul Maravelias on 12/12/16, David

DePamphilis began accusing Maravelias of “causing problems” within DePamphilis’s family

(Maravelias had invited DePamphilis’s daughter to dinner, then never spoke to her after the day

of the polite rejection). David DePamphilis was even more angry and vile towards Paul on 12/14

than on 12/12, after only two days of silence had passed.

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 70. David DePamphilis assured to Paul Maravelias that neither David, “[his] sister, or

[his] mother will ever accept you [Maravelias], ever, even if my daughter [David’s daughter

Christina] were ever to change her mind about you.” Before this comment, the single act

Maravelias had done since June 2016, when David and Paul were friendlily socializing at Paul’s

house, was to invite David’s daughter to dinner. That David DePamphilis bullied Paul

Maravelias with such cruel, bitter words two-days after their first phone call, with renewed

anger, proves beyond all doubt that David DePamphilis has been acting in an offended revenge-

crusade ever since that month. David’s own words indicate that his hostility towards Maravelias

is in excess of any plausible advocacy of his daughter’s interests; David’s cruel bullying of then-

recently-rejected Maravelias was to tell Maravelias he would “never accept him”, even if

David’s “daughter changed her mind”.

71. Maravelias immediately understood that internal stressors inside David’s family

formed the only possible explanation for David’s cruelty and bitter psychological terrorism.

72. In November 2015, DePamphilis’s eldest son Nicolas came-out to his parents as

bisexual and/or gay, revealing his recent liaisons with his boyfriend Jacob. His parents were

shocked and initially disgusted, and his mother Laurie banished him for the night to his aunt’s

house. Since that time, David DePamphilis – a man of traditional family rooting – has had to

tolerate his son’s new lifestyle, which includes his son publicly cross-dressing and showcasing

his occultist artwork on social media. Upon information and belief, David does not follow his

son on social media since his son came-out out as gay, but follows his wife and other two

children.

73. Maravelias’s brother Luke was best-friends with Nicolas for years prior to 2015, and

his sister Deborah was best-friends with Christina. David remarked that Luke “was like a son to

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
[him]”. David DePamphilis in recent years has watched the parallel adolescent trajectories of

Paul and Luke in comparison to Nicolas, and of Deborah in comparison to Christina.

74. David DePamphilis’s unabated stalking and legal persecution of Paul Maravelias

through a false “stalking” order proceeds from filial discontentment, bitterness, and resentfulness

– as well as an inability to appreciate the diversity of innate talents allocated to different children

by simple biological and/or environmental variation. Rather than appreciating his son’s laudable

natural talents in different aspects of life (e.g., social or artistic talent), David DePamphilis has

placed an unhealthy emphasis on educational achievement, “book-smarts”, or success as

measured by financial or business status.

75. Since David has internalized this definition of filial success and perceived that Paul

Maravelias’s accomplishments satisfy it, David’s inability to equally appreciate his own eldest

son’s different talents have generated a profoundly ungrateful attitude of resentfulness, despite

the vast blessings David DePamphilis enjoys in his privileged life even while striving to ruin

Maravelias’s. Maravelias’s incidental romantic invitation to David’s daughter on 12/12/16 – with

an expensive car nonetheless – happened to rub salt into David’s open psychological wound,

explaining why his uncontrolled anger moved him demonize Paul Maravelias, an innocent suitor,

and weeks later to conspire with his daughter to compose a stalking petition against Maravelias,

filled with nothing but extreme falsehoods and defamatory perjuries.

76. Seeing that his eldest son’s talents did not align to his unhealthily narrow definition of

masculine filial success as measured by moneymaking, David DePamphilis has unsurprisingly

transferred this set of masculinizing expectations onto his female daughter Christina, even from a

very young age. Psychologically, Christina DePamphilis has been raised if she were David’s

eldest son vicariously, explaining the lion’s share of her bold behaviors of drug/alcohol use and

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
sexual experimentation, as documented, beginning at the age of 15 or 16. David DePamphilis’s

attempts to impose the same set of masculine expectations he wished for his son (educational

achievement and independent financial success in business) are manifested in the present bad-

faith litigation against Maravelias; indeed, Plaintiff’s Motion itself is quite forward that it is

Maravelias’s public self-defensive speech decrying her lies and crimes which most upsets her

and her family. She openly commented while testifying in 2018 that she perceives Maravelias is

attempting to “ruin her chances” of “college” or having a “career” (Cf. Christina’s

“independency [sic]” comments from the 2018 Hearing), indicating an advanced state of feminist

psychosis, engendered by David DePamphilis’s perennial masculinizing projections she has

auto-internalized, incapacitating her ability to accept that she has legally abused Paul Maravelias

through acts of perjury and falsification and disparaged Maravelias’s First-Amendment-protected

free speech rights to publicize his own innocence by uploading public court documents to the

internet to combat her unlawful acts of libel and perjury traducing Paul Maravelias.

77. Accordingly, Christina DePamphilis has shown no remorse for her exposed fabricated

defamatory crusade against Maravelias’s reputation, blinded by her own pernicious self-

justification. She is psychologically incapable of showing any insight into the injurious effects of

her woeful falsification crimes have caused for Maravelias and his family.

78. These facts and circumstances appear to be easily discernible to all sensible adults

having a basic understanding of the situation. All of Paul Maravelias’s personal and professional

contacts continue to give him nothing but full support, entertaining at times deep discussions

contemplating the nature of David DePamphilis’s dishonorable and indeed illegal conduct. Many

adults’ faith in our judiciary has been destroyed by this Court’s previous dispensations towards

liar DePamphilis that this false, defamatory restraining order has ever seen the light of day.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 79. Accordingly, it shall be reputed a shameful act of cowardice if this Court extends this

“protective” order, which has been nothing but destructive for both parties – doubtlessly, even

more so for DePamphilis herself than for Maravelias, as she shall be forever remembered as a

perjuring, fornicating liar, because of the revealed facts at the 2018 Hearing alone.

80. Paul Maravelias has not pursued even small proportion of all the legal actions

available to him to redress the defamatory wrongs done in connection with this proven-false

restraining order. If it is extended again, his mercy will come to a decisive end.

81. Any sensible adult having a modicum of discernment or wisdom understands that this

legal abuse must finally come to an end, and that any continuation thereof will only guarantee a

heightened pointless waste of time, effort, and money by all sides.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 1/24/2019 Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of
Protection and vacate the Stalking Order, ending this case;

III. Hold a Hearing on this matter; and

IV. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,
th
January 28 , 2019
in propria persona

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 PAUL MARAVELIAS’S AFFIDAVIT CERTIFYING THE FOREGOING VERIFIED
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXTEND DURATION OF STALKING
FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE – COUNTY OF ROCKINGHAM

On this ___ day of January 2019, before me, _________________________, the undersigned
officer, personally appeared ________________________, known to me (or satisfactorily
proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged
that he/she executed the same for the purposes therein contained, who being by me first duly
sworn, on his oath, deposes and says:

All factual stipulations within the foregoing objection are true

and accurate to the best of my knowledge as of 1/28/2019.
[affiant’s statement of facts]

__________________________________
[signature of affiant]

Paul J. Maravelias
[typed name of affiant]

34 Mockingbird Hill Rd, Windham, NH 03087

[address of affiant]

In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and official seal.

____________________________________
Notary Public

My commission expires: ________________

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copies of the within Defendant’s First-Amended Verified
Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection and
Paul Maravelias’s Affidavit Certifying the Foregoing Verified Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection were forwarded on this day through
USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis,
P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

_______________________________

January 28th, 2019

i
Maravelias herein liberally reproduces content from his past legal pleadings and, in particular, his
11/1/2018 Supreme Court Appeal brief, which he invites the reader to examine at the following link:
https://goo.gl/p9KnDj
ii
Transcript references are to the consecutively-numbered transcripts, on-file with the Supreme Court, of
the May-June 2018 Hearings in this case for the first extension.
iii
The video uploaded the video to YouTube for this Court to access: https://youtu.be/EAawoOcFGVg
iv
Maravelias uploaded the recording of his entire 3.5+ hour cross-examination of the false accuser to
YouTube, as well as his 3+ hour testimony. However, sore DePamphilis claims in her Motion that
Maravelias uploaded only “parts that he liked”. This claim stands as another monument to her verifiable
falsity. The videographer’s uploaded tape includes, at times, Christina DePamphilis babbling-off for over
four minutes in deranged, defamatory diatribes having nothing to do with the question – and Maravelias,
being the falsely accused, was not hesitant to give her voice a fair and equal exposure in his uploading the
entire cross-examination, not just “parts he liked”. Maravelias is confident she only made an absolute fool
of herself while slandering him, as is evident by her and her attorney’s terrified hostility regarding
Maravelias’s conduct of publicizing her own accusations, either as spoken by her verbally in court or
written in legal pleadings by her attorney.
v
Despite these recorded facts from the Maravelias v. DePamphilis case addressing David DePamphilis’s
stalking and harassment of Maravelias, Plaintiff’s Motion refers to said petition as “meritless”. This
portrays Attorney Brown’s habitually meaningless and blind usage of such editorial adjectives, peppered-
into his pleadings abusing Maravelias wherever they might sound opportune, without any requisite
linkage to truth or reality whatsoever.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 EXHIBIT A
Paul Maravelias’s 12/23/2016 SMS text message to David DePamphilis, noting the “mental
anguish” David DePamphilis’s “senseless bullying” had caused Maravelias.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 EXHIBIT B

Simon R. Brown, Esq. December 10th, 2018

Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP
PO Box 1318 Paul Maravelias
Concord, NH 03302-1318 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087

VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST-CLASS MAIL

RE: New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct vis-à-vis

Representation in Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias, etc.

Dear Attorney Brown:

I write to remind you of certain New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct incumbent
upon you as a practicing attorney admitted to the New Hampshire Bar. At this point in time, it is
my intention solely to offer you a good-faith reminder of these rules and respectfully demand
your future compliance therewith.

I reference the following rules:

Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. …

Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and
comes to know if its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; …
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is
relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused;

Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.

2004 ABA Model Rule Comment

RULE 4.1 TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS

Misrepresentation

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s

behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms
a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations
can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are
the equivalent of affirmative false statements. For dishonest conduct that does not
amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the
course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

Statements of Fact

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 [2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should
be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a
claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed
principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid
criminal and tortuous misrepresentation.

Rule 8.4. Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly

assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; …
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
… or
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of
applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

With all due respect, some of your conduct in relation to these rules has been disturbing.
Since you are an intelligent person, I need not enumerate every single instance of your conduct
which would appear to violate these rules. Rather, I shall illuminate a few salient examples and
entrust the identification of similar acts to your imagination.

A. Groundless, Robotic Demands for Attorney’s Fees in Response to Lawful,

Necessary, and Legitimate Adversarial Conduct

The most recent manifestation of unprofessional conduct, doubtlessly the sine qua non of
this letter, has been your predictable plea for punitive attorney’s fees appended to nearly every
response to any and all pleadings I might enter into any ongoing case. This behavior has been
noted not only in the appellate cases, but also within the above-referenced Derry trial court case,
wherein I am not even the movant, but the defendant. My pleadings are completely legitimate
and necessitated by your client’s bad-faith, falsification-fueled legal pursuit of me; accordingly,
such requests are baseless. As I remember, the first instance of this behavior traces back to your
April 2018 response to my necessary, legally meritorious, and indeed correct Motion to Dismiss
and Vacate Stalking Order, on which the incompetent laughing-joke-of-a-court in Derry never
ruled.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 Most recently, you rehearsed such a petty prayer at the end of your objection to my Motion
for Recusal and Reconsideration, likewise a necessary, valid motion containing high-quality
argumentation, supported by a potpourri of uncontested facts, necessary to preserve fairness and
integrity in these proceedings.

You are aware that such requests for attorney’s fees are valid in response solely to frivolous
conduct, not to weighty legal arguments necessary for the defense of my basic rights and
property. Given the tyrannical acts of injustice the rogue Judge Coughlin will evidently do to me
upon an unsupported accusation of “bad-faith” conduct, I interpret your routinely unsuccessful
prayers for undue fees in this case as coercive threats against my financial property. I refuse to
cower to such threats which have as their object that I should surrender my legal self-defense,
allowing your client to traduce my good name and assault my constitutional rights without
opposition.

Abetting the pursuit of false, vindictive “stalking” restraining order litigation against an
innocent young man and then treating said defendant’s attempts at legal self-defense as
automatic “frivolous” behavior is gaslighting, not permissible attorney conduct. It is without any
legitimate purpose and is a continuation of the familiar gaslighting tactics waged against me by
your client. It differs from professional attorney conduct. In the latter, a lawyer focuses on
contesting the legal arguments proposed in the opponent’s pleadings. If you disagree with my
reasoned legal arguments, I welcome you to challenge them in your responsive pleadings.

By authority of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1, demand, thus, is made that you cease and
desist including such prayers for such relief in your pleadings, themselves frivolous, unless made
in response to truly “frivolous” conduct (e.g., conduct wherein the opposing party petitions the
Court to grant relief for which there is no arguable basis in the law). In contrast to frivolous
conduct, I exactingly cite the legal authorities by which I am entitled to the requested relief in all
my pleadings entered in either Court.

B. Willful and/or Negligent Mischaracterizations of Fact

Repeating your client’s testimony favorable to your position and falsely representing the
record are distinct practices. Moreover, repeating assertions later proven by tangible evidence to
have been complete falsehoods constitutes misconduct for two separate reasons: 1) because the
underlying representation comes to be known by you to be false, and 2) because it abets in the
continued commission of a crime (see RSA 641:1, 641:2, 641:3, and 173-B:3, IV.)

As a generic warning, Rules 3.3, 3.4, and 4.1 prohibit you from composing shockingly
partisan, incomplete, and frequently outright-dishonest Statement of Facts sections, such as those
found in both of your opposing briefs in the two appellate cases. Nearly every sentence you have

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
written in such sections presents a fact which I directly contradict somewhere in the record,
though you persistently neglect to present the opposing testimony. You have even asserted
unsupported facts within the questions-presented and argument headings of your briefs. Worse,
at times, my contradictions have taken the form of incontrovertible physical evidence seen and
understood by you. These examples would be the most likely to land you in hot water.

In general, I would refer you to the following excerpt from A Guide to Appellate Advocacy
in New Hampshire (Lisa Wolford, Esq. & Stephanie Hausman, Esq., 2014):

“It is not wise, however, to omit facts that are relevant but not helpful to your case,
because your opponent will invariably expose the omission. Similarly, it will not
help your case to mischaracterize or misstate the facts by presenting them in a manner
that unfairly favors your case or unfairly disfavors your opponent’s. To do so
compromises your credibility before the Court.”

I offer a few specific examples, starting with the lie about your client’s female child feeling
“scared” at a party at my house 5 years ago. Let us assume you believed the accusation from the
2016 stalking petition and had a reasonable good-faith belief that it was true. At the 5/3/18
Hearing, precisely at 1:25:48 in the recording (https://youtu.be/ErHhybEI_3w?t=5145), upon
your initial seeing my casual photograph from that same party, you witnessed the laughable
spectacle of how vastly contrary reality actually is compared to your client’s delusional and/or
perjurious representations thereof.

You made a smiling, laughing, tongue-in-cheek expression upon discovering yet another
indication of your clients’ rabid falsity, as if such revelations have become frequent sources of
entertainment for you, doubtlessly similar to unseen reactions you must have had to the Turkey
Trot video, to my parents’ letters revealing the exculpatory content of my audio recording, to
images of your client’s female daughter’s wild/licentious/intemperate behaviours, or to the June
2017 middle-fingers menagerie, inter alia. During cross, you attempted to twist my self-
defensive exposition of your client’s perjury somehow to your advantage by insinuating I was
“secretly taking photos” of your then “12-year-old” client. But the record reflects I contradicted
this, stating, “Without her knowledge? I had the camera right there. She can see that I’m take –
snapping pictures around my [own summer family] party [at my house].” (T449)

Despite knowing of the falsity of the underlying accusation, and despite knowing that the
photo was not “secret” or “surreptitious”, you went ahead and called it just that on Page 9 of
your opposing brief.

Similar characterizations repeating the now-documented perjury that I “approached”

David’s female child at the 2013 Turkey Trot, “made her scared”, and “wanted to walk with her”
are dangerous acts of misconduct for you, since you watched the video and observed the
incontrovertible proof of your clients’ extreme falsity, in that instance even ten-times more

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
severe than the 2013 party lie.2 Repeating the audio-recording-documented falsehood that
“Maravelias told her he would return when she was 18” on Page 10 of your brief, even when
your client admitted that I did not say those “direct” words (T95), and when I testified multiple
times to never saying this, is treading on thin ice.

At times, your false representations of fact wander into such territory of indefensible
exaggeration or distance from even the words of your own client that you open yourself to civil
defamation liability beyond the scope of the Professional Rules of Conduct. Examples include
“recruited his sister” (Page 9), insinuating the heretofore-unseen delusion that there was
“mediation” (Page 10) between my parents and your client in 2016 after your client’s female
child attended another party at my house, claiming-anew that there “had been no recent contact
[prior to 12/12/16]” (Page 10, see T276), attributing to me, baselessly, the attachment of “social
media posts” to a letter I did not write (Page 40), claiming that I “made or possessed recordings
of [David’s female child] without her knowledge since she was 12 years old” (Id.) (a reference to
my sister taking a video on her cell-phone of an outdoor sporting event), etc.

This conduct does not reflect upon the integrity of your profession, nor the diligence
expected by the Bar Association of all its practicing attorneys. The misrepresentation-conduct
mentioned above is merely the tip of an iceberg that is doubtlessly violative of the rules I have
cited.

You may in some cases retort, and it might possibly be, that honest human error caused
prejudicial misrepresentations which you objectively would have known were false, such as
inverting the temporal order of my 12/8/17 stalking petition against David DePamphilis and my
12/15/17 false, annulled arrest in the third paragraph of your 3/27/18 trial court pleading replying
to my objection, or telling the court first that you heard about my recording motion “five minutes
ago” (T6:9, in Maravelias v. DePamphilis), at “8:01am” that day (T12:9), then shortly thereafter
admitting that you were given telephonic notice the prior day (T12:11), where the timeliness of
notice was a material issue. Instances like these might actually concern honest human errors on
your part, although, combined with the larger portion of misrepresentation conduct which is
doubtlessly negligent and reckless, they are not helpful for you.

C. Unhinged Inventions of Baseless Calumnies Not Even Alleged by Your Client

As far as I can remember, your client’s female child has never been my “family or
household member”, nor my “current or former sexual or intimate partner” (thank God). I do not

2
You even claimed the video “depicted only the face of Maravelias’s sister” (Page 10), when the
Supreme Court was given the video and can see for themselves that both the face of your client’s
female child and myself appear in the video.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
recall anyone ever accusing me of “abuse” or bringing an RSA 173-B Domestic Violence
restraining order petition against me.

Despite this, you have persisted in libelous, patently unreasonable conduct, quoting RSA
173-B:5, I. on Page 41 of your opposing brief in a deceptive attempt to fool the Supreme Court
into equating putative acts of my third-party speech exposing your client’s female child’s
documented criminal, harassing, and bullying behavior against me with “abuse” of her. This
cowardly absurdism violates Professional Conduct Rules 3.1 and 3.3, and likely others. Your
misconduct is willful and reckless, as you had already libelously accused me of “abuse” in your
7/2/18 Motion to Criminalize Paul Maravelias Possessing a Computer Screenshot of My Client
Middle Fingering Him with Her 21 Year Old Boyfriend After She Lied About Having ‘Fear’ and
Got a False Stalking Order Against Him, and I had already corrected your, at best, groundless
legal error in my 7/5/18 objection (A164) by the time you renewed this libel months later on
11/21/18.

Even the “abuse” antics and the estopped, self-contradicting “obsession” sophistries do not,
of course, exceed in severity of misconduct the good old “likely sexual assaulter” dirt from last
year – an accusation likewise alleged nowhere in the record even by your expert slanderer client,
nor by his female child. I will not forget Mr. Samdperil’s outraged reaction to this pathetic
vituperation of yours against my august personal dignity. Indeed, two years have not elapsed
since this shameful act of unsupported misrepresentation somehow found its way into a legal
document bearing your signature, and, thus, bearing your entire professional reputation, itself in-
the-works for longer than I have been alive.

When are you not straining compliance with these rules, it is a true pleasure to litigate with
you. I am a great admirer of your courtroom personality. I have reciprocated your (outside-of-
legal-content) interpersonal gentility far more than your hurtful slander would warrant. I imagine
you have been increasingly frustrated throughout the course of representing David DePamphilis
and his female child in his legal pursuit of me. In fairness, your noticeable frustration is quite
understandable, given their subsequent reckless behaviors and now-documented falsity, of which
you could have had little knowledge in Spring 2017. I sympathize that they have made your job
quite difficult. I encourage you, however, not to permit this understandable, noticeable
frustration of yours negatively affect the professionalism of your conduct.

Kind regards,
Paul J. Maravelias

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

FIRST-AMENDED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
EXTEND DURATION OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

COMES NOW Defendant/Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within

First-Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Petitioner’s Motion

to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection. In support thereof, Defendant

Maravelias asserts the following:

1. On 1/24/2019, the DePamphilis family, by way of Christina DePamphilis

(“Petitioner”) and their attorney, motioned this Court to extend the restraining order to 2024. The

same day, this Court granted a preliminary extension. A Hearing will soon be held thereon.

2. Maravelias here repeats and incorporates by reference the points of fact and law pled

in his 1/15/19 Preliminary Objection to Petitioner’s Motion to Extend which necessitate

dismissal also of Plaintiff’s resubmitted 1/24/19 Motion to Extend.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 3. This Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend and vacate the Order for the

following further reasons.1 First, Petitioner’s Motion to Extend should be dismissed for failure to

state an actionable legal claim under the statute. Second, this Court has lost personal jurisdiction

over Maravelias since the 2018 Hearing was conducted after 30-days post-extension, in violation

of the statute. Third, this Court must dismiss regardless because of the reasons stipulated in

Maravelias’s ignored 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss (namely, the original stalking order is based off

a false accusation which did not appear in the petition). Fourth, this Court must dismiss

regardless because it again violated due-process by granting the 2018 extension based off

ridiculous privacy-violating photographs of Maravelias’s bedroom which were not advanced-

noticed neither in the extension motion nor at the first day of trial, but rather illegally surprised-

introduced at the 6/8/18 Hearing almost half-a-year post-extension-motion. Fifth, this Court must

dismiss anyways because RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is facially unconstitutional for overbreadth and

vagueness.

I. Petitioner’s Motion to Extend Should Be Dismissed for Failure to State an

Actionable Legal Claim Under the Statute

4. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. states in relevant part,

“Any order under this section shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year, but
may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the Petitioner, showing good cause,
with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the first order and thereafter
each extension may be for up to 5 years, upon the request of the Petitioner and at the
discretion of the court. The court shall review the order, and each renewal thereof and shall
grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the
Petitioner. A defendant shall have the right to a hearing on the extension of any order under
this paragraph to be held within 30 days of the extension. The court shall state in writing, at
the respondent's request, its reason or reasons for granting the extension.”

5. To warrant even preliminary extension, the Petitioner must allege that there is at least

some vague continuance of the “course of conduct” sustaining the original Order, which would

1
Maravelias herein partially reproduces content from his other/past legal pleadings, where appropriate.

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continue to jeopardize her safety. In other words, extensions of stalking orders cannot be usurped

as a method to punish non-violent, non-threatening, constitutionally protected speech-acts which

the Petitioner might find frustrating, but which are disconnected from any “stalking” that would

cause a reasonable person to fear for their physical safety.

6. The Petitioner’s Motion alleges all sorts of circumlocutive, defamatory drivel against

Maravelias which Maravelias disputes in the attached objection on the merits. As a matter of

law, however, none of these accusations amount to what is necessary to sustain a finding of

“good cause” to extend the order. If there were some evidence underlying DePamphilis’s

incomplete half-accusation that Maravelias “followed” her on 10/23/18, then perhaps there

would be good cause. But here, there is neither. The Petitioner presented a specious accusation

with zero corroborating proof, and even admits the police took accordingly no action.

7. Allowing a Petitioner to extend the restriction of another citizen’s constitutional

rights because of an unverified, specious accusations not even completely made (i.e., she does

not overtly claim Maravelias “followed” her to “Salisbury beach” in the summer, but

dramatically equivocates with passive-voice fearmongering, saying only “she was followed”,

insinuating but not saying it was Maravelias who followed) cannot be the dispensation of any

rational, law-abiding court.

8. Likewise, Petitioner’s complaints of a “hate obsession” are legally insufficient, even

if true, to sustain extension of the stalking order. Firstly, DePamphilis is estopped from making

this argument since her 2018 Motion did not assert it, because it is based on zero viable acts

which haven’t already been adjudicated (i.e., acts after the 6/8/18 Hearing), and because her own

attorney claimed Maravelias had a “previous obsession” in an April 2018 filing. Accordingly, the

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doctrines of judicial estoppel, collateral estoppel, and res judicata bar any claims pertaining to an

“obsession” as grounds to extend the order.

9. Secondly, even if Maravelias did, in fact, have a “hate obsession” towards the woman

who has abusively fabricated false accusations against him to obtain a frivolous stalking order

she has subsequently intently baited him to violate, neither could this possibly authorize

extension. Where Paul Maravelias is an honorable falsely accused citizen with no history of

actual or threatened violence, and thus where any “hate obsession” is not likely to precede any

criminal acts, his mere putative mental/emotive state (whether having a “hate obsession”, or not)

is insufficient to warrant the extension of a liberty-incapacitating stalking order. Put simply,

Maravelias would have every legal right to have what could be dramatized as a “hate obsession”

inside his brain towards his proven-liar false accuser – even though he has no such “obsession” –

and not continue to suffer deprivation of his liberty as a result of his freedom of thought to

experience certain understandable emotions.

10. The Petitioner’s newfound claim in her 1/24/2019 Motion that Maravelias “violated

the extension order” is without merit and does not enable this Court to find good cause for the

extension. She complains that Maravelias allegedly “violated” the order not because of any

actual stalking (e.g., unwanted contact, following, criminal threats, etc.)2, but because he

attached a photographic exhibit he stumbled upon in his records which proved how much of a

boldfaced liar she was regarding a particular aspect of her original stalking petition (to wit, the

2
The fact that Christina DePamphilis accuses Maravelias of violating the order because he submitted a
legal document to the Supreme Court during routine litigation, and not instead because he allegedly
followed her to “cheer practice” on 10/23/18, is proof that Christina DePamphilis’s specious accusation
about the 10/23/18 “following” was a knowingly false perjury. If she truly believed that Maravelias
“followed” her, this clearly would be have been a more persuasive basis on which to allege he “violated
the order”, rather than whining about Maravelias having exercised his free speech rights to engage in the
adversarial process to attached certain exhibits to a court document she found distasteful, because said
exhibits prove she is a total liar. This Court must not continue tolerating such a brazen, uncorrected liar.

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6/18/15 alleged incident). A Stalking Order cannot possibly forbid Paul Maravelias from

defending himself with social media images made public by the Petitioner and incidentally

encountered years-later for his legal self-defense; any interpretation of this Court’s tyrannical

Order otherwise is disparaging to the highest laws of the land and thereby invalidated, among

them Part I, Article 22 of the state constitution and the First Amendment to the federal

constitution.

11. This Court is invited to examine MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008). To

determine whether good cause exists, the trial court must assess whether the current conditions

are such that there is still concern for the safety and well-being of the Petitioner. Id. To do so, the

trial court should review the circumstances of the original stalking petition and any violation of

the order and consider any present and reasonable fear by the Petitioner. Id. Where the trial court

determines that the circumstances are such that, without a protective order, the Petitioner’s safety

and well-being would be in jeopardy, “good cause” warrants an extension. Id.

12. Here, there has been no violation of the order, and the circumstances of the

original order – irrefutably, a transitory romantic attraction by Maravelias to DePamphilis

– are completely non-existent today, with Maravelias having testified almost a year ago

how repulsed he is by Christina DePamphilis and, as Judge Coughlin rightly put it, that

Maravelias “wants nothing to do” with her and will “leave her alone” once he is left-alone:

that is, once this pernicious and unfair stalking order expires, and is not further extended

to appease the DePamphilis’s crusade of defamatory legal abuse against innocent

Maravelias.

II. This Court Shall Not Extend the Order Because It Has Lost Personal Jurisdiction
Over Maravelias By Violating the Statute’s 30-Days Post-Extension Hearing
Requirement

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 13. For the first extension, the Court granted Petitioner’s 1/5/18 Motion to Extend on

1/12/18, but did not schedule a Hearing until 2/15/18, 34 days after the extension.

14. Maravelias did not waive this issue on 2/15/18 since he was compelled to continue

with the Maravelias v. DePamphilis case that day in place of the extension Hearing in this case,

due to the imposing demands of Attorney Brown in a disorienting courtroom dialog between him

and Judge Coughlin where Maravelias was not given a full opportunity to be heard. Further,

Maravelias raised this issue in his 6/25/18 Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Coughlin

denied in one word, even though he was required by the case law to make specific findings

indicating the Court’s reasoning for the denial, as Maravelias raised this new issue in said

Motion. See Ross v. Ross, 172 A.3d 1069 (2017); Mortgage Specialists v. Davey, 153 N.H.

(2006)

15. Given the trial court’s illegal abrogation of Maravelias’s due-process “right” “to a

hearing on the extension of any order under this paragraph to be held within 30 days of the

extension” as mandated by RSA 633:3-a, III-c.., the subsequent stalking order extension is

invalid, and therefore, another extension cannot be granted. The Supreme Court was abundantly

clear in McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643 (2005) that dismissal of DV/Stalking petitions is the

required remedy when trial courts fail to obey statutory time-limit requirements. Such

requirements are compellingly necessary to provide defendants a baseline level of due-process

fairness where their basic liberties are at stake.

16. The error prejudiced Maravelias every-which-way: 1) the stalking order continued

restraining his constitutional rights without due-process, 2) the resultant moratorium granted

DePamphilis enough time to obsessively collect her pictures of Maravelias’s private bedroom,

illegally-relied-upon as advance-noticed nowhere in her 1/5/18 extension motion, entered only at

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the 6/8/18 Hearing almost half-a-year-thereafter (See infra), and 3) the DePamphilis actors were

enabled to usurp improperly the Maravelias v. DePamphilis hearing as an anti-Maravelias

slander-free-for-all regarding this case, biasing Judge Coughlin by the time he first heard this

matter.

17. “Where the legislature, out of liberty interest concerns, has mandated time limits for

holding hearings, we have held that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is lost, absent waiver,

if the case is not heard within the statutory period.” Id., quoting Appeal of Martino, 138 N.H.

612 (1994). The stalking statute is functionally identical to the domestic violence statute in

stipulating the court “shall” obey the time-limit. “Since these hearings are designed to protect a

defendant’s substantive rights, the court’s failure to hold them must result in dismissal of the

domestic violence petition.” McCarthy, ibid. Accordingly, this Court dismiss Petitioner’s Motion

for stalking order extension since the first extension was unlawful, and the Court has lost

personal jurisdiction over Maravelias.

III. This Court Must Dismiss This Case Because the Original Stalking Order is
Grounded Upon a Material Allegation Which Did Not Appear in The Petition

18. After two years since the original order, this issue has still never been adequately

adjudicated.

19. The Court’s finding of stalking in the original 2/7/16 Order relied upon a birthday

incident wherein the Defendant allegedly made two discomforting comments to Petitioner during

a romantic proposal: to wit, mentioning her “age of consent” and saying he would “be back when

she is 18” (Stephen, Robert in 473-2016-CV-00124 Final Order).

20. These accusations, which the Defendant alleges are false to begin with, appeared

nowhere in Petitioner’s 12/28/16 Stalking Petition. They were only entered circumventively by

Petitioner later in a 1/5/17 Hearing on her Stalking Petition.

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 21. New Hampshire Supreme Court mandated in South v. McCabe, 943 A.2d 779 (2008)

that findings of stalking be limited to only those facts alleged before the hearing within the

written petition, extending an identical existing rule for DV protection orders (See In the Matter

of Aldrich & Gauthier, 930 A.2d 393 (2007)) to stalking orders. In both cases, the appellate court

vacated a protective order which violated these rules in the same way the Petitioner’s Stalking

Order does in this case. In South, the Supreme Court held:

“We agree with the respondent that the holding of Aldrich & Gauthier is applicable to civil
stalking proceedings by operation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a … Thus, on remand, the trial court
should limit its findings to the factual allegations specifically recited in the stalking petition,
despite its admission of other unnoticed allegations at the hearing on the petition.”

22. In this case, the two aforecited alleged comments made by Defendant were

specifically relied upon in Justice Stephen’s finding of a stalking course of conduct. The entire

Stalking Order in this case is therefore predicated on a trial court’s finding of stalking made in

clear violation of established rules. Accordingly, the Order has been erroneous ab initio, even

absent any falsification of fact as Defendant claims.

23. Since this error has deprived the Defendant of his due process right to be notified of

the accusations against him before the Hearing, the Stalking Order is an artifact of judicial error.

Granting an extension on an order subsequently shown to have been granted erroneously

or illegally would necessarily reassert the same error.

24. RSA 633:3-a III-c. permits extension of such orders “as may be necessary to provide

for the safety and well-being of the Petitioner”. This legal standard for Stalking Order extension

differs from granting one initially as described in RSA 633:3-a I.; therefore, subjecting

Defendant to a different legal standard for Stalking Order extension predicated upon an

erroneous original finding of stalking would yet again violate due process rights and uphold a

plain legal error. Thus, if the Petitioner still wishes to accuse that there is cause to “fear” for her

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physical safety, the Maravelias deserves a fair, law-abiding trial on the original merits of a new

stalking petition. The Court may hear a new petition from the Petitioner, but the Court cannot

lawfully grant an extension on an order issued in clear violation of pertinent law as interpreted in

effectual Supreme Court rulings on stalking and domestic violence injunctions.

25. The Court did not rule upon Plaintiff’s 3/29/18 Motion to Dismiss nor addressed its

arguments anywhere. However, insofar as it indirectly denied it by granting the 2018 extension,

the Court has the authority to revisit an earlier ruling on a motion to dismiss if it becomes aware

that the ruling may be incorrect. See Route 12 Books Video v. Town of Troy, 149 N.H. 569, 575

(2003).

IV. This Court Must Dismiss Because It Violated Maravelias’s Due Process Rights by
Granting the First Extension Based Off Surprise Photographs Which Petitioner
Never Advance-Noticed in Her First Motion to Extend, but Instead Used to
Surprise-Ambush Maravelias At the Trial’s Final Day

26. The Court erred by relying upon Petitioner’s unnoticed surprise-photographs with

which she ambushed Maravelias on the hearing’s last-day to advance an unnoticed allegation of

“obsession”, in violation of RSA 173-B:3, I., applicable to stalking cases. Both that allegation

and the Maravelias-privacy-assaulting bedroom-photographs themselves were noticed nowhere

in Plaintiff’s extension motion.

27. Basic due-process requires that a Defendant be given advance notice of the

accusations and materials that will be used against him to adequately prepare a rebuttal case (a

right even specifically acknowledged by the statute, in DV/Stalking hearings). Since the Court

granted the 2018 extension on the basis of these two photographic exhibits which were

introduced almost half-a-year after the 1/5/18 Motion to Extend at the Hearing’s final day

(6/8/18), Maravelias’s rights were undeniably violated. Accordingly, this Court must not grant a

further extension predicated upon a wrongful extension.

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 V. This Court Must Dismiss Because RSA 633:3-A, III-C. Is Facially Unconstitutional
for Overbreadth and Vagueness

The “Safety and Well-Being” Language of 633:3-a, III-c. is Overbroad

28. RSA 633:3-a provides at III-c.,

“Any order … may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff,
showing good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the
first order and thereafter each extension may be for up to 5 years, upon the request of the
plaintiff and at the discretion of the court. The court shall review the order, and each renewal
thereof and shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-
being of the plaintiff. …”

29. Here, the statute can be reasonably interpreted to permit extension upon a showing of

“good-cause” that a plaintiff’s “well-being” primarily would be jeopardized without extending

the protective order, even if concern for “safety” is minimal. Any other reading is impossibly

tautological, as a threat to an individual’s “safety” is also a threat to their “well-being”. The

legislature could have omitted the word “well-being”, but intentionally appended it after

“safety”.

30. Neither RSA 633:3-a nor RSA 173-B define the term “well-being”; thus, dictionary

reference is appropriate. See Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic Dev., 163

N.H. 215,221 (2012). This Court ought to ascribe “the plain and ordinary meaning to regulatory

text”. Kenison v. Dubois, 152 N.H. 448,451,879 A.2d 1161 (2005). The Oxford English

Dictionary defines “well-being” as “the state of being comfortable, healthy or happy.”3

31. The state concerns the “fundamental right” of free speech, granting Maravelias

standing to propound a facial overbreadth challenge. See MacElman at 307.

32. Insofar as a New Hampshire court is allowed to find a defendant’s specifics acts of

protected speech have jeopardized the comfort, health, or happiness (“well-being”) or “safety” of

3
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/well-being

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a plaintiff and therefore grants the extension, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its

face in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and Part I,

Article 22 of the state constitution.

The Statute Regulates and Burdens Protected Speech

33. By operation of the “safety and well-being” language of 633:3-a, III-c., a trial court

may extend a stalking order on the basis of protected non-violent, non-threatening speech. Since

civil stalking orders criminalize possession of firearms and prohibit defendants from

communicating directly or indirectly to plaintiffs, the statute restricts constitutional rights.

Further, the stalking statute “implicates the fundamental right to freedom of movement”. State v.

Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003). “It hardly bears mentioning that a restraining order restrains one’s

liberty ... from a number of legal activities.” McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643,645 (2005). In

Maravelias’s case, the extended stalking order criminalizes appearing at his own and his sister’s

high school, as well as his legitimate automobile passage through one of only two roads

connecting his Windham neighborhood to the outer world. Though not a criminal prohibition,

the stalking statute undeniably burdened the exercise of Maravelias’s lawful speech through a

civil restraining order extension resultant of his lawful speech, as it does in general for all such

defendants.

34. The ambit of the federal First Amendment surpasses categorical prohibitions and

extends to such “statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment

rights.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Cf. State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. A.2d 1253

(2004) at 422-425, applying the same under the state constitution. In New Hampshire, “a statute

is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by means which invade areas of protected

freedom.” MacElman at 310. In the context of lawful-speech-related stalking order extension,

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633:3-a, III-c. burdens the exercise of protected freedoms. Cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.

Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), invalidating a law which

imposed merely a “financial disincentive” to certain speech, let alone a stalking order as

incapacitating as the one against Maravelias.

35. Since constitutionally protected, non-threatening speech to third-parties permits

extension under the statute, the statute is overbroad. Specifically, the language of the statute is

unconstitutionally overbroad because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s

interest in effecting the cessation of stalking, discussed infra.

The Statute Triggers Strict Scrutiny

36. “The amount of burden on speech needed to trigger First Amendment scrutiny as a

threshold matter is minimal.” American Legion Post 7 of Durham, N.C. v. City of Durham, 239

F.3d 601,607 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, Maravelias’s constitutional rights are manifoldly restricted

because of lawful speech. Every application of the statute, or at least a substantial number of

applications, is likely to produce a similar circumstance, where a Petitioner motions for

extension of a Stalking Order which has not been violated. This statutory scheme far-exceeds the

threshold of triggering constitutional scrutiny. As the statute implicates “fundamental rights”,

intermediate scrutiny in-the-least applies. Further, strict scrutiny is the only valid form review

here, since RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is content-based, discriminatory against a disfavored group, and

not viewpoint-neutral.

The Regulation is Content-Based

37. “The First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government

creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Sorrell v.

IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2664 (2011). “The First Amendment stands against attempts to

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disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speakers, which may be

a means to control content.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 882,883

(2010).

38. It is undeniable that the statute invites courts to evaluate whether a defendant’s public

or third-party speech-acts undermine a plaintiff’s “happiness” or “comfort” (“well-being”), and

is therefore content-based. For example, in the instant, if Maravelias had responded to Attorney

Brown on 11/2/17 saying, “in parting ways, I respect David’s daughter”, doubtlessly the

response would not have been used against Maravelias. Likewise, if Maravelias’s 12/10/17 email

to Mrs. Smith had been a generic salutation email mentioning, “I have some legal problems with

Ms. DePamphilis, but she’s still a great person”, then the ridiculous accusation of “following-up”

on a “threat” within WPD’s baseless charge could not have existed; the protected speech-acts to

third parties would be irrelevant to extension.

39. Therefore, the regulation is content-based, triggering strict scrutiny.

The Regulation Isolates Disfavored Speakers and is Not Viewpoint-Neutral

40. The regulation’s lack of content-neutrality closely resembles its lack of viewpoint-

neutrality. Again, the instant restraining order case is illustrative. Christina DePamphilis’s

obscene, incitative (unprotected4) middle-finger post directed to Maravelias entitled Maravelias

to no recourse under the statute, the same statute permitted Maravelias’s non-incitative-nor-

obscene (protected) speech in public or to third-parties to motivate stalking order extension.

Moreover, the statute’s viewpoint-discrimination afflicts a certain group (stalking order

defendants) doubtlessly “disfavored” by society. See Citizens United, ibid., applying strict-

scrutiny review to laws that “disfavors specific speakers”. See also Turner Broadcasting System,

4
Cf. O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (2012). “Raising the middle finger may constitute fighting
words or a true threat.” Id at 429.

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Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,658,114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). “Speaker-based laws

demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s ... aversion to what the disfavored

speakers have to say”. Id.

41. Because the “State Constitution provides at least as much protection as the Federal

Constitution”, strict-scrutiny-review is appropriate under both corpora of law. State v. Allard,

148 N.H. 702 A.2d 506,510 (2002).

The Statute Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny

42. Even content-neutral regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny must be “narrowly

tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels

for communication of the information”. Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (2014), citing Ward v. Rock

Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791 (1989). A statute fails intermediate scrutiny if burdening

“substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests”.

Ward at 799. Applying strict scrutiny, the governmental interest advanced must be not only

“significant”, but “compelling”.

Tailoring Analysis

43. Where the statute’s standard for stalking order extension atrociously exceeds the

government’s presumed interest in the “cessation of stalking” (See RSA 633:3-a, III-a.), it is

overinclusively not-narrowly-tailored. Although arguably intending to regulate unprotected (e.g.,

threatening) speech, “the overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning

unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the

process.” Ashcroft at 237. See also Doyle at 221, invalidating laws as facially overbroad under

Part I, Article 22 of the State Constitution where “a substantial number of its applications are

unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s] plainly legitimate sweep”.

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 44. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. permits trial courts to extend any stalking order where a plaintiff

testifies she’d feel “uncomfortable” or “unhappy” otherwise, since this alone shows by “good-

cause” that an extension would “provide for” her “state of being comfortable, happy, or healthy”

(the definition of “well-being”, supra). The language renders the facts of the case – a defendant’s

history of stalking, the level of expected unlawful future behavior, etc. – completely irrelevant

where a plaintiff’s mere “comfort” or “happiness” is served by granting extension.

45. The draconian statute disowns any realistic model of human psychology or sociology,

in which one person’s lawful third-party-or-public expressions might incidentally distress an

individual holding different views – even though the suppression of minor annoyance alone

triggers the dictionary definition of serving “well-being”. Negative social experiences disfavor

well-being. Rook, K.S. (1984)5 Seeing the word “no” alone triggers unhealthy, uncomfortable,

and unhappy neurotransmitters and hormones.6

46. The statute burdens a woefully latitudinous fetch of protected speech far beyond that

necessary to promote “a cessation of stalking”. A potential rebuttal pits the controlling context of

“safety” and the generic context of the statute against “well-being” as altogether constituting a

legal standard for extension higher than prevention of minor annoyance. But, such an

interpretation is tautologically illogical, since the legislature added the word “well-being” and,

thus, intently did not stop at “safety”. Regardless, such a reading would separately demonstrate

the statute’s unacceptable vagueness, discussed infra.

47. Separately, reasonable alternatives to the “safety and well-being” language which

would equally advance the counter-stalking governmental-interest evince the statute’s lack of

5
http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-25835-001
6
Newberg and Waldman, 2012 (https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/words-can-change-your-
brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world)

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narrow-tailoring. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62,74 (1990). The statute could

alternatively permit stalking order extension upon a good-cause-showing such would provide for

a plaintiff’s “safety” only, or, better-yet, “as is necessary to bring about a cessation of” (or

simply “prevent”) “stalking”, to mirror the language in subsection III-a. No possible

circumstance currently allowing extension would fail this more-narrowly-tailored test wherein

the governmental-interest involved is truly one of counter-stalking, rather than of silencing

annoying speech and effectively criminalizing a defendant’s self-defensive speech itself caused

by the stalking order, as in Maravelias’s case. Such a narrowly-tailored alternative would not

amount to the necessity of re-proving new acts of stalking or showing protective-order non-

compliance to obtain extension, since the “good-cause” standard already requires that the trial

court consider the underlying circumstantial provenance of the original stalking-order. See

MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6,10 (2008).

48. Rather, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. surreptitiously supplants the original-stalking-order legal

standard (III-a) with a patently absurd legal standard catering to “well-being” (III-c.), unrelated

to the narrow counter-stalking governmental-interest, when extension is concerned. Naturally,

therefore, the statute is also underinclusively not-narrowly-tailored. Statutes failing to restrict an

amount of harmful-to-the-governmental-interest speech comparable to the amount restricted are

not narrowly-tailored. See Showtime Entertainment, LLC v. Town of Mendon, 769 F.3d 61,73

(1st Cir. 2014); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,540 (1989). Here, if “safety and well-being”

actually is otherwise narrowly-tailored to serve the governmental-interest, then so should the

initial-stalking-order-issuance legal standard of III-a adopt the lower good-cause-provision-for-

“safety and well-being” standard, rather than the higher-burden, more-stringent standard

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currently within subsection III-a positively requiring “stalking” and granting relief only as

necessary “to bring about a cessation” thereof.

49. Instead, the illogical “safety and well-being” conundrum at III-c. radically

discriminates between groups of potentially indifferentiable stalking order defendants. III-c.

assaults the liberty-interests of extant defendants through a much-lower “well-being” legal

standard, while III-a coddles the liberty-interests of new defendants, even though the liberty-

restricting nature of the one-year injunction-at-hand remains identical both at III-a and III-c.

Though civil, this villainously contravenes the precepts of double-jeopardy. In fact, III-c. permits

further extensions “for up to 5 years”, despite imposing a far lower legal standard than III-a!

50. In failing to be narrowly-tailored, the statute also discriminates against stalking

victims. Why should the State expect legitimate stalking victims newly-seeking protective

injunction to sustain a much higher burden than those already granted a stalking order – for the

same one-year protection? If any difference in legal standard is appropriate between the two

groups, equity requires the reverse. This concern is exacerbated by New Hampshire trial courts’

“extending” stalking orders by III-c. – lawfully or unlawfully – months after their expiration. See

Stewart v. Murdock, (2015-0448). The overbroad language at III-c. creates an inequitable

advantage for prior-order-wielding plaintiffs and an indefensible disadvantage for prior-order-

subject defendants.

The Governmental Interest Served is not “Compelling”

51. The underinclusiveness aforementioned casts doubt on whether the statute’s

“proffered interest is truly forwarded by the regulation, or is in fact substantial enough to warrant

such regulation.” Showtime Entertainment, LLC, supra. That is, if the “safety and well-being”

standard were narrowly-tailored to the interest, the interest would be compelling enough to

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
warrant usage of the same legal standard for original-stalking-order-issuance at subsection III-a.

This suggests the governmental-interest served is not “compelling”, forming separate causal

grounds for failure of strict-scrutiny.

52. Furthermore, wherever the “well-being” language could possibly remain narrowly-

tailored to the governmental-interest, such interest could never be “significant”, and the statute

would fail intermediate scrutiny regardless. The presumed counter-stalking governmental-

interest motivating RSA 633:3-a might be “significant”, but the obsequiously-catering-to-the-

epicurean-“comfort”-and-“happiness”-of-a-plaintiff interest (the only interest to which “well-

being” is narrowly-tailored) surely is not.

Alternative Channels

53. Nor does the legal standard at III-c. appropriate any imaginable alternative manner a

defendant may dare disagree with a plaintiff’s stalking order within his public-or-third-party

communications without suffering greater likelihood of stalking order extension, where the

plaintiff’s “comfort” should be disturbed by knowing the defendant’s mere contrary opinion.

The “Safety and Well-Being” Language of 633:3-a, III-c. is Impermissibly Vague

54. “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if

it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what

conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000). Here, the language of RSA 633:3-a,

III-c. is unintelligible and so loosely constrained that arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement

thereof is inevitable. Not only is the term “well-being” too vague, but also the extent to which

the preceding term “safety” narrows or qualifies “well-being”.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 55. This vagueness is substantially likely, if not guaranteed, to complicate every stalking

order extension case brought before a New Hampshire trial court, regardless of the particular

facts of such cases. The statute provides zero guidance on how trial court judges should interpret

“well-being”, or on what conduct beyond threatening speech or actual violence would permit

extension not necessarily to serve a plaintiff’s “safety”, but rather their “well-being”.

Semantic Vagueness

56. The instant case offers an instructive example of the statute’s problematic vagueness.

Paul Maravelias lacks the intelligence to discern which behaviors are reasonably expected to

minimize chances of order extension. Whether he is simply to obey the order, avoiding/ignoring

the Plaintiff as he has, or must somehow appease her psychological “well-being” by tacitly

congratulating her felony-perjury-fueled legal abuse, is unclear.

57. For trial courts, the facial language of the statute creates even worse problems. One

judge might think a “well-being” order ridiculous and far in-excess-of the legislative counter-

stalking intent, calibrating his or her judgements to the statute’s broad “safety” context, even

applying ejusdem generis to constrain “well-being” thereby. However, another judge might

reject this interpretation, “safety and well-being” not being a list, and adopt the plain meaning of

the word “well-being” as this Court does on review.

Syntactic Vagueness

58. The statute is fraught with meaningful syntactic ambiguity between the co-possible

constructions “shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the (safety and well-

being)” and “… relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety, and (relief as may be

necessary to provide for the) well-being”. The former interpretation begets tautology, the latter

overbroad plaintiff-sycophancy. This tremendous interpretation-dependent leeway afforded trial

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
courts in applying subsection III-c. sponsors capricious, arbitrary extensions as perversely fact-

amnestic as John Coughlin’s against Maravelias in this case.

59. The comparable restraining order laws of no other US state discard the initial-

issuance-standard for something pointlessly different for extension, as does New Hampshire’s

unconstitutionally defective statute. For example, the analogous Massachusetts statute for

extension of Civil Harassment Orders (“stalking” orders do not exist), M.G.L. 258E §3(d), states

in relevant part that “the court [may extend] the [harassment] order … as it deems necessary to

protect the plaintiff from harassment.” Id. It does not switch the legal standard to something

different and overbroad when it concerns extension, requiring a “stalking course of conduct” for

an original order but only vague “interest in well-being” for subsequent extensions, as with the

defective New Hampshire statute. Cf. also 19-A M.R.S. 4007(2), the analogous Maine statute

controlling extension of DV protective orders following civil adjudications of “abuse”: “the court

may extend an order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it determines

necessary to protect the plaintiff … from abuse.”

