Hunt Dorothy United Airlines Crash

Docket No.
SA-435
E:xhibit No. 9-C
NATIONAL TRA.~SPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C. 20591
Report of Examination of
Altimeters and Air Data Computers
Recoyered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972 Midway Chicago, Ill.
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-C
NATIONAL TRA.~SPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Report of Examination of
Recoyered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972 Midway Chicago, Ill.
REPORT OF EXAMlliATION
OF INSTRUMENTS
RECOVERED FROM
UAL - B737 - Registry N9031U
Midway - Chicago, Illin.ois
I Exa.:m.ination conducted at:
a) United Airlines Maintenance Base, San Francisco, California
18, 19, 20 Dec. 1972
b) Kollsman Instr_ument Company, Elmhurst, New York
8, 9 , 1 0, Jan. 197 3
c) Kollsman Instrument Company, Syosset, New York
25 January 1973
d) Kollsman Instrument Company, Elmhurst, New York
26 January 1973
II Persons in Attendance
Mr. Wm. Weston NTSB Washington, D. C.
C. Tomasso FAA Des Plaines, Illinois
0. E. E. Anderson UAL San Francis co, California
W. Robertson ALPA Des Plaines, Illinois
J. Angus Kollsman Elmhurst, New York
P. Redmond Kollsman Syosset, New York
At times, others supplemented the above group:
J. Cincotta FAA San Francisco, California
F. Dilts UAL San Francis co, California
K. Humphrey UAL San Francisco, California
KOLLSMAN INSTRU1viENT CORPORATION -1-

III Accident:
UAL Flight 553

B737 N9031 U
Date: 8 Dec. 1972

2:28 P.M.
Place: Approach to Runway 31L

Midway Airport
Chicago, Illinois
Elevation of site - 620 ft. MSL(approximately).
Reported Altimeter Setting - 3 0. 05 In. Hg abs
IV Identification of Equipment reportedly recovered from the accident
aircraft and studied in this examination.
A. Altimeters
Identification data was obtained from UAL maintenance records.
1. Gaptain 1 s Altimeter
KI Type B38689 10 015, Serial No. 745A
2. First Officer 1 s Altimeter
KI Type B38689 10 015, Serial No. 492A
These are identified as -
UAL Type MR41101-121 Captain 1 s Altimeter

UAL Type MR41101-52 First Officer's Altimeter
UAL reported dates of last servicing -
22 Sept. 1972 Captain's Altimeter

1 Feb. 1971 First Officer 1-s Altimeter
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -2-

·B. Air Data Computers
Identification of installation position supplied by UAL records
KI Type KS-200-117 Serial N9· 1123 Captain 1 s C~WC
KI Type KS-200-117 Serial No. Kl003 First Officer 1 s CADC
These are identified as
UAL Type MR 41113

Serial No. 1165 Captain 1 s
Serial No. 1004 First Officer 1 s
UAL reported dates of installation are:
5 Nov. 1972 Captain 1 s Unit
16 Feb. 1971 First Officer 1 s Unit
v A. Altimeters
1. Captain 1 s Altimeter
The outside case paint was severely burned.
The nameplate, an adhesive backed foil, was missing.
The cover glass was cracked but not separated.
The baro setting noted at SFO was 30. 36 In. Hg.
No loose parts were noted when the altimeter was gently
shaken.
Moisture was present on the inside of the cover glass.
Testing was conducted as follows:
a) Integral lighting operated
b) Integral vibrator operated
c) As soon as servo power was applied to the receptacle,
the fuse in the test equipment failed.

d) The pressu~e mechanism was tested for operation
as follows:
1) (a) Baro set 30. 36 as received
(b) Due to excessive case leak attributed to
burned gaskets, cracked cover glass, etc.,
the instrument was placed in a bell jar. The
bell jar was tapped externally to remove friction.
The motion of the pointer was irregular indica-
ting a higher than normal level of friction.
(c) The pressure was adjusted to position the pointer
in 200 foot steps from 0 to 2000 feet. A
barometer was read to determine the actual
test pressure in the altimeter
Altimeter Measured Equivalent Feet

Set Altitude Pressure for Me<;i.sured Pressure
0 feet 30. 250 In. Hg abs -303 feet
200 30.045 . -115. ·. -
400 29.795 +117
600 29.517 +376
800 29.289 +590
1000 29. l l 0 +759
1200 28.900 +958
1400 28. 69·9 +1150
1600 28.547 +1295
1800 28.264 +1568
2000 28.005 +1820

The data for conversion of pressure altitude is based on
the U.S. Standard Atmosphere 1962.
To determine the instrument errors the QNH values were
computed based on the indicated value of an altimeter set
at 30. 36 and exposed to the pressures determined in the
above test.
Test QNH Reading Test Altimeter Test Altimeter

Pressure· for 30. 3 6 Baro Reading Error
30. 250 In Hg abs +100 feet 0 feet -100 feet
30. 045 +288 200 -88
29.795 520 400 -120
29.517 777 600 -177
29.289 993 800 -193
29;110 1162 1000 -162
28.900 1361 1200 -161
28.699 1553 1400 -153
28.547 1698 1600 -98
28.264 1971 1800 -171
28.005 2223 2000 -223
v A. 1. d) 2) The baro setting was then adjusted to 29. 92
In. Hg. Standard pressures were set into the
altimete.r and the altimeter error was noted for
increasing and decreasing altitudes behveen
0 and 2000 feet.
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -5-.

Set
Pressure Altimeter Error
Altitude Increasing Alt. Decreasing Alt.
0 feet -9 0 feet -80 feet
200 -120 -100
400 -llO
600 -120 -110
800 -130
1000 -155 -130
1200 -130 -120
1400 -100
1600 -130 -120
1800 -160
2000 -160 -140
v A. 1. e) Resistance measurements were made to determine the
conditions of the servo elements.
Receptacle Pin Measured Resistance Nominal Resistance
J-K 40 ohms 38 ohms
J-H 40 If
H-K 40 It
A-Y 18 ohms 18 ohms
A, Y to case 5 megohms
H, J, K to case .>s megohms
Other paths open or short at the case receptacle.

Note: The recepticle was packed with a foreign material which had to
be remove.cl a~d each pin brushed clean to obtain electrical
contact.
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION ~

-o-
~-i
v A. 1. f) The altimeter was then placed in a bell jar with a
supply of Silica Gel for the purpose of drying the
entrapped moisture in the unit. This was done over-
night (period of approximately 17 hours). After
removing the altimeter from the bell jar, the altimeter
was placed in an oven at +72°C for approximately 8
hours to continue the drying operation.
g) The investigation of the pne.umatic operation of the
Captain's altimeter was continued at Kollsman in
New York on 8 Jan. 1973. The altimeter was placed
in a bell jar where the internal vibrator was wired to
an externally controlled source of 28V DC. In addi-
tion a separate vibrator,external to the instrument
but inside the bell jar, was included.· At each pressure
setting the instrument was read three times:
1) as the instrument settled out without vibration,
2) after the instrument internal vibrator was excited,
3) after the bell jar vibrator was excited.
The baro setting was 30. 05, the reported value set when
the instrument was recovered. The pressures set in
for each test point were standard QNE values based on
the U. So Standard Atmosphere 19 62.

B38689 10 015 Captain 1 s Altimeter
Baro Set 3 O. OS
Standard Indicated Errors
Test Readings Increasing Readings Decreasing
Alt. No Vib Int Vib Ext Vib No Vib Int Vib Ext Vib
-lOOOft -120 ft -80 ft -70 ft +80 ft +20 ft -10 ft
0 -100 -35 -20 +125 +40 +20
+ 500 -130 -80 -55 +80 +30 +10
1000 -130 -100 -75 +110 +60 0
1500 -115 -60 -45 +45 +20 - 5
2000 -140 -80 -70 +125 +10 -15
2500 -165 -95 -75 +105 +40 +10
3000 -270 -120 -105 +550 +550 +550
4000 -555 -540 -540 -440 -440 -440
5000 -1440 -1440 -1440 -1440 -1440 -1440
The altimeter pointers stopped operating at +3400-feet, therefore, the increase
of pressure altitude was stopped at +5000 feet. The same values were taken for
descending readings as had been taken for ascending values.
The total friction values determined from the above test data are shown below:
The normal friction tolerance in this area is 7 0 ft.
Friction
Test Alt. Increasing Decreasing
,...1000 ft 50 ft 90 ft
0 80 105
+ 500 75 70
+1000 55 110
1500 70 50
2000 70 140
2500 90 95
3 000 165

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v A· I. h} At this point it was decided to conduct a detailed exami-
nation of the mechanism by removing it from the case.
1) The rear cover was removed and the electronics
which are attached were noted to have been subjected
to high temperatures which discolored the electronic
parts, the circuit board, the internal connector.
Several capacitors nexploded 11 • Subsequently, three
typical capai:::Ttors (same part number) were placed
in test tubes and exposed to two hours of heat at
300°, 350°, 361°, 400°, 425°F. At 361°F the
capacitors showed visible signs of deterioration.
One unit was left in the oven and when 425°F was
reached it exploded.
The.re was notable contamination in the back of the case
and at the rear .of the mechanism. It appeared that
most of this contamination came from the electronics
assembly which deteriorated with elevated tempera-
ture exposure.
The mechanism assembly was then removed from the
case for further examination. The contamination of
of the mechanism consisted of corrosion products on
the aluminum casting and shafts, on the brass parts
of the links and capsules and on the steel pinions
and shafts.

v A. l. h) 1) continued
Very little corrosion existed forward of the mount-
ing plane of the mechanism.
The solder, on the lip of the capsule closest to the
internal connector, showed evidence of melting for
approximately 1200 of the capsule lip. This solder
melts at 361°F. The fact that this solder melted
but the capsule did not leak {pressure) indicates
that the temperature-time exposure must have been
just at the meltl.ng temperature for a short period
of time. A check was performed on the capsule
loading to determine if the capsule might have
a partial loss of vacuum. Under nominal conditions
the load is -500 ft. and +1800 feet. This unit
measured -570 feet and +i600 feet which are well
within the normally expected variations. The
questionable joint is on the capsule with the negative
load which is further assurance of no leak.
DC resistance measurements of the motor were made.
The control phase measured 320 ohms (nominal is
328 ±49 ohms). The fixed phase was open, however,
this phase contains a series ·circuit for temperature
compensation which was open. The measurement
of the inotor inside of this circuit was 485 ohms
(nominal is 426 ±64 ohms).
.._.
v A. 1. h) 1) continued
Further examination of the mechanism centered on
why the indicator stuck at +3400 feet during the test
performed in Para V. A. l. g. Microscopic
examination of the gear train showed deposits of
contamination to be sitting in between gear teeth
of the intermediate pinion of the altitude gear train.
By analysis it was determined which teeth would be
in mesh at 3400 feet altitude. Moving the gears to
an accessible position, and using a 30-power micro-
scope and a fine sewing needle, the contamination
was ejected from the gear teeth. The altimeter
was placed in the bell jar and using vacuum the
altimeter smoothly passed thru the 3400 foot point.

v A. Altimeters
2. Fir st Officer rs Altimeter
Severe impact and fire damage was noted. The entire
flange and cover glass assembly was missing.
The right half of the case was missing. The case and
mechanism below the mounting plane was mis sing. The
display was damaged but the following parts· were present:
Main dial
Baro dial
100 ft. pointer
1, 000 ft. pointer
10, 000 ft. pointer
Flag (Servo On/ Off)
The display altitude had to be verified but the positions of the
pointers were such as to indicate a loss of synchronization
between the three pointers. To verify this, a separate altimeter
of the same type was photographed by adjusting the display
using the baro setting system. Several photos were taken so
that each photo would have one pointer set the same as the
corresponding pointer of the F /0 Altimeter. Examination of
the photos indicates that the pointer positions on the F /0
altimeter are un-coordinated. The disc pointer was free to
rotate on its shaft. The 100 ft. pointer and the 1000 ft. pointer
are geared together by means of a small gear located inside the
front mechanism plate. This gear is secured to the hands ta££
(100 ft. pointer) inside the gear box. Inspection of the hand-
staff assembly inside the main mechanism showed an endplay
of O. 025 inches to exist due to the impact damage. This

v A. 2. continued (First Officer's Altimeter)
excess play could result in a disengagement of the pointer
gear drive thus permitting the pointers to desynchronize.
It was noted and photographed that a diamond shaped shadow
corresponding roughly to the 1000 ft. pointer was present
on the disc pointer.
The altimeter dial had been shifted upward and slightly
to the right due to the heat and forces present on the dial.
The baro setting was 30. 035 In. Hg.
•·
.,
KOLLSl\.t1AN INS.TRUMENT CORPORATION

-13-
v. A. Servo Monitor Function
UAL supplied a separate three-pointer servo pneumatic
altimeter, of the same type, to demonstrate the failure
monitor and limiter action. Tests were conducted show-
ing the effects of:
a) Trip out assuming no change in elect;rical transmitted
data while the pneumatic pres sure to the altimeter

I
static port is changing.
,b) Trip out assuming constant pnelitnatic pressure to
the altimeter static port while the el~ctrical trans -
mitted data is changing .
. .,
.·,
KOLLSMAN INSTRUlviENT CORPORll.TION

-14-
..· '·'"":''
SERVO MONITOR TESTS
.a} Pr'.,e,.,S-s11.re Alt. at Transmitted _Synchro Altimeter

Alt±hoii§Jer Static Port Data from cADc Indication
0 "ft.
+ 0 ft
+100 0 + 5
·+200 0 +10
. +300 0 +20
+400 0 +40
+440 0 +60 Tripout
0 ft 0 ft
-100 0 - 5
~zoo 0 -15
,..300. 0 -25
-395 0 -70 Tripout
Transwit±ed Synchro Altiineter

D9'ta frthn-GADC Pressure Alt. Indicati.on
0 0 0 ft 0 ft
9.2 100 0 +100
14.4 200 0 +187
20 278 0 +zzs Tripout
0 0 0 ft 0 ft
- 7.2 ~100 0 -90

-14-:. 4 . .
1 -200 0 -182
.·{·
.....
.~....
~
..
,·•·
...,LS -347 0 -295 Tripout

v. B. Air Data Computers
The covers were removed to provide access to the individual
modules. The procedure followed was:
1. - Measure the electrical position of the output devices
(synchro or potentiometer) in the received condition.
This was done by supplying only the necessary power for
each element or section by using individual pin connections.
The synchros were connected to an angle position indicator
(API).
The potentiometers were connected to voltage ratio read-
out units.
The encoders were measured by a Simpson meter from
each leg to common.
2. The altitude sensor was electrically disconnected from
the servo system.
The sensor was then connected to an angle position indicator
(A. P. I.) and it was run through the pres sure altitude range
from -1000 ft. to +2000 ft. and return. The relative friction
was also determined by tapping the unit after the initial
reading was taken. The difference between the two values
is the friction level present.
3. The sensor was then electrically connected to the altitude
module and a readout was made of the fine synchro that
drives the servo pneumatic altimeter with standard pressure
applied to the sensor.

v B. Air Data Computers - continued
4. The encoder correlation to the fine synchro was checked by
adjusting the pressure until a t_ransition just occurs and
. then reading the fine synchro position. This should corre-
spond to a 50 foot offset from the reported code value.
5. A servicable servo pneurriatic altimeter was then connected
to the altitude module output synchro, the static ports from
the altimeter and the module were connected together.
Standard pressures were set into the sensor and altimeter

,
before reading the altimeter {in servoed mode).
6. It was then decided to check the turn-off slew coast by
subjecting the unit to 2500 ft. /min. descent and then turning
off both the pneumatic and servo power simultaneously at
1000 ft. This was repeated for a descent rate of 1000 ft. /min.
The descent rate was controlled by maintaining the altitude
rate output voltage at the standard value during descent.

r Output Readings in 11
As Received State 11
l. A. Encoders (AlOl) Equiv. St'd Press.

Tol. 1 Bit (100 ft.)
ADC Unit
Pin Code Channel Captain First Officer
5-13 A1 0 6
6-13 A2 0 0
7-13 A4 0 0
8-13 B1 0 0
·l-13 B3 1 1
2-13 B4 0 0
3-13 C1 0 0
4-13 C2 0 1
9-13 C4 1 1
12-13 D4 0 0
700 ft. 600 ft.
B. Fine Synchro #1 (B 104) Tol. ± l. 15° ( 15 ft.)
Static Reading 46.95° 43.080

Equivalent Altitude 652 ft. 598 ft.
C. Fine Synchro #2 (BllO) Tol. ±i.150 (15 ft.)
Static Reading 47.38° 42.80°

Equivalent Altitude 658. ft. 594 ft.
D. Coarse Synchro #2 (Blll) Tol. ±2° (±750 ft.}
Static Reading 2. 1 o0 0.87°

Equivalent Altitude 787 ft. 326 ft.
E. Cabin Press. Pot. (RlOl) Tol. ±o. 0015

0. 9417 VR 0. 9442 VR
,/\/ 6 8 0 ft. ~ 6 3 0 ft.
F. TAT/EPRL {Rl51) Tol. ±o. 0018

O. 326 VR 0. 0331 VR
.,,..._.,, 660 ft. ,.,.,...,666 ft .
G. Airspeed Sy:hchro 331.13° 337.87°

Tol. - 2 KTS 57. 55 KTS 66. 6 KTS
K 0 L L S lv1 A N I NS TR U ME N T C 0 R P 0 R A TI 0 N -18-
1. H. . Resistance Readings of Output Devices
Captain F/O
Fine Synchro #1 Stator
24-2S 9 8-1/2
2S-26 9 8-1 /2
24-26 9 8-1/2
Fine Synchro #2 Stator 71-72 42 so
72-73 43 50
71-73 44
J
so
Coarse Synchro #2 Stator 4-5 14 15
5-6 14 15
4-6 14 15
Airspeed Synchro
Resist. Stator 30-31 15 lS
31-32 15 15
30-32· 15 15
- ..... .
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION

-19-
2. Altitude Sensor Fine Synchrotel Reading (API)
Altitude Input
Pressure Alt. Capt. F/o·
-1000 ft 298. 85° . 300. 35°

- 800 306.2 307.75
600 >:< 313.5 ~:< 314. 9
- 400 320.85 322.25
- 200 328.2 329.4
0 335.5 >:< 336. 55
+ 200 342.9 343.8
400 ~:< 35 o. 2 350.9
600 357.45 357.9
643 F/O 360.0
671 c * 360. 0
800 4.7 5.6
1000 11. 9 12.7
1500 30.3 30.7
2000 48.6 48.55
2000 48.85 48.8
1500 30.5 31. 1
1000 12.1 13. 05
800 5. 0 6. 0
636 F/O 360.0
666 c * 360. 0 .,_
,,.
600 357.7 358.5
400 350.5 351. 3
+ 200 343.1 343.95
0 335.7 336.7
- 200 328.45 329.3
- 400 321. 1 322.1
- 600 313.8 314.7
- 800 306.45 307.4
-1000 299.15 300.0
Note 1. lo = 27. 78 ft.
2. readings are taken without vibration except for

reading of friction,
:{<Friction Noted 0. 2° 0.3°
3. readings corresponding to servo at null are marked

C Captain 1 s Unit F /O First Officers Unit
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION - 2 0-

3. Press·ure Altitude to Altitude Sensor. Altitude Module Servo
Connected, Measured Fine. Synchro #1 Output
St 1 d Press. Alt. Captain 1 s F/O No.m.

-lOOOft 287. 03° 284.46° 288. o0
- 800 301. 77 299.25 302.4
- 600 316.51 313.58 316. 8
- 400 330.72 328.16 331. 2
- 200 345.21 342.40 345.6
0 359.48 356.66 360.00
+ 200 14.00 10.80 14.4
400 28.35 24.76 28. 8
600 _,_
42.61 38.88 43.2
800 56.88 -·-
52. 90 57.6
1000 70.93 67.36 72.0
15.00 106.98 103.24 108.0
2000 147.84 139.24 144.0
2000 143.38 139.96
1500 107.66 104.28
1000 71. 62 68.28
800 57.60 54.5
600 43.26 39. 94 ..-·--
4P,-O 29.20 2.5. 64
+ 200 14.72 11. 42
0 0.22 357.16
- 200 345.96 342.70
- 400 331. 36. 328.46
- 600 317.00 313.68
- 800 302.22 299.20
-1000 287.51 284.58
Note 1. 1O = 13 • 8 9 ft• {3 O = 4 2 I)
2. readings are taken without vibration,
3. reading of F / 0 unit at special test point>!< (sensor null as received)

In. Hg ABS Fine Synchro Rdg.
29• 2 3 1 41. 8 8 ° Inc r.
29.231 43. 02° Deer.
?: O L L S ::.,f A ~; I l'T S T R U :,\1 .2 N T C 0 R P 0 R A. T I 0 :0T

- 2. 1-
4. Encoder Tra:.nsitiori to :F'ine ·synchro
Transition Captain's F/0 Norn.

·o
-10 to - 9 291. 3 . 291. 8° 291. 6°
- 8 - 7 305.8 306.2 306.0
- 6 - 5 319.9 320.0 320. 4
- 4 - 3 334.1 334.2 334.8
- 2
0
-
+
1
1
348.8
3.2
349.0
3. 3
349.2
3.6
+ 2 + 3 17.4 17.2 18.0
+ 4 + 5 31. 7 31. 7 32.4
+ 6 + 7 46. 0 46.1 46.8
+ 8 + 9 60. 8 61. 4 61. 2
+10 +11 75.2 75.5 75.6
+15 +16 111. 1 111. 7 111. 6
+20 +21 147.2 147.7 147.6
+21 to +20 147.0 147.6
+16 +15 111. 0 111. 7
+11 +10 75.0 75.4
+ 9 + 8 60.6 61. 2
+ 7 + 6 45.8 46.2
+ 5 + 4 31.6 31.7
+ 3 + 2 17. 1 17. 1
+ 1 0 3. 1 3.3
- 1 - 2 348.7 348.9
334.2
- 3 - 4 334.0
- 5 - 6 319.2 319.9
- 7 - 8 305.5 306.1
- 9 -10 291. 1 291. 5
Note 1. lo = 13. 89 ft.
2. readings are taken without vibration
3. normal tolerance ±1. 15° = ±15 ft.
- - ,-, r -Z2-
~~
.,,, ..
. ,_.., ~. :- '. -·
,5, .81;~;;,o,d Pr~s~.~i~·k1~;~rfi~'s. & SPA,· SP:. is Servo Mode:

St 1 d Press.
Altitude
Captain 1 s F/O
-lOOOft .,,_
- 800 -·· -1055ft
::I::
600 .,,_
-.-
- 850
- 400 - 645
- 200
-··
.J..
- 445
-·--·-
.,,_ - 250
0 -.-
+ 200 ..... 55
400 .,_-·-
-.-
+ 140
600 340
800 *
.,_
..,.. 540
1000 _,_
..,.. 735
1500 .,_
,,. 935
2000 1430
-·-
-.-
2000 1935
2000 ft
1500 1945
1500 1450
1000
1000
800 955
800 755
600
600 555
400
405 360
+ 200 210
0 1.60
+ 10 40
- 200
-
400
190
390
- 240
600 435
585 640
- 800 - 790
-1000 - 845
- 995 -1045
Note l.
readings taken without vibration
2. · Tolerance ±15 1 ADC
3. >:<Reading were not taken in the ascending direction ..
K 0 L LS M AN INS T R lJi\I E NT C 0 RP 0 R AT I 0 N
- .......? _,,-
1
6. Cm;i.st Test
Rate -1000 ft./ min. Captain's F/O
Power Off TE 46.70° 42.98°
Reading of Fine Synchro #1 46.20 42.97
Coast 0.5Q 0 =7 ft. 0. 01°
.Rate -2500 ft. /min.
Power Off Value 1011 ft. 1014 ft.
SPA reading 1013 ft. 975 ft.
Coast -2 ft. 39 ft.
KOL=."s:vt ..;.N INSTRT;:::AEST CORPOR/',_TION

7. CADC Monitor Checks
The computer chassis was connected to the computer test console. The
altitude module was removed from the computer chassis and connected
back to the_chassis using a jumper cable with intermediate means to open
the fixed phase of the altitude module servo motor. This would disable
the motor such that as the pressure altitude changes the servo will not
follow. When sufficient error signal has been generated, the monitor will
trip the failure relay which removes the reliability signal. The normal
tol~rance is l 00 ±15 feet.
F. 0. Unit - Alt. Module Monitor Trip
+135 ft. increasing alt.

+ 133 ft. returning
-110 ft. decreasing alt.
-110 ft. returning
F. O.
Before this test it was noted that the connection tube at the/altitude module
to chassis connection had a white flaky deposit in and around the static
port. This material was removed and stored in a container for further
analysis.
Capt 1 s Unit - Alt. Module Monitor Trip
+ l 05 ft. increasing alt.

+ 105 ft. returning
-118 ft. decreasing alt.
-112 ft. returning
·During this test the Captain 1 s CADC A/S reliability signal and associated
reliability signals tripped out and then came on. This was repeated
several times until it was isolated to the A/S module. The servo has a
spring return in the gear system. When po\.ver was off the spring would
return the unit to a position of approximately 50 knots. ·when power \Vas
turned on the monitor lights would be off indicating a monitor trip_

-25-
At the same time the A/S servo would slew upscale until the reliability
signal is latched, the lights would go on; however, the servo was at the
high end of the airspeed system. The cond:ltion was isolated to a gear
and sector (~on-linear) which had become disengaged. This allowed the
output shaft to assume a high airspeed position regardless of the value
of input airspeed.
Examination of the mechanism showed side stops on the gear to be in place
and HI and LO stops to be in place. The data taken following re-engagement
of the airspeed gears is shown on the enclosed data sheets and is also
shown in graphical form.
A shock test was performed to determine if the gear disengagement could
be duplicated. The Captain 1 s airspeed sensor was positioned to an output
equivalent to 120 Knts and was subjected to 20 g 1 s three times and the 25
1
g s three times in the fore and aft direction. Before and after each shock
run, the a.irspeed sensor was tested for operation through the range of
SO to 250 Kts and spot checked at 100, 120 and 200 Kts for any direction
of change in output. No disengagement occurred and no change was
observed.
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -2 6-

~{,~E ;~ ~u :!1 ~Ji-~;·Ht: lNCH ~~ 11 ~ ~:~ ~
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PERFORMANCE. DATA
Subject Date
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(
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Signature
/{ '/ C7 /.JJ_Jc:) ;FJ.rf-0 / S.J. :It' /J3JT

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·tj Y-0 /-57 9'2- I .J7.¥"!'-- /..5/(//cf
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8. Altitude Sensor Ac~.eleration Sensitivity
A fixture was made to mount the altitude sensor from each CADC and
individually subject the unit to accelerations greater than one g in the
normal, longitudinal and the half way positions (in between normal and
longitudinal positions).
A Schavitz Acceleration Table was used to perform this test. In this test
the output of the sensor Synchrotel was brought out of the acceleration
table and monitored on an A. P. I.
A sensitive altimeter was used to monitor the pressure to the sensor. It
was agreed to use 500 ft. altitude as the test value and observe variations
about that value. In each position the altitude would be set at 500 ft., a
reading of the API taken, the table would then be rotated to a value computed
to obtain the necessary acceleration bn the test sensor, the pressure
altitude would again be stabilized, a reading of the API taken, the table
would then be allowed to come to rest; the pressure stabilized and the
reading of the API again taken. A test run was demonstrated using an
overhauled Kollsman sensor. In all three positions .the maximum devia-
0
tion of the model sensor was i (27 feet) for accelerations from 0 to 10 g 1 s.
This test was repeated using the two sensors from the aircraft CADC units.
K 0 LL S MAN INS TR U MEN T C 0 R p·o R A TI 0 N -27-

Case 1 Sha,ft end of Sensor out (Equivalent to deceleration force when
aircraft is slowed from flying speed to zero velocity.)
G Level Captain 1 s First Officer 1 s
0 18.09° 17.32°
1 18.48 17. 37
0 19. 90 17.41
4 17.67 17.37
0 17.75 17.42
4 17.61 -----
0 17.55 -----
10 17.23 17. 18
0 17.52 17.21
Ca.se 2 Normal Acceleration (wing loading)
G Level Captain'~ First Officer 1 s
0 18.09° 17.93°
1 18.36 17. 74
0 18.01 17. 9 0
4 18.78 16.60
0 17.91 17. 74
10 15.98 14.50
0 17.82 17.73
10 16.22 -----
0 16.78 -----
Note: 1° = 27.8 ;ft.
Case 3 Position 45°

Based upon the data obtained with the test unit and a review of the
data obtained on all three units, the 45° test "\Vas not conducted on
KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION on the two CADC sensors. _ _
28
: '.::>
A. Gaptain 1 s Altimeter
The primary damage was due ·to fire and heat. Moisture and other
:forms of contamination also caused damage. The calibration has
';,Bhifte.d negative by approximately 120 feet .
. . ·.r The friction has increased over the normal 30/40 feet to a level of
about 70/90 feet. A check of the preload on each capsule showed

. .
the low side to be -570 ft. and the high side to be +1600 ft.,
compared to -500 ft. and +1800 ft, as nomina:Ivalues. The shift
~in scale error to values approximately -120 feet'from normal can
be attributed to the heat exposure which causes a negative shift of

·"'-..
.the capsules deflections.

B. First Officer 1 s Altimeter
As may be noted on the photo taken at UAL SFO, the angle between
-
the #1 pointer ( 100 ft.) and the #2 pointer ( 1, 000 ft.} is approximately
26°. If we assume that the 100 ft. pointer is indicating +975 feet then
26° away, the #2 pointer would be at 472 feet. This indicates a
de synchronization of the pointers. When the photo of the disc pointer
is examined for the 1 rshadowtt of the #2 pointer is noted that the angle
of the shadow is 3 o0 • If both pointers start at zero and move clock-
wise at 10:1 ratio, a 30° angle occurs at an altitude of 925 feet.
The disc pointer utilizes an eyelet type embossing for the center hole
to attach it to the shaft that drives it. The high heat to which the unit
was exposed would have caused the eyelet tension on the shaft to be
lost in a manner similar to that of annealing or stress relieving.
Thus, the position of the disc pointer on its hub is questionable. As
noted by the melted aluminum case, the temperature of this unit was
well over ll00°F. It is impossible, based on the information avail-
able, to state whether the shadow has any significance or not
because the difference in the pointers is relative to which pointer
is considered to have moved and in what sequence. With sufficient
im·pact damage (pre-fire) the rockingshaft pivots usually break re-
sulting .in a ttplus 11 effect on the display elements due to the hairspring
tension.

C. Captain's C. A. D. C.
The "frozen positionrr of the outputs indicate that at the time of
power removal this unit was sensing very close to 650 feet QNE
which based on a 30. 05 baro setting would be close to 77d feet.
QNH. The turn off position of the pneumatic altitude sensor
indicates approximately 665 feet Ql\TE. This represents the post
accident condition of the pneumatic sensor which could easily have
have been subjected to 15 feet of irppact damage.
The encoder was correlated to the altitude output.
The monitor operated slightly out of tolerance on the increasing
altitude side but within tolerance on the decreasing altitude side.
D. First Officer 1 s C.A.D.C.
The ''frozen positionn of the outputs indicates that at the time of
power removal this unit was sensing very close to 600 feet QNE
which ba9ed on a 30. 05 baro setting would be close to 720 feet QNH.
The turn off position of the altitude sensor indicates approximately
640 feet QNE. This represents the post accident condition of the
pneumatic sensor which could easily have ·been subjected to 40
feet of impact damage.
The encoder was correlated to the altitude output.
The monitor operated within the monitor tolerances.

ADDENDUM I
SPECIAL TESTS
Additional testing ·was conducted to ascertain characteristics which
were not previously documented.
1. Computer Step Function - In this test, the computer was taken
to some altitude by using pneumatic pressure. At this altitude h the servo

1
was deactivated by opening the motor fixed phase. This maintained all
electrical parts at their normal potential. The pressure was then
changed to a new altitude hz and stabilized. The time for the servo
to reach the second position was recorded. During this slewing
operation it was also noted if the altitude reliability signal was interrupted
and if the reported altitude was maintained or interrupted.
A. Times to Slew
Step Change Used Captain's F/O
1000 to 0 feet 3. 8, 4.3 sec 4. 8, 4. 9 sec·
0 to 1000 3. 8, 3.2 5.2, 4.2
1000 to 500 2. 3, 2.4 3. 2, 3.3
500 to 1000 2. 4, 3. 1 2. 4, 3.2
800 to 600 1. 8, 1. 8 2. 3, 3.0
600 to 800 2. 1, 1. 9 3. 1, 2.5
700 to 600 2. 0, 2.3 3. 1, 3.2
600 to 700 2. 0' 2.2 3. 3, 2.2
B. Reliability Signal
On all but the 100 ft steps, the reliability signal opened. On
the lOOft step, the step was just within the trip level and no trip was noted.

' ' -
G. Whenever the reliability signal was lost, the encoder readout
test egpipment reverted to -1000 ft which is indicative of an open common

'<
line t9 ~the encoder.
2. Computer Slew Offset - In this test, the computer was run at
high vertical speeds and it was noted on the i;est equipment at what point
the m:onitor was on the edge of tripping. This information was used to
compute the vertical speed and this data was then related to the previously
obta}:hed monitor trip data to assign the servo offset.
Captain 1 s AD~ Increasing 21, 400 ft/min
Decreasing 21,400
Monitor Trip Increasing 105 ft
Decreasing 115 ft
F/O ADC Increasing 18, 100 ft/min
Decreasing 16, 200
-Monitor Trip Increasing 135 ft
Decreasing 110 ft

Docket No~ SA-.435
Exhibit No. 7-A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTA~ON SAFEIJ1Y.E0Afill

:SUREAJ,J: OF AVIATION SAFETY ·
WASHING'l'ON, D. C. 2059l
.SWRUCTCJEES GROUP ~'S.FACTUAL REPORT .OF INVESTIGATION·
:SY
Robert J. Gordon
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit Noo 7-A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Bureau of Avi.ation Safety
Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1973
STRUCTURES GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
A. ACCIDENT
LOCATION Approxi!Dately 1.5 nautical miles southeast of Runway 31L,

Chicago Midway Airport, Chica.go, Illinois. Exact coordinates
were: lat. 87° 42' 54" W - long. 41° 45' 51" N '
DATE December 8, 1972

AlRCRAFT United Airlines, Inc., Boeing Model 737-222., N903lU, S/N 19069
B. STRUCTURES GRCXJP
The following persons·were official representatives ·of their respective

organizations on the Structures Group:
R. J. Gordon National Transportation Saf'ety Board
R. s. Kriebel Federal Aviation Administration
U. E. Toatley Federal Avi.ation Administration
B. DeRosa United Airlines
w. P. Rushing Air Line Pilots Association
R. A. Patterson Air Line Pilots Association
M. w. Ludwig Boeing Company
E. Huizinga Boeing Company
c. SUMMARY
United Airlines Flight 553, a Boeing 737-222., N903lU, crashed at approximately

1428 central standard time on December 8, 1972 while making an approach to
Runway 3lL at Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois.
- 2 -
The aircraft impacted into a residential area mainly comprised of one
story brick and wood structures. The primary wreckage area was approx-
imately 500 feet in length and 90 fe12t wide. Both wings and the fuselage,
from just a:ft of the cockpit to the rear galley door, were for the most
part consumed by the post impact ground fire.
No evidence of pre impact structural failure or in-flight fire wa.G found.
D. D~ILS OF INVESTIGATION - ACCIDENT SITE OBSERVATIONS
On December 8, l972, a Structures Group was appointed by the investigator-

in-charge for the purpose of examining the wreckage of aircraft N903lU.
The chief purpose of the Structures Group was to develop all pertinent
and significant evidence bearing on the nature and probable cause of the
accident.
The accident occurred in the residential area of Chicago, Illinois. A

total of eight houses including three garages were extensively damaged or
destroyed as a result of aircraft impact and po~t irrIJlact ground fire.
The following is a resume of this damage:
l. Two houses on the north side of West 7lst Street received extensive
irrIJlact damage of the roof and u;pper floor structure.
2. Two of three houses on the south side of West 70th Place received
extensive impact damage to the roof and upper floor structure. The
third house was destroyed as the result of aircraft impact. Two
garages were severely irrIJlact damaged.
3. Three houses and orte garage on the north side of West 70th Place
were destroyed as the result of aircraft and post impact ground fire.
After preliminary examination of the accident site was made, members of

the Structures Group proceeded to work with the- -wrecking crew to carefully
remove house rubble from around and on aircraft structure in order that the
various investigative groups could proceed with their investigation.
In conjunction with the above operation, oth~r members of the Structures

Group proceeded to collect the data necessary to prepare a chart of the
wreckage distribution. In addition significant property and house damage was
noted and charted to assist in determining the manner in which the aircraft
contacted the houses and broke up.
-· 3 -
Following com;pletion of the; wreckage diutribution work; the detailed
exru:nina.tion of the wreckage pieces wns initiated.
The results of the GroUJ> 1 S investigation effort are presented in the

following section of this report.
The wreckage of aircraft N903lU came to rest on three properties, No.

3724, No. 3722, and No. 3718, West 70th Place, Chicago, Illinois. The
aircraft, with the exception of the left cockpit section, empennage,and
inboard portions of the left and right wings, had been consumed by post
inrpact ground fire.
The first evidence of house and property damage was noted on the south
side of West 7lst Street. Numerous front roof peak shingles were found on
the front lawn and the front UJ>per storm 'Window was detached on house No. 3707.
A tree, approximately 24 fee·t in height lqcated on the front lawn of

·house No. 3709, had branches broken at a height of approximately 18 feet
from ground level.
A tree, approximately 20 feet in height, located on the lawn in front of

house No. 37o6 on the north side of West 7lst Street, had one branch broken
approximately 18 feet from ground level.
Two houses on the north side of West 7lst Street were severely damaged.
The northwest upper corner of house No. 3710 was caved inward. The T.V.
antenna located on the chimney was bent over. The left elevator tip of
aircraft N9031U was recovered on the roof. The northeast upper corner of
house No. 3714 was also caved inward. A T.V •. antenna located on the· chimney
-wa.s bent over. A tree approximately 20 :feet in height located in the backyard
and adjacent to the house had numerous branches broken.
The two telephone poles located in the alley wa:y which separates West 7lst
Street and West 70th Blace were broken, Examination of the electrical cables
indicated that they failed in tension. This was evidenced by the necked down
condition of the cable ends.
Pole #2, as designated by the wreckage distribution chart, snapped off at

a point approximately l2 feet above ground level. The pole -was found on the
ground in the backyard of house No. 37U, .West of 70th Place.
Pole #3 was resting on the southwest corner of a garage at the rear of

house No. 3723 West 70th Place. This pole had snapped off at a point approx-
imately 3 feet 6 inches above ground level.
The garage at the rear of 3717 West 70th Place was knocked off of its
foundation and the north portion of the roof was caved in-ward. A section of
the left horizontal stabilizer skin, P/N 65-47536-501, and a section of the
left elevator, P/N 65-47512-3, was recovered in the alley adjacent to the
garage door. A section of the left horizontal stabilizer was also recovered·
on the ground between two small buildings adjacent to the rear of the garage
and located on tb,e lot of 3719 West 70th Place.
- 4 -
The roof of a garage located at the rear o:f the house and :property at
3715 West 70th Place was corrr.pletly caved in.
The outboard :portion o:f the le:ft horizontal stabilizer :from a:p:proximately
Sta. 207J including the elevator, was recovered in the backyard o:f house
No. 3717 West 70th Place. The house was destroyed by aircra:ft irrr.pact. Two
:pieces of the a_ircra:ft, a hydraulic line and :filter, and a section o:f right
wing outboard mid :fla:p, was recovered in rubble adjacent to the rear foundation
of the subject house.
The right wing ti:p, from Sta. 531 outboard, was recovered at the base of
the rear wall of house No. 3715 West 70th Place. The southwest corner of the
house was extensively im:pact damaged. A section o:f the right wing leading
edge was recovered between house No. 3715 and house No. 3717.
A vacant lot (3719) exists between house No. 3717 and 3723 West 70th
Place. Numerous pieces o:f aircraft structure were :found by the Structures
Grou:p :piled on the sidewalk and in the street in front of this lot . . These
items were not documented at their location subse~uent to aircraft irrr.pact.
These items are listed as followes:
1. Section of fla:p track including jackscrew.

2. Section o:f :fla:p track fairing
3. Mid :flap section and jackscrew
4. Oxygen :filler and gauge
5. Right hand strut door, P/N 65-52206-36
6. Strut door, P/ N 65-52201-88
7. Section of skin with stringers, P/N 65-55726-5
8. Skin and rib section
9. Section of skin "With louvre
10. Fuel tank :plate, P/N 65-46446-1 ( 2 - each)
The southern peak and east side of the roof and second floor structure of
the house at 3723 West 70th Place was caved inward its :full length as a result
of aircraft i:awact. Num.erous :pieces of the left wing tip light lense were re-
covered within the upper attic :portion of the house.
Aircraft N9031U came to rest on the pro:perties of 3724, 3722, and 3718 West
70th Place. The three houses were destroyed by ai:r:ieraft impact and :post irrr.pact
ground fire.
l. Empennage
The vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly remained intact and

attached to aircraft structure. Fire damage was minimal and con:fined
to blistering of the leading edge :fairings from fin Sta. 56 to f'uselage .
The fiberglass leading edge :panels forward of f'uselage Sta. 986 were
consumed by ground fire.
., - 5-
The right horizontaJ.. stabilizer and elevator assembly remained
attached to the aircraf't. Numerous dents and :punctures were noted
on the leading edge with one gash at a:priroximately Stao 22l "Which
rienet:ra.ted the stabilizer af't to the rear SIJar. A l2 inch section
of' the elevator tip was missing.
The elevator tab remained intact and attached to the elevator. The
right horizontal stabilizer and elevator assembly was resting on an in-
verted totally destroyed automobile.
The le:ft horizontal stabilizer and elevator from a point adjacent to

the outboard edge of' the elevator tab to the stabilizer ti:p was m,issing.
The stabilizer f'rom ari:prox:bma.tely Sta. l30 outboard to Sta. 193 was torn
ilhd bent in the upward direction.
The tail cone was f'or the most :part intact and attached to aircrai't
structure. The tail cone upper surf'ace was punchured from Sta. ll56 af't
to Sta. u76. The lower surf'ace at the tail cone showed considerable
damage.
2. Fuaelage(Sta. 887 .Af't)
The right side of' the fuselage f'rom approximately Sta. 887 aft remained
partially intact. The uri:per most portion of' the fuselage structure in-
cluding a portion of' the· vertical stabilizer from Sta .. 10o6 f'orward was
f'or the most part consumed by post impact ground fire. The right hand
fuselage interior had been subjected to ground f'ire. The af't window opening
at approximately Sta. 934 b.B.d. been blocked with sheet metal and remained
intact.
The window.at approximately Sta. 9l7 was severely heat damaged. The
window at approximately Sta. 897 was missing. The galley area exhibited
extensive post impact fire dam.age. The right galley door was f'ound in
the open position.
The le:ft side of' the fuselage from approximately Sta~ 1016 forward was
consumed by f'ire. The upper portion of' the pressure bulkhead at Sta. lOl6
was burned through.
3. Fuselage (Sta. 887 Forward)

The :ma1iJ. body of' the fuselage from approximately Sta. 887 on the right
sideeilll1 sta. 1017 on the left side forward to approximately Sta. 334 on the
left side was f'or the most part consumed by post impact ground fire. Portions
of fuselage structure within these stations including system components such
as primary heat exchangers, water separators, cold air units ram air intakes
and associated ducting were recovered and identified. These structural pieces
and system components were burried in the rubble of the destroyed homes.
- 6 -
The cock.pit left side rTom a:p:proxima tely Sta. 334 forward to
Sta. 178 came to rest against a large tree located just aft and
to the right o:f' the garage to the rear of the house at No. 3722
West (oth ~lace. The left cockpit structure contacted the tree at
approximately fuselage Sta. 227. The structure -was on its left side
at an angle of 70° and on a heading of 30~
The left hand passenger door was found in a vertical :plane within
the ap:proximate center of the door opening with the forward edge o:f'
the door rotated inward approximately 40°. The fuselage structure aft
of the :passenger door including the door surr01.md had se:parated and ro-
tated rearward. The door was jal!lilled in the :partially open :position.
The le:ft cockpit seat and left instrument :panel remained in their
relative positions. The pilots Nao l window was shattered and punchured.
The :pilots No. 2 window was shattered and the No. 3 window re?M.ined in-
tact with evidence of smoke and heat discoloration. The two eyebrow
windows were intact with evidence of heat damage.
The right cockpit structure showed evidence of severe impa.ct and :post
impact ground fire damage. Various :pieces of right cockpit structure 'WaS
recovered from under rubble of both house No. 3718 and house No. 3722 West
70tb. Place.
The airstair assembly was recovered in the area of the cockpit wreckage
and exhibited no evidence of fire damage. The nose gear' assembly was re-
covered under the cock.pit weckage.
Le:ft Wing
A section of left inboard wing approximately 24 feet in length, 'Which

included the landing gear assembly, inboard ground spoiler, inboard flight
spoiler, inboard center and bottom fla:p sections, and engine :pylon structure
was recovered under the rubble of house No. 3724. The wing leading edge
f'rom approximately Sta. 254 inboard to the fUselage area vra.s missing. A
10 foot :piece of leading edge slat was also recovered in the immediate area
of' the w.ing. The wing section and associated components showed evidenced
of extensive im_pact a!Jll.d :post impact ground fire damage.
Two sections of the to:p outboard fla:p, a:pproximately 3 feet in length, a

l2 foot section of the center outboard fla:p, and a 10 foot section of the
0utboard bottom fla:p were recovered. These flap com:ponents showed no evidence
of fire damage~
The le:ft engine had separated from its pylon structure and was positioned
adjacent to the left aft i'uselage structure at ap:proximately S=!;,a.. 1016.
- 7 -
-
/' Right Wing
A section of right inboard wing approximately 18 feet in length which
included a 2 foot 9 inch section of the inboard center flap, a short section
of leading edge slat,and the engine pylon structure,were recovered under the
rubble of house No. 3718.
The follciwlng right wing flap sections. were recovered in the immediate
area of' house No. 3T-L8:
l. Outboard Fla'£ Sections
Two top flap sections, one section 13 feet 3 inches iri length, one
section 2 feet 10 inches in length.
Center f'lap remained intact.
Three bottom flap sections, one section 6 feet 5 inches in length

one section 3 feet 4 inches in length., and one section 8 feet ih
length.
2. Inboard Flall Sections
Two top flap sections:,; one section 4 'feet 4 inche;s in length, one
section 4 feet 2 inches in length.
One center and one bottom flap remained attached to each other and
measured 7 feet 10 inches in length.
The right engine had separated from its pylon structure and was positioned
in the front area of house No. 3T-L8.
The right main landing gear had separated from the aircraft and was recovered
adjacent to the right -wall of' the garage located in the back of house No. 3T-L8.
lftf~j
VQ J. Gordon
Air Safety Investigator
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONA.L TRAHSFORTATION SAFEI'Y BOARD
WASHINGTON> D. C. 20591
An Aircraft Accident Involving

United Air Lin~s> Inc.
Boeing 737; N9031U
Near Chicago Midway Airport
Chicago, Illinois
December 8> 1972
---------------------------------------
PREHEA.RING CONFE:REI!TCE
February 26> 1973
--------------------------------------
PREHEA.RING CONFERENCE OUTLII\'E
Mr. William 'R. Hendricks Hearing Officer
Mr. Hendricks will open the conference and :introduce the
Members of the Board of Inquiry and. Technical Panel.
Honorable Isabel A. Burgess Chairman> Board of

Inquiry
Presiding Officer Burgess will give the opening statement
for the conference and introduce the spokesman for each Party.
Mr. William R. Hendricks Hearing Officer

Mr. Hendricks will review the list of witnesses for the hearing
and the areas of testimony to be covered in the questioning.
Other areas) if any> from the Parties will be decided. upon and
the scope of the testimony will be set.
' -~ . '
WITNESS LIST AJ:ID AREAS OF TESTIMONY
L Mr . .William J. Simonini Eyewitness

C~ic_ago) Illinois
(a) Observations of aircraft and weather conditions
Ex: 4B
2. Mr. Thomas J. 0 1 Brien Eye~ritness

Chicago) Illinois
(a) Obsenrations of aircraft and weather conditions
Ex: 4B
3. Mr. Louis Stalec EyeWitness

Chicago) Illinois
., ·~{a) Observations of· aircraft and weather conditions
Ex: 4B
- 2 -
4. Mr. Marvin E. Anderson Surviving Passenger

UAL Flight 553
(a) Pertinent observations made during flight and approach

to Midway Airport.
(b) Post-crash observations and activities
EX: 6B
••• c ~.· : . ,
...... :-·!'~
:5. Mr. Harold R. Metcalf S~rviving Passenger

UAL Flight 553

to Midway Airport.
Ex.: 6B
6. · Mr. Harold \·[. Green Surviving Passenger

UAL Flight 553

to Midway Airport.
Ex.: 6B
- 3 -
7. · Mrs. Margurite J. McCausland Surviving Stewardens

UAL FLT 55~
(a) Qualifications> duties and responsibilities

(b) Preflight activities and observations-
(c) Observations and activities eh route and during
approach to Midway _A.irport
(d) Post-crash activities and observations
Ex: 6c
8. Mrs. D. Jeanne Griffin Surviving Stewardess

UAL FLT 553
(a) Qualifications; duties and responsibilities

(b) Preflight activities and observations
(c) Observations and activities en route and during
approach to Midway Airport
·Ex: 6c
9.. Mrs. Kathleen S. Duret Su~±ving Stewardess

t:r:AI:; FLT 553
Qualifications> duties anCi responsib:i,l:;Lt1es

Preflight activities and observation:s ..
Observations and activities en route•anB:.dtiring approach
to Midway Airport_
Ex: 6c
4 -
10. Captain Arthur C. Munin Chief; Hook and Ladder Coopany

No. 31
Fire Department of the City
of Chic~go
(a)· , Duties and responsibilities
(b>) ~espouse and firefighting/rescue activities

· at .the accident scene
Ex: 6:m
11. Captain Rugh E. Mu~phy CaptainJJ)elta Airlines

Flight 56'T
Dec ember. 8 j-_ 1972
(a) Observations and operational conditions on apj;lroa.ch

··to Midway Airport; December 8) 1972
(b) Standard Operating practices and procedures utilized for

.Runway 31L localizer approach to Mid_way
12. Mr. M;b;tton W. Harding Executive Pilot

Air Commander N309V
(a) Observations and operational conditions on apJ?roach

to Miclway Airport) December 8) 1972
13~ 11r~ George w. Kipp Executive Pilot

Cessna 31.0; Nto/d-3L
(a) Observations and operational conditions on a:gproa,eh.

·--Do MiC!-way Airport; December 8) 1972
Ex: 2-I,, 2-J

""· '-.
- 5 -
14. Captain H. R. Trimble Captain) United Air Lir~es

FLT 737J December 8) 1972
(a) Observations of weather and operational conditions

on approach t.o 0 1 Hare Airport) DecembE;n' 8; 1972
.· (b) UAL approa~h practices; procedures:; aJ:;Ld training

relating to line operations in J3-737 aircraft
15. lite· John J. J3aldwin Air Traffic Control Speciali·

Federal Aviation Aam.inistra-:.
0 1 Hare Approach Control
(a) Duties and responsibilities
(b) Radar observations) communications; and ATC services

provided to UAL FLT 553
( c) Standard ATC arrival procedures for Mi'dWay Aiport
16 .. '.Mr. Jack E. Margotta Assistant Chief) Midway To;-~:

Federal Aviation A&ninistr2.-:
(a)· Duties and responsibilities
(b) Radar observations) communications) a~d AIBa ~.e:c'v-ices provicled

to UAL FLT. 553
(c) ATC services provided to aerocommand.er N309VS
(d) Standard arrival procedures for Runway 3lt approach

(e) Crash alert procedures
Ex:: 3J3, 3C, 3D, 3E) 3F, 3G
...........
r
- 0 -
l 7· Captain John C. Aasen Flight Tr~ining Supervisor 3-7:?7

UAL :Fligh:t; Tratning Center
Denver_, Colorado
'~) Duties and responsibilities

(b.) UAL B-73 7 flight training :program (Captain,, qp;irst Officer;
Second Officer) as related to: Descent and c;i.:pproach
:procedures; crew coordination; aircraft·<;;onf:Lguration
···. ,·;-, procedures for vari.ous :flight conditions) missed- approach
and stall recovery J?rocedures; and; anti-icing system
utilization.
,(c) Correlation of flight training :procedures to.line operations
l8. C~'.Pt~in Donald K. Holman Flight Manger

UAL §light O:p~rations
Washington). D. C.
(b) Re•riew of :flight training of Captain Whitehouse
(c) Line operation observations of flight :praotices

:procedures; and techniques utilized by Captain Whitehouse
(a) Standard·a:p:proach procedures for Runway 3lL a:p:proach to

Midway Airport
(e) Standard :procedures and :practices concerning crew coordination

and crew duties for line operation
\ ··.
- 7 -
l9. Captai.h Bobby C. Gooclr:IBn Flight Manager

UAL Flight Operations
Washington; D. C.
(b) Review of flight history of First Officer Coble
(e) Line operation observations of First Officer Coble
(d) Standard procedures and practices concerning cnew

coordination and crew duties for line. operation
20. Gaptain Louis N. DeWitt Manager) Flight Performance B-737

Western Airlines; Inc.
Los Angeles) California
(b) Experience relating to B~737 flight perform~nce characteristics

in descent) approach and landing; missed~approach> and stall
recovery configurations
(c) WAL approach and landing practices and:pxocedures
.Ex: .• 2J> 13D
21. Mr. Robert P. Beatty Assistant Branch Chief;

National Data Systems Branch
National Aviation Facilities
Ex::perime:o,iJa:l_ Center
Federal Aviat'.ioil"Administration
.(a) Duties ·and responsibilities
.·(l:t) Concept> progr81llllling; capabilities and tolexanc~s of ARTS-III
Ex:: 3E; 3F> l3B, 130> 13D

··.\nt
··ti·· .
8 -
22. Mr. William K. Howell B-737 AerodynaCTics E..-rigineer

The Boeing.Company
Seattle; W~shington
(a)" Duties and responsibilities
(b) B-737 icing certification·
·'. (c) Examination of flight profile as developed from A.."ii.TS-III

data relative to aircraft configuration and thrust
reg_uirements
(d) Effects of ice on horizontal stabilizer
. (e) Eogine :peformance as effected. by high angles of attack and

inlet-duct icing
(:f) Effects of high angle of attack on :pitot-static system
(g) Stall charactei·istics; recovery technig_ue and. stick-shaker

activation
Ex:: l3A; l3B; 13C: l3D: 13E
23. Mr. Matson M. Lord. Liason Representative

Service Department
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Com.pa:::y
East Hartford.: Connecticut
(a) Duties and. responsibilities
(b) Nominal engine :performance and response in the approach

thrust engine; acceleration from idle thrust; and. factors
affecting engine spool-up (inlet duct icing; Pr~2 probe
icing; total engine time; etc.)
:(c) ~nti-icing bleed-air system operation

' ', ~ ·.
- 9 -
24. Mr. Jarrtee w. Angus Staff Engineer

Kollsman Instrument Company
~shurst) · J)(e-1.;r York
(b) .Description of the B-737 altimetry system including CAW

a:tJ,d the altimeter servo loop
( c} ,Fif.tdi:i:tgs of the exarrtination of altimeter system com;ponents

,. :from N903lU
( d)' DiEic11ssion of possible causes for altimeters system anomalies
25. Mr. Pa,nl Smith Chief; Pbarm8cology Biochemistry

Laboratory
Civil Aeromedical Institute (CA:fl,IT)
Federal A-V:iati~.:i Administration
Oklahoma d:Lty; Oklahoma
(a) Aircraft fires and resultant toxicity
(h} ·j)iscussion of accident related deaths

•/:.
Exhibit No. l-A

. NATIONAL TRANSPORI1ATION SAFErY :BO.ARD
WASHINGTON) D. C. 2059l
***********************
In t)J.eMatter bf Investigation of Accident *
Invb+v{.ug United Air Lines) Inc.; :Boeing 737* D::icket No. SA-435
o('Ur1;it~q_ $tates Registry N903lU, *
ChicagO.; Illinois) December 8) l972 *
*~*********************
ORDER OF HE.ll..RING
A :public hearing is hereby ordered by the National Transportation
Saf'ety I)oard in connection ·with the above matter at a time and :place to
be dei:J.erm:i'.ned by the Hearing Officer who will hereafter be designated..
Datea. tM s 5th day of January l973.
For the :Board.

