ROXAS & CO., INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,
respondents.
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999

FACTS:
 This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
 Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is
1,024 hectares in area.
 On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
 Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed
under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Hacienda Palico
 On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to
"Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on
October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico,
which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a "Notice of
Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:

Roxas y Cia, Limited

Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila.

 Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the DAR's valuation criteria, the
government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be
accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR;
that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner
accepts respondent DAR's offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the
same, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land.
 Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation
Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested
that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the
petitioner in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value.
 Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two
Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with
cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent
DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were
distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

Hacienda Banilad

 On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to
petitioner addressed as follows:

Mr. Jaime Pimentel

Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas

 The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that
should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer,
respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto.
 On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate
"Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of
Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda
 Banilad were addressed to:

Roxas y Cia. Limited

7th Floor, CachoGonzales
Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila.

 Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and P4,428,496.00 for
234.6498 hectares.
 On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a "Request to Open
Trust Account" in petitioner's name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. A second
"Request to Open Trust Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda.
 On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP
bonds had been earmarked as compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad.
 On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.

Hacienda Caylaway

 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the
CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares.
 On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate Resolutions accepting petitioner's voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos.
T44664 and T44663. The Resolutions were addressed to:

Roxas & Company, Inc.

7th Flr. CachoGonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M

 Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,
Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to nonagricultural. As a
result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to other uses.
 In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the
land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the
VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for
agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
 Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed its application
for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
 On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N00179646 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons.
Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist
zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to nonagricultural.
 In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination.

ISSUE(S):
(1) W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies;
(2) W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law;
(3) assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to nonagricultural, W/N this court has the power to
rule on this issue.

HELD:
(1) YES.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action
may be resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are:

(1) when the question raised is purely legal;

(2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
(3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
(4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
 (5) when the respondent acted in disregard of due process;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter;
(7) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
(8) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(9) when strong public interest is involved;
(10)when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
(11)in quo warranto proceedings.

Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its rights and to require it to exhaust
administrative remedies before the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's
land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of
land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before this may be awarded to a
farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the
former. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then,
title remains with the landowner. There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by
the government.

The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or "LBP bonds." Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement
of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the
determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the
issuance of the CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.

(2) NO.
Procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law:

A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657

Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2) modes of acquisition
of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in
Section 16 of R.A. 6657.

In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be
identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide
the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and
cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final
determination of just compensation.

Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and
the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR
issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the operating procedure in the
identification of such lands.

Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated
master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The
MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the
landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF.
He also sends invitations to the prospective farmerbeneficiaries the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the
landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the
valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the
computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all
papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau
of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property.
The BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition for
the subject property. From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply.

For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of
invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries
and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual
conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent
that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry ou such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The
Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The CARL
was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires
that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No.
9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the
conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said amendments.

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA)
transactions involving lands enumerated under Section 7 of the CARL. In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO
prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case
may be, over a particular landholding. The MARO notifies the landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC and
prospective beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least one week before the scheduled date
and invites them to attend the same. The MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the ocular inspection and investigation by
identifying the land and landowner, determining the suitability of the land for agriculture and productivity, interviewing and
screening prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field
Investigation Report which shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field investigation, a boundary or
subdivision survey of the land ma also be conducted by a Survey Party of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. This survey shall delineate the areas covered by Operation Land Transfer
(OLT), areas retained by the landowner, areas with infrastructure, and the areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey
and field investigation, the MARO sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized representative
inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries, representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR,
Department of Agriculture (DA), nongovernment organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties. At the
public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues that may be raised in relation thereto,
inputs to the valuation of the subject landholding, and other comments and recommendations by all parties concerned.
The Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF which files shall be forwarded by the
MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, evaluates and validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the
VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to the RARO for another review.

DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the number of governmen agencies
involved in the identification and delineation of the land subject to acquisition. This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to
the landowner before the conduct of the field investigation and the sending must comply with specific requirements.
Representatives of the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal
delivery with proof of service, or by registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is under CARP
coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may choose which area he shall retain. The Notice of
Coverage shall also invite the landowner to attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice.
The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and determining its suitability for agriculture and its
productivity. A copy of the Notice of Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal
and barangay halls where the property
is located. The date of the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP,
BARC, DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation shall be conducted on the date set with the
participation of the landowner and the various representatives. If the landowner and other representatives are absent, the
field investigation shall proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be a variance between the findings
of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture, the
degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and
DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation. The team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the
field investigation, the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and Land Use Map, a copy of which
shall be furnished the landowner "by personal delivery with proof of service or registered mail with return card." Another
copy of the Report and Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the municipal or barangay halls where the
property is located.

B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
"Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received
at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel actually attended
the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation. The
Minutes was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was
sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to
respondent DAR.

When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various parties the Notice of
Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month
earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation
shall be sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially
when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality
separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees.