60. For the foregoing reason, this Court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend and

vacate the stalking order because the relevant controlling statute is unconstitutionally overbroad

and void for vagueness on its face.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 1/24/2019 Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of
Protection and vacate the Stalking Order, ending this case;

III. Hold a Hearing on this matter; and

IV. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

January 28th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within First-Amended Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant’s Verified Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking
Final Order of Protection was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R.
Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH,
03302-1318.

_______________________________

January 28th, 2019

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21
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk January 15th, 2019
NH Circuit Court
Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane
Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Enclosed please find Defendant’s Preliminary Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend

Stalking Final Order of Protection for filing in the above-referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

72
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

EXTEND DURATION OF STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

NOW COMES Paul J. Maravelias (“Defendant”), in propria persona, and respectfully

petitions this Honorable Court to deny Plaintiff’s “Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final

Order of Protection” dated 1/11/19, and objects thereto. Maravelias will file a full Objection on

or before 1/21/2019, pursuant to Circuit Court – District Division Rules – Dist. Div. R. 3.8,

wherein he will respectfully demand a Hearing on any extension, pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

Defendant supports this preliminary objection with the following urgent procedural points:

1. While Defendant Maravelias is composing his full Objection, this Court may not act

upon Plaintiff’s 1/11/2019 Motion until at least 1/22/2019, once ten days after the Motion’s

docketing have elapsed. See Circuit Court – District Division Rules – Dist. Div. R. 3.8(B) and

1.8(D). The sheer volume of falsity in Plaintiff’s libelous Motion requires that Maravelias use

more of his rightful 10-day period, guaranteed by the Court’s rules, to compose a full Objection
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 73
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
informing the Court’s decision on whether “good cause” exists for a preliminary extension to

precede a hearing on the merits, or whether to deny Plaintiff’s Motion entirely, ending this case.

See RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (not granting extension and hearing automatically upon a plaintiff’s

request to extend, but rather requiring a “showing [of] good cause”, open to dispute by written

pleading of the Defendant, even for any preliminary pre-hearing extension). Plaintiff’s Motion

does not show good cause to extend. Defendant will develop this argument in his full Objection.

2. The stalking order, as it stands, does not expire until 2/5/19. Therefore, Plaintiff is not

prejudiced by Defendant’s demand herewith that he be afforded his complete 10 days until

1/21/19 to file a full Objection informing this Court’s decision whether to grant a preliminary

extension pending-subsequent-hearing, or to dismiss entirely without any hearing.

3. Last year, this Court violated Defendant Maravelias’s due process rights by granting the

preliminary extension on 1/12/2018 less than ten days after the Plaintiff’s first 1/5/2018 Motion

to Extend, before Maravelias had entered any Objection. As a preliminary matter of law, this

Court should dismiss this stalking petition in entirety because of that injurious error.

4. As another preliminary matter of procedural law, this Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s

1/11/19 Motion to Extend because she did not attempt to obtain concurrence with Defendant

prior to filing it, nor does she claim to have in her Motion. She therefore violated Circuit Court –

District Division Rules – Dist. Div. R. 1.8(C).1 This violation of the court rules prejudiced

Maravelias, since he was not expecting that Plaintiff’s malcontented bitterness was so great, she

would try to extend a stalking order she knows her own recent conduct has proven fraudulent.

5. Last year, prior to filing the 2018 extension, Plaintiff and counsel had obeyed this rule.

Here they have failed, striving to catch Maravelias off-guard and rushing him to compose his full

Objection without required advance notice that she would be filing for an extension.

1
“Any party filing a motion shall certify to the Court that a good faith attempt to obtain concurrence in
the relief sought has been made” Id.

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2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 6. “Upon the violation of any rule of court, the court may take such action as justice may

require. Such action may include, without limitation, the imposition of monetary sanctions

against either counsel or a party, which may include fines to be paid to the court, and reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs to be paid to the opposing party.” Circuit Court – District Division

Rules – Dist. Div. R. 1.2. Here, the appropriate remedy for Plaintiff’s violation of the good-faith

concurrence rule is simply to dismiss her Motion to Extend, especially as she is represented by

the same counsel who obeyed the rule last year and, thus, was willfully conscious thereof while

violating it now for unjust tactical advantage.

7. Further, as another preliminary matter of law, Circuit Court – District Division Rules –

Dist. Div. R. 1.8(B) bars this Court from granting any extension in response to Plaintiff’s 1/11/19

Motion insofar as said Motion is substantially grounded on its newly-alleged potpourri of

bizarre, neurotic facts appearing nowhere in the extant record on file. The rule provides in

relevant part, “the Court will not hear any motion grounded upon facts unless they are verified

by affidavit, or are apparent from the record or from the papers on file in the case, or are agreed

to and stated in writing signed by the parties or their attorneys”. Id.

8. Simply put, the Court cannot simultaneously obey its own rule and lawfully extend the

stalking order in response to such a Motion. In the least, the Court must dismiss-without-

prejudice the Motion to Extend and invite Plaintiff to rewrite it in a manner which does not orbit

around a ridiculous-seeming mescolanza of inadmissible new facts concerning internet speech by

strangers for strangers, Unidentified Driving Objects, friends-of-friends at Dunkin Donuts, and

hallucinogenic summertime beach-trips. The Court cannot lawfully grant the extension of an

Order restricting Maravelias’s constitutional rights in response to such a defective Motion.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, undersigned Defendant Paul J. Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable

Court:

I. Note Defendant’s preliminary Objection to Plaintiff’s 1/11/2019 Motion to Extend

the Stalking Order;

II. Not act to grant Plaintiff’s Motion until 1/22/2019, before which date Defendant
Maravelias will submit his full Objection asserting his right to a Hearing within 30
days of any extension of the Stalking Order granted pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, III-c.;

III. At any time, deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend and finally terminate this case in
entirety without any further hearings, as required by the preliminary matters of law
described hereinabove and as required by the legal errors noticed in the Superior
Court action commenced on this date seeking prerogative writs against this Court;

IV. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

_____________________________________ Dated: January 15th, 2019

Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305

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4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Preliminary Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion
to Extend Stalking Final Order of Protection was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified
Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box
1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

____________________________________

January 15th, 2019

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5
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 Pretil Portland, ME
Augusta, ME

Concord,NH
Simon R. Brown Boston, MA
sbrown@preti.com
603.410.1555 Washington, DC

January 24, 2019

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk

NH Circuit Court
10th Circuit — District Division — Derry
10 Courthouse Lane
Derry, NH 03038
RE: Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias
Docket No.473-2016-CV-124

Dear Clerk Pinelle:

I was informed that the Court denied without prejudice Ms. DePamphilis' initial motion
for an extension due to non-compliance with Rule 1.8 (B). In light of this ruling, enclosed please
find Petitioner's Verified Motion to Extend Duration ofStalking Final Order ofProtection for
filing in the above-referenced case.

Please note that the current Final Stalking Order of Protection expires on February 5,
2019. Accordingly, the Court's attention to this pleading is appreciated.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Simon R. Brown
SRB:as
Enclosure
cc: Paul Maravelias,pro se

Preti Flaherty
Beliveau & Pachios PLLP
Attorneys at Law
78
Shipping Address Only - No Mail Delivery: 57 North Main Street, Concord, NH 03301
Mailing Address:PO Box 1318, Concord, NH 03302-1318 Tel 603,410.1500 www.preti.com
13787586.1
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM,SS 10th CIRCUIT — DISTRICT DIVISION - DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

PLAINTIFF
' S VERIFIED MOTION TO EXTEND DURATION OF
STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

NOW COMES the Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis, by and through her attorneys, Preti,

Flaherty PLLP, and hereby moves this Court to extend the duration of the Stalking Order issued

against Paul Maravelias ("Maravelias"). In support ofthis Motion, Plaintiff states as follows:

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. In an Order dated February 7, 2017, after hearing testimony over three days, the

Salem Circuit Court (Stephen, J.) granted a Stalking Final Order of Protection against Paul

Maravelias.

2. After the Court issued the Final Order of Protection in February 2017, Maravelias

waged a campaign of harassment against Christina DePamphilis and her family, including but

not limited to:

a) aiding in the composition of a profane and vile letter to the Depamphilis family in
March 2017, libeling Christina's reputation.

b) sending a letter to Christina's legal counsel promising to "go nuclear and utterly
destroy (Christina's) academic and professional future..."

c) subsequently, on December 10, 2017, sending a defamatory e-mail to educators at

Christina's high school, lamenting that his firearms had been taken away and
again libeling Christina and seeking her removal from the National Honor
Society; and

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1 13786243.2
 d) despite requests to cease and desist, waging an on-line campaign of defamation
against Christina's father, offering online to provide a book to the public entitled
David The Liar.

3. In January 2018, Ms. DePamphilis moved to extend the Stalking Final Order of

Protection for a further year based in large part upon the conduct described above in 112.

4. In an Order dated June 15, 2018, after hearing testimony over three days, this

Court(Coughlin, J.) extended the Order for a further year, to February 5, 2019.

5. Maravelias appealed the Court's extension Order to the New Hampshire Supreme

Court. In an Order dated January 16, 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's Order. See

Supreme Court Order, attached as Exhibit A.

APPLICABLE LAW

6. Under RSA 633:3-A, III-c, a stalking order:

"may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing
good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the
first order and thereafter each extension may be for up to five years, upon the
request of the plaintiff and at the discretion of the court. The Court shall review
the order, and each renewal thereof, and shall grant such relief as may be
necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff."

RSA 633:3-a, III-c(emphasis added).

ARGUMENT

7. The Stalking Final Order of Protection issued by this Court continues to be

necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of Christina, an 18-year old high school

student.

8. Plaintiff first directs the Court's attention to its findings in June 2018:

Upon consideration of the testimony and numerous exhibits, the Court finds that
the Petitioner sustained her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
for 'good cause.' Further, the Court finds that the Petitionee composed or aided
in the composition of letters to the Petitioner's family (Petitioner's Exhibit 1); to
Attorney Brown (Petitioner's Exhibit 2); email to Petitioner's school (Petitioner's
Exhibit 3). Also, the Petitionee collected coke bottles with the Petitioner's name

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2 13786243.2
 and kept them in his room (Petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 6) and had duplicated
inspirational phrases on the wall of Petitioner's bedroom in his own bedroom
(Petitioner's Exhibits 7 and 8). That such letters, emails, coke bottles, and
duplicate inspirational phrases clearly demonstrate a strange, perverse and
unhealthy obsession by the Petitionee towards the Petitioner which appears to
have begun when the Petitioner was approximately 11-12 years old and the
Petitionee was approximately 17-18 years old and continues to this day. Further,
the Petitionee's behavior is without any legitimate purpose and for the sole
purpose of harassing and stalking the Petitioner. Further, the Petitioner has a
reasonable basis to fear for her personal safety and that of her family members
and does, in fact, so fear for her personal safety and that of her family members.

9. Good cause exists to further extend the Order. Defendant's conduct — expressed

substantially in court pleadings as well as other activity to be described below — continues to

demonstrate an "unhealthy obsession by (Maravelias) towards" Christina DePamphilis, meriting

extension of the Final Order of Protection for five years.

MARAVELIAS'CONDUCT

10. Maravelias has digressed from being love obsessed with Christina to hate

obsessed. At the first hearing in early 2017, Maravelias testified:

"And in summary, I love Chrissy. I love her more than David or Lori ever could,
and I shall continue to love her by showing my principled and chivalrous
willingness to let her be herself and make it her action, her initiation if she wants
to contact me." T 157-158.

1 1. Since a Stalking Order was issued in February 2017, however, Maravelias'

attitude changed dramatically, and his hostility towards Christina and her family has been

alarming.

Pleadings

12. Maravelias' hostility towards Christina is evidenced by his conduct at the first

extension hearing in 2018 and by pleadings filed in this court and the Supreme Court which have

attacked Christina's virtue through vile characterizations and sexually-charged rhetoric. The

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3 13786243.2
Supreme Court, for example, noted the following conduct by Maravelias during the first

extension hearing:

During his own testimony, the defendant referred to the plaintiff as a "delusional
criminal," a "slandering, dissolute criminal," a "perjuring, fornicating daughter," and a
"lying pig." He additionally testified that the plaintiff"deserved" to be called the terms
he had referred to her as in his November 2, 2017 letter to her attorney, such as "slut" and
"ugly and disreputable whore," that such language was "justified, merited, and
appropriate," and that he was happy that she had seen the letter. With respect
to his threat to "go nuclear and utterly destroy [the plaintiffs] academic and professional
future," the defendant testified that he "still [had not] made good
on [the] threat," but that if the court did not "give [him]justice" and he was "still branded
a stalker" after the hearing, he would "combat that on the internet, on YouTube." He
admitted to using login credentials of other persons to gain access to the plaintiffs social
media accounts and take "screenshots" from them, claiming that, even though the
plaintiff had not granted him access to the accounts, her "quasi-private" posts were
necessarily "public"....(Defendant also) referred to the minor, in open court, as a
"criminal," "fornicating daughter," and "lying pig," and insinuated that she was
intoxicated;...threatened, in open court, to publish the "troves of reputationally
damaging" images from the minor's social media accounts if the trial court extended the
order; and... admitted, in open court, that he is "very . . . preoccupied with what [the
minor] does."

Exhibit A (Supreme Court Order) at 7-8.

13. This alarming conduct creates reasonable concern about Maravelias' mental state

and his intentions.

Unwarranted Attacks Upon Christina's Reputation Through Cyber Stalking

and Other Actions

14. Following the e-mail to Windham High School educators in December 2017 (see

¶2(c)), Maravelias filed baseless complaints with several New Hampshire police departments,

accusing Christina and her father of criminal activity. Specifically, Maravelias:

a) filed criminal complaints against Christina with the Windham, Deny, and Salem
Police Departments;'

Maravelias also filed criminal complaints against David DePamphilis with the Windham and Salem
Police Departments.

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4 13786243.2
 b) posted these false complaints to police on his website, where they are displayed in
3rd position in a Google Search of Christina DePamphilis' name; and

c) likely is using search engine optimization to prioritize his links when one searches
Christina's name.

15. In addition, Maravelias video-recorded the extension hearing and posted the parts

he liked to YouTube under the name "NH Outrage." He also made disparaging comments about

David and Christina DePamphilis on those YouTube sites.

16. Maravelias has further abused Christina and David DePamphilis by maintaining

disparaging websites or webpages, Davidtheliar corn, daviddepamphilis.corn and, formerly,

failedfather.corn. He also wrote a disparaging book about David and Christina, offering to

distribute it to people free of charge. He also offered the same book to Christina's teachers in his

December 2017 e-mail. With respect to this book and his website:

a) Maravelias obtained ISBN #s for the book he wrote, and it appears that he has
published the book as he posted the book description on Google Books:
haps://books.google.com/books/about/David the Liar.html?id=FQgrswEACAAJ

b) The book's description of David DePamphilis references mental illness, criminal

defamation, and sexual deviancy.

c) Davidtheliar.com posts the vile letter referenced in ¶2(a), which includes

Christina's name, social media images potentially unlawfully obtained, and her
home address.

d) On his work website's forum page(www.wsv3.com) , Maravelias has encouraged

his customers who own guns to view Davidtheliarcorn, which is frightening to
Christina and her family.2

e) He calls David a "Bi-Polar Criminal" and "Sexual Pervert" on the

Davidtheliar.corn site.

17. Maravelias also has used his work website forums to further his libelous

campaign concerning Christina.

context of discussing this case, Maravelias announced in the forum that he owns two guns that
2 In the
were seized by law enforcement in connection with issuance ofthe Stalking Order. A customer then
discussed building an AR15 assault rifle for Maravelias.

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5 13786243.2
 18. As evidenced by his pleadings in this Court and the Supreme Court, Maravelias

continues submitting social media posts of Christina DePamphilis, despite the stalking order

prohibiting him from possessing such materials. This conduct demonstrates that he is tracking

Christina and her family through social media and other means. By possessing and submitting

Christina's social media posts, Maravelias is violating the terms of the stalking order and further

demonstrating his "unhealthy obsession" towards Christina, as noted previously by this Court.

Harassment of Christina, Her Family, and Their Friends

19. Maravelias has further harassed Christina's father, David DePamphilis, by filing a

meritless stalking petition against him in 2018. After yet another three-day hearing, this petition

was dismissed, and Mr. DePamphilis was awarded over $9,000 in attorney's fees because the

petition was found to be capricious, vexatious, patently unreasonable, and brought in bad faith.

This ruling was upheld by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in an order dated November 30,

2018. See Supreme Court Order, attached as Exhibit B.

20. In connection with the baseless petition, Maravelias tried to abuse Mr.

DePamphilis on the stand and through his pleadings. Specifically, without any basis, in the

petition, Maravelias alleged "rumors of sexual violence" by David DePamphilis against his son

and, during cross-examination - again without basis - Maravelias asked him if he had been

criminally convicted of sexually harassing his own child and whether he provided alcohol to a

juvenile male. T429-431. He also taunted Mr. DePamphilis at the hearing by gratuitously

referring to his daughter as a "wild girl," "an ugly and disreputable whore," a "sexually

experienced minor," and other lewd insults. See T 10, 26, 72, 125.

21. Maravelias' pursuit of the bad faith stalking petition was a further form of abuse

against Christina and her family, in violation of the Stalking Order.

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6 13786243.2
 22. Maravelias lives only 1/
1 2 miles from Christina in Windham. On October 23,

2018, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Maravelias followed Christina in his car as she was driving to

cheerleading practice. Christina called the Windham Police Department but elected not to

pursue a criminal complaint as she did not capture this conduct on camera.

23. Christina also was followed to Salisbury Beach, MA a few times in 2018 and had

to call her father for help.

24. As Maravelias often seems to appear on the road during her drives home from

school, Christina has been compelled to vary her driving routes to avoid contact with him.

25. David DePamphilis also has been followed to work on multiple occasions but did

not capture this activity on video and did not obtain the license plate numbers of the pursuing

vehicles.

26. Amy Anderson, a friend of the DePamphilis family, has attended most of the

hearings in support of Christina and David DePamphilis. The Andersons are the same family to

whom Maravelias sent a copy of the vile letter in March 2017 (see ¶2(a)) and a text message

disparaging David DePamphilis and falsely alleging that David was about to be removed from

his home by the Department of Health and Human Services for poor parenting. In an act of

apparent intimidation, on July 3, 2018, Maravelias recorded Mrs. Anderson's daughter and

family while they were at the Dunkin Donuts in Windham. Learning that she may be a witness

in this matter, Maravelias recently sent a letter to Mrs. Anderson concerning the incident at

Dunkin Donuts, posing discovery questions to her, setting a deadline for response, and

threatening to file a defamation suit against her if she did not comply with his deadline.

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7 13786243.2
 Further Violation of the Extendled Order

27. Finally, it is Plaintiff's position that Maravelias specifically violated the extension

order by possessing one of Christina's social media images (from Maravelias' high school

graduation) and introducing it in a Supreme Court pleading. That picture was not in any prior

legal pleadings and was maintained by Maravelias even after this Court added to its extension

Order the condition prohibiting possession of Christina's social media materials.

CONCLUSION

28. Since issuance of the original Stalking Order nearly two years ago, Mr.

Maravelias has taken no responsibility for his actions nor shown any insight concerning how his

conduct affects others and causes Christina to fear him. He persists in harassing Christina and

her family.

29. For the foregoing reasons, Christina DePamphilis continues to require the

protection afforded by the Stalking Final Order of Protection. She now requests a further five-

year extension of that Order, as authorized by RSA 633:3-A, III-c.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis

respectfully requests this Honorable Court to:

A. Extend the Stalking Final Order of Protection for a further five years (from

February 5, 2019 to February 2024); and

B. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

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8 137862432
 Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA DePAMPHILIS

By her attorneys,

PRETI,FLAHERTY,BELIVEAU &
PACHIOS,PLLP

Dated: January 24, 2019 By:

Simon R. Brown, NH Bar #9279
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302-1318
(603)410-1500

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of January 2019, I forwarded a copy of the foregoing
Verified Motion to Extend Duration ofStalking Final Order ofProtection to the pro se
Defendant.

Simon R. Brown

87
9 13786243.2
 VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

COUNTY OF

I, Christina DePamphilis, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the

allegations of the Verified Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, and

that they are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, based on my own personal

knowledge or on information supplied to me by others, which I believe to be true and correct.

Christina DePamphilis

Subscribed and sworn to th day ofd)/20/ before me.

otar ublic / Justice of the Peace

My mission Expires:

/ANGELA S. SNELL, Notary Public

My Commission Expires October 5, 2021

88
10 13786243.2
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0483, Christina DePamphilis v.Paul

Maravelias, the court on January 16, 2019, issued the following
order:

The plaintiffs motions to strike exhibits to the defendant's brief and reply
brief are granted in part and denied in part. Pages 197 to 221 of the appendix
to the defendant's brief and pages 1 to 23 of the appendix to the defendant's
reply brief are stricken because they consist of pleadings and documents that
were not submitted to the trial court in connection with the decisions that are
the subject matter of the present appeal, but were instead submitted in related
matters. See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1). The remaining relief requested by the plaintiff
in both motions is denied.

Having considered the briefs and those portions of the record that are
properly before us, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case.
See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Paul Maravelias, appeals orders of the Circuit Court

(Coughlin, J.), following a three-day evidentiary hearing, extending a civil
stalking final order of protection in favor of the plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis,
for one year, see RSA 633:3-a, III-c (Supp. 2018), and modifying the order's
terms. He argues that: (1) RSA 633:3-a, III-c is unconstitutional, both facially
and as applied; (2) the decision to extend the protective order was unsupported
by the evidence and an unsustainable exercise of discretion; (3) the trial court
allegedly violated due process by not timely holding the hearing under RSA
633:3-a, III-c, not permitting him to record video of the plaintiff during her
testimony, allowing the plaintiff to introduce certain photographs into evidence,
and allegedly "ignoring" his motion to dismiss; (4) the trial court was biased
against him; and (5) the trial court erred by modifying the protective order.

We address first the defendant's argument that the trial court failed to
timely holding the hearing. We note that, beyond his offhand reference to due
process, the defendant has not developed a due process argument with respect
to the timeliness of the hearing under RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Accordingly, any
such argument is waived. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003).

RSA 633:3-a, III-c provides a defendant with the right to a "hearing on

the extension" of a protective order "to be held within 30 days of the extension."
The record reflects that the plaintiff moved to extend the protective order on
January 5, 2018, that the trial court extended the protective order on January

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12, 2018, and that, following the defendant's objection, the court scheduled a
hearing for February 15, 2018. According to the plaintiff, however, that
hearing did not go forward on the motion to extend, but instead went forward,
without objection, on a separate stalking petition that the defendant had
brought against the plaintiff's father, David DePamphilis (DePamphilis). The
defendant asserts that he was not offered an opportunity to commence the
hearing on the motion to extend until February 20, 2018, an offer that he
apparently declined. The hearing ultimately went forward over the course of
three days, May 3, May 4, and June 8, 2018, and the trial court granted the
motion to extend on June 15, 2018. The defendant first raised his timeliness
objection in a motion for reconsideration filed on June 25, 2018.

When the legislature has mandated a time limit for the holding of a
hearing "out of liberty interest concerns," "personal jurisdiction over a
defendant is lost, absent waiver, if the case is not heard within the statutory
period." McCarthy v. Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643, 645 (2005)(emphasis added). In
McCarthy, we held that a trial court's failure to comply with the time limits for
temporary and final domestic violence protective order hearings required
dismissal of any temporary orders issued and of the petition, unless the
defendant was responsible for the delays. Id. at 646. The defendant argues
that, because the hearing in this case was not held within thirty days of
January 12, 2018, the trial court necessarily lacked personal jurisdiction over
him, and he is now entitled to have the protective order vacated.

It is well established, however, that by participating in the merits of a

proceeding without first objecting to the trial court's lack of personal
jurisdiction, a defendant consents, and thereby waives any objection, to the
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Compare Estate of Lunt v. Gaylor, 150
N.H. 96, 97-98 (2003)(defendant's motion to strike default based solely on
defective service of process did not address merits of the case so as to
constitute a waiver of personal jurisdiction), with Beggs v. Reading Company,
103 N.H. 156, 158 (1961)(defendant waived challenge to personal jurisdiction
by failing to timely move to dismiss and by participating in hearings relating to
merits of the case). Unlike the defendant in McCarthy, who moved to dismiss
the domestic violence petition at the hearing due to the trial court's failure to
timely hold it, see McCarthy, 152 N.H. at 644, the defendant here fully
participated in a merits hearing lasting three days and resulting in a transcript
nearly 500 pages in length, without once objecting on timeliness grounds.
Under these circumstances, even if we were to assume that a failure to timely
hold the hearing under RSA 633:3-a, III-c results in the loss of personal
jurisdiction, the defendant's participation in the hearing, without objecting on
timeliness grounds, amounted to his voluntary submission to the trial court's
jurisdiction and, thus, to the waiver of the timeliness requirement.

We next address the defendant's challenges to the merits of the trial

court's decision to extend the protective order. The trial court has discretion to

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extend a civil stalking final order of protection, initially for one year and
thereafter for periods of up to five years, if it finds "good cause" for the
requested extension. RSA 633:3-a, III-c; see MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H.
6, 9 (2008). In ruling on a motion to extend a protective order, the trial court is
required to "review the [protective] order, and each renewal thereof and . . . [to]
grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of
the plaintiff." RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

In MacPherson, we construed RSA 633:3-a, III-c to mean that "whether

`good cause' exists directly relates to the safety and well-being of the plaintiff."
MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. "Good cause" exists to extend a protective order,
we held, if "the trial court determines that the circumstances are such that,
without a protective order, the plaintiff's safety and well-being would be in
jeopardy." Id. In applying this standard, the trial court is required to assess
whether the current conditions are such that there is still concern for the
safety and well-being of the plaintiff, and in so doing, to review the
circumstances of the original petition and any violation of the protective order,
taking into account any present and reasonable fear by the plaintiff. Id.

"The trial court is in the best position to view the current circumstances,
as well as the defendant's prior acts, and determine whether an extension is
necessary for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff." Id. at 11. We will
uphold the trial court's findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary
support or are tainted by error of law, id. at 10, mindful that it is for the trial
court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented,
and that our role is not to determine whether we would have ruled differently,
but whether a reasonable person could have reached the same decision as the
trial court based upon the same evidence, Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780
(2003); see also MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 190 (2007).

At the outset, we note that the defendant, both on appeal and in the trial
court, has repeatedly attacked the initial protective order as based upon alleged
falsehoods testified to both by the plaintiff and DePamphilis. The protective
order is, however, a final judgment that we upheld following the defendant's
appeal of it. See DePamphilis v. Maravelias, No. 2017-0139, 2017 WL 3468651
(N.H. July 28, 2017). The defendant is, therefore, precluded from challenging
the trial court's determination that he stalked the plaintiff, or its findings of
fact in granting the initial protective order. See, e.g., Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H.
160, 164 (2010).

The record establishes that the initial stalking petition was precipitated
by the defendant's December 2016 attempted gift to the plaintiff, on her
sixteenth birthday when she was a high school sophomore and he was a
twenty-one-year-old college senior, of a new Maserati sports car, and by his
contemporaneous profession of "love" for her. In granting the protective order,

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the trial court found that the defendant had in fact been obsessed with the
plaintiff from the time she was only eleven years old. The trial court further
found that the defendant had referred to sixteen as the "age of consent," and
that when the plaintiff rejected the gift, he stated that he would continue to
wait for her and would be back when she turned eighteen. The trial court
observed that the defendant continued to profess his love for the plaintiff in his
testimony, and that his demeanor "demonstrated his obsession for the plaintiff,
including his constant communication directly to the plaintiff commenting on
her mannerisms and professing his love for her." The trial court found that the
defendant's "level of obsession and relentless pursuit of a girl beginning at the
age of 11 or 12 gives rise to reasonable fear." The protective order restrained
the defendant from stalking or abusing the plaintiff or her family members, or
from contacting her, directly or indirectly.

In March 2017, less than two months after the protective order had gone
into effect, DePamphilis received an anonymous letter purporting to have been
written by a "girl from Windham" who was a "friend" of the defendant. The
letter accused DePamphilis of allowing the plaintiff to have a "fling" and an
alleged sexual relationship with a twenty-year-old man with whom the
defendant had gone to high school. The letter contained graphic allegations
concerning the alleged sexual behavior and character of the alleged boyfriend,
referred to DePamphilis as a "warped a**hole," "derelict father," and a "total
f*cking liar," referred to the plaintiff's mother as DePamphilis's "EVIL B*TCH
wife" and "sh*t wife," and referred to the plaintiff as a "spoiled nice-girl-turned-
whore," a "whorish girl[]," a "sick bitch," and an "EVIL f*cking slut." By
contrast, the letter referred to the defendant as an "innocent gentleman," "the
only guy who truly loved" the plaintiff, and a person who had waited five years,
and had maintained his virginity, for the plaintiff.

The March 2017 letter expressed outrage that DePamphilis and the
plaintiff had allegedly lied to obtain the protective order, that as a result of the
order, the defendant's "property" had been seized by the police, and that the
plaintiff's alleged boyfriend was almost the same age as the defendant. The
letter additionally claimed that the defendant had an audio recording that
allegedly proved that DePamphilis and the plaintiff had lied, and accused the
plaintiff of successfully excluding that recording from evidence in the stalking
trial. The record in fact establishes that, at the hearing on the initial stalking
petition, the trial court excluded from evidence an audio recording that the
defendant had surreptitiously made of the birthday encounter with the plaintiff
on the basis that he had violated RSA 570-A:2 (Supp. 2018) in recording the
encounter. See RSA 570-A:6 (2001). The record further establishes that the
defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to violating RSA 570-A:2.

Finally, the March 2017 letter accused the plaintiff of consuming alcohol
with older men. Attached to the letter were photographs from the plaintiff's
social media accounts that, according to the letter, depicted the plaintiff with

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her alleged boyfriend, depicted the alleged boyfriend in the plaintiff's bedroom,
and depicted the plaintiff consuming alcohol. The letter "demand[ed]" that
DePamphilis "not share or communicate any part of [it] to anyone else."

At the hearing on the motion to extend the protective order, the

defendant claimed that he was not the March 2017 letter's author. He readily
admitted, however, that he had "aided" in its "composition," and that he had
been aware that it had been sent to DePamphilis at the plaintiff's home.
Moreover, he created a webpage with the address, "https://davidtheliar.com/,"
to which he linked pleadings that included a copy of the March 2017 letter.
When either the plaintiff's name or DePamphilis's name is entered into the
Google search engine, the webpage appears.

In April 2017, the Windham Police Department executed a search

warrant in connection with its investigation of the defendant's violation of RSA
570-A:2. During the search, police officers found, and photographed, several
soft drink bottles bearing the plaintiff's name that the defendant had lined up
on a desk. Police officers additionally found, and photographed, a scripted
quotation on the defendant's bedroom wall above his bed that matched an
identical quotation on the plaintiff's bedroom wall. During his testimony at the
hearing on the motion to extend the protective order, the defendant claimed
that he had placed the quotation on his bedroom wall merely as a "joke" for the
benefit of his sister, who had once been the plaintiff's "best friend," and he
admitted that the quotation had been there for some time prior to 2017.

On November 2, 2017, the defendant wrote a letter to counsel for the

plaintiff in response to a request to take down the "David the Liar" webpage. In
the November letter, the defendant referred to the plaintiff as "[t]he Windham-
gossip-object slut," "that ugly and disreputable whore," and a "pathetic 16
year-old delinquent," and asserted sexually-charged allegations concerning the
plaintiff and her alleged boyfriend similar in content and tone to the allegations
in the March 2017 letter. He further asserted that he "possess[ed] troves of
reputationally damaging information and assorted digital artifacts of
[DePamphilis's] family members which [he had] not shared," and threatened
that if DePamphilis pursued a defamation case against him, he would "go
nuclear and utterly destroy [the plaintiff's] academic and professional future by
publishing these embarrassing artifacts on the internet." At the hearing on the
motion to extend the protective order, the defendant testified that by this
statement, he was referring to "artifacts that [he possessed] from [the plaintiff's]
social media" accounts that, he claimed, put her in compromising positions.
The defendant readily admitted that, in collecting such artifacts, he was "very
. . . preoccupied with what [the plaintiff] does."

Approximately one month later, the defendant wrote an e-mail to four

teachers at the plaintiff's high school "demand[ing]" that she be dismissed from
the school's National Honor Society chapter. In the e-mail, the defendant

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accused the plaintiff of committing perjury at the hearing on her stalking
petition, causing him to lose his firearms, and claimed that she had engaged in
other crimes as well. He called the plaintiff "a delusional criminal," accused
her of being "an out-of-control abuser of alcohol and psychoactive substances,"
and stated that if the teachers "need[ed] documentation on [the plaintiff's]
addictive marijuana habits," he would "happily send further documentation."
He "welcomed" the sharing of the e-mail with others and invited the teachers to
"contact [him] for further info regarding the dismissal," but he requested that
the e-mail not be "relay[ed] . . . in any manner . . . to [the plaintiff] lest she and
her vindictive father have [him] arrested" for violating the protective order.

At the hearing on the motion to extend the protective order, the plaintiff
testified that she continued to fear the defendant because, despite the
existence of the protective order, he was attempting to harm her. She had
surmised that the defendant was behind the March 2017 letter because she
"could not fathom someone writing that other than" the defendant, and was
"scared of the anger and tone that was in th[e] letter." She further explained
that the defendant could not have obtained the photographs attached to the
March 2017 letter unless he had obtained nonpublic information about her
social media account, and that upon learning that the defendant was accessing
her social media photographs, she felt "[h]opeless," and as though she had lost
her "private life." The plaintiff felt intimidated by the defendant's threat to
publish "troves of reputationally damaging information and assorted digital
artifacts" concerning her, and was concerned that his obsession had gone
"from a love obsession to now a hate obsession." The defendant's attempt to
have the plaintiff expelled from the National Honor Society, she explained,
further caused her to "feel hopeless" because, if the defendant's claims were
believed, her "future could change because of him." She expressed fear "that
he would continue doing this for the rest of[her] life," testifying that he was
"taking everything [she had] built for [her]self and trying to tear it to pieces and
trying to have other people believe that as well." She expressed concern that,
in the absence of a protective order, the defendant would "go further than just
send letters to my school to try to get me kicked off the National Honor Society.
I believe he's going to try to ruin my chances of college, ruin my chances of
having a career, . . . or try[] to ruin relationships in the future." She observed
that "just with getting a boyfriend flipped a switch."

During his cross-examination of the plaintiff, the defendant introduced a

photograph and a video of the plaintiff that he had possessed from when she
was only twelve years old, both of which he claimed contradicted her
testimony. With respect to the photograph, the defendant suggested that it
showed her in a "flirtatious pose" with him, and that her leg was "scantily
clad." The plaintiff testified that she had not been aware at the time of the
picture or video that she was being photographed. At another point during the
plaintiff's cross-examination, the defendant implied, when he thought she had

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misunderstood a question, that she must have been intoxicated, drawing a
pointed reprimand from the trial court.

During his own testimony, the defendant referred to the plaintiff as a

"delusional criminal," a "slandering, dissolute criminal," a "perjuring,
fornicating daughter," and a "lying pig." He additionally testified that the
plaintiff "deserved" to be called the terms he had referred to her as in his
November 2, 2017 letter to her attorney, such as "slut" and "ugly and
disreputable whore," that such language was "justified, merited, and
appropriate," and that he was happy that she had seen the letter. With respect
to his threat to "go nuclear and utterly destroy [the plaintiffs] academic and
professional future," the defendant testified that he "still [had not] made good
on [the] threat," but that if the court did not "give [him]justice" and he was
"still branded a stalker" after the hearing, he would "combat that on the
internet, on YouTube." He admitted to using login credentials of other persons
to gain access to the plaintiff's social media accounts and take "screenshots"
from them, claiming that, even though the plaintiff had not granted him access
to the accounts, her "quasi-private" posts were necessarily "public."

In finding good cause for the extension, the trial court concluded that the
March 2017 letter that the defendant had aided in composing, the November 2,
2017 letter, the e-mail to the high school teachers, the soft drink bottles
bearing the plaintiffs name, and the scripted quotation on the defendant's
bedroom wall duplicating the quotation on the plaintiffs bedroom wall
"demonstrate[d] a strange, perverse and unhealthy obsession . . . that appears
to have begun when the [plaintiff] was approximately 11-12 years old . . . and
continues to this day." The trial court further found that the defendant's
conduct was "without any legitimate purpose and for the sole purpose of
harassing and stalking the [plaintiff]," that the plaintiff had a "reasonable basis
to fear for her personal safety and that of her family members," and that she
"does, in fact, so fear for her personal safety and that of her family members."

Upon this record, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact were
supported by the evidence. Viewed in the plaintiffs favor, the evidence
establishes that, after having been found to have stalked the plaintiff, a minor
who was still in high school, and after having been restrained from further
stalking her or members of her family, the defendant: (1) accessed the minor's
social media accounts, to which she had not granted him access, by using the
login credentials of other persons; (2) learned that the minor was in a
relationship with a man whom he knew, and believed that the relationship was
sexual in nature; (3) collected "troves" of digital images from the social media
accounts that he believed were "reputationally damaging";(4) "aided" in writing
a letter to the minor's father that accused the father of allowing the minor to
engage in a sexual relationship with an adult, accused the minor of being a
"whore" and a "slut" and engaging in underage drinking, and attached
photographs from the minor's "quasi-private" social media accounts; (5) wrote a

7
95
letter to the minor's attorney accusing the minor, in highly profane terms, of
having a sexual relationship with the adult, calling her a "slut" and
"disreputable whore," and threatening to publish, online, "troves of
reputationally damaging images" from her social media accounts; (6) wrote an
e-mail to teachers at the minor's high school accusing her of being a criminal,
engaging in underage drinking, and abusing drugs, offering to share evidence
of her drug use, demanding that she be expelled from the National Honor
Society, and encouraging the teachers to share the e-mail with other teachers;
(7) created a webpage, to which a "Google" search of the minor's name directs,
on which he linked digital images of the letters and e-mail;(8) referred to the
minor, in open court, as a "criminal," "fornicating daughter," and "lying pig,"
and insinuated that she was intoxicated; (9) threatened, in open court, to
publish the "troves of reputationally damaging" images from the minor's social
media accounts if the trial court extended the order; and (10) admitted, in open
court, that he is "very . . . preoccupied with what [the minor] does."

Based upon this course of conduct, the trial court reasonably found that
the defendant's "sole purpose" in writing, or aiding in writing, the letters and e-
mail was to further stalk and harass the plaintiff. Cf. State v. Craig, 167 N.H.
361, 377 (2015)(finding that by posting statements to his own Facebook page
directed to the victim under circumstances in which he knew the victim was
likely to view the statements, the defendant had indirectly contacted the victim
in violation of restraining order). Moreover, in view of the fact that the
defendant engaged in this conduct while already subject to a court order
specifically restraining him from stalking or abusing the plaintiff or members of
her family, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff has a "reasonable basis to
fear for her personal safety and that of her family members" is likewise
reasonable. Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably could have
determined that, without a protective order, the plaintiff's safety and well-being
would be in jeopardy. MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. Accordingly, the trial
court's determination that good cause exists to extend the protective order was
neither lacking in evidentiary support nor tainted by error of law, and its
decision to extend the order was well within its discretion. Id.

We next address the defendant's constitutional challenges to RSA 633:3-

a, III-c. The defendant argues that the "safety and well-being" language of RSA
633:3-a, III-c is facially overbroad and unconstitutional as applied to him for
purposes of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Part I,
Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Specifically, he argues that the
term "well-being" is significantly broader than "safety," and may encompass a
person's state of comfort, health, or happiness. He further argues that
protecting a stalking victim's "well-being," in this context, may implicate a
stalking defendant's constitutionally-protected speech, and that because, he
claims, the March 2017 letter, the November 2, 2017 letter, and the e-mail to
the plaintiff's high school teachers each contained or constituted his protected
speech, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad both facially and as applied

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96
to him. He further argues that the phrase "safety and well-being" is
"unintelligible" and "so loosely constrained" as to invite "arbitrary,
discriminatory enforcement" and, thus, that it is unconstitutionally vague. The
plaintiff counters, in part, that these arguments are not preserved.

It is the defendant's burden, as the appealing party, to establish that he

preserved his appellate arguments. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151
N.H. 248, 250 (2004). The purpose of the preservation requirement is to afford
the trial court an opportunity to address the arguments and correct any errors
it may have made before the arguments are presented for appellate review.
State v. Mouser, 168 N.H. 19, 26 (2015). An appealing party does not satisfy
this burden merely by raising an issue generally in the trial court, and then
developing on appeal an entirely new argument in support of that issue that
the appealing party did not develop in the trial court. See id. at 26-28.

To prevail on a facial challenge to a statute on free speech grounds under

the State or Federal Constitution, the defendant must establish that either: (1)
no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid; or (2) a
substantial number of the statute's applications are unconstitutional in
relation to its plainly legitimate sweep. Doyle v. Comm' r, N.H. Dep't of
Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215, 220-21 (2012). To establish that a
statute is unconstitutionally vague, the defendant must show that it either: (1)
fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand what it prohibits; or (2) authorizes or encourages arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 11.

In this case, on multiple occasions at trial, the defendant took the

position that the conduct identified in the plaintiff's motion to extend the
protective order could not serve as the basis for extending the order because it
constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. During his closing
argument, the trial court asked the defendant to "reconcile [his] claim for
protected speech versus the stalking statute." In his motion for
reconsideration, the defendant argued that the trial court had "VIOLATE[D]
[HIS] STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SINCE IT RELIE[D]
UPON HIS TWO ACTS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED, LAWFUL
SPEECH," namely, the November 2, 2017 letter to the plaintiff's attorney, and
the e-mail to the plaintiff's high school teachers.

Although the defendant also asserted in his motion for reconsideration

that "THE STALKING STATUTE IS FACIALLY INVALID AND/OR INVALID AS
APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE STATUTORY OVERBREADTH AND/OR
VAGUENESS DOCTRINES, AS THE COURT BASELESSLY FOUND LAWFUL
SPEECH TO THIRD PARTIES TO CAUSE'REASONABLE FEAR'AND
THREATEN [THE PLAINTIFF'S]'SAFETY AND WELL-BEING,"' he did not
develop these arguments in the trial court. Indeed, the defendant did not
identify which language in the statute he believed to be vague, proffer his

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interpretation of"safety and well-being" that serves as the foundation for his
constitutional arguments in his brief, or otherwise argue how the statute was
overbroad or vague. In contrast to the single passing reference to the
"statutory overbreadth and/or vagueness doctrines" in his motion for
reconsideration, the defendant's constitutional arguments on appeal consist of
fourteen pages of statutory and constitutional analysis.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that the defendant's facial-

overbreadth and void-for-vagueness arguments are not preserved. By failing to
develop these arguments, either factually or legally, in the trial court, the
defendant effectively deprived the trial court of an opportunity to correct its
alleged error in the first instance. See Mouser, 168 N.H. at 28; cf. State v.
Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 81 (1986)(Batchelder, J., concurring)(observing that
"[a]dvocacy consists of something more than citation or incantation," and that
"mere passing reference to an issue does not suffice to present that issue for
appellate adjudication").

We agree with the defendant, however, that by arguing at trial that the
conduct identified in the motion to extend the protective order — the March
2017 letter, the November 2, 2017 letter, and the e-mail to the high school
teachers — constituted protected speech for which the protective order could
not be extended, the defendant effectively raised an as-applied challenge.
Moreover, the trial court's request that the defendant "reconcile [his] claim for
protected speech versus the stalking statute" demonstrates that the trial court
understood the defendant to be arguing that RSA 633:3-a, III-c could not be
applied to the conduct identified in the motion to extend the protective order
consistent with his free speech rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the
defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge to RSA 633:3-a, III-c, at least
insofar as he argues that his conduct constituted protected speech, is
preserved. See State v. Wilson, 169 N.H. 755, 768-70 (2017)(finding that
ambiguous arguments in trial court preserved as-applied vagueness challenge,
but not facial vagueness challenge). We first address the argument under the
State Constitution and rely on case law interpreting the Federal Constitution
only to aid in our analysis. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).

Not all speech is constitutionally-protected. See, e.g., Beauharnais v.

Illinois, 343 N.H. 250, 266 (1952). "When . . . an individual speaks to another
person, whether through telephonic or other electronic means, not to
communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives, that conduct is not speech
protected by the First Amendment." Childs v. Ballou, 148 A.3d 291, 297(Me.
2017)(quotation omitted). A defendant "has no First Amendment right to
inflict unwanted and harassing contact on another person." State v. Mott, 692
A.2d 360, 365 (Vt. 1997). This is particularly the case when the defendant has
already been found to have stalked the other person, and ordered not to stalk
that person further. See State v. Heffron, 190 A.3d 232, 236 (Me. 2018);
Childs, 148 A.3d at 297; Mott, 692 A.2d at 365.

98
10
 In this case, the trial court supportably found, as discussed above, that
the defendant either aided in writing or wrote the March 2017 letter, the
November 2, 2017 letter, and the e-mail to the high school teachers "for the
sole purpose of harassing and stalking the [plaintiff]." Under these
circumstances, the letters and e-mail in question did not amount to protected
speech for purposes of Part I, Article 22 of the State Constitution. See, e.g.,
Heffron, 190 A.3d at 236 (ruling that posts to defendant's Facebook page
directed at person protected by a protective order violated the order and, thus,
were not constitutionally protected); Childs, 148 A.3d at 299 (finding no First
Amendment violation in the extension of a protective order based in part upon
the defendant's repeated requests that the police conduct "well-being checks"
on his child when the trial court found that such requests amounted to
stalking of the child's mother in violation of the protective order). Because the
Federal Constitution provides the defendant with no greater protection than
does the State Constitution under these circumstances, see Childs, 148 A.3d at
299, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution.

Each of the defendant's remaining arguments is not sufficiently

developed to warrant further review. See Blackmer, 149 N.H. at 49. We note,
however, that to the extent the defendant suggests that he had an absolute
right to record video of the plaintiff under District Division Rule 1.4, Rule 1.4
contemplates that the trial court may limit a party's ability to record the
proceedings. See Dist. Div. R. 1.4(f); see also Dist. Div. R. 1.1 (trial court may
waive application of any rule for good cause and as justice may require). Here,
the trial court was well within its discretion to prohibit the defendant from
recording video images of the minor victim of his stalking, about whom he had
already threatened to publish "troves of reputationally damaging information
and assorted digital artifacts" online.

We further note that, to the extent the defendant argues that the trial
court was biased, we have reviewed the record in this case, and can find no
basis upon which a reasonable person would have questioned Judge
Coughlin's impartiality, or any evidence that any of the factors that would have
per se disqualified Judge Coughlin was present. See State v. Bader, 148 N.H.
265, 268-71 (2002). The mere fact that the trial court issued decisions that
were adverse to the defendant does not establish judicial bias. See id. at 271.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

99
11
Distribution:
10th N.H. Circuit Court - Derry District Division, 473-2016-CV-00124
Honorable John J. Coughlin
Honorable David D. King
Mr. Paul Maravelias
Simon R. Brown, Esq.
Attorney General
Tim Gudas, Supreme Court
Allison Cook, Supreme Court
File

100
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Maravelias testimony against accuser (Christina DePamphilis v. Paul

Maravelias)
572 views

NH Outrage
' •ii ! SUBSCRIBE 3

102
 [David DePamphilis's daughter] vs. Paul Maravelias
5/4/18 and 6/8/18
iittp://davidtheliar.com/MaraveliasMot.

2 Comments aiP•I" BV

45 Who Knows 5 months ago (edited)

Creepy...she was 12 dude...wait did he say he collected things for her with her name on
hmmmmmm now that is coming to close...though she shouldn't have put the
middle finger post up..that was provoking...I would have never communicated anything
definitely not a indirect post "just for you"....the probably felt happy...that's like poking a
sleeping snake ....he truly has something wrong ...he doesn't get it all the way..she doesn't
want to talk to you so move on..you wasted 100k on a little girl. Nasty
Show less
REPLY

Hide replies ,•

5 months ago (edited)

I am sorry but you are totally ignorant. The false accuser girl was 16, NOT "12", when a
respectful gentleman asked her out to dinner (and invited her MOM to come as well).
The liars made up BS from 4 years prior to that when the girl was 12, and was normal
family friends/neighbors with Paul who was 17,the father David respected
him/everything was normal. The only thing that is "nasty" is you insulting an innocent
victim of cruel harassment/bullying who asked out a girl then NEVER spoke to her
ONCE after the day of the rejection. Very sad. How about you watch the cross-
examination video, and see how much an absolute liar this family is? Why don't you
read the legal pleadings in the description if you want a full sense of the sick legal
abuse these people have done against Paul? As for your "little girl" comment,the false
accuser girl is almost 18 and has been banging a 21-year-old man boyfriend since she
w as 16. Let me ask you this - did you watch the full 7 hour court hearing, or did you just
pick out a few snippets and respond with a biased feminist perspective? Truly curious.
Show less

103
 www.youtube.com

Apps I. Bookmarks ff41 Welcome! I Linkedln 4 ADP Run Eli Yahoo Finance In Facebook a Amazon.com: Onla salesfo

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Play (k)

OP- ►1 2 25 44 / 3 38 23

Cross-examination of accuser (Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias)

2 ? views

104
 NH Outrage
SUBSCRIBE 3
HB:lecl on .101 '* 2018

[David DePamphilis's daughter] vs. Paul Maravelias

5/3/18 and 5/4/18
http://davidtheliarcom/MaraveliasMot
'1!,1 MORE

4 Comments f B./

KentuckyKim 5 inont1),.;
NH Outrage aka Paul Maravelias: You are damaging yourself by posting all of this ordeal on
YouTube and your website and everywhere else you can find. Even though I do believe you
have had a "crush" over the years with your sister's friend (thank God you never made a sexual
advance), she does not return the same attraction you have, now that she is of age. I thought
when 50 years ago when I was 6, that my aunt's "friend" was creepy because he was overly
nice. He never made any "moves", but I was uncomfortable around him. It was a strange gut
feeling. He moved on and I never had to see him again, thank God.

105
She was antagonistic in posting the pic with her father and boyfriend giving you the finger on
Facebook and the post with your initials once the SPO order was in place and her page was
still open to the public. She could have mitigated the circumstances but chose not to, and I
fault her for that. Good Lord, if social media stalking was a crime, we would all be guilty. Silly
teenagers. I just want to say,"Want some French cries with that Wha-mburger?".