Exhibit No. l-B
UNITED STATES OF A.i.'vfERICA

NATIONAL TRA.NSFDRrATION SAFErY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2059l
************************
In the Matter of Investigation of Accident *
Involving United Air Lines; Inc.; Boeing 737 * D:lcket No. SA-435
of United States Registry N9031U; *
Chicago) Illinois) December 8; l972 *
************************
DESIGNATION OF HEARING O:FFICER
Pursuant to the authority conferred by the National Transportation

Safety Board; Mr. William R. Hendricks; Principal Investigation Branch;
Investigation Division> Bureau of Aviation Safety; Washington) D. C.)
is hereby designated Hearing Officer to conduct a public hearing on
behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board; to be held in the
above matter. The said Hearing Officer is authorized to set the time
and place of the hearing; to give notice thereof; and to exercise_ such
other :powe1°s in connection with the conduct of such proceeding as
authorized by the National Transportation Saf~ty Board.
Dated thi-, 5th day of January 1973.
FOR THE BOARD
.,....---, I . it
Cv:' ·tu,Ji·u
C. O. Miller
Director; Bureau of Aviation Safety
Exhibit No. 1-

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFEI'Y BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591 .
* '* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
I'i\, :tlie.. Matter of Investigation of Accident
Irtr/'o1ying United Air Lines) Inc. ):Boeing 737 * J):x~ket No. SA-435
of United States Registry N9031U *
Ch:i,e·a'.io;, Illinois) December 8, 1972 *·
************************
NOTICE OF REA.RING
Notice is hereby given that an Accident Investigation Rearing on
the a~ove matter will be held commencing at 9:30 a.:m.) (local time) on
Fclb:tttiiry 27) 1973, at the Sheraton - 0 1 Hare Motor Hotel; Rosemont)

lllfuois.
bated this 5th day of January 1973.
// /)' ~
/!-
tC./d'..C.t.c<.~~
Will~am··R.
e.Hendricks
#~;<-£..\..
. Senior Rearing Officer
·. _-·
+- •~ •
Exhibit No. l-D
UNITED UNITES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFErY BOARD
WASfilNGTON) D. C. 2059l
******~****************
In the-Matter of Investigation of Accident *
Involv}ng United Air tines; Inc.) Bo~ing 73T~ Docket No. SA-435
of Uhit.~d States Registry N903lU) *
Chic<;J.gO; Illinois, December 8, l972 *
***********************
DE3IGNATION OF PARTIE3 TO THE HEilliING
Tlie following organizations are designated Parties to the Hearing

in accordance vrith Part 43l.27 of the Board 1 s Procedural Regulations:
United Air Lines, Inc.
Federal Aviation Administration
The Boeing Company
Pratt & Whitney
Air Line Pilots Asso~iation
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
· Dated this 5th day of January 1972.
~JJ A. V3Ct.Aq,e~
Isabel A. Burgess d ·
Chairman, Board of In~uiry
··)
UNITED STATE3 OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPOfilATION SAFErY BOARD
STU.ARI' ROOM
SHERA.TON-0 1H.ARE MOTOR HOTEL
ROSEMONT, ILLINOIS
FEBRUARY 27, l973
RJBLIC HFARING
An Aircraft Accident Hearing

Boeing 737, N903lU
•
Chicago, Illinois
December 8, l972
BOARD OF INQUIRY
Honorable Isabel A. Burgess Member
National Transportation Safety
Board
Washington, D. C.
CHAIBMAN, BOARD OF·INQUIRY
Mr. Bernard C. Doyle • • . . . . • • • • • • • Chief, Investigation Division
Board
Washington, D. C.
Mr. John M. Stuhldreher • • • • • • • • • • • Senior Attorney

Office of the General Counsel
Board ·
Washington, D. C.
Mr. William R. Hendricks • • . • . • • • • • • Senior Hearing Officer

Investigation ~ivision
Board
Washington, D. C.
HEARING OFFICER
- 2 -
TEJHNICAL PANEL
Mr. William L. Lamb . • • . • • Senior Air Safety Investigator

Investigation Division
Board
Washingtion, D. c.
INVESTIGATOR IN CHARGE
Mr. Martin A. Speiser . . . . . . . . . . .. . Air Safety Investigator

Technology Division
Board
Washington, D. C.
Mr. William. G. Laynor • • . • • • • • . • • • Aerospace Engineer

Technology Division
Board
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Matthew M. McCormick • • • • • • • • • • Air Safety Investigator

Technology Division
Board
Washington, D. c.
---------------------------------------
Mr. Brad D.inbar • • . • · • • • • • • • • • . Deputy Director,
Office of Public Affairs
National.Transportation Safety
Board
Washington, D. C.
- 3 -
HFARING OUTLINE
1. Honorable Isabel A. Burgess . ......

:.' Chairman, Board of' Inquiry
Member Burgess will give the opening statement of' the public
hearing.
2. Mr. William R. Hendricks • . . • • • . • • • Hearing Of'f'icer
Mr. Hendricks will identify and receive into the record the
f'ollowing:
Exhibit No. 1-A Order of' Hearing

1-B Designation of' Hearing Of'f'icer
1-C Notice of' Hearing
1-D Designation o:f Parties to the Hearing
3. Mr. William L. Lamb • • • • • • • . • • • • • Investigator in Charge
Mr. Lamb will report for the record, the notification of' the accident
and the organization o:f the investigation. He will review the investigation
activities and submit all exhibits to be entered into the public record o:f
the accident.
Exhibit No. 2-A Operations Group Chairman 1 s Factual Report

2-A-l Simulator· and flight test report
2-B UAL FLT 553 Dispatch Documents
2-C Training Records - Captain w. L. Whitehouse
2-D Training Records - F/O W. O. Coble
2-E Training Records - S/O B. J. Elder
2-F Excerpts f'rom UAL B-737 Flight Manual
2-G Excerpts f'rom UAL Training Manual
2-H Excerpts from UAL Flight Handbook
2-I Statements from pilots flying in Chicago area 12/8/72
2-J Jeppesen Approach Charts and Chicago Area Chart
-· 2-K Cockpit visibility diagram B-737
- 4-
Exhibit No. 3-A Air Traf'f'ic Control Group Chairman's Factual Report
3-B Statements, ATC Bersonnel
3-C ATC Transcript (Approach Control)
3-D ATC Transcript (Midway Tower)
3-E Aerocommande·r N309US Q::-:-ound Track Chart
plotted f'rom orHare Radar ARrS III Computer Readout
3-F UAL Flight 553 Ground Track Chart - plotted from
orHare Radar .ARI'S III computer readout
4-A Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report

4-B Witness Statements
4-C Witness Location Chart
5-A Weather Group Chairman's Factual Report

5-B Surface Weather Observations - Midway
5-C Aviation Weather Sequences
5-D Surface Weather Charts
5-E Upper Air (850 mb. & 700 mb.) Charts
5-F Weather Radar Log - Chicago
5-G National Weather Svc., Inst:rument Checks - Chicago
5-H Instrument Location Chart - Midway
5-I National Weather Service and FAA Tower Visibility
Reference Charts
5-J Portion Electro-writer Record, Nat,ional Weather
Service, Midway
5-K National Weather Service Observer's Statements
5-L TeletYJ?e-Pilot Reports
5-M National Weather Service Forecasts (Area and
Tenninal Forecasts and SIGMETS)
5-N Upper Air Data
5-0 Pseudo-adiabatic Charts, Peoria & Green Bay
5-P National Weather Service Briefing Statements
5-Q United Air Lines Forecasts
6-A Hum.an Factors Group Chairman 1 s Factual Report

6-B Passengers Statements
6-e Flight Attendants Statements
6-D Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) Reports
6-E Chicago Fire Department Operations Report
6-F United Air Lines Galley Study
6-G FAA, Office of Aviation Medicine Report: Carbon
_Monoxide and elyanide Hazards~ in 'Air Transport
Accidents accompanied by f'ire
7-A Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report

7-B Wreckage Distribution Chart
7-C Photographs
- 5-
Exhibit N~8-A Power:plant Group Chairman's Factual Report

8-B Photographs
-8-c Engine Bleed Air System Schematic
~9-A Systems Group Chairman rs Factual Report

9-B Photographs ·
9-C Kollsman Report on Altimeter System
9-D Kollsman Report on Air Data Computer
9-E Excer:pts f'rom B-737 Instruction Manual
re: Pitot·Static System
10-A Flight Data Recorder Specialist'~ .Factual Report

lO-B Photographs of FDR and Para.meter Traces
10-C Report of FDR Examination
ll-A Maintenance Records Group Chairman's Factual Report

ll-B Excerpts from Flight Log
ll-C Deferred Item Sheets
12-A Cockpit Voice Recorder Specialist1 s Factual Report

13-A Flight Performance Group Chairman 1 s Factual Report
l3-B Automatic Radar Tracking System (ARIB) Computer
Printout
13-C Aircraft Performance 1)3.ta Plot Developed f'rom. ARTS III
Data.
13-D Approximate Flightpath Prof'ile as 1'eveloped f'rom ARrS III
1)3.ta and CVR Transcript
13-E Excerpts of' B-737 Certif'ication 1)3.ta
- 6 -
WITNESS LIST
1. Mr. William J. Simonini Eyewitness
Chicago; Illinois
2. Mr. Thomas J. 0 1 Brien Eyewitness

Chicago, Illinois
3. Mr. Louis Stalec Eyewitness

Chicago, Illinois
4. Mr. Marvin E. Anderson .Passenger; UAL FLT 553

South Holland; Illinois
5. ML Haro:_Ld R~ Metcalf' .Passenger; UAL FLT 553

Tinley Park; Illinois
6. Mr. Harold W. Green .Passenger; UAL FLT 553

Park Fa.rest) Illinois
7. Mrs. Margurite J. McCausland Stewardess; UAL FLT 553

Reston; Virginia
8. Mrs. D. Jeanne Grif'f'in Stewardess; UAL FLT 553

Silver Spring) Maryland
9. Mrs. Kathleen S. Duret Stewardess, UAL FLT 553

Alexandria; Virginia
10. Ca:ptain Arthur C. Munin Chief') Hook & Ladder Company

No. 31; Fire Department of'
Chicago; Chicago; Illinois
ll. Captain Hugh E. Mur:phy Captain., Delta Airlines

North Redding) Massachusetts
12. Mr. Milton w. Harding Executive Pilot

Vincennes; Indiana
13. Mr. George W. Kipp Executive Pilot

Ft. Madison; Iowa
14. Captain H. R. Trimble Captain; United Air Lines
Arlington) Virginia
15. Mr. John J. Baldwin Air Traffic Control Specialist

O'Hare Approach Control
Chicago; Illinois
- 7-
l6. Mr. Jack E. Margotta Assistant Chief', Midway Tower

Federal Aviation Adm..inistration
Chicago, Illinois
l 7. Captain John C. Aasen

Flight Training Supervisor B-737
UAL Flight Training Center
Denver, Colorado
l8. Captain Donald K. Holman Flight Manager

Was!\ington, D. C.
l9. Captain Bobby C•. Goodman Flight Manager

Washington, D. C.
20. Captain Louis N. DeWitt Manager, Flight Performance B-737
Western Airlines, Inc.
Los Angeles, California
21. Mr. Robert P. Beatty Assistant Branch Chief'

National D3.ta Systems Branch
Elcperimental Center
Federal AYiation Administration
22. Mr. William K. Howell B-737 Aerodynamics Engineer

The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington
23. Mr. Matson M. Lord Liason Representative

Service Department
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company
East Hartford, Connecticut
24. Mr. James W. Angus Staf':f Engineer
Elmhurst, New York
25. Dr. Paul W. Smith Chief', Pharmacology Biochemistry
Laboratory ·
Civil Aeromedical Institute
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
--
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 5L
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE'l'Y BOABD

Washington, D. C. 2059l
TELEI'YPE - PILOT REPORTS
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Docket No. SA 435
E:x:b.ioit No. 5M
NATIONAI1 TRANSPORTATION S.AFE'11Y BO.ARD

Bureau of Aviation StLfcd;y
Washington 7 D. C. 20591
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE FORECASTL~
(AREA AND TERMINAL FORECASTS AND SIGMETS).

DEC 8 1S72
DCA PP 021240
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records at th<> National Weather SO'>rvic9
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(Suitland, Ma) / /.. . .:;
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Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 5N
NATIONAL TRANSPO~ATION SAFETY BOARD

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Docket No. SA-435

ExhibH No. 5CY
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY :BO.Mill

Bureau of Avi~tion Safety ··
Washington, D.C. 2059l
PSEUDO-ADIABATIC CHARI'S, PEORIA & GREEN :BAY

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Docket No. SA-435

Exhibit No. 5Q
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY :BOARD

Bureau o:f Aviation Sa:fety
UNITED AIR LINES FORECASTS

...,,.,
UNITED AIR LINES ©
Mailing address: P.O. Box 66100, Chicago, Illinois 60666 Phone: (312) 137-2300
January 8, 1973
Mr. Alan I. Brunstein

Senior Meteorologist
National Transportation Safety Board
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is one copy each of the following forecasts issued by United

Air Lines' Weather Center for internal operational use:
a. Stonn warning No •.68 issued at 0836Z, .S Dec. 1972 and

valid for the period 08/0300C to 08/1200C.
h. Clear Air Turbulence Forecast issued at 1218 Z, 8 Dec.

1972 and valid for the period 08/1300Z to 08/1900Z for
Part I; and valid for the period 08/1900Z to 09/0lOOZ for
Part II, which includes the Law Level Clear Air Turbulence
Forecast.
The year 1962 sho.ving 011 the date-time stamp is invalid and should read
as 1972.
Yours very truly,
Enc.
cc: EXOFS - J. D. Smith Manager of Meteorology
location: Elk Grove Township, Illinois, on Roule 62, one-half mile west of Roule 83
LE 620 Rh'. f ·58 Ptinfe-d m U.S A.
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1%2 DEC 8 08 36
STORM. i.'AR:NING NO. .FOR: MCI DSM CID HLI MlE ORD .>OJ
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· . ·ExhiOit No. 5C
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'

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Exhibit No. 5H
NATIONAL 'rRAl\TGPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Butreau of Aviation Safety
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INSTRlJM!ill:fr LOCATION CHART - MIDWAY

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Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 5D

. SURFAC]j WEATHER CHARTS

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Exhibit No. 5K
NATIONAL TRAN8PORT./\TTON U.AFF.fJ.Y. "130ARD

Bureau of Aviation Gn. fl' Ly
NATI~NAL WEATHER SERVICE

OBSERVERtS STATEMENT
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.._: Oburn~ Aircraft .lccident Statement

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'
The ceiling was measured utilizing the Rotating Beaa Ceilometer, located
approxiaately two ailes northwest of the Weather Service Office. The
ceiling waa aeUllred a:t SOO !eet, and was reported as variable from 400-
600 teet. The use o! a balloon to determine the ceiling 30 ainutee
following the accident gave a height of Soo feet. The balloon wall carrled
by the wind to the east., giving an even greater separation between
ae&suring locations.
Visibility was detenlined from both the control tower and weather station
uaing previous dete:nained visibility markers. Visibility was fairly
constant preceeding the accident.
ObaerYations were disetdnated to the control tower and airlinee by means or
an ~rewriter. The last obserTation preceeding the accident va.s taken
at l and transaitted by electrowriter at 13520. The obaerYation taken
following the accident wae recorded at 1433 and transmitted at 1436C.
Weather condition• had remained fairly stable for seYeral hours preceeding
the accident. Subsequent to the accident the Tisibilty did ilrprove to
tvo llilea as renected in the observation taken at 1441.C.
All weather equiptaent was operational and checked for accuracy following
the accident. All equipta-nt was also ti.lie checked and found accurate.
The sole exception vu ~he Runw&J':/Viaual Range recorder. This wu
inoperatiTe at the weather statictn due to a defective signal line
between the tower and the weatheir station.
Jr~~~~
Willi• M. Hargis
cc i CRH, lCC MO
WSF0 1 Chicago I hereby certif~ that this ls an Oft!clal
ore, Midway True copy of a National Wat-her. Service
Record.~
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DCJc.knl. Nu. t!f\ !1.'-l'.J
1Gxllibit No. ~J
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION S.AFE'I'Y BO.itRD .~ .: ~:; -

BuTeau of Aviation Safety
Wa~hington,D. C. · 2059l
·;t~...
PORTION'. ELECTROWRITER RECOBD

NAT~ONAL WEATHER SERVICE
MIDWAY
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Docket. No. SA ~35
F.x:h:i b:I t No. '.5C1
NATION.AL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOABD

Washington~ D. C. 20591
NATION.AL WEATHER SERVICE INSTRUMElNT CHECKS ·

CHICAGO
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NatiO!'.al Ooean1«l a.""!:d Aboo~c AG::ll:ltii:Jtntion
Reply to
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On this date all checks have ooan completed on the following piaees of Equ!pment
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Docket No. SA 435

Exhibit No. 5I

:Bureau of Aviation Safety
Washington) D. C. 20591
NATIO:l!TAL YIBATHER SERVICE AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMJNIST~ION

TOWER, VISIBILITY REFERENCE CHARTS
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Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 5E
NATIONAL TRAN:IPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Bureau of Aviation Safety·
Washington, Do C. 2059l
UPPER AIR (850 'mo. & 700 mo.) CHARrS

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Exhibit No. 5P

:Bureau of' Aviation Sa:fety
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE BRIEFING STM!EMENTS

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~:«~~-~'DO~ of. UriDa brie£ed .Uni~ed Ai~f~'J!ligbt #553.
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THAT THIS IS AN OFFICIAL
I CER~THE WEATHER RECORDS
c;SPY 0 , - , ,.,.., ONAL AIR-
iGR. WASH1NGTDN i:-..1;..1.:.. .
PQRT, WASHINGTON, D, C.
E IL ISoN. Meteorologist in~
G-#.JJ~
Docket,, No. SA-1~35
Exhibi i; No • 5lP
NATIONAL TRANSJ?CRTATION S.AFF.TY BOARD

Washington, D. C. 2059l.
WEATHER RADAR LOG .:. CHICAGO, ILL.
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Docket No. SA-h35
Exhibit No. '7fl
NATIONAL TRANS:FPRTATION S.AFl1TY :BOARD

Bureau of' Aviat.ion Safety
Washington) D. C. 2059l
WEATHER GROUP CHAIRMAN 1 S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
by
Alan I. Brunsi.ein
·.
Docket No.- ,SA-435
Exhibit No. 5-A
.i

Bureau of Aviation Sa:fety
WEATHER GROUP CHAIRMAN 1 S FACTUAL BEPORr
A. ACCIDENT
Location: Near Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, Ill.
Date December 8, 1972 (approximately l428 c.s.t.*)
Aircra:ft: United Air Lines Boeing 737, N903lU
NTSB No.: DCA 73-A-3
B. WEATHER GROUP
Chairman: Alan I. Brunstein, Senior ME·teorologist, NTSB
Member W. B. Beckwith, Manager of Meteorology, United Air Lines
Member Glen Louis, Chief, Air Carrier Avionics Unit, FAA, ACDO,
Des Plaines, Ill.
-c. SUMMARY
The accident site was within an area in which there was extensive low
cloudiness and fog, as well as intermittent, light freezing precipitation
and snow.
D. DEI'AILS OF INVESTIGATION
l. Synoptic Situation
Afternoon surface weather charts showed a relatively ill-defined

low pressure area which was centered approximately l20 miles south of
Midway at about the time of the accident and had been moving in a northeast-
ward direction. That system coupled with a stationary front oriented in an
east-northeast/west-northwest direction from Virginla to Arkansas was producing
an extensive area of low cloudiness and intermittent areas of light freezing
drizzle or light freezing rain and very light snow over northern Illinois.
* All times used are central standard based on the 24-hour clock.
DCA 73-A-3 2
The 850 mb. and 700 :r;o.b. charts for both 0600 and l8oo showed a
general southwesterly airfJow over northern Illinois.
2. Aviation Weather Cbservations
Following are selected surface weather obcervations :from the locai.ions

and at the times indicated:
Midway
l200, measured 6oo feet overcast, visibility 1 mile, fog, temperature 26°F,
dew point 25°F. wind ll0°, 4 knots, altimeter setting 30.05 inches,
ceiling ragged, rain ended ll45, pressure falling rapidly.
l300, Record Special, measured 500 overcast, 1 mile, fog, 27°F, 26°F, l 70°,
4 knots, 30.04 inches, ceiling ragged.
l4oO, measured 500 overcast, 1 mile, fog, 27°F, 26°F, 260°, 6 knots,
30.05 inches, ceiling ragged.
J..!±33., local, measured 500 variable overcast, l mile, fog, 250°, 6 knots,
30.05 inches, ceiling 4oo variable to.600, aircraft mishap.
l.lli, Special, measured 500 variable overcast, 2 miles, fog, 24o 0

, 6 knots,
30.05 inches, ceiling 4oo variable to 600.
l504, local, balloon ceiling 500 feet, overcast, 2 miles, fog, 270°, 6 knots,
ceiling measured 400 variable overcast, 3/4 mile, light :freezing

drizzle, fog, 28°F, 27°F~ l4o 0
2 knots, 30.04 inches, Runway l4 right,
,
Runway Vi~ual Range (RVRJ 4500 variable to 6, 000 plus, ceiling 300
variable to 500, :freezing drizzle began lll4, snow ended 112l.
1300, Record Special, measur ::d 4oo variable overcast, 3/4 mile, very light
:freezing drizzle, fog, 28°F, 28°F, 230°, 3 knots, 30.03 inches, ·
Runway l4 right, RVR 6, 000 plus, ceiling 300 variable to 500.
l4o4, Special, measured 500 overcast, l~ miles, light :freezing drizzle,

light snow, fog, 260°, 6 knots, 30.03 inches, freezing drizzle began
14o2, ceiling ~agged.
l422, Special, measured 600 overcast, l~ miles, very light :freezing drizzle,
fog, 260°, 6 knots, 30.03 inches, ceiling ragged.
l443, Local, measured 600 overcast, l~ miles, very light :freezing driz:zJe,
fog, 28o0 • 7 knots, 30.04 inches, ceiling ragged.
DCA 73-A-3 j
1500, measured 600 overcast, l·~ rnJl e::) very liv,ht freezing drizzle) fog,
28°F, 28°F, 280°, 7 knots; 30. r 111 inches, ceiling ragged; freezing
drizzle_began 1402, snow ended 1418.
Meigs Field
1200) Record Special, parti8.l obscm:ation, measured 700 overcast) 3/4

mile, very light freezing drizzle, fog, 29°F, 27°F) 120°,
4 knots, 30.05 inches fog obscuring 6/10 of sky, pressure
falling rapidly.
1300, partial obscuration, measured 400 overcast, ~mile, fog, 29°F,

28°F, 140°, 5 knots, 30.02 inches, fog obscuring 9/10 of sky,
drizzle ended 1217.
1400, Record Special, partial obscuration, measured 600 overcast, l mile,

fog, 30°F, 28°F, 270° 6 knots, 30.02 inches, fog, obscitring 9/10
o:f sky.
1417, Special, partial obscuration, measured 700 overcast, 2 miles, fog,

270° 8 knots, 30.02 inches, fog obscuring 8/10 of sky.
1500, measured 800 overcast) 3 miles, fog) 30°F, 27°F) 300°, 6 knots)
30.02 inches.
3. Pilot Reports
Following are pilot reports availab:i_e via weather teletype:
Entered by Du Page:
1220, Pilot reports over Indianapoli_s to over Bradford between layers

at 8,ooo plus 8°C occasional light chop, C4ll.
During climb off Du Page top overca::t 5, 500, light to moderate icing.
Over O'Hare top overcast 6, 400 lighi. to moderate rime during descent,
BEl8.
On Du Page 1300 sequence:

30 north Midway 7,000 outside air temperature +30F, clear above,
second layer to southeast.
Entered by South Bend:
1309, line of snow showers 10 miles wide from Benton Harbour to

Michigan City.
DCA 73-A-3 4
E!ritered by Du Page l5l5:
During climb out of Palwaukee westbound, overcast layer base J,600,

top 5, 4oo' light rime ice thru this la'.yer J 8' 000 broken above' c4o~'.
Through the cooperation of the ATC and O:perations Groups, inflight weather
observations were solicited from piloiswho had been near the accident area
around the time of the accident. Pertinent observations will be included
in the Factual report of the Operations Group Chairman.
4. Radar Weather Observations
On the day of the accident, raciar We'3.ther eq_uipment at the National

Weather Service Chicago, consisted •Jf an ll!nterprise Electronics Corp.,
WRlOO, Meteorological Radar, C-Band, 5.6 cm. The observation made
nearest the time of the accident was at l437 and showed no echoes. The
previous observation at 1335, had shown an area of light freezing dxizzle
and snow, no change in intensity during the previous hours, in a direction
of 76°, 75 n.m. from the antenna to 172°, 50 n.m. from the antenna,
20 miles wide, moving from 3l0°, 20 kri.ots 7 elements moving from 250°,
30 knots, maximum tops 18,ooo feet, at· ll0°, 48 miles from the antenna.
5. Upper Air Information
a. The Midway 0610 radiosonde observation, at lower levels (below about

l0,000 feet m.s.l.) showed generally stable, subfreezing, and saturated
air. Except for two minor inversions, the average lapse rate was
virtually isothermal.
b. The Midway ll06 radiosonde observation below about l0,000 feet

showed generally similar conditions except that around 6,500 feet there
was a shallow layer with temperatures at or a fraction of a degree above
freezing.
c. The Midway 06lO low level wind observation was as follows:
Height (thsds. ft. m.s.l.) Direction ( 0 True) Velocity ~kts.)
(surface} 14o 7
1 150 8
2 150 12
3 l50 15
d. The Midway ll06 wind observation was not made.

DCA 73-A-3 5
e. The Green Bay and Peoria 181 )0 upper wind observations were, in
part, as follows :
Green Bay
( 'eurf'ace) 290 12
1 2:x:i 11
2 2')5 10
3 24o 8
4 210 9
5 220 10
6 235 14
7 245 21
8 ·260 28
9 260 33
12 250 41
Peoria
(surface) 300 10
1 305 10
2 305 11
3 300 14
4 250 29
6 245 35
7 250 41
8 245 4B
9 245 50
12 250 59
6. Forecasts
a. Following are pertinent :portions of the aviation area forecast

(issued by the National Weather Service Forecast Office-chicago) which
would have been available to the fligb.tcrew prior to departure from
Washington. The forecast was issued at 0640 and was valid f'or a -12-hour
period beginning at 0700.
Heights above sea level unless lated.
Generally high pressure early in period with gradual falling pressure

from the WSW. Weak cold fT.ont with flat waves Missouri, I.ower Ohio
Valley moving little and b• ;coming stationary.
SIGMET 1. Southern, Ill., southern Ind., Mo., Ky., local moderate or

greater clear air turbulenee 25,000 to 36,000 feet also over I.ower Ohio
Valley mid Mississippi Valley, Upper Great Lakes. Continue beyqnd
1300.
DCA 73-A-3 6
SI~ 2. Mid Mississippi Valley, Lower Ohio Valley, Upper Grt!at

Lakes, moderate mixed icing :in clouds and precipitation, isolai;ed
severe mixed icing in clouds and precipitation. Also over Up)?l!r
Mississ~ppi Valley light to occasional moderate mixed icing in clouds and
precipitation. Continue beyond l300.
Mid Mississippi Valley, Lower Ohio Valley, Mo._, Ill., Ind., ceilings
500-800 feet broken, overcast layer based at 2_,000 feet visibility
l-5 miles, light freezing deizzle, light freezing rain, light snow, fog,
haze. Tops l0,500-l4,ooo.... -
Icing. See SIG.MET 2. Freezing level Upper Mississippi Valley, Upper

Great Lakes at or near surface and over mid Mississippi, Lower Ohio Valley
4,ooo-l2_,000 sloping upwards f'rom NW to SE.
Turbulence. See SIGMET l.
b. At 0855 the Weather Service Forecast Office at Chicago issued

SIGMET Charlie l, valid f'rom 0855-l300 as follows:
over Ill., Ind., southern Wis., southern Lake Mich., southern Lower
Mich. occasional moderate or greater turbulence below l5,000 feet.
Continue advisory beyond 1300. See area forecast to be issued l300
for f'urther advisories.
The aviation area forecast valid at l300 contained the following

SIGMETS:
SIG.MET l. Over southern Wis., southern Lake Mich., southern Lower

Mich., Ind., Ill., K:y., Mo., Ia., occasional moderate or greater
turbulence below 20,000 feet. Continue beyond l900.
SIGME!r 3. Over Wis., Mich., Upper Great Lakes, Ind., Ill., Ky., Mo.,
~astern Iowa, moderate and occasionally severe mixed icing in clouds and
precipitation. Continue beyond l900.
c. Following a.re portion ·if' terminals forecasts issued by the Weather

Service Forecast Office, Chicago at l042, valid beginning at lOOO:
ll00-2200, ceiling 500 f'eet overcast_, l mile, light freezing drizzle,

light snow, fog, variable to ceiling 200 feet obscured,
~mile_, light freezing_drizzle, fog or light snow, fog.
Midway _
(same forecast as for 0 1 Ha.re)

DCA 73-A-3 7
d. Following are :pertinent forecasts issued by United Air Lines

Weather Center:
l. storm Warning Nr. 68, j ssued at 0236, valid from 0300-l200, for
Kansas City International, Des Moines_, Cedar Rapids, Moline,
Milwaukee, 0 1 Ha.re and 11idway. Expect occasional light freezing
precipitation thru :period slowly decreasing from the west.
2. United c~Lea.:r air turbulence forecast issue at o6l8, valid fo~

l300 to ;~oo. Low level clear air turbulence produced by wind
shear for the following terminals: 0 1 Hare, Midway, South Bend,
Muskegon, Grand Rapids, Fort Wayne.
7. Weather Briefing Services
a. The Meteorologists-in-charge of both the Weather Service Foree& t

Office, Washington, D.C., and the Weather Service Office at Washington
National Airport have certified that their offices have no record of having
briefed United Air Lines Flight #553 a .Boeing 737e ~
b. The extent of preflight weather services provided to the fligb.t-

crew by the company is unknown to the undersigned •
.-- 8. Miscell~1eous
a. The altirneter setting devices at both Midway and 0 1 Hare were

checked against a standard barometer by the National Weather Service. The
results were as f, )llows:
Midway - l-3-73: -.007 inches
0 'Hare - l-4-73: +,O(ll inches
@h_),~~
Alan I. Brunstein ~
Senior olo ist, NTSE '\
a.nuary l6, l973 - _____../
·,
DOCKET NO. SA.-435
EXRIB IT NO. 13-F
.KATIOKAL TJWISPOllTATIOlf SUETY BOAIUl

Bureau of Avia tiQll safety
W&ahington, D. c. 20591
UBITBD AIR -LDES, IlfC.
AllTS III DA.TA

UHITED FLIGHT 553
APPIOACH TO MIDWAY
DECBKBJ!;I. 8, 1972
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FLIGHT UA 553 ALTITUDE AND GltOUllD SPEED
AT SPECIFIED TIMES DERIVED FR~ ARTS III DilTA
UA FLT. 553 UA FLT. 553

TIME GaOURD SPE!D ALTITUDE
G.M. T. KTS. FEET - MSL
2022:00 UA 553 ACDIOWLEDGED SLOWIRG TO 180 KTS. 220 4000
2023:20 UA 553 ACDCM..EDGED SLOWDG TO 160 KTS. 210 4000
2023:25 UA 553 AllROU!fCED LEAVDG 4000 101. 2.000 FT. 210 4000
2023:40 9 VS ANBOUKCED 140 KTS. 210 4000
2023:45 UA 553 ANHOUJICED SLOWIRG TO APP~CH SPEED 210 40QO
2024:45 9 VS ADVISED TO JEEP Aii.SPEED UP 170 3600
2025:25 UA 553 CHANGED TO MDW l'UQtJD'CY 160 3100
2026:25 MDW ADVISED OE> of UA 553 GO-ilOllRD 120 2100
2027:02 GO-AIOmID GIVER TO UA 553 120 1100
2/23/73
Docket No. SA-435
~xhibit No. 13-B

Washington, D. C.
AUTOMATED . RADAR TERMINAL· SYSTEM
(ARTS-3) COMPUTER PRINTOUT
UNITED AIR LINES FLIGHT 553

DECEMBER 8, 1972
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Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 13-C

Washington, D. C.
ffiRFORMANCE DATA PLOT DEVELOPED
FROM ARTS -.3 INFORMATION

DECEMBER 8, 1972
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 13-D
;..I
NATIONAL TRANSroRTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C.
APPROXIMATE FLIGHT PATH PROFILE DEVELOIBD
FROM ARTS-3 INFORMATION AND TIME . CORRELATED
TO COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER TRANSCRIPT
DECEMBER 8, 1972
:,f·'
NATIONAL TRA:r:rSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Washington, D. C.
EXCERPrS FROM BOEING 737 CERTIFICATION, DATA

TABLE 1-1
'<;-- )
FAR 25 REGULATION CHECKLIST
FAR 25 Sub,ject Substantiation
25.1093(0) Induction System Anti-Icing Ahalysis D6-17728 & Flight

Tests D6-lo666
25 .1309(a) (b) Equip. System Installations Ana'.!.ysis D6-17728 & Flight
(c) (l) (3c) Essential Loads .with Engine Tests D6-1o666 ·
Out Conrl.itions
25.1323(e) Airs~ Indicator System Vendpr Iteru-Qua.ll!ied to FAA

(Heated Pitot-Static Tube) Te.chnic!!.l Stantard Order Cl6,
Hefer,nice 24.
. ~·
25.1325(b) Static Pressu+e Systems Similarity With 707 & 727
(Exposure to Icing Cond.) Aircraft & Operation During
Flight Test P.cogram.
25.1419(a) Ice Protection .Analysis
t
(b) Operational An.alysis J.:6-J.7728
(c~~l) Laboratory Tests Lab Tei:;ts T6-5007 *
Dry Air Flight Tests Flight Tests D6-1o666
c) ( 2)
4) Natural Icing Flight Tests
d) Power Plant Icing
*Data frorn T6-5007 is also included in this document under. Lab Testing.
{ .... _i
REY SYM B ~Ll.~,,,Ai'~ !No, D6-1T{2D

PAGE 1.4
6-7000
3• SYST&r DESC}.UPUON
I
The :following ta;bulation summarizes the t~ and :meana of protection
'---'
provided :for the surfaces of the 737 which are subject to i.c.ing or
fogging. A diagram sr1owi11g the protected surfaces is given in Fie-. 3-l
TABLE 3-1
MEANS OF PRorECTI~
SUBSYSTn.t PR.orECTION ~ OR HEAT SOURCE
Wing Leadir,g Ed.ge Slat Anti-Icing Air Conditioning
SUpply Mani fold
(eighth stage or
high pressure
bleed air)
Engines Cowl Leading Edge Anti-Icing High Pressure
Compressor Bleed·
Air Mixed With
Engine Inlet
Airflow
Inlet Guide Vanes Anti-Icing Eighth Stage
Nose Dome and Pt
Probe 2 Compressor Bleed
Air
Empennage None
@>
Windshields No. l and Ho. 2 Anti-Icing anrl .Electrical
Antl-F1?5g lnP,
No. 4 and No. '.i Jtnti.-Focginc; Electrica.l
Ho. 3 n0n1? @>
W;ndows I'assenecr None
@>
~ & Pitot Static Tubes All l\nt: -Ic l.ng !'!lee tr ical
Stall Warning Anti.-iclne
Senso1~ Electr>!al
Static Ports None

Total TCll\]?era- Anti-Icing
ture Probe Electrical
:bU.Sela.ge (~done) Hone

A.i.r Condit iOnil.1(:, None
Ram Air Scoop
Fuel Tank Vent None
Auxiliary Power Un.Lt (APU) None
0 ~
[t>
All systems wh i.ch provide.. ant :-icin;:; a:re also capable of clekinc.
Component is deslgnerl to 9revent cr"Ltlcal l.ce (or fog) formation.
Not required baserl. on service e~~per ience and fl Lglit tests.
REV 5YM :& BDEIAl'D No.J::6-l772/:0

. --)--
PAGE 3.l
37 Natural Icing Flight Tests Description
NU111erous flights, aa shO'Wn in Reference 20, were conducted on
airplane PA002 in search of icing conditions sufficient to demon-
1'trate the model 737 airplane ice protection systems performance.
During flight• 25-6, 25-16, 25-22, and 25-30, sufficient icing
conditions were encountered and are discussed herein. These flights
were conducted off the coasta.o! Califoniia, Oregon, and Washington.
The results of these tests are diacuaaed in Sections 38.l through
38.8.
37 .1 Flight 25-6
Mostly cu:mulua type clouds were encountered at altitudes between
9,000 to 101 500 ft and ambient air temperature of 10 F during
flight 25-6. The liquid water content and icing rates aa
detenrlned from the N.ACA rate meter -were considered as light to
moderate icing conditions. Viau.al observations and cloud droplet
aamplea indicated small drops 12 to 15 microns in diameter. Repeated
penetrations of the icing clouds were made until one to 1-1/2 inches
of moetly rime ice had accumulated on the wing !llld empennage leading
edges. The airplane was flown into clear air to obtain photographs
of the ice accretion. The airplane handling characteristics -were
deJllO!lstrated vi th this ice on the surfaces. The wing vas then de -iced
to check the wing ice protection system de-icing capabilities.
The nul!iber one engine anti-icing l!lyatem we.a turned o'ff periodically to
allow up to 1/2 inch of ice to build up on the cowl lip. The engine
"'
~
"'0
<
.-
REV SYM c HOE,N& NO. D6-17728
PAGE 37.l
6·7000
re sponu v:'..t11- L:e accretion on the inlet was checked. The engine
inlet Yaa then de-iced and the effect on engine performance o!
ice Bhedding '1aa checked. The airpilne 'WaB taken to 22, 000 tt
altitude after which a descent to 5,000 ft altitude was made to
demonstrate the ice shedding trom the empennage.
37.2 Flight 25-16

Light to moderate icing conditions "Were encountered during !light
25-16 at altitudes from 8,000 to 17,000 feet e.nd ambient
temperatures of -6 to 10 F. The ave~e liquid "Water content
for a four-minute icing encounter vaa • 39 GM/M3 as determined.
from the AACA icing rate meter (aae :Figure 38-l). Tbe anti-icing
system.8 -were turned on and system perfonu.nce data "Were obtained.
A continued search was made for more severe icing conditions by

flying into cUJIUlus clouds over the Olympic Mounts.ins. Alternate
conditiais of hea'fY rain and snow were encountered but "With very
little supercooled water. During prolonged operation in these con-
ditions the pilot's and tir1lt officer's aira:peed indication mal-
functioned. Thia occurred at 16,500 ft altitude and returned to
normal after descending to 121 600 ft altitude.
37.3 Flight 25-22

Light icing condition5 were encountered during flight 25-22. The
icing rate aa measured by the NACA rate meter and equivalent
"'
"'"
REV SYM c .HD.EhV& No-D6-17728

PAGE 37.2
liquid water ·content are shown in Figure 38-2. 'r.1e ici~
~ncounter vas at 15, 300 ft altitude "With an ambient temperature
of 3 F. Cloud droplet samples "Were taken and a typical sample
is shown in Figure 38-3. ·rhe lee protection systems vere
turned on and system performance data were obtained for the
icing duration shown in Figure 38-2.
37.4 Flight 25-30
After repeated searches for severe icing conditions during daylight
flights, it "Was decided to prepare the airplane for a 24-hour
standby. The airplane was equipped with lights for possible
night photographing of ice accretion. During flight 25-30, which
was conducted at night, severe icing conditions "Were encountered.
The first icing encounter occurred in cumulus clouds, at 10, 000 ft
altitude and an ambient temperature of -6 F. The airplane 'o'ae
circled several times through the condition at 229 knots true

airspeed with the wing, No. 2 engine, and other anti-icing
systems on. The average li~uid water content was .76 GM/~ and
a maximum LWC of 1.87 GM/M' over a 5-1/2 minute duration of the
icing encounter. These values were determined from the icing
rate meter and are sh0>1n in Figure 38-5. Figure 38-·4 presents a cloud
droplet sample taken during the encounter and indicates an
average drop di&llleter of 13 microns. The pitot-static probes
froze during the initial portion of the first icing encounter,
because the heat was inadvertently le~ off. The probes de-iced
in less than two minutes after the heat waa turned on.
0
"'...
"'
.;:
REV SYM c .BDE-'.NC I
No.])6-17728
PAGE .
37 3
The e:econd .!.c;;.·.::g enco1.l:lkr of flight 25-30 occurred at 8, 000 ft
altitude and &'1 runrient ten..pere.ture of 5.0 }'. The average liq_uid
water conten~ for a 6.5 minute period. in this icing condition was
.31 GH/M3 with & ma:.d.mum of 1.20 GM/W as sh=n in Figure 313-6.
The cloud aver&£e droplet size ~as 11 microns in diameter which
is show:i in Figure 38-4.
The NACA icing rate meter indicated an aven.ge icing rate of
.21 inches per minute for the first icing encounter of flight 25-3f,
which agreed with visual observations of the ice build-up rates.
Ice accretions on the windshield viper posts, inboard wing, wi~g
mounted C&JDen., and periodically the No. l engine cowl vere used
tor visual observations of ice build-up rates. A photograph of
the ice accretion on the back of the wing mounted camer& is shovn
in Figure 38-8. This ice thickness is 1.1 to 1.5 inches and
represents the total ice accretion during tue first icing encounter
Of flight 25-30.
Ice Protection Systems Performance
The ice protection systems performance during the 737 natural
icing flight tests is discussed in the following paragraph•'
38.1 ~
The wing ice protection system was demonstrated both as an anti-
icing and de-icing system. During flight test 25-6 the system vas
demonatra.ted as a de-icing system. The airplane was flown through
icing clouds until approximately 1-1/2 inches of rime ice accreted
a
"
REY SYM BD.E.FN& ~o. D6-l 7728
c PAGE "":{8_ 1
on the wing laading edges aa shown in Figure 313-8. This ice shed
tree the heated leading edge ala.ta surfaces Yithin t'Wo minutes
after the sy11tea vaa turned on. 'l'be surface temperature prot'ile
at slat Sta. 350 is shown in Figure 38-9 for the de-icing run.
Thia ice accretion on the slat and other unheated aurfacea of the
Ying bad no apparent effect on airplane handling characteri•tica.
i
The wing system was operated as an anti-icing system on flights 25-16,
I 25-22, and 25-30. During anti-icing operation no ice or runback
I
ice occurred on ~ of the heated surfaces. The system performance
!
during the light icing encounter ot' flight 25-22 is shown in
Figure 3 8-2.
The wing anti-icing system pert'ormance during flight 25-16 is
presented in Figures 38-1 and )8-12. The average liquid Yater
content during this flight was .39 GM;J,f3 over a !'our-minute icing
encounter vith a lllEiXimum of .68 <>1/W aa determined from the NACA
icing rate meter. This icing condition is considered to be a
moderate icing encounter and is equivalent to FAR,part 25,con-
tinuou.s maximum conditions. D8ta for the slat surface temperature
profile (Figure 38-12) was taken at the .68 GM/W maximum liquid
water content point. No runback ice vas observed on any portion

of the heated 51.&ts during this test.
Figures 3 8-5, -6, -13, and -14 give the 11ing anti-icing syste11
performance during flight 25-30. The average LWC Yas • 76 GM/M3

c..
L...._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ · - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REV SYM
c HDE.hV& INO.D6-17728
PAGE 38. 2
6~7000
with a ma.xi~ of 1.87 GMM over a 5-1/2 minute period during
the fir:11t icing encounter. With an average drop diaireter of
12 microna a.nd an ambient temperature of -5 F this condition ia

con81dered a15 a heavy icing encounter ( aee Figures 38-10 and 38-11)
and it ex~s the FAR, part 25, continUOUI! maximum icing cloud.
The te~rature profile shown at Irig time 15.32.48 in Figure 38-13
represents the syatem performance during this 1llaXimum icing
encounter. Alao presented for compariaon is an equivalent icing
tunnel test condition which shows that the actual system performance
i8 generally better tbAn that predicted by theoretical an.alyais
and tunnel test data. A smal.1 amount ot runback ice was observed on
the slat upper aurfa.ce 5-1/2 inches att of the heated area.
The second icing encounter o:t 25-30 was a. moderate icing condition
with a.n average LWC o:t .31 GM/M3 as shown in l"igures 38-6 and
38-10. The airplane waa flown into this encounter 1iith the
ala.ta extended at 208 knots true air speed and normal holding
powers. The surface temperatures at slat Sta. 77 and 350 are shown
in Figure 38-14. Approximately 1/8 inch thick runback ice was
observed on the slat u~r sur:tace aft of the heated area as
shown in Figure 38-7. The flight was conducted at night in conditions
not favorable for good photographic coverage. The 727 outboard slat
surface tel!!Peraturea for an equivalent icing condition are included
for cm12parison, a.Di show that the 737 wing ice protection system
performe.nce is equal to or better than th&t of the 727 airplane.
REY SYM c HDEfN& INO.
PAGE
D6-1TI28
38.3 6-7000
/
38.2 Engine and Engine Inlet
\
The engine ice protection system performance
the llaJlle icing conditions as those described in the above wing
section diacussion and is preaented in Figures 38-2, -5, -6, -15,

-16, and -17.
During !lights 25-6 and 25-16, the No. 1 engine anti-icing Y&ll
turned of! occaaionally and up to 1/2 inch thick rime ice was
allowed to build up on the engine inlet cowl. The engine response
and performance were checked with thia ice accretion before the
heat wa. turned on. Figures 38-18 and 38-19 show the ice accretion
and ice shedding into the inlet during the Q.e-icing runs. There
was no apparent effect on engine response and performance. No
objectionable 1urging loaa of engine thrust or engine dB.J11age vas
experienced during ice shedding. On several occasions

a light surge occurred as the ice entered the engine.
There wu no apparent ice or runback ice on the cowl leading
edge, inlet guide vanes, or noae dome during anti-icing system
operation. The system performance in the moderate and heayy
icing encounten is shown in Figure 38-15. The 7Zf cCNl surface
temperatures for an equivalent heavy icing condition are shovn
for compariaon. The 731 performance in l!lOd.era te icing conditions

is compared to that of the 127 cowl in Figure 38-16. The system
performance in the light icing condition of !light 25-22 ia shown
compared to the 7Zf system performance in an equivalent icing

~.:
:, I
< ~---- ------ ------- -· -------- -------
REV SYM BDEhVC INo.r:6-1TI28 _
1· .\1.$- -.... J
condition in Figu:re 38-17. The natural icing !light te•t data
show that the 737 engin~ ice protection •ystem performance is
equivalent to or better than the 727 engine perrormance.
38.3 ~indshielda
The 737 vindahield &nti-icing ay•tem performance vaa demon•trated

throughout -the 737 !light tea-t program. The heated areas vere
aatis!acilorily anti-iced and anti-togged during all the icing
!1ight8. A a..11 amount of ice accretion vu observed in the
cornerl! o! the pilot and copilot JJo. l vindahield a.s ahown in
Figure 38-20.
3B.4 Auxiliary Pover Unit (APU) Operation in Icing Condition•
The APU operation, with an electrical load applied, vaa demonstrated
during all the natural icing !light test• conducted on the 737-130
airplane. There was no indication of any changes in APU perf'ormance
during these !lights.
During !light 25-6, when ice acc1.lllllllated greater than 1.0 inch
thick on the unheated portions of the wing and em:pennage, 1/4
., 3/8 inches o! r1Ille ice accumul.ated on the center portion or

to
the APJ inlet scoop lip. The illlpingement area was lees than 50
percent or the acoop lip width a• shown in Figure 3C-21. There
vaa no reduction in inlet area caused by this ice accretion as

i
shown in ~gure 38-22. During !light 25-30 a •evere icing con-
i
ii dition Walil encountered which resulted in 1.5 to 2.0 inches o!
0
<
REV SYM c BOEING \ No.D6-17728

PAGE 38. 5
ice accumulation on the unheated portions of the airplane. The
APU torque box plenum pres~cL.-e was measured and it relll8.ined
constant, except for normal pressure fluctlli'!tions with airplane
.:nach number, throug..1-iout all the flights in icing conditions.
Figure 38 -23 shows the APU torque box plenum pressure during and
after the severe icing condition encountered in Flight 2)-30. The
APU exhaust gas temperature ~as monitored during all icing flights
and it remained unaffected as observed by the FAA pilots H. Joines

and R. Ul!l.
The maximum ice accretion on the unheated portions of the 737
airfoils considered for airplane hAndling evalUAtion is a nominal
three-inch ice thickness calculated during a holding flight
condition for 30 to 45 minutes in continuous maximum icing con-
di tiona. The one to 1-1/2 inches ice accumulation on the wing and
empe~e was approximately half of this maximum ice thickness.
Applying the same factor to the APU ice accumulation of flight 25-6
and adjWJting for gla~e icing conditions, the maximum ice thickness
on the APU lip would be appro:ximately 3/4 of an inch, as shCNn in
Figure 38-22. This ice accretion "1ill not restrict the inlet scoop
flow area below the throat area, connquently, it will not affect
APU operation or associated 40 KVA generator operation.
Perlormance of the APU NACA submerged inlet scoop as a !unction
of inlet throat area blockage is shown in Figure 38-24. The Boeing
737 inlet scoop throat area is slightly larger tb4n the optimum
0
NACA inflight design specification. This characteristic is evidenced
* by the rise in preuure recovery uen in Figure 38-24 'ilith appN:xi-
REY SYM C
PAGE 38.6 &.70.00
The 737 empen.nage does not have an ice protection system. Air-
plane handling characteristics vere evaluated after up to 1-1/2
inch thick rime ice cap had :!.CCUlllulated on the wing and empennage
airfoil surface, as shown in Figure 38-21, during flight 25-6.
Ice shedding !rem the horizontal stabilizer waa demonstrated when
the airplane vas descended from 22,000 ft altitude to 5,000 ft.
All the ice had shed· .from the stabili:r;er in •ma.11 pieces before
the airplane reached 5,000 ft altitude. During flight test 25-30
the airplane hand.ling characteristic• were evaluated with 1-1/2
to 2.0 inches ice thickness on the unheated wing and e:mpennage
leading edge surfaces. In addition, airplane handling and atability
cb.aracteriatics have been deteI"ll.ined vith three-inch thick
simulated ice formation. attached to the uilheated inboard ving
and empenna.ge airfoil leading edges (Reference 25). Both the
natural icing and silllllated icing !light testing have shown that
the 737 airplane can be operated safely without a.n e~nna.ge ice
protection aystem.
38.6 Unprotected Coa:ponents
Ice accretion on unprotected components such a• the air conditioning
ram air scoop, radome, and windshield vipers had no noticeable
effect on aystem performance involving these components. A
photograph of ice accretion on the air conditioning ram air scoop,

II inboard vind landing light and Krueger flap& during flight test
I
n I 25-6 is shown in Figure 38-25. Some ice wu observed on the rs.dome
~l__~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_J
REV SYM c .BO.EI.NC INO. DEi-17728
PAGE 38. 7 6·7000
&f'ter 11.nding subsequ«llt to _,evera.l of the n&tu:ral icing flights.
This a.ccretion bad no appe.rent a.f:fect on ra.dome perfoniance. No
detr:iJa8nta.l effects vara noted :t'!"om the ice which shed trom the
unprotected ccmponents.
38.7 Pitot-Static Probes
During flight 25-16 a loas of pilot's a.nd :first orf'icer' s a.irspeed
indication "lolll.S experienced. The incident occurred &tter prolonged
operation in alternate conditions of he&vy rain, snov, a.nd below
l"reezi:ng temperatures 1'hile ~ing thro~ cumulus clouds. How-
i
eTI:r, the a.irspeed imlie&tions r•turned to no:rm&.l a.tter descendillf\
I
to lUl altitude of 12,6oo feet where the total a.ir temperature W"as
15 F.
I
I
I
! An investiga.tion of the cause of this a.irspeed indica.tion mal:function
"W11.a tra.ced to ice plugging of the tota.l press~ aense line in the
pitot-sta.tic probes. After prolonged. flight in hea.vy precipita.tion,

auf'f'icient W"ater accumula.ted in the total pressure sense line which
resulted. in total blockage when the l>'ater :froze during flight in
clear a.ir. Subsequent l&bor&tory a.nd flight testing with in:itru-
mented probes substa.ntated that the unheated portion ot the total
pre.ssure sense line in the probe base is a. potential cold spot.
The vendor, Rosemount Engineering Com:pe.ny, is redesigning the pitot-
sta.tic probes to provide additiona.l h..a.ting o:f the tota.l pressure
sense line near the probe base. These pitot-sta.tic probes, Fart
L : e r l0-61458-3 (Vendor P/H 85M.E-4) will be in.stalled on all
*
0
737 Airplanes prior to customer deli very. The redesign.ct probe con-
~ ce t bas been coordine.ted..with FAA's Western Region """'-........_"-"-.__~~~~-.J

.REV SYM
c
6-7000
39 Conclu.siona
1. Ground and flight te~t data ahows that all ice protection ayetem.ll
can ba operated without affecting th& aatety or structural

integrity of the airplane.
2. Natu:ral icing flight test data corroborates dry air and icing
tunnel data.
3. It was demonatra.ted. that the 737 airplane control and safety
are unaffected by ice formations on the unprotected areas.
4. The natural icing flight teste de1110nstrated that the engine

can ingest considerable a.mount• of ice without reduction in
engine performance.
5. It was demonstrated that adequate windshield clearance dre&
could be provided by the pnetllllatic anti-fog system to safely
operate the 737 airplane in the event of a No. 1 or No. 2

windahield electrical heating ayatem failure.
6. It is concluded that these flight testa together with the analysis
and icing tunnel test have demonstrated that all ice protection
systems meet FAR,Part 25, requirements for safe flight through

severe icing conditions.
0,
<•
l.-----·-----·------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - '
REV SYM c .HOE/NC INO, D6-l7728
PAGE ?O 1
h
· 1e"
42.3 Improved Pi.tot-Static Probes
Pitot sense line freezing was experienced on the original
10-61458-3 pitot-static probes during one of the 737 natural

icing flight test demonstrations (see Section 38.7); consequently,
the probe has been modified to incorporate changes which will
increase pitot sense line heating. Also, other design changes
have been made to improve the pitot-static performance. Informa-
tion and performance data pertaining to the improved probes were
submitted for the FAA approval in References 37 through 4o as
the modifications were being incorporated. The FAA requested
that the information also be included in this document.
The pitot-static probe modifications and anti-icing performance
arc prE:ser,ted belov1 for each new Boelnes part numbe.r.
l. Part Number 10-61458-3 (Rosemount P/N 856AE-4)
This is the original pitot-static probe installed on
production 737 airplanes (See Ref. 37). A~er the pitot
sense line freezing incident it was redesigned to improve
the heating capability by; a) rerouting the heating element
to maintain contact with the pitot sense line at the probe
base and, b) incorporating provisions to reduce the heat
conduction from the pitot sense line into the probe base.
The improved -3 probe pitot sense line heating performance
is shown in Figure 42-4. The improved -3 probe was :t'urther
modified by Boeing by the installation of a silicone rubber
~1 boot on the probe mast as an inter:im fix. The boot. was
~IL__~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~-~~
bonded to the base and lower mast up to one inch from the j.
~
REV SYM E DOE/At'& ~o. Do-17728
PAGE 42.6
base. The boot limited the heat loss from the probe in this
area causing a higher ~emperature of the total pressure sense
line y.rithout effecting the anti-icing of the probe tip. The
addition of the boot adds 25 to 30°F to the sense line tempera-
ture rise at the probe base. The sense line temperature profile
in the mast was then nearly constant at 70°F above total air
temperature; see Ref. 38.
2. Part Number 10-61458-4 (Rosemount P/N 856AE-5)
The l0-61458-4 probe is the improved -3 modified by the
addition. of two extra sen.sine; holes added for the 8

2
(auxiliary) static system; see Ref. 39. This modification
was initiated to provide improved accuracy readout for the
737 customers having electro-pneumatic altimeters. The
extra sensing holes will reduce the difference in pressure
between 81 (basic flight instrument system) and 82 (auxil~ary
system) that exists when the probe is installed on the 737-200
airplanes.
The -4 probe anti-icing capability is identical to that of
the -3 probe shown in Figure 42-4.
The 10-61458-7 probe has the latest Rosemount Engineering
Company's improved heater configuration installed (!lee Ref.
39). The improved configuration includes:
a) Isolation of the pitot sense line from the probe base
by means of an isolating washer.
~t__~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__J
REV SYM E HOE/At'& N•).
PAGE
D6-.l7723
42.7 +-
.r~
~vi.--------------,
b) Increased heater power consumption from 30 watts to
I 45 watts; and
c) Rerouting of tl'e heater e::..ement to obtain better heating
of the sense line in the probe mast and base area.
These modifications have resulted in a substantial increase
of the :pi.tot sense line temperatures as verified by Rosemount
icing tunnel tests which were initiated by the
vendor to meet Boeing revised l0-61458 specifications. The -7
probe anti-icing capability is equivalent to, or better than,
that of the -3 probe with the Boeing rubber boot installed.
The -3 probe is being replaced by the -7 probe.
'.l'he .L0-6.L458-6 prooe is a modi!"ied. -·r with two add.i tiona.L static
sensing hd.es incorporated as described in item 2 above. These
probes will be used on the 737-200 airplanes to comply with
customer static pressure sensing requirements.
The -8 probe anti-icing capability is identical to that of
the -7 probe.
The tlrain hole location on the pitot static probes was changed to
provide better drainage with a nose up attitude of the airplane.
The "old" location is used on all -3 probes and early -7 probes
installed on the 737-100 and 737-200 airplanes. The "new" location
is used .on all -8 probes installed on the 737-200 airplanes and
later -7 probes installed on the 737-100 airplanes. A drawing of
0 the drain hole locations was submitted to the FAA in Ref. 40 letter.
"
< L-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~
REY SYM E HLl'Ef..t'YC >IC. D6-:!.. 772B

PAGE 1+2.8
.. · ..
NOTE: 1) The improved 10-6J45B-3 probe without the Boeing
boot installed shoUld not be used on the 737 airplanes.
2) The 10-6~4~8-4 probe is discontinued. This part number
was originated to allow for the improved -3 production
probes to be modified f~r static sensing compensationo
The -8 probe replaces the -4 probe •.
REY SYM E D6-17722

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- - - - - - f"llU T OfTICER' ~ ST.(l'IC Wczj 1'1.IGHT "ECOllOE"
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- - - -2nd AUX STATIC
-------CA,.TAitfS SU.TIC
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a<( FIGURE 42-2
REY SYM .BOE/NC NO. D6-l 28

PAGE 42.4
5-7000
SUHMARY
Handling qualities of the 737-100 series airplane with simulated ice shapes
installed on the unheated leading edge portions of the wing and empennage
were investigated for FAA certification. Testing was conducted to show
compliance with FAR 25.1419 and TTA CT113'.J\.IE-D. TC>st conditions were flown
to demonstrate satisfactory hlgh speed handling characteristics,
maneuverability and stall characteristics. The results of the ice shapes
testing satisfy the above certification regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The 737-100 series airplane, N73700, was test flown at forward and aft C.G.
positions to satisfy .the intent of References (a) and (b) by demonstrating
that no serious degradation of airplane characteristics exis.t with ice
build .ups on the unheated leading edge portions of the wing and empennage.
The ice shapes dimensioning and placement were determined as described in

Reference (c). The ice shapes were photographed as installed on the airplane
surfaces and are shown on Pages 27 through 3l .
Two ice shapes configurations were necessary to complete the testing.