The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by "personal delivery or
registered mail." Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by
personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish.
In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be
found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is
governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Notices and pleadings are served on private
domestic corporations or partnerships in the following manner:

Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors or partners.

Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary,
cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB and the regular
courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those
through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action.

Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation.

Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found actually subject
to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist that the lands
were identified because they are all registered property and the technical description in their respective titles specifies
their metes and bounds. Respondents admit at the same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed
under the comprehensive agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land.

The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only portions thereof.
Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda
Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely
agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and
"forest, sugarland, pasture land, horticulture and woodland."

Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically requires that the land subject
to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of land. Before Notices of
Acquisition were sent to petitioner, however, the exact areas of the landholdings were not properly segregated and
delineated. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact
or contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent DAR's evidence does not show
that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was
to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and
identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is
exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total area of his agricultural land subject to
CARP. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the
area chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.

C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway

Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is
covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the
Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over the two of these four titles. The land covered by two titles has an area
of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does
not know where these portions are located.

Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989,
and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein, The results of the survey and the land valuation
summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating
procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner,
however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the
landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.

(3) NO.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Respondent DAR is in a better
position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise
on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
 EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and
MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000

FACTS:
 Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan
which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel
Umali under a system of sharetenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on
December 9, 1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries.
 In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064
hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16)
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands in Penaranda,
Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685hectare riceland in
Meycauayan.
 On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daezs application for
exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the
aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.
 On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for
reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order. But on January 16, 1992, Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed
order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land.
 Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order of Secretary Leong.
 Eudosia pursued her petition before this court but we denied it and also denied her motion for reconsideration.
 On August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
 Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next
filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
 In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OICDirector Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to
retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each
for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law. Aggrieved,
they appealed to the DAR.
 On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo in
a Resolution.
 Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January 19, 1995.
 She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which ruled in her favor. The dispositive
portion of the Decision of then Executive Secretary reads:

"WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and
judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the
4.1685 hectare landholding subject thereof.

SO ORDERED."

 Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.

ISSUE(S):
(1) W/N the finality of judgment in exemption (PD27) does preclude the subsequent institution of application for
retention (RA 6657).
(2) W/N the heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.
(3) W/N the land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform program are subject to the exercise by
a landowner of his right of retention.

HELD:
(1) NO
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or
leasetenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these
requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his
ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is
tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.

On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land
must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or leasetenancy obtaining therein; and (3)
the size of the landholding must not exceed twentyfour (24) hectares, or it could be more than twentyfour (24) hectares
provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of
"other agricultural lands".

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT an those for the grant of
an application for the exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different.

Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same
thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There
was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject
4.1865hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final
and executory.

(2) YES.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to
mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that
landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights
under R.A. No. 6657.

Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) to farmerbeneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on
the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable
features.

(3) YES.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered
thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later
found to be part of the landowners retained area.

A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the status of the fee held by the owner of
a parcel of land. As such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot
confer title where no title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law.

In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685hectare riceland were issued without Eudosia
Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of
title thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to
retain the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
 LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs
TERESITA V. SALVADOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171972 June 8, 2011

FACTS:
 On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case
No. 330, against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII5) 2646 in
the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador; that petitioners acquired possession
of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessorsininterest; and that despite several verbal and written
demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.
 On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the parties were ordered to submit their
respective position papers together with the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to support their
respective claims.
 On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy
relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
 Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the Regiona Trial Court (RTC). On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered
a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship
exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary
hearing was served by the parties submission of their respective position papers and other supporting evidence.
 On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10,
2003. Respondent sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.
 Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA. the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It
ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent
or her predecessorsininterest consented to the tenancy relationship. The CA likewise gave no probative value to
the affidavits of petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish petitioners status as
agricultural tenants. If at all, the affidavits merely showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the
consent of the original owners. And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by mere tolerance, they are
bound by an implied promise to vacate the same upon demand by the respondent. Failing to do so, petitioners
are liable to pay damages.

ISSUE:
 W/N Agricultural tenancy relationship exists between thepetitioners and the respondent.

HELD: NO
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present:
1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural
tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except for the selfserving affidavit of Lucia, no other
evidence was submitted to show that respondents predecessorsininterest consented to a tenancy relationship with
petitioners. Selfserving
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner; independent evidence is necessary.

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners neighbors declaring that
respondent and her predecessorsininterest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have
presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system
of sharing between them and the landowners.

As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an
agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence
all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.
 GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO
SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M. REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989

FACTS:
 The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-
in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
 Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
 On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as
then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners
(then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders
issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
 Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
 Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands
in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the
defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
 On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now
Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and
the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
 On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their
opposition on January 10, 1983.
 Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move
for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.
 On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained.

ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.