Just drop it, lick your wounds and move on! They are "Making a Stalker","Making a
Pedophile","and who knows what else they are about to "make" out of you, and you are
assisting her and her father by trying to "defend" yourself. This has already made it to
Kentucky (by accident) which is not good for you, in your endeavors to become "somebody" in
this world. The New England area is not the only place that exists on the planet. Make a plan
to take yourself away from there, or they will destroy you. Mentally, financially and hopefully
not physically, which they know better than to throw the first punch. Beware of the boyfriend.
The taunts they have obviously provided is to anger you into doing something you will regret.

You seem to be a very intelligent person of your age. Her, well not so much Yes, I do believe
that her father is pulling the strings as he did study Criminal Law and obviously has plenty of
money. They just plain don't like you. I do wish her luck in her studies.

P.S. I would also like to add, when pursuing a potential partner, don't use big words in
conversation unless they are of your equal education. Most of the world's population do not
use that type of vocabulary and flaunting your looks is a huge turn off to the female
persuasion. Yes, the flaunting, you did bring that up in trial, hence the "scantly cladded leg
upon the bed that he was sitting on". That does belong to the feminine gender. I get it, but it
hurt you at the same time by trying to say she was flirting with you while she was underage.

106
Another thing, instead of wasting anymore time with the DePamphilis family, you should take
what you have learned thus far, and apply that knowledge into the legal field and add to your
Linkedin profile? We don't need another obsessive Elliot Rodger. :o)

I hope you don't construe this post as negative or positive on either party in any way. It's just
an observation as a could be juror. If this were not a bench trial, I could be there in that
courtroom, hypothetically. Yes, I have watched almost all of the 7 hrs. and looked at your web
page, etc. Still working on it. Be careful of that "book". You should make it a fictional account
unless you have already sought legitimate legal advice. Great cover photo by the way. Good
l uck to both families. Please, for everyone involved, put this to rest. There is no person to
gain from this publicity. Caveat.
Show less

Hide replies e%
Paul M 5 months ago
KentuckyKim, I am thankful you took the time to share your advice and informed
perspectives. I wanted to do you the courtesy of responding, given the time you took to
write a constructive comment.

Since this was the recent extension hearing and not the original stalking hearing, I think
a lot of context is missed. For instance, I did not have as much opportunity to discuss
the outright factual falsification done against me - such as claiming I had mentioned
the young woman's "age of consent" while inviting her to dinner years ago. Not sure if
you caught this, but I actually had a sentimental audio recording of the conversation
proving this was a malicious lie. They later got me wrongly arrested under our
draconian NH "Wiretapping" statute for this incidental "one-party-consent" recording.

107
They got off falsifying a stalking order petition with no consequences, while usurping an
unconstitutional law to prevent a true record of what I actually said from being
produced in court. Thus, only through lies was I legally damaged.

Many others have commented to me similarly about not "wasting more time" with my
victimizers. May I remind you that the entire videotaped hearing was the vindictive
volition of the false accuser, not at all my action. I was compelled to attend the hearing.
I view myself not as an instigator, but rather an actor in self-defense against legal
abuse. I filed an honest stalking petition against David DePamphilis last year to secure
me and my family's safety, given my concerns about his worsening behavior. But,
besides that, I have not taken any further legal initiative to this point against the
instigators.

I have also utterly failed in communication if your impression is that I have "attraction"
to the false accuser. Clearly, my victimizer's ploy to resurrect the optics of the romantic
attraction from years ago by maliciously extending the order was partially successful. In
the testimony video, you can find me recounting my inability to even recognize the
young woman when seen in the court parking lot.

On the whole, your perspectives are well-taken and helpful. Keep an eye out for the two
upcoming NH Supreme Court appeals in the matter. Thank you for sharing, and feel free
to shoot me an email if you have any questions.

Kind regards,
Paul Maravelias
paulgAulinatv.com
Show less

108
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110
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0376, Paul Maravelias v. David

DePamphilis,the court on November 30, 2018, issued the
following order:

The plaintiffs motion to strike the defendant's brief is denied. The

defendant's motion to transfer the record and exhibits from the trial court is
denied. The appealing party is obligated to provide the record upon appeal.
Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004). The defendant's motion
to strike exhibits and argument that are not part of the record is granted in part
and denied in part. To the extent that the defendant seeks to strike exhibits
appended to the plaintiffs reply brief that were not admitted by the trial court,
and argument relying upon them, the motion is granted. To the extent that the
defendant requests attorney's fees in connection with the motion, the request is
denied without prejudice to the defendant moving for attorney's fees pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 23.

Having considered the briefs and that portion of the record properly
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The plaintiff, Paul Maravelias, appeals orders of the Circuit Court

(Coughlin, J.), following a three-day bench trial, ruling in favor of the defendant,
David DePamphilis, on his stalking petition, see RSA 633:3-a (Supp. 2017), and
awarding the defendant attorney's fees and costs. We construe the plaintiffs
brief to contend that the trial court was compelled to find in his favor on the
stalking petition and that it erred by awarding the defendant attorney's fees and
costs.

We first address whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying
the stalking petition. In reviewing a trial court's decision rendered after a trial on
the merits, we uphold the trial court's factual findings and rulings unless they
lack evidentiary support or are legally erroneous. O' Malley v. Little, 170 N.H.
272, 275 (2017). We do not decide whether we would have ruled differently than
the trial court, but rather, whether a reasonable person could have reached the
same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence. Id. Thus, we
defer to the trial court's judgment on such issues as resolving conflicts in the
testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and determining the weight to
be given evidence. Id. We review the trial court's application of the law to the
facts de novo. Id.

111
 The offense of stalking includes "[p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly
engag[ing] in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause
a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety," when the targeted
person "is actually placed in such fear." RSA 633:3-a, I(a). "Course of conduct"
is defined as "2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose." RSA 633:3-a, II(a). Such acts are not limited
to those that are targeted against the person directly, but include threats against
the targeted person's immediate family. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 191-
92 (2007). However, such acts do not "include conduct that was necessary to
accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted
person." RSA 633:3-a, II(a).

In this case, the plaintiff based his December 2017 stalking petition upon
"three major incidents"': (1) in December 2016, the defendant made angry
telephone calls to the plaintiff and his father after the plaintiff attempted to give
the defendant's daughter a Maserati sports car for her sixteenth birthday; (2) in
March 2017, the defendant checked to ascertain whether the plaintiff was within
the vicinity of the defendant's property, drove toward the police station, and
spoke with a police officer after he received an anonymous letter, which the
plaintiff later admitted to have "aided in" composing, that excoriated the
defendant, his daughter, and her boyfriend in obscene terms; and (3) in June
2017, the defendant's daughter posted a photograph on a social media site
depicting her, her boyfriend, and the defendant making an obscene hand gesture
and captioned it "did Dartmouth teach you how to do this," a reference to the
plaintiff's alma mater. We note that the plaintiff testified that he had had no
direct contact with the defendant since December 2016.

Neither the plaintiff nor his father testified that the defendant threatened
them during the December 2016 "angry" phone calls. The plaintiff testified that
he was out of the country when the defendant received the anonymous letter and
did not learn that the defendant had searched around his house and driven
toward the police station until months after the fact. The plaintiff testified that
the defendant's daughter, and not the defendant, posted the photo and caption,
which the plaintiff had previously characterized as "puerile" and "risible." He
further testified that the only reason he saw the photo was because he was
tracking the daughter's social media sites. To the extent that the plaintiff likens
his situation to those in Fisher and State v. Simone, 152 N.H. 755 (2005), we
disagree. See Fisher, 155 N.H at 189 (stating defendant left 45 minute voice mail
message threatening plaintiff with retaliation and kept plaintiff's staff on phone
for hours); Simone, 152 N.H. at 760 (stating defendant called plaintiff up to 20
times a day and told plaintiff that he was suicidal and out of control).

The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by finding no credible
evidence that the "three major incidents"' occurred. However, the trial court
found that he "did not provide any credible evidence of the allegations set forth in
the petition . . . that the . . . Defendant committed acts of stalking as defined

2
112
under RSA 633:3-a,"(emphasis added), not that the acts themselves never
occurred. To the extent that the trial court paraphrased this finding in its order
on attorney's fees, this did not alter the original finding. Moreover, the trial court
found "that any action(s) taken by the [defendant] were reasonable and necessary
and for a legitimate purpose[,] i.e. protection of his minor daughter and family."
See RSA 633:3-a, II(a).

The plaintiff raises a number of additional arguments in his brief regarding

the denial of his petition. As the appealing party, he has the burden of
demonstrating reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based
upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's determination
that the acts identified by the plaintiff did not constitute stalking is supported by
the record and not legally erroneous. See O' Malley, 170 N.H. at 275.

We next address whether the trial court erred in awarding the defendant
attorney's fees and costs. Although the general rule in New Hampshire is that
parties pay their own attorney's fees, an award of attorney's fees is appropriate
when one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons. Fat Bullies Farm, LLC v. Devenport, 170 N.H. 17, 30 (2017). When
attorney's fees are awarded against a private party who has acted in bad faith,
the purpose is to do justice and vindicate rights, as well as to discourage
frivolous lawsuits. Id.

We will not overturn the trial court's decision concerning attorney's fees
absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Id. To warrant reversal, the
discretion must have been exercised for reasons clearly untenable or
unreasonable to the prejudice of the objecting party. Id. We give tremendous
deference to a trial court's decision regarding attorney's fees. Id. If there is some
support in the record for the trial court's determination, we will uphold it. Id. To
the extent that the plaintiff argues that RSA 633:3-a does not authorize an award
of attorney's fees, statutory authority is not required for an award of attorney's
fees based upon a litigant's bad faith. See id.

In this case, the trial court found that the plaintiff's "stalking petition . . .
was oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious and/or in bad faith" and that the
plaintiff's "positions were patently unreasonable." Contrary to the plaintiff's
argument, attorney's fees may be awarded when the party has filed only one
action against the other party in bad faith. See Keenan v. Fearon, 130 N.H. 494,
502 (1988)(stating that court may award counsel fees in any action commenced,
prolonged, required or defended without any reasonable basis in the facts
provable by evidence, or any reasonable claim in the law as it is, or as it might
arguably be held to be). To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's
case precluded its subsequent finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, the
standards for each determination are distinct. See Kukene v. Genualdo, 145
N.H. 1, 4 (2000)(stating denial of summary judgment does not per se preclude

3
113
 finding of bad faith). To the extent that the plaintiff argues that he did not act in
bad faith, based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's
determination is supported by the evidence and not legally erroneous. See Fat
Bullies, 170 N.H. at 30.

To the extent that the plaintiff argues that a $61.95 expense dated October
25, 2017, was erroneously included in the trial court's award, the defendant
waives this expense in his brief.

Any remaining issues raised by the plaintiff in his brief either are not
sufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003), or
otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321,
322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

Distribution:
10th N.H. Circuit Court - Derry District Division, 473-2017-CV-00150
Honorable John J. Coughlin
Honorable David D. King
Mr. Paul Maravelias
J Simon R. Brown, Esquire
Timothy A. Gudas, Supreme Court
Allison R. Cook, Supreme Court
File

4
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121
122
123
 1 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
2 Windham, NH 03087
Telephone: (603) 475-3305
3
Email: paul@paulmarv.com
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
6
7 )
PAUL MARAVELIAS, )
8 a natural person, )
) Case No. 1:19-CV-143
9 Plaintiff, )
10 )
v.
)
11 ) COMPLAINT
JOHN J. COUGHLIN,
a natural person, in his individual and )
12 official capacities, )
)
13
GORDON J. MACDONALD, ) ORIGINAL VERIFIED
14 a natural person, in his official capacity as ) COMPLAINT FOR
Attorney General of New Hampshire, ) DECLARATORY AND
15 )
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
PATRICIA G. CONWAY, )
16 a natural person, in her official capacity as )
Rockingham County Attorney, )
17
)
18 TOWN OF WINDHAM, ex rel., ) Date Action filed: 2/10/2019
WINDHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) Time: 11:00AM
19 municipal entities, )
)
20 GERALD S. LEWIS,
)
a natural person, in his official capacity as
21 Chief of Police of the Town of Windham, )
)
22 Defendants. )
)
23
24
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
25
26 1. NOW COMES Plaintiff PAUL MARAVELIAS (“Plaintiff”) with Complaint

27 and brings this action joining two substantially related claims. The first matter is predominant

28 and exigent: this action seeks an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO)

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 124 -1-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 against Defendants to enjoin them from enforcing an illegal state court order abusing

2 Maravelias’s federal constitutional rights. Defendants issued a baseless court order against
3
Maravelias ultra vires, in total absence of statutory or equitable authority, masquerading as
4
“extended terms” of a preexisting civil protective order, to newly criminalize his “possession”
5
of public internet “social media communications” necessary as exhibits in state court
6
7 proceedings for his own defense. Less than 72 hours ago, on Friday 2/8/19, Defendants

8 threatened they will enforce these illegal “extended terms” to the protective order and

9 are imminently expected to issue arrest and/or search warrants against Maravelias at
10
any moment today, in catastrophic violation of his civil rights, causing irreparable
11
injury. See Plaintiff’s accompanying “EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR
12
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE
13
14 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION”. This action seeks declaratory relief and a permanent

15 injunction to redress Defendants’ said unlawful order against Plaintiff. The second related
16 component of this action seeks declaratory judgement that NH RSA 633:3-a, III-c., pertaining
17
to the legal standard for extending civil stalking protective orders after initial expiration, is
18
facially invalid in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
19
United States of America.
20
21 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
22
2. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution.
23
Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 in that the instant
24
case arises under questions of federal constitutional law.
25
26 3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
27
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 125 -2-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 4. Personal jurisdiction exists whereas all individual parties are natural citizens

2 within the federal boundaries of the United States of America.

3
5. Claims herein for injunctive relief are authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343
4
and Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
6 6. Claims herein for declaratory relief are authorized pursuant to the Declaratory
7
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02.
8
7. Venue is appropriate per 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as Defendants’ material conduct has
9
10 occurred and is occurring substantially within the State of New Hampshire, in which all

11 parties reside.
12
PARTIES
13
8. Plaintiff PAUL MARAVELIAS is a natural person over 18 years of age residing
14
15 within the Town of Windham and Rockingham County in the State of New Hampshire. He is

16 a recent Dartmouth College graduate in Economics and employed as a software engineer. He

17 resides with his parents and sister at 34 Mockingbird Hill Road, Windham, NH 03087.
18
9. Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN is a natural person and judicial officer within
19
20 the judicial branch of the State of New Hampshire. He is a Senior Active Status judge at 10th

21 Circuit Court – District Division – Derry, 10 Courthouse Ln, Derry, NH 03038. Defendant
22 JOHN J. COUGHLIN was acting under color of New Hampshire state law at all times
23
material. JOHN J. COUGHLIN is being sued in his individual and official capacities.
24
25 10. All other Defendants are being sued in their official capacities only.

26 11. Defendant GORDON J. MACDONALD is the Attorney General of the State of

27
New Hampshire with the official address of 33 Capitol St, Concord, NH 03301. Under NH
28
RSA 7:6, he “shall have and exercise general supervision of the criminal cases pending before
ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 126 -3-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 the supreme and superior courts of the state” and “with the aid of the county attorneys” …

2 shall enforce the criminal laws of the state.” He has authority to enforce the illegal order
3
against Maravelias in question.
4
12. Defendant PATRICIA G. CONWAY is the County Attorney for Rockingham
5
6 County, NH with the official address 10 NH-125, Brentwood, NH 03833. She has authority to

7 enforce the illegal order against Maravelias in question in Rockingham County.

8
13. Defendant TOWN OF WINDHAM is a municipal entity in the State of New
9
Hampshire which maintains and operates the Windham Police Department (“WPD”), a law
10
11 enforcement agency. WPD is responsible for the training, conduct, employment, supervision,

12 and retention of its officers and employees. The TOWN OF WINDHAM is responsible for
13 overseeing WPD and ensuring its personnel comply with the laws and constitution of the
14
United States of America. At all times material, the officers, personnel, and employees of the
15
TOWN OF WINDHAM were acting and continue to act under color of New Hampshire state
16
law as applied through the customs, usages, and policies of said town.
17
18 14. Defendant GERALD S. LEWIS is an employee of the TOWN OF WINDHAM
19
as Chief of Police at the Windham Police Department. Defendant GERALD S. LEWIS is
20
responsible for the training, conduct, employment, supervision, and retention of his
21
subordinate officers and employees and has a duty to ensure said personnel comply with the
22
23 laws and constitution of the United States of America. Defendant GERALD S. LEWIS has

24 been acting and continues to act under color of state law as applied through the customs,
25 usages, and policies of the Town of Windham at all times material.
26
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 127 -4-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

2 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
3
15. In January 2018, Plaintiff was subject to a preexisting New Hampshire civil
4
stalking protective order restraining him from contacting the petitioner in that action,
5
Christina DePamphilis. The underlying state District Court case is Christina DePamphilis v.
6
7 Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124). On 1/5/18, DePamphilis moved to extend the stalking

8 order against Maravelias another year to February 2019, pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

9
16. Maravelias has long maintained the said “protective” order litigation is an
10
illegitimate, bad-faith campaign of malicious harassment orchestrated by DePamphilis’s
11
12 father David DePamphilis. Maravelias claims DePamphilis committed perjury to obtain the

13 order; he has an audio recording proving she falsely put words in his mouth to obtain it. At

14 one point during cross-examination, DePamphilis admitted that Maravelias never actually
15
spoke certain words to her which she claimed (maliciously) in her petition he said.
16
17. In June 2017, Christina DePamphilis posted incitative bullying/harassment
17
18 social media posts identifying and directed against Paul Maravelias, middle-fingering him

19 with her father and boyfriend. Maravelias’s final contact with DePamphilis had been asking-
20 her-out once to dinner, which she declined. Maravelias commented at trial she was trying to
21
“bait” him to violate her “bad-faith” “stalking order”. She was trying to provoke a jealous
22
reaction and cruelly cause more trouble for Maravelias.
23
24 18. Maravelias collected screenshots of DePamphilis’s public internet social media
25 harassment conduct to use for his self-defense at the protective order hearing. Other
26
individuals shared with him other “social media exhibits” from DePamphilis which supported
27
Maravelias’s case against the civil protective order.
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 128 -5-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 19. In May and June 2018, Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN presided over a three-

2 day trial at Derry, NH District Court on DePamphilis’s extension motion.

3
20. Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN admitted many of Maravelias’s social media
4
image evidentiary exhibits, including DePamphilis’s vulgar cyberbullying post against
5
6 Maravelias, inter alia.

7
21. On 6/15/18, Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN granted the stalking order
8
extension against Maravelias, extending said order to 2/5/19.
9
10 THE ORWELLIAN SUMMER 2018 “EXTENDED TERMS” OR “FURTHER CONDITIONS”

11
22. On 7/2/18, DePamphilis filed a certain Motion in the District Court which is the
12
critical foundation of this action. She filed a “Motion for Modification of Stalking Final
13
Order of Protection to Include Further Conditions”, attached as Exhibit A.
14
15 23. In said Motion, she sought that Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN modify her
16
stalking order against Maravelias to include the following additional criminally-enforceable
17
provision:
18
19 “Respondent [Maravelias] shall not gain access to or possess any
of Petitioner’s [DePamphilis’s] social media communications
20 either directly or through a third party;”
21
22 24. Hereinafter, Plaintiff refers to the above provision as the “extended terms”. Two
23
other such “further conditions” were sought and granted, but this action disregards them.
24
25. On 7/5/18, Maravelias filed an Objection to DePamphilis’s Motion. Maravelias
25
26 pointed-out that she was attempting to criminalize Maravelias’s mere possession of her

27 “social media exhibits” – by then, record-admitted evidentiary public court exhibits which
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 129 -6-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 proved, in one part, that she was incitatively cyberbullying Maravelias with vulgar gestures,

2 and therefore lied about having “fear” of him for the stalking order.
3
26. Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Objection (Exhibit B – redundant exhibits therefrom
4
omitted) spoke of the unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness of the requested terms,
5
6 noting that Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN had no legal authority to grant such draconian,

7 Orwellian “extended terms” against Maravelias by the procedural mechanism of a civil

8 stalking order, which is purposed to prevent physical following/stalking.
9
27. In response to Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Objection, DePamphilis filed a Reply on
10
11 7/12/18 which proposed a minor concession in her requested “further conditions”, that

12 Maravelias should not “knowingly [gain access to or possess…]”. This 7/12/18 Reply is
13 attached as Exhibit C.
14
28. On 7/16/18, Maravelias filed a surreply to DePamphilis’s 7/12/18 Reply, noting
15
16 that her requested further terms were still outrageously illegal, unconstitutional, unwarranted,

17 and draconian.

18
DEFENDANT JOHN J. COUGHLIN GRANTS THE “EXTENDED TERMS” IN ONE WORD
19
20 29. On 8/7/18, Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN DENIED Maravelias’s Objection

21 (Exhibit D) and GRANTED (Exhibit E) DePamphilis’s original 7/2/18 Motion

22 criminalizing Maravelias to “gain access to or possess” his accuser’s “[public] social media
23
communications”, even including public court exhibits where she made vulgar, incitative
24
cyberbullying posts to harass Maravelias, which proved she lied about having “fear” of
25
Maravelias to get a false, vindictive “stalking” order against him.
26
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 130 -7-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 30. Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN, sua sponte, granted DePamphilis’s original

2 7/2/18 Motion and not even DePamphilis’s concessively ameliorated “further condition” as
3
conceded in her subsequent 7/12/18 Motion, in light of Maravelias’s objection. See Exhibit F.
4
31. In his Order granting the “extended terms”, Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN
5
6 did not write a single word of statutory authority or legal reasoning for his shocking, reckless

7 order, nor wrote any response to Maravelias’s objection arguments whatsoever. Judge
8 Coughlin merely scribbled, “Respondent’s objection is DENIED”, on Maravelias’s 7/5/18
9
Objection and criminalized Maravelias to possess his own court exhibits.
10
11 DEFENDANTS’ IMMINENT FEBRUARY 2019 THREATS TO ARREST MARAVELIAS AND
ENFORCE THE ILLEGAL ORDER
12
32. On 1/24/19, DePamphilis moved the District Court to extend her order again.
13
14 This Motion was granted the same day; Defendants 8/7/18 expanded terms against Maravelias

15 are still in-effect.

16
33. In fall 2018, Plaintiff Maravelias had been a pro se litigant in two related appeal
17
cases in the New Hampshire Supreme Court regarding the DePamphilis/Maravelias parties.
18
19 34. On 2/8/19, Plaintiff Maravelias met with Sgt. Bryan Smith at the Windham
20 Police Department. Sgt. Smith, a WPD officer and Town of Windham employee, revealed
21
Defendants are now investigating Maravelias for violating the “extended terms” of the order.
22
23 35. For compelling detail on the imminent threat of irreparable injury expected from

24 impending enforcement of these unlawful “extended terms”, Plaintiff Maravelias attaches the
25 supporting declaration entitled “PAUL MARAVELIAS’S DECLARATION IN SUPPORT
26
OF EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
27
ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION”. This
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 131 -8-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 declaration contains an assortment of verbatim quotes from the recent 2/8/19 conversation at

2 WPD between Maravelias and Sgt. Smith.

3
36. In said conversation, Sgt. Smith produced a copy of an exhibit Maravelias
4
attached to a December 2018 reply brief Maravelias filed in one of his NH Supreme Court
5
6 appeals. Sgt. Smith asserted that it was one of DePamphilis’s social media communications

7 and that he would likely “arrest” Maravelias if his investigation fails to establish that the said
8 Exhibit had been part of any earlier court hearing.
9
37. The Exhibit in question is an image which proves DePamphilis boldly lied about
10
11 another part of her “stalking” accusations against Maravelias, where she falsely asserted it

12 was socially inappropriate for Maravelias to say hello to her at a 2015 graduation ceremony
13 Maravelias attended for his sister.
14
38. Sgt. Smith specifically identified Defendants’ 8/7/18 extended terms to the
15
16 protective order and explained he may arrest Maravelias for violating said terms.

17 39. Sgt. Smith said that he would likely “arrest” Maravelias if Maravelias was in
18
“possession” of certain public materials from “social media”, ostensibly referring
19
Maravelias’s own Supreme Court Reply Brief exhibit. In such an event, Defendants will
20
criminally prosecute Maravelias for violating the “extended terms” by possessing what they
21
22 claim is a public social media communication by DePamphilis, which is lawful for any other

23 person to possess.
24
PAST AND PRESENT ACTUAL HARM AND INJURY SUFFERED BY MARAVELIAS AS A
25 RESULT OF DEFENDANTS’ ILLEGAL “EXTENDED TERMS”
26
27 40. Ever since Defendants imposed the “extended terms”, Maravelias has feared

28 criminal prosecution and felt compelled to chill his public speech. In the 2/8/19 conversation,

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 132 -9-
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 Maravelias indicated he has felt compelled to forfeit defending his falsely maligned reputation

2 (from the underlying protective order) in certain ways he would pursue were the illegal
3
“extended terms” not constantly threatening his free speech with criminal penalties.
4
41. Defendants have stated to Maravelias their intention to engage in a course of
5
6 conduct affecting his constitutional interest. In fact, they have proven they are actively and

7 imminently threatening said interests by virtue of their current criminal investigation against
8 Maravelias as Sgt. Smith personally averred to Maravelias in person less than 72 hours ago.
9
42. Maravelias has trembled in fear of punishment to take acts amounting to the
10
11 introduction of otherwise-lawful public internet images into his state court briefs/pleadings

12 which would otherwise benefit his position, because of the unlawful “extended terms”.
13
43. In order to attempt to comply with the unlawful “extended terms”, Maravelias
14
has been compelled to destroy and dispose of his own property as well as take elaborate pains
15
16 that other “third parties” do not maliciously cause Maravelias to commit a crime by virtue

17 their own “possession” or “gaining access” conduct.

18
44. Maravelias has suffered extreme emotional distress and trauma in connection
19
with being subject to such unlawful, arbitrary terms and not even being able to know the
20
precise legal functioning or definition of its vague terms “social media communication”,
21
22 “through a third party”, and “possess”. He lives in constant confusion and fear as a result.

23
COUNT 1
24 VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. §1983)
25
Defendants’ “Extended Terms” Within a Standard Civil
26 Stay-Away Order Abridge Maravelias’s Free Speech and Press Rights
27
28 45. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 133 - 10 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 46. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make

2 no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”. It is incorporated against the states by operation
3
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides “no state shall make or enforce any law which
4
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
5
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”.
6
7 47. Defendants’ civil “stalking” “protective” order against Maravelias in its current
8 form, through their “extended terms” granted on 8/7/18 with no explanation at all, violates
9
Maravelias’s constitutionally protected free speech and press rights.
10
11 48. The “extended terms” constitute a prior restraint against Maravelias exercising

12 his protected freedoms to speech and press, even absent the imminent enforcement threat. By
13 possessing, publicizing, or expressing himself with certain evidentiary exhibits deemed
14
DePamphilis’s “social media communications”, Defendants will punish Maravelias with
15
criminal prosecution – nominally, for violating a civil stalking protective order pursuant to
16
RSA 633:3-a.
17
18 49. Defendants are now likely to arrest Plaintiff Maravelias because of his
19
publication to the New Hampshire Supreme Court of a Reply Brief containing an appendical
20
exhibit alleged to be a “social media communication” of DePamphilis. This exhibit shows that
21
DePamphilis lied to obtain a false “stalking” protective order by which Defendants’ 8/7/18
22
23 Order against Maravelias, imposing the “extended terms”, operates to begin with.

24
50. Defendants’ 8/7/18 “extended terms” are not narrowly tailored to serve a
25
significant governmental interest. The governmental interest behind civil stalking protective
26
orders is to protect true victims of stalking from violent acts, not to criminalize the process of
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 134 - 11 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 a respondent in such a proceeding from defending himself in the court system, using public

2 evidentiary exhibits from “social media” to defend himself against claims of “stalking”.
3
51. Defendants’ 8/7/18 extended terms do not appropriate any alternative channel by
4
which Maravelias could defend himself in the legal system where his accuser’s public “social
5
6 media exhibits” are profitable for his legal self-defense in the court system.

7
52. Defendants’ 8/7/18 extended terms do not appropriate any alternative channel by
8
which Maravelias could publicly share said “social media” evidentiary materials (e.g., on the
9
internet) to defend his name and reputation from defamatory and false “stalking” accusations,
10
11 without fearing criminal prosecution by the State of New Hampshire.

12
53. Defendants’ extended terms therefore implicate Maravelias’s right to be free
13
from reputational and social stigma. Said terms have chilled Maravelias’s public speech
14
which he would have otherwise made to defend his name from the false stalking accusations
15
16 both in the court system and on the internet, where necessitating exhibits from “social media”.

17 They also implicate his right to be left alone, since Defendants will arrest him for

18 “possession” and any lawful expression evidencing “possession”.

19
54. The above is neither theory nor speculation: Sgt. Smith asserted to Maravelias
20
on 2/8/19 his Supreme Court Reply Brief exhibit is inculpatory evidence of “possession”.
21
22 55. Defendants’ extended terms are unconstitutionally overbroad because they
23
prohibit, chill, and regulate a significant amount of legitimate speech even if some possible
24
applications of them could prevent unlawful speech.
25
26 56. Defendants’ extended terms are unconstitutionally overbroad for being both

27 overinclusive and underinclusive. As-applied, the extended terms do not prohibit any
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 135 - 12 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 unprotected criminally threatening or obscene speech, but rather prohibit public speech

2 necessary for Maravelias to defend himself within the New Hampshire court system.
3
57. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to and will enforce
4
and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff Maravelias, in
5
6 violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press.

7
58. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
8
Maravelias has and will suffer irreparable harm and injury, which will continue absent
9
injunctive relief. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth
10
11 hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.

12
COUNT 2
13 VIOLATION OF PART I, ARTICLE 22
14 OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTION

15
59. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
16
60. Plaintiff repeats the aforecited authorization for his state law claims under this
17
18 Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, which arise from the same set of facts and

19 transactions/occurrences giving rise to the federal causes of action in this Complaint.

20
61. Part I, Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution offers even broader
21
protections for free speech rights than the U.S. Constitution.
22
23 62. Accordingly, the Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to
24
and will enforce and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff
25
Maravelias, in violation of his rights under Part I, Article 22 of the NH Constitution.
26
27 63. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff

28 Maravelias has and will suffer irreparable harm and injury, which will continue absent

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 136 - 13 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 injunctive relief. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth

2 hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.

3
4 COUNTS 3, 4, AND 5
VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE-PROCESS
5 UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE
6 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. §1983)

7 64. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
8
65. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “no state shall make or enforce any
9
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
10
11 any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…”.

12 Count 3: The “Extended Terms” Violate Due Process Since They Are
13 Unconstitutionally Vague

14
66. Defendants’ nominal “extended terms” against Maravelias violate and disparage
15
his rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Said terms are
16
17 unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due process protections, for failing to define what

18 counts as “possession” of a “social media communication”, what counts as “third party”

19 “possession” of the same, what counts as “direct” “possession” of the same, or even what
20
counts as a “social media communication” to begin with (e.g., whether usage of a social
21
media app itself is necessary to “possess” such a “communication”, or whether a static
22
photographic “screenshot” reproduction of a “social media communication” visualized on
23
24 another’s device is itself a “communication” or merely an indication or record of such a

25 “communication” existing elsewhere).

26
67. The vagueness of Defendant’s extended terms terms invites arbitrary and
27
discriminatory enforcement, and they are unintelligible a person of average intelligence.
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 137 - 14 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 68. Defendants’ present and imminent threat to criminally enforce the illegal order

2 already underscores the untenable problems of vagueness in their extended terms. In

3
Maravelias’s 2/8/19 conversation with Sgt. Smith, there was disagreement whether the Reply
4
Brief exhibit is a “social media communication”.
5
6 69. On its face, the extended terms appear to criminalize Maravelias’s mere

7 “possession” of public court exhibits, necessarily “depriving” him of that property by forcing
8 him to relinquish and discard said property lest he face criminal punishment.
9
70. Defendants’ extended terms against Maravelias also produce the absurd result
10
11 that Christina DePamphilis’s possessing her own “social media communications”

12 automatically criminalizes Maravelias, since he has access to public court documents where
13 her said “communications” are already entered as exhibits and/or since he has a legal right
14
subpoena them from her; therefore, Maravelias could be said to “possess” by a “third-party”
15
(DePamphilis herself) the said “communications”, according to reasonable interpretation of
16
the vague term “third-party [possession]” in Defendants’ outrageous 8/7/18 extended terms.
17
18 71. The same can be said for virtually any instance of Maravelias’s friend or family
19
member merely reading a copy of his Supreme Court briefs or viewing the record of the case.
20
72. Defendants’ vague extended terms contain zero due-process protection
21
22 mechanisms by which Maravelias would not be require automatically to discard and not

23 “possess” any items which might be “social media communications” even if they are public
24
court exhibits for his own cases.
25
Count 4: The “Extended Terms” Violate Procedural Due Process Since They
26
Contained No Advanced-Noticed Starting Effective Date and Therefore
27 Inescapably Entrap Their Subject into Committing a Crime

28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 138 - 15 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 73. Defendants’ extended terms against Maravelias are worded such that it would be

2 impossible to obey them. Since they contain no effective starting date, they took-effect and
3
began to criminalize any “possession” of public court exhibits as soon as Judge Coughlin
4
signed the Order, before notifying Maravelias that the extended terms were granted. The
5
extended terms contain no practical procedures for compliance, such as a provision that
6
7 certain things currently in “possession” must be destroyed or relinquished by a certain time.

8 74. Since Maravelias cannot un-destroy destroyed items, it cannot be argued that
9
Maravelias could have temporarily destroyed such exhibits pending Judge Coughlin’s ruling.
10
11 Count 5: The “Extended Terms”, Masquerading Under the Procedural Guise of
a Common Civil Protective Order, Violate Substantive Due Process Since They
12 are Ultra Vires Issued in Complete Absence of Legal Authority
13
75. First, Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN acted in reckless defiance of statutory
14
authority on 8/7/18 when he ordered the extended terms against Maravelias by and through
15
16 “further conditions” to a civil stalking protective order. New Hampshire state law precisely

17 regulates said civil protective orders and enumerates the types of relief which may be granted.

18
76. Defendants’ extended terms are in excess of the permitted forms of relief for NH
19
civil stalking protective orders. The local NH district courts have jurisdiction over civil
20
stalking protective orders under RSA 633:3-a. RSA 633:3-a, III-a states, “The types of relief
21
22 that may be granted [with such civil protective orders] … shall be the same as those set forth

23 in RSA 173-B [the similar statute controlling Domestic Violence protective orders]”.
24
77. RSA 173-B:5 exclusively enumerates the forms of additional relief New
25
Hampshire state courts may grant in such DV or stalking protective orders, as follows:
26
27 “(a) Protective orders:
(1) Restraining the defendant from abusing the plaintiff.
28
(2) Restraining the defendant from entering the premises and curtilage where the plaintiff resides,

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 139 - 16 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 except when the defendant is accompanied by a peace officer and is allowed entry by the plaintiff
for the sole purpose of retrieving personal property specified by the court.
2 (3) Restraining the defendant from contacting the plaintiff or entering the plaintiff’s place of
employment, school, or any specified place frequented regularly by the plaintiff or by any family
3
or household member.
4 (4) Restraining the defendant from abusing the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, regardless of their
place of residence, or plaintiff’s household members in any way.
5 (5) Restraining the defendant from taking, converting, or damaging property in which the plaintiff
6 may have a legal or equitable interest.
(6) Directing the defendant to relinquish to the peace officer, in addition to the relief specified in
7 RSA 173-B:5, I, any and all deadly weapons…
(7) Granting the petitioner exclusive care, custody, or control of any animal owned, possessed,
8
leased, kept, or held by the petitioner….
9 (b) Other relief including, but not limited to:
(1) Granting the plaintiff the exclusive use and possession of the premises and curtilage of the
10 plaintiff’s place of residence…
11 (2) Restraining the defendant from withholding items of the plaintiff’s personal property specified
by the court. A peace officer shall accompany the plaintiff in retrieving such property to protect
12 the plaintiff.
(3) Granting to the plaintiff the exclusive right of use and possession of the household furniture,
13
furnishings, or a specific automobile…
14 (4) Ordering the defendant to make automobile, insurance, health care, utilities, rent, or mortgage
payments.
15 (5) Awarding temporary custody of the parties’ minor children to either party or, where
appropriate, to the department, provided that: …
16
(6) Establishing visitation rights with regard to the parties’ minor children. …
17 (7) Directing the defendant to pay financial support to the plaintiff or minor children, unless the
defendant has no legal duty to support the plaintiff or minor children.
18 (8) Directing the abuser to engage in a batterer’s intervention program or personal counseling. …
19 (9) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff monetary compensation for losses suffered as a
direct result of the abuse which may include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support,
20 medical and dental expenses, damage to property, out-of-pocket losses for injuries …
(10) Ordering the defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.”
21
22 78. Absolutely nowhere in either the New Hampshire civil stalking protective order
23
statute nor the procedurally-controlling DV protective order statute are Defendants authorized
24
to enjoin broad prophylactic injunctions against the free speech and due process rights to
25
“possess” public “social media communications” from the internet for one’s legal defense.
26
27 79. Second, as an officer of the NH local Derry District Court, Defendant JOHN J.
28
COUGHLIN did not have any general equitable jurisdictional power to enjoin such terms

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 140 - 17 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 against Maravelias even if they were not otherwise unconstitutional. The NH local District

2 Court has jurisdiction over such civil stalking protective order cases pursuant to RSA 502-
3
A:14, “Civil Causes. – I. Exclusive Jurisdiction” which states, “all district courts shall have
4
original and exclusive jurisdiction of civil cases in which the damages claimed do not exceed
5
$1,500”. The NH District Court does not have general equitable powers, which is reserved to
6
7 the NH Superior Court. See RSA 498:1, “Jurisdiction”, which states “the superior court shall

8 have the powers of a court of equity in … cases in which there is not a plain, adequate and

9 complete remedy at law; and in all other cases cognizable in a court of equity”. Thus,
10
Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN, within a civil stalking protective order case, had no legal
11
authority to grant relief not specifically authorized by the controlling statute(s) therefor.
12
13 80. Accordingly, Defendant JOHN J COUGHLIN’S 8/7/18 order granting the

14 extended terms against Maravelias constitutes an arbitrary, despotic act done ultra vires in
15
total defiance of constitutional, statutory, and jurisdictional authority.
16
81. Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN’S conduct was extreme and outrageous,
17
18 malicious, wanton and reckless, shocking to the conscience, completely outside the

19 boundaries of propriety and lawfulness, and contemptuous of the moral ethos of the State of
20 New Hampshire and the United States of America.
21
82. Defendants acted willfully, knowingly, and maliciously in a coordinated effort
22
23 to disparage pro se Paul Maravelias’s federal constitutional rights by unilateral acts of judicial

24 tyranny: Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Objection articulately warned Defendants of the illegality of the
25 proposed extended terms and that granting them would be in excess of legal authority. See
26
Paragraphs 23 through 25 of Maravelias’s 7/5/18 Objection. (Exhibit B)
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 141 - 18 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 83. Jointly regarding Counts 3, 4, and 5, the Defendants, acting under color of state

2 law, have threatened to and will enforce and implement the above-identified “extended terms”
3
against Plaintiff Maravelias, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
4
84. Jointly regarding Counts 3, 4, and 5, as a direct and proximate result of
5
6 Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff Maravelias has and will suffer irreparable harm and

7 injury, which will continue absent injunctive relief. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the
8 Court grant the relief set forth hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.
9
10 COUNT 6
VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
11
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. §1983)
12
85. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
13
14 86. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “no state shall ... deny to any person

15 within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

16
87. Maravelias dares Defendants to illustrate one single other time in human history
17
that a New Hampshire local District Court has ordered a civil stalking order respondent not to
18
19 “possess” “directly or through a third-party” “social media communications” of a petitioner

20 which are necessary court exhibits for said respondent’s self-defense.

21
88. Since Defendants’ extended terms were issued without any legal authority (See
22
supra), other NH civil stalking protective order respondents are not – nor ever have been –
23
24 ordered in a fashion which similarly-situated Maravelias has been ordered here.

25 89. Equivalently, no other petitioners in such actions are enabled to have their
26
opponents “ordered” to not “possess” public internet evidence as part of their opposing case,
27
as similarly-situated DePamphilis has been enabled here.
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 142 - 19 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 90. Defendant JOHN J. COUGHLIN did not even attempt to justify his 8/7/18 order

2 or make any specific findings of fact justifying the harmonizing the extended terms to the
3
particular facts and circumstances of the case. He just reflexively scribbled “DENIED” on
4
Maravelias’s Objection and “GRANTED” on DePamphilis’s original Motion.
5
6 91. Accordingly, Defendants’ extended terms violate the Equal Protection clause,

7 since similarly situated petitioners/respondents in NH civil stalking protective order

8 proceedings are currently accorded inconsistent, unequal rights.
9
92. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to and will enforce
10
11 and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff Maravelias, in

12 violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.

13
93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
14
Maravelias has and will suffer irreparable harm and injury, which will continue absent
15
16 injunctive relief. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth

17 hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.

18
COUNT 7
19
EX POST FACTO LAW UNDER ARTICLE II § 10 cl. 1 OF
20 THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (42 U.S.C. §1983)
21
94. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
22
23 95. Since Defendants’ extended terms did not contain any effective start date, they

24 became enforceable with the underlying stalking order in relation to all times said stalking
25 order was in effect, whether before the 8/7/18 granting of said terms or not.
26
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 143 - 20 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 96. The extended terms therefore violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S.

2 Constitution, criminalizing Maravelias for any “possession” after the protective order was
3
extended but before the “extended terms” were granted.
4
97. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to and will enforce
5
6 and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff Maravelias, in

7 violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

8
98. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff
9
Maravelias has and will suffer irreparable harm and injury, which will continue absent
10
11 injunctive relief. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth

12 hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.

13
COUNT 8
14
NH RSA 633:3-A, III-C. IS FACIALLY OVERBROAD IN
15 VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
16 99. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
17
100. Defendants’ unlawful extended terms against Maravelias are in-effect by the
18
19 existence of an extended civil stalking protective order, extended pursuant to RSA 633:3-a,

20 III-c. In relevant part, the said statute reads:

21
“Any order under this section shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year, but may
22 be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing good cause, with notice
to the defendant, for one year after the expiration of the first order and thereafter each extension
23 may be for up to 5 years, upon the request of the plaintiff and at the discretion of the court. The
24 court shall review the order, and each renewal thereof and shall grant such relief as may be
necessary to provide for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.” (Emphasis added)
25
26 101. Maravelias has standing to challenge the facially constitutionality of this statute
27 in this Court. This Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over this claim as it arises from
28
the same set of transactions and/or occurrences as give rise to the prior federal question causes

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 144 - 21 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 of action pertaining to the “extended terms”. As far as is known, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is not

2 currently being challenged in any New Hampshire Supreme Court appeal, nor is Maravelias
3
yet subject to any criminal prosecution involving this statute. The instant cause of action
4
therefore passes the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and all abstention doctrines.
5
6 102. This statute permits extension of such protective orders if plaintiff’s “well-

7 being” primarily would be jeopardized without an extension, even if concern for “safety” is
8 minimal. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “well-being” as “the state of being
9
comfortable, healthy or happy.” Therefore, if a petitioner merely alleges she would be
10
“uncomfortable” or “unhappy” without the extension, the state court is required to extend it.
11
12 103. Said protective orders inflict extensive restrictions against a subject’s
13 constitutional rights, such as no-contact and firearms relinquishment orders.
14
104. The statute is therefore facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment,
15
16 because it enables trial courts to extend such protective orders based on a respondent’s

17 constitutionally protected non-threatening public speech which could “discomfort” the

18 petitioner, thereby triggering the overbroad “well-being” standard for extension.

19
105. The statute’s language is therefore not narrowly-tailored to serve a significant
20
governmental interest. It does not grant respondents any alternative channels to express
21
22 themselves in public which could “discomfort” or “displease” petitioners without being

23 punished by extended-duration restrictions of their constitutional rights. The overbroad statute

24
therefore has a chilling effect against appropriate speech to such protective order respondents.
25
106. The “well-being” standard in the statute is overbroad also because it is not
26
27 narrowly-tailored to serve the actual governmental interest of the statute, which is not

28 preventing “displeasure” or “discomfort” of petitioners, but rather protecting them from

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 145 - 22 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 “stalking” – conduct causing a “reasonable person to fear for their physical safety”.

2 See RSA 633:3-a, I.

3
107. The “well-being” standard in the statute inescapably renders it a content-based
4
speech regulation, since a respondent’s public expression which is “displeasing” to the
5
6 petitioner would alone satisfy the “well-being” standard for extending it, whereas agreeable

7 public speech not upsetting the petitioner would not trigger the “well-being” standard.
8
108. The statute is both overinclusively and underinclusively not narrowly tailored.
9
First, it punishes respondents’ acts of public expression which are not contrary to the
10
11 governmental interest of preventing stalking (e.g., publicly disagreeing with the fact that a

12 stalking order was issued). Second, it fails to equally punish new stalking order defendants
13 with its overbroad “well-being” extension standard. Cf. RSA 633:3-a, III-a, the more stringent
14
legal standard for initial issuance of a stalking order requiring a “stalking course of conduct”,
15
as opposed to mere indication that granting the order serves a petitioner’s “well-being”.
16
17 109. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to and will enforce

18 and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff Maravelias by means
19
of a civil stalking protective order which is in-effect because of a facially overbroad statute,
20
RSA 633:3-a, III-c., in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Wherefore,
21
Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth hereunder in the section entitled
22
23 “Prayer for Relief”.

24
COUNT 9
25 NH RSA 633:3-A, III-C. IS FACIALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS IN VIOLATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
26
27 110. All paragraphs hereinabove are repeated herein as though fully set forth.
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 146 - 23 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 111. “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons.

2 First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

3
understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and
4
discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000).
5
6 112. The language of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is unintelligible and so loosely constrained

7 that arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement thereof is inevitable. Not only is the term “well-
8 being” too vague, but also the extent to which the preceding term “safety” narrows or
9
qualifies “well-being”.
10
11 113. This vagueness is substantially likely or guaranteed to complicate every stalking

12 order extension case brought before NH state courts, regardless of the particular facts of such
13 cases. The statute provides zero guidance on how trial court judges should interpret “well-
14
being”, or on what conduct beyond threatening speech or actual violence would permit
15
extension not necessarily to serve a plaintiff’s “safety”, but rather their “well-being”.
16
17 114. For instance, one judge might consider a “well-being” order ridiculous and far

18 in-excess-of the legislative counter-stalking intent, calibrating his or her judgements to the
19
statute’s broad “safety” context, even applying ejusdem generis to constrain “well-being”
20
thereby. However, another judge might reject this interpretation, “safety and well-being” not
21
being a list, and adopt the plain meaning of the word “well-being”.
22
23 115. The statute’s vagueness is not only semantic but also syntactic, fraught with
24
meaningful ambiguity between the co-possible constructions “shall grant such relief as may
25
be necessary to provide for the (safety and well-being)” and “… relief as may be necessary to
26
provide for the safety, and (relief as may be necessary to provide for the) well-being”. The
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 147 - 24 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 former interpretation begets tautology, the latter overbroad plaintiff-sycophancy. Both

2 interpretations are reasonable but produce vastly different legal outcomes.

3
116. The comparable protective order laws of no other US state discard the initial-
4
issuance-standard for something pointlessly different for extension, as does New Hampshire’s
5
6 unconstitutionally defective statute. For example, the analogous Massachusetts statute for

7 extension of Civil Harassment Orders, M.G.L. 258E §3(d), states in relevant part that “the
8 court [may extend] the [harassment] order … as it deems necessary to protect the plaintiff
9
from harassment.” Id. It does not switch the legal standard to something different and
10
overbroad when it concerns extension, requiring a “stalking course of conduct” for an original
11
12 order but only vague “interest in well-being” for subsequent extensions, as with the defective

13 New Hampshire statute. Cf. also 19-A M.R.S. 4007(2), the analogous Maine statute

14 controlling extension of DV protective orders following civil adjudications of “abuse”: “the

15
court may extend an order, upon motion of the plaintiff, for such additional time as it
16
determines necessary to protect the plaintiff … from abuse.”
17
18 117. That a statute’s unintelligibility to an average person and propensity for arbitrary

19 enforcement violates the due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is
20 pellucid – especially here, where said vague statute controls the extension of court orders
21
severely limiting other federal constitutional rights.
22
23 118. Defendants, acting under color of state law, have threatened to and will enforce

24 and implement the above-identified “extended terms” against Plaintiff Maravelias by means
25 of a civil stalking protective order which is in-effect because of an unconstitutionally vague
26
statute, RSA 633:3-a, III-c., in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
27
Constitution. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully prays the Court grant the relief set forth
28
hereunder in the section entitled “Prayer for Relief”.
ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 148 - 25 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

2
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable Court:
3
4 I. Issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction prohibiting
Defendants and their officials, employees, and agents from implementing or
5 enforcing the said “extended terms” to the civil protective order against
6 Maravelias in New Hampshire District Court Case No. 473-2016-CV-00124;

7 II. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ said criminally-enforceable

8 “extended terms” violate Maravelias’s civil constitutional rights as guaranteed by
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;
9
10 III. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ said criminally-enforceable
“extended terms” violate Maravelias’s civil constitutional rights as guaranteed by
11 Part I, Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution;
12
IV. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ said criminally-enforceable
13 “extended terms” violate Maravelias’s due process and equal protection rights as
14 guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;

15 V. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ said “extended terms” to the civil
16 protective order are ultra vires and in violation of NH state law;

17 VI. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants’ said “extended terms” to the civil
18 protective order violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution;

19 VII. Enter a declaratory judgment that New Hampshire RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is
20 unconstitutionally overbroad on its face in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;
21
22 VIII. Enter a declaratory judgment that New Hampshire RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is
unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to
23 the U.S. Constitution;
24
IX. Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future unlawful conduct by Defendants;
25
26 X. Award Plaintiff the reasonable costs and disbursements of this action;

27 XI. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and proper.
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 149 - 26 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1
2
3
4
Respectfully submitted,
5
6
7
8 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
/s/ Paul J. Maravelias, pro se Dated: February 11th, 2019
16
Paul J. Maravelias
17 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
18 paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 150 - 27 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
2
3
NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
4
5
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE – COUNTY OF _______________________
6
On this ___ day of February 2019, before me, _________________________, the
7 undersigned officer, personally appeared ________________________, known to me (or
8 satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument
and acknowledged that he/she executed the same for the purposes therein contained, who
9 being by me first duly sworn, on his oath, deposes and says:
10 All factual stipulations within the foregoing Original
Verified Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
11
knowledge as of 2/11/2019.
12 [affiant’s statement of facts]
13
14
__________________________________
15 [signature of affiant]

16 Paul J. Maravelias
[typed name of affiant]
17
18 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd, Windham, NH 03087
[address of affiant]
19
20 In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and official seal.
21
22
____________________________________
23 Notary Public
24
My commission expires: ________________
25
26
27
28

ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 151 - 28 -
PAUL MARAVELIAS
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1
Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
2
Windham, NH 03087
Telephone: (603) 475-3305
3
paul@paulmarv.com
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
6
)
7 PAUL MARAVELIAS, )
a natural person, )
8 ) Case No. 1:19-CV-143
Plaintiff, )
9 )
v.
)
10 JOHN J. COUGHLIN, ) EMERGENCY EX PARTE
a natural person, in his individual and ) APPLICATION FOR
11 official capacities, ) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
)
ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW
12 GORDON J. MACDONALD, )
) CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY
a natural person, in his official capacity as
13 Attorney General of New Hampshire, ) INJUNCTION
)
14 PATRICIA G. CONWAY, )
a natural person, in her official capacity as ) Date Action filed: 2/10/2019
15 Rockingham County Attorney, )
) Time: 11:00AM
16 TOWN OF WINDHAM, ex rel., )
WINDHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
municipal entities, )
17
)
GERALD S. LEWIS,
18 )
a natural person, in his official capacity as
Chief of Police of the Town of Windham, )
19 )
Defendants. )
20 )

21
INTRODUCTION
22
1. Plaintiff PAUL MARAVELIAS (“Plaintiff”) applies for an emergency ex parte
23
temporary restraining order (TRO) against Defendants pursuant to FCRP 65. Defendants have
24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
152 -1-

27
 1
issued an unlawful order against Plaintiff masquerading as certain “extended terms” to a
2
preexisting civil protective order. Defendants are actively planning to arrest Plaintiff for
3
violating said “extended terms” made ultra vires in complete absence of statutory authority
4
and, separately, in violation of federal constitutional law. To wit, Defendants are imminently
5
expected to arrest Plaintiff for filing a Reply Brief in December 2018 to the New Hampshire
6
Supreme Court, as part of an appellate case, containing an innocuous “social media”
7
appendical exhibit, evidencing “possession” thereof. Defendants are about to arrest Plaintiff
8
for “possessing” the certain public court exhibit and cause irreparable, immediate harm under
9
the false guise of enforcing a civil “stalking” protection order under NH RSA 633:3-a.
10
Plaintiff also applies for an order to Defendants to show cause as to why a preliminary
11
injunction should not issue pending the trial of this action.
12
2. In support, Plaintiff relies upon the points of fact and law within his
13
accompanying Original Verified Complaint and additionally represents as follows.
14

15 EXIGENT NEED FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

16 3. Maravelias now faces imminent arrest and prosecution for his protected speech-

17 acts within his own pro se legal self-defense in New Hampshire courts, as a result of

18 Defendants’ illegal order.

19
4. Time is of the essence. Plaintiff Maravelias requests the Court grant him liberal
20
application of the well-pleaded complaint and reasonable construction rules as Maravelias is
21
pro se and composing the instant action on extremely short notice. He risks suffering
22
irreparable injury by continuing to refine and polish this legal document. Accordingly, it is
23

24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
153 -2-

27
 1
unwise to tarry, or to fortify the instant application for TRO with a more profound review of
2
case law than necessary.
3
5. To this end, to show the exigent need for a TRO, Plaintiff relies predominantly
4
upon all facts, causes of action, legal arguments, and prayers for relief rehearsed in his
5
accompanying Original Verified Complaint.
6

7 LEGAL STANDARD

8 6. In determining whether to grant a motion for a temporary restraining order, the

9 same four-factor analysis applies as would be used to evaluate a motion for preliminary

10 injunction. See, e.g., Francis v. Pulley, No. 06-480, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93792, at *5

11 (D.N.H. Dec. 28, 2006). To wit, to grant a TRO or preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must

12 establish the following four elements: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a

13 likelihood of irreparable harm absent interim relief, (3) a balance of equities in the plaintiff's

14 favor, and (4) service of the public interest.” Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Sci.