Different wing ice shapes configurations were required for the flaps up
testing and the flaps down testing. The maximum ice build up configuration
(Page 28 ) made it impossible to lower the Krueger flaps; therefore, all
flaps down tested was conducted with a different configuration (Page29).
The testing conducted is summarized in Table I on Pages6i7, and is outlined
below.
The high speed handling characteristics and maneuverability were evaluated

by banking the airplane in both directions with 0 and 10 flaps. Roll
response was also eval~ated.
Full stalls were conducted with flaps 0, 15 and 40 at both forward and aft
C.G. positions. Stalls were initiated from 1.4 Vs trim speed at idle powe.!·.
Steady sideslips were conducted to maximum rudder deflection, both right and
le.ft, with flaps 40.
Sudden heading changes were evaluated into and away from an inoperative
engine with 15 flaps. Lateral control was used to keep the wings level.
Approach stability was investigated with flaps 15, landing gear up, at aft
C.G. to demonstrate that no serious degradation of longitudinal stability
due to ice build up exists.
.
0
"'
"' Trim characteristics with ice shapes installed were evaluated.
0
<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
DDEI.N& NO. Db-1066 7

REV SYM
PAGC:
Sec. 1.35.051 2
Tests 'Were conducted by FAA pilots, <. D. Melton and E. E. Sutherland, ancl
Boeing pilot, B. S. Wygle, at Hoeing Field, Seattle, Washington.
The test airplane was a Model 737-lJO, Airplane N73700, in production

aerodynamic configuration as described in Reference (d) 'With ice shapes
installed as called out by Reference (e).
INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA REDUCTION
Frequency Modulation (Fi-!), Pulse Code Modulation (PCH) and Pulse Duration
Modulation (PDH) magnetic tape systems were used to record test data, see
Reference (f). These data are contained in Reference (g). Manual notes
were taken to supplement the tape recorded data and are filed in Reference (h).
Time history plotted data contained in this report were recorded and plotted
at a rate of 2.5 samples per second for the PDM and PCM data. F~! data were
recorded continuously and plotted at a rate of 5 samples per second. The
IMB 7094 and 360 computers were used to process ra'W data into calibraced
and computed data. The computer programs used are substantiated in
Reference (i).
RESULTS A.~D DISCUSSION

.!!_.j,g_h_S.:e..e~_d_H_<!_P,iling Characteristics
General handling characteristics were evaluated by conducting rollinQ

maneuvers in both directions. Bank angles of approximately +45 de~rees were
reached. Test conditions were investigated at N.84 and 355 KIAS at altituces
of 30,000 feet and 10,700 feet respectively. Testing was conducted at a
forward CG position with flaps retracted. Test data are shown on Pages 8
through 10.
No unacceptable degradation of handling characteristics with ice shapes

installed was noted.
~a~e~v~r1!_b.:!:_l:!:_ty
Maneuverability was evaluated in steep banked turns, and also be perfornin~

a go-around maneuver. The go-around maneuver was conducted by retractin~
the flaps from position 40 to 2 while simultaneously applying power.
Maneuverability was investigated with flap positions of 0 and 10 for s~eeds
of 270 KIAS at 15,300 feet and 1.3 V5 respectively. Test data are sho·~-ri on
P~ges 11, 12 and 13.
The ice shapes had no unacceptable effects on the airplane maneuverabi!.~ty.

I.r..f.m_ Cl:_aI_a.s_t~r_!_s.!'._i£S
Trim characteristics with ice shapes installed were evaluated concurrently
with conditions covered in Reference (j). Sufficient stabilizer tri~
capability exists to ~anually trin the airplane at 1.4 Vs with flnps ~J.
idle power and a forw;ird C.G. position. Test results were satisfactoc1.
Test da.~_a_a!_a_f'_,h_o_,,,_·c_.-~n ._P_a-';;'-e_7_.___________________
REV SYM LiTLTEf/VC NO. D(;-)i;f,-,/

-------+--------
PAGE
Sec. 1.35.051 3
RESULTS AXD DISCUSSION (Continued)
Idle power stalls were conducted at 0, .15 nn<l 40 flap positions. ThC'
airplane 'NaSI trimmed at approximately 1. 4 V8 for all st.alls. Stall entry rate> a[!
approximately 1 knot/s<!cond were u,;cd for the <;talls. Hoth forward and aft ·
C.G. positions were investigaced for the above flap settings. lnitial
buffet with ice shapes installed was noted at speeds higher than those noted
W'ith no ice shapes installed. The stall warning system "'as active and
satisfactory for the conditions performed. Stall characteristics were
satisfactory with no discernible rolling tendencies. Time history scall
plots are shown on Pages 14 through 25 •
Control forces were evaluated at aftC.G. during steady sideslips with a

flap setting of 40. Sideslips were conducted both right and left by
trimming at l.J Vs and then applying rudder increments of approximately
+22 degrees. Approximate sideslip ~p's of ±3.5 inches H2 0 were obtained.
The airplane was released from the sideslips and allowed to return to trim.
The stability characteristics were described as being "satisfactory.''
Sudden heading changes of approximately 15 degrees away from and into the
inoperative number 2 engine were conducted with 15 flaps. The airplane was
trimmed at 1.4 Vs and a gross weight of 90,000 pounds. Aileron control was
used to keep the wings level during the maneuvers.
The heading changes were obtained for rudder inputs of 9.5 and -17 degrees.
Directional control was satisfactory.
Approach stability with ice shapes installed was evaluated at an aft C.G.
position. The airplane was trimmed at 1.4 Vs W'ith a flap setting of 15
and gear up. The airplane gross weight was approximately 90,000 pounds.
Testing was conducted by slowing to 1.1 Vs and accelerating to VFE frnm the
trim speed using elevator control only. The test results presented on
Page 26 show that positive stability exists.
CONCLUSIONS
The stall characteristics were normal and acceptable for all of the conJitions
investigated. Sufficient elevator control is available to cunduct full stalls
and the stall warning system provides adequate warning with ice shapes
installed.
The sideslip maneuvers and sudden heading changes were satisfactory wit~
0
the ice shapes installed.
0
<'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'
eoEnvc I,,oD6-l066 7
REY SYM
\PAGE 6-?IJC:)
Sec. 1.35.051 4
CONCLUSIONS (Continued)
Approac1;i stability is satisfactory. :'he stabil,ity curve slope vas positive

and acceptable.
:;: The airplane maneuverability and high speed handling qualities were acceptable
during the simulated ice testin~.
The airplane trim characteristics with ice shap~s installed vere satisfactory.
The test results presented in this report accomplish the intent of

,.. FAR 25.1419 and TIA CT1139WE-D.
~. a
~/L~~~:___--~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~
REY SYM .SL7EZ!V& NO. D6-l01i67
PAGE
Sec. 1.35.051 5
-,
AD 1546 D
;u
rn
<
(/1 TABLE I
-<
::;::
Simulated Ice Shapes Test Summary - Airplane N73700
(Reference FAR 25.1419, TIA CTll39WE-D)
Gross
Configuration wt.~ C.G.~
Condition No. ~ F1aps/Gear Kruger flaps lb x 10-3 t_MAc Remarks
i.35.05i.001 85-1 O"/TJp Locked TJp 88.8 10.2} High speed handling characteristics testing
.002 85-1 o•/TJp Locked TJp 82.8 10.6 was performed. Airplane trimmed at M.84
(30,000 feet) and 350 KIAS (10,000 feet).
l
.003 85-1 o•/TJp Locked TJp 88.7 10.2} Airplane trimmed at 270 KlAS (10,000 :teet) and
.004 85-4 10°/TJp Free 88.9 10.6 at 1.3 Ys 1 (10,000 feet). Msneuve1~bility
evaluated,
.005
.006
85-1
85-4
O"/TJp
15° /Up
Locked TJp
Free
88.2
91
10.2
ig·2:
Airpl•ne trimmed ot i.• V,l' idle power.
Stalls conducted for various entr:r ratee ,<Ja
.007 85-4 40°/Dn Free 90,5
.008 85-2 O"/TJp Locked TJp 90.2 29 2 noted on plots.
.009 85-3 15°/TJp Free 92.1 29.9
U'l
(ti .010 85-3 40°/Dn Free 91.6 29.9
~
f-' .on 85-3 40°/Dn Free 91.2 29. 9 } Airplane trimmed at 1. 3 V8 • Right and left
.012 40° /Dn
~
w 85-3 Free 91 29.9 sideslips conducted.
Lil
.013 15"/Up
~
0
Lil 85-3 Free 90.6 30 } Sudden heading change right and left. l.4 V6
f-' .014 85-3 15° /Up Free 90.5 30 trim with one engine inoperative.
-
~ . 015 85-3 15°/TJp Free 90.2 30 } Approach stability (Ll V6 ). Trimmed at 1.4 V6 •
~>Cl Iz0
.016 85-3 15°/Up Free 89.6 30 Approach stability (VFE). Trimmed at 1.4 Y8 •
•
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-< T ABL E I (Continued)
3:::
Simulated Ice Shapes Test Summary - Airplane N73700
(References FAR 25.1419, TIA CT1139WE-D)
Configuration Gross Wt. - C.G. -

Conditi~ Test Flaps/Gear Krueger Flaps lb. :x: lo-3 ~ OSTAB - Units, Power, V-KCAS Alt - Ft
1.15.051.001 85-1 O/Up Locked Up 83.8 10,8 Trim 8.0 Level 173 9,700 J
Point Flt
.002 84.8 10.7 7.2 188 9,100 ·.•·· ~.i[,._j
.003 85.8 10.5 6.3 205 9,100 ... "'.:,::'
.004 85-1. 0/Up Locked Up 86.4 10.4 6.0 221 9,100 ..
,005 Deleted
,006 85-4 l/Up Free 84.1 10.2 8.5 143 13,100
.007 85,0 10.4 8.2 153 13,500
.003 85.9 J.0.6 7.4 , 171 13,200
.009 l/Up 87.1 11 6,8 184 13,900
n~ .010 40/Dn 83,2 10.5 12.3 106 13,500 ,.
..... >...
<1 .011 81.9 l0.6 12.2 11s 13,200
w ·~ 1.15.051.012 80.5 10.7 12 Level 127 12,500
!;"
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::C ~ 1.35.051,00! 85-4 40/Dn Free 90.5 10.4 Trim *15,1 Idle 136 12,000
~ I · Point
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'1' >'<XOTE: 1.4 VrJ trim was obtained manually past the electrical trim limit of 13 units ·'
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?AGE 31
SUMMARY
The flight test results reported herein were conducted on Hodel 737-130, N73700
to establish the drag pola~s at three flap settings with simulated ice fitted to
the tail surfaces and the wing leadinh ed~e in the Krueger flap area. These
results vill be compared l<lth the certification drag polars established on
Hodel 737-130 N2286C and the resultini;: :i.ncrement used to calculate climb per-
formance of the 737-100 and -200 under icin~ conditions.
Final drag polars and climb calculations are presented in Reference (o).
INTRODUCTION
Reference (n) specifies airplane climb performance minima and, during operations
into known icing conditions, allowances must be made for extra drag caused by
ice formation on those areas of the airplane which do not have de-ice or anti-ice
provisions. On the 737-100 and -200 these areas include the vertical and hori-
zontal tail surface leading edges and the wing leading edge between the fusela&e
and nacelle in the Krueger flap area.
Reference (q) outlines the derivation of the simulated ice shapes and defines the
Krueger flaps UP and DOwN installation on airplane Hodel 737-130, N73700.
The tests were flown at approximately the for.rard CG limit (9%) of the airplane
at three flap settings, namely, UP and 1 with gear up, 40 with gear down.
Increments at flaps 1 and 4o will enable approach and landing climb performance
to be calculated under icing conditions.
All tests were conducted from Boeing Field on Hodel 737-130 N73700 with
Mr. B. S. ~ygle as the Boeing pilot. FAA pilots were Hr. E. Southerland for
Test 85-1 and Mr. D. Helton for Test 85-4. Hr. D. R. Buell was the FAA engineer
on each test.
All the instrumentation measurements necessary to compute thrust and hence dra~
were recorded by a Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) magnetic tape system which is
described in detail in reference (g).
Airspeed and altitude information was supplied by a shielded pi tot and trailing
bomb static pressure sensing device. References (k) and (1) present the pressure ,
error of these devices from wind tunnel calibrations; these errors are used in
the reduction of flight test data to obtain correct airspeed and altitude data.
The computer programs to produce performance information are the Basic Airplane
(Bi\), Engine Perfor.iance (EP), Entlne Fuel Flow (EFF) and Airplane Perfor:·~:i.nce
(AP) and these are described in Reference (g); the document substantiating these
programs to the FAA is given under reference (h).
~I
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<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
REV SYM HD..EhVC I

NO. Df1-10667
Sec. 1.15.051 I
PAGE 2
INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA REDUCTION (Continued)
References (f) and (g) develop the eouations used in the basic drag computation
equations and are summarized below:
(1) _ "'· _ !!_

D - ~N
• dv _ !!. • dh
g dt V dt
where D = total drag (lbs.)
FN = total thrust (lbs.)
W gross weight (lbs.)
V true airspeed (ft./sec.)
g gravitational constant (32.174o5 ft/sec.2)
dv rate of change of T.A.S. during condition (ft/sec.2)
dt
dh
dt =rate of change of tapeline altitude during condition (ft/sec.)
.Ambient Temn. (•K)
(2) Tapeline Altitude= Pressure Altitude x l.S.A. Temp: (6K)
(3) Airplane Drag = Total Drag - Trailing Bomb Drag
The trailing bomb drag increment is obtained from reference (m). In (1) above,
dv dh ·
dt and dt are obtained by the computer program sloping the true airspeed and
tapeline altitude time histories. Automatic plots of these are available in
reference (e) together with the complete outputs of the computer pro~rams.
Details of the instrumentation configuration for each test is given in

reference (c).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The drag points were conducted at as constant a speed and altitude as uossible
for a period of three minutes; Reference (b) contains manual notes data t~ken
during each test. The points obtained during the certification dra~ testin~
on Hodel 737-130 N2286C were duplicated for these tests over the ran~e of CL
necessary to bracket the approach and landin~ climb sneeds; at ~1.aps UP l.?, l.h,
1.5 and 1.6 x Vst~ll' at rl.aps 1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 x Vstall and flans
40, 1.2, 1.3 and l.4 VStall. -
Reference (j) scheduled tests to be conducted at flaps UP 1.6, 1.8 and 2.0
Vstall and flaps 40/gear up at 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 x Ystall; h.:iwever, to :::o-;er
a more practical area, the flaps UP and flaps 40/gear down points si:ated abo,'e
were car:::-ied out. Fla:ps 1 da t~ is addi tionaJ. to re fert>nce ( j) and war. obt·< ~ ''~d ':'.c
establish the chang;e in drag increment with flap position and hence to i::t.::?r-:::)l:i::r
for those intermediate settings applicable to the approach and landin~.
Comprehensive tabulations of all relevant parameters are presented on r"~o-e P..

CL vs. Cn plots on pa~es 5 - 7 show the com-oarison of this data >d th th, certi ti-
cation drag results from Hodel 737-130 N2286C.
~
:;1
I
;j
<(
'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
REV SYM
Sec. 1.15.051 PAGE 3
l
CONCLUSIONS
This document presents Model 737-100 drnp; polars obtained 'With simulatf'ri :ice
shapes oh the tail surfaces ·and wing leudinp; ed~es in the Krueger Q11p i;1;·ar,.
Perfonnance calculations based on these results and basic low speed dra~ polars
obtained during earlier certification with a Model 737-130 N228i'iC will hf' us<>d
to calculate climb performance 'With icin~ present~ Th:ese calculations will be
presented to the FAA in Document D6-4743 Section 6-3,· (Reference o).
<1__~-----------------------~----· ----- ·-------- ·--··

REV SYM _efjUJt:7.N"& I··:. or;-_1nr.:7__
'·
-r
Sec. ;i,~i5.051 j :•M·E If
."-....-
APR FLAPS 40 GERA. DOWN.
.
uq i---------------------S::.E=-C.=-Tc:.1.:::.:.0N J. 15. OS I
'---_..__ _ _ __.__ ___.._ _ ___,___ _____._ _ _ _ _r_H_E_Bo_E_1N_G_c_o_M_P_A_N_Y______ L~: 7~

SUMMARY
Testing waa conducted to demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) the longitudinal trim characteristics of the Model 737-200 airplane
with simulated ice shapes installed to comply with Item lBB.8 of the
Type Inspection Authorization (TIA), Reference (a). This testing satisfies
the requirements of the TIA (Reference (a)) and the FAA Demonstration
Flight Test Specification (Reference (b)),
INTRODUCTION
Part 25.1419 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (Reference (c)) states

generally that flight testing shall be conducted under simulated icing
conditions. Tests were conducted using the Model 737-100 airplane with
simulated ice shapes installed to demonstrate high speed handling
characteristics, maneuverability, stall characteristics, steady sideslips,
approach stability, trim characteristics, and to determine the drag
increment caused by ice. The results of this testing, described in
References (d) and (e), are applicable to the Model 737-200 airplane as
stated in Reference (b). In addition to the above testing, Item 188.8 of
Reference (a) states that longitudinal trim with simulated ice shapes
must be evaluated for the Model 737-200 at forward C.G., idle thrust,
·-- 1.4 V , flaps 40, and gear down. This requirement was satisfied during
Test ~6-1 conducted from Boeing Field, Seattle, Washington by Boeing pilot,
Mr. R. L. McPherson, and FAA pilot, Mr. F. D. Melton. FAA flight analyst,
Mr, D. R. Buell, participated in the test.
CONFIGURATION
The test airplane was N9002U, a production Model 737-222, described in

Reference (f). Simulated ice shapes were installed as required by
Reference (g) on the unheated portions of the wing, horizontal stabilizer,
and vertical stabilizer leading edges. Reference (h) describes the
dimensions and locations of the ice shapes. Photographs of the simulated
ice shapes are presented on Pages 4 through 6
A magnetic tape recording system with Frequency Modulation (FM) and Pulse
Duration Modulation (PDM) capability was used to record the data.
Reference (i) describes the instrumentation configuration used on
Airplane N9002U. The FM system was used to record longitudinal control
forces and movements. Pilot indicated airspeed and altitude were recorded
using the PDM system. Reference (j) contains the manual notes taken
during the test by the crew members and observers.
Q
<'--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·----'
~OEI,llV& NO, D6-11460

REY SYM
/ PAGE
Sec. 1.35.052 2
(Con!.inucd)
The teat r:!ata were processed by the 1.BM 7090 computer UBinf.: the Calibration
program substxitiated in Reference (k). The to.bulated computer data Gl'f:
filed in Reference (1). An lnstrumcntati0n problen: s.ffectinF, ;:tabili~~r
position was discovered after all instrumentation had been ::-emoveci fr.,; 0
the airplane. Therefore, the pilot's trim indicator values s.re prea<'!u t,•.'l
in this report.
TEST RESULTS Alm DISCUSSION
In compliance with the TIA (Reference (a)), Item 18B.8 the longitudinal
trim characteristics with simulated ice shapes were evaluated ~~ forH:i.rd
C.G. with flaps 4o and gear down usin~ idle thrust. The airplane was
trimmed approximately 1.7 Vs with 1.:5 units of trim, 1.4 Vs with 15 unit<:.
and 1.2 Vs at the mechanical limit (17 units). The results <U'e listed
below.
Approx.
Approx. Stabilizer
Gross Weight C.G. Altitude Airspeed
Pounds Vtrim/Vs Position
~
~
~Feet ~KGAS
Uni ts
,-.J
88,ooo 6.1 l,4oo 153 1.7 13

87,500 6.1 2,100 113 1.2 17 (Mech. limit)
87,000 6.1 l,&Jo 124 1.4 15
In addition to the trim data shown above, Mr. Melton evaluated qualitati""F.·1.:r
the handling characteristics involved in extendin~ the flaps frn1•1 l')
(gear down with power for level flight) to 4o and in a simulated J'O-ar-o\•?;1
maneuver by retracting flaps from 4o to 15, retracting the lanalr.r; g<·cu-,
and.applying power. Adequate elevator power was available for these
maneuvers and the control characteristics were satisfactory.
CONCLUSIONS
The longitudinal trim characteristics and handling qualities of the

Model 737-200 airplanes with simulated ice shapes installed are
satisfactory and comply with the requirements of References (a), (b)
and \c).
<L_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·-~~~~-
REV SYM DD.EI.NC
Sec. l.35.052 PAGE
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6
Docket No. SA-435
Exh;ibit No. l3A
·NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT. OF INVESTIGATION
By
William G. Laynor
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. l3A
February 9, l973
PERFORMANCE GROUP CRAIRMAN 1 S FACTUAL BEFORT OF INVESTIGATION
A. ACCIDENT
Location: Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois

Date December 8, l972
Time Approximately l430 central daylight time
Aircraft: United Air Lines, Inc., Flight 553, Boeing 737, N903lU
B. PERFORMANCE GROUP
The Performance Group was established on January 3, after completion

of the field investigation phase of this accident for the purpose of con-
tinuing the investigation into those areas involving the aircraft flight
profile as related to performance characteristics.
Those parties who participated in the field phase of the investigation

assigned the following representatives to this group activity:
Chairman: William G. Layo.or, National Transportation Safety Board,

Washington, D. C.
Member Mr. R. Schild, ACDO, Federal Aviation Administration,
Denver, Colorado
Member Mr. F. E. Titus, United Air Lines, Chicago, Illinois
Member Mr. w. K. Howell, The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington
Member Captain R. Patterson, Air Line Pilots Association,
Washington, D. C.
C. SUMMARY
The primary objective of the Performance Group was to determine the

most probable aircraft configuration and descent profile for that segment
of flight which was terminated by the accident. The most significant data
available for use in establishing the aircraft flightpath.was provided by
the computer tape retrieved from the FAA Automated Radar Terminal Service
(ARTS-3) which had processed the aircraft transponder beacon return during
that portion of flight. Examination of this data (Exhibit l3B) provided
ground position coordinates and altitude as a function of time. The sig-
nificant events noted on the cockpit voice recorder which was recovered
from the wreckage (Exhibit 12A) were time correlated to the ARTS-3 derived
data to produce the results shown in Exhibits l3C and 13D.
Performance Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 2 -
C. SUMMARY (continued)
In general, the magnitud~ of tolerances on the ARTS-3 processed

data precluded a preclse determination of the profile as related to
airspeed and vertical velocity. A reasonable approximation of the data,
however, was considered the basis for further evaluation in analytical
studies, flight simulation and flight test activity. A description of
the simulator and flight tests which were subsequently conducted is
provided in Exhibit
In general, it was determined that the aircraft could have achieved

the approximated profile with various combinations of thrust and drag
configuration, i.e., flap and spoiler extensions. It was noted that the
final portion of the descent prior to level-off at 1,000 to 1 1 100 feet
m.s.l., was described by a vertical velocity of 1,500 f .p.m., and all approximate
longitudinal acceleration of o.6 kts./sec.
A second objective of the Performance Group was to investigate the

possible effects of airframe and engine ice accumulation on flight pro-
file, aircraft controllability, and engine performance. This study involved
a review of the aircraft certification data and hypothetical analysis.
The subject will be explored more thoroughly in the forthcoming public
hearing.
D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
l. Use of ARTS-3 for Profile Plot
From the accident investigation standpoint, it is extremely

unfortunate that the flight data recorder was inoperative due to
an internal malfunction which had occurred prior to initiation of
the final approach descent. As a result, the only data available
which would provide an indication of the final flightpath of UAL 553
and cock;pit events preceding the accident are those takeh from the
FAA ARTS-3 radar service and the aircraft cock;pit voice recorder.
The ARTS-3 system installed at the O'Hare Airport is designed

to provide the controller with a real time position plot tagged with
an alpha.nu:rileric display for all beacon-equipped aircraft within a
predetermined range of the antenna. The basic ARTS-3 consists of
a data acquisition subsystem, a data processing subsystem, and a
data entry and. display subsystem. The computer data processing sub-
system generates a magnetic tape including range, azimuth and al-
titude data (for Mode C-equipped aircraft) for each target response.
The encoded altitude transmitted from those aircraft equipped with
Mode· C transponders is resolved to 100.-foot increments referenced to
a m.s.l. pressure of 29.92 in. Hg. The ARTS-3 computer processes
this data applying the input altimeter correction to print out an
altitude referenced to m.s.l. resolved to the nearest 100-foot level,
Performance Group Chairman 1 s Factual Report of Investigation - 3 -
l. Use of ARTS-3 for Profile Plot (continued)
x and y coordinates based upon a magnetically mrth-oriented gr.id

centered ~bout the antenna site, and a calculated, smoothed ground
speed resolved to 10 knots. It is thts data which was made available
for investigating the aircraft flight profile and events preceding
the accident.
The NTSB endeavored to use the x-y coordinate data as a function

of time, manipulated with meteorological data, i.e., winds and tem-
perature gradients, to produce parameters consistent with aircraft
performance studies. The results are shown on Exhibit l3D.
As is seen from this exhibit, the calibrated airspeed plot

displays erratic excursions on the order of 50 knots peak to peak.
This irregularity is attributed to the tolerances and resolution of
the ARTS-3 positional coordinates and the relatively nonsmoothing
method of calculation. Recognizing this limitation, the mean value
plotted as a dashed line was selected as the best indication of actual
value. The data thus derived was used as an input :for submittal to
the Boeing Company for analysis and simulator and flight test activity
wherein power and configuration changes were examined for compatibility.
To provide further credence to the configuration, the cockpit

voice recorder transcript was time-correlated to the ARTS-3 derived
data. This correlation was accomplished by comparison of the time
recorded for air/ground transmissions on the ATC tower tape with the
CVR. The tower time base was considered to be equateable to time
shown on the ARTS-3 computer printout. Verif'ication of this time
correlation to within 3 seconds was further established by comparison
of' the time over.the Kedzie marker, as indicated by the beacon signal
on the CVR, with the time on the ARTS-3 printout at which the air-
craft position corresponded to the positional coordinates of Kedzie.
The results of this effort, a plot of altitude versus time with
significant voice connnents superimposed is shown on Exhibit l3D.
The results of the simulation and flight tests which were an

attempt to duplicate and verify the parameters and events thus ascer-
tained are discussed in detail in Exhibit 2Al.
2. Icing Certification
The meteor~logical conditions determined to have existed at the

time of the accident are known to have been conducive to ice accretion.
Such conditions were verif'ied by pilots who had transited the Chicago
area during the afternoon of December 8.
Performance Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 4 -
2. Icing Certification (continued)
As a res"l)]_t of these findings, the effects of icing on aircraft

performance was considered during the Performance Group study.
The basis of this study consisted of a review of the aircraft

·certification data related specifically to Ice and Frost Protection
which included the documentation and methods of substantiation to
show compliance to the applicable FAR Part 25 regulations.
The Boeing 737 aircraft does not represent a significant departure

from previous Boeing aircraft in design concept relating to icing
protection. The B-737 ice protection systems include wing anti-icing
system, engine inlet anti-icing system, pitot static heat and wind-
shield heat. The wing anti-icing system and the engine anti-icing
system both consist of ducted bleed air providing protection to the
leading edge slats, the cowl leading edge, the inlet guide vanes,
nose dome, and Ft2 pressure sensing probe. The pitot static tube,
stall warning sensor, total temperature probe, and windshields are
heated electrically. As with other Boeing aircraft, i.e., B-707
and B-727, there is no provision for inboard wing ieading edge or
empennage anti-icing.
During the aircraft certification, it was shown by analysis,

icing tunnel, and flight testing that the ice protection systems
were capable of preventing ice formation on the heated surfaces when
exposed to the continuous and intermittent maximum icing conditions
specified in FAR Part 25 when engine thrust is maintained above
55% N. Since there is no ice protection afforded to the empennage,
the aircraft certification: process included considerable testing to
show that the ice accretion on unheated surfaces,which would result
from exposure to the conditions specified in the FAR, would produce
no undesirable aircraft performance characteristics. These demon-
strations included icing tunnel evaluation of ice accumulation, size
and shape. Simulated shapes re~resenting the mass of ice where
attached to the aerodynamic surfaces and flight test evaluations of
aircraft performance were conducted under extreme configurations
and CG limits. Additional flight tests were conducted with exposure
to natural icing conditions.
The results of these tests provided data that will be included

in the analytical study of the approach profile of ·the accident flight.
These aerodynamic effects, as well as engine performance under

adverse icing conditions, will·be subjects of discussion at the forth-
coming public hearing.
Investigator
-_.:,..... _,.·
Ilocket No.' SA- 435

Exhibit No. 4-B
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOAPJJ

BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFE.rY
"WITNESS STATEMEi'iTS
WITNESS (LOCATim.f) No. l'IA..'ME OF WITi'lES3

i--· J):i:ane· Lynn Ha;ynes
------2
1'ra?;-Y JI. 7.;- "'.'risey
3 ller:riadet• Boyce
4 }Jichael '.!. Lyons
5 John J. 1°'..'.:>rrissey
6 ]:.;elv.in C. Paulsen
7 !!"..:imas J. O1 Brien
8 · ])3,:via. L. Toth
9 "i.•.
Michael Si:;rUl"J~a
lO J)a:vi.t:i .McCo!':!!li c};,
ll Tunala. M. Feliksik
l2 Richara.. M. PeckowEl:i
l3 ; Jose:phine J. l·fclfug...1-i
14 Thomas J. 11fo!fugh
15 Mart:I._n McAndrew
16 :BI:la.ie McAndrew
17 Gera1.a. L. GJ.osni -,};
18 ,!TIJ:n:Jothy E. Mc81..:iahe
19 John C. Earzan
20 O}:larles Sl:;raka
2l :Harman G. Allen
22 LoUiS Si;alec
23 Florence C. Schoults
24 :Eileen Mize
25 James M. Oskielur..as
26 .1&3.tthe17 T. Os}:iel·..l.J-:as
27 William J. Simonini
i
Budget Bureau No. 30-R024.a.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD.

(j)
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, C.c. 20591
STATEMENT OF WITNESS
Th£ purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.
.. . j. n.w --------~fti!___________
I. Place of acciden~)21&.IJ.J.!7--tb.f-!!-y/~_&_~ Date ________ J_,g)f).f_;<,. _________ Hour dd_o_f!t[
II. Aircraft -~-7J_1__~--- FAA Certificate No. --~-J!.:f_7J!L__;[_£_~-'-----------
III. What is your name ____ rif~--~---~r----------- Age ___ 1-_~----------------
_____________________________________________ _
IV. Address ______ Q.JJ_p___ li~!l.ze_~..f-L~:.
. . ii,,,,,,,µ,LJ ~ J,,,;; Jie_ !!~
V. Occupat10nl"~~-U-i~-------~Y whom employed --~-----:Z.if.li...:YL~+----1
Av, et , C'..{) •
Vr. Where were you at .the time of the accident ~-d-~-~~~~ r
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
tfUUu> J/J/J/J:~.c/~ ~~-~-u>-'~

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Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD. @

WASHINGTON. O.C. 2059{
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
Date __ JS!_Pf!~J-~--------------------
I. Place of accident -~\i:.<:..:.'l-o__ J::i~.::'.?.'.:\.. ________ Date __ §.!__~~]_~---------------- Hour _1.i:~.?--~~2

,.,.
II. Aircraft ---~-":.:?J:.1 ___________ FAA Certificate No. --~-1±~__ §_~:?--------------------------------
III. What. is your name _:. __ J".J:=.r-.:r __ /:l.!__JJ?_t~..!i'L~--------------------- Age ____ Lh _______________ _
IV. Address _____ 2=-~"L---~'... __\:131~::--~---------~~:_~~---------------------------------------------
V. Occupation ---~h&.<;.t____________________ By whom employed -----------=-------------------

VI. Where were you at the time of the accident _JQ::_!~c.~'LQ!:.1__ E:•±__~:: __']::_~~---------------------,,-_---.- •.
39
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau No. -RG>
WASHINGTON, o.c. zosg1
Date ..J3__;.M__j_t2-~-------------
_!YJ,_';J::_"Q_~_F..-2)--0-:b:&=- _[)_~_}l _7_2._ _________
I. Place of accident
Pol<. 'r
Date
7 Hour __a_;_~_<}
II. Aircraft _!3__QJ:::....I_W_~---- FAA Certificate No. __(A_cl_:f_T_£._p_ __ _E_1,._::r:._~ __5-.6-_3______ _
III. What is your name __ §_~_&_N_lLtu=;;_rI_E __ ~.Q_°Y-'..!2..E. ______ Age ___ [_?.,._ ______________ _
rv. Address __]_2._!5-"'_<t ___'5'.._c __ _tl;:z:_J.,...,J~....-t1.:&_Q ___<:.J::l..L__Q__J::i_C.._o___L_l:....J,..,. __ f.tz __9__(p_2,. q

V. Occupation _$__L.__<,.LD_EJ~.f.I____________ By whom employed __ _:::-_________________________ _
VI. Where were you at .the time of the accident -~_8._"J;__Q..s_ __E__w_&._:¥____7_~~~---------------
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD @

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20S1
The purpose of this statement is intended solel for use in d · · er • •
sta-nces, and the probable cause of the subject a!ident. etermmm., the facts, cond1t1ons and circum-
Budget Bureau No. 31l-R024.3.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (3)

WASHINGTON. O,C. 20591
Date ___ J:J.::::..f~_-:_Z_~-------------
I. Place ,of accident -~};_r_r;&!j.f2____ .f!d_/Zk}___ Date .!'.'.~_:=-_s2_-:Z_~----------- Hour ./_@_?'___
II. Aircraft \./.f!.f:.:. ___:f!__3_L_____ FAA Certificate No. _()__JJ_~___ E.!:."?;__:_£~"'J_ ________________ _
III. What is your name _\[_f]fl_"'::'_ __ :Z_,,__..!}'lCJ_l{./!/_!:-!_<.Y-------------- Age ____ _±'(_______________ _
IV. Address _?_7-_~:Z___ ?_!_ __ ~t:t.!_'f:.~-51_-:!:~__ .f!_'("~~--------~!.i_~y_q____ C..QG._?-f__________ _

V. Occupationk~£~{&-£L__ ~_{.6t.t.~:'.'.~-- By whom employed ~/_z£d___d_1c=._(!2~-~<
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident ::k;}_{____gqg_J:!= __ £~:L~---g_£_(!!p_~~---
"£ h.fiA,qd 119.v /1/~c£.t9-P/ 17AJSS dy~/C!... /!// ~c;/#6.

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ·BOARD Budget Bureau No. a9-R@
DEPARTMENT. OF TRANSPORTATION\
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20591
The purpose of this s·tatement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
;
. I •
Date ____
it
'l__Q~!.==--------------------
I. Place of accident ___S-~.!;:?J~--~~~:':.~'.J_______ Date ------~-9_-::i_'...~------------- Hour _L1L~S>__ f_S-,.
II, Aircraft ---~:::.?~?___________ FAA Certilicate No. ___'::!'.!_~--"=~~~-----------------------------
III. What is your name ---~~G>_ri_ __~.:---~~J~.:.r--------:---------------- Age ---~2--------~-'--------

IV. Address ___ :_?_~j_·'l_--~--~i~0~-~--"-~:_~;_ __li-_! __ :._~-~~~~'1-----------,,----n-rT-----------------
J.1 . 'l.7 r'- .._ 1-r.i-\.t 1-:r.....
V. Occupation ·__ \?.:._:d:_L~------------------- By whom employed __ E:~-==--~::-~-~~.:"-~-~.'. ____ _
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident __Q~_.tl::::. __~~~l_!::_ __=:!_j~ __,f!:':~:-±___ ~q;_--~~--~-~'".:'::'--
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bu=Lu No. S9-R@
WASHlNGTON. D.C. W591
:Date ...Li?1_.:._::f_=_..:;!_i1::.,_______________ _
I. Place of accident J/'~~--- :Date _/_i2_.:...8_:2d...------------- Hour .,:2_;_;;_,k.ft?l
II. Aircraft 13_._73:z.___________ FAA Certificate No. ~~.S~..3 ____________ _
III. What is your name 7Jt'2..t?J..~~--;L_QY3..£{.LC./51.. ___________________ Age __ _2£,________________ _
IV. Address _.2/...L_<L__ .22J...Lt'..C..Afi..£}_ __ s;._b!Ls-_ ~.:j.t2,1_.::r~~.1»-a.c..s. _____ :.. _____________________ _

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget B~eau No. a11-n@
WASHINGTON, C.C.. 2091
stances, and the probable cause of the subject acicident.
.
n~ ~ Date
/;<~D4"'-
-------L~-/_!_ ____________ ?6__ _
I. Place of accident ____ LJ~_W,_(_J_ ___ Date _______ j_~JJ/-"1--~--------- Hour __?:-:.;!ll!L
II. Aircraft-~~_)}_~------ FAA Cer!;ificate No. -~-ff-~'.[3.____________ _

III. What is your name __ ;f:::<._~ __ L__,_~--------------------- Age __ j_Q ______________ :._ __
IV. Address ___.J.b.Jl.___ c?b__L~------------------------------------------------------

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V. Occupation ----~~------------------ By whom employed -------------------------------
acc~- -f:B~~-1-~--
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VI. Where were you at .the time of the
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before a;{;:;-j ~e accident occurred.
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau No, a~R@
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20St1
The purpose of this statement is intended solely f~r use in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
. ,,f d;,; ,,t, ,..,+ Date __ /_:J.:=_l__(.)__-:__7__~---
I. Pl~ "'°'""'' 71/dmay-~rflJJ•t• L_;;L~-L~-2_2._ ____: ____ H,;,:2.,.;;,:-;;, H,

of
f3_o_e;_147_-::7~2- FAA Certificate No. __.t,~_.a_Ju_ __.s:-~-_~---

II. Aircraft
m. What is your name _IJ.l-L-_};_4 __ ..,S-./:_i::_u__4_kR.>c.------------- Age __ L.S________________ _

rv. Address _3-7-iJ-:t:>-___ /d)___':"J_l_s.i__ s_-;;_ __ £~£-/1-&--r-.J_if,_ ____________________ _
V. Occupation ____ .5;!.?;.d..f!.h-_r___________ By whom employed ----=---------------------
VI. Where were you at the time of the accide~..a_s__ LJ~_La.Y:._}_z;,z_~,L-,l...!E.-dp..e.tdo..y

VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before an<l. at the time the accident occurred.
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·- - - . - - . ,.,?,Yi;r;e,,~'JcA.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau No. 3 9 - R @
WASHJNGTON. c.c. wst
stances, and the probable cause of the subject a~ident. e m deternunmg the facts, conditions and circum-
The purpose of this statement is intended solel for us . . . .
_,if Id u..!CU/ Jf- i~/ 0 r--f -=._?_~_1_9 7 Cf--

Date ...... L.2::. . .
I. Place of accident (EJ,~Q..:l_iL_~) [ L' WD CS. D L ,...... <Y Z . ---------------
------------ ate ... --.-...=-A--=- - ;:l._ 2 ' .:1. S
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II. All=ft FAA No.
III. What
.
is your name kt2.fL.L_d_
·
__.!!!d__~/!.._o------------------------Age
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- -----
IV. Address 2 '7 J._ S- ~ 7i.,..;
/ ' ~ · -----------------
- - ------- ----~--P--'::.'.;.m__ J_~-1---f2/;__1••s,._=tj-.il--r-:r;;.L/_r.._i::=2_!::2____ _
V. Occupation __ 5'....T.:.h_d ~ 4- t
--- - ------------- By whom employed ------===------- ---------
1
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident G... 'i:f' ',
Id.. - __
H -f'...J,,.;,.d_~
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C? S! Cl. -:r-1-c.5--Poh.-t:
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VII. Tell in your own w ords wh at you saw or heard before an<l at the time th e acer'd ent occurred.

WASHINGTON, C.C. 20591
1-c "bo:. 7 (,
D a t e ---------------------------------
I. Place of accident _Q-_~:.<::.J.P_j'~~~~.2.1--------- Date __ .§>_})_~·~.]_~---------------- Hour J:!_!_~~----

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II. Aircraft __ .?.__:_~~]_ ___________ FA.A Certificate No. --~~_:-__ _?.:'§:~--------------------------------
ill. What is your name ---~~.::_:.L~--~·__ _'t::E:-~·jl':_ ______________________ Age __ Lfi.._ _________________ _
IV. Address ___1:.n__ ~~-~~'...~\X~~~-----~.::.'::+~~- _LS.______________________________________________ _
V. Occupation --~-~s±_______________________ By whom employed --------=----------------------

VI. Where were you at .the time of the accident __ .1_:>_::-:.:_1-__f.:£?$~::\-~!.--------------------------------
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(Signature)
Budget Bureau No, 39-R024.3.
NATIONAL T RANSPORTATION SAFETY BOA

. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RD
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20591
STATEMENT OF
The purpose of th' t WITNESS .
s ances, and the probable cause of~:~:~~iect j and mrcum-
t is s atement is · t accident.
solely .for use in determining the f acts, conditions
. ·
I. Pfa" of •ooidmt~ ~ D•t. _____ _!_djJe/J._2:_______________ .

() • ; __ ('.4:~ ~o
II. Aircraft_!!.~ 7 31
------- Date __ I-<. I J'/] <._
--------f-._f- ------------- Hour
7·
2 Ph\
--~-"-J/,.
·-----;---- -------- F .AA Certificate N • /- 11 CJ -+-----
· your name -~_j/_':..-/f-~~-
ill. What is t/. J o f7) "·
----- . M SS 3
·""'''"f-:..""-----------------------
rv. Addr~ ____3.J.l {, lu-0J , tf,_ __1_'2. ______ _
--~------------~-:::-~
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v. Occupation ~ -----------------------------
VI Wh -: -------------------------- . By whom •mplol"d ---------
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. ere were you at the time of the accident
. --""'--:/4-""'-1--- . ~ """ "" .
VII. Tell m your own >;vords what you saw or h d b f ------- ----------- -~--~-
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ear e ore an<l at the time the .
accident occurred..
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Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3,

WASHINGTON. o.c. 20591
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use .
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident.. m determining the fac~s, conditions and circum-
Budget Bureau No, 31l-R024.3.

WASHINGTON. O.C. 2.0591
})ate ,J'-;;l-::-_J.J.l_-::-__ :;!_';b.. ___________ _
I. Place of accident' !f11Jw.a1--{l_~~ })ate -f-;)._~-:---==-7-~----._------- Hour_ ~-~-'?_Q_f2N-

II. Aircraft ~::-_']_3.:z ___ FAA Cerf;ificate ~o." ~-£flp_ __ 5:_S,_3 _______ _
III. What is your name ~a..a_,_-},__}11_':-:_~~--------- Age --?'--7-----------------

IV. Address _J_i,-_;L~ ___ U)_,_ __'7_0.,-__ck. __ r:,.d,.~___ &1,.._<:..e\?dl__1-J:/J.,,~~------------
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v. Occupation /1~--_j;.~----- By whom employed -':J1-~v 7 ~C--
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VI. Where were you at .the time of the accident --~~.J.-t-:t.t..4-::.-------:-------------------------------
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Budget Bureau No. 39-R~
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD . r.j!j)

WASHINGTON. C.C. 20St
stances, a,nd the probable cause of the subject accident.
l)at~ ___ /_":_ __!'.._~-~:!=__________________ _
I. Place of accident __%.:::~':t~--t~-~-------- l)ate --~--ll~-:i~---------------- Hour __ LH.?..:_"::~ I
II. Aircraft --~---l~] _____________ FAA. Certificate No. ---~B-~ __ .::_1_! __ ~~2--------------------------
III. What is your name __ L'l::~:i-i.1>:Ar.J~~.s_ ________:._ _________________ Age ____;_.;_:__ _______________ _
IV. Address ___ ;L~1-.f._jy_,__}_~-~-§}_______________ --------~-----------------..:.-----------------------
V. Occupation --~±~h:zJ______________________ ..: By whom employed -------------==----------------

VI. Where were you at -the time of the accident __i,,.~cf:.'..~- ~!!!..:..&c:.'::"__ j&~-"==--~.!.:3d..::::::. __________________ _
1
(U.oe renrae aide of aheet for diaJITam and additivMI !IM~m1mi)

Budget Bureau No. 39-R024.3;

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20!UH
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the f~ts, conditions and circ=-
),J,,~ ~ D•t• ____ _!'.!J~Ji_'.'::_ _______3_0___ _

I. Place of accident ___ C/~-/1'-'-------------- Date _____ (!-/¥!-~------------- Hour ?::_Jt-::._ __
II. Aircraft_L~_]}_J_______ FAA Certificate No. ---~iJ.__).¥_~.?:_-~--------------
III. What is your name ~--)!!_<,__~~-------------------- Age __ Q__t.j_ _______________ _
rv. Address --------~~~_?___ ~_zs!±_4 ______~---~--------------------------~-

v. ~----------------- By whom employed ----==---------------------
Occupation
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident _d_~~_/(f-~-J~~
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and -at the time the accident occurred.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD·' . @ .

WASHINGTON. c.c. 20S1
Date __ JJ_Qi!_<::_':u~---------------------
I. Place of accident -~S!.~ __0_~~-fu~'::'"l __ Date __'Q_ll_~ __J]<. ___ ~----------- Hour _l4_,'.3~-~ff
II. Aircraft --~.::J3-.) ____________ FAA Certificate No. __(J.tl:.(.. __ E~t~.sA:~--------------------------
III. What is your name __ G"u-_-..~L_L __G.h_~~<>l~JS _______________________ Age __ _?.:?_________________ _
rv. Address __ s;_11.;.__ 5-_ ___i2.a:i.-.;.il::-___ .],;:-;_4_y...~~-- _.ir..... _____________________________________________ _
V. Occupation -~~_!..!-_~-~"---------------------- By whom employed __E.)J.t£..,,_.k~h-~ __C,,_~-"'-'lc'!-----
VI. Where were you at ·the time of the accident __i('!c.~~-j.,,.j-__.,t_J:-Li:>•.Q.;;_.:f.L<d-::t.<:. __"2=-~!_ __~:..~~'11-2.k.__~
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD @J

WASHINGTON. o~c. 20591
Date ___ U_Q~_"i;_ _____________________ _
I. Place of accident -~l:,.O'e'.!.\.~-n~~2+--------- Date --~--b~_}_?,, _______________ Hour H.:a2__c;,~r
II. Aircraft ___<f_-:TF!_ ___________ FAA Certificate No. __ YA-h_\;':_~~~------------------------------

III. What is your name ---~_::hg:Th~--~·__ _0.::_5~b.:~_s ____________________ Age ---~.:=:_ ________________ _
IV. Address ___\._~~~5'--~-'--r~_':.'C~!:-__ ~!.: ____Cb..:~:i!i?->H:_•_______ D:.~i:_'.:fj_~?) ________________________ _


@
WASHINGTON. D,C. 20391
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determi.Iling the facts, conditions and circum-

WASHINGTON. O.C. 20:!591
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts,' conditions and circum-
Date __ (_2__-=:-__!_!_-::_Z_~----------
I. Place of accident ~.;?~---------_:- Date ___ -!_7-:_::_P.__::-__z:._~----~---- Hour _/{_LZ:_!J.fl/J

II. Aircraft 64__ ?...2.-Z_..J.AA CerGificate No. -~-V-.-~---·~_:__..f:_;;z_ __ _
III. What is your name -~C?~-~qy{_~----------- Age --~£______________ _
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V. Occupationif[~~ By whom employed--~--- >-<
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident _CJ~~LZ~-..2.~-ef~

VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accide£' occurred.

WASHINGTON, c.c. ZOS1
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determ · · •
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident. mmg the facts, conditions and circum-
, • )J .• Date ___ !J.~_)/rj_2__7._~---------

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WASHINGTON, c.c. 20591
STATEMENT OF \tVITNESS
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determinin h · · ·
stances, and the probable cause of the subject accident. g t e facts, Dond1t1ons and c1rcum-
/211j) l--1/ Ar I! JI? j?DR T Date --.L~>)--=_L:;;J._= __7_;{.,_ ________ _

I. Place of accidenCiJ.id._G_()_,,.__k._l:_?J./.(_Q.i_J Date _}_:J._=f{_-_7_..:Z.,___________ Hour "'~-~-().Q_p 1•
II. Aircraft .13.ci.~;jj-9---:Z.3_1._ FAA Certificate No. __fd..A.,l.<-"--£-~_7;__.;i_S.3_ ______________ _
III. What is your name L.DJ..d.L..5 __ _5_±_ca,}_e..CL____________________ Age _5-_Q ______________ _

IV. Address _3_2_c)_j_ ___ h)_,__7_:;:/_!;_ _f?/.e__c.:~ -
V. Oecupation/_J.EJJ.flj_t!_t:-__ _fE_£ij_;_(£BJ wh:~-=~~:~:~-~;r.;~~~~~:~-

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VI. Where were you at ·the time of the accidentL/JilY..f/l./,Q..,4..L/:::.~_j___ :z_s:_:!.J____ _s_?-:, ___________ _
VII. Tell in your ow~ .words what you saw or heard before and at the time the accident occurred.
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. . (Signature)
Ge D 9-3J,.D09
Budget Bureau No, 39-R024,3.

WASHINGTON. 0,C, 20S1
Date _j_3..__ p_§'_~_']_~-------------------
I. Place of accident -~-'£'..<p:l._f'.l;A~..,'l'--------- Date _El_J2.~_!_2; ________________ Hour 11LEl_.£.:.I

II. Aircraft --~-=.l~J_ ____________ FAA Certificate No. __ l:<__(±-!:_!:__?:~2------------------------------
III. 'What is your name __ £L'e..'r:~~~---c;.!. __€g,._k__:,._~lL~------------------ Age --~-0__________________ _

IV. Address __H_1.;?__ __1=>_:.__]_~_'":.~ __f_h0:_~-----~.!.~"t~~-j!:_,________________________________________ _
\T. Occupation _G.'.!"S6V..!~(--G_i.._~~-----~------- By whom employed _J3Ji<:::::__~2<::-f1~-f_~J:.J.;~=i..o .

VI. Where were you at ·the time of the accident _]l~+__2=J.--~"='J;t.:LJ?.c::.i~--fl.:~::-__....__~_:-_:f!!f:'_~--~~II:: ___ _
IT1itA "P.Qll..QJ:"Ra R.Jr1.a nf sh.ant lnr. tlfaur·nm an.rl aii.rlHinnsJ at.aJ.am.ent)

Budget Bureau No. 30-R024,3.

WASHINGTON, O.C. ZOH1
. Date __t_:_J?.~·-?.?::'. ___________________ _
I. Place of accident __ g._\:!:.':.:.<:+£ __0:J:.~_:.'.:J------- Date __ .f<._l>_".:'-..:~1.~---------------- Hour JSJ.}_<>_E..f:."t

4.~ .
II. Aircraft ---~--.]_'?;]__________ _:._ FAA Certificate No. --~~-'=--Y-~A------------------------------
III. 'What is your name ___ E_~l!'_"-_'C__{Ji_".:'~2-_:_I'.!~i::: _______________________ Age __'_!i __________________ _
IV. Address ___ ]7::_'.!:]___ ~L-2~>!___~±~-----~:':'.>-XS__J_l:_,_ ________________________________________ _
V. Occupation __lf::~~,:::--=~------------------- By whom employed __ _:_ __ =-----------------------
VI. 'Where were you at the time of the accident -~~.l.f.:S_-~!_-t__':'.~--?~:~--~~"±-_'._ __b_::_~".'.__0'.:-~~-~---
. Mo'""'7-, - -,.,...,<. o~ f-i.... s;,,,,,J-..c:L... "<- ""ils."I s-1--.:i-
VII. Tell in your own words what you saw or heard before an<l at the time the accident occurred.
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---~-~-----------------~----------------------------
(Signature)
Budget Bureau No. 3~-R024.3.

WASHINGTON~ D.c. 20S1
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for use in determining the facts, {)Onditions and circum-
Date __ _!~ __Q.~__1_~------------------
I. Place of accident --~':5-~:e__ ~·5:.'::'~--------- Date --~-P-~':.:__'._~--------------- Hour 1'.!.'..~~--~~?:"
II. Air{)raft -~=--12.] ____________ F .AA Certificate No. ____l:i_8-_L:_:i:_~_;i:~---------------------------
ill. What is your name ---~2'-~~i-____ t'l_:_ _____Q?.!:.L0.:<_'=":-.::i. _______________ Age __ LL----------~-------
rv. Address _3.~~~---~~~_J_}~~--~l~----..cJ..~~"'t-~~--L~---------------~---------------------------

v. Occupation __ d_t'1~---------------------- By whom employed ------=-------------------------
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident -~-.d~b--3.5-_'2(~--~·-_2_2._fil.
VII. Tell in your own words what you s11w or heard before antl -at the time the accident occurred.
Budget Bureau No. 31'>-R024.3.