HELD: NO
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil
and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated
pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very
purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of
land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the
satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence
is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and
the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital
right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of
the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with
law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities
to their ancestral lands.

Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act
No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like
those of the property in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. …

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.'
 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner,
vs
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTONSOLIMAN and HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005

FACTS:
 The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively
to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of
certain incentives under the law.
 On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farm used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
 On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that
lands devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we
declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
 In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land
and found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it
be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
 On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return
of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored their request.
 On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private
agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention
limits, viz: 1:1 animalland ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner),
and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded
from the operations of the CARL.
 On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable
the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the
CARL.
 On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application
of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O.
No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of
102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and
placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
 Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should b exempted as it is
devoted exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
 They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President
affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the
Luz Farms case as the A.O. Provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for
cattleraising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the
courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for
being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land
reform program of the government.

ISSUE: W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD: NO.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit
for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that
livestock, swine and poultryraising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as:
animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors,
exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, antipollution equipment like biogas
and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers,
and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the
coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
 MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011

FACTS:
 Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
January 8, 1960. Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and
other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and
otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the
corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the
supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and byproducts of said business; and (3) to
import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other
livestock as may be authorized by law.
 On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and
swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising
are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
 Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its several properties from the coverage of
the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
 Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands
used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CAR coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner
redocumented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.
 Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV
conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived with a recommendation for the exemption of
petitioners 316.0422hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and
recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27,
1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422 hectare property from CARP.
 The Southern Pinugay Farmers MultiPurpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by Timiano
Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director
Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994. Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letterappeal with the
DAR Secretary.
 Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of TeresaBaras, Rizal. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but
the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its
Decision dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to
vacate portions of the property. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein
failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8,
1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.
 In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881, which was approved on February 20, 1995.
Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the
CARL. On October 22, 1996, the factfinding team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and
Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock population on the property. The headcount
showed that there were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
 On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from
CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring
75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.
 Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be
devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that
the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were
registered in the name of petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently
bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the
certificates rather than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by
petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
 Applying the animalland ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the
infrastructureanimal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21
heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal before the Office of the President (OP). On February 4,
2000, the OP rendered a decision reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the
entire 316.0422hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.
 However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by farmergroups Samahang
AnakPawis ng Lagundi (SAPLAG) and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the
OP issued a resolution dated September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision and a new one entered
REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
  On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the
application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal -and and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O.
No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus,
negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order
to exclude it from CARP coverage.
 Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not
inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR Conversion Order No.
CON04100016 (Conversion Order), granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422hectare
property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
 On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were filed by farmergroups, namely: the
farmers represented by Miguel Espinas (Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers, and the SAPLAG. The farmergroups
all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the
farmergroups unanimously intimated that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property
into a leisureresidentialcommercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).
 With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November
4, 2004, the appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be
limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that this remaining
area be covered by the CARP.
 CA amended its decision and the 162.7373 hectareagricultural portion is declared covered by CARP. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: W/N the parcels of land owned by the petitioners can be subjected to CARP.

HELD: YES.
The subject parcels of land were not directly, actually, and exclusively used for pasture.

Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case does not rest on facts parallel to those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the
subject property remained a livestock farm. We even highlighted therein the fact that there has been no change of
business interest in the case of respondents.

Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. While petitioner
advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA,
we find it surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation
over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CAs keen observation that the assailed MARO reports
and the Investigating Teams Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by
petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, through the HON.
SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,
vs
SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRIBUSINESS CORP., represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., President and General
Manager, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178895

x-------------------------------------------------------x

SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRIBUSINESS CORP., represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., President and General
Manager, Petitioner,
vs
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIA REFORM, through the Honorable Secretary, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179071 January 10, 2011

FACTS:
 Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the
name of Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corporation. Said parcels of land are hereinafter described as follows:

 On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to
petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under
Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
 On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an
Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T12637 and T12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that
pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said
parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of
cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
 On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of
land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The Investigation Report dated March 9, 1993
stated:

“Cognitive thereto, we are favorably recommending for the exemption from the coverage of CARP based on LUZ FARMS as
enunciated by the Supreme Court the herein Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No. T12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad.
286 of TCT No. T12637 which is already covered under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had already been
valued by the Land Valuation Office, Land Bank of the Philippines.”

 On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots 1454A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President,
Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letteraffidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary requesting for the
exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its
livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an
application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 stating that it has been operating
grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
 The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the
application for exemption of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were
actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it
needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of
land was approved.
 On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454A & 1296 were taken beyond the
operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per
Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional
Director denied the Motion.
 The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its
assailed Order affirming the Regional Directors ruling on Lots 1454A & 1296 and further declared Lots 1298 and
 1293B as covered by the CARP.
 On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent prompting the former to
file the instant petition.
 The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer
Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T12637 and T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the Lopez lands) from
coverage of the CARL.
 However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for
exemption with respect to Lots 1454A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in Barrio Limot (the Limot
lands). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP
T16356). The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied.