15 Advancements, 794 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2015); See also Planned Parenthood League v.

16 Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981), Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 26–27

17 (1st Cir. 2007), Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2014).

18
7. The predominate factor in this determination is the first factor: the likelihood of
19
success on the merits. See Corporate Technologies v. Harnett, 731 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2013);
20
Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (“In the
21
First Amendment context, the likelihood of success on the merits is the linchpin of the
22
preliminary injunction analysis.”).
23

24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
154 -3-

27
 1
PLAINTIFF IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS
2
8. The well-pleaded facts and allegations in Plaintiff’s accompanying Original
3
Verified Complaint establish an overwhelming likelihood of success on the merits of his
4
causes of action relating to the unconstitutionality of the “extended terms” provision.
5
9. To show a likelihood of success on the merits, it is enough that the movant
6
raises “questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make
7
them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation.” Brandeis Mach.
8
& Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Hamilton
9
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953)
10

11 PLAINTIFF WILL SUFFER IRREPARBLE INJURY

IN THE ABSENCE OF A TRO
12

13 10. Plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law. Money damages are unable

14 to compensate the imminent injury and harm which Defendants have represented to

15 Maravelias, nor are such damages available.

16
11. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
17
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976);
18
Sammortano v. First Jud. Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002). Any loss of
19
constitutional rights is presumed to be an irreparable injury. Colon-Marrero v. Conty Perez,
20
698 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, the facts and arguments alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint
21
require no further explanation. There is an imminent criminal enforcement against Maravelias
22
of a woefully unconstitutional, arbitrary set of “extended terms” issued in the total absence of
23
legal authority and purposed to criminalize Maravelias’s own legal self-defensive speech in
24
state court.
25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS
RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
155 -4-

27
 1
12. Furthermore, the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if this Court does not
2
maintain the status quo by granting a TRO to assert jurisdiction in this matter. See Robert
3
Haig, 3d Bus. & Comm’l Litig. in Fed. Cts. § 17:26 (2011) (“Nonetheless, the court may still
4
grant a mandatory preliminary injunction when necessary to protect the movant from
5
irreparable harm and to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision.”)
6
(emphasis added). Here, if this Court does not issue a TRO, Defendants will have enough
7
time to initiate criminal charges against Maravelias for violation of the unconstitutional
8
“extended terms”. In such an event, Younger abstention might preclude this Court from
9
“rendering a meaningful decision” – or any decision at all in this case. See Younger v. Harris,
10
401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention does not currently preclude this action because
11
Defendants have not yet filed charges against Maravelias. The sought injunctive relief is
12
exclusively prospective. Ergo, a TRO is necessary additionally to maintain this status quo.
13
THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES HEAVILY FAVORS GRANTING
14
A TRO, WHICH WILL NOT HARM DEFENDANTS
15
13. The sought TRO enjoins state officers from enforcing a particular order under
16
the guise of the NH civil protective order statute which the trial of this action will conclude is
17
illegal. A TRO enjoining state officers from criminally enforcing the said unconstitutional
18
“extended terms” does not cause any harm or injury whatsoever to the Defendants. It is well
19
established that no one, the government included, has an interest in the enforcement of an
20
unconstitutional law. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (1996).
21

22 14. On the contrary, the issuance of a TRO is indeed quite beneficial to Defendants

23 and all parties. Defendants will avoid law enforcement resource usage and wasteful, pointless,

24 and costly state-level criminal litigation if they are not enjoined from enforcing the Order.

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
156 -5-

27
 1
15. In fact, the issuance of a TRO could benefit Defendants even more than it will
2
benefit Plaintiff. Title 18 U.S.C. Section 242 imputes severe federal criminal penalties to any
3
state officer who, under color of law, “willfully subjects any person ... to the deprivation of
4
any rights ... secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States”. Absent
5
injunction, Defendants’ imminent unlawful enforcement action against Maravelias will
6
inevitably result in exactly the aforesaid federal crime, since Maravelias has apprised them of
7
the illegality of their conduct sufficiently as to render their imminent illegal action “willful”.
8
16. There are virtually zero equity considerations which oppose the issuance of a
9
TRO, while there are extensive motivations to grant one.
10

11 GRANTING THE TRO IS IN THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST

12 17. It is in the public’s interest to protect constitutional rights. See Hyde Park

13 Partners, L.P. v. Connolly, 839 F.2d 837, 854 (1st Cir. 1988) (“obviously, should the statute

14 be unconstitutional, the public interest would be adversely affected by denial of … an

15 injunction”).

16
CONCLUSION
17
18. Plaintiff states an actionable claim and exigent necessity for a temporary
18
restraining order. A Proposed Order is attached, pursuant to Local Rule 65.1.
19
19. Plaintiff has made efforts to give advance notice to Defendants of this TRO
20
request. See attached “PAUL MARAVELIAS’S CERTIFICATION OF NOTICE TO
21
DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO FRCP 65(b)(1)(B)”.
22

23

24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
157 -6-

27
 1
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Paul Maravelias respectfully requests this Honorable Court:
3
I. Issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction
4
prohibiting Defendants and their officials, employees, and agents from
5 implementing or enforcing the “extended terms” to the civil protective
order against Maravelias in New Hampshire District Court Case No. 473-
6 2016-CV-00124 as identified in Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint;

7 II. Issue an Order to Defendants to show cause as to why a preliminary

injunction should not issue pending the trial of this action;
8
III. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and proper.
9

10

11

12

13
Respectfully submitted,
14
PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
15

16

17

18

19

20 /s/ Paul J. Maravelias, pro se Dated: February 11th, 2019

21 Paul J. Maravelias
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
22 Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
23 603-475-3305

24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
158 -7-

27
 1
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR
2 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
3

4 NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
5
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE – COUNTY OF ____________________
6
On this ___ day of February 2019, before me, _________________________, the
7 undersigned officer, personally appeared ________________________, known to me (or
satisfactorily proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument
8 and acknowledged that he/she executed the same for the purposes therein contained, who
being by me first duly sworn, on his oath, deposes and says:
9
All factual stipulations within the foregoing Emergency Ex
10 Parte Application for TRO and Order to Show Cause Re
Preliminary Injunction are true and accurate to the best of
11 my knowledge as of 2/11/2019.
[affiant’s statement of facts]
12

13
__________________________________
14
[signature of affiant]
15 Paul J. Maravelias
[typed name of affiant]
16
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd, Windham, NH 03087
17
[address of affiant]
18
In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and official seal.
19

20
____________________________________
21
Notary Public
22
My commission expires: ________________
23

24

25 EMERGENCY EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY PAUL MARAVELIAS

RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD WINDHAM, NH 03087

26
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
159 -8-

27
 1 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
2 Windham, NH 03087
Telephone: (603) 475-3305
3
Email: paul@paulmarv.com
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
6
7 )
PAUL MARAVELIAS, )
8 a natural person, )
) Case No. 1:19-CV-143
9 Plaintiff, )
10 )
v.
)
11 ) PAUL MARAVELIAS’S
JOHN J. COUGHLIN,
a natural person, in his individual and ) DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF
12 official capacities, ) EMERGENCY EX PARTE
) APPLICATION FOR
13
GORDON J. MACDONALD, )
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
14 a natural person, in his official capacity as )
) ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW
Attorney General of New Hampshire,
15 ) CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY
PATRICIA G. CONWAY, ) INJUNCTION
16 a natural person, in her official capacity as )
Rockingham County Attorney, )
17
)
18 TOWN OF WINDHAM, ex rel., )
WINDHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
19 municipal entities, Date Action filed: 2/10/2019
) Time: 11:00AM
)
20 GERALD S. LEWIS,
)
a natural person, in his official capacity as
21 Chief of Police of the Town of Windham, )
)
22 Defendants. )
)
23
24
I, Paul Maravelias, declare that:
25
26 1. On 2/8/19 at 11:00am EST, I voluntarily met with Sgt. Bryan Smith at the
27 Windham Police Department. Sgt. Smith leads the investigation/detective division.
28

160 -1-
 1 2. Sgt. Smith asked me if I objected to our conversation being recorded. I told him

2 that was fine. At that point, there was no “reasonable expectation of privacy” that could have
3
made it unlawful under NH RSA 570-A for me to have a concurrent separate audio recording
4
on my cell-phone. Further, Sgt. Smith is a police officer who was performing his official
5
duties in a public space. See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
6
7 3. I declare that the following pieces of dialogue occurred in said conversation.
8 Hereunder, I add emphasis in parts to highlight dialogue of special legal significance. In a few
9
parts, I add text in brackets to aid contextual understanding but not actually spoken.
10
11 Maravelias’s Statements to Sgt. Smith in the 2/8/19 Interview

12
4. “I have court exhibits – public documents … for instance, the pictures of her
13
middle-fingering me and harassing me at a time when she claims to fear me. This whole thing
14
is a malicious, defamatory harassment campaign against me. So, uh, I own those court
15
16 exhibits, okay? And… and if your department is going to arrest me for owning court

17 exhibits… every single individual officer in this building knows I have a constitutional right

18 to own and possess court documents”

19
5. “I’ve been very compliant.”
20
21 6. “The whole thing is invalid, the whole thing is unconstitutional; I have a right to
22 own any public images on the internet. But in the gray area I suppose you could call it … the
23
gray area that I haven’t even tested yet with you is, you know, posting things that aren’t legal
24
documents, but it’s fully within my first-amended right to post and put on the internet, and,
25
sort-of, dialectically prove my innocence and that they lied. I haven’t even done that, okay?
26
27 All I’ve done … is compose legal documents which are favorable to my position and that is

28

161 -2-
 1 completely protected by my rights under the constitution of the United States of America and

2 the State of New Hampshire.”

3
7. “I understand what the order was that Judge Coughlin granted when he scribbled
4
‘Denied’ on my 20 pages of constitutional analysis and fact– and merit-based objection”
5
6 8. “Are you investigating me for having violated the stalking order?”
7
9. “Can you name one act that I’ve done that you believe would, uh, approach
8
getting near those outrageous social media ‘possession’ terms that is not an act of me
9
10 engaging in the legal process in the court system? Have I gone on my website and posted

11 pictures that I believe are, you know, helpful to my position but aren’t court filings, have I
12
done that?”
13
10. “On the date that that order was made, legal exhibits in my folder cannot be
14
15 expected to be thrown in the trash. I mean, I understand you’re doing your job right now, but

16 do you understand how insane this is? … I mean these people lied to get a restraining order
17 against me and I’m sitting in my town’s police department and there’s a serious conversation
18
whether or not I’m a criminal for owning pieces of paper that are court documents that I used
19
to – do you understand how Orwellian, like is this Communist Russia? The publicity that
20
would come against this department – I mean, just imagine the headlines, ‘Man arrested: 23-
21
22 year-old guy arrested for possessing court exhibits to prove a girl lied about him’. You

23 understand the climate we’re in right now, these false accusers? I mean I didn’t do any
24
‘stalking’ to begin with … I have a right … that I possess my court exhibits. It’s not going on
25
her social media and pulling stuff now, since [the time that] that term was granted, okay?
26
That’s not what’s happened: I have court exhibits”
27
28

162 -3-
 1 11. “If you want to get down to the specifics of this and say that by filing a legal

2 document, your investigating me for violating the stalking order, I would like to have my
3
lawyer.”
4
12. “Do I have to be terrorized by the thought that your department is going to come
5
6 and arrest me right before my hearing? [on 2/12/19 on the protective order extension]”

7
13. “Do I have to be terrorized now that I know I’m being investigated for violating
8
a stalking order”?
9
10 14. “Please don’t give these people validation by arresting me, and, you know, my

11 name is in the paper – that’s all they want, they’re out to get me. Please sir.”
12
Sgt. Smith’s Statements to Maravelias in the 2/8/19 Interview
13
14 15. “You understand that part of that order … there was a motion granted that said

15 that you’re not allowed to possess her social media.”

16
16. “You understand that the court stated you can’t possess her social media,
17
whether you believe it’s unconstitutional or not … you understand and know that the court
18
19 said that you can’t possess her social media?”

20
17. “OK, I’m asking you: do you understand that that was a piece, or that that was
21
granted, that you can’t possess her social media?”
22
23 18. “Yeah, there’s an investigation, I told you I wanted to talk about it”.

24
19. “As to whether charges come or not … all dependent on what the findings are of
25
my investigation.”
26
27 20. “I’m investigating whether your possession of some of her social media pieces

28 … [violates the ‘extended terms’ of the protective order]”

163 -4-
 1 21. “In your Plaintiff’s Reply Brief to the Supreme Court, you put this piece of

2 social media in it. … You know the pieces that you submitted, so … Prior to submitting this
3
brief to the Supreme Court, had you ever used this piece of social media in any of your
4
hearings or any of your court cases?”
5
6 22. “But you presented it. So you possessed it if you presented it.”

7
23. “That’s a piece of social media post, would you agree to that? Is that a social
8
media post?”
9
10 24. “Whether it’s valid or not, the court has said it’s valid.”

11
25. “I’m investigating a report that you possessed her social media after you were
12
told you can’t. That’s what I’m investigating.”
13
14 26. “I’m attempting to get that, as to whether they were in public files or not”

15
27. “I’m in the middle of my investigation. In the middle of an investigation, I
16
haven’t decided whether I have probable cause to arrest you yet.”
17
18 28. “If I believe that you fit the four corners of the law and you violated the stalking

19 order, then I will arrest you.”

20
29. “If there’s probable cause … I’ll get a warrant, and then I’ll call you and tell you
21
22 to turn yourself in.”

23 30. “There’s a complaint that you possess her social media.”

24
31. “I’m still collecting stuff, when it comes to, what the public documents are –
25
26 whether exhibits were, when you ever … to use that piece of social media as an exhibit, when

27 I get that, and I review all the facts and circumstances, I’ll make a decision, um, and like I

28 said, if I do an arrest warrant for you I’ll call you.”

164 -5-
 1 The above facts are within my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to their

2 truth if called as a witness. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
3
New Hampshire and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct to
4
the best of my knowledge as of 2/11/2019.
5
6
7
8
9
10
/s/ Paul J. Maravelias, pro se Dated: February 11th, 2019
11 Paul J. Maravelias
12 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
13 paul@paulmarv.com
603-475-3305
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

165 -6-
 1 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
2 Windham, NH 03087
Telephone: (603) 475-3305
3
Email: paul@paulmarv.com
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
6
7 )
PAUL MARAVELIAS, )
8 a natural person, )
) Case No. 1:19-CV-143
9 Plaintiff, )
10 )
v.
)
11 ) PAUL MARAVELIAS’S
JOHN J. COUGHLIN,
a natural person, in his individual and ) CERTIFICATION OF NOTICE
12 official capacities, ) TO DEFENDANTS PURSUANT
) TO FRCP 65(b)(1)(B)
13
GORDON J. MACDONALD, )
14 a natural person, in his official capacity as )
Attorney General of New Hampshire, )
15 )
PATRICIA G. CONWAY, )
16 a natural person, in her official capacity as ) Date Action filed: 2/10/2019
Rockingham County Attorney, ) Time: 11:00AM
17
)
18 TOWN OF WINDHAM, ex rel., )
WINDHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, )
19 municipal entities, )
)
20 GERALD S. LEWIS,
)
a natural person, in his official capacity as
21 Chief of Police of the Town of Windham, )
)
22 Defendants. )
)
23
24
I, Paul Maravelias, declare as follows. I am the pro se Plaintiff of this action. Pursuant to
25
26 FRCP 65(b)(1)(B), I made the following efforts to give Defendants’ notice that I would apply

27 to this Court for an ex parte temporary restraining order against them.

28

166 -1-
 1 On Friday 2/8/19 at 2051 EST, I sent the following email whose recipients included 1)

2 two contacts for the NH Attorney General, 2) the Town Clerk of Windham, NH 3) Gerald S.
3
Lewis, WPD Chief of Police, 4) Sgt. Bryan Smith, WPD, and 4) the two Captains and one
4
Prosecutor email contacts for WPD as available on the town website:
5
6 “Dear Sgt. Smith:

7 Thank you for meeting with me this morning at the department. I appreciate your professionalism.
8
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 65(b)(1)(B), this email serves to provide you and your department (and, by
9 extension, the Town of Windham and the State of New Hampshire) advance notice that I intend to
file an Emergency Application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against you in
10 NH Federal District Court on Monday morning to protect my federal constitutional rights and
11 restrain you from arresting me or issuing any warrants in response to my conduct of submitting a
public court exhibit in a routine NHSC appeal brief.
12
You do not have probable cause that I have violated a protective order pursuant to RSA 633:3-a,
13
and even if you did, this action is necessary to protect my constitutional rights against an overbroad
14 statute doubtlessly invalidated by whatever outrageous applied circumstances which could possibly
motivate such an arrest on its face.
15
I am terrorized at the prospect of being falsely arrested as a result of, it would appear, my lawful
16
First-Amendment-protected legal self-defense conduct - my mere participation in the adversarial
17 process. Given this circumstance of which I learned just today, I have reasonable fear that I will
suffer "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" if a TRO against you is not granted
18 before you "can be heard in opposition". See F.R.C.P. 65(b)(1)(A).
19
This is especially true as the Derry Circuit Court hearing for the protective order extension against
20 me is scheduled for 8am on Tuesday morning.
21
If circumstances over the weekend or early Monday morning come about such that you decide
22 certainly not to pursue any warrants against me in connection with this matter, please contact me
ASAP by cell at 603-475-3305 and/or email.
23
24 Respectfully and sincere regards,

25 Paul J. Maravelias
paul@paulmarv.com”
26
27
28

167 -2-
 1 I could not find an adequate email contact address for the Rockingham County Attorney.

2 I did not give notice to Defendant John J. Coughlin since the sought temporary restraining
3
order and preliminary injunction do not enjoin him, as he lacks enforcement capacity.
4
Before the printing and filing this morning of 2/11/19 of the Original Verified Complaint,
5
6 Application for ex parte temporary restraining order, and related papers, I emailed a

7 preliminary copy of these materials to all recipient email addresses enumerated above. Said
8 emailed copies were solely to provide further notice pending formal service of process, and
9
accordingly may lack signatures, notary verifications, or other de minimis differences as
10
effectuated after the printing but before the filing of this action.
11
12
13
The above facts are within my personal knowledge and I am competent to testify to their
14
truth if called as a witness. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
15
16 New Hampshire and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct to

17 the best of my knowledge as of 2/11/2019.

18
19
20
21
22
23
/s/ Paul J. Maravelias, pro se Dated: February 11th, 2019
24
Paul J. Maravelias
25 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
26 Windham, NH 03087
paul@paulmarv.com
27 603-475-3305

28

168 -3-
 1 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS, pro se
34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
2 Windham, NH 03087
Telephone: (603) 475-3305
3
Email: paul@paulmarv.com
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
6
7 )
PAUL MARAVELIAS, )
8 a natural person, )
) Case No. 1:19-CV-143
9 Plaintiff, )
10 )
v.
)
11 ) [PROPOSED] ORDER
JOHN J. COUGHLIN,
a natural person, in his individual and ) GRANTING TEMPORARY
12 official capacities, ) RESTRAINING ORDER AND
) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS
13
GORDON J. MACDONALD, )
TO WHY A PRELIMINARY
14 a natural person, in his official capacity as )
) INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT
Attorney General of New Hampshire,
15 ) ISSUE
PATRICIA G. CONWAY, )
16 a natural person, in her official capacity as )
Rockingham County Attorney, )
17
)
18 TOWN OF WINDHAM, ex rel., )
WINDHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT, Date: _________
)
19 municipal entities, ) Time: _________
)
20 GERALD S. LEWIS,
)
a natural person, in his official capacity as
21 Chief of Police of the Town of Windham, )
)
22 Defendants. )
)
23
24
[PROPOSED] ORDER
25
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
26
27 Order to Show Cause Re Preliminary Injunction, the Memorandum and Exhibits in support

28 thereof, as well as the parties’ brief and oral argument, if any, this Court finds that Plaintiff

169 -1-
 1 has demonstrated a need for preliminary injunctive relief in this case, and that immediate,

2 irreparable injury will result to Plaintiff in the absence of a temporary restraining order.
3
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is the
4
same standard that applies to preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Francis v. Pulley, No. 06-
5
480, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93792, at *5 (D.N.H. Dec. 28, 2006). Plaintiff has shown the
6
7 Defendants are engaging in a course of conduct affecting his constitutional interests and

8 that there is imminent threat Defendants will criminally enforce the material “extended

9 terms” against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations identify an imminent threat of

10
irreparable injury by deprivation of federal constitutional rights and establish he is likely to
11
succeed on the merits, warranting ex parte prospective injunctive relief. The Court finds
12
the protection of constitutional rights to be in the public interest and that the balance of
13
14 equities tips in Plaintiff’s favor.

15
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application and
16
ORDERS A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER against Defendants Gordon J.
17
18 MacDonald, Patricia G. Conway, the Town of Windham, Gerald S. Lewis, and their

19 officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys (collectively, “Defendants Bound”).

20 Effective immediately, the said Defendants Bound are:
21
22 1. HEREBY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from enforcing anywhere the

23 extended terms granted on 8/7/2018 to the NH district court civil protective order in
24
Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (473-2016-CV-00124), to wit, the
25
extended terms that “Respondent [Plaintiff Maravelias] shall not gain access to or
26
possess any of Petitioner’s [Christina DePamphilis’s] social media communications
27
28 either directly or through a third party”; and

170 -2-
 1 2. HEREBY ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from obtaining, executing, or

2 enforcing any arrest or search warrants in connection to any investigation or

3
criminal charge relating to Plaintiff’s alleged violation of the said extended terms.
4
5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall show cause as to why a preliminary

6 injunction should not issue enjoining them and their agents from enforcing the said
7
extended terms to the protective order against Plaintiff. The Court will construe Plaintiff’s
8
moving papers for a TRO as a motion for preliminary injunction.
9
10 This order SHALL remain in full force and effect through the earlier of the expiration of
11
ten (10) days or a hearing on a preliminary injunction. The case is set for a hearing on a
12
preliminary injunction on __________________.
13
14
15 IT IS SO ORDERED, this ___ day of February 2019 at _______.

16
17
18 Dated: February ____, 2019 ___________________________
United States District Judge
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

171 -3-
172
173
174
175
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

RESPONDENT’S OBJECTION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF

STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION TO INCLUDE FURTHER CONDITIONS

NOW COMES the Respondent, Paul Maravelias, and moves this Court to deny Petitioner’s

baseless Motion for Modification of Stalking Final Order of Protection to Include Further

Conditions dated 7/2/18. In support thereof, he represents as follows:

1. On 7/2/18, David DePamphilis’s daughter, the Petitioner, filed the aforementioned

Motion to impose even more severe court-ordered restrictions on Maravelias’s public free-

speech rights, even after her outright lies, inconsistent statements, and vulgar acts of harassment

against Maravelias were undeniably exposed in numerous ways during hearings before this Court

on 5/3, 5/4, and 6/8 of this year.

A. PETITIONER CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS’S MOTION AIMS TO EXCUSE HER

DOCUMENTED ILLEGAL BEHAVIORS AND EMPOWER HER TO CONTINUE VIOLATING
THE LAW, AND IS BUT ANOTHER PREDICTABLE ACT IN HER CONTINUED CAMPAIGN
OF LEGAL HARASSMENT AGAINST MARAVELIAS

176
 2. As this Court will remember, Christina DePamphilis has cruelly bullied the victim, Mr.

Maravelias, with incitative, vulgar, and insulting posts on her public social media profile(s)

during the pendency of her criminally falsified “stalking” order against the victim/Respondent.

3. She now seeks to have this Court outlaw Maravelias’s mere possessing a record of her

behavior.

4. In particular, in June 2017, Petitioner posted an inflammatory picture of her boyfriend

directly addressing the victim and making incitative comments against him (6/19/18).

5. After failing to elicit any response from Maravelias that would violate her bad-faith

“stalking” order against him, she then posted a rehearsed image of herself, her father David

DePamphilis, and her 21-year-old boyfriend Matthew LaLiberte, all middle-fingering the victim,

and also making an incitative comment against the victim which identified him.

6. Viewed in the light of her acts of criminal harassment (RSA 644:4) against Mr.

Maravelias, the Petitioner’s present motion to prohibit Maravelias from “gaining access” to or

even “possessing” these public posts, even from “third parties”, is a risible perversion of

propriety.

7. Essentially, Christina DePamphilis wishes to be legitimated by this Court to continue

her vulgar harassment of Mr. Maravelias while injunctively restraining him from even using her

outrageous public social media exhibits for legal purposes to defend himself. This Court should

feel insulted by such a disrespectful and inappropriate attempt to abuse its power.

8. The Petitioner’s continued conduct of filing baseless motions against the victim is for

no valid purpose beyond solely to harass him; this Court should impose sanctions against her

accordingly for such repeated and patently unreasonable motions against Mr. Maravelias.

177
 9. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s motion attempts to excuse her generic illegal behaviors,

past and future, demonstrated on her social media, in which Mr. Maravelias is not the victim.

10. In the Motion to Extend Hearing, this Court accepted inter alia a relevant evidentiary

exhibit of the “minor” Petitioner – a picture from her social media. In this post, she had pictured

herself, at age 16, holding a purse in her right hand and an open bottle of vodka in her left while

leaving a party at “4:43am”, with her parked, about-to-be-driven car in the background.

11. Christina DePamphilis also documented her psychoactive substance abuse, her private

sexual behaviors1, and her further underage alcoholic consumption in other social media

postings.

12. Thus, the Petitioner’s current desire to handcuff Maravelias in his public free speech

rights to third-parties is but a panicked “futile attempt” to avoid responsibility for her pictured

acts of law-breaking and perjury2, should Maravelias discontinue his magnanimous decline so-

far to lawfully document said public postings on the web, as he lawfully threatened to do in a

November 2017 response to Attorney Brown’s out-of-the-blue threatening letter3.

1
If this Court were to grant Petitioner’s Motion and thereby enter the enterprise of unlawfully policing private
conducts of speech, it would at least be equitable for the Court to order Christina DePamphilis to cease and desist
making improper posts revealing her private sexual behaviors before peers. Upon information and belief, this
behavior is socially unacceptable, and is considered disturbing by her peers. It is not practiced by other youth, even
by ones who picture themselves violating state laws on alcohol/marijuana consumption. While the latter is at least
somewhat socially acceptable, the Petitioner has caused discomfort to her peers with her unwanted social media
indications of her private sex life. These should never be publicly posted on social media, especially given her age.
2
Christina DePamphilis maintained her false claim under oath on 5/3/18 that she has “fear for her physical safety”
of Mr. Maravelias, despite her abusive, harassing, and unlawful conduct victimizing Mr. Maravelias. Indeed, this
Court has validated Christina DePamphilis’s hurtful law-breaking, in wrongfully granting an extension on her
Stalking Order. That matter is pending this Court’s review in a reconsideration pleading filed by Respondent.
3
Maravelias has every right to publicly republish her legally-public postings, as acknowledged by the mere
existence of the instant motion by Petitioner, the daughter of David DePamphilis, to injunct against said right.

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 13. The Petitioner requests that it be unlawful for Maravelias to even “possess” her social

media postings. This is so absurd that it would criminalize Mr. Maravelias for merely owning his

copy of this Court’s own public evidence exhibits from this case which he used at Hearing.

14. Thus, it would also violate the “Right to Know” law (91-A), guaranteeing access to

public court records, e.g. Christina DePamphilis’s posting of herself middle-fingering her victim.

15. While it is strongly speculated that there are many photographs in existence of the 17-

year-old female Petitioner which are already quite unlawful for anyone to even possess4, these

are most certainly not the public social media postings in question, which are fully lawful for

legal use.

B. PETITIONER’S MOTION DISHONESTLY OMITS PARTS OF MARAVELIAS’S ALLEGED

“THREATNING QUOTE” TO OBFUSCATE THE FACT THAT HE WAS MERELY COUNTER-
THREATENING LAWFUL DETERRENT RETALIATION IF LEGALLY ATTACKED

16. The Petitioner seems quite fixated on the fact that Maravelias merely responded to

Attorney Brown’s provocative, threatening letter to him. Maravelias made a comment along the

lines that he would “go nuclear and utterly destroy [Christina’s] academic and professional future”.

17. Conveniently, Petitioner omits the second part of Maravelias’s actual sentence: “[share her

own public social media artifacts], should David dare challenge [Maravelias] legally”.

18. Thus, Petitioner’s counsel first provoked Maravelias with an absurd, causeless threat of

lawsuit, and Maravelias then lawfully counter-threatened to share Petitioner’s already-public social

media posts, which might have a negative effect on her future due to her own outrageous behaviors.

4
18 U.S.C. § 2251, RSA 649-A:3

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C. PETITIONER’S MOTION HAS NO BASIS IN THE LAW WHATSOEVER, AS THE REQUESTED
RELIEF FAR EXCEEDS THE POWERS GRANTED TO THIS COURT BY THE LAW AND
WOULD FURTHER BLATANTLY ABUSE MARAVELIAS’S BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO FREE SPEECH, PRESS, AND PETITION, AMONG OTHERS

“Free speech and Liberty of the press are essential to the security of Freedom in a State: They ought,
therefore, to be inviolably preserved.” – N.H. Const., Part I, Article 22

19. A Stalking Order – whether lawfully issued or not – does not grant a trial court unspecified

powers to enjoin broad prophylactic injunctions on First Amendment-protected speech against

Respondent. Petitioner’s Motion seeks no relief whatsoever regarding Maravelias’s conduct with

her, but rather his speech to third-party actors. This is shameful and cowardly.

20. “Only narrow categories of speech, such as defamation, incitement and pornography

produced with real children, fall outside the ambit of the right to free speech.” State v. Zidel, 156

N.H. 684, 686, 940 A.2d 255 (2008). As Petitioner’s requested terms seek to injunct against

Maravelias’s free speech rights in none of the aforecited unprotected categories5, but rather would

proscribe any and all communications with large classes of third party individuals, her motion must

be unquestionably denied.

21. If this Court were to abuse its power by granting such latitudinous injunctions against Mr.

Maravelias’s public speech to parties other than Petitioner, it would incur liability in federal – let

alone state-level – lawsuits for damages on the grounds of willful, reckless First Amendment

transgression. Since this Court is well-aware of the facts and circumstances of this case and has

demonstrated a repeated pattern of inexcusable conduct evincing a clear bias against Respondent, it

5
Insofar as the Petitioner falsely claims Maravelias’s 12/10/17 email regarding her conduct was “libelous”, the
proper remedy for defamation is recovery of damages through civil equity litigation – not a personal-safety-
exclusive Stalking Order. Mr. Maravelias is the victim, not the author, of libelous/slanderous expression.

180
would be liable for Section 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal damages in violating Respondent’s

constitutional rights while acting under color of state law.

22. That such violations be knowing or willful is not a prerequisite element for § 1983 action.

23. While the Court has authority to issue specific orders of protection as enumerated on the

standard form for Stalking Orders requested by Petitioner prior to and not after any hearing, the

Court may do so only “as is necessary to bring about a cessation of stalking”. See RSA 633:3-a, III-

a. Furthermore, 633:3-a, II. narrows the legal definition “stalking” such that it “shall not include

constitutionally protected activity, nor shall it include conduct that was necessary to accomplish a

legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person”.

24. Therefore, the requested modifications to the Stalking Order are absolutely illegal. They

overwhelmingly exceed the Court’s statutory authority to prohibit solely acts of further “stalking”,

of which constitutionally protected speech (e.g., to own/use public social media postings or

communicate with public employees independent of contacting Petitioner) is not.

25. Furthermore, if the Court nonetheless asserted an undefined power to grant these expanded

injunctions against Respondent, it would violate plainly established protections on constitutional,

legitimate speech to third-parties who are not plaintiffs in any civil protective order. Such a court

order would be contemptuous of Part I, Article 22 of the State Constitution and the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, inter alia.

26. The relief sought in Petitioner’s motion is unconstitutional for being impossibly vague and

woefully overbroad. “Courts are suspicious of broad prophylactic rules in the area of free

expression, and therefore precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely

touching our most precious freedoms”. Montenegro v. New Hampshire Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166

N.H. 215, 220 (2014). The sought expanded terms of protection fail to sustain any “precision of

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regulation” standard, as they are impermissibly overbroad and confusingly vague. A statute is

considered unconstitutionally “‘overbroad’ in violation of the First Amendment if in its reach it

prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114

(1972).

27. The second and third sought orders of protection forbid that the Respondent should contact

Petitioner’s “present or future” “academic providers” or “employers”. In imposing such groundless

authoritarian sanctions against Maravelias, the Court would expect him to conjure a supernatural

ability to presciently discern through a crystal ball who might be her “future employer(s)” or who

might be her future/current “academic provider(s)”, a term which is in itself impossibly vague.

28. Clearly, these measures are wickedly crafted to outlaw any and all acts of constitutionally

protected, self-defensive speech Maravelias may take on the web or elsewhere to defend his own

wrongfully discredited name, traduced in envy by the Petitioner-attention-seeker, as any public act

of speech whatsoever could be visible to an “employer” or “academic provider”.

29. “The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a

substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.” Ashcroft v. Free

Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002). Even if the requested additional injunctions did function to

prevent further acts of “stalking”, they are still egregiously overbroad and therefore unactionable

manifestations of the statute, due to the copious protected speech that would be simultaneously

criminalized. See Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t. of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215,

221 (2012), which holds laws facially overbroad under Part I, Article 22 of the State Constitution

where “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the [law’s]

plainly legitimate sweep”. Id.

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 30. This Court must observe the brutally evident reality that Christina DePamphilis finds

herself in a guilt-ridden panic-mode state, now that her outrageous acts of protective order

falsification have been documented by Maravelias at the Hearing, that the wrong order was actually

extended against him (perpetuating the injustice), and that he still has full right to make public

speech acts to document her crimes. This Court issues jail sentences routinely in its official duties:

why then should it protect a nefarious perjurer-criminal from natural consequences as

comparatively tepid as having the objective facts of her own public words further publicized?

D. PETITIONER’S CITATION OF RSA 173-B:5 IS INCOMPLETE, DECEPTIVE, AND INVALID

31. Paragraph 9 of David DePamphilis’s daughter’s Motion attempts to deceive this Court into

believing it has any legal authority whatsoever to grant her request. This is another act of the

Petitioner’s storied obscurantism and willful misrepresentation of facts.

32. RSA 173-B is the domestic violence statute, in which the operative legal term is “abuse”.

33. “Abuse” is defined in 173-B:1, I as certain acts performed exclusively “by a family or

household member or by a current or former sexual or intimate partner” of the victim.

34. Mr. Maravelias has never been a “family or household member” of Petitioner, nor one of

the many men who may honestly claim to have been her “sexual or intimate partner”, thankfully.

35. Thus, 173-B terminology pertaining to “abuse” is thoroughly inapplicable to the instant

case.

36. Although the procedural stipulations of 173-B are applied to Stalking protective orders

under 633:3-a, III-a, this does not mean specific language pertaining to physically violent domestic

“abuse” in 173-B may be absorbed into a very different case pertaining to alleged “stalking”.

37. The Petitioner attempts to fool this Court into adopting a strange interpretation of 173-B:5

by obscurantistically omitting the full text of the statute for essential context:

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 “I. A finding of abuse shall mean the defendant represents a credible threat to the safety of the
plaintiff. Upon a showing of abuse of the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
shall grant such relief as is necessary to bring about a cessation of abuse.” (Emphasis added)

38. The Petitioner dishonestly cherry-picks the last 8 words of the statute in Paragraph 9 of her

Motion – omitting even the majority of the quoted sentence, let alone the surrounding context – to

advance a preposterous interpretation thereof before this Court.6

39. That is, the Petitioner deceitfully conflates the statute controlling the original issuance of a

domestic violence restraining order with a nonexistent power of this Court to issue further stalking-

related injunctions against Mr. Maravelias without any form of due process inherent to the original

issuance of Stalking order terms of protection, such as a full and fair trial, the notice of criminal

consequences for perjurious accusations in the petition form, and a public notary taking the oath of

the Petitioner certifying the truth of his or her allegations.

40. The dishonesty of Petitioner’s Paragraph 9 conduct is extreme and willful. This Court

should impose sanctions for such blatant attempts to fool it into breaking the law, and the bar

association should be contacted regarding a potential Code of Attorney Conduct violation7.

41. Absolute judicial immunity exists where a judge acts within a “judicial capacity”. Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Since issuing unlawful injunctions against Respondent on the basis

of an inapplicable legal standard for a separate cause of action (as documented above) establishes a

framework in which the Court knows it acts outside of the law, such an act would be in excess of

any legitimate “judicial capacity” and would dissolve the ordinary shield of absolute judicial

immunity from federal Section 1983 and/or other litigation.

6
See the parallel language specific to Stalking orders in 633:3-a, III-a, which differs from 173-B’s text and again
pertains to the initial process of Stalking Petition filing and subsequent court order post-hearing, not an unfettered
right to grant further unnoticed prayers for relief found nowhere in the Petition nor ever raised at the Hearing.

7
See New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (b)(1), Rule 4.1, and the 2004 ABA Model Rule
Comment on Rule 4.1

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 42. In further support of the Court’s inability to impose unlawful, unconstitutional restrictions

on the public speech of Respondent, see Exhibit A (Respondent’s May 2018 Motion to Dismiss

filed in the baseless criminal case against Respondent for his 12/10/17 National Honor Society

ethics complaint email, which Petitioner references in her Motion).

E. THE LEGAL SCOPE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STALKING STATUTE CONCERN
PERSONAL SAFETY PROTECTION EXCLUSIVELY – NOT ENFORCING CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS FOR ACTS OF DISAGREEABLE SPEECH OR EVEN DEFAMATORY SPEECH.

43. The expanded terms requested by Christina DePamphilis have absolutely nothing to do

with protecting her physical safety. They are fretful, neurotic exasperations that the Court order

Maravelias 1) not possess public legal exhibits and 2) not make any communications to third-

parties. Even if this were a legitimate “protection” of someone’s “career” or “academics”, the law

affords this Court no ability to enforce random “protection” injunctions at its own despotic, nanny-

state volition, as requested.

44. The Stalking statute permits physical-violence-prevention-related protections exclusively.

F. PETITIONER’S ABUSIVE MOTION FALSELY ACCUSES THE RESPONDENT EXACTLY OF

HER OWN DISTURBING BEHAVIORS

45. When taking breaks from secretly collecting pictures of Maravelias’s private bedroom

without his knowledge and harassing him with vulgar middle-finger posts with her boyfriend, the

Petitioner Christina DePamphilis has been monitoring Maravelias’s online activity and gaining

access to material she is not intended to see. In a recent filing, she revealed that she has likely

hacked into Maravelias’s private business product support forum and accessed Maravelias’s private

postings on an off-topic discussion section therefrom.

46. Given the Petitioner’s disturbing and obsessive behaviors, Maravelias understandably feels

violated, uncomfortable, and utterly creeped-out. But, he dares not file another honest and truthful

Stalking petition – even as a victim of true stalking – since this Court has proven its undeniable

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prejudicial hostility against Maravelias in forcing him to pay an opponent’s attorney’s fees in a

factually corroborated, truthful Petition filed against David DePamphilis.

47. Thus, at the very least, this Court ought not to unlawfully expand the abusive “terms of

protection” in the same extant Stalking Order it knows to be originated in falsification.

48. Furthermore, Respondent Maravelias has been absolutely magnanimous up to this point in

declining to exercise his right to disseminate DePamphilis’s outrageous social media postings. The

Court should perceive Maravelias’s good-character benevolence, and not further abuse his speech

rights through unilateral acts of judicial tyranny.

49. To prove this, Maravelias represents to have been sent the following social media postings

made by Christina DePamphilis, which he has opted never to share heretofore in any context:

a. A post showing Christina conspiring with her brother Nicolas DePamphilis over SMS
about where the two may consume an illegal drug without David DePamphilis
knowing;

b. A video of Christina forcing the slurred exclamation “I’m. So. High!” through an
intoxicated blur while sitting on a toilet at a party;

c. A highly inappropriate, suggestive video of Christina genuflecting on her knees and

sucking a frothy white fluid (hypothesized to be whipped cream) into her mouth which
then appears smeared on her face;

d. Photographs and videos of Christina climbing out of her second-story bedroom

window late at night to escape to a party in secret;

e. A video wherein Christina brags of “passing” a field sobriety test a police officer
administered to her when pulled over returning from said party;

f. A photograph proving she was indeed at her Salisbury beach house in February 2017,
and therefore feloniously perjured before this Court on 5/4/18 when so denying; and

g. A video picturing Christina intoxicated on a ski lift and casually joking about the
danger thereof, revealing she later took rescue snowmobile escort down the mountain.

50. Maravelias is not “obsessed” with a delinquent law-breaker. His mind has not been

“preoccupied at all with [her]”, as written to Attorney Brown in the November 2017 letter. He has

186
not disseminated any of the aforementioned exhibits. This shows his clemency and non-obsession.

If this Court will illegally injunct further against Maravelias’s free speech rights through shameful

diktats, he will make broader exercise of the free speech rights he still has.

51. Furthermore, since Maravelias has been sent the social media exhibits in question by

independent third parties who support him, the instant Motion to further abuse Maravelias is an

incredibly foolhardy act by the Petitioner. It is suspected that these third parties too will discontinue

their independent magnanimity in allowing Christina DePamphilis to grow in her delinquency

without public correction or documentation of the said.

CONCLUSION

“To extend the Stalking Order in this case would show plaintiffs all across the great State of New
Hampshire that you can come to court to get a restraining order against someone – to shut them up when
they say things you disagree with.” – Paul Maravelias, 6/8/18 Hearing Closing Argument

52. Mr. Maravelias enjoys enormous validation of his trenchant determination from months

ago that the DePamphilis bad-faith “stalking order” abuse against him has been but a cowardly

attempt to restrict his speech, having nothing at all to do with a “fear for personal safety”.

53. The Petitioner’s shameful, panicked, and obscurantist Motion decisively confirms this.

54. The said is a but veiled attempt to criminalize Maravelias’s quotidian existence. It is a

nefarious scheme to conduce an innocent human life into doubtless imprisonment. It is a cowardly

contrivance birthed of the perverse validation this Court’s errors have tortiously bestowed upon

Maravelias’s abusers, and lacks any legal merit. It is beyond shameful that David and Christina

DePamphilis still machinate against the victim such dishonest abuse-stratagems which cowardly

masquerade under the misleading optics of protectivism.

187
188
189
190
191
EXHIBIT D

192
EXHIBIT E

193
EXHIBIT F

194
195
 March 21st, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed the following pleadings to be filed in the above-referenced case:

1) Respondent’s Verified Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting

Stalking Order Extension;

2) Paul Maravelias’s Verification Affidavit to Motion to Reconsider

Please note the opposing party has filed their own Motion to Reconsider on 3/18/19.
I shall file a separate Objection thereto pursuant to the Court’s rules on or before 3/28/19.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

Hon. Robert S. Stephen
John J. Coughlin

196
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

VERIFIED MOTION TO RECONSIDER

3/8/19 ORDER GRANTING STALKING ORDER EXTENSION

Paul Maravelias (“Respondent”) respectfully requests The Honorable Court reconsider its 3/8/19 Order
extending the stalking order for one year. Maravelias acknowledges the good and noble intentions of the
current Court, but humbly argues its Order is more appealable than appealing. In support, he states as follows:

I. THE STALKING ORDER EXTENSION IS LEGAL ERROR

A. The Court’s Extension Order is Illegal and Prejudicial Because It Relies Substantially Upon
an Allegation Found Only at Paragraph 15 of Petitioner’s Motion to Extend, Whereas the
Court Narrowed the Scope of the Hearing to Paragraphs 12, 13, 22-24, and 27

1. On 2/7/19, the Court granted Maravelias’s Motion to State Reasons for Granting Extension,
stating it found Paragraphs “12, 13, 22-24, and 27” of DePamphilis’s 1/24/18 Verified Motion to Extend
constituted “good cause to extend the Stalking Final Order of Protection”.

2. At the 2/12/19 Hearing on the extension, the Court verbally clarified its intention with granting
the Motion to State Reasons was to have a more “focused” hearing.

3. On 3/8/19, the Court issued an Order extending the stalking order based solely on its finding:

“Mr. Maravelias continued efforts at disparaging Ms. DePamphilis and her family
by making offensive and hateful statements in public postings on the internet”

4. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of DePamphilis’s Motion to Extend do not notice any such allegation;
they paraphrased the Supreme Court’s summary of Maravelias’s past truthful “offensive” statements he had
made in his testimony, not on the internet, at the first extension. Paragraphs 22-24 forged the now-exposed
“following” false accusations. Paragraph 27 accused Maravelias of attaching a public social media exhibit to
an appellate brief to show DePamphilis lied. An allegation about “statements” “on the internet” appears
nowhere in the paragraphs to which this Court strictly constrained the legal scope of the extension case.
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 B. This Error Is Prejudicial and Violates Maravelias’s Due Process Rights Under the U.S.
Constitution, Amend. XIV and the N.H. Constitution, Pt. I, Art. 2 and 15, Inter Alia
5. This Court signaled Maravelias to prepare a case in rebuttal of certain enumerated accusations.
Maravelias then persuasively countered them at trial. Now the Court is ambushing Maravelias with an
extension based on different allegations, against which he would have prepared a defense had the Court not
specifically narrowed the hearing’s scope to other specific allegations.
6. “It is well settled that a ‘defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which the
plaintiffs are proceeding and the redress that they claim as a result of the defendant’s actions.’” Morancy v.
Morancy, 134 N.H. 493 (1991). Here, the Court had explicitly limited the parts of Plaintiff’s “theory” to be
considered for the extension. The Court even made extensive interventive commentary at hearing to narrow
the focus thereof and prohibit discussion of topics beyond the cited Motion to Extend paragraphs; the Court
interjected to limit both parties, at times, when they began to stray outside the six paragraphs in subject matter.
7. The Court’s error of extending based on a non-anticipatable allegation of Maravelias making
“offensive” statements on the “internet” violates Maravelias’s due process rights under the 14th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and Part I, Articles 2 and 15 of the State Constitution. The latter states in relevant part,
“No subject shall be deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law,
exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land․” N.H.
CONST. Pt. I, Art. 15. “Law of the land in this article means due process of law.” Petition of Harvey, 108
N.H. 196, 198, 230 A.2d 757 (1967). Federally, “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST, Amend. XIV. “It hardly bears mentioning that
a restraining order restrains [the defendant’s] liberty ... from a number of legal activities”, McCarthy v.
Wheeler, 152 N.H. 643,645 (2005), including disparaging Maravelias’s 2nd Amendment rights and even
restricting his “fundamental right to freedom of movement”, State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420 (2003).

8. As it stands, this Court’s Order extends a stalking order disparaging Maravelias’s rights and
reputation 1 where Maravelias was never given a fair opportunity to be fully heard in his defense 2,3. It
egregiously violates the notion of “fundamental fairness” that the Court would bait Maravelias into preparing a

1
The Court’s Order worshipfully caresses Ms. DePamphilis’s emotions by punishing Mr. Maravelias for his “offensive” personal beliefs and
statements made in public, but see State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632 (2009), recognizing a personal liberty interest against reputational or social stigma by
and through governmental determinations such as stalking protective orders, implicating due-process protections for reputational aspects alone. It is
Maravelias whose reputation is wrongly “disparaged” by the existence of an “offensive” and “hateful” governmental “restraining order”, and whose
legal rights are being violated.
2
Cf. N.H. CONST, Pt. I, Art. 15, “Every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to himself … and to be fully heard in
his defense.”