WASHINGTON, O.C.. 2~t
I. Place of accident ---~'-~"+-~-[':;_~:?-~4------- Date ----~--~~L·.t:::. _____________ Hour J±'3_;.__ ~_,;:_/"

II. Aircraft __ .!'?.:_""}.?]_ ___________ FAA Certificate No. __ !:£.J_1=,_~_S2_~-----------------------------
III. What is your name ___ 0_::~~---L•___Q~L<_,:!;_/_'1.':!J_L ________________ Age __ J_l_________________ _
IV. Address __;,_53_1.,__~,__].3~:___eL·-~ ____<;d;_.._c::,=;...~ __ l.k ____________________________________________ _
V. Occupation ----~~-ht____________________ By whom employed --------=----------------------
VI. Where were you at the time of the accident _.l~'.:.':-~~·___t,:>_:1!;.J~--'-"!.~t!<--~--1,_~-=~bl.=:. ___________ _
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Budget Bureau N o . @
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20591
/.~~-JL~---
w ' r- (Signature)
/ITSJ.D "';v~T>&:.a W..d"" .al~~ .fur di.A.rrr.a.m ..ann pAdHionsl .&Wement) .GP n 9 3'... D!J!l
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 4A

Bureau of Aviation Safety .
Washington, D. C.
WITNESS GROW' CHAIRMAN 1 S REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
by
DELBERT C. VALLE
Exhibit 4A

GROUP CHAITu.'1AN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

(DCA73-A-3)
A. ACCIDENT
Location: .Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
Date December 8, 1972
Aircraft: Boeing 737, Identification N 9031U,

owned and operated by United Air Lines, Inc.
The aircraft was being operated as scheduled
Flight No. 553.
B_. WITNESS GROUP
Chairman: Delbert C. Valle, Air Safety Investigator

Kansas City, Missouri ·
Member Milton S. Washington, Operations Inspector,

Federal Aviation Administration, Air Carrier
District· Office, O'Hare International Airport,
Chicago, Illinois
Member Wayne J, Morrison, Special Investigator, United

Air Lines, !nc,, Security Division, OlHare
Inte~ational Airport, Chicago, Iliinois
Member Ernest R. Burmeister, Safety Representative,

Airline Pilot 1 s Association, 1040 South Norbury
Lombard, Illinois
The Witness Group was formed at the original organizational meeting

on December 9, 1972. Activities began with a visit to the accident
site where a visual survey of the immediate area was conducted.
Addresses and telephone numbers of persons who had submitted their
names· as witnesses to the accident were obtained from the local law
enforcement officers at the crash site.
The interrogation of witnesses began in the immediate area, and as

·the Group's activities continued names of other witnesses were
obtained from the news media· and by house to house canvassing, The
2
Witness Group terminated the on-the-scene activities on December 14,

1972.
C. SUMMARY
1. The aircraft descended from the cloud base at an estimated

altitude of about 400 feet and was within view of the ground
witnesses for a distance of approximately one-half mile prior to
ground impact.
2. When the aircraft was first observed it was heading in a

northwesterly direction, (in line with runway 31 of the Midway
Airport) and shortly th.e:reafter it veered to the right and was on
a near northerly heading when the crash occurred.
3. The witnesses were in general accord that the aircraft

nose attitude was extremely high a.nd that it was flying at a much
lower altitude than other ai:rcraft that they had observed making
approach to the Midway Airport.
4. The witnesses that were located outdoors gave varied accounts

of the aircraft noises and sounds. Several of these persons became
so engrossed in the flight path and attitude of the aircraft that
they did not remember any noise coming from the aircraft. Others
remembered a loud surge of engine power shortly before the crash
occurred. Persons that were inside buildings stated that their
attention was initially directed to the aircraft by a loud roaring
sound which they associated with a .. very low flying aircraft.
5. In the majority of the interviews the witnesses were unable

to recall the position of the landing gear and flaps and were not
aware of any lighting on the aircraft.
6. No smoke or fire was observed coming from the aircraft when

it initially came into view; howeyer, several persons stated they
saw bursts of smoke come from one or both engines prior to the crash.
7. The witnesses reported the weather as low clouds with some

haze or fog and no precipitation.
Approximately seventy-five persons were contacted personally or by

telephone and queried about their observations of the aircraft accident.
As a result of these interviews twenty-seven written statements were
obtained. These statements are listed as Exhibit 4B and included
as a supplement to this report. Exhibit 4C is a map of the general
area which shows the relation of ·the location of the witnesses to the
crash site.
3
The witnesses were in general agreement that the prevailing weather

conditions consisted of low clouds with bases about four-hundred feet
above ground level w:i:th some visibility restriction because of haze
and fog. No precipitation was reported and winds were light.
Of the persons interviewed six stated that they saw the aircraft on
a near northwesterly heading as it descended from the low cloud deck.
From these observations it was determined that visual contact with
the aircraft prevailed over a distance of about six city blocks or
approximately one-half mile. When the witnesses initially observed
the aircraft the wings were near level, the nose attitude high and
the rate of descent appeared to be greater than normal when com-
pared to other aircraft flying along this segment of the approach
to Midway Airport. Persons that were indoors and located about
under the area of where the aircraft came out of the clouds stated
that the noise level was very high .and .they were so concerned that
they rushed to the. windows to view the aircraft. These. witnesses
were in general agreement that the loud noise was considered abnormal
only as a result of the aircraft being at such a low altitude when
it passed over their positions.
According to the witnesses the aircra:Jf-t continued traveling on the

northwest heading for a few seconds and then it made a shallow
banking turn to the right to a near northerly heading. Almost simul-
taneous with the right turn the nose came up rapidly into a very high
pitch attitude. Several witnesses stated that the aircraft appeared
to gain a slight amount,of altitude at that point. However, immediate-
ly thereafter the descent continued and the aircraft struck the houses
in a near wing-level, nose-high attitude. Severai witnesses stated
that there was a sudden increase in engine noise at about the time
the pitch attitude increased and the. aircraft began the turn to the
right. There was no reported smoke or fire emerging from the air-
craft prior to the sound of the increased engine power. However,
at that point several persons stated that they observed smoke coming
from one or both engines. The majority of witnesses stated that they
were unsure as to the configuration and exterior lighting on the
aircraft. Five.persons stated that the landing gear appeared to be
fully extended and according to seven witnesses the flaps were
partially or fully extended. No one repor.ted the landing gear or
flaps in transit.
v!ulvd-c. ~
Delbert C. Valle
January 11, 1973
---: ·----:-r·' . ' ..-.· . . :, ' ,
' ' '.'.~.
Ilooket No. SA-435

E:ihibit No. 4c
)
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY EoARD
BUREAU OF AVIATION S.l\.FETY
WASH!NGTOli, D. C. , 20591
'WIT~lESS LOCATION CH/I.ET
/
5
l D. 11.a)'l'les 16 ,..~.dnctr...,
7 .. "1ertnex 17 C,'llos111..t.1c
J ,_....,~ .. teT.~
la ll.L:ycns 19
J, !'llun
o;: J.~rrlsuy
~
<!> "!. Paub011 21 11,Allen
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l!J r,!i:hnlts
21. E,l'(U,.
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12 .1,P,,c-il<-kl ~
,______ ll ~: ~~;~
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l'i !'!,'1cA.ndr....,
"
* " r u t Site
NATIONAL TRANSPOmATION SAFErY BOARD
WASEINGTON, D. C. 2059l
STUARI'. ROOM
SHERATON-0 1HARE MOTOR ROTmi
ROS»!ONT, ILLINOIS
FEBRUARY 27, l973
RJBLIC HEARING
An Ai=raft Accident Hearing

:Boeing 737, N903lU
Chicago, Illinois
December 8, l972
BOARD OF INQUIRY
Honorable Isabel A. Burgess Member
Nation.al Transportation Sa.:fety
Board
Washington, D. C.
CHAIBMAN, BOARD OF INQUIRY
Mr. Bernard C. D:>yle • • • • • • • • • • • • • Chief, Investigation Division

Board
Washington, D. c.
Mr. J"ohnM. Stuhldreher. • • • • • • • • • • Senior Attorney

Office of the General Counsel
National Transportation Sa.:fety
Board ·
Washington, D. C.
Mr. William R. Hendricks • • • • • • • • • • • Senior Hearing Officer

Investigation ~ivision
Board
Washington, D. C.
HEARING OFFICER
-~ .
.,».---'?"
- 2 -
TEJHNIC.AL PANEL
Mr. William L. Lamb Senior Air Sa:fety Investigator

Inyestigation Division
~eau of Aviation Safety
N~tional Transportation Sa:fety
Boar a,
ws:s~gt1:on, D. C.
INVEBTIGA.TOR IN CHARGE
Mr. Martin A. Speiser Air Sa:fety Ir}vestigator

Technology Dinsion
Blir.e-au. ·of' Aviation Sa:fety
N~t$Q.l1al· mransportation Sa:fety
Board
Washington, D. C.
Mr. William G. Laynor • • • • • • • • • • • • Aeros.J;)e,G.e Engineer

Tec'bnology Division
Buie1'!-u of Aviation Sa:fety
Nat'.tbnaJ.. Trans:portation Sa:fety
·Board.·
Wasbington, D. C.
Mi-. MatthewM. McCo:rndck. • . • • • • • • • Air S~~'f;;yinvestigator

·Tec1JAoI;qgy Division
E1u'e!3:,'u,-ot Aviat;ion Safety
N~ti:b~ Transportation Safety
Board·
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Brad.. DJ.nbar De:pµ,ty Direetor,

Of.f:ice ·0f .Public Affairs
Nat±o~al Transportation Safety
Bofµ"d-
Washington, D. c.
- 3 -
~--
EFABING OurLINE
l. Honorable Isabel A. :Burgess • 'I • • • • • • Chairman, :Board of' Ing_uiry
Member :Burgess will give the o:pening statement of' the :public
hearing.
2. Mr. William R. Hendricks • • • • • • • • • • Hearing Officer
Mr. Hendricks will identify and receive into the record the
following:
Exhibit No. l-A Order of' Hearing

l-:B Designation of' Hearing Officer
l-C Notice of' Hearing
l-D Designation of' Parties to the Hearing
3. Mr. William L. Lamb • • • • • • • • • • • • • Investigator in Charge
Mr. Lamb will report for the record, the notification of' the accident
and the organization of' the investigation. He will review the investigation
activities and submit all exhibits to be entered into the :public record of'
the accident.
Exhibit No. 2-A O:perations Group Chairman's Factual Report

2-A-l Simulator· and flight test re:port
2-:B UAL FLT 553 Dis:patch Documents
2-C Training Records - Captain w. L. Whitehouse
2-D Training Records - F/O w. O. Coble
2-E Training Records - S/O B. J. Elder
2-F Ex:cer:pts from UAL E-737 Flight Manual
2-G Ex:cer:pts from UAL Training Manual
2-H Ex:cer:pts from UAL Flight Hand.book
2-I Statements from :pilots flying in Chicago area l2/8/72
2-J Je:ppesen Approach Charts and Chicago Area Chart
2-K Cockpit visibility diagram :B-737
- 4-
Exh:i:bit No. 3-A Air Traffic Control Group Cha.innan' s Factual Report
'~ ·· 3-B Statements, A'ro Bersonnel
3-C A'ro Transcript (Approach Control)
3-D A'ro Transcript (Midway Tower)
3-E Aerocommander N309US ~und Track Chart
plotted. from O'Hare Radar .ARrS III Computer Readout
3-F UAL Flight 553 Ground Track Chart - plotted from
O'Hare Radar ARl'S III computer readout
4-A Witness Group Chairman's Factual Report

4-B Witness Statements
4-e Witness Location Chart
5-A Weather Group Chairman's Factual Report

5-B Sur:f'ace Weather Observations - Mid-way
5-C Aviation Weather Sequences
5-D Sur:f'ace Weather Charts
5-E Upper Air (850 m.b. & 700 m.b.) Charts
5-F Weather :Radar Log - Chicago
5-G National Weather Svc., Inst:rument Checks - Chicago
5-H Instrument Location Chart - Mid-way
5-I National Weather Service and FAA Tower Visibility
Reference Charts
5-J Portion Electrowriter Record, Nat.ional Weather
Service, M:rdway
5-K National Weather Service Observer's Statements
5-L Teletype-Pilot Reports
5-M National Weather Service Forecasts (Area and
Terminal Forecasts and SIGME.TS)
5-N Upper Air rs.ta
5-0 Pseudo-adiabatic Charts, Peoria & Green Bay
5-P National Weather Service Briefing Statements
5-Q United Air Lines Forecasts
6-A Human Factors Group Chairman's Factual Report

6-B Passengers. Statements
•<"
6-e Flight Attendants Statements
-t~{h:--,.: 6-D Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) Reports
<j~{ __ 6-E Chicago Fire Department Operations Report
6-F United Air Lines Galley Study
6-G FAA, Office of Aviation Medicine Report: Carbon
_Monoxide and Oyanide Hazards 2ill '.Air Transport
Accidents accom;panied. by fire
7-A Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report

7-B Wreckage Distribution Chart
7-C Photographs
- 5-
Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report

Photographs
Engine Bleed Air System Schematic
9-A Systems Group Chairman's Factual Report

9-B Photographs
9-C Kollsman Report on Altimeter System
9-D Kollsman Report on Air Data Computer
9-E Excerpts from B-737 Instruction Manual
re: Pitot·Static System
10-A Flight Data Recorder Specialist's .Factual Report

10-B Photographs o:f FDR and Parameter Traces
lO-C Report o:f FDR Examination
ll-A Maintenance Records Group Chairman f s Factual Report

ll-B Excerpts :from Flight Log
ll-C Deferred Item Sheets
12-A Cockpit Voice Recorder Specialist's Factual Report
J3-A Flight Performance Group Chairman's Factual Report

13-B Automatic Radar Tracking System (ARrS) Computer
Printout
13-C Aircraft Performance Data Plot Developed. from .ARrS III
Data.
13-D Approximate Flightpath Profile as 1'eveloped. :from .ARrS III
Data and CVR Transcript.
13-E Excerpts o:f B-737 Certification Data
r ._ _. •
- 6 -
-·. .
! ~..
l.
~-~=-
Mr•~W~am J. S:irr:lonini
WITNESS LIST
Eyewitness
Chicago, Illinois
2. Mr. Thom.8.s J. O'Brien Eyewitness

Chicago, Illinois
3. Mr. Louis StaJ.ec '3 1 0 '/ W' 7 S-. .d..J:;.eEyewitnes s
/'v'--a ~ ~- Chicago, Illinois
Mr. Marvin E. Anderson __., t;-J, A. E. Passenger, UAL FLT 553

J IT;,~ . d J,,.. __; _ South Holland, Illinois
) ~ /-3~~ ~ ~~~~~,
5. Mr. Harold R. Metc~;VA~ C · Passenger, UAL FLT 553
' ' ' · Tinley Park, Illinois
6. Mr. Harold W. Green Passenger, UAL FLT 553

Park Forest, Illinois
7. Mrs. Margurite J. McCausland Stewardess, UAL FLT 553

Reston, Virginia
8. Mrs. D. Jeanne Grif'f'in Stewardess, UAL FLT 553

Silver Spring, Maryland
9. Mrs. Kathleen S. Drret Stewardess, UAL FLT 553

Alexandria, Virginia
lO. Captain Arthur C. Munin Chief', Hook & Ladder Com,pa.ny

No. 3l, Fire De:partment of'
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
ll. Captain Hugh E. MurJ?hy Captain_, Delta Airlines

North Redding, Massachusetts
l2. Mr. Milton W. Harding Ex:ecutive Pilot

Vincennes, Indiana
l3 • Mi;:\ .George W.
.~~~~···
Kipp Ex:ecutive Pilot
·;,_! .
-
Ft. Madison, Iowa
Captain, United Air Lines
Arlington, Virginia
l5. Mr. John J. Baldwin Air Traf'f'ic Control Specialist

O'Hare Approach Control
Chicago, Illinois
- 7 -
l6. Assistant Chief', Midway Tower

Chicago, Illinois
l7. Captain John C. Aasen Flight Training Su:pervisor B-737

UAL Flight Training Center
Denver, Colorado
l8. Captain Donald K. Holman Flight Manager

Was~ington, D. C.
l9. Captain Bobby C. Goodman Flight Manager

Washington, D. C.
20. Captain Louis N. DeWitt Manager, Flight Performance B-737
Western Airlines, Inc.
Los Angeles, Ca.lii'ornia
2l. Mr. Robert P. Beatty Assistant Branch Chief'

National IS.ta Systems Branch
Experimental Center
22. Mr. William K. Howell B-737 Aerodynamics Engineer

The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington
23. Mr. Matson M. Lord Liason Representative

Service Department
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company
East Hartford, Connecticut
24. M;l:. ttBines

. ,_,,_...
;
W. Angus Staff' Engineer
Elmhurst, New York
25. Dr. Paul w. Smith Chief', Pharmacology Biochemistry
Laboratory
Federal Aviation Aam:i.nistration
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
.c'.··.~ •
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD -~
~'l~;:·
OEPAR'.TMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
•
-·~
.
,.,_
'.
·"
June 5" .):973 .

•:.:.'
Honorable William D. Ruckelshaus

Acting Director
Federal Bureau. of-lnvestigat_ion
"
-~·
Washington, D. C. · 2053.5
Dear Mr. Ruckelshaus:
As you may know, the. National Transportation Safety Board is

current.ly investigating the.;!>ircraft accident of the United Air Lines
Boeing 737, at Midway Airpo}'.t, Chicago, on December 8, 1972. Our
investigative team assigned. to this accident discovered on the day ..
following the accident that several FBI agents had taken a nuinber of·-.'.:
non-typical actions relating to this accident within the first few hours' '-.,'
following the accident. · !,~ :
Included Were: for the first time in the memory of our staff,
FBI agent went to the control tower and listened to the tower tapes
before our investigators had done so; and fo:;- the first tin-ie to our
knowledge, in connection ·with an aircraft accident, an FBI agent inter-
viewed witnesses to the crash, including £light attendants on the air-
craft prior to the NTSB interviews. As I am sure you can understand,
these actions, particularly with respect to this flight on which Mrs.
E~- Howard Hunt was killed, have raised innumerable qu·estions in the
..... :
· t<t'i- mi11ds of those with legitimate interests in ascertaining the cause of
tfiis accident. Included among· those who have asked questions, for
example, is the Government Ac~ivities Subcommittee of the House
I .:;,-. Government Operations ·Committee. On the basis of informal discus-
s-ions with the staff of the Commitiee, it is likely that questfrns as to
.at sp~cific actions were taken by the FBI in connection with this air-
).i~'-~"f:i'~l~nt,and why such actions Were taken, will come up in a .
:~&'.q.~&'"'.}g~t:nearing
. at which the NTSB will appear and which ·is .
,~,~.:'~~r'li:tPlo r June l 3, 1 9 1 3 .
~~fl}~;·' -.'.:
.,~d'.r·to
be fully responsive to the Committee, as well as to
be fully inforn1ed ourselves about all aspects of this accident so as Lo
assure the con1plete accuracy of our deLerininaLion of the probable
- 2 - .
· :;s:" c.'-•·~•'Would. appr.,,iato lfoihg advise~ -~~fi deiaiJ, with resp;<f;•:;,';'~

4 ;,,· iliQ 'J:B; ~\fi:fl:ii;s_in
··;''.j7?;.">, ~
~C ?fi:c1'•'-'i:C't }\)!>]).!~.,the following information'
conn ccti on )Vith thi, accfd ent. ' W c would like to
" J. l!''·'··'"' !~<...~···· -
!~}.$');1~~,..@:~!~;~~-.,,;i;·-fhe
1l·. "'·:.*"..'''·'-. ·.- '· ·.·
the purpo,e of the FBI '
','t;;'~Ziifi;i'th.:i~(i;C:a'Se;:
reasons for the early response and unus_ual FBI actiona:,
····~eti'dii• t:•k~
the number.of FBI personnel involved, all investigative
by '.he •gents and the thne• they took •uch •ctions_ (includ: j
mg the time the first FBI agents arrived on the s.ccne), and copies. of a:tt-1
reports" and records made by the agents in connection with their investi- ·
gationa (we· already
documents ihould pehave·::~-bpi~a
of 26 FBI iJ'1.terview reports; any other
provided, therefore).
While we have initiated action· a.t the staff level between our agency
and yours to effect better liaison and avoiq engaging in efforts which may
be in conflict in the !utu.re.r we 'ha.ve that aome mo,re formal determ~1ed
agr.~.em~.t?:t
o~
arrangement--in·th:e natl.ire of' an infe_ragency m.emorandum of'
=der•tandini' tor _insianco--woUld •eem appropriato. It would cl<iiijiiy
resp~ctive fo~th p-roc.edt:r~.~s
if,yq:~'
de-lineate our statutory responsibilities and s_et
to eliminate any !liture conflicti;. We would therefore appreciate#
would designate, ·at your· earliest convenience, an official with. w}\-Om we:
may discuss this matter an{f with the authority to negotiate such a.forn:ial
agreement with the Safety Board.
In the interim, however; we would like to receive, in advance of

the scheduled June 13, 1973 public oversiglit hearing, the specific infor-
mation concerning the actions of the FBI in connection with the Midway
accident and tl:le reasons therefor, in order to enable us to be as fully
re•ponsive ;u possible to th:e House Subconunittee.
Sincerely,
ti Original aiiD•d by
John B. llo&d
John H. Reed
Chairman
UNITED STATES DEPARTn!EJ";T OF JUSTIE:E
;.--··'~
/ f~1-
';:'.\f~~'-'>'.·.~::: _FEDER-A~ BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
. . . ·z;f.::. 'WASHINGTO~,D.C~ :iosu
_,,::
I
June U, 1973
I
Mr. John H. Reed
Chairman
Department of Transportation
Washington, D. C. 20591 ..
. : .,1
Dear Mr. Reed:
Your letter dated June 5, 1973, concerning the

FBI's investigation into the crash of a United Air Linea
Boeing 737 at Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, on
:::~::c:~:::~igative jurisdiction~);~.
8 9
December :h: ; : : : : :
in connection with the Destruction of Aircraft or Motor-~<-· ~.tJ.~
Vehicles (DMN) Statute, Title 18, Section 32, U, S •._ Co~e·, ~>
which pertains to the willful damaging, destroying or ~- . ·~·~
disabling of any civil aircraft in interstate, overseas or -~
foreign air commerce. In addition, Congresp specifically ~-
designated the FBI to handle investigations under the Crime ii)
~.board Aircraft (CAA) Statute, Title 49, Section 1472,
U. s. Code, pertaining, among other things, to aircraft
piracy, interference with flight crew members and certain
specified crimes aboard aircraft in flight, including assault, · ·
murder, manslaughter and attempts to commit murder or
manslaughter.
FBI investigation of the December 8, 1972, United

Air Lines crash w~~ instituted to determine if a violation
of the DAMV or CAA Statutes had occurred and for no other
reason. The fact that Mrs. E. Howard Hunt was aboard the
plan:~.was unknown to the FBI at the time our investigation
~ " ~:"~ti tut_~d.
, ·Lt has been longstanding FBI policy to

te1y proceed to the scene of an airplane crash
for the purpose of developing any information indicating
a possible Federal violation within the investigative
jurisdiction of the FBI. In all such instances liaison
'"" ';~[~'
Mr. John H. Reed
i
is immediately established with the NatioP~l Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) personnel upon their arrival at the
scene.
crash
~~®!* ;Q EB• llsJent~onded
seen~ to the
s ones arriving within 45 minutes of
the crash. FBI Agents did interview witnesses to the crash,
including flight attendants. Speciai Agent (SA) Robert E.
Hartz proceeded to the Midway Airport tower shortly after the
crash to determine if tower personnel could shed any light as
to the reason for the crash. ·On arriving at the tower, SA Hartz
identified himself as an FBI Agent and explained the reason
for his presence. He was invited by Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) personnel at the tower to listen to the
recording made at the tower of the conversation between the <;o_'-._
tower and United Air Lines Flight 55 3. At no time did ;. . ·f,..;·
i
SA Hartz request to be allowed to listen to the .tapes. ~After.,
.,' listening to the tapes, SA Hartz identified a sound as ~eirrg ~·
that of the stall indicator on the aircraft. The FAA agreed'
~
that SA Hartz was right and immediately notified FAA Head-
quarters at Washington, D. c.
:.~-.i-·
·The FBI's investigation in' this. matter was
terminated within 20 hours· of the accident and on December ll, .J
1972, Mr. William L. Lamb, NTSB, was furnished with copies

of the complete FBI investigation pertaining to this crash
after it was determined there was apparently no violation
of the DAMV or CAA Statutes.
In order to avoid the possibility of any mis-
understanding concerning our respective agencies' responsi-
bilities and to insure continued effective liaison between
the:· N!.L'SB and the FBI, I have designated SA Richard F.
Bat~~i;~t~Section Chief, Criminal Section, General Investigative
.uli~~:£iqrt:; FBI Headquarters T Washington T D. c. ' telephone
rfi~~;t:::324-2281·, to represent the FBI concerning any matters
o{C~}Th~~hai{ interest.
Sincerely yours,
~-""'.?70. - n ~~~
/lr::C--~ ./'? .(/ l?r /}
William D. Ruckelshaus
Acting Director ~:
- 2
1··-·· .. -·------- - - - -
alphlgraphiGS® 2407W 22nd Street

Oak Brook, Illinois 60521
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ONARC RADl/R ,ARTu!lT
C0.+1Aon;,c Re:'ADov-r
p,eepl'IRE:D /.9 DEC. 7..Z
EXHIBIT 9B
.NA.TIONAL TRANSPOR'T'-.ATION SAFETY :BOAfill

SYSTEMS GROLJP CF..AIRMfl..1'TS FACTUAL F.EPORT
INDEx: OF PHOTOGRAPHS
'No. l Cockpit Area
2 Ca~tain's Instrtnnent Panel
3 Center Panel
4 Flight Director Panel
5 Pedestal
~--
6 Left Main Gear Up-Lock
7 Flap Jackscrew
8 Horizontal Stabilizer Jacksr rew
•.
'·
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20
I ·....
Docket No. SA-435

Exhibit No. 8B
NATIONAL TRP.NSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Bure~uof Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C •
......
. '·
. PQWERJ?LANT GROUP CRA.J.RMAN 'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVE}3IJ:IGATION
INDEX TO PHOTOGRAPHS
By
Edward P. Wizniak
;,
-' ·,
NATION.AL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Exhibit 8B
Washington, D. c.
February 2, l973
POWERPLANT GROUP CRAIRMAN 1 S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED AIR LINES FLIGHT 553, BOEING B-737, N903lU,

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 8, l972
INDEX TO PHOTOGRAPHS
ON SCENE
l. No. 1 Engine: Left Side View; recovered third stage compressor

disk is visible in foreground.
2. No. l Engine: View towards the front of the engines; the 4th
stage compressor disk is visible; blades are bent opposite to
the direction of compressor rotation.
3. No. l Engine: Rear View.
4. No_. 2 Engine: View toward the acce&sory and components d·rives

gearbox.
5. No. 2 Engine: View toward top of engine.
DISASSEMBLY AT UNITED AIR LINES MAINTENANCE BASE, SAN FRANCISCO,

CALIFORNIA
6. No. 1 Engine: View showing molten metal splatter adhering to

the turbine front case, first stage turbine nozzle guide vanes
and combustion chamber inner outlet duct assemblies.
7. No. l Engine: l3th stage modulating valve.
8. No. l Engine: Layout of cowl anti-ice system.
9. No. l Engine: Layout of inlet guide vane anti-ice system.
10. No. 2 Engine: Fan inlet case
ll. No. 2 Engine: View showing exhaust section and 4th stage
turbine blades.
12. No. 2 Engine: View showing metal splatter adhering to the first
stage turbine nozzle guide vanes.
. ·"' ',• .;-_: ..-'•
Index to Photographs - 2 -
13. No. 2 Engine: Layout of cowl anti-ice system.
14.. No. 2 Engine: Layout of inlet guide vane· anti .:.tee system.
~f.'0J~~
Edward P. Wizniak .
-·· .·.
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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY :SOARD
BUREAU OF AVIATION SAFETY
WASHINGTON; D. C.. 2059l
PHOTOGRAPHS
BY
Robert J. Gordon
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l, Area of Left Engine
2. Area of Left Wing
3. Right Engine
4. Area of Right Wing
5. Cockpit Section
6. Right Main Cear
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IOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-TI
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY :BO.ARTI

Washington) TI. C. 2059l
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CIVIL AEROMETIICAL INSTITUTE REPORTS
l. Rwnan Factors Team Member·

;Report) John G. BlethroW:
2. Iaentificatioi:l Re1iort -
Clyae c. Snow)· Ph. TI.
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REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
UNITED AIR LINES, FLIGHT 553

·. BOEING 737
Midway Airport
Chicago, Illinois .
8 December 1972 ·.
Human Factors Team :tviember' Report--

John G. BJ;ethrow
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ACCIDENT SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 crashed at approximately 2:28 p.m. CST
on 8 December 1972. The cloud ceiling in the area of Midway Airport
was approximately 500 feet with reported patches of fog or low
clouds at 100 feet.
The aircraft broke through the clouds approximately 5 blocks

before impact and about 100 feet above ground. A tremendous power
surge was heard and felt by all .of .the survivor~with .only a change
in attitude resulting. A majority of ~itnesses, both passengers and
observers on the ground, felt that the aircraft assumed a nose-~p
attitude with the ~pplication of power and that the right .wing dropped
significantly.
Shortly after the initial surge, a tremor was felt which to one
qualified witness resembled the earlier application of power.
Immediately following the tremor, brili:i~ntly. fla~·hingli-ght~-· --·--
11
accompanied by popping 11 noises were observed on the left side and
then the overhead bins and ceiling liners began to fall.
Impact forces varied widely from the tail section to the cockpit
due to the early, nose-high attitude of the aircraft and exposure to
the house structures. _The tail section experienced the least forces;
therefore, witness statements of crew members and passengers seated in
this area (regarding the crash sequence) were weighed heavily by this
investigator.
The final impact sheared the right half of the cockpit and an
undetermined allX)unt of the first-class section, broke the fuselage at
the forward and aft edges of the wings, and separated the forward cabin
from the aft cabin.
All of the surviving passengers attest to the fact that the cabin
interior was quite dark after impact and that a condition of quiet prevailed.
A stewardess seated in the tail section was aware of a hissing noise which
this investigator attributes to a sheared natural gas line (supply line)
in the basement of the house in which the plane ~ame to rest.
-3-
Fire broke out immediately both forward and in the area of the
left wing. The progress of the fire was rapid because natural gas
was feeding it, fuel from the wings was p~oling in ~he basement.
and there was wooden debris surrounding the wreckage.
There were three flight crew members, three cabin attendants, eleven
paid first-class passengers, and forty-two paid tourist passengers plus
two infants. The survivors were primarily near the immediate tail
section or over the center wing area. None of the flight crew survived,
although Captain Whitehouse survived for a sufficient time to build a
carbon monoxide level of 40.4%. ~fone 9£ the passengers seated in the first
section (1st 5 rows) .s.urvived although the "stewardess ..seated i~ the
·· rearWard.facing ju~p seat on the forward l~ft side of the cabin did
su·rvive. She was ·taken .out of her seat a·nd from. beneath pipes, bricks,
and other debris by firemen who were forced to fight flames to reach
her. Her exit from the fuselage area was made through the open right
side of the cabin.
Fourteen paid passengers and one infant out of the forty-two passengers
and two infants seated in the tourist section survived the impact and
fire. Passengers in seats SC, SD, and SF exited through the hole created
by the cabin separation in the forward wing area and climbed back
through the rubble on the right side of. the aircraft to the area of the aft
galley service door and up to the street. Passengers in SA, lOA, lOB,
lOC, 12E, 12F, 16E, 16F, and 17B all exited through the aft galley
service door. Passengers in lOB and 12F were small children and
were carried from the aircraft by cabin attendants or adult passengers.
Passengers in lOD, lOF, and .llF went out what was described as a hole
larger than an overwing exit, at least six feet wide and on the right
side near where they were seated. They walked over debris in getting
back past the aft galley service door and out to the street. Two
cabin attendants for the tourist section were in their jump seats
and secured by full seatbelt and shoulder harness restraints. Their
seats remained intact and the restraint.s released with no difficulties.
The attendant on the left portion of the jum~ seat (nearest door)
attempted to open the left aft cabin door but fire was immediately
apparent.
Fire began coming in the door and considerable time was
consumed in trying to close it because the slide dislodged from
its case and blocked the closing. A man sitting in Seat 17B was of
assistance in closing this door, and he was also extremely help~ul
in assisting the other cabin attendant overcome the.debris blocking

the aft galley service door.
The· aft galley service door is the only door used for evacuation
but one passenger used the left overwing exit, according to anbther
passenger. There is no indication as to whether this person returned
to the cabin but fire was present in the area and a body was located
near tpe aft edge of t?at w~ng.
The stewardess in the first class area ~xperietlced a mental block

from the trauma of her experience a~d·coul~ not recall any passenge~
seat locations. Six .pa~sengers · i_n that· area. i:oulci; not be. accounted
for because of this and the fact that no one else could remember
their locations.
Both tourist section stewardesses and the passenger survivors in
the tourist area failed to establish a seating documentation for all
of the fatalities; seat locations, therefore, could not be determined
for three passengers.
All passengers were out of the aircraft in less than nine minutes
(an accurate timing of the evacuation has not been feasible to date).
Passengers an.d crew members who were not subjected to heavy crash
loads and injury trauma were either out early and seeking the shelter
of safety or were busy in assisting others and were not aware of much
more than the progress of the fire and the rapidly faili~g cabin
environment. Those in the areas of heavy cabin destruction were slower
to respond to the emergency because of the stupefying mental and
physical trauma, disorientation, and/or difficulty in negotiating
the devastated cabin interior so that speed of movement was foremost in
thought and previously consumed time secondary. Reliable ground
witnesses offered the best estimates.
Smoke was no problem to the passengers in the area of the wings,
according to their verbal statements, but the ?ft cabin attendants were
very much aware of a smoke problem. One attendant states that heavy
gray-colored smoke, present in the early portion of the evacuation
quickly gave way to a very dense and heavy black smoke which seemed
to be so heavy it would not go down her throat. In the opinion of the
cabin attendants and passengers assisting in the evacuation at the aft
g·alley service door, the smoke is the primpry reaso!J for abandoning
the cabin when they did. They attempted to continue a rescue operation
in spite of the smoke but were limited to mov.ement no-
further than the gulps of fresh air near the door would permit.
Evacuation slides at doors other than the aft.galley service
door were not deployed - those in the forward cabin heeause. of the
devastation and the one at the aft main door (left side} because of
fire. The one·sliqe deployed was used in an effort to· cover a drop
to the basement bf. the ·house under that section.
I
PERTINENT OBSERVATIONS
1. All 02 walk-around and therapeutic bottles recovered were burned

and their contents expended, except one therapeutic bottle. This
bottle was scorched around the top somewhat, but still retained its
contents.
2. The supply bottles for the emergency o2 system were recovered.
Each bottle was burned extensively and had emptied its contents.
One bottle, either the crew supply or the supplementary supply, had
been exposed to extreme concentrated heat which caused the bottle
to. burn through.
The time the;e bottles discharged during the crash sequence
is not known, but they did discharge and carried sufficient o2 to
accelerate combustion.
3. Emergency lighting failed, according to witness statements.
4. The bullhorn was not used in any way.
5. Parents with infant children (2 on this flight) were holding
their children at the time of impact, if the caqin attendant directions
were followed.
6. The bright lights and npopping noi.ses" heard prior to impact
were probably due to the severing of power lines approximately one-half
block before final impact.
7. Both ground fatalities were found in the rubble beneath the
first-class section.
8. There was no warning of an impending crash except the application
!
of power to the engines.
9. Firemen were on the scene and had hose pulled to the aft end of
the wreckage in less than five minutes~
10. Examination of the numerous pathological and toxicological reports
issued on the crew members and passengers of UAL-553 by the Cook County
Coroner and a personal, visual examination of the bodies still retained
by the morgue on 10 D.ecember 1972 (Sunday) , point out that although
virtually all bodies were severely burned, traumatic injury
was quite prevalent. An injury which is totally incapacitating
to one person might not preclude escape for another. Therefore, speed
-7-
of fire progression, amount of smoke produced, content of smoke,

containment of smoke, distribution of wreckage debris, and individual
will would all influence the probability ~f survival.
11. Very little mention of seat belt injury is present in the listing
of injuries made available to this investigator, but each passenger
personal.ly interviewed made comment to the fact that bruises, cuts and/
or both were in evidence.
SEAT DOaJMENTATION
The Capt~in s seat is virtually intact and shows o~ly minor fire
1
.: damage .. Floor a ttachme.nts held. The pedesta i·· was cut to remo"ve the seat
.sometirge after th~s investigator photog"raphed it, in place, at the site.
The rest~aint system was ~ac{fic Scientific using the collective tjpe
buckle. Each. insertion point functioned when exa_mined at the hanger. The
shoulder restraints were completely within the enertia reels except for
buckle inserts and hard to start when unreeling. A complete lack of
scortching, discoloring, abrasion marks, or soiling other than that
portion attached to the buckle inserts (scortched) points to the fact
that this portion of the restraint system was not, in use at the time of
impact.
The first officers seat was recovered in part and showed evidence of
impact damage and extensive burning. Only the back portion and part of the
arm rest (left) were accounted for. The shoulder restraints were recovered
in part although the buckle inserts were missing and the inertial reel
housings had partially melted into the belts. The reels were stuck but
inspection disclosed that they were full of unburned belt and indicates
I
that this portion of the full restraint was not used. The restraint system
on this seat was also Pacific Scientific and utilized the collective buckle.
The 2nd officer's seat was almost totally destroyed and the only portion
recovered was the upper part of the telescoping backrest. All parts of the
restraint system were missing.
One Pacific Scientific crew buckle (collective) was found in the

cockpit wreckage but there was no indication as. to whether the 1st or 2nd
officer had used it. This buckle was also operatiorral when found even though
extensively burned.
The observer seat was partially recovered. There is no evidence of this

-B-
seat having been occupied during impact or subsequent fire.
Cabin attendant jump seat (rearward facing) in the first class
section was recovered and reassembled for approximate position during
impact. The seat pan portion was broken free of' the wall; both back p_§!ds
were separated from the wall and both head pads were missing. Hinge
supports under. the seat pan were bent downward and to the left. The
restraints(lap belts only) were missing except for two anchors still
attached to the wall behind the left portion (inboard). The retaining
J
band of an extinguisher bracket located on the.wall next to the right
side of the seat pan, about hip height, was displaced to the left indicating
the.extinguisher, no. longer· contained, had been knocked or shoved across the
occupied seat.
Cabin attendant seat. (:E01:ward facing) on "the aft cabin wall was missing
. .
as well as the restraint systems (Pacific Scienti_fic with collective buckles.
and enertia reels). Both attendants survived and were not hospitalized. They
were in complete aggeement that the seat and restraint systems functioned
perfectly. They also agree that movement from the aft galley area forward of
about row 15 was extremely difficult because seats on the left side had
broken loose and the overhead bins had fallen. Survivors had climbed over
seats on the right side.
Fire was extensive and extremely hot in the main wreckage so that very
little by way of passenger seat units were recovered. Those seats and seat
portions brought to the hanger storage at Midway airport were badly damaged
by impact and fire. Only two tourist seat units (three seat sections each)
were recovered relatively intact and no first class units were recovered
intact.
I
All passenger seats which were sufficiently intact to make any analysis
on showed a downward loading in excess of the 4 1/2 g set by government
regulation and a side loading in excess of the 1 1/2 g set by the same
regulation (Part 25.561). Damage to seats, other than fire, was far more
extensive from the forces which devestated the fuselage than by passenger
loading.
No seat could be positively established as having been in a specific
place within the aircraft, other than being a def:i,nite type and possibly a
right or left unit. The two tourist units recovered reasonably intact could
be identified as one right hand unit and one left unit. According to burn
patterns, they would have been fully loaded and in an area where the seating
chart denotes this type of seat occupancy.
One tourist class unit, window section on the right side, was sheared
off and backwards from the center section destroying the seat pan of that
section.
One tourist class unit, window section right side, the only remaining
section of that unit, was punttured from behind at a point approximately
8 inches up from bottom and near center. The blunt penetrating 'object
pierced the seat back frame, cushoin, and fabric covering. Evidence indicates
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theseat was occupied so the object would have entered the passenger"s
lower back, somewhere near the lumbar region and top of the pelvis.
Recommendations:
.·.
" 1. This invest~gator would re.commend that the. e~ergency Oxygen supply
bottles for the cabin and crew systems be located in the tail section rather
than in a forward area. In the case of UA-553 they were located in the
forward most part of the forward cargo pit on tHe right side in close
proximity to the storage batteries. I cannot say that these bottles were
responsible for loss of life, but they were empty when found and carried a
significant amount of Oxygen.
2. A nationwide re-education of parties most apt to be in attendance at
a crash site for rescue and/or;removal of victoms is recommended. Marking
body locations will help Human 'Factors investigators in the analysis of
evacuation patterns, injury causation, or reasons for an unsuccessful
attempts toward escape.
3. Survivors, other than those at the aft galley "ervice ddor, were
quite aware of the cabin darkness after impact. Smoke would have rendered
emergency cabin lighting ineffective after a period of time but the survivor
statements indicate an immediate total darkness and the probability of a
1
failure of the emergency light lng system. This investigator would recommend
a more protected location fo~ :the emergency lighting hardware and a more
reliable triggering method.
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,.,_, JOHN .G. BLETHROW

?o'esearch Human Biologist,
cAMI.
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
(Identification Report)
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UNITED AIR LINES, FLIGHT 553
BOEING 737
.· Midway Airport
chfcago, ·n1inois
8 December 1972
Clyde C. Snow, Ph.D.

Civil Aeron1edical Institute
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IDENTIFICATION
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT: UNITED AIR LINES FLIG1IT 55 3

BOEING 737
MIDWAY AIRPORT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
8 December 1972
On the evening of 8 December 1972, I traveled from Washington, D.C.,

to Chicago, Illinois, to participate in· the .human fac;tors inv_estigat.ion
of the Unfted Air Lines Flight 553 which had crashed near Midway
Airport earlier that afternoon. Upon a:z:rival, I was assigned .to the.
. Hum.an Factors Group with the request that_ I aid in the identification
of the victims. At this time (approximately 1:00 a.m., 9 December 1972),
I called the Cook County Coroner's Office and was informed that gross
external descriptions of all the bodies had beert completed as well as
complete necropsies on two of the three male crew members. Further
work was suspended until the next morning.
On Saturday morning, 9 December 1972, I arrived at the Coroner's

office at 8:30 a.m. By this time, a United Air Lines team under the
direction of Dr. Joseph Kidera:had been organized and was gathering
background information useful in identification from the victim's
next-of-kin. The evening before, the identification division of
the Chicago Police Department had begun sorting and cataloging
personal effects of the victims. The FBI Disaster Squad, under
the direction of special agent-Beverly Ponder, had arrived from
Washington and immediately set to work to collect fingerprints from
1
those bodies from which prints 1were obtainable.

Although final positive identification (in the form of a signed
i
death certificate) is the responsibility of the Cook County Coroner,
coroner officials - lacking identification specialists of their own -
agreed to accept as positive identifications those made through the
combined efforts of Dr. Kidera' s team and the FBI Disaster Squad.
2
Unfortunately, before this arrangement was agreed upon several

bodies were released by coroner authorities on the basis of
clothing, personal effects, or visual identification by relatives.
A preliminary inspection of the bodies revealed that many were
too badly burned for fingerprinting and that identification would
have to be based on dental evidence. An inquiry to coroner officials
.revealed that the dentist ordinarily used as a consultant in such
cases was not available on weekends. Since one crew member, at this
time, had not been identified and, at best, the identification~· made
the previous evening could only be· considered tentative, it appeared
that priority should be given to the organization of a d;ntal identifi-
cation team. After clearing with Dr. Kidera, I was granted permission
to organize such a team by Cook County Coroner authorities.
The first member of this team was Dr. Kenneth Giese, D.D.S.,
the dental resident taking weekend calls at nearby Cook County Hospital.
When contacted, Dr. Giese immediately volunteered his services and
reported to the morgue at approximately 12:30 a.m., 9 December 1972.
Dr. Paul Goaz, D.D.S., Loyola University Colleg~ of Dentistry, and
Dr. William Burch, also of the L~yola faculty, were contacted and
volunteered their services. Since the morgue was lacking in instruments
and supplies needed for dental identification, Drs. Goaz and Burch
brought much of their own equipment, including camera and film.
Although there were some exceptions, the following routines were
generally followed:
1. Each body was first examined by the FBI and if prints were
available they were taken.
2. The body was next examined by this investigator and two United
Air Lines physicians serving on Dr. Kidera 1 s team. This
examination yielded an assessment of the individual 1 s sex, age,
race, stature, weight, and evidence of old surgical procedures,
deformities, and anomalies useful in identification.
3. The dentition was then removed, cleaned, and charted.
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4. The completed dental charts were then sorted into subgroups

on the basis of the individual's sex, race, and esti'matt·d age.
5. Dental and medical records of possible decedents obtained
by United Air Lines were then compared to dental charts of
the victims of the same sex, race, and approximate age to
obtain positive identification.
6. In a number of cases, tentative identification provided
by the victims' personal effects served to pinpoint certain
victi~s who could then be rapidly iden~ified by dental and/or
fingerprint evidence.
All personnel involved worked continuously until approximately

1:30 a.m. Sunday morning. Efforts were resumed Sunday morning at
8:00 a.m. and continued until 11:00 p.m. Sunday night when the last
victim was positively identified.
Table 1 lists victims by body number, name, age, height, weight,
race and criteria used for identification. Of the 45 fatalities
(43 passengers+ 2 occupants of the house-struck by the aircraft),
33 victims ( 73 %) could be positively identified by fingerprints
or dentition. Approximately 17 ( 38 %) victims yielded partial· or
complete sets of fingerprints. From this group, 12 positive
identifications were made from FBI fingerprint records.
a. Thirty victims were examined dentally and positive

identifications were made on twenty-eight. The two remaining were
elderly, completely edentulous females - one who was wearing a
complete set of dentures, the other without dentures. The cranium
of the dentured female also displayed a number of negroid skeletal
features while the other appeared to be caucasoid. A review of the
records revealed that the only edentulate females of this age group
involved in the accident were an eighty-three year old negro passenger
and a seventy year old white resident of a house struck by the
aircraft. Inquiries to relatives revealed that the negro female
passenger was known to have worn her dentures at all times in public
and that they had been made at the Zollar Clinic in Chicago. When
contacted, Zollar officials were able to identify the dentures as
products of their laboratory.
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b. One body - that of an 8-month-old male, white infant -

was identified by exclusion since no other infants were listed
aboard the aircraft or known to be in the houses struck by the
aircraft. This identification was further supported by the positive
dental identification of the infant's mother.
c. The remaining victims were identified by personal

effects found on tl:~e bpdy or, in a few instances, by visual
i"nspection by next-of-kin. Unfo:rtunately, these bodies were 'released
by coroner officials b~fore identification .could oe co~firmed by
. dental ~r finge~piint records.
Table 2 summarizes the methods employed for identification

of the 45 victims.
Fingerprints only 4
Fingerprints & Dentition 8
Dentition only 21
Exclusion 1
Persona 1 effects /visua l._,,1:...:1:..___
45
Reliance on visual identification during the early stages of

the investigation resulted in several problems:
1. Body# 94, later identified as that of a male passenger

by dental evidence was originally identified as that of 2nd
Officer Barry J. Elder and autopsied as such. Although this
mistake was eventually rectified, it resulted in the loss of
autopsy and toxicological data on crew member Elder.
2. The badly cremated.body of a young adult female wa9

mistakenly identified by a male relative as that of his 8-year-old
niece. This mistake was also discovered and corrected through
dental identification.
5
3. The body of 1st Officer Coble was mistakenly classified

as "female" by morgue personn,el on the evening of the· crash.
This error caused an undue delay in identification of this
crew member.
Leaving the purely humanitarian aspects aside, positive

identification of victims of aircraft accidents is a fundamental
first step in human factors investigation. In this case, for
example, had the error in identification :i,nvolving th'? passenger
and crew member gone undetected, and had th7- pass.enger been under
.the in!l~~nce of ~rugs or ~lcohol, invesd.gatiqn .would have been
seriously misled. Misidentification of one passeng~r for another
can negate the efforts of human factors researchers in reconstructing
the evacuation sequence or correlating injury with structural
deformation or restraint system failure.
For these reasons it is strongly recommended that in future

accidents NTSB insist on positive identification of all victims
through dermatoglyphic, odontological, anthropological or other
biological evidence (e.g. medical or surgical history, serology, etc.).
In the few cases which do not yield sufficient biological information
for positive identification to be established, evidence provided by
personal effects is acceptable only after all other victims have been
positively identified. Visual identification by relatives or
acquaintances should not be accepted under any circumstances.
It is also recommended that, whenever possible, no bodies be

released until at least all crew members have been positively identified
and preferably not before all victims (passengers and crew) have been
identified. This recommendation is made in order to avoid confusion
in those rare instances where dental or other information on two or
more victims is similar enough to require further double-checking of
the bodies. Such comparisons are often difficult to make if one of
the bodies has been released since it entails bringing it back to
the morgue - a procedure which is upsetting to the victim's family
and which may be impossible if the body has already been shipped
home for burial or actually buried.
6
It is recognized that many states and smaller cities do not

have trained identification specialists capable of handling th? problems
posed by mass aviation disasters. Smaller airlines may also lack the
trained personnel and well-equipped facilities for rapid and efficient
retrieval of personal data on passenger-victims· which Dr. Kidera has
organized for United Air Lines. It is recommended that in such cases
the Federal Aviation Administration help provide support which would
include the following:
1. Maintenance of rosters of U.S. dentists. quali~ied by

experience and training in forensic odontology. Such rosters
should be organized b~.city~ state, and region s6 that local
specialists can be mobilized when necessary.
2. Encouragement (through FAA Regional Flight Surgeon and
AMES) of local officials to include provisions for positive
identification of victims in disaster planning.
3. A small (two-member) team of well-equipped identification
specialists authorized to travel to the scene of all major
accidents. The functions of this team would be to organize
and coordinate the activities of local personnel recruited
for identification services.
The difficulty of the task of identification of mass air

disaster victims increases exponentially with the number of victims
involved. In the past, the number of victims has seldom exceeded 150.
Judging from past experience, this number also represents the upper
limits of our capabilities of handling the problem of identification by
present procedures. With the advent of jumbo jets, we are faced with
the eventuality of accidents involving several hundred victims.
Therefore, research toward improvement in the procedures and techniques
of identification should be encouraged by airlines, the FAA, and NTSB.
\
24 January 1973
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IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS ON VICTIMS
OF UAL B-737 ACCIDENT
MIDWAY AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILUNOIS
TABLE I , I
8 DECEMBER 1972
,ody
Nr Name Sex ,\ge Race Stat Wt
Ident. B"
Finger- Visual/Pers.
Dentition or in ts
. Effects Remarks
I Time
Identii
!i 3 Abner, v. 'i' 83 N 62 160 x .Invalid
I 2000
! 12 /10
1
88 Baldwin T. J 42 w 69 160, x r ! 12 /9
97 Bayer, L.
l
j 42 } l 0900
,.r w 73 175 x ! 12 /9
l [
l ! 1030.
87 Bes hoar J. <'<" ~ 47 w 70 200! x IX I i2110
73 Blodgett, R. o L7 w 75 220 x x I 1 1100
I 12 /9
79 Clark, M. 9 Lg N ! 68 \ 125, x f
.. { . I 12/9
l 1500
!
86 .Coble, W. l c! \ 43 !w j 70 ·190!
I
x . ff lst 11250
Officer
1 12 /10
I
j
'
107 Collins, G. r" } 47 N.· I I·
1
'
x
tu .s,
~Congressman
t 2000
1°2 /18 f
i T T
75 Elder. B. 0 i 31 f
I
w l
72 ! 180f 1x ! i 1215
! 2nd Officer ) 12 /9
dl Ellison. R. 2 l 41 ! N l
I 67 I 1361 x '
:,
l
I 2000
I 12 /10
85 Ellison, F. oLs fN !
I
70
t
! 125i
I
x
I
l
!x
II I
(Invalid?
: 1430
j
12 /l 0
l. l 1500
'15 · Ender l A 70 i 170~ x 12 /10
' I I l
!
. iw ~
! I I
}
i i 1610
72 Fields, E. 2 163 64 j 150~ x ! ! Inva 1 id f 12 /l 0
c. 2 '23
I I
Iw i' 'I1 1131 !ix I i

:
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110 Hewitt
.;
61 ' 1 12 /9
1
~52 1w ~'
J
l
98 Hunt D. It 2
2
64 r 14oi x f
~
~
\ 1630
l 12 /9
' I. 1:' 1 f l I
i l
--
104 Janda, E. d f47 lw n! lSOj x I 12/9
:
78 Jordan, M. x f
Jordan, H.
I
82 x ix
i !
1·
93 Jording J. 64 '! 120\ x
I
1
l
1
99 Jording, Infant 17. I
I 1045
·25 Know land, R. r' 35 W 72 200' x :x
I
J 2 / J II
I
l t 20.'.5
102 Kri 11, A. er ''44 w 66 i 143l x J 2 /8
\ I 2000
71 Kru er J. cl . 72 I' 1811
! 34 \ w x 12 /8
! ~ i I 1800
70 Lewis. B. J 0'
' 35 I W i 73. 185i x ' I 12 /I 0
1 I
II --
94 McNair w. r! ! 37 f w~
}
'
l x I I l r 12 /9
1405
~
( i I l\ l
1 11 Moreau R. er f 50 I N 67' 1551 i ! \ 12 /9
J T 1645
(N i : I
I Il l I
1()~ Newm:1n v. 9 f 50 65'.
. 140! x : 12I1 o
! \I 1 I 1650
l
(
1)(1 NL•wm:in s. 9 \ 24 ! N
l\ 65·
}
I
1301 x 12 /l 0
r
?
1 l ! I
I
I
I l '<
1 2000
TABLE I
IDENTIFICATION STATISTICS ON VTCTJMS
OF UAL B-737 ACCIDENT
HIIMAY AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
8 DECEMBER 1972
Ident. B'i
Finger- Visual/Pers. Time
h iffiC Sex Age Racj Stat Wt Dentition or in ts Effects Remarks Idcnti:
Slwrman F. Q 58 w I 62 llC i. x
1330
12 /9
--
s_~ull K. 0 42 Iw 71 165 x x l
!
12/l 0
____.Jvst Iw I
I
I 2000
\_ W. Sr. r{' 42 !
' 66 116 x I 12 /8
_-.._,_w'l':;t, W. Jr. / 7 w 44 ! x I
I
!t
1045
12 /9
lI l 1045
-.. - -
wt'St. M. 2 10 w 44 f
t
x ! 12 /9
lfst c. .2 8 i w I 45 x I I
I
i
I
I
2230
12/10
lw ! l 0945
~!St J. 0 55 74 26°5 x ·Ix :
~ ! 12/fO
I
,2225
! 65 l 157
l r
!":thers, c. c! ·33 N !' x I 12/8
l
lhifehouse w. i 0 44 w 71 I 185· x
l
i Pilot
i
I
1115
12/9
.1 \·LJ.1i tney D. 0 27 1w ! 69 1751

t
x
!
l I
I 1630
12 /9
Iw I
I 1515
• l \
_Jl_\:__li J liam. R. 0 27 70. I 145 x i I
I 12 /9
l l
--
,r, C:ucul ich, T. 2 37 ! w l 49 ! 641 x
'
l
I
Ground
Fatality 12 /10
--
n c''::culich, v. I 9 70
i
!
i w I 61
i
! 130!
i
x ,I Ground
Fatality 12 /10
Box J. 4 l tr Time I 4i I
ff Ccmpan.ios Changing Qua:rters. Covering Dislricts. etc.
343
~~I
_q4
3 .6/
1l I
JI CZ /421
f 3 ::JI
~'I
!15
14-4l 1141 7o
- 111~
J418 I '61 /.
-ro
3-J/
J.-11
I (., Id-. 3 14 31 I?- 3 14£63 11j/

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2i l> I . 3j.J6 ~ 3 ;1J0 14 !5g 193.:J
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~r. Docket No. SA-435
. Exhibit No. 9-C-l
j i
•
;.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BO:ARD

- ' Washington, D. C. 20591
Photographs of
Recovered from
B737 UAL Flight 553
8 Dec. 1972./Midway Chicago, IlL
\.. ,
~ ;!· - - •
:-:..:.·--·;_ -·~
~.-~-1:~ .-:r:~ ;._>. ~
INDEX OF PHOTOGRAPHS
L Captain's Altimeter
Front View with Moisture Entrapped 1-1

Front View 1-2
Front 3/ 4 View 1-3
Rear View 1-4
Mechanism ~ Left View 1-5
Mechanism - Bottom View 1-6
Gear with Contaminant in Teeth 1-7
Amplifier 1-8
Amplifier 3 / 4 View 1-9
Amplifier 3/4 View 1-10
Rear View - Cover Removed 1 -11
2. First Officer's Altimeter
Front View of Display 2 -1

Display without Pointers 2-2
Disc Pointer 2 -3
Front 3 / 4 View 2-4
Rear 3 / 4 View 2-5
Coordinated Display (100 ft pointer set) 2-6
JI JI (1000 ft pointer set) 2-7
Tl IT · (10, 000 ft pointer set) 2-8
3. Captainr s Air Data Computer
Front Panel 3-1

Top View with Closure Panel 3-2
Top View without Closure Panel 3-3
3 / 4 Top View Showing Inpact Damage 3-4
Altitude Module - Exterior 3 -5
Altitude J:viodule - Cover Removed 3-6
Altitude Sensor on Acceleration Table 3-7
Altitude Sens or on Acceleration Table 3-8
Airspeed Module Cover Removed 3-9
Airspeed Sensor Gearing 3-10