ISSUE: W/N the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Courts ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.

HELD:
NO. The Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to
exemption from CARP coverage.

In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted
to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for
exemption. Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that
necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR
Regional Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of
Appeals.

Tthe MARO itself in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to
the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABCs use
of the area as a seasonal extension of the applicants grazing lands during the summer. Therefore, the Limot lands cannot
be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock business, especially since these were
only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable and are in fact actually,
directly and exclusively being used for agricultural purposes.

BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC., PETITIONER,

vs
E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 131481, March 16 : 2011
 x--------------------------------------------------------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PETITIONER,

vs
E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 131624

FACTS:
 At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a
larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Originally
owned by the MAnila Golf and Country Club, he property was aquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in
1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".
 Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
2264, otherwise known as the "Loval Autonomy Act", enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to
as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation
Thereof."
 In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its
aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, ataching to the apllication detailed
development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel
Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal
Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Subsequently,
[EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development.
 It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the
confluence of events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the
titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under
liquidation.
 On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL,
took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.
 On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating
in part, as follows:

"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the Municipality of Dasmarinas, Cavite, has approved the
development of your property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite, with a total area of 372
hectares, more or less, into residential, industrial, commercial and golf course project. This conversion conforms with the
approved Development Plan of the Municipality of Dasmarinas Cavite".

 On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of notices of
acquisition, each of which drew protest from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of
land situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite owned by [EMRASON].
 In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region
IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices. Collectively docketed
as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional
Director, Region IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator
directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo
determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.
 Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property.
 In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits :'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence,
[EMRASON] received another set of notices of acquisition. As lo be expected, [EMRASON] again protested.
 On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a
decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is,
pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP.
 The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already
converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
 On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the
Agrarian Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the
department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to
qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to
deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x".
 On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an
order affirming the Notices of Acquisition and Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage
under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which subject Notices of Acquisition had been
issued.
 Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his
subsequent order of January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President.
 On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
C. Corona [(Deputy Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x, dismissing
[EMRASON's] appeal.
  Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration, followed later by another motion whereunder it
invited attention to legal doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than the Office of the
President itself.
 On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out with his second challenged issuance
denying [EMRASON's] aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x.
 From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP, EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals.
 On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which enjoined then DAR
Secretary Ernesto Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona from implementing the OP Decision
of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further orders from the court. On September 17, 1996,
the appellate court issued a Resolution granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
 The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals, with the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted, recalled and/or dissolved.
 At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the
subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the
subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as
an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved,
having been issued in violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be
dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
 The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because -the latter's participation was "not being in any
way prejudicial to the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal
complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON
given that under Section 5 of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995,
appeals from judgments or final orders of the OP or the DAR under the CARL shall be taken to the Court of
Appeals, through a verified petition for review; and that under Section 3 of the same Administrative Circular, such
a petition for review may raise questions of facts, law, or mixed questions of facts and law.
 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already
converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.. The
Court of Appeals further observed that the subject property has never been devoted to any agricultural activity
and is, in fact, more suitable for non-agricultural purposes.

ISSUE:
 W/N the subject property could be placed under the CARP.

HELD:
NO. Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit:

SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a
total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by
law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products
raised or that can be raised thereon.

A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and
classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of the land
acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)

Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land."
The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been
reclassified as residential prior to said date.

Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive
where it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails throughout the municipality in accordance
with that plan. It is partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain uses. Fire
limits, height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation that are antecedents
of modern comprehensive zoning, (pp. 11-12.)

The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental
regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize
classification of uses within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal
specifically with each of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, (zoning has been defined as the
confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that
zoning is the regulation by districts of building development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only
capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith. (Zoning is the
separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in
accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular
uses designed to subserve the general welfare.) Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with
these have been given in the cases, (pp. 27-28.)

The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases is the reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v. Court of
Appeals, the Court had the occasion to define and distinguish reclassification from conversion as follows:

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to
the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, x x x. (Italics supplied.)

Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.

Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that the authority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in
the sanggunian of the city or municipality.

Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on July 9, 1972, immediately effected the zoning and
reclassifying of the subject property for residential use. It need not comply with any of the requirements or conditions
which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon.

DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed and approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities may, however, consult the National
Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning." Consideration must be given, however, to the use of
the word "may" in the said sentence. Where the provision reads "may," this word shows that it is not mandatory but
discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. The use of the word "may"
in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in
statutory construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Since consultation with the
NPC was merely discretionary, then there were only two mandatory requirements for a valid zoning or subdivision
ordinance or regulation under Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance or regulation
be adopted by the city or municipal board or council; and (2) it be approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which
were complied with byl Resolution No. 29-A.