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3
Cf. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2, Rule 2.6
defense limited to “X”, only to penalize him thereafter based on “Y”. At hearing, Maravelias said he wished to
take more time to prepare his case, call other witnesses, dispute further contested matters within the Motion to
Extend, review the original circumstances of the stalking order, and deliver a longer cross-examination and
testimony than he did – all of which were prohibited or severely restricted by the Court’s recurring insistence
that the hearing be “focused” in content to the six cited paragraphs and not go-on a second day.
9. Maravelias’s disallowed extended self-defense would have rebutted the relied-upon Paragraph
15 allegation about public internet speech to third-parties. In view of the Court’s subsequent extension based
on an allegation extraneous to the Court’s articulated “focus”, the Court’s rushing and restriction of
Maravelias’s case caused him even greater prejudice than the Paragraph-15-reliance alone, in isolation.

C. As-Applied Through the Court’s Present Reasoning for Extending the Stalking Order, RSA
633:3-a, III-c. Violates Fundamental Rights Guaranteed By the 1st and 14th Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution and Part I, Articles 22, 15, and 2 of the N.H. Constitution
i) The As-Applied Violation of Freedom of Speech
10. Absent reversal, the Court’s order stands to caricaturize New Hampshire family courts into a
risible laughing-stock of Orwellian tyranny, feminist-Marxist speech-police, and punitive misandry to chill
public expressive conduct – an embarrassing spectacle profitable for all Americans to appreciate the modern
state of civil “protective” order statutes and the insidious terrorism against personal liberty into which they
have shamefully suppurated.
11. This Court’s order openly punishes Maravelias’s public self-defensive speech on the “internet”
– comments repudiating DePamphilis’s false accusations of “stalking” which this subjective Court finds
“offensive” and “hateful” – and continues a “stalking protective order” stripping Maravelias of his
fundamental constitutional rights because he engaged in such “offensive” political speech 4 in public. It is
lamentable that this Court would commit such rampant desecration of Maravelias’s freedom of speech under
Pt. I, Art. 22 of the State Constitution and the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. To constitutionally
attribute extension to a defendant’s public speech-acts, such speech must evince an objective likelihood of
imminent crime or violence. Here, it is undisputed Maravelias made no such unprotected speech.
12. Since Maravelias’s public “comments” on the “internet”, made in response to and about the
existence of this very same court case and unjust restraining order, do not fall into any categories lacking
First Amendment protection (e.g., threats of violence or “fighting words”), the Court’s extension is
unconstitutional. The Court cannot lawfully extend a stalking order because a defendant communicated his

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4
Criticizing a governmental determination - a wrongful “stalking” restraining order maligning Maravelias’s name – is political speech.
corroborated opinion to others in public that he has been legally abused and harassed through a false
restraining order built upon wild lies that have been subsequently disproven. 5 The Court’s reasoning that non-
threatening “offensive” speech equals “hostility” and therefore ongoing risk tantamount to “stalking” is
beyond absurd. If equally applied to all citizens, this legal reasoning would doubtlessly burden the speech of
every human being who has ever lived, save perhaps Mother Theresa, with a potential “stalking” order.

ii) The As-Applied Violation of Equal Protection and the Principle of Stare Decisis
13. This Court has been applying unequal, inconsistent interpretation schemes of RSA 633:3-a in
civil stalking order decisions. In other stalking cases from the last year, this Court has explicitly clarified
“disparaging”, “offensive” words alone with zero threatened violence do not amount to present or ongoing risk
sufficient to sustain a stalking order. In other similar cases, the Court has adopted this proper constitutional
interpretation of RSA 633:3-a even where the “offensive”, “hateful” communications were made directly to a
petitioner, as opposed to third-party political self-defensive speech in a public forum, the case of Maravelias’s
alleged “offensive” comment(s). See generally Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
14. Here, the Court disparately punishes Maravelias with continued stalking order extension solely
based on the accusation he made “offensive” comments in public, themselves purposed to decry the perverse
injustice of this very stalking order. Accordingly, the Court’s extension is unconstitutional and contumelious
towards the core tenets of our common law legal system; See U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV, supra, and N.H.
CONST, Pt. I, Art. 2 and 15. “The first question in an equal protection analysis is whether the State action in
question treats similarly situated persons differently.” Longchamps Electric, Inc. v. New Hampshire State
Apprenticeship Council, 145 N.H. 502, 506 (2000). “The equal protection guarantee is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Lennartz v. Oak Point Associates, P.A., 167 N.H.
459, 462 (2015). As previously stated, the Court’s attitude towards “offensive” statements within stalking
order cases has taken drastically different turns for different yet identically situated defendants. Since
Maravelias is an older male and pro se litigant, he is statistically likely to suffer such unequal, prejudiced
judicial outcomes. 6,7,8 The Court’s unequal application of the law also violates stare decisis: if non-threatening

5
Maravelias assumes the Court refers to comments made on a YouTube video of the 2018 Hearing on the past extension in this case. However, the
Court’s order does not even identify the specific “offensive” comment(s) and is therefore unconstitutionally vague regardless. (See infra)
6
Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. (2005).
“[Plaintiffs in sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases] were significantly more likely to win when a female judge was on the bench. This
effect was independent of judicial ideology—the presence of both liberal and conservative female judges increased the probability that plaintiffs
prevailed on panels of varying ideological composition.” Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol114/iss7/5
7
Basile, S. (2005). A Measure of Court Response to Requests for Protection. Journal of Family Violence, 20, 171-179. (Finding strong bias against
males in civil protective order cases in proximate Gardner, MA trial court)
8
Quintanilla, V. D., Allen, R. A. and Hirt, E. R. (2017), The Signaling Effect of Pro se Status. Law and Social Inquiry, 42: 1091-1121.
doi:10.1111/lsi.12261 (Finding a significant systemic disadvantageous effect of proceeding pro se attributable to an inherent signaling effect from the

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title and to the socialization of the legal profession)
“offensive” words to third-parties in public are not considered “safety” threats to plaintiffs in similar stalking
cases, there is no rational basis that they should be here. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), p. 1537.

D. As-Applied Through the Court’s Present Extension of the Order, RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
15. The Court has failed to identify what specific alleged “offensive and hateful statements” on the
“internet” by Maravelias it finds warrant extension. This defect alone renders the extension legally erroneous
and reversible: when issuing RSA 633:3-a protective orders, trial courts are required to make specific factual
findings in support. 9 Due process naturally requires that this apply also to extensions of such orders. The
Court’s vague 3/8/19 Order – the current application of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. – fails to adequately notify
Maravelias, a person of ordinary intelligence, of what kinds of self-defensive public “statements” of opinion
are likely to cause extension of a stalking order. It is unclear that Maravelias defending his wrongly-defamed
name to third-parties on the internet amounts to concern for the “well-being” of the false-accuser Petitioner, or
what constitutes as “hateful”. The statute for extension, as-applied, is therefore unconstitutionally vague. 10

E. The Court Cannot Lawfully Grant Any Stalking Order Extension Because RSA 633:3-a, III-
c. is Facially Unconstitutional
i) Substantial Overbreadth and Vagueness in Violation of the 1st Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and Pt. I, Art. 22 of the State Constitution
16. A statute is facially overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473
(2010). See also Doyle v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Resources & Economic Dev., 163 N.H. 215, 220-21 (2012).
Such is the case with RSA 633:3-a, III-c., which inexplicably widens the legal standard for stalking order
extension to mere service towards a plaintiff’s “well-being”. Any constitutionally protected speech-act or
lawful act at all by a defendant with which a plaintiff merely disagrees enables and requires the Court to
extend the stalking order: e.g., even a defendant’s basic act of appearing as an adverse party or asserting he has
never “stalked” the plaintiff, which is often undeniably true in such civil cases where a disturbingly low
“preponderance of evidence” standard applies for obtaining such stalking protective orders in the first place.
See RSA 633:3-a, III-a. Pampering a plaintiff’s personal contentment and mental happiness (serving their
“well-being”) far exceeds the legitimate governmental purpose of RSA 633:3-a to protect victims from
stalking. The Court’s Order admits that its finding “good cause” for the extension “directly relates to [serving
the] well-being of the plaintiff”, citing the controlling case law MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 9 (2008).

9
See Kiesman v. Middleton, 156 N.H. (2007), Fillmore v. Fillmore, 147 N.H. 283 (2001), Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. (2007), etc.
10
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). Extending a restraining order because a defendant makes “offensive” or “hateful” comments to third-

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parties about a remorseless liar legally abusing said defendant “invites arbitrary enforcement” of these vague, undefined, subjective terms. Id.
 17. Therefore, all stalking order extensions, let alone a substantial number thereof, are plagued by
unconstitutional overbreadth. Such “well-being” extensions punish defendants through constrained rights
without narrowly serving any legitimate governmental interest. Given the plain language of the statute, there
are no set of circumstances wherein the RSA 633:3-a, III-c. would require trial courts validly and narrowly to
service the governmental interest of prevention of stalking in an extension case as opposed to overinclusively
coddling a plaintiff’s mental “well-being”. Separately, the “safety and well-being” language is substantially
vague rendering the statute unconstitutional on its face regardless of overbreadth. Maravelias repeats his
hereunto-ignored robust argumentation on these two points previously submitted to this Court at ¶28-60 of his
First-Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Objection to Petitioner’s Motion to Extend.

ii) Substantial Violation of Equal Protection Rights Under the 14th Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution and Pt. I, Art. 2 of the N.H. Constitution
18. Maravelias repeats his argumentation at ¶48-50 (discussing the lack of narrow-tailoring in the
“safety and well-being” language through the lens of the “underinclusiveness” doctrine) and rephrases it into a
facial challenge on the grounds of state and federal constitutional Equal Protection rights. The legal standard
for a new stalking order at RSA 633:3-a, III-a. (to show the plaintiff has been “stalked”) is much higher and
more stringent than the standard for extension at RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (merely to show that such extension
would serve a plaintiff’s “safety and well-being”). New stalking defendants and past stalking defendants
facing another new extension are “similarly situated” for purposes of equal protection, as are new stalking
plaintiffs and plaintiffs seeking an extension of a stalking order. To concede comparatively broader rights to
stalking plaintiffs seeking a further extension violates the Equal Protection rights of new stalking plaintiffs not
already having a protective order; similarly, affording new stalking defendants broadened comparative
protection of liberty interests violates the Equal Protection rights of stalking defendants facing further
extension. Unlike a criminal conviction of guilt proven beyond all reasonable doubt, a civil finding of
“stalking” on the “preponderance of evidence” standard cannot lawfully distinguish between past and new
stalking defendants for purposes of the “similarly situated” element of Equal Protection analysis. Therefore, no
possible set of circumstances exists where the lowered extension standard of RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is not facially
unconstitutional. This impinges upon the fundamental rights inherently limited by stalking protective orders.
F. The Court’s Extension Errs to Adduce an Iota of Credibility to Christina DePamphilis’s
Wild Representations, Where Gaping Swaths of Her Testimony and Verified Motion Were
Revealed as Fantastical Contrivances, Flabbergasting Falsehoods, Inexplicable Self-
Contradictions, and/or Phantasmagorical Hallucinations

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 19. With all due respect, if the Court declines to find Christina DePamphilis in criminal contempt
for willful perjury and falsification, the Court must embrace a view wherein her mental sanity is drastically
impaired. 11 The 2018 record already attests to Christina DePamphilis’s underage usage of illegal psychoactive
narcotic drugs. 12 In light of this and the above, the Court erred to find her “credible”.

II. THE 8/7/18 “EXTENDED TERMS” MUST BE IMMEDIATELY DISSOLVED

A. The Court Embarrassingly Misidentifies its Own 8/7/18 Judicial Order Not Granting
Petitioner’s 7/12/18 Ameliorated Terms, But Rather the More Punitive Original 7/2/18 Terms

20. The Court misidentifies its own 8/7/18 Order not granting Petitioner’s 7/12/18 Reply (where
the ameliorated “knowingly” and “about her” improvements were conceded) but rather impetuously granting
the more-punitive terms requested in Petitioner’s original 7/2/18 Motion. Perhaps the Court realized John J.
Coughlin’s shocking misconduct, panicked, and seized the damage-control opportunity to retroactively
pretend the ameliorated terms were granted, hoping nobody would notice. If an honest oversight, this Court’s
lackadaisical, dismissive effortlessness here is reminiscent of John Coughlin’s thoughtless scribbling-off on
the illegal Orwellian terms in the first place. With all due respect, this is a denigrating mockery of pro se
Maravelias’s basic legal rights. This Court so nonchalantly handles his potential criminalization and arrest for
“possessing” pieces of paper in his own legal brief, crucially dependent on the exact version of the terms. The
Court had even learned the Windham Police were actually criminally investigating this demented travesty. As
it goes without saying, the Court cannot uphold the constitutionality of terms it never in fact granted. 13

11
Assuming dubitante that Christina DePamphilis never willfully lied, she necessarily: 1) asserted-as-fact that “Maravelias followed” her on 10/23/18
to “cheer practice” (Verified Motion) and asseverated with “10 out of 10” certainty the face of the allegedly-pursuing vehicle in Windham was
Maravelias’s (sworn testimony), when Maravelias was in fact in Concord, 2) swore under penalty of perjury that her Verified Motion alleging
multiple summertime “following” incidents was true and accurate to the best of her knowledge, only to testify that there was only one such believed
summertime “following” incident, 3) asserted in her Verified Motion that the 10/23/18 “following” vehicle was Maravelias’s, when in fact she
testified it was a completely different, white vehicle she had no idea if Maravelias had ever owned or driven, while intimately knowing his “two”
“black” cars he owns and routinely drives, 4) inexplicably changed the time of the alleged 10/23/18 “following” accusation from “7:00pm” (Verified
Motion) to “4:00pm” (sworn testimony), otherwise indicative of an attempt to bait Maravelias into preparing a suddenly-non-responsive evidentiary
defense, 5) mysteriously happened to guess that Maravelias might have Google phone location history proving where he was and thus coincidentally
consciously premeditated an absurd and failed attack against Maravelias’s phone location evidence predicated on the notion that he had “multiple
phones”, using an arcane two-year-old police search record of his family member’s house as apparent support, 6) said that she was referenced in the
web description of Maravelias’s book “David the Liar”, then admitted she was not in fact referenced therein, 7) said she continues to be “stalked” by
Maravelias “every day”, even though she could not name a single instance Maravelias attempted to interact with her in years, apart from the
“following” false accusation, 8) asserted-as-fact in her Verified Motion that Maravelias “intimidated” and “harassed” her friend by “recording” the
friend at Dunkin Donuts, even though she was not there and admitted to having no idea whether this was true or false, 9) admitted that she had no
evidence whatsoever to suggest that the alleged summertime “following” incident involved Maravelias, not ever identifying nor even seeing the
driver, 10) admitted Maravelias never submitted criminal complaints about her to the “Windham” and “Salem” police departments, which she had
asserted-as-fact in her Verified Motion, 11) stalked and gained illicit access to Maravelias’s private business product support web forum to monitor
his communications, 12) testified that, although she knew Maravelias’s false arrest in 2017 in connection with her “stalking order” was annulled, not
prosecuted, and legally accepted as “false”, she still wished that the defamatory internet record of said false arrest “should” appear as the “first” result
in a Google search for Maravelias’s name as opposed to elsewhere on the first page, not even endeavoring to conceal her outrageous bad-faith
motivations of retaliatory slander and libel, inter multa exempla alia. That this Court would esteem such a litigant as anything less than a mentally
disturbed individual and/or a brazen perjuring felon – let alone “credible” – strains the scope of legal error and approaches judicial misconduct.
See Appellant’s Brief in 2018-0483 for comprehensive summary of the record documenting Christina DePamphilis’s drug and alcohol use.
12

See John Coughlin’s 8/7/18 hand-written Order on the final page of DePamphilis’s 7/12/18 Reply proposing the slightly-ameliorated terms: “The
13

Court granted The The [sic] Petitioner’s Motion for Modification of Stalking Final Order of Protection on 8/7/18”; Cf. John Coughlin’s 8/7/18 hand-

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 B. The Court Must Dissolve the Extended Terms 1) Because They are Made Ultra Vires Outside
this Court’s Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Without Any Statutory or Legal Authority
Whatsoever, in Violation of RSA 173-B:5, and 2) Due to Their Rampant Unconstitutionality
21. Maravelias here repeats the federal constitutional arguments he asserted to this Court by
submitting as an exhibit his Original Verified Complaint and related papers in Paul Maravelias v. John J.
Coughlin, et al., N.H. Fed. Dist. Ct. Case No. 1:19-CV-143. The Court’s Order makes zero specific response
to these robust arguments, indicating it has not properly carried-out its duty to respect fundamental rights.
22. The insane “indirect” “possession” of “social media [exhibits]” terms also violate Pt. I, Art. 2,
15, 19, 22, and 23 of the N.H. Constitution. 14 Ordering Maravelias immediately not to “possess” “directly or
through a third-party” “social media” exhibits (i.e., Maravelias’s public court exhibits where Christina
DePamphilis insults and middle-fingers Maravelias baiting an unlawful reaction) necessarily compels the
destruction of his own private property, in violation of Art. 2, 15, and 19, criminalizes Maravelias’s speech
adopting such legally favorable exhibits and any others in violation of Art. 2, 15, and 22, criminalizes any
retroactive possession or possession prior to receiving notice of the Court’s order in violation of Art. 2, 15, and
23, and deprives of him “liberty” and “property” without jury trial nor by the “law of the land” as neither RSA
633:3-a nor 173-B:5 permit protective orders to act as vessels for such tyrannical, arbitrary terms.
C. The Court’s Judicial Officer Has Committed and Will Continue to Commit a Federal Felony
Crime Under 18 U.S.C. §242 If It Does Not Dissolve the Outrageous “Extended Terms”
23. Maravelias understands that political pressure exerted within New Hampshire’s highly
fraternized judicial branch disincentivizes the Court from doing the right thing, in light of Maravelias’s current
federal lawsuit against John Coughlin for granting the “extended terms” in 2018. Maravelias preserves legal
notice of these bad-faith motivations and cautiously reminds that any state judicial officer’s deprivation of
federal rights under color of law, willful or not, is a felony crime. See 18 U.S.C. §242. Judicial immunity does
not apply where a judge exceeds subject matter jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 15
Accordingly, the Court’s judicial officer would also be civilly liable to Maravelias under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

III. THE N.H. SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT BAD-FAITH AND HOSTILE BIAS
AGAINST MARAVELIAS, THE FUTILITY OF APPEAL, AND GENERIC FAIRNESS

written Order on the final page of DePamphilis’s Original 7/2/18 Motion containing the original more-punitive terms lacking the words “knowingly”
and “about her”: “granted as to Petitioner’s Request for Relief A.; B1; B2; B3 John J. Coughlin”.
14
If appellate issue preservation on these state constitutional challenges to the “extended terms” should ever pass into dispute, Maravelias demands in
fairness his single paragraph here suffice to preserve these issues in light of Dist. Div. R. 3.11(E), imposing a strained 10-page limit on this document.
15
Ordering a civil defendant not to “possess” public court exhibits and internet pages constituting “social media” “directly or through a third party” is
an unheard-of abuse of power rarely or never performed by a judicial officer; it is therefore not a “judicial act” within the U.S. Supreme Court’s test
for determining the scope of judicial immunity. Indeed, issuing such draconian criminalization of private legal self-defense conduct under the guise of
a concomitant “stalking restraining order” has never happened before ever in any jurisdiction anywhere in the history of the universe.

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 A. This Court Must Adjudicate Maravelias’s Legal Arguments Since the Corrupt N.H. Supreme
Court Has Been Acting with Sickening Prejudice and Personal Bias Against Maravelias,
Bound to Reject His Appeals No Matter How Irrefutably Correct His Legal Arguments Are
24. Put bluntly, our state’s Supreme Court is currently pissed-off by Maravelias and his
commitment to exposing John J. Coughlin’s dishonest, self-interested, and criminal acts of injustice. As a
result, they have been childishly retaliating against Maravelias through sordid acts of financial extortion 16,
willful libel 17, and criminal judicial terrorism 18. Maravelias has zero-chance of winning any appeal whatsoever
before such biased activist-tyrants; this Court is his only hope for fairness. Maravelias has noticed an
unfortunate tendency of trial court judges to ignore a pro se defendant’s legal arguments, issue orders confined
to threadbare finding-of-fact on-the-merits favoring the politically expedient party, and reflexively relegate
any potential legal error to the Supreme Court for resolution – as if pestered by the Lukan importunate
widow. 19 This mentality perverts justice and prejudices Maravelias, whose appellate strivings in the current
malicious Supreme Court are guaranteed to end only in futile financial loss.

B. The Court’s Extension Shocks the Conscience and Assaults Fairness Given the “Offensive”
and “Hateful” Slander Campaign DePamphilis Continues to Wage Against Maravelias

“Whoever secretly slanders his neighbor, him I will destroy.” – Psalm 101:5

25. This Court improperly usurps a stalking order as punishment for alleged defamatory conduct to
magnify the injustice against Maravelias, the victim of DePamphilis’s outrageous slander and libel. David
DePamphilis has been personally approaching people he believes know Paul Maravelias to perpetuate a vile,
tortious campaign to defame and harass Maravelias. E.g., DePamphilis has recently approached teenage
employees of a local coffee shop – complete strangers – “warning” them Paul Maravelias is a “pedophile” 20,
emailed a Windham state representative claiming Maravelias’s asking-out a girl to dinner in 2016 represented
a likelihood Maravelias “may sexually assault her”, caused language describing Maravelias as a “sexual
predator” and “piece of shit stalker” to appear on public internet pages when one Googles Maravelias’s name,

16
To wit, the Supreme Court not only declined to reverse the outrageous fee award against Maravelias for a truthful stalking petition, but recently
issued an unheard-of Order instructing Maravelias to pay for DePamphilis’s attorney’s fees for the good-faith Supreme Court appeal case itself!
17
See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration in 2018-0483, indicating where Robert Lynn’s Court patently mischaracterized transcribed testimony.
18
See Id., exposing Robert Lynn’s unapologetic calpestation of Maravelias’s rights without even making a single reference to Maravelias’s chief
arguments and evidence in the appeal case. E.g., the Supreme Court’s shameful Order willfully omitted any reference to DePamphilis’s incitative
“middle-finger” bullying/harassment post against Maravelias proving she had no “fear”, exposing Justice Lynn’s unscrupulous feminist activism.
19
E.g., the Court’s 3/8/19 Order addresses absolutely none of Maravelias’s multiple legal arguments for dismissal in his 2/14/19 Motion to Dismiss.
20
DePamphilis’s reprehensible “pedophile” slander against Maravelias is an artifact of cognitive dissonance and psychological projection.
DePamphilis’s own son Nicolas, in his twenties, has been in an intimate homosexual anal relationship with a 17-year-old boy named Nate since Nate
was only 16 years of age. While 16 is the age of consent, Nate ostensibly weighs less than David’s daughter and has the physical semblance of an
emaciated pre-pubescent young girl; See e.g. https://goo.gl/AsBZuV, https://goo.gl/SoitTA, https://goo.gl/h2aw1J, https://goo.gl/YtSrK8, etc. It is for
this reason it comforts David DePamphilis to slander Paul Maravelias a “pedophile”, as DePamphilis knows Maravelias embraces healthy, natural,
and orderly sexual preferences for humans of substantial somatosexual maturity who are also female. Therefore, DePamphilis’s delusional
“pedophile” slander against Maravelias functions as a cognitive-dissonance-reduction coping mechanism for paternal feelings, plausibly homophobic,

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of shame, bitterness, and rage. Psychopathology aside, DePamphilis’s criminal slander against Paul Maravelias is contemptible and must be ceased.
etc. When Maravelias brought a stalking petition against DePamphilis to address even worse stalking conduct,
Judge John J. Coughlin, a prince of perversity and exposed civil rights abuser, judicially abused Maravelias, an
impecunious 22-year-old, ordering $9,000 payment of rich 49-year-old business executive DePamphilis’s
attorney’s fees. This partisan, despotic, corrupt judiciary has prostrated itself in utter sycophancy to a sadistic
defamer assaulting Maravelias’s reputation, and this Court now punishes Maravelias with a baseless continued
restraining order for his public speech merely defending himself against DePamphilis’s libelous legal abuse.

IV. MARAVELIAS’S CONCESSION TO CHILL HIS OWN SPEECH IN EXCHANGE FOR

RESTORATION OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

26. Regarding Maravelias’s constitutionally protected conduct of vindicating his own wrongly
disparaged name on the internet, Petitioner was displeasured primarily by two artifacts: 1) a YouTube video of
Maravelias’s testimony at the public 2018 extension hearing, and 2) a public court document she herself
submitted, allegedly containing her address. If the Court reconsiders and terminates indefinitely this stalking
order within 30 days of this Motion, Maravelias hereby agrees that he will, within 10 days of the Clerk’s
notice of such order ending this case, 1) remove from the web Petitioner’s own offensive court pleading (viz.,
the 1/5/18 Motion to Extend) and 2) remove the YouTube video of Maravelias’s 2018 testimony.
27. It is under duress of continued wrongful loss of constitutional rights that Maravelias
begrudgingly offers to restrict his public expression in this way, solely to please the arbitrary whims of New
Hampshire judicial officers. Maravelias expects this compelling fact to heighten SCOTUS interest once the
activist, bad-faith NH Supreme Court renders its obligatory screw-Maravelias appeal-rejecting Order in utter
blindness to fact and law, if the instant Motion is denied and another necessary NHSC appeal pursued.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable, Well-Meaning Court:
I. Grant this Motion, including any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary;
II. Reconsider and totally dissolve the extension of the Stalking Order, ending this case;
III. If not granting Prayer II, dissolve the 8/7/18 extended terms; and
IV. Make a finding to identify the certain “offensive” “internet” comment(s) causing extension.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE – I, Paul Maravelias, certify by signature hereunder that this document was sent this
day to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona March 21st, 2019

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 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully submits the within Objection

to Plaintiff’s 3/18/19 Motion to Reconsider. In support thereof Defendant states as follows.

I. CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS’S LAUGABLE “MOTION TO RECONSIDER” IS

LIKE SOMEONE WHO COUNTERFEITS A LOTTERY TICKET, STEALS
$500,000 FROM THE STATE, AND THEN SUES THE STATE’S LOTTERY
COMMISSION CLAIMING TO BE OWED EVEN MORE STOLEN MONEY

1. On 3/18/19, Plaintiff filed her own Motion to Reconsider the Court’s 3/8/19 Order

which was extensively favorable to her, openly punishing Maravelias’s lawful speech in public

in which he defended himself against her cruel, scandalous campaign of defamatory legal abuse

through the instant falsified restraining order.

2. Despite having been exposed as a boldface liar on multiple occasions, see

Appellant’s Brief in NHSC Case No. 2018-483, and despite the entire “following” gravamen of

her present extension case having been proven a total and utter fabrication, she now posits the

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1
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
audacity to ask this Court extend the legal abuse even longer, and to further stifle Maravelias’s

legitimate, necessary, and rare business in his own town’s public building.1

3. DePamphilis’s Motion to Reconsider petitions the Court to extend the stalking

order for 5 years instead of 1 year. The said contention is beyond meritless, gratuitous, and

malevolent. DePamphilis’s Motion to Reconsider should not be well-taken by the Court. Indeed,

it is uncomfortably disrespectful to the Court that she would petition for such even-greater relief

even after the Court graciously allowed her to lie about “following” and not be held in contempt.

4. Maravelias respectfully argues that no extension at all should be granted, for the

many reasons noticed within his own 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider.

II. BY OPPOSING THE MINOR AMENDMENT TO THE STALKING ORDER,

PLAINTIFF REAFFIRMS HER PATENTLY UNREASONABLE, BULLYING
CONDUCT AND MOTIVATIONS TO CRIMINALIZE MARAVELIAS’S
LEGITIMATE PRIVATE AFFAIRS HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH HER

5. This entire component of DePamphilis’s Motion to Reconsider is inappropriate,

legally inapposite, and unactionable. Accordingly, it should be stricken from the Court’s record.

See Defendant’s 3/28/19 Motion to Strike filed herewith. Hereinafter, Maravelias opposes the

substance of Plaintiff’s opposition to the amendment, in case the Motion to Strike is not granted.

1
DePamphilis brings this contention even after criminally attempting to suppress Maravelias’s voting
activity, as explicated in Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion and reaffirmed by her guilty failure to file any
Objection thereto whatsoever. She made no attempt at all to counter Maravelias’s legal analysis which
concluded her and her attorney’s voter suppression conspiracy was indeed criminal. Instead, she includes
a baseless footnote at Page 2 of her Motion to Reconsider, alleging contrary to RSA 657:1 that the
Windham town website alludes to Absentee ballots being available to people subject to restraining orders.
Accordingly, Attorney Simon R. Brown commits his usual business of subterfuge and duplicity to
advance his baseless arguments, since the language “[persons having] an active protective order”
obviously refers to protected-party plaintiffs “having” such orders, not to the restrained defendants
thereof. See RSA 654:25, RSA 654:12, V.(b), and RSA 657:15, II., excluding from certain voter
registration lists the information of protected parties under RSA 173-B restraining orders. Either Attorney
Brown has inferior reading comprehension skills to a 23-year-old with zero legal training, or he is making
willful misrepresentations to the Court. And accordingly, all experience hath shewn the latter.

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2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 6. The Court’s minor amendment to the stalking order is appropriate and narrow. If

anything, it does not go far enough to disencumber Maravelias of needing to constantly be on the

defensive against DePamphilis’s legal abuse mission to get him arrested for simply going about

his own private life, never contacting or going near her.

7. Christina DePamphilis and Maravelias’s sister are students at Maravelias’s high

school only for a few more weeks, until June. Maravelias’s “limited and legitimate” activities

within this short time which could involve his presence at his own alma mater are only: 1)

voting, 2) picking up/dropping off his sister from school, and 3) attending his sister’s graduation.

8. Absolutely none of these “limited and legitimate” potential activities in the next

10 weeks require Maravelias to come anywhere near David DePamphilis’s scary daughter.2

Consequently, there is no cause to make the stalking order against Maravelias any more punitive.

III. CHRISTINA DEPAMPHILIS AND HER ATTORNEY SIMON R. BROWN

SHOULD BE SANCTIONED, HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND
CRIMINALLY CHARGED FOR THEIR CONTINUED WILLFUL FALSE
STATEMENTS IN LEGAL PLEADINGS AND FRAUDULENT
MISCHARACTERIZATIONS

9. The NH Rules of Professional Conduct and RSA Chapter 641, “Falsification in

Official Matters”, are herein repeated and incorporated by reference as though fully set forth.

2
On this point, at ¶11 of her Motion, DePamphilis regurgitates a ridiculous list of “public events”
Maravelias would have interest or connection with, then deceptively consummates the list with an
adverbially emphasized reference to “even Christina’s graduation” (emphasis added), which DePamphilis
knows is a valid “public event” Maravelias clearly plans to attend for his own sister. Attorney Brown
again manifests his routine deceitful chicanery before this Court, since he knows Maravelias’s sister
Deborah is also graduating in June, and that Maravelias would have most certainly made a separate
Motion anyway to permit him to attend his own sister’s graduation at his own high school where he
graduated as Valedictorian in 2013. Plaintiff’s misrepresentation conduct is patently unreasonable,
dishonest, and for the sole purpose of staking and harassing Paul Maravelias; accordingly, she should be
sanctioned.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 10. At ¶14 of her Motion, DePamphilis remorselessly realleges the long-debunked

falsehood that she was “forced to flee her 8th grade graduation due to Defendant’s concerning

behavior” 4 years ago in 2015. As previously shown at the 2018 extension, this baseless

allegation was about as true as her false allegation that Maravelias had “approached” her at the

“2013 Turkey Trot”, whereupon a cellphone video surfaced depicting Christina DePamphilis

running up to Maravelias, interrupting his conversation, and approaching him at that event – after

she asserted in her stalking petition the wild lie that the opposite had happened.

11. At ¶17 and ¶19 of her Motion, DePamphilis claims Maravelias “shows no signs of

ceasing his harassment of Christina and her family through the Internet”. This outrageous

contention imputes criminal intent to Maravelias’s protected free-speech conduct of documenting

her own legal abuse against Maravelias – sharing already-public court documents – by posting

copies on the internet of filings in this case. DePamphilis does not cite an iota of support for her

contention that Maravelias has committed “harassment” under RSA 644:4.

12. DePamphilis and her attorney should be sanctioned for wanton violation of Rule

3.1 of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibiting meritless and

unsubstantiated contentions. Punitive sanctions are all more necessary in light of DePamphilis’s

extreme and ongoing “harassment” of Maravelias, through the internet and other means.3,4

3
E.g., the act of posting incitative bullying posts against Maravelias on social media with vulgar gestures
and using Christina DePamphilis’s boyfriend as a failed incitation mechanism. This speech is not
protected and is the very essence of RSA 644:4, criminalizing of “harassment”, committed when one
“insults, taunts, or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response”.
4
E.g. also, David DePamphilis recent and ongoing slander campaign against Paul Maravelias, touring
proximate coffee shops to tell strangers Maravelias is a “pedophile” and emailing state representatives to
advance similar false, defamatory representations to malign Maravelias’s reputation.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 13. Unabashedly, DePamphilis obviates her generic obscurantist dishonesty by

referring to Mstr. Nate Vigeant, David DePamphilis’s son’s intimate-partner boyfriend, as his

“son’s friend”. It is literally true that one’s wife, girlfriend, husband, or boyfriend can be

described as a “friend”. However, DePamphilis’s bizarre off-topic references to Master Vigeant

(who was only mentioned in a passing footnote in Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion) are deceptive and

totally unnecessary. Accordingly, they are suggestive of a homophobic motivation to disown

Mstr. Vigeant’s intimate-partner boyfriend relationship to DePamphilis’s son, as if this well-

known, undenied fact is something to be ashamed of.

IV. DEPAMPHILIS’S LEGAL ABUSE AND EXTORTION AGAINST MARAVELIAS

HAVE AMOUNTED TO HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS IN LOSS
AND DAMAGES, YET SHE HAS THE AUDACITY TO BEG THE COURT TO
FURTHER ABUSE MARAVELIAS’S RIGHTS TO MINIMIZE HER FUTURE
SPECULATIVE “LEGAL FEES”

14. David DePamphilis, the rich 50-year-old business executive paying for and

pulling the strings behind his revenge-puppet daughter Christina to wage this illegitimate war of

legal abuse and defamatory harassment against Maravelias, asks the Court to abuse Maravelias’s

constitutional rights for 5 further years instead of 1 year because this might save him some

money in the future. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, ¶20.

15. Paul Maravelias’s fundamental rights are more important than David

DePamphilis’s ability to purchase a third house or a sixth car.5,6

5
Last year, in April 2018, David DePamphilis requested this Court hold a Hearing on one of his Motions
in Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis. Once scheduled, DePamphilis filed a Motion to Continue so he
could enjoy his lavish vacation to Aruba undisturbed. In DePamphilis’s Motion to Continue, Simon R.
Brown ingeniously stated the following: “Mr. DePamphilis is scheduled to be out-of-state”.
6
David DePamphilis’s custom of using the instant restraining order legal abuse to financially extort
Maravelias has a long history. In the original stalking petition, the DePamphilis actors petitioned Judge
Stephen to force Maravelias to pay for DePamphilis’s “surveilance[sic] camera[s]”. Even Judge Stephen
was disturbed by such a meritless, absurd, and quickly-rejected request.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 3/18/19 Motion to Reconsider;
III. Grant Defendant’s 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting Stalking
Order Extension; and
IV. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

March 28th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion
to Reconsider was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq.,
counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________

March 28th, 2019

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
225
226
 April 3rd, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed the following pleadings to be filed in the above-referenced case:

1) Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Verified Motion to

Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting Stalking Order Extension; and

2) Defendant’s Declaration and Affidavit in Support of Reply to Plaintiff’s

Objection to Defendant’s Verified Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting
Stalking Order Extension

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

227
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MOTION TO

RECONSIDER 3/8/19 ORDER GRANTING STALKING ORDER EXTENSION

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) and respectfully submits the within Reply to

Plaintiff’s above-referenced 3/29/19 Objection. In support thereof Defendant states as follows:

I. IN RESPONSE TO MARAVELIAS’S 5,000+ WORD MOTION TO RECONSIDER

DISCUSSING MANIFOLD DUE PROCESS, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND
STATUTORY DEFECTS WITH THE COURT’S LEGALLY ERRONEOUS
EXTENSION ORDER, PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION CONTAINS TWO
DESOLATE SENTENCES OF NON-BOILERPLATE CONTENT.

1. Plaintiff has filed another meritless, burdensome, and vexatious pleading, entitled

“Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Verified Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting

Stalking Order Extension”, docketed 3/29/19.

2. Plaintiff does have a right to bring meritorious legal contentions in opposition to

Maravelias’s legal self-defense of his besieged constitutional rights. However, in such an event,

the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that Plaintiff and counsel make “a

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of [the] existing law” which

Maravelias’s Motion to Reconsider cites as requiring the Court to reverse its 3/8/19 Order.

3. Maravelias’s 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider cites numerous constitutional and

statutory laws for the basis of his claims for relief. Plaintiff’s Objection makes zero attempt to

address any of these compelling arguments. Insofar as Plaintiff despises any human being’s

rights other than hers and wishes to abolish American constitutional law to enable her legal

abuse campaigns against innocent individuals, she must at least endeavor to make a good-faith

argument “for an extension, modification or reversal of [the] existing law”. See Rule 3.1, N.H.

Rules of Prof. Cond., supra.

4. Plaintiff disappointingly tenders the following embarrassing threadbare sentence

as the entirety of substance to her Objection:

“Defendant had fair notice of the assertions made in the Motion to Extend, and the Court
could rely upon ample evidence and testimony to support ‘good cause’ to extend the Order.”

5. In failing to provide any meaningful response to any of Maravelias’s multiple

compelling arguments showing the necessity to reverse the Court’s 3/8/19 extension, Plaintiff

only validates Maravelias’s incontrovertible arguments.

6. Insofar as Plaintiff offers the above-quoted limited response to the first argument

in Maravelias’s Motion to Reconsider, she contributes nothing of legal merit. The legislature

specifically included the following provision in RSA 633:3-a, III-c. for stalking order extensions:

“The court shall state in writing, at the respondent's request, its reason or reasons for
granting the extension.”

7. If the plain language of the statute did not clarify well-enough the obvious due

process implications thereof, this Court explicitly clarified in open court that the “focus” of the

2/12/19 Hearing was “limited” to the paragraphs it cited when granting the Motion to State

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Reasons – the parts of Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend which “moved” Judge Leonard (e.g.,

primarily, the now-exposed “following” lie).

8. Therefore, and for the reasons stated in Maravelias’s Motion to Reconsider, the

Court deprived him of an opportunity to prepare and give a full rebuttal to the allegations that

were noticed as being considered for extension. Plaintiff’s exiguous one or two sentences on this

topic do not contravene Maravelias’s arguments; rather, they merely exemplify how a sore bad-

faith litigant might attempt to make some dismissive, futile remarks about this gaping injustice.

II. PLAINTIFF’S EXIGUOUS OBJECTION ESPOUSES AN INCRIMINATING

SILENCE ON MARAVELIAS’S CRUCIAL ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT
MUST FULLY ADJUDICATE MARAVELIAS’S HEREUNTO-IGNORED
LEGAL ARGUMENTS BECAUSE THE CURRENT NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT IS A BIASED, MALIGNANT THRONG OF ACTIVIST-
TYRANTS ACTING IN CLEAR BAD-FAITH, BOUND TO DENY MARAVELIAS
A FAIR AND FULL OPPORTUNITY TO VINDICATE HIS ATTACKED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON APPEAL

9. Maravelias expresses his gratitude to Plaintiff for this opportunity to include more

critical materials into the record before this trial court rules upon the Motion to Reconsider.

10. Paragraph 24 of Defendant’s 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider is repeated.

11. Many recent objective indicators suggest the New Hampshire Supreme Court has

been acting with unfairness, hostile subjectivity, and corrupt bad-faith against Maravelias. There

is a traceable fact-pattern of libel, harassment, extortion, and criminal deprivation of rights under

color of law which Justices Lynn, Hicks, Basset, and Hantz-Marconi have consummated against

pro se Maravelias in the past few months. This vile conduct has transpired primarily within two

appeals with the parties: Paul Maravelias v. David DePamphilis (2018-0376), and the instant-

case appeal of the 2018 extension, Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (2018-0483). At all

material times, Maravelias was pro se and litigating against lawyer-represented DePamphilis.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 12. Our current shameful Supreme Court is pissed-off by the rare appearance of a

young pro se litigant with zero legal training who relentlessly and competently fights “the

system” for his own rights to be respected. It apparently angers the four complicit Supreme Court

justices that Maravelias does not capitulate to the unchecked feminist tyranny of family courts

and privileged lawyers who disparage the rights of the innocent through nominally non-criminal

“protective” order statutes enacted by an authoritarian, globalist legislature gradually to erode the

fundamental natural rights New Hampshire citizens have enjoyed since long before ratifying the

United States Constitution in June 1788.

A. The New Hampshire Supreme Court Has Surreptitiously, Purposefully, and

Nervously Withheld Publication of Their Secret Legal-Abuse Orders Against
Maravelias, Inexplicably Excluding their Final Orders in 2018-0376 and 2018-
0483 From the Public Supreme Court Website Containing Final Orders In All
Non-Confidential Cases

13. The Supreme Court’s recent conduct to abuse, defame, and harass Maravelias has

been sub rosa without any accountability to the public legal community. This is reminiscent of

the apartheid courts of South Africa or the secretive Nazi Volksgerichtshof “People’s Court”.

14. As evidence, Defendant refers to his accompanying Declaration and Affidavit in

Support of Reply to Plaintiff’s Objection to Defendant’s Verified Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19

Order Granting Stalking Order Extension. The Supreme Court’s despicable and unilateral

tyranny against Maravelias is being done in secret, hoping to elude the public’s attention.

15. The Supreme Court’s embarrassing, self-censored, law-ignoring Final Orders

against Maravelias in 2018-0376 and 2018-0483 are already preserved in this Court’s record of

the case at bar, having been attached as Exhibits B and A respectively to Plaintiff’s 1/24/19

Verified Motion to Extend.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 B. The New Hampshire Supreme Court Has Been Abusing Paul Maravelias With
Baseless, Punitive, Secret Orders to Extort Thousands of Dollars From Him,
Ordering Him to Pay DePamphilis Extraordinary Appellate “Attorney’s Fees”
Without Making Any Finding Whatsoever Maravelias’s Appeal Was “Frivolous”

16. This Court must adjudicate Maravelias’s ignored constitutional arguments

because his only right of direct appeal is to a law-breaking, extortionate judicial body that has

been financially abusing him. This abuse is bound to continue if Maravelias appeals this case.

17. The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently ordered Paul Maravelias to pay

David DePamphilis $4,900 in attorney’s fees for the good-faith, meritorious Supreme Court

appeal case itself (2018-0376) of Judge Coughlin’s underlying reckless order to Maravelias to

pay DePamphilis over $9,000 of attorney’s fees in relation to a truthful and necessary 2017

stalking petition filed against DePamphilis, which the Supreme Court affirmed without making a

single reference to the record to support the false accusation Maravelias acted in “bad-faith”.

18. Maravelias cannot exercise his legal right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court

without fearing more patently unreasonable extortionary harassment from the said: an unchecked

throng of arbitrary tyrants with contempt-of-court police powers, who are abusing said power to

order financially-struggling Maravelias to surrender his scant funds to a rich 50-year-old

executive without making a single specific finding of fact supporting the outrageous judicial act.

19. It is vital that the record in this case preserve a paper trail of these despotic, illegal

abuses committed by our state’s highest Court, for review by the United States Supreme Court:

a. David DePamphilis orchestrated the Supreme Court’s recent extortionate act in 2018-
0376 by filing a 12/28/18 post-trial Motion entitled “Appellee’s Request for Taxation
of Costs and the Award of Attorneys’ [sic] Fees”. Maravelias does not have a readily
available scanned copy and therefore asks the Court to take judicial notice thereof.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 b. On 12/31/18, Maravelias filed “Appellant’s Objection to Appellee’s Request for
Taxation of Costs and Award of Attorney’s Fees” in 2018-0376, attached as Exhibit A.

c. On 1/28/19, Maravelias filed his “Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider” (Exhibit B) in

2018-0483, the appeal of the 2018 extension in the instant case. This Motion exposed
the Supreme Court’s dishonest, fallacious, libelous, and bad-faith conduct prejudicing
Maravelias as evident in their 1/16/19 Order. This Motion had the effect of angering
the biased Supreme Court into their further acts of retaliation against Maravelias.

d. On 2/21/19, the Supreme Court issued unpublished orders both in 2018-0376 (Exhibit
C) and 2018-0483 (Exhibit D). In 2018-0376, they casually granted DePamphilis’s
demented motion for appellate attorney’s fees without making a single factual or
conclusory finding that Maravelias’s appeal itself was “frivolous or in bad-faith”. In
2018-0483, they blanket-denied Maravelias’s flustering, incriminating Motion to
Reconsider. I.e., the bad-faith Supreme Court purposefully tarried in their decision on
DePamphilis’s extortionate motion to monitor Maravelias’s reaction to their secretive
legal abuse in 2018-0483. After being exposed as liars, libelers, and fact-ignorers in the
1/28/19 Motion to Reconsider, they abused their power to retaliate against Maravelias
by granting the unheard-of appellate attorney’s fees on the same day.

e. On 2/26/19, Maravelias submitted an explosive “Motion to Reconsider Anomalous,

Arbitrary Rule 23 Award of Appeal Attorney’s Fees” in 2018-0376 (Exhibit E) using
first-person language to the complicit justices. Maravelias included the following
prayer for relief, “If denying the requested reconsideration, state specific facts and
reasons why this appeal was allegedly ‘frivolous or in bad faith’;”.

f. On 3/29/19, the Supreme Court issued an unpublished two-sentence Order (Exhibit F)

blanket-denying the Motion to Reconsider, offering zero factual findings to support the
baseless allegation Maravelias’s appeal was “frivolous”, and ordering him to pay
DePamphilis $4,900.00 of attorney’s fees.

20. DePamphilis has recently moved the Supreme Court to repeat said unilateral

extortionate tyranny against Maravelias even in this case, where Maravelias is the

Defendant. On 3/22/19, DePamphilis filed a Motion in 2018-0483 begging them to order

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Defendant Maravelias to pay DePamphilis for all attorney’s fees in that appeal, months after the

Supreme Court refused on 1/16/19 to overturn the 2018 extension of this stalking order, enabling

DePamphilis to continue abusing Maravelias with bold lies without ever being held accountable.

21. If our criminal Supreme Court’s behavior in 2018-0376 is any indication, they

will soon order destitute Maravelias to pay his rich abuser for daring to exercise his right to

appeal this outrageous stalking order when extended in 2018, after said stalking order was

proven false with video and photographic evidence at the 2018 hearing. Maravelias cannot afford

to expose himself to the arbitrary whims of these extortionate tyrants if unnecessary. Ergo, if this

Court continues to ignore Maravelias’s constitutional arguments, it subjects him to further undue

harassment, extortion, and legal abuse. This Court must adjudicate said arguments in full.

22. Clearly, this Court cannot ignore Maravelias’s legal arguments within his 2/14/19

Motion to Dismiss and 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider without greatly prejudicing him,

necessitating another futile appeal to the bad-faith New Hampshire Supreme Court.

23. Defendant Maravelias takes this opportunity to proffer a prescient plea to the

Honorable Stephen G. Breyer to grant a foreseeable Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the United States of America if and when, expectedly, 1) this trial court

declines to stop abusing Maravelias’s federal constitutional rights as argued in the numerous

pleadings and oral argument before this Court on the instant restraining order extension, and 2)

the activist, bad-faith New Hampshire Supreme Court likewise hears and wrongly affirms this

protective order extension in late 2019, defenestrating Maravelias’s pro se federal constitutional

arguments carelessly into the wind as part of an objective pattern of harassment, extortion, and

judicial tyranny which New Hampshire’s highest court has been inflicting against defenseless

Maravelias.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 3/29/19 Objection to Defendant’s Verified Motion to Reconsider
3/8/19 Order Granting Stalking Order Extension;
III. Grant Defendant’s 3/21/19 Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting Stalking
Order Extension; and
IV. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

April 3rd, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Objection to
Defendant’s Verified Motion to Reconsider 3/8/19 Order Granting Stalking Order Extension was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________
April 3rd, 2019

235
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

PAUL MARAVELIAS’S DECLARATION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF REPLY TO

PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT’S VERIFIED MOTION TO RECONSIDER
3/8/19 ORDER GRANTING STALKING ORDER EXTENSION

I, Paul Maravelias, declare as follows:

• The New Hampshire Supreme Court publishes its “Other Final Others”, cases not
resulting in a full precedential Opinion, at the following internet link:
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/finalorders/index.htm

• I am a litigant in two recent Supreme Court appeals, Paul Maravelias v. David

DePamphilis (2018-0376) and Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias (2018-0483).
Neither of these were “confidential” cases.

• The Supreme Court issued Final Orders in these cases on 11/30/18 and 1/16/19
respectively. Their Orders, in at least one part or many times, ignored essential facts
showing clear prejudice to my case, willfully libeled me by falsely characterizing my
transcribed testimony, and upheld rampant violations of my federal constitutional rights.

• These Final Orders are mysteriously removed, redacted, or never included where
expected on the Supreme Court website listing all such Final Orders. Under
“November 30, 2018”, where one would expect the 11/30/18 2018-0376 Final Order in
my case, only the case “2018-0206, Sanford A. Woodmansee v. Andrea V. Lasker,
Esquire” appears.

1
236
 (https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/finalorders/2018/index.htm#nov) Likewise,
there are no Final Orders whatsoever dated January 16th, 2019; the 1/16/19 Final Order in
2018-0473 appears nowhere.
(https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/finalorders/2019/index.htm#jan)

• In the afternoon of 4/2/19, I called the Supreme Court to inquire about the publication
standard for “Other Final Orders” on the website. I was informed that all non-confidential
“Other Final Orders” should appear there, where a case was accepted and finally resolved
on the merits after briefing (as was it with both of the 2018 appeal cases which I
initiated). I was informed there is a “uniform” standard in practice and that there are
allegedly no discriminatory, subjective practices at play.

• Disturbed that I was correct in my suspicion the Supreme Court’s secret legal abuse
Orders against me were purposefully being rescinded from the public’s eye, I
immediately created legal documentation of this foul-play on the Supreme Court website.
I have archived both “Other Final Orders” pages as of this date, proving that the Final
Orders in my appeals do not appear. The following links are permanent archived
evidence:

o http://www.webcitation.org/77L9np4mv
o http://www.webcitation.org/77L9qXB9J
o https://web.archive.org/web/20190402193606/https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supr
eme/finalorders/2019/index.htm
o https://web.archive.org/web/20190402193537/https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supr
eme/finalorders/2018/index.htm

• On 4/1/19, I asked the one of the clerks of the Supreme Court in person for information
about if and when “Rule 23” appeal attorney’s fees have ever been granted before in
history. She could not give me any documentation nor cite one time in history that the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ever done this.