4. First Officer 1 s Air Data Computer
Front Panel as Received 4-1

Front Panel After Cleaning 4-2
.Front, 3 / 4 View
'
4-3
;(op View Without Closure Panel 4-4
Aftitude Mo.dule - Exterior 4-5
Altitude Module Mounting Face 3/4 View 4-6
Altitude Module Static Port 4-7

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. Powerplant Gro.up Chairra.an 1 s Factual Report of' Investigation
- 24 -
Recovered Components (continued)
---
~ -
No. 1- Engine
No. 2 Engine
Oil Pressure Dif'f'erential 4436
Switch 606
Engine Bleed Air Valve 1642
F8-347
Main Oil Pump 198
M364
Pressure Ratio Bleed Control 615781
6322585
NL = Not Legible
NF = Not Found~:
GS =
~
------
Transferred to Systems Group
SC~\-c---.--t f Cc)µ:V"-- ~~~ k_

Edward P. Wizniak
·;,,-,
:~·";..,. -·~~<·_. ~
, :,.
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOB
NATIO""L TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Bureau of ;\viation Safety
PHOTOGRAPHS OF FLIGHT RECORDER AND PARAMETER TRACES
INDEX
1. Flight recorder and foil recording medium magazine
2. End of altitude and indicated airspeed traces
3. Closeup of last two recorded impressions for

altitude and indicated airspeed
"
UNITED AIR LINES, BOEING MODEL B-737, N9031U
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 8, 1972
FLIGHT RECORDER, FAIRCHILD MODEL F-5424, S/N 5134
EXTERIOR OF FLIGHT RECORDER
MAGAZINE MHJ FOIL RECORDING i':EDIUM

UNITED AIR LINES, BOEING MODEL B-737, N9031U
FLIGHT RECORDER, FAIRCHILD MODEL F-5424, S/N 5134
END OF :--IORHAL RECORDING 82: 14 MU!. AFTER LIFTOFF
35X
"[i'ffiICATED i\TRSPEED
35X
ALTITUDE
UNITF.D AIR LINF.S, BOEING HODEL B-737, N9031U
FLIGHT RECORDER, FAIRCHILD HODEL F-5424, S/N 5134
SCRIBE MARKS LOCATED 0,372 INCH BEYOND

END OF NOP-YIAL RECORD ING
BOX
INDICATED AIRSPEED
SOX
ALTITUDE
i
··~
J
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOA

FLIGHT RECORDER GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
By
Billy M. Hopper
I
Docket l'lo. SA-435
Exhibit No. lOA
~ATIONAL TRANSPORTATION f>AFETY BOl\RD
Bureau of Aviat:l.on :>afP.ty
Washington, D. r,. 20591
February 7, 1973
FLIGHT RECORDER GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
A. ACCillENT
Location Chicago, Illinois

Aircraft Boeing Model B-737, N903lU
Operator United Air Lines, Inc.
Flight No. 553
Flight Recorder: Fairchild Model F-5424, S/N 5134
Ident. No. DCA 73-A-3
Report No. 73-15
B. FLIGHT RECORDER GROUP
Billy M. Hopper, Nati.anal Transportation Safety Board, Group Cha.irman

J. J. Zizzi, Federal Aviation Administration
F. E. Kabel, United Air Lines
A. D. Yates, Jr., Air Line Pilots Association
C. EXAMINATION AND READOUT
The subject aircraft was reported to have crashed and burned during
an approach to land on Runway 3lL at Midway Airport. The subject flight
recorder was recovered from the wreckage and was forwarded to the Safety
Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety offices in Washington, D. C., for exam-
ination and readout of the pertinent flight record.
The subject recorder was found to be completely intact. The outer

case was blackened and covered with soot- and ash-like deposits. The
magazine containing the foil recording medium was removed easily in the
normal manner. The interior of the recorder evidenced exposure to heat
and the internal components were also covered with soot-like deposits.
The foil medium was removed from the magazine and the surface was cleaned
with alcohol and detergents. The foil was undamaged and p:r:eliminary
visual examination reflected that all paameters had been recorded in a
normal manner with no evidence of recorder malfunction. The foil rnerJ.jum
was placed on the optical reader to begin the readout.
Various reference measurements were made on the flight record in an

area where the subject aircraft was on the ground at Washington Natlonal
Airport, Washington, D. C., reported to be the last departure point. These
measurements, based on the current calibration for recorder S/N 513~·,
ID(>.
Flig.ht Recorder Group Chairman s Factual Report of Investigation
1
- 2 -
C. EXAMINATION AND READOUT (continued)
reflected that. che recorder had been operatlng wtth:in the cA.librat Inn
tolerances. The Trip and De.te 111 nary trace.: was examined 'ln the area
of the .last indicated takeoff wlt!t the flndi.11g that the nwnbers "055308"
had been registered. These numbers ind\.cater1 flight number 553 of the
8th day, corresponding to the reported number and day of the accident
flight.
The altitude, indicated airspeed, magnetic heading, and vertical

acceleration traces were examined throughout the flight record, beginning
at the indicated point of takeoff. This examination disclosed that all
four parameter traces ended abruptly at a point 82:14 minutes after take-
off. The altitude and airspeed were decreasing at this time while the
heading was steady on 274 degrees magnetic and some activity was indicated
on the vertical acceleration trace. Measurements were made at the end
of the recorded altitude and airspeed traces which, based on the current
calibration and the reported Midway Airport altimeter setting of 30. 05
inches Hg, reflected an altitude of 10,625 feet MSL and an airspeed.of
307 KIAS.
The recording styli for the above parameters are held away from the
foil surface normally. A cB.lh-operated pres sure bar is employed to-
depress all four parameter styli against the foil surface simultaneously
to record stylus positions. Double-lobe cams mounted at each end of a
motor-dri.ven shaft activate the pressure bar periodically at t.he nominal
rate of every 0.55 second.
There.are four additional recording styli, referred to as binary

scribers, which are always in contact with the foil surface and are not
affected by pressure bar action. Further examination disclosed that
th~se binaries continued to scribe traces for a distance of 0.385 inch
beyond the abrupt ending of the pare.meter traces. The foil was then
examined in all areas throughout this distance of 0.385 inch for evidence
of additional parameter stylus operations.
Such evidence was found at a point 0.372 inch beyond the abrupt
ending of the parameter traces in the form of two stylus impressions made
by each recording stylus for altitude, airspeed, and heading. A great
amount of activity was present in the area of the vertical acceleration
trace at this point. These impressions were found to be of corresponding
size and shape when compared to the impressions made by their respective
styli prior to the abrupt ending of the recording. The lateral separation
in each pair of impressions also corresponded to that in previous recordings.
Each pair of impressions was measured and the current calibration

applied to determine the values of each impression. The values are listed
Flight Recorder Group Cha.lrrnan '.s l'actual Reporl. ol' Inves L:i.gal: I on - 3 -
C. EXAMINATION AND READOUT ( cont.lnued)
below with the earliest mark.first:
Parameter No. 1 No. 2
Altitude 925 ft. MSL . 775 ft. MSL
Indicated Airspeed 414 KIAS 421 KIAS

Magnetic' Heading 003.5 deg. 014.5 deg.
Photographs were made of the alt:i tude and airspeed traces at the
point where they ended abruptly, and also later where the last pair of
impressions were made for each. These photographs are contatned i.n
Rxh.ibit JOB.
D. EXAMINATION OF FLIGHT RECORDER
The total flight time from takeoff to the ace ident 1'as detc.rm:ined
by NTSB investlgators to be approximatcely 96 minutes; however, the subject
recorder ceased to record the various parameters 82: 14 m.imites after take-
off, thus indicating that the recording ·stopped approximately 14 minutes
prior to the accident. The flight recorder receives its 115 VAC electrical
power from the No. l Unswitched Radio Bus, the same source W"hich supplies
po;rer to the coclqlit voice recorder.
The flight recorder was for1'arded to the United Air Lines Maintenance
Operations Base for examination to determine the cause for the record•er
failure. During the examination it was found that a mitre gear, P /N 10466,
wh1ch is part of the drive assembly had slipped on .its shaft causi.ng the
recording function to cease operating. The United Air Lines report of
this finding is contained in Exhibit lOC.
E. FINDINGS
1. The subject flight recorder ceased· to record altitude, indicated

airspeed, magnetic heading and vertical acceleration at a point
82: 14 minutes after takeoff at the last departure point and ap-
proximately 14 minutes prior to the accident.
2. The flight recorder was examined with the finding lhat a mal-
function in "the drive gear train caused the cessation of norinnl
recording.
3. There was no evidence of prior recorder malfunction "in any of

the parameters as determined by examining previous flights cc1n-
tained on this foil medium.
Flight Rec order Group Chairman ' s Factual Report of Investigation - 1+ -
E. F INDINGS (c ontinued)
4. Heat d a mage to t he rP.c nrrlt~ r d i rl nnt ~•. f"l'~c:I. U 1e r cC'o r·ued tr·a (' t):;
and basic rcfc..•rc?tLr.P rnr~~1: :11 1·•!ll'l' ' lii .f; rcf]r) •· .Lr~ rl 'Lhat r1"?C'o r.dP.r l' per·-
Rt [n11 lJacJ been witl il ri 111•· •·1ttT•!11t c:aliurnl. i(in 1.oler·anc P.iL
_,,A'_.. ' . . - ( ··v<:.G: )

~-a.- ·e, //,; _ ;; ·"'/7/<".<-·
Bili-.( M. Hopper
Aj. r Safe L.v Investigator
Docket No. SA-435 •
Exhibit No. lOC
NATIONAL TRANSPORfATIO" SAFETY BOARD.

BUreau of Aviation Safety
Ha.shington, D. C. 20591
REPORT OF FLIGHT RECORDER EXAMINATION
,·
'
t ·.
i
~\:..'.. :-:''·'<.
fi.'r0:: ~ ·S~RE\<s HOLD ING

. . . ,, :Tl!IS' mTRE GEAR WERE
' ~,, '\LOOSE ENOUGH TO ALLOI<
r;r~':'.' ,• GEAR TO ROTATE ON
"1 ~,,~;?- c; HAFT
'~-~';;" •;'· ; ~ '.~ ~ ~ ·;.
.
....,,..
UNITED AIR LINES
PO.Box 66100:Chicago. lllinois 60666
January 26, 1973
Mr. W. Lamb
National Transportation
Safety Board
Dear Mr. Lamb:
I am attaching a report from SFOEG-Earl Kabel/SFOEG-Les

Olson, 1/12/73, subject C-45-15-46/147 Flight Recorder
Failure Analysis (N9031U) detailing the specific cause
of the failure of our flight recorder installed on N9031U.
Sincerely,
,: J
ice President
F·light Safety and Industry Affairs
Encl.
Loi:ation: Elk Grove To1~nship. lllirrois. on Route 62. one-h;ilfn1ile >vest of Route 83
IC .. o '" •11 , ..... , •• us~
.,
../ /•
TO - SFOEG - Les Olson SFOEG - Earl Kabel
January 12, 1973
C-45-15-46/147 FLIGID RECORDZR FAILU?J: ANALYSIS (N9031U)
He have conducted an analysis to detennine the probable cause of

failure of the Flight Recorder installed on N9031U at the ti.De of
the accident at Midway Airport on 12-8-72.' 1be Recorder was Fair-
child Serial Number 5134, Part Number 15630-601, our MR 31212-6142.
Ibis unit was last overhauled on 11-20-72.
During this analysis we found the miter gear on the cross shaft
which engages the miter gear on the motor and block assembly
failed to drive the cross shaft. Please refer to the attached
photographs and sketch for more details. Subsequent detailed
analysis of other ccmponents of the recorder have not disclosed
any other possible source of failure.
(
\
'-....
Earl Kabel
FEK:mn
Attachment
.,
Notes cm cause of failure of flight recorder - MR31212-6i42 (Fairchild
S/N 5134).
1. Thi• recorder W'a• installed on ll9031U at time of accicent on

12-8-72.
2. The recorder failed to function normally during the a?proach.
3. Analysis of the flight recorder condit'ion indicates tl::at the

probable cause of failure ·.·as a slipping· miter gear iuenti fied
l.n the sketch belo"' as miter gear Number II •
.. - .· ..
•
TDWU£
CON!~l !.rt~N.G
MITER GEAR
NUMBZR I
MOTCR
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. . ., . , ·-~ .
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...
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SA-435 File No. 1-0048
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Boeing 737, N9031U
Chicago-Midway Airport
Chicago, Illinois
December 8, 1972
Adopted: August 29, 1973

Washington, D.C. 20591
REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-73-16
BOEING 737, N9031U
CHICAGO-MIDWAY AIRPORT
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 8, 1972
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Synopsis . • . . . • • 1
Investigation .... 2
1.
History of the Flight 2
1.1
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft 4
Other Damage • . • . 5
1.4
Crew Information . . 5
1. 5
1.6 Aircraft Information 5
1. 7 Meteorological Information .. 5
Aids to Navigation . 7
1. 8
1. 9 Communications . . ~ 7
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities 7
1.11 Flight Recorders . 8
1.12 Aircraft Wreckage 9
1.13 Fire o • • • • ~ • 11
1.14 Survival Aspects • 12
1.15 Tests and Research 14
1.15. 1 Automated Radar Terminal Service Data
and Derivation of Flight Profile •• 14
1.15. 2 General Electric Engine Sound Spectrogram Study 16
1.15. 3 B-737 Performance Study 17
1.15. 4 Simulator Tests ........... g ••
19
1.15. 5 B-737 Flight Tests . . . . . . . • . • . . • 20
1. 15. 6 Central Air Data Computer (CADC) Examination 21
1.15. 7 Description of B-737 Ice Protection and Certification. 21
United Air Lines Crew Procedures 22
1.16
Analysis and Conclusions 23
2.
23
2.1 Analysis . • .
Conclusions . . . • 31
2.2
(a) Findings 31
(b) Probable Cause 32
Recornmenda tions 33
3.
Appendices
Appendix A - Investigation and Hearing 35
Appendix B - Cre·w· Information . . . . 36
Appendix C - Aircraft Information 38
Appendix D - Wreckage Distribution Chart 39
Appendix E - Approach Chart • 41
Appendix F - Transcription of CVR 42
Appendix G - Approach Profile (ARTS-III) 55
Appendix H - Nonprecision Approach Profile 57
Appendix I- Safety Recommendations A-73-39 thru 43 58
iii
SA-435 File No. 1-0048

Boeing 737, N9031U
Chicago-Midway Airport
Chicago, Illinois
December 8, 1972
Adopted: August 29, 1973

REPORT NUMBER: NTSB-AAR-73-16
TECHNICAL REPORT STANDARD TITLE PAGE
I . Report No. I 2.Government Accession No. 3.Recipient 1 s Catalog No.
NTSB-AAR-73-16
4. Title and Subtitle Aircraft Accident Report - 5.Report Date
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., B-737, N9031U, CHICAGO-MIDWAY August 29, 1973
AIRPORT, CHICAGO, .ILLINOIS, DECEMBER 8, 1972 6.Performing Organization
Code
7. Author\s) 8.Performing Organization
Report No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10.Work Unit No.

National Transportation Safety Board 1020-A
Bureau of Aviation Safety 11 .Contract or Grant No.
13.Type of Report and
Peri ad Cove red
12.Sponsoring Agency Name and Address- Aircraft Accident Report
December 8, 1972
Washington, D. C. 20591 14.Sponsoring Agency Code
15.Supplementary Notes
This report contains Aviation Safety Recommendations A-73-73 and A-73-74.
16 .Abstract (
A United Air Lines Boeing 737-222 crashed on December 8, 1972, at 1428 c.s.t~
while making a nonprecision instrument approach to Runway 31L at the Chicago-Midway
Airport, Chicago, Illinois. 111e accident occurred in a residential area approxi-
mately 1.5 miles southeast of the approach end of Runi;vay 31L. 111e aircraft was
destroyed by impact and subsequent fire. A number of houses and other structures
in the impact area were also destroyed.
111ere i;vere 55 passengers and 6 crewmembers aboard the aircraft. Forty pas-
sengers and three crewmembers were killed. Two persons on the ground also received
fatal injuries.
The aircraft was observed below the overcast in a nose-high attitude and with
the sound of high engine power just before it crashed into structures on the ground.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
this accident was the captain's failure to exercise positive flight management during
the execution of a nonprecision approach, which culminated in a critical deterio-
ration of airspeed into the stall regime where level flight could no longer be
maintained.
17.Key Words l~.Distribution Statement

Nonprecision Approach, Distance Awareness, Crei;v 111is report is available to
Coordination, Positive Flight Management. the public through the
National Technical Informa-
Identifier: Boeing 737-222 Accident tion Service, Springfield,
Va. 22151
19.Security Classification 20.Security Classification 21.No. of Pages 22.Price

(of this report) (of this page)
60
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
NTSB Form 1765.2 (11/70)
ii
BOEING 737, N9031U
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 8, 1972
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Synopsis . • • • • • • 1
1. Investigation • . • • 2
1.1 History of the Flight 2
1.2 Injuries to Persons 4
1.3 Damage to Aircraft 4
1.4 Other Damage • . . . 5
1.5 Crew Infonna ti on • • 5
1.6 Aircraft Infonnation 5
1. 7 Meteorological Infonnation .. 5
1. 8 Aids to Navigation • 7
1. 9 Connnunications • • " 7
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities 7
1.11 Flight Recorders • 8
1.12 Aircraft Wreckage 9
1.13 Fire . . . . . . . . . 11
1.14 Survival Aspects • 12
1.15 Tests and Research 14
1. 15. 1 Automated Radar Tenninal Service Data
and Derivation of Flight Profile • . 14
1.15. 2 General Electric Engine Sound Spectrogram Study 16
1.15. 3 B-737 Performance Study 17
1.15.4 Simulator Tests • • . • • • • . . • . ,, . • 19
1. 15. 5 B-737 Flight Tests • . • . . . . . • • . . . 20
1.15. 6 Central Air Data Computer (CADC) Examination 21
1.15. 7 Description of B-737 Ice Protection and Certification. 21
1.16 United Air Lines Crei;.;r Procedures 22
2. Analysis and Conclusions 23
2.1 Analysis . . . 23
2.2 Conclusions 31
(a) Findings 31
(b) Probable Cause 32
3. Reconnnenda tions 33
Appendices
Appendix.A - Investigation and Hearing 35
Appendix B - Crew Infonna ti on • • . . 36
Appendix C - Aircraft Information 38
Appendix D - Wreckage Distribution Chart 39
Appendix E - Approach Chart . 41
Appendix F - Transcription of CVR 42
Appendix G - Approach Profile (ARTS-III) 55
Appendix H - Nonprecision Approach Profile 57
Appendix I- Safety Recommendations A-73-39 thru 43 58
iii
;~i~fil'~~~i
,,
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''• ·.,, ;',

SA-435 File No. 1-0048

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591
1973

BOEING 737, N9031U
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 8, 1972
SYNOPSIS
A United Air Lines Boeing 737-222 crashed on December 8, 1972, at

1428 c.s. t. while making a nonprecision instrument approach to Runi;.;ray 31L
at the Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois. The accident occurred in
a residential area approximately 1.5 miles southeast of the approach end of
Runway· 31L. The aircraft i;vas destroyed by impact and subsequent fire. A
numb·er of houses and other structures in the impact area were also destroyed.
There were 55 passengers and 6 crewmembers aboard the aircraft. Forty

passengers and three crewmembers were killed. Two persons on the ground
also received fatal injuries.
The aircraft was observed descending below the overcast in a nose-

high attitude and with the sound of high engine power just before it crashed
into structures on the ground.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable

cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise positive flight
management during the execution of a. nonprecision approach, which culminated
in a critical deterioration of airspeed into the stall regime where level
flight could no longer be maintained.
, As a result of this accident the Safety Board again emphasized the

unique demands for crew coordination and constant vigilance during non-
precision approaches. The Board also made several safety recommendations
to the Federal Aviation Administration dealing with the use of flight
spoilers and the occupant survival and evacuation.aspects-of this accident.
- 2 -
1. INVESTIGATION
1.1 History of the Flight
United Air Lines Boeing 737-222, N9031U, operating as Flight 553

(UA-553) on December 8, 1972, was a scheduled passenger flight from
Washington National Airport, \.J"ashington, D. C., to Omaha, Nebraska, with
an intermediate stop at the Chicago-Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois.
There were 55 passengers, including 5 children and 2 infants, and a crew
of 6 aboard the aircraft.
UA-553 departed Washington at 1250 _h/on an Instrument Flight Rules

(IFR) clearance and was assigned an en route altitude of 28,000 feet by
Air Traffic Control (ATC). The flight proceeded in accordance with its
IFR flight plan. After its arrival in the Chicago Air Route Traffic Control
Center area, UA-553 was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet and was given radar
vectors to intercept the Midway Airport Runway 31L localizer course. At
1419, Chicago Center effected a radar handoff and transfer of the flight to
Chicago Approach Contro1.1./ After contacting approach control, UA-553 was
advised that radar contact had been established. The flight was also advised
to maintain a heading of 290° and to intercept the Runway 31L localizer
course.
At the same time, approach control was handling other traffic, includ-
ing Aero Commander N309VS which had executed a missed approach at Midway (
and was being vectored back to the Kedzie outer marker (OM) to intercept
the localizer for a second approach to Runway 31L.
Approach control requested UA-553 to decrease airspeed to i80 knots

at 1421:56, and to slow to 160 knots 80 seconds later. A clearance to
descend to 2,000 feet was issued at 1423:42. Shortly thereafter, the
separation between UA-553 and the preceding Aero Commander prompted the
controller to request UA-553 to begin slowing to its approach speed. All
these advisories were acknowledged by the flight.
At 1424:10, the controller advised the Aero Commander to turn inbound

to intercept the localizer and cleared it for the approach to Runway 31L.
At 1424:45, the Aero Commander was switched to the Midway Tower frequency
with a request to, " ... keep up as much speed as long as you can. 11 Accord-
ing to the approach controller, the spacing between the Aero Commander and
UA-553 was approximately 3~ miles at that time. At 1424:51, when the Aero
Connnander reported passing the OM, it was cleared to land on Runway 31L and
requested to report when the runway was in sight.
1/ All times herein are central standard, based on the 24-hour clock.
J:./ The Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON) is located~

Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. This facility provides radar
approach control service for the Chicago metropolitan are~:Q,
- 3 -
At 1425:35, when UA-553 was approximately 2 miles outside the OM and

on the localizer course for R~nway 31L· (as observed on the approach control
radar), the flight contacted the Midway Tower and reported that it was out
of 3,000 feet for 2,000 feet. After requesting the flight to report
passing the OM inbound, the tower controller advised UA-553 that it was
number two oti the approach. At 1426:30, UA-553 reported passing the OM
inbound and was advised by the tower, "United five five three continue
inbound. You're number two on the approach. 1 1 11 keep you advised. 11
At 1426:41, the Aero Commander reported the·runway in sight and

received clearance to land on Runway 31L. About 9 seconds later, the tower
controller considered having the Aero Commander land on Runway 31R instead;
but when he saw its proximity to Runway 31L, he reissued the clearance to
land on that runway. At 1427:04, UA-553 was issued a missed approach
clearance as follows: 11 United five fifty-three execute a missed approach,
make a left turn to a heading of one eight zero climb to ti;vo thousand."
UA-553 replied, "Okay left turn to one eight zero .••• left turn Okay. 11 At
1427:36, the controller advised, 11 United five five three contact departure
control now one one eight point four. 11 UA-553 did not acknowledge that
transmission; there were no further communications with the flight.
The approach controller stated that after the tower controller had
coordinated with him regarding the missed approach clearance issued to
UA-553, he noticed that the radar target associated with the aircraft had
drifted approximately 1/8 to 1/4 mile to the right of the localizer center-
line. He observed the, target for two sweeps of the radar antenna after
which he saw it disappear from the radarscope.
According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) information, the captain

called for the final descent check a.t 1426: 24, about 4 seconds after the
sound of the Kedzie OM identifier ended. The checklist was completed at
1427:03; about 1 second later the first officer called, "Ah, thousand feet."
Less than 2 seconds after this call, the sound of stickshaker activation
(a device designed to alert the pilot to approaching stall) could be heard
on the CVR tape and remained audible until the recording ended at 1427:25.
11
The beginning of the stickshaker sound coincided with the word· execute 11
in the tower controller's missed approach clearance.
According to surviving passengers, the last public address announcement

from the cockpit, made about 5 minutes before impact, indicated that the
flight was over Gary, Indiana, at 4,000 feet, and would be landing in about
5 minutes. Some survivors stated that the engine noise decreased at the
time the announcement was made, and that this loi:ver noise level remained
constant until shortly before impact. Most survivors agreed that there was
a rapid application of power just before impact, accompanie.d by the rotation
of the aircraft to a nose-high attitude. The sound level of the engines
at this time was described in terms such as 11 full throttle 11 and 11 sounded
like on takeoff .. 11 One passenger stated that the aircraft 11 seemed to jerk
as the engines came on. 11 Two of the three surviving cabin attendants and
one ground i;vitness were of the opinion that there was more than one power
11 surge.rr
- 4 -
Several survivors said that the aircraft shuddered following the nose-
up pitch change; four of them estimated that the aircraft 1 s nose rose at
least 30°. One passenger stated that the nose pitchup occurred in two
phases: the first, gradual and to a moderate angle; the second, abrupt and
to a high angle.
Several eyewitnesses heard loud engine sounds and observed the aircraft
in a nose-high attitude. A licensed pilot stated that when he saw the air-
craft break out of the overcast at 400 to 450 feet above the ground, it i;vas
descending in a level attitude. He said: "There was a surge of power and
there i;vas an abrupt attitude change in the aircraft. The nose went to a
very high angle of attack."
0
The geographic coordinates of the crash site '\Vere 41°45 1 51 11'. N.
87 42' 54" w.
1.2 Injuries to Persons
Injuries Crew Passengers Others
Fatal 3 40 2
Nonfatal 1 15 2
None 2 0 (
Two occupants of a house struck by the aircraft received fatal in-

juries. Two other persons near the accident site received minor injuries.
Post-mortem examinations of the flightcrew disclosed no evidence of

incapacitating disease. However, the coroner's autopsy report on the
captain included the statement that 11 • • stenosing coronary athero-
sclerosis with ultra-acute focal myocardial infarction • ."was in evidence._
This finding was based on the Hematoxylin-Basic Fuchsin-Picric (HBFP) acid
stain technique.
Specimens of the captain 1 s heart tissues subsequently examined by a

medical specialist of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology revealed no
evidence of any ultra-acute myocardial infarction. According to one of the
developers of the HBFP technique, the method cannot be considered diagnostic
of myocardial infarction; in addition, exposure of a victim to carbon
monoxide can produce a false positive indication of a myocardial infarction.
1.3 Damage to Aircraft
The aircraft '\Vas destroyed by impact and postcrash fire.

- 5 -
1.4 Other Damage
The impact and subsequent fire destroyed five ·w·ood and brick frame
houses and one garage, and damaged thre·e other houses and two garages.
(See Appendix D for detailed information.)
1. 5 Crei;v Inform.a ti on
The captain, first officer, second officer, and flight attendants

were qualified and certificated for the operation involved. (For detailed
information see Appendix B.)
1.6 Aircraft Information
Aircraft N9031U, a Boeing 737-222, was registered to United Air

Lines, Inc. It was certificated, maintained, and equipped in accordance
with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.
The aircraft weight and center of gravity (e.g.) at the time of the
accident, computed to have been 86,394 poun~s, and 19.0 percent mean aero-
dynamic chord (MAC), respectively.., were both wit:hi1 .. specified limits.
(For detailed information, see Appendix C.)
1.7 Meteorological Information
National Weather Service surface weather charts showed a relatively

ill-defined low pressure area centered approximately 120 miles south of
Midway Airport at the time of the accident. That system, coupled with a
quasi-stationary front oriented in an east-northeast/west-southwest
direction from Virginia to Arkansas, was producing an extensive area of
light freezing drizzle, or light freezing rain, and very light snow over
northern Illinois.
The following are selected surface weather observations at :t-Iidway

Airport at the times indicated:
1300 - Record Special, measured 500 feet overcast, visibility 1 mile,

fog, temperature 27°·F., dew point 26° F., wind 170° 4 knots,
altimeter setting 30.04 inches, ceiling ragged.
1400 - measured 500 feet overcast, visibility 1 mile, fog, temperature

27° F., dew point 26° F., wind 260° 6 knots, altimeter setting
1433 - local, measured 500 feet variable overcast, visibility 1 mile,

fog, wind 250° 6 knots, altimeter setting 30.05 inches, ceiling
400 feet variable to 600 feet, aircraft mishap.
The Midway low level radiosonde (upper air) observation made at 1106
showed saturated conditions from just above the surface to approximately
- 6 -
6,100 feet mean sea level (m.s.l.). The air was generally stable with
several inversions in evidence. Temperatures were subfreezing except in a
layer between about 5,700 and 6,700 feet where temperatures were a fraction
of a degree above freezing.
The tennina1 forecast for Midway prepared by the National Weather

Service was: ceiling 500 feet overcast, visibility l mile, light freezing
drizzle, light snow, fog, variable to ceiling 200 feet obscured, visibility
1/2 mile, light freezing drizzle, fog, or light snow, fog.
Weather Service forecasts for the route included SIGMETS )_/ warning of
moderate or greater turbulence below 15,000 feet, and moderate to occasionally
severe icing in clouds and precipitation. Company forecasts anticipated
low level clear air turbulence produced by wind shear at various terminals,
including Midway, and also warned of light freezing precipitation.
With his other dispatch documents, the captain of Flight 553 received
a weather packet containing current and forecast en route and terminal
weather conditions, and forecast winds and temperatures aloft. Similar
information was aVailable in the company dispatch office at Washington
National Airport.
Several pilots who had made a localizer approach to Runway 31L at

Midway just before, and immediately after, the accident were questioned
concerning the weather conditions at the time. The pilot of Aero Commander (
N309VS stated that icing was not an operational problem either during his
flight from Indianapolis, Indiana, to Midway, that afternoon, or during his
initial approach, missed approach, and second approach to Runway 31L. He
added that at no time did he think it was necessary to actuate the wing
and empennage deicer boots, although occasionally he applied windshield
alcohol because of light rime ice. A post-flight inspection revealed no
ice on his aircraft. At minimum descent altitude (MDA) on his first
approach, he was 11 running in and out" of clouds, with 11 occasional holes; 11
during his second approach he had better ground visibility at MDA, and he
had no difficulty landing. He estimated the ceiling over the airport to
have been 500 feet or more, with a vi.sibility of 1 to 1~ miles.
The captain of Delta Air Lines Flight 567, a DC-9 which arrived from
Detroit, Michigan, and landed on 31L just before the Aero Conrrnander, stated
that he encountered light icing conditions and used all available anti-
icing equipment, including empennage anti-icing. He noted very little
accumulation of ice on his aircraft, possibly less than a quarter of an
inch, during the entire approach. He stated that he was still in the over-
cast when he was over the Kedzie OM. Just beyond Kedzie, he found some
holes in the overcast "and had ground contact right away, but ... didn't
actually come out from under the overcast until just about 500 feet. 11
11 SIGMET. An advisory concerning weather of such severity as to be

potentially hazardous to all categories of aircraft.
- 7 -
The pilot of a Cessna 310, which landed on 31L immediately after the
accident, reported that he entered the overcast in the 1'1idi;vay area at
4,000 feet m.s.l. and that he remained in i t for about 8 or 9 minutes
during his approach. He stated that the buildup of ice on his aircraft was
about 1/2 inch and that he intennittently operated the wing and empennage
deicing boots. He estimated that he had visual ground contact from an
altitude of 500 to 600 feet above the ground.
The accident occurred during daylight hours.
1.8 Aids to Navigation
The localizer approach to Runway 31L at 1'1idi;vay incorporates a localizer,

operating on a frequency of 109.9 MHz with an inbound course of 312°, a
compass locator (Kedzie) installed at the OM site located 3.3 nmi from the
end of the runway, and a middle marker (MM) located 0.6 nmi from the runway.
The published procedure shows a minimum crossing altitude over the OM of
1,500 feet m.s.l. (889 feet a.g.l.), at which point descent to the MDA of
1,040 feet m.s.l. (429 feet a.g.l.) is authorized. The missed approach
procedure prescribes a climbing left turn to 2,600 feet m.s.l., and thence
to proceed to the Peotone (EON) VOR via the 001° radial. The published
landing minimums for this approach were MDA 1, 040 feet m. s .1. and 1-mile
visibility. Also shown on the approach chart is the Calumet intersection,
6.9 nmi from Kedzie, which is fanned by the intersection of the 356° radial
from the Chicago Heights (CGT) VOR and the runway 31L localizer course.
(See Appendix E.)
All navigational facilities (NAVAID's) associated with this approach

procedure were flight-tested by the FAA immediately after the accident and
were found to be operating within prescribed tolerances. None of the
flights using the localizer before or after the accident reported any
problems.
1.9 Corrrrnunications
No discrepancies with air-ground corrrrnunications between UA-553 and

Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities were reported.
1.10 Aerodrome and Ground Facilities
Runway 31L at Midway Airport is asphalt surfaced and is 6,519 feet

long by 150 feet wide. The elevation at the runway threshold is 611 feet
m.s.l.; the published field elevation is 619 feet m.s.l. The runway is
equipped with high-intensity runway lights, runway end identifier lights,
and visual approach slope indicator (VASI) lights, all of which were on and
operating at the time of the accident.
Runway 31R, parallel to and approximately 700 feet to the right of

Runway 31L, is 5,388 feet long by 150 feet wide and is restricted from use
by jet traffic.
- 8 -
1.11 Flight Recorders
N9031U was equipped with a Fairchild Model F-5424 Flight Data Recorder
(FDR) serial No. 5134. The altitude, indicated airspeed, magnetic heading,
and vertical acceleration traces ended abruptly 82:14 minutes after takeoff
(approximately 14 minutes before the accident). Measurements at the end of
these traces indicated an altitude of 10,625 feet m.s.l., an airspeed of
307 knots, and a heading of 274° magnetic. Examination of the flight
recorder showed that a miter gear (P/N 10466), which is part of the drive
gear assembly, had slipped on its shaft causing the recorder to stop
functioning.
The aircraft was also equipped with a Sundstrand, United Control Data
Division Model V-557, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) serial No. 1648.
Although the CVR showed evidence of extreme fire and heat damage, the entire
tape was recovered with only moderate damage to a nonpertinent area. A
transcription was made of the final 27~ minutes of the recording. Communi-
cations and conversations by the individual crewmembers were identified
by persons who were familiar with their voices. Simulator studies and air-
craft test flights were conducted to duplicate and to record various CVR
sounds, such as: gear and flap lever movements, various switch actuations,
aural war!ling signals, etc. A transcript of all pertinent sounds and
communications during the last 8 minutes of recorder operations is included
in Appendix F.
(
Precise timing of the CVR data was made by determining the accuracy
of elapsed times between recorded events. First, a time base for the CVR
recording was established by comparing the recorded identification signal
frequency of the Kedzie OM with the known frequency characteristics of that
signal. Next, the times thus established for all recorded events were
correlated to real time by reference to a recorded time signal that had
been transmitted by Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated (ARINC) at 1400.
Comparison of the resulting CVR transcript times with times of iden-

tical events recorded by ATC sources showed variances; however, the times
were generally within 3. seconds of one another, and there were no differ-
ences exceeding 6 seconds.
The cockpit area microphone (CAM) track of the CVR was examined to
the fullest extent of the Safety Board 1 s audio laboratory capability in an
attempt to identify engine sound frequencies during the final phase of the
flight. No evidence relating to engine thrust settings was found. A
similar attempt was made by United Air Lines, using special engine-analysing
equipment; the results were negative. The CAi:1 track recording was then
examined by the General Electric Company's Research and Development
Laboratories. The engine operating data developed by General Electric are
summarized in Section 1.15, Tests and Research.
- 9 -
1.12 Aircraft Wreckage
The aircraft crashed into a residential area approximately l~ miles

short of the runway and 1/4 mile to the right of the localizer approach
course. The main wreckage area, oriented on a magnetic heading of 338°,
was approximately 250 feet long and 90 feet wide. The aircraft was in a
nearly wings level, nose-high attitude when i t first penetrated the upper-
most branches of a 20-foot tree.. After this contact, the aircraft impacted
trees, houses, utility pole cables, and garages betore it came to rest
across the foundation of one of the destroyed houses. The descent angle,
from initial tree contact to the final impact site, was approximately
4.5°. Terrain elevation in the wreckage area is 615 feet m.s.l. (See
Appendix D for details.)
Portions of both wings and the fuselage from just aft of the cockpit
to the rear galley door were consumed by the postcrash fire. The relatively
intact left cockpit section and empennage incurred only minor fire damage.
All airframe structural components were accounted for either in the main
wreckage area or along the path of impact.
Ground fire damage precluded any detennination of the preimpact

integrity of the control system or the degree of deflection of the primary
flight controls. The horizontal stabilizer jackscrew was found extended
to 14% inches, which corresponded to a stabilizer trim position indication
of 9~ Units (UAL Stabilizer Trim Scale) aircraft noseup.
The left main landing gear was found almost fully retracted but not
completely within the up-lock. The right main gear was completely separated
from the aircraft. The nose gear was torn loose from its mount; the
position of its retract mechanism indicated that it had been retracted at
impact.
Measurement of the landing flap jackscrew actuators showed that the

flaps had been extended 37° at impact. (Full flap extension is 40°.) Three
of the six wing leading-edge slat actuators were recovered; they were in
the extended position. All ground and flight spoiler actuators were found
to have been in the spoiler retracted (stowed) position at impact.
The left wing anti-ice valve was found in the ·closed (wing heat off)
position. Damage to the right wing anti-ice valve precluded a detennination
of its preimpact position. Both air conditioning pack valves were found in
the closed position.
Both engines were separated from the aircraft. All first stage fan
blades of the No. 1 engine were broken off above the blade root platforms.
Nearly all second stage fan blades and all attached fourth stage compressor
blades were bent opposite to the direction of compressor rotation. Large
amounts of debris and building materials were found in the air inlet and
front fan areas of the No. 2 engine. The leading edges of the first and
second stage fan blades were extensively damaged and bent opposite to the
- 10 -
direction of compressor rotation. Both thrust reversers were in the

stowed position.
Disassembly and inspection of compressor, combustion, and turbine

sections of both engines showed extensive rotational damage to the fan/
compressor blades through the 13th stage. Silver colored metallic deposits
were found adhering to the exterior surfaces of the combustion chamber
domes, the inner and outer outlet ducts, and all four stages of the turbine
blades and vanes.
Inspection of the engine bleed-air systems· revealed vegetation or

debris in the entrance elbows of the eighth stage bleed-air manifolds and
check valves, downstream (eighth stage manifold side) of the pressure
modulating valves in the 13th stage bleed-air manifolds, and on the down-
stream face of the pressure modulation valve butterfly. No debris was
found upstream (on the 13th stage side) of the pressure modulating valves
or on the upstream face of the modulating valve butterfly. All bleed-air
inlet guide vane anti-ice and nose cowl anti-ice valves were open.
The relatively intact, captain 1 s side of the cockpit i:;vas damaged by

ground fire. The first officer 1 s station, including the instrument panel,
was destroyed.
The center control pedestal was toTil away at impact from its nonnal
position. The flap selector handle was relatively intact and moved freely (
between the 30° and 40° positions. The flight spoiler (speed brake) handle
was in the stowed pesition. The stabilizer trim indicator ·was found set
at 9~ units aircraft noseup. The landing gear handle was not recovered.
The No. 1 engine pressure ratio (EPR) gauge was recovered with the
pointer indicating 1. 66 EPR and with a target EPR reading of 1. 97 in the
selector window. The No. 2 engine EPR pointer indicated 1.90 EPR with a
reading of 1.95 in the selector window.
The anti-ice switches of both engines, the Pitot heat switches, and
the window heat switches were 11 0N. ri The filaments in the related indicator
light bulbs were stretched.
The two VEF navigation receiver frequency selector heads i:;vere found
set at the Runway 31L localizer frequency.
A functional test of the captain's Attitude Director Indicator (ADI)

showed it to be operational in all modes except 11 go-around. 11 Further
examination disclosed that the command bars would not function in this mode
because of ground fire damage to the related parts.
A test of the captain 1 s airspeed indicator shoi:;ved that it was opera-

ting within operational specifications, except in the range between 70 and
140 knots, where it read .5 to 5 knots slow.
- 11 -
The No. 1 Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) course selector i;vas

found set at 317°. All warning flags were in view. The No. 1 Radio
Magnetic Indicator (RHI) was recovered; the No. 1 needle indicated a bearing
of 178° and the No. 2 needle, a bearing of 133°. The compass card indicated
a heading of _351°. The mode selector was positioned to 11ADF. 11
The captain's flight director panel mode selector switch was in the
rrt.anual 11 position. The first officer 1 s mode selector switch was 11 0FF. 11
11
The autopilot switches were 11 0FF. 11
The captain's and the first officer's altimeters were recovered with
barometric settings of 30.05 and 30.04, respectively; no meaningful alti-
tude indications were obtained from either instrument 1 s face. The captain's
altimeter appeared to be vir~ually intact, but showed evidence of ground
fire damage. In a functional· test, this altimeter responded to pressure
changes in the "barometric mode, 11 but because of hea:t damage to the internal
components, no assessment could be made of the preimpact accuracy or oper~
a.ting capability of the instrument in the 11 servo mode. 11 Only the charred
face and a portion of the servo unit of the first officer 1 s altimeter were
recovered.
Information concerning the captain's and first officer's air data

computers is contained in Section 1.15, Tests and Research.
1.13 Fire
None of the eyei:;.;ritnesses near the scene of the accident reported

seeing fire while the aircraft was in flight, or hearing sounds other than
those associated with engine operation. The investigation revealed no
evidence of in-flight fire, or of structural damage not related to impact
and ground fire.
The first witnesses at the crash site stated that structures on bOth
sides of the aircraft fuselage were burning, and that white smoke was
emanating from the fire. They also stated that the fire was very intense
around the center section of the aircraft, and that thick black smoke
obscured part of the fuselage. The overall conflagration involved the
aircraft as well as the destroyed dwellings and their contents.
The Chicago Fire Department was first notified of the crash at 1429.
Five engines, three truck companies, one helicopter, one dry chemical unit,
and three ambulances responded immediately. The first radio calls report-
ing that units were "on the scene 11 were made at 1431 and 1432. Additional
alarms were struck at 1437 and 1449.
The fire was put out almost entirely with water; 20 gallons Of foam
were used in the rear service door area. The main fire was controlled
within 20 to 30 minutes after the fire fighting equipment arrived at the
scene. Smoke, heat, and small 11 flareups 11 continued for more than 3 hours
after the crash.
- 12 -
1.14 Survival Aspects
The first sounds of impact were recorded about 1 second before the
end of the CVR recording. The aircraft either damaged or destroyed
several houses _before coming to rest across the foundation of one of them.
Except for the a.ft portion of the coach section, the ernpennage, and the
left side of the cockpit, the fuselage was destroyed by impact and fire.
Therefore, the analysis of the conditions in the cabin and the related
survival aspects, irrunediately after impact, is based on survivor observa-
tions.
The only survivor in the fuselage section forward of the wing was
the first-class flight attendant who occupied the aft-facing jumpseat
adjacent to the left forward entry door. She was seriously injured when
her seat collapsed and she was trapped by debris from the aircraft and the
house. She was freed from the wreckage after an intensive JO-minute rescue
operation by Chicago Fire Department personnel. No first-class section
seats '\Vere recovered intact.
There were 17 survivors in the coach section, including the 2 uninjured

flight attendants who occupied the jumpseat in the rear of the cabin.
According to the survivors, ceiling panels and hat racks with their contents
fell dn the passengers and in the aisle of the coach section during the
impact sequence; seats dislodged from approximately row 12 to 15, as well
as other debris, obstructed the aisle. A survivor who was seated in the (
center cabin section reported that there was no floor structure under his
seat. He released his seatbelt and exited through the cargo compartment
and a break in the fuselage. Another survivor stated that he 11 had the feel-
ing that there were people moving underneath" him as he tried to find an
exit. A female survivor reported that 11 people were scrambling over the
seat tops and I was kicked and my 1'~and was stepped 'on. 11
Survivors reported that all cabin lights went out after the impact,
and that no lights were visible during the evacuation. Six survivors
escaped through breaks in the fuselage. Nine passengers who exited through
the rear service door were assisted by the two flight attendants; these
attendants were the last to leave the aircraft.
The left side of the cockpit and the left forward entry door area
were relatively intact. The captain's seat was intact and sustained only
minor fire damage. The floor attachments for this seat were in place; the
4-point seatbelt and shoulder harness release mechanism was found unlocked
and operable. Shoulder harness straps were found retracted in the inertial
reel without signs of scorching or discoloration.
The first and second officers' seats were destroyed by impact and
fire. The first officer's shoulder harness straps were found retracted
inside the inertial reel and showed no thermal damage.
Injuries sustained by the survivors included fractures of the vertebrae,

pelvis, and extremities, as 'i..rell as first-degree burns. Lack of specific
- 1 3 -
data regarding the injuries sustained by nonsurviving passengers precluded

the determination of impact-associated injury patterns and the effect of
injuries on the ability to escape. To the extent that the preimpact seat
location of the surviving passengers could be established, no distinct
survivability pattern emerged. Elevated carbon monoxide levels ;;.;rere found
in 27 percellt of the fatalities in the first-class section and 76 perCent
of the fatalities in the coach section. Elevated hydrogen cyanide levels
were found in the captain and in six fatalities in the coach section.
Carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide are some of the toxic products of the
thermal decomposition of such materials as i;vool, cotton, paper and plastics.~·,
According to expert testimony during the public hearing, a study of carbon
monoxide and cyanide in victims of house fires in the City of Detroit
showed the presence of cyanide in all victims of carbon monoxide poisoning.
In view of the allegations of foul play which have been injected into
the publicity surrounding this accident, the Safety Board finds it neces-
sary to present certain aspects of the trauma experienced by nonsurvJ.vors
in more detail than would normally be reported.
Four pathologists from the Cook County Coroner's Office prepared brief
gross descriptions of the passenger fatalities and established a cause
of death in each case. Although the deaths of most occupants r;ve"X."e attributed
to burns, some of the causes of death mentioned different fonns of trauma,
such as 11multiple injuries 11 and 11 extreme 11 and 11 partial body destruction. 11
Several also contained the statement, 11 associated with carbon monoxide
asphyxia; 11 some of them mentioned cyanide.
The causes of death of the first-class passengers were described with

more ceference to violent trauma than those of the coach passengers. In
the gross body description of one first-class passenger, the pathologist
used the phrase, 11 disruption of head, torso, upper and lower extremities
by burns and apparently some explosive force. 11 The cause of death of this
person was stated as 11 extensive burns. 11 In describing the body of a victi1n
who had been seated in the rear of the coach section, the same pathologist
used the phrase 11 severe destruction by blast and flames 11 and at~·ributed the
cause of death to "blast injuries and severe burns, associated with carbon
monoxide asphyxia. 11 When Board investigators questioned him about the tenni-
nology used in these two protocols, the pathologist emphasized that he had
found no evidence of effects typical of an explosive device or charge on
either victim, and that he had not intended, in using that terminology 1 to
indicate either the presence or the effects of an explosive blast; he sc3tf.·
that his 11 was a bad choice of adjectives, 11 and that he had used thJse i:trn1s
to describe injuries caused by high-energy impact.
··k I. N. Einhorn, 11 Physio-Chemical Study of Smoke Emission by Aircraft

:t;.faterials, 11 Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation,
1972.
- 14 -
Interviews with surviving passengers and cabin attendants by personnel

of the Safety Board and the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed no
evidence of abnonnal or unusual passenger behavior before the impact. It
should be noted that the coach passenger whose cause of death described by
the pathologist _included the words 1'blast injuries 11 was seated two rows
ahead of the two uninjured flight attendants and directly ahead of two
surviving passengers.
The captain sustained a fractured ann, fractured ribs, and lacera-

tions. The cause of his death was attributed to 11 smoke inhalation with
carbon monoxide asphyxia and blood cyanide accumulation. 11 The observations
associated with the captain's heart have already been described in
Section 1.2.
The first officer 1 s death was attributed to 11 injuries multiple

extreme with severe burns 11 and other trauma; the cause of the second
officer's death was listed as nextensive burns. 11 The results of the
toxicological examinations involving these two crewmembers were negative.
1.15 Tests and Research
1.15.1 Automated Radar Terminal Service Data and Derivation of Flight

Profile
A special group was established to study those aspects of the UA-553 f

flight profile that related to the performance characteristics of the
Boeing 737 aircraft~ The usual sources of data to reconstruct such a pro-
file are the indicated airspeed and altitude traces recorded by the air-
craft's FDR. However, because of a mechanical malfunction of the FDR,
the data were not available.
Another source of data useful for flightpath derivation is the FAA

Automated Radar Terminal Service (ARTS-III) installed at the Chicago-
O 'Hare International Airport. The ARTS-III system processes the trans-
ponder beacon return from all aircraft 1vithin a specified range of the
approach control.radar site. The raw data from the beacon return consist
of azimuth and range referenced to the antenna location, as well as an
encoded pressure altitude for aircraft equipped 1vith a Mode 1 C 1 transponder.
These raw data are manipulated into positional coordinates which are
differentiated with respect to the data receipt time to acquire a ground
speed for the target. The positional accuracy of the ARTS-III data acqui-
sition system is limited to approximately ~o in azimuth and 1/16 runi in
range.
The processing equipment also applies a correction, based on the

current sea level barometric pressure, to the raw altitude data to produce
a mean sea level altitude, resolved to the nearest 100-foot level. The
received altitude data, also resolved to 100-foot increments, are generated
1.:;rithin the aircraft by an altimetry system and, as such, include those
errors ~7hich may be inherent within that airborne system. In addition,
the t1vo-step resolution to 100-foot levels in itself produces a tolerance
of ± 100 feet to displayed altitude data. The data thus generated
- 15 -
are selectively presented on the air traffic controller 1 s video display.

In addition to the video display, the raw data and calculated parameters
for all received targets are stored on a computer-generated magnetic tape.
UA-553 was tracked by the O'Hare AR'D3-III system from a position

approximately 55 runi southeast of the antenna site at a computed altitude
of 9,500 feet, to a position 15.9 nmi from the antenna site at a computed
altitude of 1,000 feet m.s.l. (380 feet above the ground elevation of the
impact site). The latter position was approximately 0.2 nmi from the
geographical coordinates of the impact site. Sine~ the AR'D3-III system
requires a line of sight transmission, the loss of a target will generally
occur as a result of line of sight obstructior1.
The magnetic tape containing the tracking data of UA-553 was examined
to recons true t the aircraft 1 s flight p refile before the crash. 1-'leteoro-
logical data, i.e., winds and temperatures were applied to the ARTS-III
positional and altitude data to derive calibrated airspeed and vertical
velocity as a function of time. Use of the ART3-I(I raw positional data
to calculate airspeed resulted in an erratic trace because of the afore-
mentioned positional tolerances; therefore, it was necessary to smooth
these data. The after-the-fact smoothing technique differed from that used
in the ARTS-III ground speed manipulation in that future, as well as past,
data points could be considered. The result Was an estimate of actual
value which did not include the lag inherent in the AR'D3-III calculation.
A special test was then conducted to determine the validity of

results obtained from such manipulation of the AR'D3-III data. The AR'D3-III
tracking data obtained for another aircraft flying the same track as
UA-553 were compared with similar data extracted from the other aircraft 1 s
FDR. The airspeed values obtained, using both methods, correlated con-
sistently within 10 knots. Since the FDR altitude is obtained from the
same source as the aircraft beacon transponder altitude, i t was expected
that the altitude values would correlate within the resolution and toler-
ances inherent in the ARTS-III system. Such correlation was, in fact,
verified to be within 100 feet.
The AR'D3-III computations for UA-553 indicated that the flight, when
first acquired at 9,500 feet m.s.l., was descending to 4,000 feet m.s.l.
approximately 1,000 feet per minute (ft/min). The flight remained level at
4,000 feet for approximately 5 minutes and decelerated during approximately
the last 3 minutes of this period from an airspeed of 230 knots to abo~t
180 knots. At that time, the final 'approach descent i;.;as initiated with a
descent rate of 750 ft/min. About l~ minutes after the start of this
descent, the aircraft had decelerated to 145 knots, and the descent rate
had increased to approximately 1,250 ft/min. This descent rate was main-
tained until the aircraft was over the Kedzie OH where the ARTS-III data
showed an altitude of 2,200 feet m.s.l. After a momentary level-off, the
descent rate increased to about 1, 550 ft/min, which i;vas maintained until
the aircraft reached 1,100 feet m.s.l. and level-off was initiated. The
- 16 -
airspeed at level-off was approximately 120 knots. Level flight was main-
tained for 16 seconds before the ARTS-III system lost the aircraft's
beacon return.
Logitudinal acceleration and vertical velocity were derived from

flight changes in airspeed and altitude, respectively. These data were
used to establish the most compatible configuration and thrust combina-
tions for simulation of the flight profile in the UAL B-737 simulator and
subsequent flight tests.
For further confirmation of the most probable descent configuration,

the CVR transcript was time-correlated to the ARTS-III derived data by
alignment of the ARTS-III time base with the air/ground transmission times
recorded on the ATC voice tape. The time correlation was further verified
to within 3 seconds by comparing the time over the Kedzie OM with the time
on the ARTS-III data when the aircraft position corresponded to the posi-
tional coordinates of the Kedzie OM. (See Appendix G, Approach Profile
derived from ARTS-III and CVR Data.)
1.15.2 General Electric Engine Sound Spectrogram Study
At the Safety Board 1 s request, the General Electric Company conducted

a sound spectrographic analysis of the C~! track of the CVR recording to
detennine the presence of frequencies that might be indicative of engine
power settings.
The CVR tape contained a high-level background noise which tended to

mask meaningful frequency data. Through special filtering techniques much
of the noise was attenuated, and some discrete frequencies corresponding
to sound generated by aircraft equipment became evident. Frequencies which
were interpreted as characteristic of engine rotation sounds generated. by
rhe first and second stage rotors of the low pressure compressor (N 1 blade
passing frequencies) were discernible for certain increments of time. The
results of the comparison of these frequency values with the characteristics
of the Pratt and Whitney JT8D-7 engine by the General Electric Company are
sunnnarized as follows: .
1. Engine sounds were first detected at 1414:36 which corresponded

with a power setting of 56 percent Ni for both engines.
2. A linear, ·straight line, gradual deceleration continued until

1416:43 when N1 was at 52. 7 percent.
3. A linear, more gradual deceleration then continued until 1419: 36

when Ni was at 51.2 percent.
4. At this point both engines were accelerated to 63 percent N1 .