• The Supreme Court’s two-sentence extortionate 3/29/19 Order forcing me to pay my

legal abuser $4,900 in appeal attorney’s fees uses the following language: “The
defendant is hereby awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 23 in the amount of
$4,900.”

• Hundreds of NHSC Final Orders have been scanned and digitized onto the internet,
published on the Supreme Court website and others. A Google search of the entire
internet for the exact phrase “attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 23” returns exactly 5
2
237
238
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S RSA 633:3-A, III-C. MOTION TO STATE REASONS

FOR GRANTING PRELIMINARY EXTENSION OF STALKING FINAL
ORDER OF PROTECTION

Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) respectfully submits the within Motion pursuant to RSA

633:3-a, III-c. and represents as follows:

1. On 1/24/19, this Court granted a preliminary extension of the Stalking Order in this

case (Leonard, E.) upon Plaintiff’s resubmitted 1/24/19 Motion to Extend.

2. Defendant is objecting in a separate pleading. A Hearing will soon be scheduled.

3. RSA 633:3-a, III-c. provides in relevant part:

“The court shall state in writing, at the respondent's request, its reason or reasons for
granting the extension. The court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce and collect the
financial support obligation which accrued prior to the expiration of the protective
order.

4. In order to inform a more productive, focused Hearing, Defendant Maravelias

respectfully requests this Court state its reasons for granting the 1/24/19 preliminary extension.

239
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Issue a written Order stating the reasons for its 1/24/18 preliminary extension
currently pending Hearing; and

III. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

January 28th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s RSA 633:3-a, III-c. Motion to
State Reasons for Granting Preliminary Extension of Stalking Final Order of Protection was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

_______________________________

January 28th, 2019

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
241
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
JUDICIAL BRANCH
http://www.courts.state.nh.us

Court Name:
Case Name:
Case Number:
(if known)

ADVANCE NOTICE FORM

STILL CAMERA/CELLPHONES/TABLETS/AUDIO/VIDEO
(ONE DAY ONLY)

Name:

Organization:
(if applicable)

Telephone: E-mail:

Type of camera or recording device:

Still Camera Cell Phone/Tablet Audio/Video Audio only

I understand, under Supreme Court Rule 19, Superior Court Rule 78, and Circuit Court Rule 1.4
– District Division, Rule 78 – Probate Division and Rule 1.29 – Family Division, that I am allowed
to bring still photography/audio/video equipment and a cellphone or tablet in to the courtroom during
courtroom proceedings provided I give the judge in the case advance notice and do not use my
equipment in a way that disrupts court proceedings. I also understand the judge may limit the number
of still/video cameras and audio recorders in the courtroom at one time.

2/7/19
Date Signature

Give form to Clerk’s Office when completed

242
NHJB-2772-DFPSSUP (07/08/2016)
243
244
 February 6th, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit District Division Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed Objected-To Motion to Continue Hearing to be filed in

the above-referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq. Paul J. Maravelias

245
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT DISTRICT DIVISION DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

OBJECTED-TO MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING

respectfully submits the within Motion and represents as follows:

1. On 1/24/19, this Court granted a preliminary extension of the stalking order in this

case in response to 1/24/19 Motion to Extend. Defendant objected. The Court has

scheduled a Hearing on the extension for 2/12/19.

2. Defendant Maravelias respectfully requests the Court for a continuance until late

March or April 2019. This will allow both parties to better prepare their respective cases.

3. Defendant needs more time to prepare his case and collect certain evidentiary

materials in response to Plaintiff s allegations in the Motion to Extend.

4. Plaintiff OBJECTS to this Motion. Maravelias attempted to obtain concurrence.

5. This request is without any prejudice to the Plaintiff, who currently has the

preliminary stalking order extension in-effect against Maravelias. It is the Defendant who has

requested a Hearing and who presently waives his statutory rights as to the timeliness thereof.

246
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD , WINDHAM, NH 03087
 6. Furthermore, this continuance is necessary because Defendant Maravelias s

mandamus action to this Court (Superior Court Case No. 218-2019-CV-00090) will not be

decided until a 2/20/19 Hearing at Rockingham Superior Court. The outcome of said action has a

procedurally significant and potentially dispositive impact on the Hearing in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Continue the extension Hearing presently scheduled for 2/12/19 to late March or
April 2019; and

III. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

February 6th, 2019 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Objected-To Motion to Continue Hearing
was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for
the Plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

February 6th, 2019 ___________________________________

247
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD , WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM,SS 10th CIRCUIT — DISTRICT DIVISION - DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

PLAINTIFF
' S BENCH MEMORANDUM REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S STATED GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL

NOW COMES the Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis, by and through her attorneys, Preti,

Flaherty PLLP, and respectfully submits the within Bench Memorandum Regarding Defendant's

Stated Grounds for Dismissal. In support of this Motion, Plaintiff states as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. A Hearing on Christina DePamphilis' Motion to Extend Stalking Order for Five

Years has been scheduled for February 12, 2019 at 8:00 a.m.

2. In his Memorandum of Law in Support of Objection to the Motion, Defendant

alleges that the Stalking Statute, RSA 633:3-A, III-C is unconstitutional and asserts other

grounds for dismissal. He has not filed a separate written Motion to Dismiss unconnected to his

Objection.

3. In the event Defendant does move to dismiss on these grounds, Plaintiff objects

and submits the instant Bench Memorandum in support thereof.

II. THE EXTENSION LANGUAGE OF THE STALKING STATUTE IS

CONSTITUTIONAL

4. Maravelias claims:

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1 13834003.1
 "Insofar as a New Hampshire court is allowed to find a defendant's specifics (sic) acts of
protected speech have jeopardized the comfort, health, or happiness ("well-being") or
"safety" of a plaintiff and therefore grants the extension, the statute is unconstitutionally
over broad on its face in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
constitution and Part I, Article 22 of the state constitution."

Defendant's Memo of Law ¶ 32.

5. Defendant raised this identical issue in his recent appeal of the 2018 extension
order. In its January 2019 Order(DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483 at pp. 10-11),
the New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed and rejected this claim, concluding that
Defendant's communications at issue "did not amount to protected speech for purposes of Part I,
Article 22 of the State Constitution" or the Federal Constitution.
6. As this issue has been decided adversely to Defendant by the Supreme Court,
collateral estoppel principles bar Defendant from raising it again in connection with this hearing.
7. Defendant further argues that the "safety and well-being" language of RSA 633:3-
a, III-c is impermissibly vague. Defendant's Memorandum of Law ¶¶ 54-60. Defendant is
mistaken.
8. To demonstrate that a statute is unconstitutionally vague, a defendant must show
that it either: (1) fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand what it prohibits; or (2) authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 11 (2008).
9. The stalking statute is not unconstitutionally vague as its terms are easily
understandable and courts have specific guidance concerning how to apply it in connection with
extensions.
10. Under RSA 633:3-A, III-c, a stalking order:
"may be extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff,
showing good cause, with notice to the defendant, for one year after the
expiration of the first order and thereafter each extension may be for up to
five years, upon the request of the plaintiff and at the discretion of the
court. The Court shall review the order, and each renewal thereof, and
shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety and
well-being of the plaintiff."

RSA 633:3-a, III-c. (emphasis added).

1 1. As the Supreme Court recently outlined in its January 2019 Order:

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2 13834003.1
 In MacPherson, we construed RSA 633:3-a, III-c to mean that "whether 'good
cause' exists directly relates to the safety and well-being of the plaintiff."
MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. "Good cause" exists to extend a protective order,
we held, if"the trial court determines that the circumstances are such that, without
a protective order, the plaintiff's safety and well-being would be in jeopardy." Id.
In applying this standard, the trial court is required to assess whether the current
conditions are such that there is still concern for the safety and well-being of the
plaintiff, and in so doing, to review the circumstances of the original petition and
any violation of the protective order, taking into account any present and
reasonable fear by the plaintiff. Id.

DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483 at p. 3.

12. In light of the statute's plain terms and the clear standard of review that exists in

connection with extending stalking orders of protection, the statute is not unconstitutionally

vague.

III. ALL OTHER STATED GROUNDS SUPPORTING DISMISSAL SHOULD BE

REJECTED

13. All other grounds for dismissal alleged in Defendant's Memorandum of Law lack

merit. Dismissal thus is not warranted, and the Court should decide whether "good cause" exists

to further extend the final stalking order of protection based on the testimony, exhibits, and

argument to be presented at the hearing.

14. Defendant's claim that this Court has lost personal jurisdiction over him

(Memorandum 11¶ 13-17) was rejected by the Supreme Court in its recent Order. See

DePamphilis v. Maravelias, Case No. 2018-0483 at p. 2. In addition, Defendant assented to the

dismissal of this identical claim in the pending matter of Paul Maravelias v. John J. Coughlin,

Rockingham County Supr. Crt., Docket No. 218-2019-CV-00090.

15. Secondly, Defendant's arguments attacking the validity of the original stalking

order (Memorandum 11 18-23) should be rejected. The Supreme Court recently held that as the

protective order is a final order upheld after appeal, Defendant is "precluded from challenging

250
3 13834003.1
the trial court's determination that he stalked the plaintiff, or its findings of fact in granting the

initial protective order." Id. at p. 3.

16. Finally, Defendant argues that his due process rights were violated at the 2018

extension hearing because he was cross-examined with photographs not referenced in the Motion

to Extend, which were later cited by the Court in its extension Order. Memorandum 1111 26-27.

This issue was raised in Defendant's appeal and rejected as "not sufficiently developed to

warrant further review." Id. at p. 11. Accordingly, Defendant cannot raise it anew in connection

with this hearing.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis

respectfully requests this Honorable Court to:

A. Consider her positions set forth in this Bench Memorandum;

B. Deny any Motion to Dismiss advanced by Defendant; and

C. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA DePAMPHILIS

By her attorneys,

PRETI FLAHERTY PLLP

Dated: February 11, 2019 By:

Simon R. Brown, NH Bar #9279
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302-1318
(603)410-1500

251
4 13834003.1
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this 11th day of February 2019 a copy of the foregoing Bench
Memorandum was forwarded via email and U.S. First Class Mail, postage pre-paid, to the pro se
Defendant, Paul Maravelias.

Simon R. Brown

252
5
13834003.1
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM,SS 10th CIRCUIT — DISTRICT DIVISION - DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis, by her attorneys, respectfully submits the within Motion

to Quash Subpoena, and in support thereof, represents as follows:

I. THE SUBPOENA AND DEMAND FOR COUNSEL DISQUALIFICATION

1. Defendant emailed an unsigned Subpoena to Plaintiff's counsel on February 6,

2019, but made no other attempt at service. Defendant seeks to compel counsel to testify at the

hearing on Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection

set for February 12, 2019, and to produce documents, including "Any + all email

communications not protected by atty.-client privilege relating, however slightly, to these Mot. to

Extnd. allegations: 1) 10/23/18 incident, 2) 7/3/18 incident, 3) other 'following' incidents." See

copy of Subpoena attached hereto at Exhibit A.

2. In connection with the emailed Subpoena, Defendant sent a letter demanding

disqualification of undersigned counsel on the grounds that he now is a necessary witness at the

February 12 hearing. See letter attached as Exhibit B. Defendant has not filed a motion with

this Court seeking disqualification.

3. The Subpoena should be quashed, and undersigned counsel should not be

disqualified.

253
1
13823097.1
 II. THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED

4. The Subpoena is improper and should be quashed for numerous reasons. First,

undersigned counsel is not a necessary witness to the events cited in the Subpoena. The

witnesses to those events are identified in the Motion to Extend; they are the witnesses, not the

lawyer who cited the incidents in a pleading but was not present and could not testify to those

events. Defendant knows this, yet he has tried to subpoena opposing counsel in order to remove

him from representation of Plaintiff and to cause undue delay.

5. Secondly, if the Subpoena is not quashed and undersigned counsel is required to

testify, it will cause unreasonable hardship and expense to Plaintiff and likely necessitate the

appearance of another attorney to represent Plaintiff at the hearing. See Rule of Professional

Conduct 3.7 (Lawyer as Witness) ("a lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the

lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless....disqualification of the lawyer would work

unreasonable hardship on the client"). Disqualification would require undersigned counsel to

withdraw and Plaintiff to retain new counsel, which would cause further and unnecessary

expense to Plaintiff.

6. In addition, if Defendant is permitted to inquire of counsel as a witness, his

questions will undoubtedly address matters protected by the attorney-client privilege and the

attorney work product doctrine.

7. Finally, the Subpoena should be quashed as it is defective. It is not notarized, it

was not properly served, other statutory requirements have not been met, and it was merely

emailed by Defendant.

254
2
13823097.1
 III. CONCLUSION

8. Defendant's Subpoena is a transparently improper tactic to bolster his request that

the February 12 hearing be continued. Just as the Court awarded David DePamphilis his

attorney's fees in having to defend against Defendant's improper stalking petition last year

(Maravelias v. David DePamphilis, Supreme Court Case No. 2018-0376), Defendant again

should be sanctioned and ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorney's fees in connection with having to

respond to this latest improper tactic.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Christina DePamphilis respectfully

requests this Honorable Court:

A. Grant this Motion and Order the Subpoena Quashed;

B. Award Plaintiff her attorney's fees incurred in having to draft and pursue this

Motion; and

C. Grant such other relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA DePAMPHILIS

By her attorneys,

PRETI FLAHERTY PLLP

Dated: February 11, 2019 By:

Simon R. Brown, NH Bar #9279
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302-1318
(603)410-1500

255
3
13823097.1
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this 1 1 th day of February 2019 a copy of the foregoing Motion to Quash
Subpoena was forwarded via e-mail and U.S. First Class Mail, postage pre-paid, to the pro se
Defendant, Paul Maravelias.

Simon R. Brown

256 13823097.1
Exhibit A

257
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
JUDICIAL BRANCH
http://www.courts.state.nh.us

Court Name: 10th Circuit - District Division - Derry

Case Name: Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias
Case Number: 473-2016-CV-00124
(if known)
SUBPOENA

To:
Simon R. Brown,Esq.
Name of Witness
57 North Main Street
Street Address
Concord.NH.03302
City, State, Zip Code
You are required to appear at: 10th Circuit - District Division - Derry located
Location (if at a courthouse, put name of court)
at 10 Courthouse Ln Derry NH
Street Address City State
on 02/12/2019 at 8:00AM to testify about the above case.
Date Time
You are further required to bring with you the following:
Any + all email communications not protected by atty.-client privilege relating, however slightly, to the
these Mot.to Extnd. allegations: 1)10/23/18 incident, 2)7/3/18 incident,3)other "following" incidents.

IF YOU DO NOT APPEAR YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO LEGAL PENALTIES

Date Signature Justice of the Peace, Clerk of Court, or Judge

Printed name
Issued at the request of Phone number (optional)

RETURN OF SERVICE
On at o'clock in the C a.m. ❑ p.m. I read or
delivered in hand to the above-named person an original subpoena of which this is a true copy. I also
delivered payment of travel fees of $ and attendance fees of $ this date.
Signature
Printed name
Title (if applicable)
Agency (if applicable)

REQUESTING PARTY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF TRAVEL AND ATTENDANCE FEES

N HJB-2775-DFPS (03/13/2013)
258
Exhibit B

259
 FEB 07 2G1

Simon R. Brown, Esq. February 6th, 2019

Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP
PO Box 1318 Paul Maravelias
Concord, NH 03302-1318 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087
VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST-CLASS MAIL

RE: Demand for Lawyer Disqualification per Rule 3.7 of the New Hampshire
Rules of Professional Conduct

Dear Attorney Brown:

As I understand, you are representing Christina DePamphilis in the upcoming hearing at

Derry Circuit Court on her motion to extend the restraining order against me, presently
scheduled for 2/12/19.

I respectfully demand that you fully and immediately disqualify yourself from the case, in
which you are a necessary witness, pursuant to Professional Conduct Rule 3.7:

Rule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a
necessary witness unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

(2)the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the
case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work unreasonable hardship on the client.

(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer's
firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7
or Rule 1.9.

In January 2019, you wrote a "Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of
Protection" on behalf of your client. Your Motion — the subject of the upcoming hearing —
references the following:

• Alleges that I sent "a letter to Christina's legal counsel [you] promising to 'go
nuclear and utterly destroy (Christina's) academic and professional future";

260
 • Indicates that either you or your client have gained illicit access to my online product
forums for my business, and recorded certain private content thereof in parts;

• Alleges that I "abused" your client's family member at a time and place where you
were personally present;

• Reveals that you have personally been in communication with a third-party, Amy
Anderson, to conspire to propound against me in a legal pleading what I shall argue
to be malicious and defamatory false accusations which you yourself know to be
false, in violation of Rule 3.1; and

• Accuses me of violating the restraining order because of certain content I placed

within a legal pleading that I sent you.

I am calling you as a necessary witness in the upcoming. You must testify to your personal first-
hand knowledge in the above matters. Further, my 1/28/19 Objection to your Motion references
the following:

• I assert that a video which you have personally seen in full has proven that an extensive
element of your client's stalking accusations against me is totally false;

• I assert that I myself have been the victim of David DePamphilis's stalking manifested in
one part when he had a "profane 5/4/18 verbal explosion" at me at a place and time
where you were personally present;

• I accuse you of defending and asserting a baseless claim that I "followed" your client on
10/23/18 which you know to be false, and I called it a "criminal ac[t] of fraud upon this
Court" that you included said claim in your Motion;

• I accuse you of mischaracterizing the record and dishonestly dramatizing facts in legal
pleadings in a manner violative of Rule 3.1, evidencing that your entire litigation against
me is in bad-faith and purposed only for defamatory harassment of me;

• I accuse you of having stated elsewhere that I had only a "previous obsession" with your
client, which would estop your current different claim that I have a "hate obsession";

• I accuse you of personally "inventing" certain "libelous attacks against" me which your
clients never alleged against me, further in violation of Rule 3.1;

261
2
 • I accuse you of falsely citing the record in the Motion you wrote by quoting text which
does not in fact appear in the being-cited transcript, which prejudiced me;

• I renew my legal argument about loss of personal jurisdiction by the past-30-days 2018
Hearing in a matter dependent upon my allegation of your "disorienting courtroom
dialog" to the judge on 2/15/18 which deprived me of any ability to contemporaneously
object and therefore did not wave the issue, which you witnessed.

Further, in my 1/15/19 Preliminary Objection, I alleged that you did not reach out to me to obtain
concurrence before filing your Motion to Extend as you did previously in 2018, in violation of
Dist. Div. R. 1.8(C). I argue, and shall argue at trial, this error was prejudicial and warrants
dismissal of the stalking order extension. The argument is predicated on your testimony of
whether or not you did reach out to me to attempt to obtain concurrence.

In all the above, you are necessary witness I plan to subpoena. You have first-hand material
knowledge of facts and issues central to my case against your client's motion to extend the
restraining order.

It is therefore certain, let alone "likely", that you are a "necessary witness" in said hearing. The
New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct clearly forbid that you should "act as advocate"
at said trial.

All of the above issues are heavily contested issues between both parties; accordingly, your
testimony will not "relat[e] to an uncontested issue". While a few of the issues above might
vaguely pertain to the "nature ... of legal services" you "rendered in the case", most pertain to
your own conduct or observations outside the usual acts of your work as a lawyer.

If you continue to represent Christina DePamphilis, I would be enoiinously prejudiced. It would

be unclear which representations you make are your own personal representations or your
detached analyses of others' representations as counsel.

In December, I wrote you a letter documenting your repeated rule-violative misrepresentation

conduct I believe you have committed throughout the course of this case. I have not pursued an
attorney misconduct complaint and I have been very forgiving.

However, I do require your compliance with the rules in this matter to ensure my case in rebuttal
is not prejudiced by your improper representation of your client in a dispute in which you are a
personal first-hand witness to any material issues.

Kind regards,
Paul J. Maravelias

262
3
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO MOTION TO QUASH

Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) respectfully submits the within Objection and states as follows:

1. On 2/7/19, Defendant obtained two Subpoenas, issued by proper legal authority.

Defendant effectuated formal service of process on the said witnesses by proper county sheriff

authorities.

2. To wit, Maravelias 1) obtained a notarized Subpoena signed and certified by Justice

of the Peace Denise E. Neale ordering Laurie DePamphilis to appear at the 2/12/19 Hearing, 2)

delivered said Subpoena to the Rockingham County Sheriff for personal service upon the

witness, paying a filing fee in excess of $70, 3) obtained a notarized Subpoena signed and

certified by Justice of the Peace Denise E. Neale ordering Simon R. Brown, Esq. to appear at the

2/12/19 Hearing with certain materials, and 4) delivered said Subpoena to the Merrimack County

Sheriff for personal service upon the witness, paying a filing fee in excess of $80.

3. Strangely, opposing counsel claims Maravelias “made no other attempt at service”

beyond the good-faith convenience email to give more notice. Opposing counsel claims said

263
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Subpoena summoning him is “defective” and “not notarized”. To rebut this baseless contention,

Maravelias attaches digitized scans of both legally valid Subpoenas herewith. (Exhibits A + B)

4. Opposing counsel’s other arguments in support of the Motion to Quash are without

merit and at times constitute inappropriate contentions in violation of the New Hampshire Rules

of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1; Defendant Maravelias requests to address them orally during

today’s Hearing. Frankly, opposing counsel’s Motion to Quash arguments are irrelevant

regardless, because the Subpoena in question is a valid order legally binding upon opposing

counsel until this Court takes any action otherwise, at which point it will be moot.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 2/11/19 Motion to Quash;

III. Hear further oral argument on this matter, if necessary; and

IV. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

February 12th, 2019 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

264
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM,SS 10'1'CIRCUIT — DISTRICT DIVISION - DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

PLA ➢ NTI FF'S MOTION TO RESTRICT VIDEO-RECORDING BY DEFENDANT AT

EXTENSION ➢-IEA
' '➢ NG

NOW COMES the Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis, by and through her attorneys, Preti,

Flaherty PLLP, and respectfully submits the within Motion to Restrict Video-Recording by

Defendant at Extension Hearing. In support of this Motion, Plaintiff states as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. A Hearing on Christina DePamphilis' Motion to Extend Stalking Order for Five

Years has been scheduled for February 12, 2019 at 8:00 a.m.

2. Defendant has filed notice that he intends to both audio and video record

the proceedings.

3. At the previous extension hearing conducted in May 2018, Defendant sought to

videotape and audiotape the entire proceeding, including the testimony of Ms. DePamphilis.

4. Ms. DePamphilis objected, and the Court thereafter ordered that Maravelias could

videotape the entire hearing, except when the minor Plaintiff testified. Under these

circumstances, Maravelias was permitted to audiotape her testimony, but not videotape it, and he

was able to obtain a transcript of her testimony.

265
1 13817570.2
5. In an Order dated January 16, 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's 2018

extension of the Stalking Final Order of Protection. See Christina DePamphilis v. Paul

Maravelias, Supreme Court Case No. 2018-0483. In so doing, the Supreme Court

upheld this Court's ruling with respect to videotaping Ms. DePamphilis' testimony,

noting that:

District Division Rule 1.4 "contemplates that the trial court may limit a party's
ability to record the proceedings." See District Division Rule 1.4(f); see also
District Division Rule 1.1 (trial court may waive application of any rule for good
cause and as justice may require)..."[t]he trial court was well within its discretion
to prohibit the defendant from recording video images of the minor victim of his
stalking, about whom he had already threatened to publish 'troves of
reputationally damaging information and assorted digital artifacts' online."

January 16, 2019 Order at p. 11.

II. IN LIGHT OF DEFENDANT'S MISUSE OF THE 2018 EXTENSION

HEARING VIDEO, IN ITS DISCRETION, THE COURT SHOULD
PRECLUDE HIM FROM VIDEOTAPING ANY OF THE UPCOMING
EXTENSION HEARING

6. Defendant's misuse of the video-recordings of the 2018 extension hearing compels Ms.

DePamphilis to request that he be prohibited from videotaping any of the upcoming

hearing.

7. At the 2018 hearing, Maravelias testified that he was "going to give the justice system,

the courts, another opportunity to give me justice, and I'll walk away happy...if I'm still

branded a stalker, I've got to go combat that on the internet, on YouTube. I haven't

done it yet." T413-414. Consistent with this testimony, Maravelias published the clips

he liked of the extension hearing on YouTube in an effort to gain public scorn towards

Christina DePamphilis. He posted these videos on YouTube under the name "NH

Outrage," and these clips still appear at the top position if one Googles Christina's name.

In those recordings, he points the viewer back to w wv,.davidt heliar.corn,which displays

266
2 13817570.2
 pictures of Christina and her home address. These activities have led to the public

commenting on Christina, the victim of Maravelias' stalking, and Maravelias responding

negatively towards her. See YouTube comments attached as Exhibit A.

8. As one found to have stalked a teenage high school student, Defendant should not be

permitted to videotape this Court's proceedings in an effort to turn members of the

public against the victim and expose her private information, thus creating a safety

concern for Christina and her family.

9. As the Supreme Court recently held, this Court has discretion to limit Defendant's ability

to record the proceedings. District Division Rule 1.4(f). Given Defendant's

documented history of abusing this privilege, this Court would act well within its

discretion to prohibit Defendant from video-recording any of the upcoming extension

hearing.

III. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT SHOULD AGAIN ORDER THAT MS.

DEPAMPHILIS SHALL NOT BE VIDEO-RECORDED AT THE EXTENSION
HEARING

10. Alternatively, at a minimum, Ms. DePamphilis requests the Court to prohibit any video-

recording of her during the extension hearing, an order that was recently affirmed by the

New Hampshire Supreme Court.

1 1. The well-founded reasons supporting the Court's prior Order still exist today.

1 2. Christina is an 18-year-old high school student. The record of the underlying stalking
hearing, conducted in early 2017, reflected that Maravelias was obsessed with Christina,
h
professed his love for her, and tried to give her an expensive sports car on her 16t
birthday. His testimony at the 2017 stalking hearing showed an alarming level of
infatuation and obsession for Christina, a high school sophomore at the time.
13. Since the Stalking Order was issued in February 2017, Maravelias' obsession for
Christina persisted, but in a different, more alarming manner. His love obsession turned

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 into an anger and revenge obsession as evidenced by his writings to Christina's parents,
her teachers, and others in which he directly and profanely impugned Christina's
character with bizarre sexual references. This conduct continued with his testimony at
the 2018 hearing and in pleadings to this Court and the Supreme Court in which
Defendant repeatedly characterized Christina in vile and offensive terms.
14. Maravelias' insistence to not only audiotape but videotape the teenage petitioner's
testimony should be concerning to the Court. It will allow him to further intimidate and
victimize her as his stated intent is to disseminate the video he collects of her in these
matters on the Internet as part of his continuing campaign to denounce and harass the
DePamphilis family. It also will allow him to retain footage of the teenage petitioner for
his own personal devices, which is inconsistent with the terms and purpose of the
stalking order of protection she seeks to extend.
1 5. As the Motion to Extend hearing will be audio-recorded by the Court, it is not necessary
or appropriate for Maravelias to videotape the proceedings, including the testimony of
the teenage complainant, whom he has been found to have stalked, so that he can
possess and retain footage of her which he could use for his own devices, including
dissemination on the Internet and social media.
16. In a stalking case, prohibiting the videotaping of the victim - especially a teenage
petitioner seeking to extend a stalking order of protection - by a person found by the trial
court to have stalked her, is an appropriate restriction. Such a condition "advances an
overriding public interest that is likely to be prejudiced if the relief is not granted." See
Circuit Court Rule 1.4(f). The relief sought also is no broader than necessary to protect
that interest, and no reasonably less restrictive alternatives are available to protect the
interest. See id.
1 7. Maravelias is not prejudiced by such an order. He enjoys access to the court's audio
recording ofthe hearing and transcripts thereof and would be permitted to create his own
audio-recording of Christina's testimony. Christina's testimony is preserved and
available to Maravelias; he obtained a transcript of her 2018 testimony and can do so
again with respect to this hearing. Thus, his procedural rights are not violated, as the
Supreme Court already has ruled.

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4 13817570.2
 WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Christina DePamphilis

respectfully requests this Honorable Court to:

A. Grant this Motion;

B. Prohibit the Defendant from video-recording any of the proceedings at the

Extension Hearing scheduled for February 12, 2019;

C. Alternatively, prohibit the Defendant from video-recording Christina

DePamphilis' testimony at the Extension Hearing scheduled for February 12, 2019; and

D. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTINA DePAMPHILIS

By her attorneys,

PRETI FLAHERTY PLLP

•
Dated: February 11, 2019 By:
Simon R. Brown, NH Bar #9279
P.O. Box 1318
Concord, NH 03302-1318
(603)410-1500

CERT➢ FICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this 11`h day of February 2019 a copy of the foregoing Motion to Restrict
Video-Recording by Defendant at Extension Hearing was forwarded via e-mail and U.S. First
Class Mail, postage pre-paid, to the pro se Defendant, Paul Maravelias.

Simon R. Brown

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5 13817570.2
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RESTRICT

VIDEO-RECORDING BY DEFENDANT AT EXTENSION HEARING

Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) respectfully submits the within Objection and states as follows:

1. Defendant notes his Objection to Plaintiff’s aforecited 2/11/19 Motion.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion lacks legal authority, seeks to contravene well-established

statutorily authorized and substantive due-process rights, seeks to disparage the public’s interest

in an open and transparent judiciary, and is half self-plagiarized from her similar 2018 pleading.

Further, it usefully reveals the improper ulterior purposes of her and her family’s protective order

litigation against Maravelias: viz., their anti-freedom-of-expression ideological objectives rather

than any legitimate need for “protection”.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion operates under a bizarre legal theory in which the law affords

certain individuals different thresholds of standing to record a public hearing where said hearing

is open to the general public and any person at all could videotape it and upload it to YouTube.

4. Maravelias requests to be heard for oral argument on this matter today.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Deny Plaintiff’s 2/11/19 Motion to Restrict Video-Recording by Defendant at

Extension Hearing;

III. Hear oral argument on this matter at today’s Hearing; and

IV. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

February 12th, 2019 PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Restrict
Video-Recording by Defendant at Extension Hearing is being hand-delivered today to Simon R.
Brown, Esq., counsel for the Plaintiff, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH,
03302-1318.

February 12th, 2019 ___________________________________

271
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”) respectfully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss the

1/24/19 Motion to Extend Stalking Order filed by Christina DePamphilis (“Plaintiff”) and end

this case. In support, Maravelias states the following.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE MERITS

1. The Court stipulated that it found good cause for the 1/24/19 temporary stalking order

extension because of three parts of Plaintiff’s 1/24/19 Verified Motion to Extend:

a. Paragraphs ¶12-13 (viz., the past 2018 extension case had illuminated that Maravelias
had called the Plaintiff mean/bad names to others a few times);
b. Paragraphs ¶22-24 (viz., Plaintiff alleges Maravelias has “followed” her in summer
2018 and again “in his vehicle” on “10/23/18”); and
c. Paragraph ¶27 (viz., Maravelias submitted a NH Supreme Court Reply Brief containing
a public court exhibit allegedly in violation of the 8/7/18 “extended terms”).

2. This Court held a Hearing on 2/12/19 which assumedly established the following facts:

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 272
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 a. Cell phone location history proves Paul Maravelias did not “follow” Plaintiff on
10/23/18 in Windham. At all times material, “3:45pm to 4:15pm”, he was miles-away
doing business in Concord, NH. Maravelias was at the Administrative Office of the
Courts, the USPS Post Office, and the NH Supreme Court filing a Motion.

b. Christina DePamphilis testified she knew Maravelias has two vehicles, a Black Alfa
Romeo and a Black Minivan, but she feared he could possibly have different vehicles.
She claimed the 10/23/18 following vehicle was a “white SUV” and speculated it could
be Maravelias’s, though not knowing. But she had priorly asseverated in her sworn
Verified Motion that Maravelias was following her “in his vehicle”. (¶23)

c. Paul Maravelias testified he’s never been in the Salisbury Beach area at any times
material (to wit, “August 2018”) nor ever followed the Plaintiff.

d. Regarding Plaintiff’s allegation at ¶27 and the 8/7/18 “extended terms”, Maravelias
testified they were issued ultra vires without legal authority. He has filed a federal
lawsuit against state criminal enforcement officials for declaratory/injunctive relief.

3. Assuming the above facts, Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend does not state a claim under the

statute for extension. There was no “following” (¶22-24), no act of stalking by Maravelias filing

a legal appellate brief (¶27), and Maravelias’s behavior long-ago of calling Plaintiff not-nice

names to other people (¶12-13) does not amount to present concern for her safety and well-being.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MATTER OF LAW

4. Even ignoring all facts found at yesterday’s Hearing and assuming all of Plaintiff’s well-

pleaded allegations within the Verified Motion to Extend, the Court must dismiss. The following

argumentation relies upon a few shared legal principles.

5. First, there is a difference between 1) the absence of reversible error within the Supreme

Court’s appellate jurisdiction, and 2) the absence of actual error which this Court may correct

within its original jurisdiction over stalking orders.1

1
The Supreme Court’s 1/16/19 Order denying Maravelias’s appeal of the 2018 extension in this case is
instructive: “‘The trial court is in the best position to view the current circumstances, as well as the

2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 273
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 6. Second, insofar as Plaintiff’s 2/11/19 Bench Memorandum invokes a passing-reference to

collateral estoppel, the requirements of collateral estoppel are not satisfied2 where Plaintiff

attempts to hand-cuff this Court because of a Supreme Court Order denying the appeal of the

past 2018 extension – i.e., meaningfully different arguments tailored to a different case.

7. Third, any past-arguments purposed to dismiss, reconsider, or reverse-on-appeal the past

2018 extension are separate arguments from Maravelias’s new arguments – however similar – in

this motion to dismiss the new 2019 extension. “A trial court … has the authority to revisit an

earlier ruling on a motion to dismiss if it becomes aware that the ruling may be incorrect.” Gray

v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160 (2010) See also Route 12 Books Video v. Town of Troy, 149 N.H. 569,

575 (2003).

8. Fourth, since the standard for extending a stalking order is much lower than for the

original issuance thereof3 – despite the same requested one-year-order remedy – the Court

violates a defendant’s due-process rights if it grants an extension on a preexisting stalking order

defendant’s prior acts, and determine whether an extension is necessary for the safety and well-being of
the plaintiff.’ Id. [MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. (2008)] at 11. We will uphold the trial court’s
findings and rulings unless they lack evidentiary support or are tainted by error of law, id. at 10, mindful
that it is for the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented, and
that our role is not to determine whether we would have ruled differently, but whether a reasonable person
could have reached the same decision as the trial court based upon the same evidence, Cook v. Sullivan,
149 N.H. 774, 780 (2003); see also MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Fisher v. Minichiello, 155 N.H. 188, 190 (2007).” (Emphasis added)
2
“For collateral estoppel to apply, three basic conditions must be satisfied: (1) the issue subject to
estoppel must be identical in each action; (2) the first action must have resolved the issue finally on the
merits; and (3) the party to be estopped must have appeared as a party in the first action, or have been in
privity with someone who did so.” Stewart v. Bader, 154 N.H. 75, 80 (2006) The issues Maravelias raises
herein are not “identical”, because they are in reference to the current 2019 extension, and because they
meaningfully differ in substance. Further, Maravelias did not have a fair and full opportunity to litigate all
of these issues even with regards to the different 2018 extension case. “A party against whom estoppel is
pleaded must have had a full and fair prior opportunity to litigate the issue or fact in question.” Id.
3
Compare RSA 633:3-a, III-a. to RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

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34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
which itself comes into reasonable question after the fact4. I.e., if the underlying stalking order

violated statutorily mandated rights, due-process rights, or constitutional rights, any extensions

thereof necessarily re-prejudice a defendant by subjecting him or her to the lower extension

standard where the higher original-issuance standard should apply.

A. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because Its Application Thereof Has
Violated the Equal Protection Clause of the State and Federal Constitutions

9. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “no state shall ...

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

10. On 12/10/18, subject to the stalking order, Defendant Maravelias submitted a Motion

to Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity

and accompanying 20-page Memorandum of Law to this Court. Plaintiff then filed an Objection.

11. Maravelias’s Motion claimed a statutory right under RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b) and

claimed constitutional rights under the Federal and State Constitutions.

12. On 1/24/18, Plaintiff DePamphilis submitted a Verified Motion to Extend Stalking

Order which claimed a statutory right under RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

13. Over two months after Maravelias’s 12/10/18 Motion, this Court has not ruled upon it

nor taken any action on it whatsoever. But this Court granted DePamphilis’s 1/24/19 Motion the

very same day.

4
“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” Saviano
v. Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320 (2004).

4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 275
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 14. Christina DePamphilis is a lawyer-represented 18-year old female. Paul Maravelias is

a pro se 23-year-old unmarried white male.

15. As applied, this Court’s implementation of the stalking order has violated all

applicable state and federal constitutional Equal Protection clauses. Where both parties claimed a

right, the Court acted immediately on one party’s claim yet has still taken no action in response

to the other party’s over two months later. The parties were similarly-situated and no legitimate

reasons exists for the disparity; Maravelias even reminded the Court of his outstanding 12/10/18

Motion on 1/4/19 by filing a Motion for Timely Ruling. Further, Maravelias’s claimed right was

both constitutional and statutory, whereas DePamphilis’s was only statutory.

16. Dismissal is the appropriate remedy to the said Equal Protection violation. The said

violation came about by and through this stalking order, which was temporarily extended

recently only to incidentally consummate the Equal Protection violation.

B. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because It Violated the 30-Day Hearing
Requirement in 2018, a Critical Due-Process Right, Thereby Losing Personal Jurisdiction
Over Maravelias

17. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶13-17 of his 1/28/19 First-

Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Petitioner’s Motion to

Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of this issue.

18. In summary, it is not fair to subject Maravelias to the lower standard for extension

(RSA 633:3-a, III-c.) when the past order giving rising to Plaintiff’s current extension motion

5
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 276
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
was issued in violation of Maravelias’s due process rights, where this Court failed to hold a

Hearing on the past extension within 30-days of Plaintiff’s 1/5/18 Motion to Extend.5

19. The causal nature of the new extension by means of the violative first extension

renders this objection to the Court’s continued exercise of personal jurisdiction a new issue.

20. The Court may hear a new stalking petition from Plaintiff as part of a new case, but

must dismiss this case which can only continue to exist by virtue of upholding this Court’s 2018

error of disobeying the 30-day-hearing requirement in RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

C. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because It Violated Maravelias’s Advance-
Notice Rights by Relying Upon Plaintiff’s Photographic Exhibits She Noticed Nowhere in
Her 1/5/18 Extension Motion, Rather Ambushing Maravelias on 6/8/18 Almost Half-a-Year
Later at the Hearing’s Final Day

21. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶26-27 of his 1/28/19 First-

Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Petitioner’s Motion to

Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of this issue.

22. Maravelias preserved this issue in his 6/25/18 Motion for Reconsideration to this

Court. The 1/16/19 Supreme Court Order did not address this ripe and valid issue.

23. It is well settled that a “defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which

the plaintiffs are proceeding and the redress that they claim as a result of the defendant's

actions.” Morency v. Plourde, 96 N.H. 344, 346, 76 A.2d 791, 792 (1950).

5
This argument is meaningfully different from the one the Supreme Court’s 1/16/19 Order rejected. The
latter decided whether the 30-days-violation was grounds for an appellate court to reverse the 2018
extension – not whether Maravelias’s new objection here bars the trial court from granting another 2019
extension, the instant argument.

6
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 277
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 24. For the reasons already stated, this Court cannot grant another extension based upon

an underlying Order where Maravelias’s due-process rights were violated.

D. This Court Must Dismiss the Stalking Order Because The 8/7/18 “Extended Terms”
Were Issued Ultra Vires in Defiance of Statutory and Constitutional Law

25. Maravelias repeats and incorporates by reference all the facts and arguments

appearing in Maravelias’s recently filed federal lawsuit regarding the 8/7/18 “extended terms”

nominally attached to this stalking order, N.H. Federal District Court, Maravelias v. Coughlin et

al. (Case No. 1:19-CV-143), which was entered as an Exhibit in yesterday’s Hearing. The said

litigation treats this topic in extensive detail.

26. By and through this stalking order, Plaintiff has been allowed to disparage and injure

Maravelias with said “extended terms” not authorized by the controlling statute, RSA 173-B:5,

and in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Part I Articles 2, 12, 22, and 23 of the NH

Constitution. Further, granting the “extended terms” was likely a criminal act in violation of

RSA 641:5, I.(B) and 18 U.S.C. §242, a federal criminal statute.

27. Amending the stalking order to dissolve these terms is not a sufficient remedy. Since

the granting of said terms implicated Equal Protection rights and other due-process issues

discussed hereinabove, and as these “extended terms” were only allowed to transpire by and

through the vessel of this underlying “stalking order”, said order cannot be retrospectively

considered as not violating Maravelias’s due-process rights in application, and the Court cannot

therefore extend it. This is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a new stalking petition.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 278
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
E. This Court Must Dismiss Because the Original Stalking Order is Grounded Upon a
Material Allegation Which Did Not Appear in Plaintiff’s Petition, Violating Advance-
Notice Due-Process Rights

28. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates by reference Paragraphs ¶18-25 of his

1/28/19 First-Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Petitioner’s

Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order of Protection, presenting the substance of

this issue.

F. This Court Must Dismiss Because Opposing Counsel Failed to Obey Circuit Court Rule
1.8(C), Which Prejudiced Maravelias

29. Maravelias herein repeats and incorporates Paragraphs ¶4-6 of his 1/15/19

Preliminary Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Stalking Final Order of Protection.

30. Plaintiff’s counsel knew of the Court’s rule to reach-out to the other party to attempt

to obtain concurrence prior to filing such a Motion: counsel obeyed this rule in the past.

Maravelias was therefore caught-off-guard by the 2019 Motion to Extend and given less time to

prepare a case-in-rebuttal. This prejudicial outcome warrants dismissal in light of an attorney’s

willful or negligent violation of the Court’s rule.

F. This Court Must Dismiss Because RSA 633:3-A, III-C. Is Facially Unconstitutional for
Overbreadth and Vagueness, and Because It Is Virtually Impossible for Any Such
Extension Not to be Plagued by Said Overbreadth and Vagueness Defects

31. For a concise summary of this issue without verbose constitutional law analysis,

Maravelias repeats herein and incorporates by reference Paragraphs ¶99-118, Cause of Action

Count 8 and Count 9, of the “ORIGINAL VERIFIED COMPLAINT” within Maravelias’s

recently filed federal lawsuit, N.H. Federal District Court, Maravelias v. Coughlin et al. (Case

No. 1:19-CV-143), itself entered into the instant case as an Exhibit in yesterday’s Hearing.

8
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 279
34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 32. For a more rigorous treatment of this issue, Maravelias repeats herein and

incorporates by reference Paragraphs ¶28-60 of his 1/28/19 First-Amended Memorandum of Law

in Support of Defendant’s Objection to Petitioner’s Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final

Order of Protection.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Dismiss Plaintiff’s 1/24/2019 Motion to Extend Duration of Stalking Final Order
of Protection, ending this case; and

III. Grant any further relief deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

February 14th, 2019 in propria persona

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34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
 March 8th, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed Respondent’s Verified Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or

Amend Stalking Order to Remedy Voter Suppression Conspiracy Against Respondent to be
filed in the above-referenced case.

This motion is urgent and time-sensitive as an illegal conspiracy currently threatens to

prevent me from voting in Windham’s upcoming 3/12/19 election.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

290
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

VERIFIED EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION TO AMEND OR DISMISS STALKING

ORDER TO REMEDY VOTER SUPPRESSION CONSPIRACY AGAINST RESPONDENT

COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within Emergency

Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Amend Stalking Order to Prevent Voter Suppression Conspiracy

Against Respondent pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), RSA 659:40, and state and federal

constitutional law. This stalking order is still pending this Court’s ruling on the recent

2/12/19 extension Hearing; accordingly, this Motion becomes moot if and when this Court

denies the extension. The Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, her father David DePamphilis, and

their attorney Simon R. Brown, Esq. (hereinafter, “conspirators”) are currently orchestrating an

unlawful conspiracy to bully and intimidate Maravelias into not voting in the upcoming 3/12/19

Windham town election by operation of the instant stalking order, which arguably criminalizes

Maravelias’s appearance at Windham High School, Windham’s designated polling place.

Further, the conspirators are actively attempting to have Maravelias arrested for having lawfully

voted in a November 2018 election in Windham.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 1. On 12/10/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion to Amend Stalking Final

Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and accompanying

Memorandum of Law, claiming rights under the state and federal constitutions. Petitioner filed

an Objection. The said 12/10/18 Motion is still on the Court’s docket pending a ruling.

2. On 1/24/19, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Stalking Order. On 1/28/19,

Respondent filed his Objection and Memorandum of Law thereon. The Court granted the

preliminary stalking order extension and held a 2/12/19 Hearing. At said Hearing, it was shown

that DePamphilis’s verified extension motion contained gaping inaccuracies and/or sporadically

contradicted her testimony, e.g., wrongly accusing Maravelias “followed” DePamphilis on the

roads, misrepresenting the attributability of the allegedly pursuing vehicle to Maravelias as the

owner, exaggerating the number of “times” the alleged “following” occurred, inter alia. On

2/14/19, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion to Dismiss the stalking order extension on factual

and legal grounds. Petitioner filed an Objection on 2/22/19.

3. The stalking order extension case is still pending this Court’s ruling, as

Respondent confirmed with this Court’s clerk on 3/6/19.

4. If the Court dismisses and/or denies the recent extension motion by 3/12/19 as it

should, the stalking order will be expired. This case will be ended, rendering the instant Motion

moot. The pending 12/10/18 Motion to Amend will also become moot if the extension is denied.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE VOTER SUPPRESSION CONSPIRACY

5. Petitioner’s 2/22/19 Objection to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss rehearses a

potpourri of inaccurate contentions, inflated liberties with the record, and desperate defamatory

denigrations of Maravelias’s character aspired to obfuscate the fact that DePamphilis’s central

292
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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
“following” accusations were exposed at trial as totally baseless at best, and, at worst, fraudulent

acts of willful deception. In keeping with these motivations, Petitioner includes a footnote at

Page 2 alleging the following:

“Defendant [Maravelias] also admitted to voting in-person at Christina’s high

school even though the stalking protective order prohibits him from appearing at
her school. While voting is a right, Defendant could have taken appropriate steps
to avoid this violation, such as seeking an absentee ballot.”

6. The aforecited legal document was composed and submitted by Simon R. Brown,

Esq., the DePamphilis’ lawyer counsel. Maravelias contends that Christina DePamphilis, David

DePamphilis, and Attorney Brown are willful conspirators in the voter suppression endeavor

detailed hereinafter.

7. Paul Maravelias graduated from Windham High School as the Valedictorian of

the Class of 2013. He is currently a resident of Windham, New Hampshire and is domiciled

there. He is registered to vote in Windham.

8. Paul Maravelias wishes to vote in all elections, including the upcoming 3/12/19

Windham town election. He does not plan to be absent from Windham on 3/12/19. He does not

have any employment obligations, religious commitments, or physical disabilities which would

prevent or burden his appearance at Windham’s official election polling location. He is not

elderly or inform, nor cares for children or infirm adults, nor a uniformed services voter.

9. Paul Maravelias is over 18 years of age, has never been accused or convicted of

any felony crime, and has a legal right to vote in all town, state, and federal elections.

10. Windham’s official election polling location is Windham High School.

293
3
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 11. At all material times, David DePamphilis, Christina DePamphilis, and Simon R.

Brown, Esq. (“conspirators”) knew and were aware of the truth of all the facts alleged in

Paragraphs 7-10 above, or had no reason to believe contrarily to any of the identified facts.

12. Recently, in his vindictive legal harassment crusade, David DePamphilis

complained to the Windham Police Department yet again to attempt to get Maravelias arrested

for frivolous reasons.1 DePamphilis complained that Maravelias had voted in a November 2018

election, claiming this violated the stalking order.

13. On 3/6/19 at 0834 EST, Sgt. Bryan Smith of the Windham Police Department

called Maravelias’s cell-phone. The conversation contained the following dialogue:

Sgt. Smith: “Hey it’s Sgt. Smith at the Windham Police how are you?’
Maravelias: “Hey Sergeant how are you.”

1
Upon information and belief, David DePamphilis’s alarming hostility against Paul Maravelias has
worsened since the 2/12/19 Hearing where Maravelias disproved DePamphilis’s wild accusations with
irrefutable physical evidence. For instance, Maravelias has learned David DePamphilis created a bizarre
defamatory spectacle at the Dunkin Donuts in Windham one recent night in early March or late February
2019. David DePamphilis reportedly entered the coffee shop by himself to demand the employees tell him
if they “[knew] Paul Maravelias”, claiming Maravelias is a “dangerous” “pedophile” and a “very, very,
very bad” person who should be “reported”. The alarmed teenage workers found David’s intimidating
tirade disturbing as they tried to keep their composure. They feigned ignorance at DePamphilis’s
persistent inquisitions, not wishing to aggravate David’s behavior nor perpetuate the unsafe situation.
David DePamphilis’s outrageous, baseless “pedophile” slander against Maravelias to total strangers is
indicative of the sole abusive harassment motivations for which this stalking order has been sought.
DePamphilis’s delusional “pedophile” slander also creates reasonable question as to his mental state. A
cognitive dissonance reduction phenomenon is hypothesized, wherein accusing Paul Maravelias of being
a “pedophile” numbs the inescapable observation of the object of DePamphilis’s own eldest son’s sexual
preference, his intimate partner Nate, and any such resemblance thereof to an emaciated underage
prepubescent female relatable to “pedophilia”. See e.g., https://www.instagram.com/p/BsGwKb_Frg6,
http://oi68.tinypic.com/2ladmpd.jpg, http://oi64.tinypic.com/zloism.jpg,
https://www.instagram.com/p/BhZOTQCnyHa/, https://www.instagram.com/p/Bp0sfaDFnwT/ As it goes
without saying, Maravelias is not a “pedophile” nor has ever been remotely accused of any sexual offense
involving any person of any age, nor has this laughably absurd accusation ever been lodged against
Maravelias anywhere outside the history of David DePamphilis’s verbal and legal abuse.

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 Sgt. Smith: “I’m doing well.”
Maravelias: “Good.”
Sgt. Smith: “So the reason I’m calling is, um… we were notified that you in the last
election in November went to Windham High School and voted during that?”
Maravelias: “So that’s what you were notified?”
Sgt. Smith: “Yeah, well, like, we were told that you testified to that in the hearing. Um, so,
we just wanted to call, or I wanted to call, to remind you that, um, you have other ways to
be able to vote such as a – a, um, an absentee ballot, without actually going to the high
school, just based on the fact if Christina’s there, you may in violation of the … the
stalking order, so.”
Maravelias: “Thank you for saying that. I’m not – I’m not accepting what you alleged in
your description there, but, but thank you for saying that. I, and I, yeah.
Sgt. Smith: “OK. So like I said, I – I’m – we’re just letting you know that, or I’m trying to
notify you that, you know you have another way to be able to vote, and if Christina’s there,
uh, in the school since it states that you can’t go to her – her school, that you may be in
violation of that stalking order, so.”
Maravelias: “Thank you for that.”
Sgt. Smith: “Alright?”
Maravelias: “Thank you sir.”
Sgt. Smith: “Thank you sir, have a good one.”
Maravelias: “Thank you, bye”.

14. Shortly after this phone call, Maravelias submitted a follow-up email to Sgt.

Smith and WPD Captain Michael Caron. The email was as follows:

Dear Sgt. Smith,

Thank you for calling me today.

I understand you’ve indicated in your call that I should not appear at WHS, the town’s polling
place, to vote in elections.

Instead, in order to ensure compliance with the DePamphilis “stalking” order, I must use an
absentee ballot to avoid potential arrest.

Certainly if the stalking order continues to an election, I will not go to the polling place, in light of
your call. In fact, because of the extra hassle, I probably won’t vote.

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 I appreciate the warning in advance.

Kind regards,
Paul Maravelias

15. When composing the above email, Paul Maravelias knew that he could not

lawfully obtain an absentee ballot since he does not satisfy the requirements of RSA 657:1 for

absentee voting. Maravelias also knew and believed Sgt. Smith and Attorney Brown, in their

respective communications, had invited Maravelias to commit a misdemeanor criminal violation

of RSA 657:24, “Misusing Absentee Ballot”. Maravelias recognized he was necessarily

entrapped into either committing a crime (obtaining an absentee ballot without meeting the legal

requirement), being arrested for violating a falsified stalking order (Sgt. Smith’s threatened

enforcement should Maravelias appear at the polling place to vote), or hopelessly surrendering

his right to vote in the election.

16. On 3/7/19 at 1106 EST, Paul Maravelias sent a letter to Attorney Brown by email

regarding voting in the election, attached as Exhibit A. Maravelias’s covert purpose with the

letter was to establish Attorney Brown’s willful complicity in this voter suppression conspiracy.

The letter made Attorney Brown unequivocally aware Maravelias did not meet the absentee

voting requirements and offered Attorney Brown an opportunity to contradict Maravelias’s

assumption Attorney Brown’s 2/22/19 footnote was in violation of the New Hampshire Rules of

Professional Conduct Rule 3.1, “Meritorious Claims and Contentions”.

17. Maravelias’s letter alleged DePamphilis has a “political” “motivation to prevent

[Maravelias] from voting” and has pursued the stalking order extension partly for the purpose “to

chill and restrain my political expression and voting activity.”

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 18. At 1728 EST the same day, Attorney Brown replied by email (Exhibit B) in a

manner not exculpating him of willful participation in the conspiracy. He entirely ignored the

content of Maravelias’s letter and creatively envisioned it as constituting a request for legal

advice, advising that Maravelias should seek his own counsel.

19. It is obvious by his silence that Attorney Brown is not ignorant of the RSA 657:1

absentee voter requirements, the central issue of Maravelias’s letter, and that Maravelias does not

satisfy them. Attorney Brown did not recant his unlawful footnote soliciting Maravelias to

commit a misdemeanor crime nor object to Maravelias’s assumption that said footnote was in

violation of Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, ibid.

20. The above letter constitutes the extent to which Maravelias contacted the

opposing party prior to filing this motion for ex parte emergency relief. The opposing party

perpetuated the voter suppression conspiracy by refusing to retract their WPD criminal complaint

and refusal to assent that Maravelias lawfully appear at Windham’s polling location to vote.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

21. The New Hampshire Rules of the Circuit Court – District Division do not

promulgate specific requirements controlling motions for emergency ex parte relief. Thus, the

Court should rely upon generic common law standards for ex parte relief adopted by courts of

competent jurisdiction (e.g., as discernible within Superior Court rules, specific statutory

provisions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, etc.)

22. When ruling on a motion for ex parte relief, the Court must determine whether

immediate or irreparable injury will result to the movant absent relief. See e.g., Fam. Div. R.

2.9(B), RSA 511-A:8, RSA 458:16, II.(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Petitioners for ex parte relief

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must provide a sworn affidavit certifying the factual allegations sustaining the requested

emergency relief.

23. The equal right to vote in elections is a constitutional right guaranteed to all adult

inhabitants of New Hampshire. See N.H. Const. Part I, Art. 11. “It is well-established that the

deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury’” Melendres v.

Arpaio, 795 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).

Courts must resolve prospective voting-related disputes with emergent expeditiousness, as “once

the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress”. League of Women Voters of N.C. v.

N. Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014).

24. The equal right to vote in elections is a “fundamental” right under both the federal

and state constitutions. See Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp 559, 560 (D.N.H. 1972); Akins

v. Secretary of State, 154 N.H. 67, 71 (2006). If a law imposes “severe” restrictions on voting

rights, the regulation must “withstand strict scrutiny to be constitutional” and must “be justified

by a compelling governmental interest … necessary to the accomplishment of its legitimate

purpose” Akins, 154 N.H at 72, 73.

25. Respondent Maravelias has no adequate remedy at law. Since his right to vote in

the upcoming 3/12/19 Windham election is a fundamental constitutional right, monetary

damages cannot redress the deprivation of said right.

IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

A. Without Appearing at His Alma Mater, Windham High School, Paul Maravelias Has
No Lawful Means of Voting in the 3/12/19 Election

26. RSA 657:1, I. “Absence, Religious Observance, and Disability Absentee Voting”,

effective January 1, 2019, sets forth the controlling absentee voter requirements:

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 “Any person who is absent on the day of any state election from the city, town, or
unincorporated place in which he or she is registered to vote or who cannot appear in
public on any election day because of his or her observance of a religious commitment or
who is unable to vote there in person by reason of physical disability may vote at such
elections as provided in this chapter. A person who is unable to appear at any time during
polling hours at his or her polling place because of an employment obligation shall be
considered absent for purposes of this chapter. For the purposes of this section, the term
‘employment’ shall include the care of children and infirm adults, with or without
compensation.”

27. According to the plain language of the statute, absentee voting is strictly confined

to registered voters meeting certain requirements. As Paul Maravelias lives and works in

Windham where he is registered to vote, does not plan to be absent on 3/12/19, nor meets any of

the other statutory requirements, he is unquestionably ineligible for absentee voting. It goes

without saying that a civil protection order cannot force Maravelias to intentionally make himself

absent from his own town of residence against his will for the entire day of an election, as the

sole means to vote lawfully and/or without threat of arrest. Any contention to the contrary would

surpass absurdity, necessitating infringement of Maravelias’s natural rights under Part I, Article

2 of the state constitution and individual right to privacy and right to be left alone, guaranteed by

the state constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

28. Indeed, the Absentee Ballot Form promulgated by the Town of Windham for the

upcoming election parallels the requirements of RSA 657:1 as enumerated herein, affording

Maravelias no opportunity to honestly or lawfully obtain one. See Exhibit C.

29. It is a criminal offense to seek an absentee ballot without meeting the

requirements therefor as set forth in RSA 657:1. RSA 657:24, “Misusing Absentee Ballot.”,

states in relevant portion:

“Anyone who votes or attempts to vote under the provisions of this chapter who is not
entitled to vote by absentee ballot or anyone who knowingly votes or attempts to vote in
violation of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

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 30. Maravelias would commit a crime if he were to obey the footnote in

DePamphilis’s 2/22/19 Objection, written by Attorney Brown, inviting him to “seek an absentee

ballot” where one necessarily unavailable under the law. Sgt. Bryan Smith of the Windham

Police Department also wrongly encouraged Maravelias to commit this crime.

31. Since the right to vote is a guaranteed constitutional right which may be freely

exercised without the threat of arrest, and since absentee voting is unavailable to him, Maravelias

must appear at his alma mater of Windham High School on 3/12/19, Windham’s designated

polling location, in order to vote in the election.

B. The Conspirators’ Conduct Against Maravelias Is Criminal

32. RSA 629:2, “Criminal Solicitation”, provides in relevant part:

“I. A person is guilty of criminal solicitation if, with a purpose that another
engage in conduct constituting a crime, he commands, solicits or requests such
other person to engage in such conduct.
II. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor
renounced his criminal purpose by persuading the other not to engage in the
criminal conduct or by otherwise preventing commission of the crime under
circumstances manifesting a purpose that it not occur.”

33. Christina DePamphilis, by her attorney, Simon R. Brown, submitted to

Maravelias her 2/22/19 Objection which contained the aforementioned Page 2 footnote having a

purpose to solicit Maravelias to obtain an absentee ballot to vote in the upcoming election. This

purpose is further demonstrated by David DePamphilis’s coincidentally recent criminal

complaint to WPD about Maravelias’s alleged past voting conduct, submitted immediately prior

to the upcoming election, causing Sgt. Smith to call Maravelias for the purposes of rehearsing

the same solicitation that Maravelias “[seek] an absentee ballot”.

34. At all material times, conspirators knew that Maravelias is not an absentee voter.

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 35. The conspirators’ 2/22/19 communication to Maravelias and indirect 3/6/19

communication to Maravelias through Sgt. Smith purposefully solicited Maravelias to attempt to

vote as an absentee without being a proper absentee voter, which is a crime (See supra).

36. When Maravelias’s non-absentee status was explicitly affirmed or reaffirmed to

Attorney Brown on March 7th, Attorney Brown did not retract the communication soliciting

Maravelias to obtain an “absentee ballot”. Any affirmative defense to Criminal Solicitation under

RSA 629:2, II. is therefore waived.

37. RSA 629:1, “Conspiracy”, provides in relevant part:

“I. A person is guilty of conspiracy if, with a purpose that a crime defined by
statute be committed, he agrees with one or more persons to commit or cause the
commission of such crime, and an overt act is committed by one of the
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
II. For purposes of paragraph I, ‘one or more persons’ includes, but is not limited
to, persons who are immune from criminal liability by virtue of irresponsibility,
incapacity or exemption.”

38. It is previously established that the conspirators acted with a purpose to cause

Maravelias to vote or attempt to vote through an absentee ballot where such act would be

inappropriate and, in fact, a misdemeanor crime as “defined by statute”.

39. All conspirators of furthermore guilty of criminal conspiracy, since 1) Attorney

Brown agreed with his client to submit a legal document in her name “[causing] the commission

of such crime”, 2) David DePamphilis agreed with Christina and/or Attorney Brown to file the

aforementioned criminal complaint with WPD, and 3) Sgt. Smith of WPD agreed to

recommunicate the unlawful solicitation to Maravelias that he must improperly seek an absentee

ballot where legally unavailable.

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 40. The conspirators’ criminal conduct is not limited to their attempts to induce

Maravelias to misuse absentee voting.2 The ultimate purpose of this conspiracy is of voter

suppression: to intimidate Maravelias with the threat of criminal prosecution to dissuade him

from voting. RSA 659: 40, “Bribing; Intimidation; Suppression”, provides in relevant part:

“II. No person shall use or threaten force, violence, or any tactic of coercion or
intimidation to knowingly induce or compel any other person to vote or refrain
from voting, vote or refrain from voting for any particular candidate or ballot
measure, or refrain from registering to vote.
III. No person shall engage in voter suppression by knowingly attempting to
prevent or deter another person from voting or registering to vote based on
fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or spurious grounds or information. Prohibited
acts of voter suppression include:
(a) Challenging another person’s right to register to vote or to vote based on
information that he or she knows to be false or misleading.
(b) Attempting to induce another person to refrain from registering to vote or
from voting by providing that person with information that he or she knows to
be false or misleading.
(c) Attempting to induce another person to refrain from registering to vote or
from voting at the proper place or time by providing information that he or she
knows to be false or misleading about the date, time, place, or manner of the
election.
IV. Whoever violates the provisions of this section or whoever conspires to
violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a class B felony.”

41. Conspirators used the threat of criminal prosecution for a stalking order violation

as a “tactic of coercion” to “induce or compel” Maravelias to “refrain from voting” and did so

knowingly. See RSA 659:40, II. Having attempted to deceive Maravelias with the false pretense

that he could obtain an absentee ballot even though he was not absent nor otherwise qualifying,

conspirators contacted the Windham Police 1) to seek Maravelias’s arrest for voting in

November 2018, and 2) to articulate unlawful, unconstitutional enforcement schemes of the

stalking order that would result in Maravelias’s arrest should be appear at WHS to vote. Further,

2
Maravelias here furnishes a primarily state-law-focused analysis, but see 18 U.S.C. § 241., “Conspiracy
against Rights”, lacking the requirement that conspirators be state officials acting under color of state law.

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it was expectable that Maravelias would eventually discover for himself that he could not obtain

an absentee ballot by reading the plain language of the form. See Exhibit C.

42. Conspirators committed a separate count of voter suppression under RSA 659:40,

III. by knowingly attempting to deter Maravelias from voting by using the “grounds or

information” that the absentee ballot provided him an alternate manner of voting, a contention

hereinabove established as totally false, and therefore “deceptive, misleading [and] spurious”.3

43. RSA 659:40, III.(c) contemplates the manner in which conspirators committed

voter suppression with strikingly specific applicability to the facts here. Conspirators made false

representations about the “manner of the election” as it concerned Maravelias’s part, lying that

he was obligated to “[seek] an absentee ballot” or was even lawfully allowed to do so.

C. As-Applied, the Stalking Order Violates Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire
Constitution

44. Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution states:

“All elections are to be free, and every inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and
upwards shall have an equal right to vote in any election. Every person shall be
considered an inhabitant for the purposes of voting in the town, ward, or unincorporated
place where he has his domicile. …”

45. The stalking order in this case, currently in-effect only through this Court’s

preliminary 1/28/19 extension pending final ruling following the 2/12/19 Hearing, states in

relevant part:

3
Cf. Guare v. State of New Hampshire, 167 N.H. 658 (2015), finding “confusing and inaccurate”
language on a voter registration form to constitute unreasonable burden on the right to vote as a matter of
law in violation of Part I, Article 11. Here, conspirators’ misleading representations imputing a
nonexistent duty to Maravelias to obtain a legally unavailable absentee ballot were at best “confusing and
inaccurate”, and were likely indeed, moreover, willful acts of deception.

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 “2. … The defendant is prohibited from coming within 300 feet of the plaintiff. …
5. The defendant shall not contact the plaintiff at or enter upon plaintiff’s place of
employment or school …
12. The defendant shall not follow the plaintiff or appear in proximity to the residence,
place of employment or school of the plaintiff, or follow or appear at any other place
where the plaintiff may be.”

46. RSA 173-B:5, I.(a)(3), applicable to stalking order permissible forms of relief by

operation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a., provides that courts may issue civil stalking protective order

terms “restraining the defendant from contacting the plaintiff or entering the plaintiff’s place of

employment, school, or any specified place frequented regularly by the plaintiff or by any family

or household member”.

47. The only statutory authorization for civil restraining order terms potentially

prohibiting Maravelias from appearing at the “school” of the Petitioner (his own “school”, and

Windham’s designated polling place, Windham High School) appears in RSA 173-B, the

Domestic Violence statute. The legislative intent of this statute is “to preserve and protect the

safety of the family unit for all family or household members by entitling victims of domestic

violence to immediate and effective police protection and judicial relief.” State v. Steven Kidder,

150 N.H. 600; 843 A.2d 312 (2004).

48. It is a testament to the irrational, dysfunctional machinations of our state’s

incompetent legislature that, thirty years later, the ambit of “domestic violence” legislation

has now metastasized to outlaw a peaceful citizen with zero history of violence from voting

at his own town’s polling location, his own high school where he graduated as

Valedictorian in 2013, because of a civil restraining order involving zero acts of “violence”,

alleged or actual, and a petitioner who has never once had any “domestic” nor “intimate”

relation with said oppressed citizen whatsoever.

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 49. As-applied, the stalking order irrefutably violates Maravelias’s rights under Part I,

Article 11 by imposing criminal penalties for “appearing” at the “school” of the Petitioner, where

said “school” is also the sole designated polling location for Maravelias’s town’s election. As

established above, Maravelias cannot lawfully vote by any other means. The cited terms of the

stalking order, lacking any explicit exception for voting, are logically synonymous with

criminally prohibiting Maravelias from voting.

50. Categorically incapacitating Maravelias from voting and threatening criminal

prosecution should he appear at the polling place doubtlessly consists a “severe restriction” on

voting for purposes of triggering strict scrutiny constitutional review. Here, prohibiting

Maravelias from voting in a public building patrolled by multiple police officers cannot have the

remotest effect of advancing a “compelling governmental interest” in the protection of domestic

violence and stalking victims. Assuming, but not granting, that RSA 633:3-a civil protective

orders serve a “compelling” and not just “significant” governmental interest, voting is a

constitutionally protected political activity where is not likely any act of threatened or actual

violence would occur to Petitioner, even in the astronomically low chance she were present at the

polling location to vote at the same time Maravelias.

51. Ergo, the stalking order is unconstitutional as-applied through RSA 633:3-a.

D. As-Applied, the Stalking Order Violates Equal Protection under the State
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

52. Part I, Article 11 guarantees not only the right to vote, but the “equal” right to

vote. Here, Maravelias is inequitably targeted by a civil protection order resulting in the rapine of

his basic voting rights whereas all other citizens who not subject to such civil protective orders

do not suffer the same effective voting restrictions. The state cannot deprive constitutional rights

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from citizens because of a civil protective order in which there was not even the slightest

accusation of violence or actual crime; accordingly, this unequal protection aspect amounts to a

separate violation of the state constitution.4

53. The Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees

“nor shall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

For the aforementioned reasons, the stalking order as-applied violations federal equal protection

law by isolating Maravelias as a civil protective order defendant. The law on felony

disenfranchisement is long-settled by the United States Supreme Court; states cannot lawfully

deny citizens’ right to vote unless to convicted felons.5

E. The Appropriate Remedy Is Dismissal of the Stalking Order

54. The Petitioner and David DePamphilis have criminally colluded with Simon R.

Brown, Esq. and the Windham Police Department to usurp this stalking order as a political

bludgeon to intimidate, dissuade, and chill Maravelias’s voting activity. They have cornered

Maravelias into either surrendering his right to vote or risk likely arrest and criminal prosecution

for appearing at the polling location.

55. This outrageous, patently unreasonable conduct is typical of DePamphilis’s legal

harassment conduct against Maravelias since late 2016. From it, the Court should infer there is

no legitimate desire nor cause for a “protective” order other than DePamphilis’s obsession with

4
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), permitting voter disenfranchisement solely as a criminal
punishment to convicted felons.
5
See Richardson, ibid., quoting Section II of the 14th Amendment, “except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime”.

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bullying and harassing Maravelias. Accordingly, especially while the Court still can rule on the

merits of this stalking order, it should be dismissed.

56. As a matter of law, the entire stalking order must be dismissed because its

implementation violates Maravelias’s legal right to vote under the state and federal constitution.

The unlawful enforcement is declared, pending, and actual. The chilling effect on Maravelias’s

political activity cannot be cured unless the entire order is dismissed immediately. While the

Court could alternatively modify the stalking order to dissolve Terms 2, 5, and 12 thereof, the

remaining terms would provide no substantive protection warranting any order in the first place.

Given the expansive nature of the said offending stalking order terms, dissolving them would

functionally equate to dismissing the order lest a skeletal order remain ineffective to its intended

purpose.

57. While said necessary remedy is not legally beautiful, this Court cannot function as

the legislature’s nanny. It is the legislature’s responsibility to resolve the disastrously

problematic scheme they have recklessly created in their failure to appreciate this particular

situation, even though it is a statistically likely one indubitably set to occur again elsewhere.

F. In the Alternative, this Court Must Immediately Amend the Stalking Order to
Prevent Immediate, Irreparable Harm to Maravelias’s Voting Rights

58. In the alternative, this Court should dissolve Terms 2, 5, and 12 of the Stalking

Final Order of Protection, and clarify that Maravelias has the right to appear at his town’s polling

location for the purpose of voting in elections.

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 WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Issue a declaratory judgment that Paul Maravelias is not eligible for absentee
voting in the 3/12/19 Windham town election according to RSA 657:1;

III. Issue a declaratory judgment that the named conspirators’ conduct is criminal and
constitutes voter suppression according to RSA 659:40;

IV. Deny the pending motion to extend the stalking order, and/or dismiss this stalking
order on the grounds set forth in this Motion, rendering the instant Motion moot
and the 12/10/18 Motion moot, or,

V. In the alternative, amend the Stalking Final Order of Protection to dissolve Terms
2, 5, and 12, effective immediately; and

VI. Grant and further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

March 8th, 2019 in propria persona

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 PAUL MARAVELIAS’S AFFIDAVIT CERTIFYING THE FOREGOING VERIFIED
EMERGENCY EX PARTE MOTION TO DISMISS OR AMEND STALKING ORDER
TO REMEDY VOTER SUPPRESSION CONSPIRACY AGAINST RESPONDENT

NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE – COUNTY OF ROCKINGHAM

On this ___ day of March 2019, before me, _________________________, the undersigned
officer, personally appeared ________________________, known to me (or satisfactorily
proven) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged
that he/she executed the same for the purposes therein contained, who being by me first duly
sworn, on his oath, deposes and says:

All factual stipulations within the foregoing Motion are true

and accurate to the best of my knowledge as of 3/8/2019.
[affiant’s statement of facts]

__________________________________
[signature of affiant]

Paul J. Maravelias
[typed name of affiant]

34 Mockingbird Hill Rd, Windham, NH 03087

[address of affiant]

In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and official seal.

____________________________________
Notary Public

My commission expires: ________________

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Respondent’s Verified Emergency Ex Parte
Motion to Dismiss or Amend Stalking Order to Remedy Voter Suppression Conspiracy Against
Respondent was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq.,
counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________

March 8th, 2019

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Simon R. Brown, Esq. March 7th, 2019
Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP
PO Box 1318 Paul Maravelias
Concord, NH 03302-1318 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
Windham, NH 03087

VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST-CLASS MAIL

RE: Voting in 3/12/19 Windham election and your comments in

Christina DePamphilis v. Paul Maravelias, 473-2016-CV-124

Dear Attorney Brown:

I write this message in light of what I consider to be a confusing and meritless comment you
made in a footnote about my lawful ability to vote while your client’s stalking order is in effect
against me. This footnote appeared in your Objection pleading to my 2/14/19 Motion to Dismiss
your client’s recent Motion to Extend the stalking order, still pending ruling.

There is an upcoming election on March 12th in Windham, where I am domiciled and

registered to vote. I desire to vote. I plan to be in Windham all day on 3/12/19. The polling
location is at Windham High School, my own high school where I graduated in 2013 as the
Valedictorian. I don’t have any employment responsibilities, religious commitments, or physical
disabilities that would prevent me from voting in person. Given the content of the election and
my known political positions, your client has a motivation to prevent me from voting.

Please let me know if you disagree with my position which follows. The current stalking
order cannot and does not lawfully prevent me from appearing in person at my town’s designated
polling location, WHS, to vote. You made some confusing reference to a mail-in ballot. I am not
legally obligated to go through any special procedures, compared to any other citizen, in order to
vote in an election just because in my case someone has a [criminally falsified] civil restraining
order against me.

If you disagree, please explain to me exactly how I should vote.

1
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 If I do not hear back from you in response by the end of 3/10/19, I will assume the
following:

• I will assume you and your client now agree with my position that it is fully lawful
for me to appear in person at my high school to vote in any election while the
stalking order is in effect, and assent to the said act;

• I will assume that your footnote was an attempt to bully me into not voting at all, to
advance your and your client’s political agenda;

• I will assume that you concede your footnote was in violation of Rule 3.1 of the New
Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct;

• I will assume that your footnote was in fact in violation of Rule 3.1 of the New
Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct; and

• I will assume that one of your client’s purposes in pursuing the stalking order and
recent extension thereof has been to chill and restrain my political expression and
voting activity.

Kind regards,
Paul J. Maravelias

2
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313
 My name is______________________________ and I am requesting an absentee ballot for the Town Election held on 3/12/19.
print clearly

I cannot appear in person to vote and request an absentee ballot for the following reason: (Select one
below)
I will be absent from Windham on the day of the Election.
I am disabled.
I have a religious commitment.
I have an employment obligation. For the purposes of this application, the term
“employment” shall include the care of children and infirm adults, with or
without compensation.
__________________________________________________________________________________________

I hereby declare that: (Select one below)

I am a duly qualified voter who is currently registered to vote in the Town of Windham.
I am not a registered voter, and am either disabled, or already absent until after Election Day,
and cannot appear in person to the Town Clerk or supervisors of the checklist to register to
vote. Therefore, I am requesting for the proper documentation to be sent to me.

My voting domicile (home) address is: ___________________________________Windham, NH

Please mail my absentee ballot to (if different than the above domicile address):
_________________________________________________________________________________

Signature of applicant _________________________________________ Date_____________

Best contact phone and email: _____________________________________________________

The applicant must sign this form to receive an absentee ballot.

Any person who witnesses and assists a voter with a disability in executing this form shall print and sign his or her name in the space below:

I attest that I assisted the applicant in executing this form because he/she has a disability.

Signature ______________________________________ Print Name ___________________________________________

To track your ballot go to: https://app.sos.nh.gov/Public/AbsenteeBallot.aspx

Mail, fax, or hand deliver this completed form to the Town Clerk’s Office. If in person, be prepared to present an ID.

314
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (hereinafter, “Defendant”), on behalf of himself and those

similarly situated, and respectfully submits the within Motion for Clarification pursuant to U.S.

CONST., Amend. XIV, and N.H. CONST., Pt. I., Art. 1, 2, 8, 14, and 15. Maravelias

respectfully demands this Court apply the law equally at all times and not discriminate against

certain subjectively disliked individuals. In support thereof Maravelias states the following:

I. MARAVELIAS AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED ARE INESCPABABLY

CONFUSED BY THIS COURT’S MIXED SIGNALS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES
VIABLE AND MERITORIOUS SUBSTANCE FOR CIVIL STALKING
PROTECTIVE ORDER RELIEF UNDER RSA 633:3-A

1. On 3/8/19, this Court granted a request to extend a stalking protective order

because the Defendant allegedly made “offensive and hateful” “statements” in public (on the

“internet”) to third-parties. See 3/8/19 Order. The Court reasoned that this behavior proves

“hostility” towards Plaintiff, therefore showing “legitimate concern” for her “safety” and that

such “fear for her safety” is “reasonable” because of the “offensive” statements in public.

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 2. On 12/8/17, Paul Maravelias filed a Stalking Petition against David DePamphilis.

This Court held hearings thereon in February 2018. Maravelias alleged and corroborated that

David not only engaged in extreme offensive and hateful statements in public (which were also

defamatory, calling Maravelias a “sexual predator” and “piece of shit stalker”), but also

participated in incitative bullying/harassment posts on the internet, directed specifically to

Maravelias, containing vulgar gestures and instrumentalizing his daughter’s new boyfriend

which, situationally and in-context, could incite a violent or disorderly response.

3. Judge John J. Coughlin not only denied Maravelias’s Stalking Petition but even

forced Maravelias to pay DePamphilis over $9,000 in attorney’s fees, claiming that Maravelias’s

Petition was “patently unreasonable” and that Maravelias provided “no credible evidence” for his

accusations.1 See 5/11/18 Order in 473-2017-CV-00150. Maravelias then appealed. The biased,

activist, bad-faith Supreme Court refused to reverse. See NHSC Case No. 2018-0376.

II. BECAUSE OF THIS COURT’S INCONSISTENT APPLICATIONS OF THE

LAW, ALL POTENTIAL STALKING VICTIMS HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER
THEIR ALLEGATIONS ARE SUFFICIENT FOR A STALKING PETITION AND
MUST FEAR PUNITIVE, ARBITRARY ORDERS TO PAY THEIR POTENTIAL
STALKERS THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS IF THEY DO NOT PREVAIL

4. This Court must clarify whether proving a defendant made “offensive and hateful

statements in public” to “disparage” a plaintiff is a viable cause of action for claims to civil

protective order relief under RSA 633:3-a.

5. When Maravelias filed a Stalking Petition, alleging this same element and indeed

far more, and ultimately proved this element and far more, Judge John J. Coughlin committed

1
This Court’s finding surpassed insanity, since Maravelias provided witness testimony and even physical screenshot
evidence proving his allegation(s) beyond any and all doubt, regardless of whether they raised to the level of
stalking.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
extortionary judicial abuse against Maravelias by blindly declaring the petition “patently

unreasonable”.

6. “A claim is patently unreasonable when it is commenced, prolonged, required, or

defended without any reasonable basis in the facts provable by evidence or any reasonable claim

in the law as it is, or as it might arguably be held to be.” Glick v. Naess, 142 N.H. 172 (1998).

7. Here, it is irrelevant whether the parties’ claims against each other of “offensive

and hateful” comments, between the two stalking cases, are factually true. The instant question is

purely legal: if there is a “reasonable claim” in the law for a contention, it cannot be “patently

unreasonable”. See Glick, supra.

8. In one stalking case, Maravelias alleged David DePamphilis made offensive and

hateful statements to disparage Maravelias in public (and much worse). This Court issued an

Order on 5/11/18 (Coughlin, J) pronouncing the said allegation “patently unreasonable”: i.e., an

allegation which, even if proven true, is not an actionable contention for relief for RSA 633:3-a

stalking orders, requiring a “course of conduct” placing a person in fear of their “personal safety”

and permitting extension similarly only when there is ongoing concern for a plaintiff’s “safety”.

Compare RSA 633:3-a, III-a. with RSA 633:3-a, III-c.

9. But here, the Court’s recent extension 3/8/19 Order granted stalking order relief

based solely upon a finding that a defendant made “hateful and offensive” statements in public.

III. ABSENT CLARIFICATION AND RETROACTIVE CORRECTION, THE

COURT’S INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF RSA 633:3-A VIOLATES
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS AND CHILLS THE
ABILITY OF STALKING VICTIMS TO PETITION FOR RELIEF

10. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST, Amend. XIV. See also N.H. CONST, Pt. I, Art. 2, “All

men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights among which are, the enjoying and

defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of

seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged

by this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.”

11. There is a class of citizens whose stalking order petitions have been denied and

another class whose petitions have been granted.

12. There is a class of citizens who have been ordered to pay attorney’s fees under the

exception to the regular American rule that each party pays their own fees: the “patently

unreasonable” contention exception. See LaMontagne Builders v. Bowman Brook Purchase

Group, 150 N.H. 270, 276 (2003).

13. There is a class of citizens who have not been ordered to pay attorney’s fees,

when requested by an opposing party under the “patently unreasonable” exception.

14. Further, Maravelias himself is individually entitled to 14th Amendment Equal

Protection rights according the U.S. Supreme Court’s established “class of one” of doctrine

which applies even in civil suits for money damages where no “fundamental rights” are at stake,

as they are here in the context of a restraining order. See generally Araiza, W.D., 2013.

“Flunking the class-of-one/failing equal protection.” Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 55, p.435. See also

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).

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 15. The Court’s acts against Maravelias in the context of stalking order relief under

RSA 633:3-a are logically incompatible and violate constitutional due process and equal

protection rights:

a) When Maravelias was a civil stalking plaintiff, his allegation that someone made
offensive and hateful comments against him, showing hostility and therefore
reasonable fear, was deemed “patently unreasonable” (i.e., an allegation which even
if true, cannot possibly result in civil protective order relief under RSA 633:3-a).

b) When Maravelias was a civil stalking defendant, the Court granted the stalking
order relief through exact same reasoning it previously rejected in Maravelias’s
petition and deemed “patently unreasonable”, forcing impecunious 22-year-old
Maravelias to pay his alleged-stalker over $9,000 dollars in attorney’s fees.

16. This Court’s orders necessarily either extort Maravelias wrongfully of over

$9,000 dollars or deprive Maravelias of his fundamental constitutional rights through a

wrongfully extended stalking order. Either one or the other must be true: there is no logically

possible way to harmonize this Court’s inconsistent, discriminatory conduct.

IV. THE COURT MUST EITHER DISSOLVE ITS PUNITITVE FEE AWARD
AGAINST MARAVELIAS OR DISSOLVE THE STALKING ORDER
EXTENSION AGAINST MARAVELIAS

17. Equal Protection demands that the Court cannot have it both ways. There have

been zero changes to the applicable statutory or case-law landscapes in the past few months

when the Court took the above-referenced, logically incompatible actions against Maravelias.

18. This Court has original jurisdiction over both actions. Regarding the 5/11/18

punitive fees award against Maravelias, this Court has full authority to reverse it. “A trial court,

however, has the authority to revisit an earlier ruling on a [motion] if it becomes aware that the

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
ruling may be incorrect.” Route 12 Books Video v. Town of Troy, 149 N.H. 569, 575 (2003) (in

the context of revisiting a motion to Dismiss).

19. The Supreme Court’s order in 2018-0376 has no preclusive effect as follows in

Paragraphs 20 and 21:

20. First, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction generically does not restrain this

Court from doing the right thing, upon new information, within this Court’s original jurisdiction.

I.e., the Supreme Court acknowledges the trial court’s authority and only acts upon reversible

error – a higher standard than actual error.

21. Second, the Supreme Court did not uphold the fees awards on the “patently

unreasonable” grounds; instead, they upheld it on the “bad-faith” grounds and offered one single

threadbare sentence noting that their “review of the record” caused them to feel Maravelias acted

in bad-faith, with zero specific references or citations whatsoever. The Supreme Court’s obvious

bad-faith, patently unreasonable screw-Maravelias order primarily concerned the other aspect of

that appeal, which were the merits of the stalking order dismissal, not the fees award.

22. Maravelias does not presently seek to relitigate or collaterally attack the dismissal

of his stalking petition, since the legal question of viability of offensive public speech for

stalking orders does not span the substantive fact-based question on the merits of whether David

DePamphilis actually committed such conduct in that particular stalking petition.

23. However, as a matter of law, the baseless fees award predicated upon the

allegation that Maravelias’s theory was “patently unreasonable” – the same exact theory this

Court has recently used to extend a stalking order against Maravelias – must unquestionably be

reversed.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
V. CONCLUSION

24. If the Court stands-by its legal reasoning for extending the instant stalking order,

Paul Maravelias plans to file two new Stalking Petitions against both David DePamphilis

and Christina DePamphilis. Such petitions will proceed upon the Court’s own theory of relief

that the DePamphilis’ conduct against Maravelias has met and far-surpassed the communication

of “offensive and hateful” statements disparaging Maravelias in public, and thus a stalking order

shall issue lest the Court openly commit subjective discrimination against Maravelias as clear as

night-and-day, in violation of his 14th Amendment Equal Protection rights.

25. However, since Maravelias was wrongly penalized the first and only time he filed

a stalking petition, falsely accused of “bad-faith” and “patently unreasonable” conduct, he

therefore cautiously seeks this Court’s clarification first. Before filing any stalking petitions,

Maravelias wishes to confirm that alleging “offensive and hateful” statements made in public

shows “hostility” substantiating reasonable safety concern viable for civil stalking relief.

26. Maravelias intends to aggressively pursue this alarming Equal Protection

violation in both state and federal courts if this Court cannot resolve the injustice by either

reversing the stalking order extension or reversing the punitive fees award against Maravelias.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Clarify whether the allegation that a defendant’s public offensive and hateful
communications about a plaintiff cause said plaintiff reasonable fear for purposes
of RSA 633:3-a relief;

III. Depending on the Court’s clarification, either do one of the following:

a. Vacate and reverse its 3/8/19 Order granting extension in this case; or

b. Vacate and reverse its 5/11/18 Order in Paul Maravelias v. David

DePamphilis, 473-2017-CV-00150, forcing Maravelias to pay David
DePamphilis over $9,000 in attorney’s fees predicated upon the legal finding
Maravelias’s “positions” were “patently unreasonable”.

IV. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

March 28th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Motion for Clarification was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________

March 28th, 2019

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
323
324
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION TO

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (“Defendant”), on behalf of himself and those similarly

situated, and respectfully submits the within Reply to Plaintiff’s 4/5/19 Objection to Defendant’s

Motion for Clarification. In support thereof, Maravelias states as follows:

1. The Court has not ruled on Defendant’s 3/21/19 Mot. for Reconsideration, neither

on Plaintiff’s own 3/18/19 Mot. to Reconsider, nor on Defendant’s 3/28 Mot. for Clarification.

2. Plaintiff’s 4/5/19 Reply attempts to excuse this Court’s differential treatment of

similarly situated individuals under the civil stalking protective order statute, RSA 633:3-a, and

thus defeat the need for the clarification sought in Maravelias’s 3/28/19 Motion.

3. To this end, Plaintiff notably admits “the standard for extending a stalking order is

completely different from the standard of granting a stalking order of protection in the first

instance”. (Emphasis added) Objection at ¶3.

4. If the Court does not grant the motion for clarification and thereby tacitly accepts

the difference in standard between RSA 633:3-a, III-a. and III-c. as justification for its disparate

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals, the Court will further validate Maravelias’s

constitutional argument that RSA 633:3-a, III-c. is substantially overbroad on its face in violation

of the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause. See Def. 3/21/19 Mot. for Reconsideration, ¶18.

5. Maravelias makes and preserves the following legal arguments in further support.

6. The legislature never intended first-year original stalking orders to address or

prevent behavior “X”, and extended stalking orders to address or prevent behaviors “X + Y”.

Such would render the stalking statute overbroad in violation of the Equal Protection clause by

unfairly discriminating against new vs. returning stalking plaintiffs and defendants. While the

burden of proof can rightly differ between a first-year stalking order and a motion to extend a

preexisting one, the range of potential bad-acts justifying said original or extended orders cannot.

7. In other words, if the statute allows certain factually undisputed bad-acts of

conduct alone to warrant extension – where the same bad-acts would not be sufficient for a new

stalking order – the statute violates Equal Protection for the reasons stated in Maravelias’s past

pleadings. The only constitutionally appropriate difference between the standards governing

original issuance and extension are the burdens of proof at play, since extension cases naturally

incorporate the contextual past-history of any stalking conduct incident to the original order. See

MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 9 (2008). “Good cause” must be limited to a finding of

“ongoing risk” of stalking conduct for an extension to be constitutionally valid. It may not be

fulfilled solely upon evidence that granting extension would serve a plaintiff’s “well-being”.

8. Plaintiff’s Objection invites this Court to persist in its unconstitutional application

of the statute (which proceeds from the overbroad facial language of the statute) to permit

extension under the literal “safety and well-being” standard of RSA 633:3-a, III-c., which

Plaintiff admits is a “completely different” standard. This accurate admission is proof-positive of

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
the statute’s substantial overbreadth in violation of the 1st and 14th Amendments to the U.S.

Constitution, as reviewed extensively in Defendant’s past or pending pleadings before the Court.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant Defendant’s 3/28/18 Motion for Clarification, id est:

II. Clarify whether the allegation that a defendant’s public offensive and hateful
communications about a plaintiff cause said plaintiff reasonable fear for purposes
of RSA 633:3-a relief;

III. Depending on the Court’s clarification, either do one of the following:

a. Vacate and reverse its 3/8/19 Order granting extension in this case; or

b. Vacate and reverse its 5/11/18 Order in Paul Maravelias v. David

DePamphilis, 473-2017-CV-00150, forcing Maravelias to pay David
DePamphilis over $9,000 in attorney’s fees predicated upon the legal finding
Maravelias’s “positions” were “patently unreasonable” – the same legal
“positio[n]” it recently accepted on 3/8/19 to grant extension in this case.

IV. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

May 10th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Motion for Clarification was
forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the
Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________
May 10th, 2019

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

MOTION TO STRIKE

NOW COMES Paul Maravelias (hereinafter, “Defendant”) and respectfully moves this

Honorable Court to strike from the record portions of Christina DePamphilis’s (hereinafter,

“Plaintiff”) 3/18/19 pleading entitled Plaintiff’s Verified Motion to Reconsider. In support

thereof Maravelias avers the following points of fact and law:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 3/8/19, this Court granted Plaintiff’s request to extend the stalking order. The

Court’s Order was markedly favorable to DePamphilis, even to the point of transgressing

Defendant’s fundamental free-speech rights. The Court’s Order openly punished Maravelias

because of his “offensive” expressive conduct to third-parties in public – “comments” he

allegedly made on the “internet” to defend himself against DePamphilis’s legal abuse.

2. On 3/21/19, Maravelias filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court’s extension.

3. Remarkably, Plaintiff filed her own Motion to Reconsider as well on 3/18/19.

Defendant is filing a contemporaneous Objection to the said frivolous pleading by Plaintiff.

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 4. In her Motion to Reconsider, DePamphilis’s ungrateful bemoaning spans two

topics:

a. In Paragraphs 6 through 15 and Prayers for Relief A and B, she complains that the
Court’s amendment allows Maravelias to appear at his high school for “legitimate
and limited” purposes such as “voting” and “public events”, e.g., such as where
Plaintiff is totally absent.

b. Elsewhere in her Motion, she complains that the Court did not grant an even
longer punitive extension of the restraining order.

5. As a matter of law, Plaintiff is disallowed to advance the first above-referenced

category of complaints within her Motion to Reconsider. While she is theoretically allowed to

advance the second category within the Motion to Reconsider pertaining to the duration of the

extension, the other portions are in violation of the Court’s rules and should be stricken. A

motion for reconsideration cannot be usurped as an opportunity to inject new facts and advance

original legal arguments which could have been timely raised in the incident litigation. Here,

DePamphilis waived her opportunity to do so by failing to file a timely Objection to

Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion to Amend.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Plaintiff’s Contentions Opposing the Minor Stalking Order Amendment Violate

the Limited Legal Scope of a Motion to Reconsider Pursuant to Dist. Div. R.
3.11(E)

6. Plaintiff violates the Court’s rules in her 3/18/19 Verified Motion to Reconsider

while attacking the Court’s very modest concession to Maravelias to access a public building

where Plaintiff is absent. See New Hampshire Rules of the Circuit Court – District Division,

Rule 3.11(E), providing in relevant part:

“A motion for reconsideration or other post-decision relief shall be filed within ten (10) days of
the date on the clerk’s written notice of the order or decision which shall be mailed by the clerk
on the date of the notice. The motion shall state, with particularity, points of law or fact that the

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PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 Court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the
motion as the movant desires to present; but the motion shall not exceed ten (10) pages. To
preserve issues for an appeal to the Supreme Court, an appellant must have given the Court the
opportunity to consider such issues; thus, to the extent that the Court, in its decision, addresses
matters not previously raised in the case, a party must identify any alleged errors concerning
those matters in a motion under this rule to preserve such issues for appeal. A hearing on the
motion shall not be permitted except by order of the Court.” (Emphasis added)

7. The plain language of the Court’s rule mandates that motions to reconsider

highlight “misapprehended” or “overlooked” points of fact of law exclusively. Such motions

cannot function as covert vessels for newfound legal contentions rooted upon original

stipulations of fact. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is filled to the brim with inappropriate and

previously unseen allegations of fact, even including a photographic exhibit and offering notary

verification to bait the Court to act upon such new inviable introductions of fact. This boldly

violates the Court’s aforecited rule and disparages Maravelias’s due process rights under U.S.

CONST, Amend XIV, and N.H. CONST, Pt. I, Art. 2, 15. 1

8. Plaintiff failed to file a timely Objection to Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Verified

Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss or Amend Stalking Order to Remedy Voter Suppression

Conspiracy Against Respondent within 10 days of its docketing.2 Accordingly, there is no

noticed, preserved adversarial dispute on this particular issue for the Court to possibly

“reconsider”. DePamphilis waived her opportunity to contest the sought amendment(s) relating

to Maravelias’s presence at his alma mater for limited and legitimate purposes.

1
The Court’s rule to this point, and the necessity of enforcing it, are natural consequences of constitutional due-
process protections. Where DePamphilis attempts to inject unilateral litigation content into an awkward motion to
reconsider, Maravelias is deprived of all his due process rights to face adverse witnesses, cross-examine, make
offers of proof, call his own witnesses, and/or have access to any of the discovery/evidentiary dispensations of a full
trial with both parties present. If the Court were to allow such adversarial conduct improperly transpire through the
unfair medium of a mere unitary Motion to Reconsider, Maravelias would be greatly prejudiced.
2
Maravelias emailed the submitted 3/8/19 Motion to counsel the following day on 3/9/19, affording ample notice
before the 10 days elapsed thereafter wherein she failed to exercise her right to file an Objection.

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 9. Plaintiff cannot indicate any “overlooked” or “misapprehended” “points of fact or

law” where she did not raise any for the Court on this point. Although the emergency ex parte

relief did deprive Plaintiff of notice before the preliminary injunction, this fact alone in no way

disabled her from filing a timely Objection within 10-days of the 3/8/19 Motion3 to notice her

arguments in opposition to the sought amendment. In such an event, Maravelias would have had

the proper due-process right to file a Reply and ask the Court for a Hearing on the matter.

B. Plaintiff Had, and Still Has, Adequate Alternative Remedy to Seek Amendment of
the Stalking Order Without Improperly Usurping a Motion for Reconsideration
to Maravelias’s Injury

10. Despite Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely Objection to Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion

to Amend, she does not lack a statutory remedy. RSA 175-B:5, VIII.(b) provides:

“(b) If either party wishes the defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order of
protection, the remedy is to petition the court for modification of such order.”

11. Although the statute secures this necessary due process right to defendants

wishing to be excused from certain terms, DePamphilis certainly has shown no timidity in the

past from delegating to herself the inverse right. See DePamphilis’s 7/2/18 Motion to Amend the

stalking order – long after the 2018 extension ruling – seeking to criminalize Maravelias for

possessing public court exhibits documenting her online cyberbullying and middle-finger

harassment of Maravelias.

12. Similarly, Plaintiff can file a separate and proper motion to further attack

Maravelias’s rights and stifle Maravelias’s legitimate affairs in public in his town. However, she

cannot lawfully usurp a Motion to Reconsider the extension ruling as a forum for these new

absurd, bad-faith contentions.

3
See Dist Div. R. 1.8(D), staying motions for 10 days until “the court may act thereon”, leaving ample time for the
opposing party to file a timely Objection pleading, regardless of any preliminary ex parte action.

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4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 C. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Bars Plaintiff from Litigating These Contentions

13. “The doctrine of res judicata ensures that ‘a final judgment on the merits of an

action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been

raised in that action.’ Butland v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 229 F. Supp. 2d 75

(D.N.H. 2002), citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308

(1980).

14. In New Hampshire, the elements of res judicata are: “(1) the parties must be the

same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action must be before the court in both

instances; and (3) a final judgment on the merits must have been rendered on the first action.”

Brzica v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 147 N.H. 443, 454, 791 A.2d 990 (2002).

15. Notwithstanding her potential statutory remedy to seek further amendments to the

stalking order unfavorable to Maravelias by proper Motion, res judicata bars relitigation of

Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion to Amend within a disconnected motion to reconsider the stalking

extension request.

16. Between Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion raising the issue and Plaintiff’s inapposite

3/18/19 Motion to Reconsider the extension order, the parties are unquestionably identical.

Further, the “same cause of action” (a certain amendment to a RSA 633:3-a civil stalking order

pertaining to Defendant’s permission to appear in certain public buildings) is before the Court.

17. A “final judgment on the merits” was rendered when 1) the Court partially

granted Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion by amending the stalking order through the extension

decision issued that day, and 2) when 10 days had thence passed by 3/18/19, within which

DePamphilis possessed a right to file a timely Objection to contest Maravelias’s Motion to

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5
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
Amend – a right she voluntarily forfeited, notwithstanding the Court’s exigent preliminary

injunction granted due to the imminent 3/12/19 Windham town election.

18. By forfeiting her opportunity to oppose Maravelias’s 3/8/19 Motion to Amend by

means of the standard common-law adversarial process of filing a rule-compliant Objection, res

judicata bars her subsequent re-litigation of that issue inside a motion for reconsideration.

D. Plaintiff’s Rule-Breaking, Scandalous Contentions Should Be Stricken from the

Court’s Record

19. The Court may strike a pleading where a party introduces redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter. See, e.g., Fed. R. of Civ. Proc 12(f). A Motion to Strike is

particularly appropriate where a party usurps judicial pleading as a forum to launch baseless

defamatory attacks against an individual, as DePamphilis has done within the offending portions

of her Motion to Reconsider (e.g., her remorseless and criminal mischaracterization of

Maravelias at Paragraph 12). See, e.g., Magill v. Appalachia Intermediate Unit 08, 646 F. Supp.

339, 343 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (striking allegations that “reflect adversely on the moral character of

an individual” where “unnecessary to a decision on the matters in question”).

20. Paragraphs 6 through 15 and Prayers for Relief A and B of Plaintiff’s Motion to

Reconsider meet this standard. They are wholly “immaterial” and “impertinent” by virtue of

violating the Court’s rules while lacking legal viability. Further, DePamphilis commits unabated

criminal libel against Maravelias at Paragraphs 12 and 14 by hurling baseless vituperations

crafted to disparage Paul Maravelias’s noble reputation and character.

III. CONCLUSION

21. Accordingly, the instant Motion to Strike should be granted. The Court should not

tolerate inappropriate manners of legal contention, especially where DePamphilis is lawyer-

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6
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
represented and expected to know and follow the Court’s rules. There is no valid reason pro se

“23-year-old” Maravelias should have greater knowledge of and respect for The Honorable

Court’s rules than DePamphilis’s 53-year-old bar-admitted attorney who has been practicing in

this state longer than the parties have been alive.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Strike from the record and not consider Paragraphs 6 through 15 and Prayers for
Relief A and B of Plaintiff’s Verified Motion to Reconsider filed 3/18/19;

III. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

March 28th, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Defendant’s Motion to Strike was forwarded
on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown, Esq., counsel for the Petitioner,
Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-1318.

______________________________

March 28th, 2019

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7
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
335
336
337
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

MOTION TO AMEND STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION

TO EXCLUDE SECOND-AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITY

COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within Motion to

Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity

pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), state and federal constitutional law, and the Court’s general

equitable powers. In support, Respondent asserts the points of fact and law contained within the

attached-herewith Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Amend Stalking

Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity.

Respondent gently reminds The Honorable Court of its “responsibility to decide” and afford

“every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding … the right to be heard”. (Code of

Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.6) Accordingly, the recusal of Hon. John J. Coughlin from

this case is mandatory under the Judicial Code of Conduct, and thus respectfully expected, for

the reasons set forth in Respondent’s recent 11/21/18 Motion for Recusal and 10/31/18 Motion to

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Set Aside Judgement (e.g., as one example of patterned prejudice throughout this case, Judge

Coughlin would reflexively deny Mr. Maravelias’s requests for relief with one-word, or

otherwise non-specific/unsupported, findings.) Denial of the instant Motion would require

specific legal reasoning to provide for meaningful appellate review and assure that Maravelias’s

legal arguments are indeed being read and considered by the Noble, Dutiful, Law-Abiding Court.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Trustworthy, Competent,

and Most Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Amend the Stalking Final Order of Protection to dissolve the following three
terms, effective immediately:

i. “10. The defendant shall relinquish to a peace officer all firearms and
ammunition in his/her control, ownership or possession, and the defendant
is prohibited from purchasing or obtaining any firearms or ammunition
during the pendency of this order.”

ii. “11. The defendant shall also relinquish all deadly weapons as defined in
RSA 625:11,V which may have been used, intended to be used, threatened
to be used, or could be used in an incident of stalking or abuse. These
weapons may include the following:”

iii. “22. The defendant shall relinquish all concealed weapons permits and
hunting licenses.”