The speed of 63 percent was achieved at 1419:48 approximately.
One engine had a slight overshoot, and the other, a slight under-
shoot.
- 17 -
5. The speed of 63 percent Ni was held until 1420:55 when it was

reduced to 61.5 percent, with stabilization of both engines at
1421:03.
6. The engine speeds of 61.5 percent were then maintained until

1421:52 when speed was again increased to 63 percent Ni after
a 3-second acceleration time.
7. The 63 percent N1 speed was continued until approximately

1423:55 when speed was reduced to 59.1 percent after a decelera-
tion time of approximately 5 seconds. The engines appeared to
be at slightly different speeds at that time.
8. The engine speeds then decreased slightly in a linear fashion,

with the N1 difference increasing slightly until the final
acceleration was noted at 1427:03:35. Just before the accel-
eration, one engine i:;vas at 58.6 percent N1 , and the other,
at 57.2 percent Ni·
9. The sounds of both engines were detected during the accelera-

tion; one engine peaked at 72 percent N1 at 1427:07.95; the
other peaked at 79.2 percent N1 at 1427:09.55.
10. The overall noise level of the tape reached a maximum very
shortly after the engines reached their peak speeds, making
interpretation difficult. Oscillations were noted but little
can be said reg£rding their nature except that their extremities
did not exceed the equivalent of 4 percent N1 .
1.15.3 B-737 Performance Study
The performance of UA-553, based upon the flightpath.derived from

ARTS-III data and the engine sound spectrogram study, was compared with
the theoretical performance characteristics of the B-737. First, the
aircraft 1 s drag as a function of airspeed \.;ras computed for the different
approach configurations (combinations of flap, landing gear,. and spoiler
positions) that could have been used. Next, the various drag values and
the thrust values derived from the General Electric study were used to
detennine the resultant forces acting on the aircraft. These forces, in
turn, were compared with the vertical velocity and longitudinal accelera-
tion values shown in the appr.oach profile, starting i;.;rith the descent from
4,000 feet, and ending with the activation of the stickshaker.
For purposes of this examination, it was assumed that the ARTS-III

altitude data offered a more accurate parameter than the calculated
airspeed trace, which included the tolerance of ARTS-III positional
measurements, ·as well as errors introduced by inclusion of estimated wind
data. For this reason, the calculated rate of descent was examined with
the longitudinal acceleration and airspeed treated as variables. To
provide a plausible set of initial conditions, it was further assumed that
- 18 -
the 15° flap extension at 1423:20, inferred from CVR sounds, was made at the
placard airspeed of .195 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), approximately
10 knots below the airspeed derived from the ARTS-III data. Subsequent
changes in configuration were keyed to intracockpit conversation and other
sounds similar to lever movements recorded on the CVR.
It was determined from this study that the profile of the accident
aircraft could be matched closely with the theoretical perfonnance capa-
bility of the B-737 for that part of the approach preceding passage of the
Kedzie OM. The correlation was achieved with the flaps extended 15°,
landing gear up, and partial flight spoiler extension coincident with the
initiation of the descent from 4,000 feet at 1424:10 approximately. The
theoretical deceleration to this point would have produced an airspeed of
157 KIAS. At a 750 ft/min rate of descent, the aircraft would have con-
tinued to decelerate and would have reached an airspeed of 140 KIAS at
1425:32; at that time an increased rate of descent to approximately
1,250 ft/min would have produced a positive acceleration. Recorded cockpit
sounds indicate that the landing gear was extended at 1425:50, and that
the flaps were repositioned at 1426:00, although the position to which the
flaps were extended was not apparent. The theoretical airspeed at this
time would have been 152 KIAS.
The ARTS-III altitude trace shows that the aircraft momentarily

levelled off at 2,200 feet m.s.l., for approximately 12 seconds, which would
have resulted in a decay of airspeed to 126 KIAS. A rate of descent of
approximately 1,550 ft/min was established as the aircraft passed the outer
marker. This descent rate was maintained until the aircraft levelled off
about 1,000 feet m.s.l. The correlation of the CVR with the ARTS-III data
indicates that the stall warning stickshaker corrrrnenced 6 to 7 seconds after
the aircraft levelled off. In order theoretically to produce such a condi-
tion, it is necessary to assume that the aircraft was in a configuration
which resulted in sufficient drag to prevent a high positive acceleration
during this final descent. It was shown in this study that had 30° flaps
been selected at 1426:00, and had the spoilers been extended to the flight
detent position upon establishing the 1,550 ft/min descent, the aircraft
would have started to level off at MDA .approximately at 133 KIAS. Any con-
figuration producing less drag would have resulted in the aircraft levelling
off at a higher airspeed.
In the 30° flap, gear down, flight detent spoiler configuration with
a combined engine thrust of 5,900 pounds, as indicated by the engine sound
spectrogram, the aircraft would have decelerated approximately at 2 knots
per second after levelling off. The theoretical speed for stickshaker
activation in this configuration is 116 KIAS. Without making allowances
for levelling-off technique or increase in thrust, it would have taken
approximately 8~ seconds under these conditions to decelerate from 133 to
116 KIAS.
Under similar conditions, but with the flight spoilerti retracted,

the deceleration rate was computed to be 1.1 knots per second. Based on
- 19 -
the stickshaker activation speed of 105 KIAS, about 25 seconds would have
elapsed beti;;veen the aircraft level-off and activation of the stickshaker.
1.15.4 Simulator Tests
Two series of flight simulator tests were conducted to compare the

performance of the B-737 in various approach configurations with the flight
profiles developed from the ARTS-III data and to explore the effects of
different techniques in recovering from the approach-to-stall flight regime.
The first test series was conducted prior to the receipt of the
engine sound spectrogram findings; consequently, a flight idle engine
thrust level during the latter portion of the descent profile was chosen
for investigative purposes. Engine thrust levels ranging from takeoff
thrust to as low as 1.50 EPR were investigated during the recovery phase
of the profile.
The engine sound spectrogram study demonstrated that thrust levels in

excess of flight idle were used throughout the final moments of the flight.
Therefore, a second perfonnance profile, incorporating the thrust levels
derived from the General Electric data, was developed and investigated in
a second series of simulator tests. The results of these tests validated
the new perfonnance study. To attain a 1,500 ft/min descent without
allowing a significant speed buildup at a thrust level corresponding to
59 percent N1 , it i;vas necessary to use the following drag configuration:
30° flaps, landing gear down, and full flight spoiler extension.
The effect of flight spoiler positioning and thrust application upon

the time interval between the level-off and the activation of the stick-
shaker was investigated. The entry configuration was established as 30°
flaps, landing gear down, flight spoilers in detent, and the engine thrust
level at 59 percent N1 . With the thrust maintained at 59 percent N , the
1
time interval from level-off to stickshaker speed ranged from 4 to 9
seconds, and the stickshaker speed varied from 120 to 124 KIAS. When the
thrust was advanced to 76 percent N1 at level-off, or when the thrust --;;vas
maintained at 59 percent N1 with the spoilers stowed prior to level-off,
the time interval from level-off to stickshaker activation ranged from 20
seconds to 25 seconds.
The flap setting, spoiler position, and engine acceleration were

varied during the final phases of several of the tests. The highest thrust
applied was 76 percent Ni; this was insufficient either to accelerate the
aircraft, or to maintain level flight, under any combination of flaps in
excess of 15° and spoilers more than halfway extended. On three runs the
flaps were retracted to 15° at stickshaker speed; this resulted in the
irrnnediate onset of buffeting. Extending the flaps to 40° stopped the
buffeting but not the stickshaker. The retraction of the spoilers at the
latter flap setting stopped the stickshaker, even --;;vhen the retraction was
delayed until 110 KIAS.
- 20 -
1.15.5 B-737 Flight Tests
Flight tests were conducted to correlate the airspeed, configuration,

and thrust requirements during the descent from 4,000 feet, previously
detennined from performance and simulator studies, and to investigate, in
more detail, the flight performance characteristics of the B-737 in the
approach-to-stall regime. The results of these tes.ts were affected to a
limited extent by thennal activity and wind shear in the test area.
For safety considerations the flight tests were conducted at pressure

altitudes between 6,000 feet and 8,000 feet. Therefore, it was necessary
to apply theoretical corrections to the test conditions to make them compa-
rable to the accident conditions. As with the initial simulator study, the
flight tests i;.;rere also conducted before the results of General E lee tric 1 s
engine speed study were available.
The flight test findings provided sufficient data to substantiate the

validity of the theoretical analyses described in 1.15.3. To examine the
apparent flight profile from outer marker passage until level-off at the
MDA, a 1,500 ft/min descent was established in the 30° flap, gear down
configuration with spoilers extended to the flight detent position (maximum
in-flight extension), and thrust equivalent to 55 percent Ni. At the
existing temperature and altitude conditions, this power setting would
theoretically produce a combined engine thrust of approximately 3,760 pounds.
At an indicated airspeed of 135 knots (147 KTAS), a deceleration of 0.57
knot per second was evident. Using the B-737 certification drag data, a
theoretical value of 0.66 knot per second was calculated for these conditions.
Tests relating to stickshaker and stall entry speeds were conducted

from a level, flight idle thrust condition with 30° flaps and landing gear
down; the flight spoiler position was varied. With the flight spoilers
stowed, the stickshaker activated at 108 knots and stall buffeting occurred
at 104 knots. With flight spoilers halfway extended, stickshaker activa-
tion occurred at 113 knots and stall buffeting at 108 knots. In both con-
figurations, stall buffeting was experienced within 4 seconds of stickshaker
activation.
Maintenance of level flight at an altitude of 8,000 feet and an air-

speed less than the stickshaker activation speed, with 30° flaps, landing
gear down, and flight spoilers stowed, required an engine power setting of
1.62 EPR. The combined thrust produced at this power setting would,
theoretically, be approximately 12,980 pounds. This value was similar to
the value extrapolated from certification test data which indicate a
required thrust of 12,500 pounds for these same conditions.
Another series of tests wf.•.s designed to examine the effect of con-

figuration changes and thrust application on recovery from the stall
regime. Deceleration to stickshaker speed was accomplished from both level
and descending flight with the engines at idle thrust. The s~try configura-
tions were established as: 30° flaps, landing gear down, and with the
flight spoilers in the stowed, halfway extended, and flight detent positions.
- 21 -
Recovery techniques consisted of power application to between 1.7 and

1.8 EPR (approximately 8,500 pounds of thrust per engine), reduction of the
pitch attitude to an approximately level attitude, and repositioning of the
wing flaps as a test variable, i.e., either retracted to 15° or extended to
0
40 at the initiation of the recovery. Spoilers were left in their ori-
ginally selected position. In all cases, recovery was effected with ·power
application and a simultaneous decrease in pitch attitude. The pitch atti-
tude at the onset of stickshaker activation was consistently near 12°, as
shown on the captain's attitude indicator. The stabilizer trim correspond-
ing to this position was seven units noseup. Trim Was not changed during
the recovery sequence. A loss of altitude of 150 to 500 feet occurred
during all recoveries. The loss of altitude when the flaps were retracted
to 15 was greater than that experienced when the flaps were left at 30° or
extended to 40°. Notwithstanding the differences in stickshaker activation
speed, the differences in flight spoiler positions upon entry into stall
buffeting appeared to have little effect on the loss of altitude consistent
with the recovery technique.
1.15.6 Central Air Data Computer (CADC) Examination
Electronic measurement of the fine altitude synchro in the altitude

module of the captain's CADC showed a phase angle of 46.95° which corres-
ponded to a pressure altitude of 652 feet. This altitude, corrected to
the local barometric pressure (30.05 inches) at the time of the accident,
was equivalent to an altimeter reading of 772 feet m.s.l. A similar
measurement of the first officer's CADC fine altitude synchro showed a
phase of 43.08° which corresponded to a pressure altitude of 598 feet and
to a corrected altimeter reading of 718 feet m.s.l.
A functional test of the captain 1 s CADC showed nonnal operation

throughout its operating range; no out-of-tolerance condition was observed.
A test of the first officer 1 s CADC also showed satisfactory operation;
however, the altitude readings were consistently 40 feet low throughout its
operating range. A test uas conducted in which an undamaged CADC unit was
exposed to heat; a heat-induced altitude error was noted similar to that
found in the first officer's CADC.
1.15.7 Description of B-737 Ice Protection Systems and Certification
Ice protection systems in the B-737 include wing anti-icing, engine

inlet anti-icing, Pitot static heat, and windshield heat. The wing anti-
icing and the engine anti-icing systems both consist of ducted bleed-air
providing protection to the leading edge slats, the cowl leading edge, the
inlet guide vanes, nose dome, and engine inlet pressure sensing (PT?) probe.
The Pitot static tube, stall warning sensor, total temperature probe, and
windshields are electrically heated. Like the B-707 and B-727, the B-737
has no provision for inboard wing leading edge or empennage anti-icing.
During certification of the B-737, it was shown that the aircraft's

ice protection systems were capable of preventing ice formation on the
-· 22-
heated surfaces under conditions of maximum continuous and intermittent

icing specified in Part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) when
engine speed is maintained above 55 percent Nl.
The JT8D engine i;vas certificated in accordance with Part 33 of the

FAR. It i;vas deffions tra ted during the certification pnogram that the engine
would perform in the icing environment as required by the regulations.
The Boeing Company performed an analysis to determine the engine

power required to provide sufficient heat to the engine cowl and nose dome
to prevent ice accumulation under the meteorological conditions existing
at the time of the accident. The analysis indicated that the heat provided
to the engine anti-ice system at idle power would have been sufficient to
maintain the cowl leading 'edge surfaces and nose dome free of ice. Although
a small amount of runback ice could have formed aft of the heated leading
edge surfaces of the cowl, the maximum accumulation during the approach
period would have produced negligible effects on engine operation.
1.16 United Air Lines Flight Crew Procedures
Certain procedures listed in the company 1 s Flight Operations Manual

and Flight Handbook were pertinent to the final portion of the flight.
The Nonprecision Approach and Missed Approach Procedure (NAP) profile

in the Flight Proficiency section of the Flight Manual (see Appendi~ H)
showed that the final descent check was to be accomplished before the final
approach fix (FAF) was reached. The profile also indicated that the recom-
mended descent rate from the FAF was approximately 1,000 ft/min, and that
the aircraft 1.;ras to be placed in the approach configuration before reaching
the FAF.
Pertinent extracts from the flight manual are quoted, in part} as

follows:
'~issed Approaches
As the missed approach is initiated, the pilot should advance the

throttles and rotate to the go-around attitude (approximately 15°),
simultaneously calling for takeoff thrust and flaps to the missed
approach setting.
1
~pproaches to Stalls
At first warning of impending stall advance the throttles and lower

the nose, simultaneously calling for takeoff thrust and flaps to
the recovery setting; gear up at first indication of positive rate
of climb.
1
~pproach Descent
After completion of the Final Descent Check List, the Captain 1vill
announce the target approach speed. Hhen the airplane is 1,000 feet
- 23 -
above field elevation, the F /0 will crosscheck the flight instruments

and announce: 1,000 feet above field elevation, flight instruments
check.
11
At 500 feet above field elevation as determined by barometric
altimeter, the F/0 will announce: 500 feet above field elevation.
Starting at 500 feet above field elevation and at approximately each
100 feet increment, he -i:vill. call out only displacement or deviation
errors as pertinent. . •• At approximately 100 feet above minimum
altitude by use of the barometric altimeter, he will announce:
approaching Minimums. At minimum altitude by use of the barometric
altimeter (Radio Altimeter for CAT-II approach), he will announce:
Minimums •.. If the Captain executes a missed approach, he will
announce: Going Around.
"Use of Anti-ice Equipment
It is difficult to specifically define when to use (or not use) anti-

icing and to establish any appropriate set technique. The following
represent general guides on operation: (When in doubt, use it) .
11
In icing conditions, maintain engine RPM above approximately
55 percent Nl for satisfactory anti-icing.
11
If ice does form on the engine inlet, disturbance of the airfloi;v
can produce engine surging, high EGT's, flameout, etc. With even a
small amount of ice present, turning on Engine Anti-Ice will cause the
'
melting ice to go through the engine and may cause violent engine
surging at intervals of one to two minutes. Throttle adjustments
should be sloi;v and deliberate to avoid exposure to engine flame-out. 11
2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1 Analysis
The crewmembers were properly certificated and qualified for the

flight. There i;vas no evidence of any medical condition that would have
incapacitated the crew, or of any interference with the crew in the per-
formance of their duties; nor did the Safety Board's investigation reveal
any evidence of sabotage or foul play in connection i;vith this accident. The
nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the nonsurviving occupants
was consistent with the nature of the impact and the combined destruction
of the aircraft and the houses. The finding of elevated levels of carbon
monoxide and cyanide in some of the victims was consistent with death due
to smoke inhalation in the conditions existing during the postcrash fire.
The aircraft was certificated, maintained, and equipped in accordance

i;vith FAA regulations. The aircraft i;veight and e.g. were both ~vithin limits
specified for the intended landing at Midway. There was no evidence of any
- 24 -
failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure> powerplants, or control

system before impact.
Both CADC units were capable of normal operation, but their altitude
synchros, as recovered, showed an altitude higher than that of the crash-
site. The alti~ude differences, which could have been transmitted from the
CADC units to the captain 1 s and first officer 1 s servo altimeters, were
157 feet and 103 feet, respectively.
The two CADC units are connected to static sources located on inde-
pendent Pitot/static probes which have no corrrrnon connections. The same
probes contain independent static sources for the airspeed indicators. A
static source error equivalent to an altitude error of 100 feet could
produce a 10-knot airspeed indicator error in the same direction, i.e., if
the aircraft is higher than the altimeter indicates, the airspeed indicator
\<Till sho\..;:r a speed that is higher than the aircraft's actual airspeed.
Several sources for connnon errors in the two independent systems were
considered. One \..;:ras ice, which could have accumulated on the Pitot/static
probes. However, since both probe heat switches were found in the "ON 11
position, and since examination of the filaments of the probe head indica-
ting lights showed that probe heat was energizeP at the time of impact, it
is unlikely that probe icing was the source of error in this case. Another
source of error could have been the effect of the aircraft 1 s extreme nose-
high attitude during the final moments of flight. According to The Boeing
Company's flight test data, pitch angles within the stall buffeting region
can produce static system errors that result in altimeter readings 60 feet
higher than the actual altitude. Also, if electrical power to the CADC was
interrupted while the aircraft was in a nose-high attitude at impact, the
Pitot/static sensing ports could have been 20 feet or more above the eleva-
tion of the crash site. Additional errors inherent in the reported baro-
metric pressure correction at the time of impact could account for still
another 15 to 20 feet. Since it is possible, as shown above, to account
for a significant portion of the difference between impact elevation and
the CADC altitude computations at the time of power interruption, the
Safety Board concludes that the static system errors reflected in the CADC
readings at impact do not have a bearing on the events that occurred at ~IDA~
The flight 1 s progress was routine until arrival in the Chicago area
and the start of the approach descent. Although an approach clearance was
not issued to UA-553 in accordance with the applicable ATC procedures, the
radio and cockpit conversations, and the subsequent events leave no doubt
that the controller and the crew understood that the flight was cleared for
the approach.
The approach controller requested a speed reduction to 180 knots when

the aircraft was approximately 15 runi from Midway AirportJ in level flight,
at 4,000 feet, and at an airspeed of approximately 230 knots. Eighty
seconds later the controller requested a further reduction in airspeed to
160 knots. Immediately thereafter, the CVR indicates a sound believed to
have been made as the flap lever was moved to the 15° position. Although
- 25 -
the ARTS-III data showed an airspeed in excess of 200 knots at that time,
it is more likely that 15° flaps were selected at or below the flap limit
speed of 195 knots, as the aircraft was decelerating. The engine poi;ver
setting remained at approximately 63 percent N during that time period.
1
When the controller advised the flight to slow to approach speed, 106
seconds after_ he issued his first speed advisory, the aircraft 1 s speed. i;.Jas
still in excess of 180 knots. The deceleration rate for that entire period
i;vas less than the aircraft 1 s deceleration capability, provided the thrust
had been reduced and the flight spoilers extended.
The approach controll~r tried to maintain adequate separation between

UA-553 and the preceding Aero Commander by requesting the airspeed adjust-
ments. These speed advisories were within the scope of proper air traffic
procedures, since the function of ATC is to effect adequate separation as
well as expeditious flow of traffic. The flightcrew acknowledged the
advisories but did not comment on them in cockpit conversation. If a
pilot has any problems in complying with ATC advisories, he can use his
prerogative to abandon the approach at any point, or to ask for an alter-
native course of action.
When the tower controller could not make Runway 31L available to the
flight by diverting the Aero Commander to land on Runway 31R, he issued a
missed approach clearance to UA-553. The fact that the onset of the stick-
shaker activation coincided~with the first worO of the missed approach
clearance indicates that this clearance had no bearing on the events at 1'1DA.
In view of the above circumstances, the Board concludes that ATC was
not a factor in this accident.
At 1423:20, the controller cleared UA-553 to descend to 2,000 feet.

Although the first officer acknowledged leaving 4,000 feet immediately
after receipt of the descent clearance, the evidence shows that the
aircraft continued to decelerate in level flight, and that the Ni speed
was not reduced until about 35 seconds later. The performance studies and
simulator tests show that the flight spoilers were probably partially
extended at this time. The aircraft departed 4,000 feet about 1424:15 when
a rate of descent of approximately 750 ft/min was established. The perform-
ance study indicates that the descent i:vas initiated at an airspeed of
approximately 155 knots.
The reason for the crew's relatively slow response to ATC advisories
appears to be their unawareness of the exact distance to the Kedzie 01'1.
There was no DME associated with this approach; and the crew did not request,
or receive, distance advisories from the approach controller. Another
method for the crew to determine their position on the localizer with regard
to the 01'1 i:vas the use of the Calume-.t intersection, as depicted on the
pertinent approach chart. The distance from Calumet to the Kedzie OM is
6.9 nmi. However, there is no direct or indirect reference to the use of
the Calumet intersection recorded on the CVR. The conversation from the
time of level-off at 4,000 feet until the aircraft passed the Calumet inter-
section deals mainly 'tvith the inoperative status of the FDR and means to
troubleshoot it.
- 26 -
That the crei;v was unaware of Kedzie 1 s proximity is also evident in

the unhurried manner in which the descent to Kedzie was executed. CVR and
perfonnance data indicate that the descent from 4,000 feet was started with
the landing flaps extended to 15° and with thrust equivalent to 59.l percent
N1 engine speed. The 750 ft/min rate of descent was increased to between
1,050 and 1,250 ft/min about l~ minutes later when the flight reported
''We're out of three for two." When the controller responded that .the flight
was number two on the approach, the captain called for the landing gear to
be lowered. Shortly thereafter, the flap lever was manipulated; perfonnance
and simulator studies indicate that the flaps were probably extended to
30° at that time. The increased lift, as the flaps extended, caused a
momentary level-off at 2,200 feet, which should have resulted in an airspeed
decay from approximately 150 to 130 knots. The throttle position remained
constant with engine power at 58 to 59 percent N1 .
The cumulative effect of the crew 1 s apparent failure to ascertain

their position on the localizer course was that the flight crossed the Kedzie
OM at about 2,200 feet m.s.l., 700 feet B.bove the published minimum crossing
altitude. The Kedzie beacon signal may have been the crew's first positive
indication of their inbound position. At that time, the aircraft 1 s distance
from Runway 31L was 3.3 nmi which was equivalent to 1 minute 39 seconds
flying time at an average ground speed of 120 knots. When he recognized
the situation that was developing, the captain increased the rate of descent
to approximately 1,550 ft/min and immediately called for the final descent
check. The company's nonprecision approach profile indicated that this
checklist was to be completed before crossing the OM. TBstimony by company
flight management personnel at the public hearing indicated that this pro-
cedure was not mandatory in a nonprecision approach and that it depended
primarily on the distance between the final approach fix (OM) and the
runway. Considering the short distance beCTveen Kedzie and Runway 31L, the
captain's delay in calling for the final descent check does not appear to be
_a preplanned course of action on his part. The resulting increase in the
cockpit workload and disruptiOn of crew coordination during the most
critical phase of the approach turned out to be key elements in the develop-
ment of the accident sequence.
The absence of FDR information, the imprecis:Lon of the ARTS-III data,

and the high ambient noise level of the CVR recording preclude a precise
determ1nation of the nature and tempo of events during the 61 seconds from
the call for the final descent check until impact. However, certain events
and flightpath parameters can be identified. The ARTS-III data indicate
that the approximately 1,550 ft/min descent was maintained until the air-
craft reached an altitude between 1,000 and 1,100 feet m.s.l. The data
further indicate that there was no gradual reduction in descent rate since
the transponder returns received by the ARTS-III system on successive
antenna sweeps prior to the level-off were 1,300, 1, 100, and 1,000 feet.
Considering the system resolution of± 50 feet, the significance of the
200-foot increment is that a minimum of 100 feet of altitude change ·was
recorded during the nominal 4 seconds between antenna returns. This implies
that the aircraft still had a descent rate of at least 1,500 ft/min within
- 27 -
4 seconds of reaching level-off altitude. The 1,500 ft/min descent from

the outer marker to the MDA was in excess of that recommended in the
company 1 s operations manual.
The indicated airspeeds derived from the ARTS-III data showed a

gradual deceleration during this descent, with level-off being initiated
approximately at 120 knots. The theoretical perfonnance of the B-737 con-
flicts somewhat with this evidence. The CVR sound spectrogram study showed
that the power remained at 58 percent to 59 percent N throughout the
1
descent. i;.Ji th the thrust produced under the existing conditions, a 1, 550
ft/min descent can be achieved in a high-drag configuration, but the sta-
bilized airspeed will be in excess of 130 knots. The perfonnance study
indicated that had 30° flaps been selected at 1426:00 and had the spoilers
been extended to the flight detent position upon establishing the 1,550
ft/min descent, level-off would have been initiated approximately at
133 knots. Any configuration producing less drag 'ivould have resulted in a
higher level-off airspeed, which would have been less compatible with the
subsequent events. The aircraft's perfonnance corresponding to this thrust
and drag configuration was validated by the B-737 simulator tests. There-
fore, the Safety Board concludes that level-off airspeed was closer to the
theoretical value and that the final descent was accomplished in a 30° flap,
landing-gear-down configuration with the spoilers extended to the flight
detent position.
The first and second officers did not complete the checklist until
the captain had leveled off approximately at 1,000 feet. As a result, the
first officer did not make any of the required altitude callouts, nor does
it appear that he i;.;ras monitoring airspeed and rate of descent. In regard
to his checklist response that the spoilers were 11 arrned, 11 it is noted that
the green 11 armed 11 light is illuminated whenever the spoiler lever is moved
out of its forward 11 stowed 11 position and placed in the 11 arrned 11 detent
(spoilers retracted and the system ready for automatic deployment upon
landing) or in any position aft of that, including the "flight" detent
(maximum in-flight ·deployment). Since the flight spoilers affected the
aircraft 1 s performance and were needed to expedite the descent, the first
officer probably would not have retracted them on his own initiative. There-
fore, to account for this checklist item in the limited time available, he
may have based his response on the illumination of the light, rather than
on the position of the speed brake lever.
The sound of the click recorded in conjun~tion with this checklist

item could not be definitely identified. Although the CVR transcript inter-
prets this sound as 11 similar to sound made by moving speed brake lever to
anned position,rr it was later determined that such a click could also have
been produced by the tapping of the springloaded spoiler lever or by moving
the lever into the flight detent.
ARTS-III and CVR data show that the level-off coincides with the final
checklist response. The first officer's 1,000-foot call, about 1 second
after his final checklist response, seems more of an afterthought than the
- 28 -
required callout of MDA. The rather abrupt level-off reflected in the

ARTS-III data suggests that, because the captain's attention was.occupied
by other instruments and checklist activities, the realization that he was
rapidly approaching MDA may have come suddenly, and late. Considering the
pilot reports of a 500-foot ceiling between the OM and the airport, it is
also possible that visual ground contact, coupled with a high descent rate~
prompted the immediate level-off.
The rush of cockpit activities at this point, the first officer 1 s

routine callout that the spoilers i;vere 11 armed, 11 and the fact that the.
spoilers are seldom used during the final segment of an instrument approach,
may well have caused the captain to overlook the position of the spoilers
at level-off. This probability is supported by the events that followed.
ARTS-III, CVR, and engine sound correlation shows that the engine
thrust was not increased in anticipation of the level-off. The throttles
were repositioned to produce 72 percent Ni on one engine and 79.2 percent N1
on the other within 6 to 7 seconds after initiation of the level-off
maneuver. Although the addition of power may have been intentionally
delayed because of the captain 1 s observation of an airspeed higher than
Vreference' the asyrrrrnetrical development of ·thrust was probably associated
with the abrupt nature of the maneuver. Probably more significant in this
context is the fact that the captain moved the throttles to a position
that corresponded closely i:vith the thrust required to maintain his reference_
speed in the nonnal landing configuration i:vith the spoilers stoi:ved.
The stickshaker started to sound as the poi:ver was increased, and the
sound continued for the 20 seconds remaining until impact. The ARTS-Ill
data indicate that the aircraft continued to maintain level flight for 8
to 10 seconds of this time period.
The activation of the stickshaker indicates that the angle of attack

had reached a point corresponding to a speed of approximately 9 percent
above the stall value. With a 30° flap configuration, the stickshaker would
activate at a body angle of attack of approximately 13°; with the flight
spoilers stowed, this would correspond to an airspeed of 105 knots. If the
flight spoilers were deployed to the flight detent position, the airspeed
corresponding to stickshaker speed i:vould have been about 116 knots at the
same angle of attack; in either case, both of these speeds are significantly
below the reference speed of 125 knots.
The main consideration in the deceleration of the aircraft from

reference speed to stickshaker speed is that the thrust to counter the total
drag of the aircraft in level flight was insufficient. In the 30° flap,
gear down, flight de tent spoiler configuration, i:vi th a thrust set ting
corresponding to that used during the final descent (58 to 59 percent N ;
1
5,900 pounds thrust)~ the aircraft would have decelerated approximately at
2.0 knots per second in level flight. The transient condition produced by
an increased load factor during the level-off i;.;rould produce an even higher
deceleration. In conjunction ·with the probable airspeed at level-off and
- 29 -
the stickshaker activation speed with the spoilers deployed, this decelera-
tion rate correlates closely with the indicated time sequence of events.
I.Ji th the flight spoilers retracted, the aircraft deceleration i:vould

have been reduced to 1.1 k-nots per second. In conjunction with the lower
stickshaker activation speed (105 knots) approximately 25 seconds would
have elapsed.between level-off and stickshaker activation. Such a time
lapse was not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the Safety Board con-
cludes that the flight spoilers remained in the flight detent position
during and subsequent to level-off. The Board further believes that the
captain, caught in a rapid tempo of unusual events, was unable to analyz2
the situation in time to apply effective corrective action.
The engine acceleration after level-off produced an asymmetrical thrust

of 8,000 pounds on one engine and 5,900 pounds on the other, a total of
13,900 pounds. A thrust in excess of 12,500 pounds should have been
sufficient to accelerate the aircraft out of the stickshaker regime if the
flight spoilers had been stowed. With the spoilers in the flight detent
position, however, a total thrust of 14,500 pounds would have been required
merely to maintain unaccelerated level flight i:vithin the stickshaker regime.
With less thrust, any attempt to maintain level flight would require an
increase in pitch attitude resulting in a continuing deceleration and the
eventual reaching of the stall angle of attack.
The specified recovery procedure for an approach to a stall is to

0
lower the nose, apply takeoff thrust, retract the flaps to 15 , and retract
the gear when a positive rate of climb is achieved. The performance and
simulator studies indicate that the B-737 has sufficient thrust capability
to accelerate out of the approach-to-stall regime, even with the spoilers
extended. If takeoff thrust is produced within 2 or 3 seconds of stick-
shaker activation, little or no altitude has to be sacrificed.
The stickshaker sound started while the engines 'Were still accelerating
in response to the captain 1 s application of level-off poi;.;er. C\TR evidence
suggests that instead of applying more power, the captain's irrrrnediate
reaction was to reconfigure the aircraft; within 2 seconds of stickshaker
onset, there i;vas a sound indicative of flap lever movement. If the flaps
were retracted to 15° at this time, the associated loss of lift would cause
the aircraft to settle. It is quite likely that the captain would councer
this situation by increasing the nose attitude even further. Eyewitnesses
and surviving passengers both attested to such an increase in pitch at::it•.tde.
The subsequent CVR corrunents, 1'want more flaps, 11 11 flaps fifteen, 11 11 I 1 rn

sorry, 11 and the sound of another click similar to flap lever moven1ent can
be interpreted as the crei;v 1 s realization of the adverse effect of flap
retraction and their corrective action by selecting 40° flaps. Such a
final selection w·as verified by wreckage examination. Al though the CVR
sound spectrogram does not cone lusi v-=ly show a subsequent poi;.Jer inc re as e,
it seems probable, based upon i;vitness observations and engine examination,
that takeoff thrust was eventually applied. At this point, hoi;.;ever 1 the
- 30 -
angle of attack may have been so high as to make recovery impossible even
with full thrust developing.
That the crew realized the position of the flight spoilers during
this 20-second sequence of events is not evident4 After the accident, the
spoiler lever wa·s found in the fonvard or stowed position, and the spoilers
in the retracted position. Ho'l:.;ever, the postimpact condition of the center
control pedestal and the possibility of spoiler retraction when hydraulic
pressure was lost during the impact make this evidence inconclusive.
The postimpact position of the horizontal stabilizer trim was deter-

mined to have been 9~ units noseup, which would correlate more closely with
a spoiler-stowed configuration at speeds within the stickshaker regime.
Boeing data indicate that a trim setting of 6~ units would more nearly
correspond w·ith a 30° flaps, gear down, spoiler extended configuration, at
an airspeed of 130 knots and a P"''er setting of 55 percent N1. Sounds
recorded on the CVR indicate that the pitch trim was changed coincident
i;vith level-off. i-Ihether the trim i;vas subsequently changed to compensate
for spoiler retraction, or for changes in flap setting, or as an instinctive
action just before impact, could not be detennined. The sounds generally
associated with trim activation might have been masked by the stickshaker
sounds during the final 20 seconds of flight. Although the position of the
stabilizer trim as found cannot be reconciled with that which would be
expected for the existing conditions, the Board believes that the signi-
ficance of this condition is outweighed by the evidence regarding the deploy-
ment of spoilers during the final descent and level-off.
Since the flight was operating in icing conditions described as light

to moderate by pilots flying in the same area at the time of the accident,
the Board considered the possible influence of icing in producing a thrust/
drag relationship i;vhich might have caused the aircraft to decelerate into
a stall condition. UA procedures specify that engine anti-icing be turried
on when an aircraft is flying in clouds below 20,000 feet with temperatures
.at or below freezing. The engine anti-icing valves and switches were found
in the open and on positions, respectively, upon examination. Although
there was no cockpit conversation relative to icing conditions or anti-
icing activation, it seems reasonable to assume that engine anti-icing was
ac ti va ted in accordance i;vi th UA procedures. In addition, during the descent
engine Ni rpm was maintained at or near the minimum N speed of 55 percent
1
recommended for satisfactory anti-icing in icing conditions. Observations
of survivors and ground witnesses do not indicate a problem with the engines
that would nonnally be associated with the accumulation of engine ice, i.e.,
sounds of compressor stall or rapid surging due to ice ingestion when the
engines responded to thrust application. For these reasons, the Safety
Roard concludes that engine icing was not a causal factor in this accident.
The weather conditions during the approach of UA-553 were also condu-
cive to airframe icing. The aircraft would have been subject to these condi-
tions for approximately 6 minutes. Pilots conducting approaches to Midway
dtiring the time period involved reported that the ice accumulation on their
aircraft was not significant. The pilot of a DC-9 which operated in these
- 31 -
conditions for about 7 minutes reported less than 1/4-inch ice accumulation.
From the examination of the wing anti-ice valves it was detennined

that the wing anti-ice system i;vas off at impact. This position i;vould be
compatible with company practices which recormnend turning off the wing
heat before .the final approach to avoid a thrust penalty in case of a missed
approach, and to prevent landing i;vith a hot wing. There i;vere no remarks on
the CVR that indicated crei;.;r activity in regard to wing anti-ice. The
pressing cockpit activities during the final part of the approach make it
unlikely that the wing anti-icing system i;vas deactivated at this time.
This would imply that the crei;v considered the existing icing conditions not
severe enough to apply wing anti-icing. Finally, it was demonstrated
during the B-737 aircraft certification tests, and confirmed through analy-
tical evaluation during this investigation, that ice accumulations on the
airframe surfaces consistent with the certification requirements would not
significantly affect the controllability of the aircraft. l'loreover, the
drag increment produced by an ice accumulation 3 inches thick on the leading
edge of the empennage surfaces is less than 1,000 pounds at 120 knots.
Comparably, a drag increment of approximately 3,500 pounds is produced by
flight detent spoiler extension. In view of the above, i t is concluded that
airframe icing was not a causal factor in this accident.
In summary, the preponderance of evidence indicates that the rush of

cockpit activities during the final descent caused a breakdown of the safe-
guards inherent in the tasksharing of a crew. The error-provoking environ-
ment set the stage for the crew's failure to notice that the spoilers were
still extended at level-off and to arrest the rapid deterioration of air-
speed that followed.
Although the greater portion of this analysis deals with the events
surrounding the level-off, the Board wishes to emphasize that the accident
sequence was triggered by the captain's failure to exercise positive flight
management earlier during the approach.
2.2 Conclusions
a. Findings
1. The fligh tcrew ;;.J"as certificated and qualified to conduct

this flight.
2. The aircraft was certificated, equipped, and maintained in

accordance with existing FAA rules and company procedures.
Aircraft weight and center of gravity were within limits
for the intended landing at Midway.
3. The aircraft and its associated systems, flight controls,

and po;;verplants, ;;vith the exception of the flight data
recorder, were ain.J"orthy.
- 32 -
4. No evidence was found of sabotage or foul play in

connection i;<lith this accident.
5. The engine anti-icing system was on during the final approach,

and the engines were operated above the minimum thrust settings
recornmeilded for s'atisfactory operation of the anti-icing
ays tern.
6. The light to moderate icing conditions to which the aircraft

i;vas exposed i;.;rould not have compromised the capability of the
aircraft to level off and execute a successful missed approach.
7. The ATC handling of the flight, including the timing of the

issuance of the missed approach clearance, did not compromise
the safety of the flight.
8. The flight was slow in responding to ATC requests for speed

reductions and to the descent ~learance.
9. The crew did not use one of the available means to detennine
their distance to the outer marker.
10. The aircraft crossed the outer marker about 700 feet above the
published minimum crossing altitude.
11. The captain did not call for the final descent check until
the aircraft had passed the outer marker; the distance from
the outer marker to the runway was 3.3 nmi.
12. There was a breakdown in crew coordination during the most

critical phase of the approach.
13. The first officer did not make the prescribed altitude call-
outs during the approach.
14. The flight spoilers were deployed to the flight detent posi-
tion for the final descent from the Kedzie OM and remained
in this position during the level-off at MDA.
b. Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board detennines that the

probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to
exercise positive flight management during the execution of a
nonprecision approach, which culminated in a critical deteriora-
tion of airspeed into the stall regime where level flight could
no longer be maintained.
- 33 -
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations concerning the crash survival aspects of this accident

were combined with those of two other recent accidents and submitted to the
FAA in a letter dated June 25, 1973. (See Appendix I.)
In view of the fact that adherence to established operational proce-

dures and practices would probably have prevented this accident, the Board
reiterates its often-expressed concern about the apparent lack of crew
coordination and cockpit discipline during nonprecision approaches.
Two of the accident reports released by the Board in 1972 (NTSB-AAR-

72-11 and NTSB-AAR-72-31) contained specific recommendations in this regard.
In the first report, the Board included the complete FAA 1 s Air Carrier
Operations Bulletin No. 71-9 in the recormnendations section. The subject
of the bulletin is: Training Emphasis on Nonprecision Approach Procedures
and Interpretation of Low Visibility Weather Reports. This bulletin, in
essence, surrnnarizes the common faults noted in nonprecision approaches and
makes several pertinent recommendations. The following quotation from this
bulletin illustrates its main theme:
"Perhaps we should stop using the philosophy of non-

precision and face up to the need for standards that all
phases of flight should be based upon precision and pro-
fessionalism. Still another area in the conduct of non-
precision approach has to do with the attitude, cockpit
discipline and crew coordination of the flight crew. Recent
events strongly indicate a widespread lack of appreciation
for the importance of these factors. Substandard attitude,
discipline and coordination are apparent to the degree that
many approaches are being flown in a hit-or-miss fashion
rathe-i; than in a disciplined by-the-book procedure. 11
In the second report, the Board recommended that the FAA:
1. Reemphasize to all flightcrew members the necessity for

total crew coordination and adherence to approved procedures.
2. Insure that all flightcrew members are currently apprised

of the contents of Air Carrier Operations Bulletin 71-9,
emphasizing that a 11 nonprecision 11 approach requires as
much, if not more, crew coordination than a 11 precision 11
approach because of the lack of precise guidance from
electr.onic navigational aids outside the aircraft.
As an additional step in drawing attention to this bulletin, the

Board will forward copies to the organizations listed below with the
recommendation that its contents be used, together with this accident
report to stress the unique demands for crew coordination and vigilance
during nonprecision approaches:
- 34 -
Allied Pilots Association

Air Line Pilots Association
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Flight Safety Foundation, Inc.
National Business Aircraft Association, Inc~
National Pilots Association
National Air Transportation Conferences, Inc.
Air Transport Association of America
National Air Carrier Association, Inc.
Association of Local Transport Airlines
In view of the role of the flight spoilers in this accident and the
indication that the crew was not aware of the reason for the higher-than-
normal stall warning activation speed, the Safety Board concludes that
certain crew training deficiencies exist and recorrrrnends that the Federal
Aviation Administration:
1. Reassess and improve the methods used, both in flight manuals

and in simulator or flight training, to familiarize flightcrews
with the effects of spoilers on aircraft characteristics and
stall warning devices. (Recommendation A-73-73.)
2. Issue an advisory bulletin to alert pilots and operators to the

hazards of the improper use of spoilers. (Recommendation A-73-74.)
BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETI BOARD
Isl FRANCIS H. McADAMS

Member
Isl LOUIS M. THAYER

Member
Is I ISABEL A. BURGESS
Member
Is I WILLIAM R. HALEY
Member
John H. Reed, Chairman, was not present and did not participate in the
adoption of this report.
August 29, 1973

- 35 -
APPENDIX A
INVESTIGATION AND HEARING
1. Investigation
The Board received notification of the accident at 1440 c.s.t., on

December 8, 1972, from the Federal Aviation Administration. An investiga-
tion team was immediately dispatched to the scene of the accident. Working
groups were established for Operations, Air Traffic Control, Witnesses,
Weather, Human Factors, Structures, Powerplants, Systems, Maintenance
Records, and Flight Recorders. An additional group was formed later for
Aircraft Perfonnance. Parties to the Investigation included: United Air
Lines, Inc., the Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing Company,
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Division of the United Aircraft Corporation, Air
Line Pilots Association, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization,
and the Interriational Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
2. Hearing
A public hearing was convened by the Safety Board at Rosemont,

Illinois, on February 27, 1973. Parties to the hearing were: United Air
Lines, Inc., the Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing Company,
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, Air
Line Pilots Association, and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization. A deposition was taken at Chicago, Illinois, on June 13
and 14, 1973.
3. Reports
A preliminary report on this accident was issued by the Safety Board

on January 19, 1973.
- 36 -
APPENDIX B
CREW INFORMATION
Captain Wendell Lewis Whitehouse, aged 44, was employed by United Air
Lines on January 30, 1956. He held Airline Transport Pilot Certificate
No. 1159888, issued on October 3, 1968, with type ratings in the Douglas
DC-6/7 and the Boeing 737 aircraft. He also held Flight Engineer
Certificate No. 1386803. He was upgraded to captain in the Boeing 737 on
October 29, 1968.
Captain \.Jhitehouse flew an unsatisfactory Boeing 737 proficiency check

on April 29, 1970; a recheck was completed satisfactorily on May 13, 1970.
His last proficiency check was conducted on April 11, 1972, and his last
line check on August 30, 1972. He completed his last proficiency training
on October 27, 1972. His most recent first-class medical certificate was
issued without limitation on August 11, 1972.
Captain Whitehouse had accumulated a total of about 18,000 flying

hours, of which 2,435 hours were in the Boeing 737. In the 30-day period
preceding the accident, he flew a total of 61 hours in the Boeing 737.
First Officer Walter 0. Coble, aged 43, was employed by United Air
Lines on October 4, 1957. He held Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1300051,
issued on June 30, 1958, with ASEL and instrument ratings. He was quali-
fied as a Boeing 737 first officer on January 31, 1969. On June 19, 1972,
he flew an unsatisfactory proficiency check, but passed a subsequent recheck
on June 21, 1972. His last proficiency check was conducted on June 21,
1972, and his last line check on October 25, 1972. His most recent
first-class medical certificate was issued, without limitation, on July 28,
1972.
First Officer Coble had accumulated a total of about 10,638 hours of

flying time, of which 1,676 hours were in the Boeing 737. In the 30-day
period preceding the accident, he flew a total of 32 hours.
Second Officer Barry J. Elder, aged 31, was employed by United Air
Lines on May 8, 1967. He held Commercial Pilot Certificate No. 1646564
with ASEL and instrument ratings. He was qualified as a Boeing 737 first
officer on September 16, 1970, but because of company personnel reductions
he reverted to second officer status on the aircraft. He had not received
proficiency flight training or recurrent ground training from the company
since January 31, 1971. His most recent first-class medical certificate
was issued, without limitation, on November 11, 1972.
Second Officer Elder had accumulated a total of 2,683 flying hours of

which 1,128 hours were in the Boeing 737. In the 30-day period preceding
the accident, he flew a total of 53 hours.
The three flightcrew members had a 23-hour rest period prior to this
flight.
- 37 -
APPENDIX B
t:vlarguerite J. McCausland, the first-class stewardess ( 11 A11 position),

has a seniority date of June 1, 1957. Her initial B-737 emergency proce-
dures training was on March 19, 1968. Classroom and open book recurrent
emerg.ency pro·cedures training for the B-737 was cOnducted on May 17, 1971,
and December 20, 1971. 'Her mbst recent emergency evacuation training was
conducted on aDC-8-62 on May 4, 1972.
D. Jeanne Griffin, coach stewardess ( 11B 11 position) has a seniority

date of July 5, 1962. Her initial B-737 emergency procedures training was
on April 3, 1968. Her most recent B-737 open book and classroom recurrenc
emergellcy'~procedures training was on January 24, 1971, and June 23, 1971.
Her--mOst r.ecent emergenqy evacuation training was conducted on the B-747
mockup on July 27, 1972.
1<athleen S. Dure_t, _coach stewardess ( 1 'C 11 position) has a January 13,

1965, ~eri~6ri ty date. Her initial B- 7 37 emergency prgcf?dures training
was ·on March 27, 1968. Her most recent classroom B-737 emergency-proce-
dures traiiling was on November 30, 1970, and her most recent emergency
procedures open book training was on July 13, 1971. Her most recent
recurrent emergency evacuation training was conducted on a· DC-8-62 on
December 6, 1971.
- 38 -
APPENDIX C
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
Aircraft.N9031U, a Boeing 737-222, serial No. 19069, was manufactured

in September 1968 and registered to United Air Lines, Inc., on September 26,
1969. A standard airw9rthiness certificate was issued for the aircraft
in September 1968. The aircraft had accumulated a total of 7,247 flying
hours at the time of the accident.
Aircraft and component records showed that all inspections and over-
hauls had been performed within the prescribed time limits and that the
aircraft had been maintained in accordance with all company procedures and
Federal Aviation Administration regulations. All applicable airworthiness
directives had been complied with as of December 8, 1972.
The aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D engines. The
No. 1 engine, serial No. 655956, had a total of 5,852 hours since overhaul
and the No. 2 engine, serial No. 655840, had a total of 6,554 hours since
overhaul.
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APPE~
@ Stell ON Of llFT HOR 1ZONTAL ST AB llllER.
@SECllOO OF FUP TRACK INCLUDING JACK SCREW.
@sECTION OF FLAP TRACK FAIRING,

"'
'.l
.,; NATIONAL TRANSPOI
@FLAP MIO fLAP SECTION ANO JACK SCREW, L~J.IJ--t-~·~·/~~NA WA SHIN
@oXYGEN FlllER ANO GAUGL Jl06 CD
-20 fT, TRll
A~_Clfjl K
WRECKAGE DIS
@RIGHT HANO STRIJT()OOR P/N 65·S22Cl·)6,
Al l!fl. HEIGHT. UNITED A
@STRUT OOOR Pfa 6ViZ2CMt8. WEST 7ld. STREET BRA!KH[S BROKHI Al 18 FT, HEIGHT
@SECTION Of SKIN WITH STRINGERS, Pfa 65·55716·5.
BOEING MODEL
3701 PHOTO "B" ACCIDENT Sil
@SKIN AND Rl8 SECllON.
@si:cnoo DF SKIN Wllll lOlNRE:.

@FllL TAN~ PLAIT, l(N &4644£..l ! i1 [ACHI.
f01\' WEST lATITUI
NORTH lDNGll
CITY OF CH
"""lOCAT!ON.
ITEMS~ THROt.K;H 29 NOT IN ORIGINAL
fO~O IN sr111:rr ANO 00
APPROXIMAT[ANGLE/\
OffLIGHT PAftl DECEMB
SIDEWALK Of LOT 3n9 \\'EST 70h Pl.AC[.
'·
..
,
'
,..,..
.. "j;-- ··..;,.~"-'
- 41 -
APPENDIX E
cJLkppesen Approach Churl NOV 24·72 @ CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

MIDWAYiower 118.7 ]]9.2126.2 Apl.E/ev6]9 1
-MIDWAY
Var 02°E LOC
Rwy 3 1 l
CHICAGO Approach
] ] 9 .35
!R)--1 ATISl20.05109.9
Deµa-;-;::·1R.-,---..LG-,-,-.,,-.,,-----~
) ] 9 .35 121.7
LOC
NDBRwy 3 ll
l 09. 9 !MXT g::_
270' . 090• MSA I 80 270"
~1---------~-..L-------..L~l2:::;.l~.7_.:;C"n..-----'-'~'~o~o-·~1_,2~20~0~·..L~'~'~o~o·..,
2049'
840'•
HINES
LOM
219MD=:: 938'
•
*·~
2399' I.
.1041' *
862d,
cl,968'
825' 764'
"'0 • (!.
> 847cli
19. !
2300 093~
899' 087°-
-2670
.;>/
..?o
0 /u: <!p
0 4 o 0o CALUMET
~/
•
730'
I
I
• 779' ol~I
"' .1037'
• 993'
I
~w
g~~
0
r .1020·
87,-SD 113.2 EON 114.2 CGT(IAF) 87-lD

NOTE: Final approa'h from holding pallern at
MX LOM not authorized.
MM LOM
-~ ~,ii EAST
~ 2000'
I
•
'-----w-------
~
•I
,i, ~i'*1soo·
3~1'§! {889'}
,,,,,,\ (1389')
10 NM
~ 1$
TDZ RWY 31 L 61 1 1 ~ 2.7 ~~
APT.619' 0 0.6 3.3
PULL UP: Climbing LEFT turn to 2600 feet and proceed to EON VOR via
inbound R-001.
STRAIGHT -IN LANDING RWY 31 l CIRCLE-TO.LAND
LOC NOB
1 1
MOA l 040 (429'} MOA 1120 509')
A A
1120 1 (501')-l
8 8
c c 1120 1(501' -1 1h
D D
& 1180'(''"'!1-·2
Alt MDA 1 040 1{429') MOA 1120 1(509') E~g Non·Skd -1 3 I
1,"~s~~·-----l'-----'----'-A~·'~·~c~,1'--'o~,~1'~4--~~,_"'~----'-2_s_o~·r_,,_,_1_.2____S_:..,
: 'G"""'d"'"'O"'oo;dc.·"'""-'_ _,_6.,,o'--'_,s,,o'--'-'-'o.,,oL!."'2<00L1.cel4"'0'"'Ic;6"'-0 NOT E: SJr d I ng sca le N A.
~ LOM to MAP 3.3 3:18 2:29 1:59 1:39 1:25 1:14
CHANGES, LO C frequency. Cl IH1' JEPPESEN t..co. O(NVE<, (Oto. U.S ....
..LL••GHrs ·~seovm
TRANSCRIPI'ION OF COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING, UA 553 1 DECE!>ffiER 8, 1972
CAM Cockpit area microphone CAPO Radio transmission from Chicago Approach Control
RDO Radio transmission from N9031U (UA 553) MTWR Radio transmission from Midway Tower
-1 Voice identified as Captain * Unintelligible word/words
-2 Voic;e. .i,1,_entifiea as First Officer NOnpertinent word
-3 Voi'ce id'EintitiE:d as Second Officer Break in c.ontinllity
-? Voice unidentified' QuestiOnable teX~:"
9\18 ·naciio ii_.a;{S-inis'si:on frbm Aero comnianaer 680 1 N309\'.~· .'EaitOrial inse·rticin
·pa'.U.Se
Nal'E: Al'i ti'tiie· appears· as
. . ' ' . a'reenwi~h Me8.n Time- (Gl<fl'J ·1:-. ~·:.;~;., ..., :·'
:·,,,,..,·
• ''- ·.11.~.i. .
INTRA.,..·cocKPIT . ·')UR-GROUND COl>MUNICATIONS:';
SOURCE ·--soURCJ? "'

~ CONTENT & TIME
·~· .
•2019:30.5
CAM-1
'' ~ ._,_,J
·":;; .... ... ··~ .
CAM-3 .I'a1'.i?~ ftie:

.. 2019:32.0
RlXl-2 AhJ Midway' approach, ·United five five three, we're at
:i'_our thousand, understand it 1 s three one left
CAM-1 Recorder go off?
CAM-3 Yeah
CAM-'?.
* **
2019:<5.5
CAM-1 See what 1 s -wrong -with it, will ya?
2019: 50.0
RlXl-2 Do ya read United five five three?
INTRA.- COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
~
2019:52.0
CHI APC Sir, I was busy on that phone over there, you 1 re in
radar contact, two ninety heading, intercept thirty-
one left localizer for Midway, Oscar's current
2020:00,0
RD0-2 Okay, thank you, we got_Qs_ca]'_, ah, __ two nip~:t:;y on t_he
heading --- intercept three one left
202o:o4.o
CHI AFC --S, sir
2020:09.0
C!IT APO Nine Victor Sugar radar contact south heading, two
thousand five hundred, vector for thi1·ty-one left
again
RL0-2 Sound of LOM IDENT ((KedZie LOM, TIP.SH, DASH, DASH, IDT,
IXJT, DABH))
2020:37 .5
CAM-3 Braking aetion :reported fair by a guppy
CAM-l Fair?
CAM-3 On one, ah, three one left
CAM-3 T11e only change is the altimeter thirty oh five
CAM-? ***
CAM-l Sounds to me a_ circuit breaker} perhaps
2020:52.5
CAH-3 Hah?
CAl<!-? ** l(-
CAM-l Yeah} I ju.st meant, I thought you 1 d better check

everything, ah
INTRA.-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COf.l<IUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TJME & TIME CONTENT
CAM-3 It, ah, -- indicates
CAM Sound of several clicks ((appear between words

nah" and 11 indicates" above)) ((heard on all
four, tracks sritinds similai• tO 'circuit breakel'
~eacbivatea ~nd ac~iYated TePe~tedly))
CAM-3 A wire on the reel to test
CAM sauna of' several clicks
2021:13.0
CAM-3 It tests
CAM-3 . 'I thiri~it 1 s okay. I think it 1 s -working
CAM-?
***
2021:23 .o
CAJ·i-3 :1.t says off
,·,1'
2o21: 23 \i; '' -·,:-
':cJir.AJ?c . Ze1•~__ nine vs.L:tu:rn left to one" three zero
11
CAM-1 You got. an off" light
CA.M-3 Yeah, but, ah, the signal, the enccxle light

comes on
CAfl-?
** *
CAM-3 And it shows, indicating tape
CAM Sound of two clicks ((similar to flap lever

movement))
)
'
'
'
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR~G:RoUND COtMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME & TiME
2021:56.5 United five five thTee, slow to a hundred an eighty
CHI AR; knots
2021:59,5
R00-2 Hundred an eighty knots, :five five three
2022:00.0
CAM Sound of two clicks ((similar to flap lever
movement))
2022:26.5
CHI AR; Zero nine VS, descend to two thousand feet
CAM Sound of clicks ((similar to electric trim

actuator))
2022:112 ,5
CAM-2 Wonder why they put that in there, final approach
from holding.pattern at Kedzie not authorized?
2022:45.5
CHI APO Zero nine VS turn left zero nine zero
CAM-2 What would be wrong if you were there in the

holding pattern? You 1 d be back here anyway
cAM-2, Wonder why?
cAM-1 I aon 1 t know
CAM-l The holding patteTn 1 s probably higher than ·fifteen

hlllldred :feet
cAM-2 That 1 s probably true
CAM-? ** -l(·
CAM-3 Or it 1 s not aligned -with the runway
CAM-2 Yeah
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIME
20'23:12.0
CHI APO Zero nine VS turn left heading zero two zero
'•
2023:16.0
CHI. APO
0
20?3:l8.5
RD0-2
' .
Five five three, slow to a hundred an sixty knots
.J:!~diea. an sixty lgi,at~-~. fiv7 .five three

.,
2023:19.5
CAM .SbtindJ p_f thi-ee cliclm ((similar t.o movement of
~~P .levei·,) _): ,1
:s-/. s~i:/~~~~h. ae~c~-n~ ·ta: ttr.~!t11~rii~~~~-:ie~t