III. If denying the instant Motion, make specific findings of fact and law supporting
its decision, addressing whether the Court purports to have statutory authority to
grant the requested relief, to provide for meaningful appellate review;

IV. Hold a Hearing, if necessary, on this matter; and

V. Grant any further relief deemed equitable as a result of the unjust transgression of
Maravelias’s constitutional rights proceeding from Petitioner’s now-documented
malicious protective-order falsity.

339
340
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO AMEND STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION
TO EXCLUDE SECOND-AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITY

COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within

Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent’s Motion to Amend Stalking Final Order of

Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b);

Part I, Articles 2, 2-a, 15, and 18 of the Constitution of the State of New Hampshire; and the

Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of

America. In support thereof, Respondent asserts the following:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. The record indicates the following. On 12/28/16, DePamphilis filed a Stalking Petition

against Maravelias. They were neighbors and family friends. Maravelias had not interacted with

Petitioner since 16-days prior on 12/12/16, when he respectfully invited her and her mommy to

341
dinner. He left shortly after she nicely told him they were “just friends”. Maravelias wished her a

“beautiful Christmas”, left, and never once spoke to her nor interacted with her ever, at-all, not

even once, after that day – even though she said they were “friends”, said the gesture was

“sweet”, and chose to take his cell number.

2. DePamphilis’s defamatory 12/28/16 petition was littered with now-demonstrated material

falsehoods. It was a form of malicious retaliation previously threatened in a 12/23/16 text

message by David DePamphilis (Petitioner’s father) to Paul Maravelias’s parents, due to an

argument Paul and David had.1, 2 In 2018, a cell-phone video was played in this Court proving

Christina DePamphilis had extensively lied about at least one key event in her petition in which

she falsely dramatized Maravelias’s normal interaction with her at an outdoor event in 2013.3

3. On 2/6/17, Judge Robert S. Stephen granted a Final Stalking Order based upon

Petitioner’s unnoticed, material falsehood that Maravelias had spoken a creepy, weird phrase to

Christina DePamphilis, which is proven false by an audio recording Maravelias had of the same

conversation.4 The recording was ruled inadmissible.

4. In an unsettling twist of injustice, liar DePamphilis complained to the police about

Maravelias’s cell-phone recording and had Maravelias arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor

under New Hampshire’s draconian, tyrannical “wiretapping” statute (RSA 570-A). Unbeknownst

to Maravelias, it criminalizes recording one’s own conversation outdoors without getting

1
As these exhibits are already part of this Court’s record in this case, economical reference can be made
to Maravelias’s Supreme Court appeal brief appendix, which consolidates nearly the entire record of this
case into an electronically accessible PDF at https://goo.gl/28aGb4
2
Brief appendix, A187
3
Brief, 24-25
4
Brief, 13 and 21; Brief appendix, A24-35

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everyone to sign a consent form beforehand, while all interlocutors are knowingly speaking

words into each other’s ears. In this case, the recording would prove the stalking order is false.

5. On 1/12/18, by Petitioner’s motion, this Court extended this stalking order to 2019.

6. Maravelias has been the victim of DePamphilis’s proven lies to obtain a false stalking

order, her repeat harassment and social-media middle-finger bullying of Maravelias during the

order, using her boyfriend in June 2017 as a weapon to taunt Maravelias and unsuccessfully

incite him to violate the unjust order.5

7. Maravelias is a lawful firearms owner, but the stalking order unnecessarily restrains

Maravelias’s basic constitutional rights. Maravelias surrendered his firearms to police on

12/28/16 and has been wrongly deprived of his property since, due to the unjust order.

8. Maravelias possessed a concealed carry permit from Windham Police, which he has been

wrongly forced to relinquish due to the needlessly harsh terms of the unjust order.

9. Since Maravelias’s conduct was never unlawful nor threatening, and since even his

conduct as alleged by petitioner was never unlawful nor threatening, the stalking order terms

restricting Maravelias’s otherwise-lawful weapons activity should be immediately dissolved.

10. Further, this Court should apologize to Maravelias for what has been done to him.

II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Where Maravelias is a professionally trained, lawful firearms owner

with safety certifications and a concealed carry permit, is not party to
any ongoing criminal case, has no disqualifying criminal convictions,
has no other pendant civil restraining orders, has no history of

5
Appeal brief, 21-22; Brief appendix, A11-13

343
 violence, and is subject to a demonstrably falsified non-intimate-
partner, non-domestic-violence “stalking” restraining order, should
the Court grant the requested modified protective order terms?

B. Does the mandatory firearms prohibition in intimate-or-domestic-

partner-violence (DV) restraining orders at RSA 173-B:5, I. and II.
apply to civil stalking orders by the language of RSA 633:3-a, III-a.?

C. Are RSA 173-B:5 and/or RSA 633:3-a, III-a. unconstitutionally vague

or overbroad?

D. Insofar as it is vague, does RSA 633:3-a, III-a. lead to an absurd result

contrary to legislative intent?

E. Does either statute facially, or do the terms of the resultant current

civil injunction as-applied, violate Maravelias’s constitutional rights
under Part I, Articles 2, 2-a, and/or 15 of the New Hampshire
Constitution and/or the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America?

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11. This Court should, given the facts of the case, grant the requested relief in basic

fairness and equity. The Court has authority to grant the requested relief both statutorily and in

its general equitable powers.

12. Further, the Court is required by law to grant the requested relief under the rights and

protections guaranteed by state and federal constitutional provisions.

13. Further, if RSA 633:3-a and/or RSA 173-B are found not to provide statutory

authorization to grant the requested relief, they should be invalidated as leading to an absurd

result contrary to legislative intent and as unconstitutionally overbroad and/or vague in violation

of, inter alia, the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Part I,

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Articles 2, 2-a, and 15 of the State Constitution, and the relief should thus be granted regardless.

IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

14. By reviewing legislative history and reading the protective order terms themselves,

the governmental interest of civil stalking reliefs is pellucid: to protect the physical safety of

stalking victims. Sadly, the instant case is an example of civil stalking litigation usurped for

vindictive, frivolous purposes ultimately to defame Maravelias and cowardly restrict his free-

speech rights (see Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Stalking Order filed 7/2/18, seeking the Order

command Maravelias not to “possess” “directly or indirectly” artifacts from Christina

DePamphilis’s public “social media’, including court exhibits where she incitatively middle-

fingered, insulted, and baited Maravelias online in highly public places with her boyfriend to

attempt to elicit a stalking order violation, because she is nervous he might expose her criminal

activities by posting her own outrageous public social media posts online).

15. The stalking statute (RSA 633:3-a) is modeled after the preexisting Domestic

Violence statute (RSA 173-B), the purpose of which is likewise the protection of physical safety,

yet for victims having an intimate/domestic relation to perpetrator. “RSA chapter 173-B governs

the protection of persons from domestic violence. The purpose of this chapter ‘is to preserve and

protect the safety of the family unit for all family members by entitling victims of domestic

violence to immediate and effective police protection and judicial relief.’” Knight v. Maher, 20

A.3d 901 NH (2011), quoting Walker v. Walker, 158 N.H. 602, 605, 972 A.2d 1083 (2009).

16. Given the physical-safety-protective nature of the so-called “protective” order, it

cannot be just for the Court to deprive a defendant of his firearms property without making

345
specific findings of acts where violence was committed or was threatened to be committed. In

this case, there are no such acts. Christina DePamphilis’s 2018 extension was predicated solely

on her insulted whining that Maravelias spoke and written offensively to third-parties, not to her,

during the pendency of the original order. Such an accusation cannot possibly result in the

continued criminalization of firearm possession in any sane, orderly, and free society.

A. The Court Has Authority to Grant the Requested Relief

17. RSA 633:3-a, III-a. states:

“A person who has been the victim of stalking as defined in this section may seek relief by
filing a civil petition in the district court in the district where the plaintiff or defendant resides.
Upon a showing of stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant such
relief as is necessary to bring about a cessation of stalking. The types of relief that may be
granted, the procedures and burdens of proof to be applied in such proceedings, the methods
of notice, service, and enforcement of such orders, and the penalties for violation thereof shall
be the same as those set forth in RSA 173-B.” (Emphasis added)

18. RSA 173-B:5, VIII. authorizes the Court to modify the terms of DV orders and also

applies to stalking orders by operation of 633:3-a, III-a.:

“VIII. (a) No order issued under this chapter shall be modified other than by the court. Temporary
reconciliations shall not revoke an order.

(b) If either party wishes the defendant to be excused from any provisions of an order of
protection, the remedy is to petition the court for modification of such order.” (Emphasis added)

19. RSA 173-B is the domestic violence statute, which stipulates more-severe civil and

criminal reliefs for victims of “abuse”, defined as various conduct within the context of an

intimate partner or domestic relation. RSA 633:3-a was introduced to extend protective order

reliefs to petitioners unrelated to the defendants, never in an intimate relationship or even as total

strangers. As the parties in this case were never household/family members nor intimate partners,

application of RSA 173-B to stalking orders, for certain matters, is legally erroneous.

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 20. The analogous civil protective order relief provision at RSA 173-B:5, I. contains

specific language forbidding firearms not found in 633:3-a, III-a., the stalking statute’s version:

“I. A finding of abuse shall mean the defendant represents a credible threat to the safety of the
plaintiff. Upon a showing of abuse of the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall
grant such relief as is necessary to bring about a cessation of abuse. Such relief shall direct the
defendant to relinquish to the peace officer any and all firearms and ammunition in the control,
ownership, or possession of the defendant, or any other person on behalf of the defendant for the
duration of the protective order.” (Emphasis added to language unique to DV restraining orders)

21. Further, the DV statute contains a separate firearms prohibition, not included in the

stalking statute, at RSA 173-B:5, II.:

“II. The defendant shall be prohibited from purchasing, receiving, or possessing any deadly weapons
and any and all firearms and ammunition for the duration of the order. The court may subsequently
issue a search warrant authorizing a peace officer to seize any deadly weapons specified in the
protective order and any and all firearms and ammunition, if there is probable cause to believe such
firearms and ammunition and specified deadly weapons are kept on the premises or curtilage of the
defendant.”

22. Simple examination of both statutes reveals the language of RSA 633:3-a, III-a.

applies the “procedural”, “relief”-related, “enforcement-method” provisions of RSA 173-B for

the legislative economy of not repeating such matters, but not that substantive legal differences

between the two forms of restraining order (here, firearm ownership policy) should be equalized.

As specific firearm prohibitions of RSA 173-B are intentionally absent from the stalking statute,

this Court has full authority to amend the stalking order to allow Mr. Maravelias to own and use

his own property which has been stolen from him following a false stalking petition.

23. The longstanding difference in firearm policy between civil DV and stalking

restraining orders proceeds from the evolution of federal law. The Federal Domestic Violence

Firearms Prohibition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), prohibits possession of arms or ammunition

while subject to a “qualifying” protective order issued on behalf of a spouse or intimate

partner (i.e., RSA 173-B DV restraining orders only).

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 24. Admittedly, RSA 633:3-a, III-a. does still leave problematic ambiguity regarding

which exact aspects of RSA 173-B apply to stalking orders. This ambiguity is further

addressed infra; however, Maravelias’s recommended interpretation of the statute above (as

not requiring the RSA 173-B domestic-violence-only mandatory firearm prohibition) is

supported by a reading of the stalking statute in its proper context: while 173-B DV

restraining orders are rooted the prevention of “domestic violence”, 633:3-a stalking orders

arise typically from non-violent stalking between strangers, as is falsely alleged in the instant

case. In this case, there is no “domestic” relation nor any “violent” acts. The New Hampshire

Supreme Court has instructed the stalking statute is to be read in its distinct, whole context,

and it only “[looks] to [the] domestic violence petition [173-B] remedy” in broad terms.

MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008).

25. The statutory interpretation canon of in pari materia further suggests civil stalking

reliefs are distinct from domestic violence reliefs as it concerns firearms policy. RSA 458:16

provides a certain class of restraining orders in divorce proceedings which are procedurally

distinct from 173-B domestic violence and 633:3-a stalking actions. Like RSA 633:3-a, RSA

458:16 contains no mandatory firearms prohibition. However, it lacks the application clause of

173-B procedure found in 633:3-a, III-a. I.e., RSA 458:16 divorce restraining orders pertain to

non-violent intimate-partner situations, where DV orders pertain to violent spousal/intimate

partner situations, and where stalking orders pertain to not-necessarily-violent (and, usually,

wholly non-violent) stalking acts between strangers or otherwise non-intimate/domestic partners.

26. In this light, RSA 458:16 can be recognized as pari materia to RSA 633:3-a in that

neither type of restraining order necessarily invokes the federal firearms prohibition at 18 U.S.C.

§922(g) applicable to DV restraining order subjects. See Peirano & Larsen, 155 N.H. 738 (2007),

348
affirming an RSA 458:16 restraining order firearms prohibition was valid only because the court

made a specific additional finding that the “[spousal defendant] represents a credible threat to the

physical safety of the [spousal plaintiff]”, only then invoking the federal 18 U.S.C. §922(g)

prohibition. Since RSA 458:16 restraining orders ordinarily lack the distinguishing element of a

finding of violence and therefore do not automatically trigger the federal prohibition, so should

RSA 633:3-a stalking orders be held to not involve a mandatory firearms prohibition, lacking

both distinguishing elements of the 18 U.S.C. §922(g) prohibition: to wit, an 1) intimate partner

relationship, and 2) a judicial finding of a violent act committed. Thus, application of RSA 173-

B to stalking procedure by RSA 633:3-a, III-a. should be read as limited to matters of procedure

only, and not to adopt the substantive legal element of mandatory firearms prohibition.

27. For all the above reasons, the mandatory relinquishment of firearms throughout

the whole pendency of a civil restraining order is mandatory only for RSA 173-B domestic

violence restraining orders, and not stalking orders. Since the protective order here does not

involve such a DV protective order, neither the federal prohibition nor the specific firearm-

prohibition terms of RSA 173-B in conformance thereto apply; the Court has full authority to

grant the requested relief in this civil stalking order where the parties were never “spouses or

intimate partners”.

B. The Court Is Required to Grant the Requested Relief

28. Part I of the New Hampshire Constitution provides:

“[Art.] 2. [Natural Rights.] All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights among which
are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and,
in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. …

[Art.] 2-a. [The Bearing of Arms.] All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves, their families, their property and the state.

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 [Art.] 15. [Right of Accused.] … No subject shall be … deprived of his property … or deprived of
his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land …”

29. The Second Amendment to the Federal Constitution asserts “the right of the people to

keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” and is incorporated against the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia

v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

30. “The state constitutional right to bear arms is not absolute and may be subject to

restriction and regulation.” (holding that firearm possession prohibition for certain convicted

felons is not unconstitutional) State v. Smith, 132 NH 756 (1990). Return of firearms is

unauthorized for subjects of outstanding DV, not stalking, restraining orders, where the

defendant was found to have committed an act of violence. See State v. LaFratta (2016-0673)

31. In its current un-amended form, the stalking order hyperactively infringes upon

Maravelias’s state and federal constitutional rights to purchase, keep, and use weapons. It even

requires he surrender “hunting licenses”. These are shocking violations of Mr. Maravelias’s basic

human rights to life and liberty (i.e., self-defense and the acquisition of victuals).

32. Maravelias is not subject to any state or federal “restrictions or regulations” which

would legitimately prohibit his otherwise lawful firearms activity. As previously stated,

Maravelias is not subject to any DV restraining order; accordingly, the state and federal laws

prohibiting firearm possession by domestic violence restraining order defendants do not apply.

The only other category of recognized firearm-rights-deprivation applies to criminals convicted

350
of a felony or a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Maravelias has never been convicted,

arrested, nor remotely accused for/of any domestic violence or felony offense.6

33. Since there is no state or federal recognized exception to firearms rights which would

apply to Maravelias, since the constitutional provisions speak for themselves, and since the Court

has the authority to do so, the Court is required by law to grant the requested relief.

C. If RSA 173-B:5 Prohibits Civil Stalking Order Defendants’ Possession of Firearms by

Operation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a., it Should be Invalidated as Leading to an Absurd
Result, and the Court Still Must Grant the Requested Relief

34. As noted hereinabove, the language of RSA 633:3-a, III-a. may leave problematic

uncertainty in how it applies DV procedure (173-B) to stalking. The quadripartite classification

of RSA 173-B applicability to stalking orders, in the light of firearms prohibition, is analyzed:

(1) “The types of relief that may be granted”

Analysis: This cannot be held to apply 173-B mandatory firearm prohibition to

stalking orders since it uses the term “may [be granted]” instead of the imperative
“shall” language at RSA 173-B:5, I. and II.

(2) “the procedures and burdens of proof to be applied in such proceedings”

Analysis: This language is potentially ambiguous. While “burdens of proof”

suggests the referenced “proceedings” are limited to the procedural law context of
the civil petition hearing, which would be extraneous to the legal question of
firearms, the entire resultant protective order could be argued to be part of the
broader “proceeding”, and the firearms prohibition a “procedure” thereof.

(3) “the methods of notice, service, and enforcement of such orders”

6
Maravelias purchased his firearms in New Hampshire in 2016 and thus went through the typical
background check performed by the NH Department of Safety upon filing the routine “Firearm
Transaction Record” form, verifying with both state and federal databases that he has no criminal record.

351
 Analysis: This language is potentially ambiguous. While the “methods of notice”
and “service” are extraneous to the legal question of firearms, the “methods of
enforcement” could arguably be held to encapsulate the categorical firearms
prohibition at RSA 173-B:5, I. and II, applying them to stalking orders.

(4) “and the penalties for violation thereof [shall be the same as those set forth in
RSA 173-B.]”
Analysis: Violation penalties are extraneous to the legal question of firearms.

35. If this Court concludes that RSA 633:3-a, III-a. does, in fact, apply the mandatory

firearms prohibition in 173-B Domestic Violence restraining order to stalking restraining orders,

then it should defy the statute as leading to an absurd result not intended by the legislature.

36. As illustrated by the instant case, stalking orders can result from very innocent

behavior where there is not the slightest serious accusation of violence. Here, the worst conduct

alleged by DePamphilis was that Maravelias asked her out on a date on her 16th birthday, offered

her an expensive gift, and spoke some socially awkward phrases which Maravelias did not, in

fact, ever speak, as proven by his audio recording of the conversion.

37. It would be a patently absurd result that this alleged behavior – even if true – result

in the criminalization of Maravelias’s firearms activity where, by comparison, he could have

been convicted of the all following overtly criminal acts, and never lose his firearms-rights:

1) Criminally threatening to terrorize another person with a chemical or biological

substance – misdemeanor under RSA 631:4 II.(b);

2) Walking down the street, encountering a 14-year-old teenage girl happily strolling in
the opposite direction, and randomly slapping her across the face – misdemeanor
simple assault under RSA 631:2-a II.;

3) A 50-year-old man having sexual contact with a 13-year-old girl - misdemeanor

sexual assault under RSA 632-A:4, I.(a).

352
 38. In criminal prosecutions for all the above hypothetical crimes, there would be no

lawful authority for the State to prohibit the true criminal from possessing firearms as penalty (as

these crimes are not felonies nor misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence), whereas, by

comparison, Maravelias’s one-time chivalrous act of respectfully inviting of a young woman to

dinner, whom he had known for years, in front of her mommy, triggered a civil stalking order

which imposes the felony-like criminal consequence of totally revoked firearm-ownership-rights,

if indeed RSA 633:3-a is interpreted to encapsulate the RSA 173-B firearms prohibition clause.

39. This outcome is absurd beyond belief. It is a ridiculous, patently unjust outcome

violating Part I, Article 18 of the State Constitution, which prohibits punishments

disproportionate to the severity of the offense. It is a longstanding principle in American law

“that all laws should receive a sensible construction”, that “the reason of the law in such cases

should prevail over its letter” United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868). See also State v.

Maxfield, 167 N.H. 677 (2015); Bodge v. Hughes, 53 N.H. 614 (1873). RSA 633:3-a, III-a. must

therefore not be held to apply the mandatory firearms prohibition incumbent upon RSA 173-B

restraining orders for domestic violence exclusively.

D. When It Updated RSA 173-B in 1999 to Mirror the Federal Mandatory DV Firearms
Prohibition, 18 U.S.C. §922(g), the Legislature Never Intended That This Prohibition
Would Extend to Non-DV Stalking Orders by Operation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a.

40. The legislature never intended the absurd result shown above. Where multiple

reasonable interpretations of statutory language exist, as with the RSA 633:3-a, III-a. clause

applying RSA 173-B procedures to stalking orders, it is appropriate to examine legislative

history to apply the statute’s just intent. See State v. Rosario, 148 N.H. 488, 489 (2002); State v.

Williams, 143 N.H. 559, 561-62 (1999).

353
 41. In 1998, RSA 633:3-a was updated to include a stalking civil protective order

procedure, never originally contained in its original 1993 exclusively-criminal-code

implementation. See RSA 633:3-a (1998). At this time, the “... shall be the same as those set

forth in RSA 173-B” clause at subsection III-a was added to the statute. Id.

42. RSA 173-B at that time, in 1998, did not contain the mandatory firearms prohibition

language. The analogous “Relief” section contained similar language to the modern RSA 173-

B:5 text, though lacking any and all reference to firearms. See RSA 173-B:4 (1998).

43. In the 1999 legislative session, the legislature repealed RSA 173-B:4 and replaced it

with an updated version moved to RSA 173-B:5. See House Bill 722 (1999). The changes added

the mandatory firearms prohibition for Domestic Violence restraining orders now found at 173-

B:5 I.(a) and II.

44. Since RSA 633:3-a, III-a. had already pointed to RSA 173-B for procedural matters

on civil petitions before January 1st, 2000, when the latter statute lacked the firearms prohibition,

and since the latter (173-B) was then updated to mirror the federal firearms prohibition on DV

restraining order subjects, it is undeniable that the firearms prohibition was never intended to

anachronistically apply to the stalking statute, and that its citation of the DV statute is solely

regarding high-level procedure on the civil petition – not incorporating the firearms restriction.

45. Deliberations at a June 16th, 1999 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on HB722

indicate that the updated RSA 173-B mandatory firearms prohibition was solely concerning

Domestic Violence restraining orders, for the purpose of complying with the applicable federal

law, and never remotely intended to affect non-domestic, non-violence restraining orders such as

the stalking order in the instant case. See N.H. Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing Report HB

722 (Chapter 660, 1999 Session), excerpted as follows:

354
 Representative William Knowles (Primary Sponsor):

“HB722 … brings [RSA 173-B] under compliance with Federal Law [18 U.S.C.
§922(g)] for firearms restrictions …”

Chief William Halacy, Concord PD:

“So, we’ve really got a couple of purposes here … to bring [RSA 173-B] in line with
the existing federal statute.”

Lincoln Soldati, Strafford County Attorney:

“I believe that it continues NH’s tradition of … supporting victims of DV, and
…providing provisions to protect victims of DV … this legislation, in no way,
impacts law abiding citizens. What it does impact is the right to possess … firearms
for citizens who are not law abiding”.

Letter to Committee from Scott Hampton:

“My reasons for support. Domestic violence is a crime. … as long as each citizen is
committed to the safety of all family members, no one would lose access to their
weapons under the proposed NH (and underlying federal) legislation.”

46. Nowhere did the legislature remotely discuss the RSA 633:3-a, III-a. application of

RSA 173-B civil procedure to stalking orders. Reference to the intention of protecting intimate

partners and family members from violent acts is ubiquitous and unvarying. (See purpose clause

of RSA 173-B, preserved in HB722 amendment, “It is the purpose of this act to preserve and

protect the safety of the family unit for all family or household members by entitling victims of

domestic violence to immediate and effective police protection and judicial relief.”) Irrefutably,

any interpretation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a. as adopting the mandatory firearms prohibition of DV

restraining orders is woefully contrary to the unrelated purposes of the 2000 amendment

introducing said firearms prohibitions to Domestic Violence restraining orders only.

355
 47. When RSA 173-B was first amended to include the mandatory firearms prohibition in

2000, it was done in conformance to the federal statute, which does not apply to non-domestic

restraining orders such as the instant stalking order between Maravelias and DePamphilis. The

history between Maravelias and DePamphilis is undisputedly neither “domestic” nor “violent”,

and, thus, the RSA 173-B amended prohibitions were never intended to apply, nor do apply.

E. If RSA 173-B:5 Prohibits Civil Stalking Order Defendants’ Possession of Firearms by

Operation of RSA 633:3-a, III-a., One or Both Statutes is/are Unconstitutionally
Overbroad and/or Vague, and the Court Still Must Grant the Requested Relief

48. RSA 633:3-a, III-a. is unconstitutionally vague for the above-explained reasons,

pertaining to the uncertainty of what exactly in RSA 173-B applies to stalking orders. “A statute

can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons. First, if it fails to provide

people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.

Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v.

Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,732 (2000). See also State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420, 423 (2003).

49. Here, the statutory scheme invites trial court judges to inconsistently interpret the

RSA 633:3-a, III-a. clause applying RSA 173-B “procedure” as including or not as including the

mandatory firearms prohibition. The enforcement invited is arbitrary and discriminatory, with

high probability that trial courts will rely on preponderance-of-evidence-admitted, unproven

accusations in the civil petition for subjective discretion on whether to apply the RSA 173-B

mandatory firearms prohibitions to stalking orders. Further, the language of RSA 633:3-a, III-a.

is unintelligible to the average person, since the language “procedures [of the] proceedings” and

“methods of enforcement” could be reasonably interpreted either way to include or not include

the mandatory firearms prohibitions inside RSA 173-B:5.

356
 50. Insofar as RSA 633:3-a, III-a. does incorporate the DV mandatory firearms

prohibition to stalking orders, it is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face in violation of Part I,

Articles 2, 2-a, and 15 of the Constitution of the State of New Hampshire, and the Second,

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America.

That it is also overbroad as-applied lies beyond question, since the stalking order in this case

imposes three terms restraining Maravelias’s second-amendment-protected activity.

51. “A statute is void for overbreadth if it attempts to control conduct by means which

invade areas of protected freedom.” State v. MacElman, 154 N.H. 304, 310 (2006). Here,

applying a Domestic Violence civil protective order firearms prohibition to someone subject to a

non-DV/intimate-partner “stalking” order, where there is no remotest court finding of any violent

acts, invades protected freedom while attempting to control conduct.

52. To survive constitutional scrutiny, RSA 633:3-a, III-a. must be narrowly-tailored to

serve a significant (or, at least, compelling) governmental interest and not prohibit too broad a

sweep of otherwise lawful conduct in so doing. Here, the question is not even one of how

narrowly-tailored the statute is, because it lacks all tailoring whatsoever if indeed it can apply to

something completely different from what the legislative history and statutory context dictate

(that is, domestic violence restraining orders versus the instant civil stalking order where there is

no history of violence nor intimate/household relation between defendant and plaintiff).

357
 V. CONCLUSION

53. As documented supra, the legislature’s addition of a mandatory firearms prohibition

to RSA 173-B, effective January 1st, 2000, is inapplicable to RSA 633:3-a orders and was

purposed to comply with 18 U.S.C. §922, federal law prohibiting firearms for DV restraining

order subjects who are intimate/domestic partners of a victim of judicially found violent acts.

54. Prior to the 2000 amendment to RSA 173-B, RSA 633:3-a, III-a. already had the

exact same language as today about the procedure application of RSA 173-B civil petition

procedure. This application was never intended to incorporate vast and legally distinct chasms of

pertinent DV law to civil stalking orders, such as the mandatory firearms prohibition. As such,

the legislature’s deliberations invariably excluded mention of stalking procedure and withal

never envisioned an instance where the prohibition would apply outside its limited DV context.

55. Maravelias is subject therefore to absolutely no state nor federal statutory mandate

that he continue to be divested of his firearms property. As Maravelias is a professionally

trained, safety-certified, law-abiding firearms owner and victim of David DePamphilis’s

longstanding course of protective-order-falsification legal abuse instrumentalizing his young 17-

year-old teenage daughter Christina DePamphilis7, this Court must inescapably dissolve the

7
Maravelias anticipates and offers-in-advance DePamphilis’s counsel’s obligatory NPC-like reminder
that five years ago in 2013, over three years before December 2016, she was 12.
Maravelias anticipates and contests-in-advance DePamphilis’s counsel’s obligatory NPC-like repeated
slander that Maravelias “grabbed the arm” of DePamphilis’s daughter in 2013, which was a groundless
accusation totally disproven, and that Maravelias took a “secret photo” containing her at his own house,
when Maravelias introduced a normal picture he happened to take during casual photography around a
summer family party, proving that she lied about being “scared” while attending his own party.
Maravelias anticipates and disputes-in-advance DePamphilis’s counsel’s obligatory, unprofessional,
predictable, baseless, NPC-like request for attorney’s fees in connection with having to respond to this
valid and necessary motion. Maravelias has a right to use the court system to recover his wrongfully
stolen firearms and his legal abusers must accept the English adversarial process: that American citizens,
unfortunately for bullies and tyrants, have rights.

358
359
EXHIBITS

360
361
362
363
364
365
 January 4th, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed Respondent’s Motion for Timely Ruling to be filed in the above-
referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

366
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis

v.

Paul Maravelias

MOTION FOR TIMELY RULING

COMES NOW Respondent Paul Maravelias and respectfully submits the within Motion for

Timely Ruling pursuant to RSA 173-B:5, VIII.(b), Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 Rule 1.1,

Rule 1.2, Canon 2 Rule 2.2, Rule 2.3(A), Rule 2.5, Rule 2.6, Rule 2.7, Rule 2.11, Rule 2.15, the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, and Part I, Articles 15 and 35 of

the Constitution of New Hampshire. In support, Respondent avers the following points of fact

and law.

1. On 10/31/18, Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgement in this case, objectively

documenting Judge Coughlin’s hostile bias against Maravelias, based on judicially noticeable

facts, which injuriously prejudiced Maravelias prior to Judge Coughlin’s 9/5/18 retirement.

2. On 11/16/18, this Court mailed a written Order flatly denying Maravelias’s Motion with a

nondescript two-sentence order, itself remarkably signed by Judge Coughlin himself. The

Administrative Office of the Courts later confirmed he has taken Senior Active Status.

367
1
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 3. On 11/21/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion for Recusal and Reconsideration

decrying the spectacle of rank injustice, and further judicial misconduct, inherent to Judge

Coughlin dismissing a Motion alleging his own material misconduct. Maravelias cited the

relevant law requiring another judge to rule upon the 10/31/18 Motion to Set Aside Judgement

and for John Coughlin to recuse himself from all further involvement.

4. Well over one month thereafter, this Court has still not ruled on Respondent Maravelias’s

11/21/18 Motion nor, therefore, on his 10/31/18 Motion in a lawful fashion.

5. A Stalking Final Order of Protection is currently in effect against Maravelias, wrongly,

because of biased and dishonest judicial misconduct, inter alia. (See 10/31/18 Motion)

Maravelias’s basic liberties are at stake; thus, the matter is of extreme exigency.

6. Maravelias repeats the points of fact and law in his 11/21/18 Motion for Recusal and

Reconsideration which charge the presiding justice at Derry District Court to rule upon

Maravelias’s outstanding Motions. Maravelias respectfully demands that this Court rule on

his urgent Motions to dissolve immediately the unjust abridgement of his constitutional

rights. The Code of Judicial Conduct, cited in relevant portions above, stipulates that failing to

do so is grounds for a second judicial misconduct complaint against the presiding justice at Derry

District Court, whose responsibility is to respond to Judge Coughlin’s noticed misconduct.

7. The Stalking Order is set to expire in approximately one month regardless; therefore, it is

imperative that this Court rule upon Maravelias’s Motion in a timely fashion, before, arguably,

the request becomes nominally moot.

8. Further, on 12/10/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion to Amend Stalking Final

Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and associated

368
2
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
memorandum of law thereon.1 This Motion, which arguably becomes moot if this Court grants

the 10/31/18 Motion deposing of this entire stalking order, seeks to amend the unjust Order as a

minimal concession, insofar as its current state violates Maravelias’s constitutional rights even

more so that the committed legal errors (by which the Order was extended) would allow.

9. This Court’s over-one-month inaction on the 11/21/18 Motion and nearly-one-month-

inaction on the 12/10/18 Motion – where Maravelias’s basic liberties are at stake – strongly

suggest a course of improper conduct infringing upon Maravelias’s right to be heard. Combined

with his extensive documentation of Judge Coughlin’s misconduct, this intentional delaying

cannot be seen as anything but a corrupt dilatory practice which weighs the interests of the Court

(and individual judicial officers’ interests) ahead of the liberty interests of Respondent

Maravelias, a participant in the case.2,3

1
In response to Respondent’s 12/10/18 Motion, Petitioner filed a wholly unavailing Objection which
failed to address any of Maravelias’s crucial legal arguments, rather assembling continued dramatic spin-
drivel disparaging Maravelias and baselessly whining that his legal self-defense shows “hostility”, and
therefore the government should steal his firearms. Besides that obvious nonsense, Petitioner did include
one legal point when she invited this Court to withhold ruling on the 12/10/18 Motion until the related
Supreme Court appeal is decided. Said argument is entirely unfounded: the Supreme Court is reviewing
the 6/15/18 Extension Order, but the firearms modification subject is not at all related to that appeal. This
Court has original jurisdiction and therefore has the responsibility to act immediately on all outstanding
Motions, as Maravelias’s basic liberties are currently besieged by an illegal and erroneous restraining
order. See RSA 633:3-a and RSA 173-B, providing for mandatory timeliness requirements passim in
situations like the instance case where protective order terms restrict constitutional rights and therefore
necessitate high standards of due process.
2
Maravelias here raises and preserves the argument that he will still have standing to pursue recourse for
the judicial misconduct noted even if the Stalking Order is subsequently vacated in entirety by the
Supreme Court, notwithstanding this Court’s dilatory practice of delaying ruling on the 11/21/18 Motion.
3
For the purposes of potential civil litigation in federal district court and/or New Hampshire courts,
Maravelias here records his present intention to pursue declaratory and/or other forms of relief through
civil procedure against the judicial officer(s) who have willfully violated constitutional rights, willfully
violated laws and court rules, and/or committed other forms of misconduct which have injured
Maravelias. Once the Stalking Order is no longer in-effect, the matters of the 10/31/18 Motion and
11/21/18 Motion do not become moot; rather, they remain relevant within Maravelias’s intended
litigation, as well as the rulings they seek. Maravelias preserves the argument that this Court’s self-
interested dilatory practices could have the potential unjust effect of excusing the concerned party/parties

369
3
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Rule upon and grant Respondent’s 12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Final
Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity;

III. Rule upon and grant Respondent’s 11/21/18 Motion for Reconsideration and
Recusal;

IV. As a consequence of the latter, rule upon and grant Respondent’s 10/31/18 Motion
to Set Aside Judgement, ending this case;

V. Grant any further relief deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

January 4th, 2019 in propria persona

from adverse effects proceeding from the judicial rulings sought by Maravelias if the Stalking Order is
soon vacated and therefore the 10/31/18 and 11/21/18 Motions not ruled upon. Before the filing of the
10/31/18 Motion, all judicial officers concerned were aware that Maravelias was appealing the Stalking
Order to the Supreme Court; therefore, there is the requisite knowledge and illicit personal interest present
to demonstrate in Maravelias’s intended litigation tortious and/or unlawful dilatory conduct.

370
4
PAUL MARAVELIAS – 34 MOCKINGBIRD HILL RD, WINDHAM, NH 03087
 March 21st, 2019
Robin E. Pinelle, Circuit Clerk
NH Circuit Court Paul Maravelias
10th Circuit – District Division – Derry 34 Mockingbird Hill Rd
10 Courthouse Lane Windham, NH 03087
Derry, NH 03038

RE: Christina DePamphilis vs. Paul Maravelias

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Dear Clerk Pinelle,

Please find enclosed Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider Denial of 12/10/18 Motion to

Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity
to be filed in the above-referenced case.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Maravelias

CC: Simon R. Brown, Esq.

371
 THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

ROCKINGHAM, SS 10TH CIRCUIT – DISTRICT DIVISION – DERRY

Docket No. 473-2016-CV-00124

Christina DePamphilis
v.
Paul Maravelias

MOTION TO RECONSIDER DENIAL OF 12/10/18

MOTION TO AMEND STALKING FINAL ORDER OF PROTECTION
TO EXCLUDE SECOND-AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITY

Paul Maravelias (“Respondent”) respectfully submits the within Motion to Reconsider this

Court’s denial of his 12/10/18 Motion, pursuant to Dist. Div. R. 3.11(E), and states as follows:

1. On 12/10/18, Respondent Maravelias filed a Motion to Amend Stalking Final

Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-Protected Activity and accompanying 19-

page Memorandum of Law in support, claiming rights under the state and federal constitutions.

2. On 3/8/19, almost three months after the said Motion was docketed with the

Court, the Court denied it.

3. Despite the extensive legal, constitutional, and statutory analysis presented in

Maravelias’s well-researched memorandum, his specific request that the Court make specific

findings of fact and law in case of denial, and Petitioner’s entire response as well, this Court did

nothing more than reflexively deny the entire Motion with one threadbare word, “Denied”.

372
 4. Viewed objectively, this judicial act expands upon an already elaborate history of

this Court automatically rejecting Respondent Maravelias’s pleadings through dismissive, knee-

jerk, non-descript denials. This concerning conduct raises legitimate questions of equal

protection, non-lawyer bias, and judicial misconduct. The extant component of this unfortunate

history primarily spans the course of the past 2018 extension case where John J. Coughlin, a

demonstrable civil rights abuser, was still appointed to this case.

5. Since the recent 2019 Motion to Extend litigation, a new judicial officer, Hon.

Elizabeth Leonard, has heard this case. Although ruling multiple times quite unfavorably against

Maravelias, Judge Leonard has always attempted to respect the rights off all parties and does not

have any known history of biased, dishonest, extortionary, bad-faith, malicious, oppressive,

capricious, patently unreasonable, unlawful, and/or criminal conduct, unlike her predecessor.

6. Appealing to the magnanimity and legal duty of The Honorable Court,

Respondent Maravelias reasserts his legal right to be fully heard by the Court. Maravelias merely

wishes to advocate for his own constitutional privileges by having his legal arguments properly

and fully adjudicated by this Noble Court.

7. The Court’s one-word denial order overlooks all points of fact and law contained

within Maravelias’s 12/10/18 Motion and Memorandum of Law thereon. The Court’s one-word

denial of the whole Motion amounts to an effective denial of Prayer III therein, which had stated:

“If denying the instant Motion, make specific findings of fact and
law supporting its decision, addressing whether the Court purports
to have statutory authority to grant the requested relief, to provide
for meaningful appellate review;”

373
WHEREFORE, Respondent Paul Maravelias respectfully prays this Honorable Court:

I. Grant this Motion;

II. Reconsider its 3/8/19 denial and grant all prayers for relief within Respondent’s
12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-
Amendment-Protected Activity, including Prayer III pertaining to making specific
findings of fact and law if denying the 12/10/18 Motion; and

III. Grant any further relief as may be deemed just and necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. MARAVELIAS,

March 21st, 2019 in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Paul Maravelias, certify that a copy of the within Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider Denial
of 12/10/18 Motion to Amend Stalking Final Order of Protection to Exclude Second-Amendment-
Protected Activity was forwarded on this day through USPS Certified Mail to Simon R. Brown,
Esq., counsel for the Petitioner, Christina DePamphilis, P.O. Box 1318, Concord, NH, 03302-
1318.

______________________________

March 21st, 2019

374
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RSA 633:3-a
I. A person commits the offense of stalking if such person:
(a) Purposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which
would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of that
person's immediate family, and the person is actually placed in such fear;
(b) Purposely or knowingly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific individual, which the
actor knows will place that individual in fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of
that individual's immediate family; or
(c) After being served with, or otherwise provided notice of, a protective order pursuant to RSA 173-B,
RSA 458:16, or paragraph III-a of this section, or an order pursuant to RSA 597:2 that prohibits contact
with a specific individual, purposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a single act of conduct that both
violates the provisions of the order and is listed in paragraph II(a).
II. As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means 2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a
continuity of purpose. A course of conduct shall not include constitutionally protected activity, nor shall it
include conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact
with the targeted person. A course of conduct may include, but not be limited to, any of the following acts
or a combination thereof:
(1) Threatening the safety of the targeted person or an immediate family member.
(2) Following, approaching, or confronting that person, or a member of that person's immediate family.
(3) Appearing in close proximity to, or entering the person's residence, place of employment, school, or
other place where the person can be found, or the residence, place of employment or school of a member
of that person's immediate family.
(4) Causing damage to the person's residence or property or that of a member of the person's immediate
family.
(5) Placing an object on the person's property, either directly or through a third person, or that of an
immediate family member.
(6) Causing injury to that person's pet, or to a pet belonging to a member of that person's immediate
family.
(7) Any act of communication, as defined in RSA 644:4, II.
(b) "Immediate family" means father, mother, stepparent, child, stepchild, sibling, spouse, or grandparent
of the targeted person, any person residing in the household of the targeted person, or any person involved
in an intimate relationship with the targeted person.
III. [Repealed.]
III-a. A person who has been the victim of stalking as defined in this section may seek relief by filing a
civil petition in the district court in the district where the plaintiff or defendant resides. Upon a showing of
stalking by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant such relief as is necessary to bring about
a cessation of stalking. The types of relief that may be granted, the procedures and burdens of proof to be
applied in such proceedings, the methods of notice, service, and enforcement of such orders, and the
penalties for violation thereof shall be the same as those set forth in RSA 173-B.
III-b. The minority of a plaintiff or defendant shall not preclude the court from issuing protective orders
under this section.
III-c. Any order under this section shall be for a fixed period of time not to exceed one year, but may be
extended by order of the court upon a motion by the plaintiff, showing good cause, with notice to the
defendant, for one year after the expiration of the first order and thereafter each extension may be for up

377
to 5 years, upon the request of the plaintiff and at the discretion of the court. The court shall review the
order, and each renewal thereof and shall grant such relief as may be necessary to provide for the safety
and well-being of the plaintiff. A defendant shall have the right to a hearing on the extension of any order
under this paragraph to be held within 30 days of the extension. The court shall state in writing, at the
respondent's request, its reason or reasons for granting the extension. The court shall retain jurisdiction to
enforce and collect the financial support obligation which accrued prior to the expiration of the protective
order.

RSA 173:B:3, I.
Any person may seek relief pursuant to RSA 173-B:5 by filing a petition, in the county or district where
the plaintiff or defendant resides, alleging abuse by the defendant. Any person filing a petition containing
false allegations of abuse shall be subject to criminal penalties. Notice of the pendency of the action and
of the facts alleged against the defendant shall be given to the defendant, either personally or as provided
in paragraph III. The plaintiff shall be permitted to supplement or amend the petition only if the defendant
is provided an opportunity prior to the hearing to respond to the supplemental or amended petition. All
petitions filed under this section shall include the home and work telephone numbers of the defendant, if
known. Notice of the whereabouts of the plaintiff shall not be revealed except by order of the court for
good cause shown. Any answer by the defendant shall be filed with the court and a copy shall be provided
to the plaintiff by the court.

N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 1

[Equality of Men; Origin and Object of Government.]. All men are born equally free and independent;
Therefore, all government of right originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the
general good.

N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 2

[Natural Rights.] All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights among which are, the
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of
seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this
state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.

N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 14

[Legal Remedies to be Free, Complete, and Prompt.] Every subject of this State is entitled to a certain
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or
character; to obtain right and justice freely, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without
any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.

N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 15

[Right of Accused.] No subject shall be held to answer for any crime, or offense, until the same is fully
and plainly, substantially and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse or furnish evidence
against himself. Every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that may be favorable to himself; to
meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to be fully heard in his defense, by himself, and counsel.
No subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges,

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put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of
his peers, or the law of the land; provided that, in any proceeding to commit a person acquitted of a
criminal charge by reason of insanity, due process shall require that clear and convincing evidence that
the person is potentially dangerous to himself or to others and that the person suffers from a mental
disorder must be established. Every person held to answer in any crime or offense punishable by
deprivation of liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the state if need is shown; this right
he is at liberty to waive, but only after the matter has been thoroughly explained by the court.

N.H. CONST., PT. I, ART. 22

[Free Speech; Liberty of the Press.] Free speech and Liberty of the press are essential to the security of
Freedom in a State: They ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved.

U.S. CONST., AMEND. I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. CONST., AMEND. II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV, PT. 1

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

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Dist Div. R. 1.4

RULES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE -- DISTRICT

DIVISION

GENERAL RULES

Rule 1.4. Photographing, Recording and Broadcasting

(a) Except as otherwise provided by this rule or by other provisions of law, any person, whether
or not a member of an established media organization, shall be permitted to photograph, record
and broadcast all court proceedings that are open to the public, provided that such person
provides advance notice to the presiding justice in accordance with section (c) of this rule that he
or she intends to do so. No person shall photograph, record or broadcast any court proceeding
without providing advance notice to the presiding justice that he or she intends to do so. In
addition to giving any parties in interest an opportunity to object, the purpose of the notice
requirement is to allow the presiding justice to ensure that the photographing, recording or
broadcasting will not be disruptive to the proceedings and will not be conducted in such a manner
or using such equipment as to violate the provisions of this rule.

(b) Official court reporters, court monitors and other persons employed or engaged by the court
to make the official record of any court proceeding may record such proceeding by video and/or
audio means without compliance with the notice provisions of section (a) of this rule.

(c) Any person desiring to photograph, record or broadcast any court proceeding, or to bring
equipment intended to be used for these purposes into a courtroom, shall submit a written request
to the clerk of the court or his or her designee, who, in turn, shall deliver the request to the
presiding justice before commencement of the proceeding, or, if the proceeding has already
commenced, at the first reasonable opportunity during the proceeding, so the justice before
commencement of the proceeding, or at an appropriate time during the proceeding, may give all
interested parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the request.

(d) Any party to a court proceeding or other interested person who has reason to believe that a
request to photograph, record or broadcast a court proceeding will be made and who desires to
place limitations beyond that specified by this rule upon these activities may file a written motion
seeking such relief. The motion shall be filed as far in advance of the proceeding as is
practicable. Upon the filing of such a motion, the court may schedule a hearing as expeditiously
as possible before the commencement of the proceeding and, if a hearing is scheduled, the court
shall provide as much notice of the hearing as is reasonably possible to all interested parties and
to the Associated Press, which shall disseminate the notice to its members.

(e) No court or justice shall establish notice rules, requirements or procedures that are different
than those established by this rule.

(f) At any hearing conducted pursuant to subsections (c) or (d) of this rule, the party or person
seeking to prohibit or impose restrictions beyond the terms of this rule on the photographing,
recording or broadcasting of a court proceeding that is open to the public shall bear the burden of
demonstrating: (1) that the relief sought advances an overriding public interest that is likely to be

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prejudiced if the relief is not granted; (2) that the relief sought is no broader than necessary to
protect that interest; and (3) that no reasonable less restrictive alternatives are available to protect
the interest. Any order prohibiting or imposing restrictions beyond the terms of this rule upon the
photographing, recording or broadcasting of a court proceeding that is open to the public shall be
supported by particularized findings of fact that demonstrate the necessity of the court’s action.

(g) The presiding justice retains discretion to limit the number of cameras, recording devices and
related equipment allowed in the courtroom at one time. In imposing such limitations, the
presiding justice may give preference to requests to photograph, record or broadcast made by a
representative of an established media organization that disseminates information concerning
court proceedings to the public. The presiding justice also may require representatives of the
media to arrange pool coverage.

(h) It is the responsibility of representatives of media organizations desiring to photograph,

record or broadcast a court proceeding to contact the clerk of court in advance of a proceeding to
ascertain if pool coverage will be required. If the presiding justice has determined that pool
coverage will be required, it is the sole responsibility of such media representatives, with
assistance as needed from the clerk or his or her designee, to determine which media organization
will provide the coverage feed. Disputes about pool coverage will not ordinarily be resolved by
the court, and the court may deny media organizations’ requests to photograph, record or
broadcast a proceeding if pool agreements cannot be reached. It also is the responsibility of said
person to make arrangements with the clerk of court or his or her designee sufficiently in advance
of the proceeding so that the set up of any needed equipment in the courtroom, including
equipment for pool coverage, can be completed without delaying the proceeding. The court shall
allow reasonable time prior to a proceeding for the set up of such equipment.(i) The court shall
make all documents and exhibits filed with the court, and not sealed, available for inspection by
members of the public in a reasonably timely fashion, it being recognized that the court’s need to
make use of documents and exhibits for official purposes must take precedence over their
availability for public inspection. The court may elect to make one “public” copy of an exhibit
available in the clerk’s office.

(j) The exact location of all recording, photographing and broadcasting equipment within the
courtroom shall be determined by the presiding justice. Once established, movement of such
equipment within the courtroom is prohibited without the express prior approval of the presiding
justice. The court may prohibit the use of any equipment which requires the laying of cords or
wires that pose a safety hazard or impair easy ingress and egress from the courtroom. All
equipment used must operate with minimal noise so as not to disrupt the proceedings.

(k) Unless otherwise ordered by the presiding justice, the following standing orders shall apply to
all recording, photographing or broadcasting of proceedings within any courtroom:

(1) No flash or other artificial lighting devices shall be used.

(2) Set up and dismantling of equipment in a disruptive manner while court is in session is
prohibited.
(3) No recording, photographing or broadcasting equipment may be moved into, out of, or
within the courtroom while court is in session.
(4) Recording, photographing or broadcasting equipment must remain a reasonable distance
from the parties, counsel tables, alleged victims and their families and witnesses, unless such

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person(s) voluntarily approach the position where such equipment is located. No such equipment
shall be used or set up in a location that creates a risk of picking up confidential communications
between lawyer and client or conferences held at the bench among the presiding justice and
counsel or the parties.
(5) All persons using recording, photographing or broadcasting equipment must abide by the
directions of court officers at all times.
(6) Interviews within the courtroom are not permitted before or after a proceeding.
(7) A person who has been granted permission to record, photograph or broadcast a court
proceeding shall not engage in any activity that distracts the participants or impairs the dignity of
the proceedings.

Comment

With respect to subsection (c) of this rule, it is contemplated that such requests will be deemed
timely if they are filed enough in advance of the proceeding that the presiding justice has an
opportunity to read and consider the request, to orally notify all interested parties of its existence,
and to conduct a brief hearing in the event that any interested party objects to the request. Given
the strong presumption under New Hampshire law that photographing, recording and/or
broadcasting court proceedings that are open to the public is allowable, this subsection is not
intended to impose lengthy or onerous advance notice requirements; instead, it recognizes that
frequently such requests will be filed only shortly before the proceeding in question is to begin.

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