2023:20.0
ciHI:.APC ·1·--
...fi.ve .:fiv.e...t1l:ree.
"'
;J.~~~i~ :~o th~\is~na
'
·~-~-
'
-.~.,.
~ ;.-_.
·_,, .,.,-,,'.
•. 2023:23.0
. -7'
-, .1
' :Ii00-2
•
CAM Soun~. ..,of ~cl".s -.( ('similai·_, t6~_sound · of'·'·::£t8.b_illz~'.r
trim actuation))
2023 ,35.0
CHI APC An zero nine VS -- whet is your S:irspeed now?
2023 ,39.5
CHI APC 1 key 1 keep it up for a while, please
2023:42.0
CHI APC Five five three start slowin 1 toyer approach speed,
please
2023:44.5
R00-2 Okay, slowin 1 up
TNTRA-CCCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE· SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIMli:
CAM Sounds of severaJ. clicks ((similar to a:ound of

stabiliZer trim act~tion))
2024:08.5
CHI AFC * VS, turn left heading three two zero now, intercept,
cleared for the approach, stay ~"ith me
2024:31.5 ··~-~
CAM-3 Christ, I can 1t even find the circuit breaker

for this
CAM-2 Over here
CAM-? * * * flight recorde1·
CAM-7 ***
2024:44.5
CHI AFC Nine VS, keep as much speed as long as you can sir,
call the tower now, one eighteen seven
2024:50.0
CAM-3 I doll 1 t know
CAM-3 Don1t know what to say
CAM-3 I get a reaction h'hen I pull th~, ah, AC
CAM-2 No reaction when you pull tha IC though
CAM-3 You -want me to call Maintenance?
CAM-1 Call it in
CAM-3 Is this tape? Or uh
2025:ll.5
CAM-3 I 1 ll have to call Dispatch
CAM-1 ***
D·lTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
~ CONTENT
- --- & TIME
Five five three, call the tower now on one eighte~~~--··

seven
.2025,28.0
1100-2 Eighteen ·se.venJ .five .five three
.-~:~~~::~:.M.~~~Y-":t_bife_r_,
. .;:.:.~~:: ~~tt~~-~ ~-Un.it~&:'
-":.~~:;~~-~~~ ·. -.'.\--;-;-;~~: . ~' )~~~;
"f.ive._;five' i::hiee·,
of,·,: three ·;fo17 t-wo
.- ';:
,.-. ·
---_,.
Uni:ted five~-.five :th~'ee_,_ ~·:epo~t passing the
· :nwnber t;.;p, on:.st~1e ·-~~~'rOach,
,·
,;··
Chic?-80:., 'this is .fi've -:ri-V'e·three ((secon~.. Off~i;?~r·: c;--~ ,.,, ,.
ca'.Q.il)g ARrnc)) .- .,_'.
2025,44.o . '
R00-'2_-· -dKa~ ;-·. ~~~o~:g~'.:~-{1~}~~:~t~R -m~:;·ke~
~~ :_,,~- - ' - ---5~·
Let 1 s have the gear down please
Start of first sonnd of first series of Kedzie

outer marker beacon tones
ChicagoJ United five five three ((second officer

calling ARINC))
Sonnd of a click ({similar to sonnd of landing

gen.r handle ~oiug into down tent))a:
CAM Sound oi' chime { (simultnneous -with click above))
.....
-1NTM-COCKflT t.- AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS
SOUEOE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
----
2025:52.20
'1r\IR Nine Victor-sugar, what's your airspeed?
End of sound of first series of Kedzie outer ma1·ker

beacon tones
2025:54.14
9VS Ah, we 1 re down to ah, hundred twenty knots
\
2025:55.06
CAM Increase in rnnbient noise level ((similar to
increase made by nose lanaing gear extended))
2025:56.82
!,fi'WR Ah hund1·ed and twenty, okay
2026:00.64
CAH Sonnd of fi1·st of four clicks in rapid increase
((sounds simila1· to flap lever moved from fifteen
degrees to 25 degrees position))
2026: 01. 50
Gear 1 own
CAM-?
CAM Sound of several clicks ((similar to sound of

stabilizer trim actuation))
2026:10.02
RD0-1 Sou.~d of beginning of second series of Kedzie outer
marker beacon tones
2026:20.02
RD0-1 End of sound of second series of Kedzie outer marker
beacon tones
2026 :211. 66
CAN-1 Final descent check
I
IN'I'RA-COCKI'I.T AIR-GROUND CO~NUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT
---- & TINE
2026:25.66
CAM-3 Flight and nav
2026:27 .ll
CA.H-2 Cross-checked
"-:·
CAM-? ***
CAM ·sound··of'
·clicks ((similar t·~
trim act~tion)_) __ , :·· '
United f'ive·· f.J_Xf!, t}u:_ee.1 -_an~ a_h,, Keazi~ ·:t11bo'und
2026:35,97 '
. '~:
CAH-? Flight
. ,. ' ~
"'
0
,_._
."\--, ..2:026 ,3\; .38 '
>'~.-:,. ··,.,
"- ~ J ,: -·--
-~ .;· _
~u±n~~~~:),··r1.~:,, ·
.1'£---t· ,: 1 -,.v_-, . .'··'
',·~fu¢. ,_ .-'· 'Unl.itba .five· _f.ive :thre'ej conti_nue Tnbo'Urldi you~-re
twOOn ~p~- appio_ac~i. 1
ll -t~~e_p-· yqU advised ·. 'A>
~\ :--. \
2026:110.10 '
CAN Sound of seve:Ja.i clicks ((similar-to soUna of
electrical stabilizer txim actuation))
2026:110.46
R00-2 Okay
2026:40.96
CAM-2 Cross-checked
CAN-3 With a glideslope f.lag
CAM-2 No glideslope
2026:41.10
9VS Eh, nine VS has the runvay
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND CO~MUNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
- --
2026:43.06
Ml'WR Nine VS, runway three one left cleared to land
2026:44.67
CAM-3 Aaan the --- landing gear
2026:46.18
9'/S Okay
2026:48.40
MTWR Nine VS, do ya have the right runway in sight by
any chance?
2026:50.41
C/\.M-2 Down, three greens
2026:51.37 2026:51.37
CN·l-3 Speed brake? 9'/S Affinnative
2026:52.45
CAM.-2 Ah --- anned
2026:52.6
MTWR 'ud you swing over to that and land? There's a jet
about two m-- and disregard that, ah, okay, I see
ya now, you're cleared to land on thirty-one left
2026:54.69
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by moving
speed brake lever to anned position))
2026:56.o4
CAN-3 Wing flaps
2026:58.75
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by flap
lever moving into detent))
IN'rHA-COCKPI'l' AIR-GROUND COM!•M1ICAT!ON$
SOURCE SOURCE
~ & 1
fIME
2026,59.112
CAM-2 ThirtyJ green 1.ightJ pressure fluid
2027,oi.48
Cl\M-3 An the auto-pilot?.
CAM sOund of click"( (siniila.r :to electrJ.cal stabi}j,zer

trim rtctuatlon)) s'.i:multaneous with 11 an the ,,uuto-
:Pilot11 · · ,i ,.
2027,02,96
CAM:-2 Disnrmea
2027,o4.11 .--,
CAH-2 Ah thousand .feet
.
.,._
.U~1i~a.::f~:X~:~~~~y-;bl}f7_~-~ ~t.~.6~\;e -~ ·m·~_sse~. ~pproach},

- J-ma,ke-- a-··le:r.b,..;turn-, td a_ -heading of --- ·one· eig1jt zero_f ~
cli~b,_'l;';j"lwo- .thousand 'l(b,etwe,~n --wo_rds_ 1'of"- ,.~nd -11 one'! .; '~;-
.' _;_' ~-·

~h~ere:': TS .a .,pause and a vdJ:Ce _".in' the Dackgrottnd says_· , , .
11
b'ne · elg~-iy:,.-")) · .. •l
;·.
2027,05 .74
CAM Sonnd of stickshaker begins and continues to
end of recording
((Two to three hurried words at very low

amplitude and masked by noise of stick-
shaker))
CAii Sormd oi' click ( (siinilar to sormd made by flap

lever moving into detcnt))
Okay, left tm·n to one eight zero, --- left turn,

okay?
INTRA-COCKPIT AIR-GROUND COM:.ruNICATIONS
SOURCE SOURCE
- --
2027 :13 .88
CAM-3 Want more flaps?
2027:15.33
CAM-? Flaps fifteen
Yeah, make left turn to one eighty
2027:16.14
CAM-? I'm sorry
2027:16.47
CAM Sound of click ((similar to sound made by flap
leyer moving into detent))
Sound of click ((sound similar to landing gear

lever moved out of down detent))
2027:20.14
CAM Sound of double click ( (som1d similar to landing
gear lever moved into up detent))
2027:20.64
CAN Sound of landing gear warning horn begins and
continues to end of recording
2027:23.55
CAM Sound of initial impact and garbled voice
2027 :24 .46

RDO-l _§ounds of impact and unintelligible voice ((over
open microphone))
2027:25.02
RD0-1 END OF RECORDING
·'-~·
CAllBRATED AIRSPUD·KNOTS
g ~ s 8 3 ~ ~ ~ ~
''
''
''
CAM-l·l: OJSCUSSIO'I ON lNOP'ERATJVE STATUS Of FDR ''
,,''
,,
,,
21:56. CHI APCt ltf!ITED 5Sl Slow ro 180 KNOTS

RD0-2, 180 KNOTS, 553
zuo- CAM: sour.o SIMILAR TO fV,p LE\/fR A\:'.JVE.'t'lNT
,
I
i
I
'
l' ~
l ~
I §
I
, I
=
• I
I
.•
"'1
'' 'I
I
' I
I
I
/2"16 ·CH! Al'C: 553 SLOW TO \60 KNOTS '

I
RD0-2: 160 KNOTS, }5l
,,I
,....z:3:1~·
CA/r\, SOUND SIMILAR TO HAP UVER MOVEMENT
--CH! APC1 THEN DESCEND TO WXJ Fm, u~mrn 5Sl ,
23,23 • RD0·2i 001\'N TO 2oo:J, 551 LEAVING FOUR
,,I
~ CAtu.w:r
" C-c!'=1=rn"s=EC7T1=0=,'
~
;;;
~,
,
~I
~'
~
Z:h42 •CHI APC, 553 START SlOWING TO YOUR APPROACH SPEED
RD0·21 Ot!J..Y, SLOWING UP '
I
I
I
I
I
~ ,, I
8 ,,,
,
,,
~
3:
~
~
,
3::
;-. ,,
,!
~ 24:ll ,,
" ,I
,I
,,
,,,
,,
CAl.H-3: DISCUSSION ON INOPERATIVE STATUS _Of fDR
,,
I
I
I
25:11
'
I
I
I
I
I
,
I
,,
I
I
/25:35 • RD0·2i MIDWAY, TOWER UNITED 553,AN' WE'RE
I
Ol!T Of THREE fOR TWO I
<'.5:39 • MTl'IR: UNITED 553, REPORT PASSINO THE OUTER ll'ARKfR,
NUMBER TWO ON THE APPROACH ''
25M • RDD·21 OKAY REPORT THE OUTER ,\\llRKER
25'46 ·CAI.Ht lfT'S HAVE THE C£11R DOWN PLEASE 'II
25:48 • RD0·1: FIRST SERIES OF )(£OZIE BEACON TONES
25,51- CAM: SOUNO SIMILAR TO CEAR l£VER /t\OVEMENT I'
I
I
~ ,
,'
,,
Z6:00 ·CA At SOUND SIMJIAR TO FlAP l£VER N10VEMEW FROM
,.. 8 15°TO 2S"
-0
-0 2f,,\o· RDO•l: START Of 2nd StRIES OF KEDZ!E OM B£11CON TO~ES
,,
I
z<= "'
,..
0 I
~z
>-
~ -<
"' ,..
z KEDZIE /26:20 - RDO·l: £ND Of" SOUND Of KEOZIE OM 9EACON
IOETERMINED TO HAVE HEFJJ TURN£0 Off I'
I
0:8 "' -< OUTER ~'ARKER AT APPROXIMATE PEAK OF SIGNAU I

I
c,.. -0
az 26.Z4 ·CAM·!: F!ML D£SCENT Cl<ECK
II
"'-
>
-< " '
"'0
,.. ! <"t; ~ 26:30 • R00·2: urmED 553 AN, AH, KEDZIE INBOUND
;zZ
~
~
~
"'
~
~
~
-<
~.z
~-
/26:36 • MTWR, UNITED 5~3, CONTINUE INBOUND YOU'RE <2
ON THE APPROACH· l'tl KEEP YOU ADV ISEO
?~ Jl • 91/)· f\J!\( 'I~ f'A~ T~' 011'1,YAV
I
I
!'
~ '~ 0
"'
,j'1
,-.,-
-57
APPENDIX H
CIBCLING: FLAPS 25/140 KTS

GEAR DOWN
INBOUND STRAIGHT-IN: LANDING FLAPS

FLAPS 15/150 KTS
GEAR OOWN
FINAL DESCENT CHECK
TTh1E CHECK
DESCENT RATE: APPROX 10~0 fpm CLIMB SPEED:
VREF + 15 KTS.
MISSED APPROACH
TAKEOFF THRUST
FLAPS 15
GEAR UP - ON POsrrrvE
APPROACH CONFIG• RATE-OF-CLl1fB
AFTER CLEAR OF
OBSTACLES:
FOLU)\V FLAP RETRAC-
TION SCHEDULE.
CLIMB THRUST.
*APPROACH CONFIGURATION:
NO~MAL J\1ANEUVERING or
FLAPS 25/VREF + 12 KTS
FLAPS 30/VREF + 5 KTS
NON-PRECISION APPROACHES/MAP
TWO ENGINES
AUG 23/71 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 951

3-16 REFERENCE AND REVIEW
·-:~;,-<:
1-. ,·
' ~! :::
.., __
-_,.'' ,,·"..:-:··
-
,.,.,;
__...
·.r'.:
- 59 -
APPENDIX I
and possibly vital, measure of protection for occupants of aft facing

seats. The principal advantage of a shoulder harness, both in forward
and rearyJard facing s"eats, is that it helps to restrain the user in
an upright position, thereby keeping the spinal column in a more suit-
able position from the standpoint of load distribution~ Additionally,
the shoulder harness prevents the upper body from flailing, a frequent
cause of serious injuries in aircraft accidents. The Board believes
that increased protection from injury of the flightcrew as well as the
cabin attendants is of vital importance, since their availability to
guide and aid passengers during evacuation may make the difference
between survival and disaster. Therefore, the Safety Board recommends
that the Federal Aviation Administration:
1. Take the necessary steps to ensure that all air carrier

before-landing and takeoff checklists contain a 11 Fas ten
Shoulder Harness es 11 item.
2. Amend 14 CFR 25.785(h) to require provisions for a

shoulder harness at each cabin attendant seat, and
amend 14 CFR 121.321 to require that shoulder harnesses
be installed at each cabin attendant seat.
Auxiliary Portable Lighting. During the investigation and public hear-

ing held in connection with the EAL L-1011 accident, testimony indicated
that the absence of lighting of any kind at the crash scene seriously
hampered survivors' ability to orient themselves and prevented them
from searching for and assisting other injured survivors. Additionally,
this lack of light prevented cabin attendants from taking effective
charge among the surviving passengers. In both Chicago accidents, a
similar lighting problem was encountered. Although section 121.549(b)
of the Federal Aviation Regulations requires each crewmember to have
available a flashlight, cabin attendants usually stoi;v their personal
flashlights in their handbags, which tend to become lost in the debris
of the wreckageo This, for example, was the case in both Chicago
accidents. The Board believes that effective alternate means of light-
ing, which is not dependent on random stoi;vage and location, should be
readily accessible to the flight attendants. Therefore, the Safety
Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:
3. Amend 14 CFR 25 .812 to require provisions for the stow-

age of a portable, high-intensity light at cabin attend-
ant stations; and amend 14 CFR 121.310 to require the
installation of such portable, high-intensity lights at
cabin attendant stations.
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- 61 -
APPENDIX I
5. Amend 14 CFR 25.812 to provide an additional means for

activating the main emergency lighting system to provide
redundancy and thereby improve its reliability.
Emergency Evacuation Problems: A recurring problem of galley security

was encountered in the UAL B-737 accident when, during impact, food and
service items fell from the two aft cabin galley units. The impact,
which was described by cabin attendants as a series of mild to moderate
jolts acting forward and rearward, caused the fou~ oven units and food
carriers, the cold food trays, and the liquor supply units to be thrown
to the floor near the rear service door. The Board previously has
commented on the evacuation hazard caused by loose galley equipment and
acknowledges a letter from the FAA dated February 16, 1973, which cites
corrective actions to alleviate the galley security problem. Specifically,
we are encouraged by recent amendments to Parts 25 and 121 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations, which cover the retention of items of mass in
passenger and crew compartments. Nevertheless, we wish to reiterate
our belief concerning the need for further improvements to ensure the
security of galley equipment under crash landing loads. The Board is
aware that an amendment to 14 CFR 25.789, which would require the instal-
lation of secondary retention devices on galley equipment, is under con-
sideration for rulemaking action. In vietv of the steps that you have
initiated to remedy this safety problem, the Safety Board is not making
a formal recommendation at this time. However, we urge you to expedite
your consideration of this matter in order that an amended galley reten-
tion regulation can be made effective at an early date.
This document 1vill be released to the public on the date sho1vn

above. No public dissemination of this document should be made prior
to that date.
Reed, Chairman, 1-fcAdams, Thayer, and Haley, Members, concurred in

the above recommendations. Burgess, Member, was absent, not voting.
....
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DOCKET NO. SA-435

EXHIBIT NO. 6-H
ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
CONSULTATION REPORT OF }!YOCARDIUH SECTIONS
(
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ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY
:·,
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20305
PATIENT IDEIH\FiCATIOtf IFCE.,£ ~SE A_CIF ACOEo;IO"

NUMBER IN i..L.L COFRESPONQSNCE:
•
;-~~~H OJ FEil 73 1433492
r::: i -;- L H.. li SE • HE ft 0 [LL L
f;i; (... r:·.; L;11:C:S I:ECIO~i DESPLPi I :JES
IL'.ODOi8 CPT
f;-63- i<:-72 AB
624
-:i RWM/ RRM/ s b
r-Federal Aviation Administration
Great Lakes Region ADDRESS REPLY D=rt:A DIRECTOR
,l.TTN: AFIP -
2300 East Devon
Des Plaines, Ill. 60018
_J 16 February 1973
L
CON"SULTATION REPORT ON CONTRIBUTOR MATERIAL
AFIP DIAGNOSIS1 1. Aircraft accident, Boeing 737, air-to-around, pilot.

2. Heart: no pathologic diagnosis. -
Pending receipt of the investigative report, this case has been reviewed
and coded, as ::indicated above. Upon completion of the pathologic studies
in this case, it is requested that the report of autopsy,· photographs,
x-rays and pathological materials be submitted for review. Kindly address
ship to: The Director, Attn: Chief, Aerospace Pathology Branch, Armed
Foreces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C. 20305.
The reported heart weight of 390 grams, left ventricular wall thickness of
1.8 cm, and the right ventricular 1·1all thickness of 0.5 cm are greater- than
average for a normotensive man of 44. Hov1ever, cardiac v1eight and ven-
tricular thickness can vary with the diligence of the prosector, and the
_ventricular measurements were reported to be approximate.
The five different sections of myocardium submitted for revie\'1 appear es-
sentially normal. Coronary arteries were not present in any of these sectfons.
In the opinion of the staff, "ultra-acute myocardial infarction" is not present
in this material.
I R. W. MORRISSEY
Colonel, USAF, Mt
Examination and report; ):>y: The..Di rector ,
'( I
MAJ Robert R. McMeeki\1, i·:C, USA ·: ! r 1 " : ••• ·, ·
Chief, Aerospace Pathology Branch : James L. Hansen, 1 U~ D.A
; ,' Col:i:1cl, }~C,, USl..
1 Deputy Director.
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.. Docket No. S.4-h35

Extlibit t[o. 9-E
NATIO•.JAL Tl'ANSPORTATION SAFErY BOARD

Bu.reau o.f ..A.via ti on Safety
Washington, D. C. .20591
Excerpts From B-737 Instruction: Ma.nual
re: Pitot Static System
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INSTRUCTION MANUAL
1. ~-rener3.l
ii. l11e pitot static nystem consists of four combined pitot static probes,
cwt> ~11 ternotc ~-t-.:1tic r•,"lrts, und connecting tuhing to .':lir Ou.ta inr.trunlf~nt£".
'''"1 dr:.tin trap and tN:I·. fittin{';S. (See figures 1 und 2.) 111cG1'
i11i.~tr11111Pnl·:.; !!11·:1.011r0 .·~\'ll:.u11jc ( pitot) and tl.JT1l)i0nt (static) air prc'u~;1t1·1·~: t.o
.Jl·h 1111i11r :1i1·11:1n1: vr~l'tic:.i.l :.•peed, air.c;i•ef:c1, 111~1t~l1 1u1rnber, u.nd :..tll:.itudt•.
1:. ii .. iL :n1d/01' c.t.u.tic 1·ressure is sup1)lied to one or rno1·e of the fnlloHing

i1;~~t.rumPnts ::u1d equiprnent; airplane instantaneous vertical speed/r:.:i..te of
cl in1)·· illJ.ico.tor' :11 timeter, <:.lir do.ta comruter( .s), mach/airspeed '.-ffi.rning
G'·.ri tch, combined t11:.ich/airs1 •eer'l indicator, cabin altimeter and
·ltfferrnt.i~l pressure indicator J and air conditioning pressurization
cnntrnl.
i!e~tcor circuits arn provided for anti-icing of the pitot static probes.
k-ofel' to f'itot Static Tubes and Temperature Probe Anti-Icing System,
c1~:...pt".er 30.
· )ttot ~:y.stem
.,. r:.-,1n· pitot tubes :tre uced t.o sense dynamic air pressure. Two probes :::!.re
no. :int ed 1.111 ear.Ii :;'tile c·f the fuselage below control cabin window No. 3.
i'l·t· ..::~i 1 !:1i11'r; pitl)t'. source is from the upper left pitot static probe and
t.: !(' r-i r::t. 1 'ffl.1..'<'!' I G f1·om the upper right pi tot static }1rObe. ~hesc pi tot
! 1'f':~:."1·l':.; rL't-:'! Ll1eir 1·t :..;pectivc co1.1hined mach 1 . irspeed indl.c:-ttors.
f'. •dn: l.l i:t!',V tfr~. 1 :uKl N,). 2 [d.t.ot prl~~;c11rf's from the lower rigl·t :u1d lowc1·
l C>f'L l i !·.or. ct.:·ttic !··1·0\ie feed r.hc various indi.catorc :1.nd equipnent as
:.:l1nw11 in ftp:ut·c ; 1 •
1\, Static or ambient pressures are sensed through two ports on the combined
pitot static rrobe. Each static port is connected to a port on the
opp:isite side of the airplane as shown in figure 2. Static pressure is
also available from alternate static ports locatP.d at station 4o6 on both
sides of the airplane. The four static pressure systems feed indicators
ond equirment 'J.S shown in figure 2 ..
50:'"'
;,,w 15 /C8 34-11-0
+ Page 1
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
B. The static source selector valve provides a second source of static
pressure for the captain's and first officer's altimeter, instantaneous
vertical speed indicator and roach/airspeed indicator. Each valve is
controlled by the applicable static source selector switches located on
the captain's or first officer's side :i:anel. Static air pressure is
used from the appropriate static source when the switch is in NORMAL
position and from the alternate static source when the switch is in
ALTERNATE position.
C. Provisions for a tail-cone static test system are installed in the

empennage assembly.
UPPER RIGHT UPPER LEFT
00000 0 0 DODOO
i
ALTERNATE LOWER RIGHT LOWER LEFT ALTERNATE
STATIC PORl SEE DETAIL A STATIC PORT
>---PITOT
STATIC
PROBE
[!:>. NOT INSTALLED ON

All PROBES
CAPTAINS OR
FIRST OFFICERS
STATIC PORTS
/C>--\----::7"'----- N 0 1 0 R N 0. 2
AUXILIARY
STATIC PORTS
DETAIL A
Pitot Static System Component Location 580

34-11-0 Figure 1 Aug 15/68
P&fl'..e 2
+
INSTRUCttoN-·MANUAL
UPPER LOWER
\ \ NO. a / / NO. 1 AUX mor NO.

0 3
\\--©I I
~
~
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e-- u
~
0
F/OPJTOT
0 \
\
\
I
III ?
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&-
NO. 10 I
§
~ @ ~ \ I
ii:
NO . • I I DP
\ \ IL ~-
-fSn__.!'!OSTAT~ J. \f
I I I
---L ~~----~
NO 4
'<9> ----,\/I / NO. 1 Aux STATIC

____
~ I
.___-+---rt-
w.f-JNo.
~T~AE_STATIC_ _ _ _ _ _ ~
8-- ___ -----d:J--sAPT STAT~\\ i

e-- NO. 11@>-----·
NO. 13
CAPT mor
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O / / \
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~'2.o..' AUX..2.!ATIC.__ -?----@No.
I
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I
6
II \\ ADC I
Il NO. 12 \ \ NO. , I
I I --@ \ \ NO. 2 AUX PITOT 0 NO. 7 I
\
INSTRUMENTS EQUIPMENT
8 AIRSPEED/MACHMETEA IP1CI PRESSURE CONTROLLER
8 Al TIMETER
AIRSPEED MACH
WARNING SWITCH
8 INSTANTANEOUS VERTICAL AIR DATA COMPUTER

SPEED INDICATOR
STATIC SOURCE
8 CABIN AL Tl METER ANO D!FFEA

ENTIAL PRESSURE INDICATOR
SELECTOR VALVE
STATIC POAT
DRAIN TRAP AND TEST FITTING LOCATION (FACING COMBINED P!TOT

FORWARD) STATIC PAOBE
NO. 3, NO. 4, AND NO. 5 ·RIGHT SIDE OF E 1 RACK OAA!N FITTINGS
STATIC LINE
NO. 6 ANO NO. 7 · LE FT S! DE OF E 1 RACK
PITOT LINE
NO. 8, NO. 9, AND NO, 10 ·RIGHT FORWARD END
OF NOSE WHEEL WELL
NO, 11, NO. 12, AND NO. 13 ·LEFT FORWARD ENO

OF NOSE WHEEiL WELL
502 Pitot Static System Schematic

Aug 15/68 Figure 2 34-11-0
Page 3
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( INSTRUCTION MANUAL
AIR DATA PRESSURE INSTRUMENTS - DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION
1. General
A. Air data pressure instruments are those which derive their inputs from
the pitot static air pressure system and the air data compucer system.
Refer to Picot Static System, 34-11-0. The air data.pressure instruments
a.re composed of two airspeed/rnach indicatorsJ two instantaneous vertical
speed/rate of cllmb indicatoi·s, two altimeters, and two air data
comp11 ters.
B. JndicaLcd airspeed and m1"ch m:mber a.re conventionally displayed as a

function oi' diffei:enLial p.i-Lot. 1::1.11d static air pressures on roach/airspeed
combined :ins Lnw1ent ind. i ca Lurs.
C. Instantaneous '.rcrLi.cal nrieed./t·aLc: of climb, through a range of 0 to

6oOO feet per mi1,ute, ls irnJ.icated according to accelerometer and static
air pressure illfonnat.ivn.
D. Altitude throughout the range of 1000 feet below mean sea level to
50,000 feet above mean sea level may conventionally be indicated on both
captain 1 s and first officer 1 s indicators from static air pressure
information and by fine altitude signals from the air data computer to
the ca.ptain 1 s altimeter.
E. Each air data computer s.vstern electrically integrates and computes from
pitot static pressures the corrected altitude, mach number and airspeed
signals. 'l.'his data is sent 'co the ATC transponder, autopilot, flight
director, rnacl1 "tr1rn, and. other systerns as sL.)wn in figure 6. Power to
operate the comp11\.e1· is obtained from the circuit breaker panels Pl8 and
P6.
~102 34-12-0
Play ;_'.1/bt; Pat!:t'·
+
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
ALTIMETER·
--AIRSPHD,-MACH INDICATOR
AIRSPEED -· · ALTIMETER
MACH INDICATOR··
VERTICAL
SPHD
IND ICA TOR ---''c--o,.L_,
OI ITT
Air Data Pressure Instrument System Component Location 502

34-12-0 Figure 1 Nov 15/66
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
2. Airspeed/Mach Indicators
A. The airspeed/mach indicator is a conibination of two flight instruments

which presents an integrated display of indicated airspeed and mach
number. The captain and first officer are each provided with an
indicator.
B. Indicated airspeed is displayed through the range of 6o to 420 knots.

The indicator dial scale is calibrated linearly in two knot increments
between 60 and 160 knots, and logarithmicall_y in ten knot increments
between 160 and 420 knots. A pointer, rotated by a mechanically-connected
pressure diaphragm, indicates the airspeed range through a single
revolution ..
C. The rnach mechanism is actuated by on evacuated capsule whose linkage is

such that it rotates a subdial at an angular rate which varies linearly
with the logarithm of the static pressure. This subdial is graduated
in increments of 0.02 rnach lli1d reads frorn 0.5 to 1.0 mach.
D. The airspeed dial and subdial scale factors are selected so that the
single pointer shows airspeed on the outer perimeter of the dial and
mach number on the subdial scale through a cutout in the main dial
adjacent to the high airspeed markings. (See figure 2.)
E. A manually set airspeed command index, which may be rotated around the
outer periphery of the main dial, is set by the airspeed command knob.
Hhen the auto throttle system is installed, the airspeed command index is
used to set the airsi;eed to be maintained. (See 22-31-0.) The
difference between the index setting and actual airspeed generates an
airspeed error, This error, if used in the flight director system pitch
corni;uter, 1naintains the airplane s1-eed at the ir Jex setting. (See
311._2(,-( ) . ) Two monually set indices are also mounted at the
perimeter; howev·er, these arc not controlled by the airspeed c0nnnn.nd knob.
AIRSPEED
COMMAND
KNOB
,.,'-+f--_,,~ MANUALLY SET

INDICES
,,..,
502 Airspeed/Mach Indicators

Nov 15/t{1 Figure 2 34-12-0
+ Page 3
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
3. Instantaneous Vertical Speed/Rate of Climb Indicators
A. Instantaneous vertical speed/rate of climb indicators are provided for

both the captain and first officer and are operated by static pressure
applied to both the inside of the instrument case through an orifice
and to the interior of a flexible diaphragm within the case. As the
airplane changes altitude the pressure inside the diaphragm changes more
rapidly than that inside the instrument case. The resulting differential
causes the diaphragm to expand or contract, and the amount of change is
proportional to the rate of change of altitude and is indicated by a
radial pointer in thousands of feet per minute. An accelerometer is
incori:iorated in the instrument also, and provides indication of
instantaneous vertical speed. (See figure 3.)
B. A small screw, installed on the lower left corner of the instrument, is

used to adjust the pointer to zero.
,_..,. .........
u• IYSI
DOWN VERTICAL
SPEED
ZERO
ADJUSTMENT
SCREW ------ll-...q,
03.01
Instantaneous Vertical Speed/Rate of Climb Indicators 501

34-12-0 Figure 3 Apr 15/66
PA.µ:e h +
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
4. Altimeters
A. Altimeters are provided for both captain and first officer. 'fhese are
servopneumatic three-pointer instruments and have a range of -1000 feet
to 50,000 feet. The large pointer, which indicates feet in hundreds,
moves once around the dial for each 1000 feet of altitude. The
intermediate pointer, which indicates thousands of feet, moves once
around the dial for each 10,000 feet of altitude. The third hand (cross),
which indicates 10,000's of feet, moves one half a revolution for the
instrument range of 50,000 feet. This hand is part of a rotating disk
which is shaped so that a cross hatched area is exposed below 16,000 feet.
As the disk rotates, above 10,000 feet, a white arc is exposed. A slot
in the face of the instrument exposes a dial which indicates the
altimeter setting in inches of mercury. The altimeter is set by manually
rotating a set knob on the front of the instrument. (See figure 4.)
B. Instrument vibrators are attached to the back of each altimeter to shske

the instrument mechanism to prevent error caused by mechanical linkage
friction. Power to the vibrators is supplied through a circuit breaker on
panel PlB. A standby warning flag and an OFF-ON switch are incorporated
in the servopneumatic altimeters, and the flag will appear upon loss of
28 volt de flag signal from the air data computer or when in standby
operation (OFF-ON switch to OFF) with the servodrive de-energized. In
the standby mode the altimeter will operate conventionally.
r · ·--··1000 FT POINTER
THREE
POINTER
ALTIMETER - - -
J_JOO FOOT
POINTER
Altimeters
Jun 15/66 Figure 4 34-12-0
+ Page 5
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INSTRUCTION MANUAL
5. Air Data Computer
A. General
(1) The air data computer is an electropneumatic unit, which, when

supplied with re~uisite electrical power and pitot and static
pressures computes outputs for various systems.
(2) The air data computer consists of individual plug-in altitude, mach
and airspeed modules, and a chassis assembly. (See figure 5.) The
computer front panel has pitot and static pressure input connections,
six test switches, a function test select switch, and three failure
annunciators.
B. Computer Modules
(1) The altitude transducer provides error signals proportional to

changes in static pressure. The transducer sensor develops an
electrical signal for a motor-generator servo loop. The motor-
generator mechanical value of altitude is corrected for all
repeatable errors, such as gearing errors, by the altitude scale
error corrector. This corrected altitude is used to drive the
various synchros and potentiometers used to develop output signals
to the various systems and indicators. These outputs include
altitude hold to the flight director and autopilot, altitude rate to
the autopilot and flight director (if used), altitude to a servo-
pneumatic or electrical altimeter (if used), pressurization system,
and total air temperature indicator/engine pressure ratio limit
indicator (if installed). Fine and coarse altitude signals are sent
to a servoed flight director (if used) or electrical altimeter (if
used). Digital altitude signals (if used), are sent to the
automatic traffic control system.
(2) The airspeed transducer converts changes of pitot and static

pressure inpu~s into electrical signals. The transducer sensor
output is proportional to the differential pressure. This output
combined with log Qci/Qc from the static source error correction kit
(if installed) is applied to the servo loop with a motor
generator mechanical output of airspeed. Airspeed outputs from
the computer are indicated airspeed to a servoed flight recorder
(if used) or servoed airspeed indicator (if used), gain scheduling
to the autopilot and scale error correction, log Qc, to the mach
assembly. The characterized altitude and airspeed potentiometers
develop mach data for the autopllot control wheel steer-'l.ng gain.
502
34-12-0 May 15/68
Dos•·.:. (.,
+
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
PITOf. PRESSURE STATIC PRESSURE

INPUT INPUT
- -- - - - - FUNCTION TEST.
SELECT SWITCH
- - - -- TE ST SWITCH
FAILURE
ANNUNCIATOR S ~~-111--49--0
MACH
ASSEMBL Y
ALTITUDE
TRAN SDUC ER ---._
AIRSPEED
TRAN SDUCER
502 Air Dat a Ccmput er

Mey 15/68 Figure 5 34- 12- 0
) Pag e 7
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COMIUTU- 1 All DATA COMl'\Jl[l NO. I
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CO""Vlll -1 ---, 10 SEIVOf D FLIGHT

lfCOIDfl All SP'fED
AUT 0 '1LOT GAIN
SC H!OUllNG TO
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INDICATOI (If USED) AUI O,I LO T S~TIM
_J
All D.. l • COMl'VTU
NO 2 ll F INST4LLID)
[I:>. COUKTION KIT IS NOT AN US!NTIAl Sll'4lS!Mll Y
ANO MAY NOT al INSTALL[D
~ SAT/ TAI CllCUIT YEAK!l INST .. lLI D ON Alll'l.ANIS
....... WITH PIOVISI ONS FOi T.u/SAT INDICAIOI
CJl
............ Ul r;-.__ llfll TO All DAT4 TlMl'BA.TVll INDIC4TING !~Tl>'
~o L!---' 34-11--0 TO Vlll fY l'IOll INl'VT TO Al• D4T4 COMl'V IU
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~~~·--·-
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
(3) The mach assembl;r develops a mechanical value of mach from the log
Qc/Ps input. This input is formed by the log Ps synchro in the
altitude transducer by a log Qc signal, above 115 knots, from the
scale error corrector and a mechanical value of altitude, Log Qc/
Ps drives a servo loop within the rnach assembly which in turn
positions a motor-generator. The motor-generator mechanical output
of mach drives the static source error correction kit (if installed)
and the dual mach trim potentiometer that sends inach number signals
to the rnach trim system. ·
C. Functional Test and Failure Monitoring
(1) The functional test circuits drive the airspeed and/or altitude
transducers to test the operation of the modules. (See figure 7.)
The function test select switch on the computer front panel selects
the desired signal to be monitored by the test indicator.
(2) The airspeed transducer and mach assembly are operationall;r tested
by depressing the IAS SERVO test switch. The altitude transducer
is tested by the 600 FEM and the ALT SIEW switches. These switches
provide a simulated error signal that causes the servo motor to
drive. If the signal is within tolerance the pointer of the
test indicator will travel from the red area to the green area as
long as the servo drives. When it reaches a null, the pointer
returns to its original'position. The 5KN and 60 FI test switches
drive the airspeed servo 5 knots from null and the altitude servo
f/J feet from null respectively.
(3) Each failure monitor will determine if a power failure o= servo

loop failure has occurred in its particular module. If a failure
occurs, the proper warning flag is selected for display. High and
low detectors monitor each modules operation so that too high or
too low a signal will send a logic 0 signal to the delay inverter
and logic circuit. This circuit causes the appropriate annunciator
light on the front of the computer to come on. The annunciators
will not come on during functional testing since S403, S405, and
S407 open the automatic suppression circuit to ground. The
automatic suppression circuit also prevents the annunciator light
from coming on when the computer is energized. The annunciators,
once tripped, can be reset by applying 28V de to their reset
terminals on the back of the computer. The failure warning monitors
in the three modules can be tested by depressing the MON TRIP test
switch with the function test select switch in the appropriate
position. The test indicator pointer will go to the green area
and return to its original position when the MON TRIP test switch is
released.
502
May 15/68 34-12-0
+ Page 9
,,
-----·· - - .. ---------------------------------------
l "' ;.Ji..•1;' "LAG (<J'•'•ECPU Jt • ..\ll(~LAl·H5 '.'.IJH
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IMOI
ALTITUDf ~Tf 2 v
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AJRSP!:[lJ 60 fl SWITCH
140•
ALTlfUDE - FUNCTION TES
T?.Ar i'iDIJCEP TRAN)DUCER SELECT
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PS MACH
ASSEMBLY TO ALTllUDF
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1401
ALTITUDE 5lfW
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IAS JLfW
SWIT\H 5403 I VOLTAGE FAILURE WARN-
DIVIDER ING RELAY
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HI LOW I HI LOW HI LOW
K401
-z
600 FPM
SWITCH
S.W6 MACH
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AIRSPEED ALTITUDE
FAILURE
MONITCA:
FAtlURf
MONITOR - FAILURE
MONITOR WARNING
FLAG ;ia
t t 5WllCHES
c ~
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n
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MON TRIP Al TITUOE MONITOR
IAS MONITCit z ~!Ill
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SWITCH 5-407
1-MCH MONITOll TAS/SAT
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GATE 2 ~
;:~:~--ill~ .-j zc . ~"'~

MACH
T'RIM
13V AC ":j 1 l5V AC DELAY
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ov
1401
AND DlOOE
LOGIC CIRCUIT
AUTOPILOT
AIRSPEED >
r-
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FLIGHT
DIRECTOR
jf GATE 1 NO. I
FLIGHT
AIRSPEED
I DIRECTOR
~ ANNU/'KIATOR
NO, 7.
•ir - ... I " - I

AUTOMATIC
MACH AUTOPILOT
-·~
I
-1~ SUP~ESSION
ANNUl'KIAT~ Al TITUDE
C~CUll
I I 1 HOLD
SMl7 5405 \.<03
ALTITUDE I
~ TAT EPRL
ANNUNCIAH~
INSTRUCTION MANUAL
(4) When a logic 0 output from a failure monitor is applied to the diode
logic circuits, the applicable warning flag switches will ~ause the
indicator flags to appear. When the mach assembly corrects for
s,tatic source error, it contains a jumper so that a failure in mach
will cause the altimeter warning flag to indicate a malfunction.
502
May 15/68 34-12-0
+ Page 11
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION Si\FETY ;,,. ,..

Washington, D. C. 20591.
HUMAN FACTORS GR.our C!JAIRNAN' s FAC1UAL REPORT
BY
C. Hayden LeRoy
(
Docket lio. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A
HUMAN FACTORS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
A. ACCIDENT (DCA-73-A-3)
Operator: United Air Lines, Inc., Chicago, Illinois

Aire.raft: Boeing 737-222, N9031U, operating as Flight 553
Location: Residential area, approx. 1.5 n.m. southeast of Runway 31L,
Chicago-}!idway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
Time Approximately 1428 c.s.t. 1/
) Date December 8, 1972 -
13. HUMAN FACTORS GROUP
Chairman: C. Hayden LeRoy, National Transportation Safety Board,

Washington, D. C.
Co-chairman: Ronald L. Schleede, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D. C.
Members : Dr. Paul L. Brattain, Federal Aviation Administration,
Chicago, Illinois
Dr. Clyde C. Snow, Federal Aviation Administration,
Okla ho ma City, Oklahoma .
John G. Blethroi;v, Federal Aviation Administration,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma _
Dr. Vernon L. Scott, United Air Lines, Denver, Colorado
Norva L. Achenbaugh, Air Line Pilots Association, S/S Div.,
New York, N. Y.
C. SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 was en route from Washington National
Airport, Washington, D. C. to Chicago-}!idway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
with 61 people onboard (53 ticketed passengers, two unticketed infants,
and a crev1 of six.) The aircraft 1vas executing a localizer - only ILS
approach to Runway 31L at Midway Airport. The crew maintained radio
contact with Midway Tower during the final portion of the approach. At
approximately 1428 c.s.t., the aircraft crashed about 1.5 nautical miles
southeast of Runway 3 lL, Midi;vay Airport into a residential area, destroy-
ing several houses~ The aircraft -i;vas destroyed by impact and subsequent
fire. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 500 feet
ceiling and 1 mile visibility.
]) All times herein are central standard time based on the 24-hour clock.
r
- 2 -
Fifteen passengers and the three flight attendants evacuated or

were helped from the wreckage. Forty passengers and the three flight
deck crewmen i::vere fatally injured Ly. impact and subsequent fire. 'D"vo
persons occupying a house struck by the aircraft also suffered fatal
injuries. Chicago Fire Department, Police ·Department, and local resi-
dents aide.ct survivors and transported them to Holy Cross Hospital.
Fire and Police Department personnel participated in removing bodies
from the wreckage to Cook Ccunty Morgue.
D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION
1. Aircraft
a. Cockpit Configuration
The cockpit had the standard pilot/copilot seat arrange-

ment with a second officer/flight engineer jump seat in the cockpit
doorway. The flight engineer seat was forward facing and could be
folded out of the right bulkhead into the center aisle. A fixed
observer seat was situated immediately adjacent (left) to the flight
engineer seat. Pilot and copilot seats i;vere equipped \vith seatbelts
and inertial reel type shoulder harnesses. The flight engineer seat
had a seatbelt and fixed attachment type shoulder harness.
b. Passenger Cabin Configuration - See Attachment II
The aircraft was configured for 87 passen.gers; 20 first

class, 67 coach passengers, and two double occupancy flight attendant
seats.
(1) First Class - 20 seats
The first class section had five rows of double seat

units, one unit on each side of a center aisle.. These seats 1·1ere all
forward facing. An aft facing double occupancy flight attendant jump
seat was located on the left side of the forward bulkhead just inboard
of the left forward entry door. This jump seat was attached to the
aft wall of a lavatory located between the forward entry door and the
cockpit. This aft-facing seat was equipped with seatbelts only; no
shoulder harnesses. Immediately aft of the flight attendant jump seat
and the entry door 1vas a windscreen separating the entry aisle from the
first row of passenger seats in the first class section. The upper
half of the windscreen i;vas made of 11 Lexon, 11 a clear polycarbonate and
the bottom half had compartments in ivhich were stored the intercom
phone, food serviCe trays, emergency oxygen bottle, and a water fire
extinguisher. A service door i;vas located in the right fo~vard section
- 3 -
of the cabin, with a closet located forward of it and the forward galley
unit situated aft of it.
(2) Coach Section - 67 Seats
The right side of the coach section had 11 rows of

triple seat units; the left side had 10 rows of' triple seat units plus
two ro·1;vs of double seat units in the aftmost rows. All seats were
forward facing including the flight attendant aft jump seat. This
double occupancy jump seat was attached to the bulkhead between the
aft lavatory and the aft entry door on the left side and was fitted
with inertial reel type shoulder harnesses. A plastic -.;;vindscreen,
similar to that in the first class cabin separated the aft entry door
and the last row of coach seats.. The rear entry door '!;Vas fonvard and
outboard of the jump seat and behind the windscreen. Immediately
behind the right row of coach seats were two aft galley units on either
side of the rear service door.
2. Occupants
.. Occupants of the aircraft at the time of the accident i;vere
identified as follows:
a. Flight Crew
The flight cre1vmembers were in, their respective seats in

the cockpit. None survived the accident. They were:
Date of Birth Certificate

Position
Wendell L. Whitehouse 6/4/28 ATR 1159888

Captain
5/23/29 Com' 1 1300051
First Officer Walter O. Coble
9/1/41 Com 1 1 1646564
Second Officer Barry J. Elder
b. Flight Attendants
The Flight Attendants were seated in their assigned seats

in the passenger cabin for landing. All three survived the accident.
Seat Location
Position
ifl Stewardess Marguerite J. McCausland Fonvard Jump Seat, Aisle side

D. Jeanne Griffin Aft Jump Seat, entry door side
ifr2 Stewardess Aft Jump Seat, Aisle side
{}3 Stew·ardes.s Kathleen S. Duret
Recurrent Emergency Trai~ing records for all stewardesses

shoi;ved them to be current.
. r
- 4 -
c.. Passengers
The 55 passengers included two unticketed infants (under 2

years old), five children (aged 3 to 10 years old), 31 male adults, and
17 female adults. See Passenger List, Attachment l.to this report.
3. Reconstruction of Crash Sequence
The following information is. based On interviei;.,s with ground

witnesses who lived in the area of the approach to Midi;va:y Airport, the
Structures Group, and passenger and flight attendant survivors.
The aircraft broke out of the clouds and was reported to be in

a level attitude, sinking slightly; it started to veer to the right with
the right ·wing down but straightened up; engine.noise level increased,
as did the pitch, until the aircraft was reported by several witnesses to
be so nose-high that the nose was higher than the tail. Es ti mates of the
angle of attack were not consistent, but did indicate a nose-high obser-
vation from several vantage points. In this nose-high attitude, the air-
craft continued to loose altitude and settled down until it contacted
electric lines, causing a blue flash (seen by many,) followed by the
tail section, right wing, and then the nose of the plane fell.
In the final stages of deceleration, four houses and t1vo garages

were extensively damaged, and four houses and one garage i:;vere destroyed
by aircraft impact and post-impact ground fire. Also, several trees and
two telephone poles were broken by impact. Damage i:;va~ contained in a
swath 90-foot wide by 500 feet long.
Passenger survivors were seated in Rows 8 through 12 and 16 and

17. Initial descent appeared normal and was not especially noted, except
that some mentioned having heard the landing gear do down, seen the "No
Smoking 11 sign come on, and the stewardess cabin check for seatbelts fastened
and seatbacks and foodtrays upright. Some noticed that they were closer
to the ground than usual when the aircraft broke out of the clouds. Most
were altered by the increased engine sound and then startled by the air-
craft nose-high attitude, variously described as: "extreme attitude
(nose-high) of the aircraft 11 ; 11 plane 1 s nose i:;vas up at an unusual angle 11 ;
and "extreme rotation of the aircraft. 11 A fei:;v believed the aircraft
turned to the right, having noted hoi:;v close the roof tops were as viei;ved
through the windows on the right side of the aircraft. The plane was very
low and still losing altitude, described by one man as a "sinking feeling . 11
Only three passengers reported having time to assume a 11 brace 11 position
before impact. Five survivors reported that the tail section and bottom
of the aircraft struck objects (assumed to be trees and houses) and
T
-
- 5 -
bounced before the. final ground impact, --;;vhich i;.1as described as an

extremely hard jolt. Most described the decclr~rative. force as one
which threw them forward against their seatbelts sufficiently hard
to badly bruise and/or cut their lower abdomen and hips. Additionally,
two passengers (forward and aft) reported a .pull to i::he left, and two
toi:;vard the front reported being throi.:vn dovmward. Numerous loose
objects were tossed about the cabin,; e~g.) cei.ling panels, overhead
hatracks, and hatrack contents.
The ste1·1ardesS in the jumpseat in the forward cabin was aware of

excessive speed just prior to impact, at which time she blacked out.
The two stei;vardesses on the aft jumpseat reported that the engine sound
made them think they were doing a missed approach, but they did not
remember an attitude. change, level-off, or altitude gain. One ste...:vardess
thought there was a second surge on the engines, and i;vithin seconds there
were flashes and popping noises outside the aircraft on the left side;
the liquor compartment and oven units came out of the aft buffet which
had been secured and checked in preparation for landing. There v1as a
"tremor or a series of trernors' 1 and then both stewardesses had the im-
pression of a few seconds of silence, except for a hissing sound re-
ported by one and the feeling of "settling 11 or 11 drifting doi;mv1ards 11
by the other.
·4. Fire
a. Ignition and Propagation

0
Ground witnesses reported an arcing and blue/white flash

as the aircraft struck electric lines. One reported that he did not
see debris flying around as if an explosion had occurred. He stated
further: irTail section came in contact with i:vires just before crash.
From time plane contacted ""ires until I sai;v smoke was about 5 seconds--
another 15 to 20 seconds before I was able to see flames." Other
witnesses reported first a dense black smoke and then flames appeared
over the center of the cabin. Also after this, one witness heard two
explosions.
A United Air Line employee i;vho lives in the area, esti-

mated his arrival at the scene to have been 5 minutes after the acci-
dent. He said the fire department ""as on site and no occupants got
out of the aft end after he arrived. The aircraft mid-section, from
about 3 feet forward of the aft galley door, was completely engulfed
in flames about 10 feet high. He had been trained in firefighting
and assisted on ~ hose near the right engine.a He reported that as
close as he was to the fire he could not feel the heat. He also men-
tioned that firemen manning a hose near the aft galley door seemed to
- 6 -
be thrown back at one point by an explosion of approximately the magni-

tude of a large tire, or perhaps a 5-gallon can. He thought it cmue
from the cargo compartmentG
Another United Air Line employe·e i;vho arrived at the scene

an estimated 1minutes after the acciden~ repo~ted that flames were
concentrated in the center of the fuselage and were 10 to 15 feet high.
All survivors advised that they. ;;.,rere first ai;vare of fire

after the accident, and all but two reported that it was outside the
aircraft when first noted~ One survivor sitting over the wing stated
that within 5 to 10 seconds after impact there was fire 11 beloi;v, on
and around the left wing, then some on right side . 11 Two survivors
from Roi;v 8 reported seeing fire coming back from the nose outside the
AircraftQ One of them did not notice it until he reached the exit,
which he thought could have been a break in the right side of the
fuselage. The man in Row 11 first saw fire inside the aircraft a few
feet ahead of his seat, as did the lady in Row 12. Although the
man reported smoke inside the cabin within 5 seconds, half of the
passenger survivors do not remember smoke inside the cabin before
they were out of the aircraft, and the majority of the others do not
remember it as a hindrance to their evacuation. The Row 17 survivor
advised smoke entered only momentarily through the aft main entry
door when he helped the stewardess open and then close it again due
to fire outside.
The stewardess in the jump seat at the forward entry door

was trapped in her seat, pinned at her right arm and both legs. Before
she was rescued, she felt fire around her on the back and right arm.
Only seconds after the aircraft cai:ne to rest, one stei;;vardess from
the coach section opened the aft entry door and was confronted with
flames and smoka which started to come in; because of this, she
closed the door again with some difficulty due to blockage by the
partially deployed door slide. The galley service door was opened
soon thereafter onto a scene of much burning debris and wood" Hoi;;.;ever,
evacuation was started. The plane was filling rapidly with thick, grey
smoke, with visibility reduced to about 4 to 5 feet, as the stei.;.;:rardess
assisted. passengers1 who \Vere trapped or blocked by debris in the cabinJ
and directed them to the exit. She had to go back to the door for air
before returning to the cabin. Passengers were still coming out and i;;.;hen
she returned again to the cabin, the smoke was so black and thick that
she could see no one else. This smoke was described as billoi;;.;ing from
the forward part of the aircraft to the galley. It was thick and very black
11
and was in her eyes, nose, etc. She described it as thick and heavy --it
seemed to have weight to it--if you inhaled it, it just wouldn't go
down your throat."
- 7 -
b. Fuels Available
(1) According to the Operations Group Report, approxi-

mately 12,000 lbs. of Jet A fuel should have been on board the aircraft ,
distributed between the integral fuel tanks in the wing. Normal opera-
ting procedures require that fuel in the 706-gallon center tank, which.
is located between the wing front and rear spars and between the left
and right wing tanks, be used firsto Therefore, it should have been
comparatively empty.
(2) Peoples Gas, Light and Coke Company of Chicago ad-

vised investigators that the severed gas supply line into 3722 West
70th Place, 1vhere the aircraft came to rest, was the standard l}z 11
line which passed through the basement front wall. The natural gas
was under loi;v pressure, a 6 11 water column or pressure of about 2~ oz.
p.s.i.
(3) One crew and two passenger oxygen cylinders were

located on the right side of the aircraft in the forward cargo com-
partment forward of the door. The cylinders are charged as follows:
Oxygen eylinder Standard Oxygen Capacity
Crew 39 cu.
ft.~ {compress e d to
Passenger 1
Passenger 2
114 cu.
76 cu.
ft:
ft
(1850 p.s .i. @
(4) United Air Lines advised that two air freight ship-
ments destined to Omaha comprised the entire contents of the aft cargo
compartment, and consisted of one 70-lb. piece of machine parts and a
344-lb. shipment of nylon hosiery packaged in 5 cartons.
(5) The buildings involved in the accident were primarily

one-story brick and wood residences. The aircraft came to rest after
sliding into three homes and lay in a pile of wooden debris.
Co Site Characteristics
The unusual fire propagation pattern and extreme heat that

the center section of the aircraft--from aft entry door fonvard to
include most of the First Class cabin--was subjected to, can be par-
tially attributed to the peculiar setting.
The residence at 3722 West ?0th Place was a typical-of-

the area one-story building. The basement floor i;vas about 3 feet belo1v
ground level and the foundation extended about as high above ground.
Entry from the front was up .S(overal steps to a front stoop. During
- 8 -
initial contacts, portions of the aircraft, i:vhich i;.;as reportedly still

nose-high and slightly right wing low, struck several houses in the
block between Hest 7lst Street and West 7Dth Place, and the nose fell
through, causing the aircraft to come to a. hard slid~ng stop after crashing
into three houses. The fuselage demolished ·the center house and stopped
in the debris almost centcr0<l over the 3-foot deep basement. The air-·
craft nose ,and center i:·1ing stubs damaged about ·one-half of the near
sides of each of the adj a cent houses, .leaving half of the one to the
left as high as the peak. ivith the preponde"rance of ignition sources
and fuels available in the basement of the center house, and the
chimney-effect of the half-house remains on both sides, the fire was
intensely hot and very concentrated. This is best illustrated by the
statement made by the United Air Lines employee who worked the fire
hose near the #2 engine and reported that he did not feel the heat.
Radiant heat from a fire of this magnitude in an open area would have
been intense.
5. Aircraft Evacuation - See Attachment II
Details of passenger evacuation from the aircraft are limited

to information supplied by survivors from the area of seat rOi.JS 8 thru 12,
16 and 17, and the aft entry/galley compartment. The ifl Stewardess, who
was the only survivor from the front of the aircraft, advised that she
blacked out on impact and had her eyes closed during most of the time
it took rescuers to extricate her from the ivreckage. She i;vas removed
toivard the missing right side of the First Class cabin. No one success-
fully evacuated from the First Class cabin.
When the aircraft came to rest, the normal cabin lighting had
failed and it ivas very d~rk inside. No one saiv emergency lights and
the breaks in the right side of the fuselage did not get noticed until
they were illuminated by the fire from outside the aircraft.
With the exception of two passengers i;vho could not remember, all
survivors stated that their seatbelts remained intact and most reported
bruises to attest to this fact. Male survivors on the right side at
Rows 8, 10, and 11 had difficulty releasing their respective seatbelts
because their seats, though intact, had come partially loose and were
leaning forward, consequently semi-suspending the occupants by their
seatbelts.
No floor was in front of seat SF, so the occupant had to step

on a cable to relieve pressure before his seatbelt buckle would release.
He then thought he was in the lower compartment (belly) because he
could not see i;vindo1vs. He climbed over .a small amount of 1rreckage and
then went out a break in the right side of the fuselage.
- 9 -
Survivors reported two sizeable breaks in the right side of the

fuselage: at the cabin partition (forward of row 6) and between sc;:it
rows 9 and·lO. Each of these were used for egress by three survivors.
One survivor said he saw t1vo men unsuccessfully try to opG11 the
right ove~-w·ing window exit~ The left 1vindoi:;v exit w"as opened and a sur-
vivor reported seeing one passenger go through 'it, even though it led ·to
only a fire and no apparent exit. He called to him to return but appar-
ently was not heeded. One body was.recovered along the outside of the
fuselage in that area.
Reportedly quantities of debris, including: overhead hatracks,

., ceiling panels, luggage, and some seats from the left side of the coach
cabin; as well as liquor compartment and oven units from the aft buffet
in the back, cluttered the aisle and exit route.s. All of this made
movement within the cabin very difficult.
Several survivors scrambled or crai;vled over the bent-fonvard

seatbacks to the aft galley service door exit. The man in Seat 9A
,' tried the left overi;.,ing window exit at Seat SA; closed the windo1v when
j flames broke out; and then moved back to the aft galley service door
J where the stewardess was beckoning. He figured he had seen about 4
persons exit before he did and several followed him out. He estimated
it was about 2~ minutes after the crash when he got out of the aircraft.
The Stei;vardess es 1vent directly to their respective aft doors

and called to passengers to move aft. As the left side entry door was
opened, flames were apparent and the #2 Stewardess clOsed the door again
with the help of a knowledgeable male passenger. The passenger then
went to assist the {f3 Stewardess open the aft galley service door. This
door had been blocked by galley equipment which had come out during
impact, even though the galley had been double-checked for security
before landing. As the door v1as started, the door-mounted evacuation
slide got hung up on the door jamb. Once this was cleared, the door
.,·! easily opened all the way. A three to four foot drop was bridged with
the inflated evacuation slide. Eleven people evacuated by this exit.
The {fa2 Stewardess was able to go about midway into the cabin
to assist those who were trapped. Several trips into the cabin were
made, interspersed with a gasp for air at the aft exit door. At first,
the smoke was thick and grey and limited visibility to only 4 or 5 feet
maximum. However, it dramatically changed to billowing, thick, very
black smoke, which the Stewardess described as seeming 11 to have weight
and if you tried .to inhale, it just i;vouldn rt go doi;m your tl1roat. 11
The majority of evacuations i;vere initiated r3-pidly and self-

1
accomplished. However, in this instance, one lady did rescue another s
infant son.
- 10 -
6. Firefighting and Rescue
The report from the Fire Department of the City of Chicago is

entered into the record as Exhibit No. 6E.
The passengers' estimates of time~ beti::veen the accident and

fire department arrival varied, i;vith two estimat.es placing it -i;vithin 3
minutes, and ti:;vo others i:;vithin 5 minutes; another passenger said it was
about 10 minutes before he noticed them. Others did not know.
There were apparently ti::vo distinct firefighting operations:

one from the street - at the tail of the aircraft, and the other from
an alley - at the aircraft nose. Damaged houses and fire separated the
two areas.
The stewardess from the first class cabin was trapped in the
forward stei;vardess jump seat under debris which was at least i::vaist deep.
The forward entry door was found by the investigators to be jammed in a
partially open position with the forward edge rotated inward approximately
40°. Rescue efforts continued for almost half an hour before the stewardess
could be extricated. The fireman advised that the right side of the air-
craft had been destroyed quite far back, beyond the stewardess' location.
She was removed from the wreckage out toward the right where the aircraft
had been obliterated.
A ground witness estimated that body removal was started about

90 minutes after the accident. There was no docurnent~tion of body
locations at the site. Hoi::vever, the fireman who helped rescue the
stewardess, reported that mail and most of the bodies he helped with
were removed from lo1v in the right sidea
la Medical Examination
a. Summary
A summary of the severity and numbers of persons injured

as a result of this accident is shown on the chart belo1v:
Fatal Serious Minor/None Total
Crew 3 1 2 6
Passengers 40 11 4 55
Others''' 2 0 2 4
Total 45 12 8 65
*Two occupants of one of the houses struck by the aircraft during the
crash received fatal injuries as a result of the ·accident. Their
location in the house at the time of impact is not kno<;~Q Two persons
near -the accident site received minor injuries and were treated in a
hospital emergency room. One, 1vhose house 1vas demolished, 1vas treated
for smoke inhalation; and the other for burns to both hands and an
I
-11-
abrasion to the leg. Both were released in less than an hour.

Others in the· vicinity of the crash escaped with no reported
injuries.
b. Injuries Related to Location in Aircraft
Eighteen aircraft occupants survived the accident:

three flight attendants, one of whom was rescued; eight adult
male passengers; four adult female passengers; two female
children, 4 and 5 years old; and one male infant, 17 months old.
With the exception of the stewardesses who were in their assigned
jump seats, all of the survivors were seated in rows 8 through
12, and 16 and 17.
Attachment III is a list, divided into sections of

the aircraft interior (cockpit, first class, and coach sections),
which shows the following for each aircraft occupant and Hie two
persons injured on the ground: ·
-seat location, where known. These are followed

by a listing of others from unknown seat
locations in the same aircraft section.
-survivor or fatality
-injuries or cause of death information from
Pathological Reports of Coroner-Cook County,
Illinois.
-Cook County, Illinois Toxicologist's Report
concerning findings of presence of alcohol,
carbon monoxide, and cyanide.
c. Fliiht Crew Medical History

(1) F.ederal Aviation Administration (FAA) Medical
Records for the flight crewmembers were examined and indicate
that:
Captain W. L. Whitehouse's last FAA First

Class Medical Certificate was dated August 11, 1972. His file
contained records of six February and August examinations for
1970 thru 1972. No .limitations were noted.
First Officer W. 0. Coble's last FAA First
Class Medical Certificate was dated July 2, 1972. His file
contained records of three annual examinations dated back to
1970. No limitations were noted.
Second Officer B. J. Elder's last FAA First
Class Medical Certificate was dated May 17, 1972. His file
contained records of five May and November examinations for
1970 thru 1972. No limitations were noted.
-12-
(2) United Air Lines (UAL) Company Physicals
The last Company Physical Examination for

Captain Whitehouse was dated August 29, 1972. It noted: "79.
EKG Normal Resting ECG and Normal Response to Masters Two Step
Test."
First Officer Coble's last Company Physical

was dated June 22, 1972. Under notes regarding Clinical
Evaluation, 58. Heart appeared:
"Grade 2/6 syst. eject. murmur ..

Second right intercostal space radiates to
left lower sternal border without thrills."
79. EKG was noted:
"Normal Resting ECG and Normal Response t.o

Masters Two Step Test."
Second Officer Elder's last Company Physical

was dated October 10, 1972. It was unremarkable and noted under
79. EKG "Normal Resting ECG."
8. Aircraft Wreckage
The Structures Group advised that the aircraft hull,

with wing stubs attached but missing the radome, came to rest
within an area approximately 110 feet long. The aircraft itself,
including almost 15 feet of nose cone measures 100 feet overall.
Survivors indicated two major breaks in the right fuselage wall:
a comparatively small triangular one between seat rows 9 and 10;
and a larger one that appeared to be forward of seat row 6, near
the cabin class partition location.
The smaller break was large enough that one man reported
he left the aircraft through it, without tearing his suit. No
survivors reported aµy breaks on the left side of the aircraft.
Ground witnesses who observed the wreckage from either the front
or back had the impression that the hull appeared fairly intact.
Of course, the center section was not observed because it was
entangled with the wreckage of the houses which were destroyed.
The documentation of cabin interior wreckage is reported

in Exhibit 6-D, Human Factors Team Member Report, John G. Blethrow.
C. Hayden LeRoy
EXHIBIT 6A
ATTACHMENT I
PASSENGER LIST
First Class Section (11)

~&£ Age
BALDWIN, Theod9re G. 42 KRUEGER, James w. 33

BES HOAR, John R. 46 LEWIS, 'Barry W. 34
BLODGETT, Ralph 44 MC NAIR, William R. 37
COLLINS, George W. 47 MOREAU, Roger w. 48
ENDER, Arnold L. 49 WEST, James R. 55
HUNT, Mrs. Dorothy L. 52
Coach Section (44)
ABNER, Mrs. Virginia 84 RAUEN, John H. Jr. 52

ANDERSON, :t-1arvin E. 43 ROSSMAN, W. 54
BAYER, Lon J. 36 SEACHRIST, George 63
CLARKE, Miss Michelle 29 SHERMAN, Sister
CHRISTESON, Howard H. 46 Mary Francisca 58
ELLISON, Franz 36 SHERWOOD, Ari 17 Hos.
ELLISON, Rosemar1 A.
1 30 SHERWOOD, Jennifer 3
ERICKSON, yhlbur V. 58 SHERWOOD, Mrs. Judith 31
FIELDS, Edith M. 63 SHULL, Kenneth 42
GREEN, Harold w. 35 WEST, Laura 5
HEWITT, Christine 23 WEST, Mrs. Linda s. 30
JANDA, Dr. Earl 47 WEST, Michelle 10
JORDAN,·. Harold M. 57 WEST, Cherilyn 8
JORDAN, Marion J. SS WEST, William L. 36
JORDING, Derek A. 7 Hos. WEST, William L. Jr. 7
JORDING, Joan H. 25 WETHERS, Carl D. 38
KNOWLAND, Richard A. 35 WHITNEY, Donald 27
KRILL, Dr. Alex 44 WIESER, Aloyius E. 34
METCALF, Harold R. 34 WILLIAMS, Raymond 27
.NEWNAN, Shiela 2S
NEWMAN, Virginia A. so
PARKER, Hiss Nancy M. 32
PATTERSON, Walter L. 35
PENDREY, Miss Delores 47
PHILBIN, Father William 47
PRABISH, William A. 2S
..
~
~
n
~ ATTACHMENT II
"'
~
I I
,-.---~
=
~ KNOWll LOCATION OF SURVIVORS AND FATALITIES
:0
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COAT
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CLO~?'.T
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g"'o
z :0 L -L~..J
o-<" R ~
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-< :0
0 "'-< SUM1'l-\RY OF SURVIVOR ~?_f~f..~- T:f..!.1J1S. I
A B c D
r---1-1 rus ELAGE G
~
EXITED VIA BREAK IN
I I
~ L-- - _ _;
z0 EXITED VIA REAR SERVI~E ·nooR l l
"'£ r--r--i 2 ir--~

. - r
REHO\'ED FROM WRECKAGE 1
rn
I
:___
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r--~I
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z TOTAL SURVIVORS 18
I
___J 3
l_ __ --~J .:1
n
r
)>
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___ j 4
r--T--..,
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:0 IN FUSEIAGE
ABC
6I .L_-1-B
DEF
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nz"' !; n
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o-~--·~- "~~"' ..-:.
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~ ... .,
Le{ - - I 9 f:· -- ?J LEGEND ,
---- - ;
-· --~-
•_..:..,; __ .I
c CHILD !
R RESCUED FROM WRECKA.GE
i
B EXITED VIA BREAK IN FUSEL\GE I
I
D EXITED VI.A RE.AR SERVICE DOOR
d" 'HALE
i FEMALE
lll'i-1--,
V-:1.j ___ _114 fQ~~1 __ J
~--.,
~SEAT l10T OCCUPIED
IA I BAGGAGE IN SEATS
~ F~TALITY
~1·FATALITI 1 SEX UKKNa,.,"N
"'
.______ o"',.
o :o.,,
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'
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ATTllCHJ.LENT III
COCKPIT CREWMEMBERS
LOCATION CAUdE OF DEll:t'H TOXICOU GY

Source: Cook County Coroner 1 s Office
i
Captain Anterior and posterior burns over Neg. 82% 0.211
entire body. Laceration of R. elbow
exposing elbow joint with apparent·
ulnar Fx below level of elbow joint.
Scalp laceration. Nonpe.netrating
green-stick appearing Fx's of ribs
#2 through #6 with external henoor-
rhage. Cause of death: "Smoke
inhalation with carbon monoxide
asphyxia and blood cyanide accumula-
tion; associated are stenosing
coronary atherosclerosis with ultra-
acute focal myocardial ini'arction,
cholesterol cholelithiasis, and
esophageal hiatus enlargement. 11
"'irst Officer Cause of death: "Multiple extreme Neg. Neg. Neg.

injuries with severe burns into
advanced incineration .. 11 11 Extreme
diffused fractures, with crown
decapitation. "
Recond Officer Extensive burns Neg. Neg. Neg.
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS
LOCATION Il~JURIES.
O'wd. jump seat Laceration above R. eye. Burn above L. eye.

Multiple abrasions of face abrasions. Multiple chest
contusions. Fx distal end of R" radius and bilateral
burns of arms. Sprain of lm;er back. Laceration of
R. thigh~ Bilateral Fx of ankles.
ti.ft jump seat Complaints of lung tightness
ft jump seat Complaints of lung tightness, and overall stiffness

- 2 -
OCCUPANTS OF FIRST CLASS SECTION
KNOWN SEAT SURVIVOR OR CAUSE OF DEl\'l'H ~ TOXICOLOGY i

LOCATION FATALITY COOK COUNTY ALC co GN
CORONER'S OFFIGE mg% % '-"'In:!
Unknov.rn Fatality Extreme burns with 20.o'fo :=x> neg.
advanced incinera-
tionj associated carbon
monoxide asphyxia
Unknown " Extensive burns 35.0 :=x> neg.
Unl'.nmm " Injuries multiple ex- neg. neg. neg.

treme', with crushing
Fx of skull-face and
brain lacerationg
Unknown " Shock incidental to neg. neg. neg.

extreme burns, with
advanced incinera-
ti on
Unknown " Burns with incinera- 33.0 89 neg.

ti on. changes;
associated carbon
monoxide a~phyxia
Unknown " Extensive burns nego neg. neg.
Unknown " Extensive burns with l9.0 - -

multiple injuries)
extreme
Unknrnm " Extensive burns neg. neg. -

Unknown " Extensive burns l8.o neg. -
n
Unkn mm Severe burns and 2l.O neg. -
extensive multiple
internal injuries
,,,
Unkn mm Cranio-cerebral nego neg. neg.
injury with
fractured neck
- 3 -
occuPANTS OF COACH SECTION
KN01'iN SEAT SURVIVOR DESCRIP.J'IC,': OF TOXICOLOGY

LOCATION OR A INJURIES Ol' All.; CO CE
FATALIT'I CAUSE OF fo·;":rn * mg'fo '/o pg/ml
*Source: Cook· Ccuui;y
Coroner'c Office
6A Fatality Severe burns witll partial Neg.

destruct; ion of the body;
associated with carbon
monoxide asphyxia.
6B II
(Infant) Extensive burns Neg. Neg Neg.
6F II
Shock incidental to Neg. 46
e"--treme burns; advanced
incineration changes
monoY.ide asphyxia and
cyanide.
II
IC Extensive burns Neg. 90 O.l91
Sc Survivor Burns of head and left

hand. Contusions of
right hand. ~ck sprain.
Abrasions of legs. Burns
and contusions of abdomen.
SD II
Burns of left ear, right
hand and abdomen. Fx and
laceration of left leg.
II
Contusion upper lip. Fx
L-3, L-4. Bilateral con-
tusion left leg. Burns
of left leg.
II
Shins bruised. Right ank:h
twisted. Abdomen bruises
and head lacerations.
Lower back strained.
Lacerations on right hand.
9D Fatality Extensive burns with neg. 90 neg.

extreme multiple injuries.
lOA Survivor (Child) Contusions of

buttock and across hips.
- 4 -
OCCUPAN'['S OF COACH SECTION
KNOWN SEAT SURVIVOR DESCRIPTION OF TOXICOLOGY

LOCATION OR A INJURn:s OR ALC GO CN
FATALITY CAUSE OF DEATH-:+ - mg'/, % p.G/ml
*Source: Cook County
Coroner 1 s Office
lOB Survivor (Infant) Bruises of right

arm and contusions right
side.
lOC " Fx L-5. Contusions of

hec:d and face.
lOD " Multiple abrasions Of

head and face. Fx left
arm. Bilateral con-
tusions of hands,
abdomen, thighs, knees)
legs. Abrasions of feet.
lOF " Abrasions left lateral

chest. Laceration Of
head. Laceration of leg.
llF " Abrasions of head. Fx L".

clavicle. Dislocation L.
shoulder. Bilateral con-
tusions of legs.
'
l2A Fatality (Child) Extensive burns Neg. 90 JI! 8f;.
12B " Severe burns involving Neg. 90 0.103

about 75% of the body
along with multiple
internal injuries;
associated with combined
carbon monoxide and
cyanide asphyxia
12C " (Child) Extensive burns Neg. 90 0.103
12D " (Child) Multiple ext en- Neg. 90 -

sive burnsJassociatea
with carbon monoxide
asphxia.
- 5 -
OCCUPANTS OF COACH SECTION

LOCATION OR A INJURIES OR ALC co CH
FATALITY CAUSE OF DEATH·:t mg'fo % pg/rrJ.
*SOURCE: COOK COUNTY
CORONER'S OFFICE
l2E Survivor Abrasions of head. Con-

tusions of face. Fx T-5.
Minor bi:j_ateral J.acera-
tions of feet.
n
l2F (Child) Contusions and
abrasions of face. Fx
right arm. Bronchopneumonia
l5A Fatality Extensive burns Neg. 52 Neg.

n
l5B Extensive burns Neg. Neg. Neg.
n
l5C Extensive burns Neg. <;() Neg.
l5D " Extensive burns Neg. <;() -

l5E " Severe burns i'lnd multiple Neg. <;() Neg.
extensive injuries; assoc~ated
with car".on monoxide asphyYia.
l5F " Blast injll:ries and severe Neg. 8l 1'1eg.

burns; associated with
carbon monoxide asphyxia.
l6B " Extensive burns Neg. 86 };eg.
l6E Survivor Laceration of :forehead.

Contusions o:f L. and R.
forehead. Contusions of
R. thigh. I
Laceration of :forehead. I
l6F "
Fx nose. Laceration upper
lip and nose. Avulsion
of front incissors. Con-
tusions of abdomen, buttocks.
left knee.
·, lTB n
Lower abdominal hernia.
-··; ,.·
- 6 -
OCCUPAl'!TS OF COACH SECTION .
SEAT LOCATION SURVIVOR DESCRIPTION OF TOXICOLOGY

UNKNOWN OR A INJURIES OR ALC co _,
Cl"
FATALITY
r
'. iJJSE OF DEATH -
0r-.r-.-,. r•nTTTF"'·- r!nPni\TF.R .IS
SOURCE:
r•E
mg'fo % pg/rri
Unknown Fatality l·iulti ple Fx' s of upper neg. 90 neg.

and lower extremities.
CAUSE OF DEATH : Ext en-
sive burns of the body
with probable smoke
inhalation; associated
asphyxia
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 neg.

Multiple severe burns;
monoxide asphyxia

Extensive burns
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: Extreme 4.o 90 neg

burns with incineration
-advanced; associated
caTbon monoxide asphyxia
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe neg. 90 O.ll2

external burns and
multiple internal in-
juries; associated with
carbon monoxide and
cyanide asphyxia
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.

Extensive burns of body

Extensive burns
Unkn mm " CAUSE OF DEATH: 4.o 90 neg.

Extensive burns
Unkn mm " CAUSE OF DEATH : 35.0 90 neg.

Extensive burns
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 O.OC)9

Extensive burns
- T -
OCGU1'Al'!IB OF COACH SECTION (Cont 'd)
SEAT LOCATION SURVIVOR DESCRIPTION OF TOXICO!.AJGY

UIOO!OWN OR A INJURIES OR ALC co Ci·r
FATALITY CAUSE OF DEA'I'H - SOURCE: mg)b % prdrri
COOK COUI•'.TY COROfiER 'S. OFFI"'
Unkn<ftm " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.

Severe burns
Unkn= " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.

Multiple severe burns
UnknCftffi " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.

Extensive burns with
multiple injuries,
extreme
'
Unkn<ftm " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 neg.

Extensi1re burns and
multiple injuries,
extreme
UnkhCftffi " CAUSE OF DEATH : 19 - -

. Extensive burns with
multiple injuries)
extreme
OTHERS
CAUSE OF DEA'.1.11 TOXICOLOGY

SOURCE: COOK COUNTY CORONER ' s ALC co CN
OFFICE mg<t % /m1
"c-
Occupant of House CAUSE OF DEATH: Burns; neg. 69 neg.

associated carbon monoxide
asphyxia
Occupant of House CAUSE OF DEATH: Extreme burns, nego 9C neg.

with advanced incineration;
asphyxia
- 8 -
Federal Aviation Administration, Civil Aeromedical Institute,

Aviation Toxicology Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma eY.amined
specimens fro!f, three aircraft occupants. Results were as follows:
capt. lmilOenouse YIU Cohle .Lst C 1 ass !Jasgr.
Acidic & Neutral Drugs none detected . none detected none detected
(Acid-Ether Extraction, (blood) (tissue) \blood)
UV Scan)
Basic Drugs none detected none detected none detected

(Alkaline-Ether (blood) (tissue) (blood)
Extraction, UV Scan)
Ethyl Alcohol none detected none detected 0.012% (12 mg'f,)

(Gas Chromatography) (blood) (tissue fluid) (blood)
'
Carbon Monoxide 4o.4% Saturation Specimens Less than 1-f'
"
(Conway Diffusion, unsuitable saturation
Palladium Chloride) for analysis
Hemoglobin 18.o gm% - 13.6 gm%
Cyanide 3.9 /lg/ml - -

(Conway Diffusion,
Na OH)
-:... :
.·
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 6A

Washington, D. C. 20591-
.;
.;
··~ HUMAN FACTORS GROUP CHAIRWi.N' S FACTUAL REPORT

·.:
'
•i
.,
BY
C. Hayden LeRoy
... ,
·'
- .. _......._ ...
,..
.- Docket lio. SA-435

Exhibit No·. 6A
Washington, D. c. 20591
HUMAN FACTORS GROUP CHAIRHAN' S FACTUAL REPORT
A. ACCIDENT (DCA-73-A-3)
\
Operator: United Air Lines, Inc., Chicago, Illinois

Aircraft: Boeing 737-222, N9031U, operating as Flight 553
.,. Location: Residential area, approx. 1.5 n.m. southeast of Runway 31L,
.;' Chicago-}1idway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
,."...- Time Approximately 1428 c.s.t. 1/
December 8, 1972 -
~
::
Date
.,
1'_.;
B. HUMAN FACTCRS GR01TP
·[• Chairman: C. Hayden LeRoy, National Transportation Safety Board,

..
,'i
;:
Washington, D. C •
Co-chairman: Ronald L. Schleede, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D. C.
"
-~ Members : Dr. Paul L. Brattain, Federal Aviation Administration,
!, Chicago, Illinois
"" Dr. Clyde C. Snow, Federal Aviation Administration,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
John G. Blethrow, Federal Aviation Administration,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma .
Dr. Vernon L. Scott, United Air Lines, Denver, Colorado
Norva L. Achenbaugh, Air Line Pilots Association, S/S Div.,
New York, N. Y.
c. SUMMARY
United Air Lines Flight 553 was en route from Washington National
' Airport, Washington, D. C. to Chicago-}lidway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
,, with 61 people onboard [53 ticketed passengers, two unticketed infants,
j
and a crew oI six.) The aircraft was executing a localizer - only ILS
W approach to R~ at Midi;vay Airport. The cre-..v maintained radio
.: 0 /'- contact with Midway Tower during the final portion of the approach. At
i (Jvu.J- <2..- ~oximately 1428 c.s.t., the aircraft crashed about 1.5 nautical miles
·f ~-,/ southeast of Runway 31L, 1'1idway Airport into a residential area, dest-:-oy-
; )l/_ ·"o \ ing several houses. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and subsequent
'. ') ~ fire. Weather at the time of the accident was reported as 500 feet
; / ceiling and 1 mile visibility'.
J
·j ./)_,rl
1?-----
/ ,,.
- :.:~,..;-/. / f1 & 1/ All times herein are central standard time based .on the 24-hour clock.
: ti <-
-l c?~
!
..
- 2 -
Fifteen passengers and th~j

flight attend;,'nts evacuated or
were helpe rom the wreckage. Forty passengers and the three flight
deck crewmen were fatally injured by impact and subsequent fire. Two
persons occupying a house struck by the aircraft also suffered fatal
injuries. Chicago Fire Department, Police ·Department, and local resi-
dents aide.ct survivors and transported them to. Holy Cross Hospital.
Fire and Police Department personnel participated in removing bodies
from the wxeckage to Cook County Morgue;
D. DETAILS OF THE INVESTIGATION
1. Aircraft
a. Cockpit Configuration
The cockpit had the standard pilot/copilot seat arrange-

ment with a second officer/flight engineer jump seat in the cockpit
doorway. The flight engineer seat was forward facing and could be
folded out of the right bulkhead into the center aisle. A fixed
observer seat was situated immediately adjacent (left) to the flight
engineer seat. Pilot and copilot seats were equipped with seatbelts
"' and inertial reel type shoulder harnesses. The flight engineer seat
had a seatbelt and fixed attachment type shoulder harness.
b. Passenger Cabin Configuration - See Attacillnent II
The aircraft was configured fo@passen_gers;@first

class
seats.
@ coach passengers, and two double occupancy flight attendant
(1) First Class - 20 seats
The first class section had five rows of double seat

units, one unit on each side of a center aisle. These seats i;vere all
forward facing. An aft facing double occupancy flight attendant jump
seat was located on the left side of the forward bulkhead just inboard
of the left forward entry door. This jump seat was attached to the
aft wall of a lavatory located between the fo;rward entry door and the
cockpit. This aft-facing seat was equipped with seatbelts only; no
shoulder harnesses. Immediately aft of the flight attendant jump seat
and the entry door was a 1vindscreen separating the entry aisle from the
~ first row of passenger seats in the first class section. The upper
,.. ~
-~ of the windscreen was made of "L.e4.Q.n, 11 a clear P.Olycarbonate and
.j the bottom half had compartments in which were stored the intercom
phone, food serviCe tra:ys, emergency oxygen bottle, and a i;.;ater fire
.)
. .,
.. , extinguisher. A service dooi was locate.cl in the right for1\1 ard section
l'
·l
l
.,
,•
~ ..
of the cabin; with a closet located forward of it and the forward galley
unit situated aft of it.
(2) Coach Section - 67 Seats'
~ . The right side of the coach sectio,; had (LJ) rows of

~ seat units; the left side hac(!]:J rows of~ se';;:i units plus
two ro·w·s of double seat units in the aftrnost ro1·1S. All seats were
forward facing including the flight attendant aft jump seat. This
double occupancy jump seat was attached to the bulkhead between ·the
aft lavatory and the aft entry door on the· ltlt side and was fitted
with inertial reel type shoulder harnesses. A plastic windscreen,
similar to that in the first class cabin separated the aft entry door
and the last row of coach seats. The rear entry door was forward and
outboard of the jump seat .and behind the windscreen. Immediately
behincl,.the right row. of coach seats were two aft galley units on either
side df the real'.' service dO.ci·•
2. Occupants
Occupants of the aircraft at the time of the accident were

identified as. follows:
a. Flight Crew
The flight crewmembers were in, their respective seats in

.)
the cockpit. None survived the accident. They were:
Position Date of Birth Certificate
Captain Wendell L. Whitehouse 6/4/28 ATR 1159888

First Officer Walter O. Coble 5/23/29 Com' 1 1300051
Second Officer Barry J. Elder 9/1/41 Com' 1 1646564
b. Flight Attendants
The Flight Attendants were seated in their assigned seats

in the passenger cabin for landing. All thr~e survived the accident.
Position Seat Location
{ftl Stewardess Marguerite J. McCausland Forward Jump Seat, Aisle side

#2 Stewardess D. Jeanne Griffin Aft Jump Seat, entry door side
#3 S tewardes.s Kathleen S. Duret Aft Jump Seat, Aisle side
Recurrent Emergency Trai~ipg records for all stev1ardesses

showed them to be current.
I
- 4 -
c. Fas sengers
The 55 passengers included two untic:keted infants (under 2

years old),~ children (aged 3 to 10 years old), 31 male adults, and
17 female adults. See Passenger List, Attachment l.to this report.
3. Reconstruction of Crash Sequence
The follo'\'ving information is· based bn interviews with ground

witnesses who lived in the area of the approach to Midway Airport, the
Structures Group, and passenger and flight attendant survivors.
The aircraft broke out of the clouds and was reported to be in

a level attitude, sinking slightly; it started to veer to the right with
the right wing down but straightened up; engine.~oise level increased,
as did the pitch, until the aircraft was reported by several witnesses to
be so nose-high that the nose was higher than the t"ail. Es ti mates of the
angle of attack were i.ot consistent, but did indicate a nose-high obser-
vation from several vantage points. In this nose-high attitude, the air-
craft continued to loose altitude and settled down until it contacted
electric: lines, causing a blue flash (seen by many,) followed by the
. ... tail section, right wing, and then the nose of the plane fell •
:f
·. ·....f
In the final stages of deceleration, four houses and t'\'VO gar::,ges
were extensively damaged, and four houses and one garage were destroyed
by aircraft impact and post-impact ground fire. Also, several trees and
two telephone poles were broken by impact. Damage wa~ contained in a
swath 90-foot wide by 500 feet long.
1«1J ]
·.•
JAzPjf Init~:~s~:;~:~!~~d17~~:!Il:~a~~~ R~~t ~s~h~~~g~y1 ~o~:~,
!:s
that some mentioned having· heard the landing gear do down, seen the "No
1
:x:::t
Smoking 11 sign come on, and the ste;;vardess cabin check for seatbelts fastened
and seatbacks and foodtrays upright. Some noticed that they were closer
) to the ground than usual when the aircraft broke out of the clouds. Host
'
; were altered by the increased engine sound and then startled by the air-
' craft nose-high attitude, variously described as: "extreme attitude
" (nose-high) of the aircraft 11 ; up lane 1 s nose was up at an unusual angle";
and "extreme rotation of the aircraft." A few believed the aircraft
turned to the right, having noted hoi:v close the roof tops v7ere as vie"ved
through the windows on the right side of the aircraft. The plane was very
low and still losing altitude, described by one man as a 11 sinking feeling."
Only three passengers reported having time to assume a 11 brace 11 position
... before impact. Five survivors reported that the tail section and bottom
of the aircraft struck objects (assumed to be trees and houses) and
1
\.
i'
iI
i
!
l
- 5 -
bounced b·efore the final ground impact, which 1vas described as an

extremely hard jolt. Host described the decelerative force as one
which thre'' them forward against their seatbelts sufficiently hard
to badly bruise and/or cut their lower abdomen and hips. Additionally,
two passengers (forward and aft) reported a .pull to. 'the left, and two
toward the front reported being throi;vn downi::vard. Numerous loose
objects were tossed about the cabin; e4g~, ceiling panels,, overhead
hat racks, and hatrack contents.
The stewardess in the jumpseat in the fonvard cabin was ai::vare of

excessive speed just prior to impact, at which time she blacked out.
The two stewardesses on the aft jumpsei't reported that the engine sound
made them think they were doing a missed approach, but they did not
remember an attitude change, level-off, or altitude gain. One ste1vardess
thought there 1.;ras a second surge on the engines. J.nd 1vi thin seconds there
were flashes and popping noises outside the aircraft on the left side;
the liquor compartment and oven units came out of the aft buffet which
had been secured and checked in preparation for landing. There was a
utremor or a series of tremorsn and then both ste\vardesses had the im-
pression of a few seconds of silence, except for a hissing sound re-
11
ported by one and the feeling of 1tsettling 11 or "drifting do·wntvards
by the other.
a. Ignition and Propagation
Ground witnesses reported an arcing and 'blue/white flash

as the aircraft struck electric lines. One reported that he did not
see debris flying around as if an explosion had occurred. He stated
; further: "Tail section came in contact with i;vires just before crash.
i From time plane contacted wires until I saw smoke was about 5 seconds--
i1 another 15 to 20 seconds before I was able to see flames." Other
.
·i
witnesses reported first a dense black smoke and then flames appeared
over the center of the cabin. Also after this, one witness heard two
j
.J explosions .
''l A United Air Line employee who ,lives in the area, esti-
1
i mated his arrival at the scene to have been 5 minutes after the acci-
..ll dent. He said the fire department was on site and no occupants got
out of the aft end after he arrived. The aircraft mid-section, from
'
11
i
about 3 feet forward of the aft galley door, was completely engulfed
in flames about 10 feet high. He had been trained in firefighting
and assisted on a hose near the right engine. He reported that as
close as he was to the fire.he could not feel the heat. He also men-
.i tioned that firemen manning a hose near the aft galley door seemed to
'j
1
I
1
j
1I
l
·- --~·--'-'-~--~··- ~
- 6 -
be thrown back at one point by an explosion of approximately the magni-

tude of a large tire, or perhaps a 5-gallon can. He thought it come
from the cargo compartmento
Another United Air Line employe'e who arrived at the scene

an estimated rJ minutes after the accident, reported that flames were
concentrated in the center of the fuselage and were 10 to 15 feet high.
All survivors advised that they' were first aware of fire

_!!fter the accident, and all but two reported that it was outside the
aircraft i;;vhen first noted. One survivor sitting over the wing stated
that within 5 to 10 seconds after impact there i;;·1as fire ''beloi;;v, on
and around the left wing, then some on right side. 11 Two survivors
from Row 8 reported seeing fire coming back from the nose outside the
Aircraft. One of them did not notice it until he reached the exit,
which he thought could have been a break in the right side of the
fuselage. The man in Row 11 first saw fire inside the aircraft a few
feet'ahead of his seat, as did the lady in Row 12. Although the
man reported smoke. inside the cabin within 5 seconds, half of the
passenger survivors do not remember smoke inside the cabin before
they were out of the aircraft, and the majority of the others do not
remember it as a hindrance to their evacuation. The Row 17 survivor
advised smoke entered only momentarily through the aft main entry
door ;,hen he helped the stewardess open and then close it again due
to fire outside.
.. The stewardess in the jump seat at the forward entry door

.i was trapped in her seat, pinned at her right arm and both legs. Before
i
•·: she was rescued, she felt fire around her on the· back and right arm .
Only seconds after the aircraft came to rest, one stei;;vardess from
the coach section opened the aft entry door and was confronted with
flames and smoke which started to come in; because of this, she
closed the door again with some difficulty due to blockage by the
partially deployed door slide. The galley service door was opened
soon thereafter onto a scene of rrruch burning debris and wood e Hoi;;vever,
evacuation was started. The plane was filling rapidly with thick, grey
smoke, with visibility reduced to about 4 to 5 feet, as the stewardess
assisted passengers1 who were trapped or blocked by debris in the cabin,
and directed them to the exit. She had to go back to the door for air
before returning to the cabin. Passengers i;;.;ere still coming out and i;;.;hen
she returned again to the cabin, the smoke was so black and thick that
she could see no one else. This smoke was described as billowing from
the forward part of. the aircraft to the galley. It was thick and very black
11
and was in her ey-es > nose, etc.. She described it as thick and heavy· --it
seemed to have weight to it--if you inhaled it, it just wouldn't go
down your throat."
.>~·-··· ..... -·--· ..
.'
- 7 -
b. Fuels Available
(1). According to the Operations Group Report, approxi-

mately 12.,000 lbs, of Jet A fuel should have been on board the aircraft,
distributed between the integral fuel tanks in the wing. Normal opera-
ting procedures require that fuel in the 706-gallon center tank, which.
-is located between the wing front and rear spars and between the left
and right wing tanks, be used first. Th.,refore, it should have been
comparatively empty.
(2) Peoples Gas, Light and· Coke Company of Chicago ad-

vised investigators that the severed gas supply line into 3722 West
11
70th Place, where the aircraft came to rest, i;vas the standard 1~
line which passed through the basement front wall. The natural gas
was under low pressure, a 6 11 water column or pressure of about 212: oz.
p.s.i.
(3) One crew and two passenger ·oxygen cylinders were

located on the right side of the aircraft in the forward cargo com-
partment forward of the door. The cylinders are charged as follows:
Oxygen Cylinder Standard Oxygen Capacity
Crew 39 cu.
114 cu·.
ft.~
f ~compresse dto
Passenger 1
76 cu.
f~: 1850 p.s.i.@ 70°F
Passenger 2
(4) Ur.ited Air Lines advised that two air freight ship-_
ments destined to._Omaha comprised the entire contents of the aft cargo 7
~~
compartment, and consisted of one 70-lb. piece of machine parts and a
344-lb. shipment of nylon hosiery packaged-in 5 cartons.
(5) The buildings involved· in ·~h~

accident were primarily ~
one-story brick and wood residences. The aircraft came to rest after 'hv'•
sliding into three homes and lay in a pile of wooden debris. lJY.
c. Site Characteristics
The unusual fire propagation pattern and extreme heat that

the center section of the aircraft--from aft entry door forward to
include most uf the First Class cabin--was subjected to, can be par-
tially attributed to the peculiar setting.
The residence at 3722 west 70th Place was a typical-of-

·ll the are.a one-story building.· Th0> basement floor was about 3 feet below
grouni level and the foundation extended about as high above ground.
Entry from the front was up sever al steps to a fro.nt stoop. During
----- . - •• l • ... -
. ,.,
- 8
initial contacts, portions of the aircraft, -:mich was reportedly still

nose-high and slightly right wing low, struck several houses in the
block between West 7lst Street and West 70th Place, and the nose fell
through, causing the aircraft to come to a.hard slid~ng stop after crashing
into three houses. The fuselage demolished ·the center house and stopped
in the debris almost centered over the 3-foot deep basement. The air-·
craft nose and center wing stubs damaged about one-half of the near
sides of each of the adjacent houses, leaving half of the one to the
left as high as the peak. With the preponde'rance of ignition sources
and fuels available in the basement of the center house, and the
chimney-effect of the half-house remains on both sides, the fire was
intensely hot and very concentrated. This is best illustrated by the
statement made by the United Air Lines employee who worked the fire
hose near the #2 engine and reported that he did not feel the heat.
Radiant heat from a fire of this magnitude in an open area would have
been intense.
5. Aircraft Evacuation - See Attachment II
Details of passenger evacuation from the aircraft are limited
ij
!
to information supplied by survivors from the area of seat rows 8 thru 12,
16 and 17, and the aft entry/galley compartment. The #1 Stewardess, who
was the only survivor from the front of the aircraft, advised that she
blacked out on impact and had her eyes closed during most of the time
it took rescuers to extricate her from the i;vreckage. She was removed
toward the missing right side of the First Class cabin. No one success-
.j
fully evacuated from the First Class cabin.
l
·1
!' When the aircraft came to rest, the normal cabin lighting had
failed and it was very dark inside. No one saw emergency lights and
1,. the breaks in the right side of the fuselage did not get noticed until
l they were illuminated by the fire from outsid.e the aircraft.
With the exception of two passengers who could not remember, all
survivors stated that their seatbelts remained intact and most reported
bruises to attest to this fact. Male survivors on the right side at
Rows 8, 10, and 11 had difficulty releasing their respective seatbelts
because their seats, though intact, had come partially loose and were
.j' leaning forward, consequently semi-suspending the occupants by their
seatbelts.
·1 No floor was in front of seat SF, so the occupant had to step

on a cable to relieve pressure before his seatbelt buckle would release.
He then thought he was in the lower compartment (belly) because he
1 could not see windows. He climbed over a small amount of wreckage and
j then went out a break in the right side of the fuselage.
l
- 9 -
Survivors reported two sizeable breaks in 'the right side of the

fusel'1ge: at the cabin partition (forward of row 6) and between scat
rows 9 and· 10. Each 'of ·these were used for egress by three survivors.
One survivor said he saw two men unsuccessfully try to open the
right ovei:ving window exit. The left window exit w·as opened and a sur-
vivor reported seeing one passenger go through 'it, even though it led ·to
only a. fire and no apparent exit. He called to him to return but appar-
ently was not heeded. One body was.recovered along the outside of the
fuselage in that area. ·
Reportedly quantities of debris, including: overhead hatracks,

~-· ceiling panels, luggage, and some seats from the left side of the coach
cabin; as well as liquor compartment and oven.units from the aft buffet
in the back, cluttered the aisle and exit route.s. All of this made
movement within the cabin very difficult.
Several survivors scrambled or cra1vled over the bent-fori;vard

seatbacks to the aft galley service door exit. The n.an in Seat 9A
tried the left overwing window exit at Seat BA; closed the window when
flames broke out; and then moved back to the aft galley service door
where the stewardess was beckoning. He figured he had seen about 4
persons exit 'before he did and several followed him out. He estimated
it was about 2~ minutes after the crash when he got out of the aircraft.
The Stewardesses went directly to their respective aft doors

and called to passengers to move aft. As the left side entry door was
opened, flames were apparent and the 1f2 Stewardess closed the door again
with the help of a knowledgeable male passenger. The passenger then
went to assist the jfo3 Stewardess open the aft galley service door. This
door had been blocked by galley equipment which had come out during
impact, even though the galley had been double-checked for security
before landing. As the door was started, the door-mounted evacuation
slide got hung up on the door jamb. Once this was cleared, the door
easily opened all the way. A three to four foot drop was bridged with
the inflated evacuation slide. Eleven people evacuated by this exit.
The jf2 Stewardess was able to go about midway into the cabin
to assist those who were trapped. Several trips into the cabin were
made, interspersed with a gasp for air at the aft exit door. At first,
the smoke was thick and grey and limited visibility to only 4 or 5 feet
maximum. However, it dramatically changed to billowing, thick, very
black smoke, which the Stewardess described as see01.ing"to have weight
and if you tried .to inhale, it just wouldn't go down your throat."
The majority of evacuations were initiated rapidly and self-

accomplished. However, in this instance, one lady did rescue another's
infant son.
,.
- 10. -
6. Firefighting and Rescue
The report from the Fire Department of the City of Chicago is

entered lnto the record as Exhibit No. 6E.
The passengers' estimates of times be.t\·1een the accident and

fire department arrival varied,with two estimat.es placing it within 3
minutes, and two others tvithin 5 minutes; another passenger said it ~1as
about 10 minutes before he noticed them. Others did not know.
There were apparently two distinct· firefighting operations:

one from the street - at the tail of the aircraft, and the other from
an alley - at the aircraft nose. Damaged houses and fire separated the
two areas.
·--- The stewardess from the first class cabin was trapped in the
forward stewardess jump seat under debris which was at least waist deep,
The forward entry door was found by the investigators to be jammed in a
partially open position with the forward edge rotated inward approximately
40°. Rescue efforts continued for almost half an hour before the stewardess
could be extricated. The fireman advised that the right side of the air-
craft had been destroyed quite far back, beyond the stewardess' location.
She was removed from the wreckage out toward the right where the aircraft
had been obliterated.
A ground witness estimated that body removal was started about

90 minutes after the accident. There w~. rca. __documentation of bod'c'..--
ons at Ho1vever, the fireman who helped rescue the
,, stewardess, reported that mail and most of the bodies he helped with
were removed from low in the right side.
7. Medical Examination
a. Summary
A summary of the severity and numbers of persons injured

as a result of this accident is shown on the chart below:
Fatal Serious Minor/None Total
Crew 3 1 2 6
Passengers 40 11 4 55
Others>' 2 0 2 4
Total 45. 12 8 65
*Two occupants of one of the houses struck by the aircraft during the
crash received fata~ injuries as a result of the ·accident. Their
location in the house at the time of impact is not knoi;.;rn. Two persons
near ·the accident site received minor injuries and were treated in a
hospital emergency room. One, whose house was demolished, 11vas treated
for smoke inhalation; and the other for burns to both hands and an
-11-
abrasion to the leg. Both were released in less than an hour.

Others in the vicinity of the crash escaped with no reported
injuries.
b. Injuries Related to Location in Aircraft
Eighteen aircraft 0ccupants survived the accident:
three flight attendants, one of whom was rescued; eight adult
male passengers; four adult female passengers; two female
children, 4 and 5 years old; and one male infant, 17 months old.
With the exception of the stewardesses who were in their assigned
jump seats, all of the survivors were· seated in rows 8 through
12, and 16 and 17. ·
Attachment III is a list, divided into sections of
the aircraft interior (cockpit, first class, and coach sections),
which shows the following for each aircraft occupant and the two
persons injured on the ground:. ·
-seat location, where known. These are followed

by a listing of others from unknown seat
locations in the same aircraft section.
-survivor or fatality
-injuries or cause of death information from
Pathological Reports of Coroner-Cook County,
Illinois.
"Co.ok County, Illinois Toxicologist's Report
concerning findings of presence of alcohol,
carbon monoxide, and cyanide.
c. Fli'ght Crew Medical History

(1) F.ederal Aviation Administration (FAA) Medical
Records for the flight crewmembers were examined and indicate
that:
Captain W. L. Whitehouse's last FAA First
Class Medical Certificate was dated August.11, 1972. His file
contained records of·six February and August examinations for
1970 thru 1972. No .limitations were noted.
First Officer W. 0. Coble's last FAA First
Class Medical Certificate was dated July 2, 1972. His file
contained records of three annual examinations dated back to
1970. No limitations were noted.
Second Officer B. J. Elder's last FAA First
Class Medical Certificate was dated May 17, 1972. His file
contained records of five May and November examinations for
1970 thru 1972. No limitations were noted.
-12-
(2) United Air Lines (UAL) Company Physicals
The last Company Physical Examination for

Captain Whitehouse was dated August 29, 1972. It noted: "79.
EKG Normal Resting ECG and Normal Response to Masters Two Step
Test."
First Officer Coble's last Company Physical

was dated June 22, 1972. Under notes· regarding Clinical
Evaluat.ion, 58. Heart appeared:
"Grade 2/6 syst. eject. murmur.

Second right intercostal space radiates to
left lower sternal border without thrills."
79. EKG was noted:
"Normal Resting ECG and Normal Response to

Masters Two Step Test."
Second Officer Elder's last Company Physical

was dated October 10, 1972. It was unremarkable and noted under
79. EKG "Normal Resting ECG."
8. Aircraft Wreckage
The Structures Group advised that the aircraft hull,

with wing stubs attached but missing the radome, came to rest·
within an area approximately 110 feet long. The aircraft itself,
including almost 15 feet of nose cone measures 100 feet overall.
Survivors indicated two major breaks in the right fuselage wall:
a comparatively small triangular one between seat rows 9 and 10;
and a larger one that appeared to be forward of seat row 6, near
the cabin class partition location.
The smaller break was large enough that one man reported
he left the aircraft thiough it, without tearing his suit. No
survivors reported any breaks on the left side of the aircraft.
Ground witnesses who observed the wreckage from either the front
or back had the impression that the hull appeared fairly intact.
Of course, the center section was not observed because it was
entangled with the wreckage of the houses which were destroyed.
The documentation of cabin interior wreckage is reported

in Exhibit 6-D, Human Factors· Team Member Report, John G. Blethrow.
~~ t!::fi4:;~cl
C. Hayden LeRo~~~r
Air Safety Inve~~~
..
EXHIBIT 611.
ATTACHNe!T I
PASSENGER LIST
First Class Sec.tion (ll)

Age
G"RIJE GER
0
. ·1 1
BALDWIN, Theodore G. ,i 42 Tames W.
BESHOAR, John R. ,/ .. fllf:J _
46 LEWIS, "Barry W. 34
BLODGETT, Ralph~/.)11~~ MC NAIR, William R. 37
COLLINS, George W. 47 MOREAU, Roger W. 48 c •.:.,,rf,) IV /Ir-<:"""-
_.j., i;).,4
ENDER, Arnold L. 49 WEST, James R. 55 - \0-y> -
HUNT, Mrs. Dorothy L. 52
Coach Section (44)
ABNER, Mrs. Virginia 84 RAUEN,.John H. Jr. 52

ANDERSON, Marvin E. 43 ROSSMAN, W. 54
· .I BAYER, Lon J. 36 SEACHRIST, George 63
c'f!,'/ v-J~ CIARKE, Miss Michelle 29 SHEfillAN, Sister
CHRISTESON, Howard H. 46 Mary Francisca 58
ELLISO;<, Franz 36 SHERWOOD, Ari 17 Mos.
ELLISON, Rosemary A. 30 SHERWOOD, Jennifer 3
; ~RICKSON, Fi''mr V. 58 SHERWOOD, Hrs. Judith 31
~ FIELDS, Edith M. 63 SHULL, Kenneth 42
19/ ,; GREEN, Harold W. 35 WEST, Laura 5
. HEWITT, Christine 23 WEST, Mrs. Linda S. 30
JANDA, Dr. Earl 47 WEST, Michell~ 10
·JORDAN, Harold M. 57 WEST, Cherilyn 8
JORDAN, Marion J. 55 WEST, William L. _.-- 36
JORDING, Derek A. 7 Mos. WEST, William L. Jr. 7
JORDING, Joan M. 25 ··:.--· '1 WETHERS, Carl D. 38
KNOWIAND, Richard A. 35 --WHITNEY, Donald 27
KRILL, Dr. Alex 44 WIESER, Aloyius E. 34
· METCALF, Harold R. 34 WILLIAMS, Raymond 27
NE\\ftlAN, Shiela 25
NEWMAN, Virginia A. 50
.• Q._, PARKER, Miss Nancy M. m;;i-~
., Q[!-"~-PATTERSON, Walter L• 35
., :. L;/;\. PENDREY, Miss Delores 47
/cf':: - PHILBIN, Father William 47
PRABISH, William A. 25
.
. ' ..
~
ATIACHHDIT JI
\
L:J\,.___ ~ KNO~ll LOCATJON OF SURVI\IOF.S AND FATALITIES
n..n
,_.
' I
a
C-OAT
~-
CLO~tT
i:
r
,.<
r -· -· - • -· _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J
SUW-t~RY oF SL:P.V1V.2.B_S~~~~.P~TI!?_ ·I
:E
r---1--,
I
L-- __
C D
_J
I
EXITED VIA BRL'-.K IN B!SEUGE 6 I
i
z0 EXITED VI.A REAR SERVI~E 'DOOR ll
"',,,£
r--r--1 2 r--12· ·~
L__ . -~J
l _7 I
REHOVED FROM WRECKAGE l
iI
m--· r--r--,
I I
!--- __ ....
z"' r--~··· TOTAL SURVIVORS 18 !

.;
___ I 3
L____1:J
.-.-.- . :_·'lI
m--;
.;I t '·' '
4 I I
:-=t .:_ I
.--r--,
I I
L.., _ _ _ _ _ .t
I
_ _ _ ,J.
( T'. l
L~I~J -':- - I
5 I I
I I
L-- ___ ..J._ ~: ~ • • t
·~
·. ,_, -.: I
.
BREAK IN FUSELAGE
.J..,. , " D E F -~·
. -1-B) q:
-~
A B C . ·-· '····
j .-
001~
•• • J
6! .. I
11...- - -~
·~
.
--
.!
~
- "',,,
iC
~~7
.C
~
. "'z'--+----..-l
...... -· ·.
.. ,,,-
, n
.. -<
ox
-- '
'
! ....
0 -1r~rc-, ,.,-l'Vfi-,
_-, L~-~J~J~o L~~~~ 3p=: USED c
! '
·'
'-----ii
·-1-17. 3.__-- s-.,__ld1
l
L __
c.. C-
v~r1 ~-
_JJ
-
- BY lOD lOF
__ &.llF
r+------'
R
B
~SCUED FROH WRECK..\GE
EXITED VIA BREAK IN FUSEIAGE

;
. D EXITED VI.A REAR SERVICE DOOR
·1
.if'. MALE
~
' .'. ~ FIY.ALE
/; ,.. ~ ··- - - .·:-..-:. .. : ~--=. _- ·.:7..:- - ~:- -
..
~SEAT NOT occtiPIED
IA I BAGGAGE IN SF.ATS
~! F~TALIT'i
[KJ ~~~A~~~-s-EX ut<rnCT~--- ·~.,
'I
'
i
l
~-
COG'tCPIT CREYn.fEi.IBERS
LOCATION CAUSE OF DEA'l'H TOXICOLOGY

Source: Cook County Coroner's Of'·f':Lc e ALC
-· m.ci:',:, co CH
('.' ~i """. ; __ -
·'
Captain Anterior and posterior burns aver Neg. 82% ~.24.
entire body. Laceration of R. olbCC·l . /
e:x;posing elbow joint with apparent -
ulnar Fx below level of elbow joint.
Scalp laceration. Nonpe.netrating
green-stick appearing Fx's of ribs
#2 through #6 with external hemor-
. rhage. Cause of death: 11 Smoke
inhalation with carbon ~~noxiAP
c e x i a an "hl ood cvanide accumula- )
associated are stenosing .
. ary atherosclerosis with ultra-
acute focal myocardial ini'arction,
cholesterol choleli thiasis, and
esophageal hiatus enlargement. ff
~irst Officer Cause of death: "Multiple extreme Neg. Neg. Neg.

injuries with severe burns into
advanced incineration. JI 11 Extreme
diffused fractures, with crown
decapi taM.on. JI
,
Second Officer Extensive burns Neg. Neg. l'Tet;.
FLIGHT ATI'ENDA1'TTS
LOCATION IllJURIES
rnd. jump seat Laceration above R. eye. Burn above L. eye.

Multiple abrasions of face abrasions. Multiple chest
contusions. Fx distal entl of R. radius and bilateral
burns of arms. Sprain of lo1-1er back. La.ceration of
R. thigh. Bilateral
... . .. Fx of -ankles.
... •··
,_ .. ... ~······
... -· .. ·- -.
... .. . I
- -
I
lit jump seat Complaints of lung· .tightness '
I
lit jump seat Complaints of lung tightness; and overall stiffness

__,;.t.;;,. - ·---....:.:
- 2 -
OCCUPANTS OF FIRST CLAES SECTION .

. . ..
KIWWN SEAT . SURVIVOR OR CAUSE OF DEATH~ TOXICOLOG:C I
LOCATION FATALITY COOK COUNTY ALC co o;
CORONER'S OFFICE mf;% c; ).1~ /r-;_~
Unknown Fatality Extreme burns with 20.0% 90 neg.

advanced incinera-
ti on; associated carbon
monoJ:d_de.. as:phyxia
Unknown
It
Extensive burns 35.0 90 neg.
Unknown " Injuries multiple e::{- neg. neg. neg.

treme·, witli crushing
Fx of skull-face and
brain laceration,
Unknown
It
Shock incidental to neg. neg. neg.
extreme burns, wi.th. II
advanced incinera- :··.:...
"
ti on
.J Unknrnm
It
:Burns with incinera- 33.0 89 neg •.
ti on. c·nanges;
associated carbon
·:·
monoxide a~phyxia
Unknrnm n
Extensive burns neg .. neg. neg.
Unknown
n
Extensive burns with 19.0 - -
multiple injuries,
extreme
Unknown
n
Extensive burns neg-~ neg. -
.j
~
... Unkn mm It
Extensive burns 18.o neg. -
... Unkn mm
II
Severe burns. and 21.0 neg. -
extensive multiple
internal injuries
·.
)
Unknown " Cranio-cerebral neg. neg. neg ..
. ...
'
• : ! ••
injury with
fr:actured neck
.~
,
;
·i
•;'
- 3 -
OCCUPANTS OF CO! CH SECTION .
KNOHN SEAT SURVIVOR DESCRIPrION OF TOXICOLOGY

LOCATION OR A INJURIES OR AI.C co ""
r.-~
FATALIT'I CAUSE OF DEATli *

*s.ource: Cook·C!)unty
mg"/, % pg/ml
..
Coroner rs Office
6A Fatality Severe burns with partial Neg. 90 :rTeg.

destruc~ion of the body;
monoxide asphyxia.
6B
If
(Infant) Extensive burns Neg. Neg Neg.
<
i
~,
.__'
6F If
Shock incidental to Neg. 46 0.269
/ extreme burns; adva11ced , l/
incineration changes
monoxid~hyxia and
( cyanide. ,, ~
f:.:::
TC
If
Ex-tensive burns Neg. 90 O.l9l
/
'
8 Survivor Burns of head and left
hand. Contusions of
right hand. :&<ck sprain.
Abrasions of legs. Burns
and contusions of abdomen.
.
"
G If
Burns of left earJ right
hand and abdomen • Fx and
laceration of left leg.
:1
j
·'
"
(9 If
Contusion upper lip. Fx
L-3, L-4. Bilateral con-
tusion left leg. Burns
of left leg.
.,
0 If
.
Shins bruised. Right anl&
twisted • Abdomen bruises
and head lacerations •
Lower back strained.
Lacerations on :right hand.
9D Fatality . Extensive burns with neg. 90 neg.

. extreme multiple inju;r-ies •
~
..
0
; : ; .
Surviyor (Child) Contusions of
buttock and across hips •
,, - ...
, ~ ~' . .. . ,,,.. - ... - . ..
'
.· .·
- 4 -
OCCUPfa.WfS OF COACH SECTIOfi

LOCATION OR A INJURTE;s OR ALC co Ci f 1
FATALITY CAUSE OF DEATH* . mg<f, '/o p._g/rrJ_

*Source: Cook County
Coroner's Office
I\ 10~ . Survivor
.
(Infant) Bruises of right
arm and contus.ions right
side.
(;) " Fx L-5. Contusions of

head and face.
B
n
Multiple abrasions of
,.
head and face. Fx left
arm. Bilateral con-
tusions of hands,
abdomen, thighs, knees J
legs. Abrasions of feet.
..
\:) n
.
Abrasions left lateral
chest. La.ceration of
head. Laceration of leg.
® n
Abrasions of head. Fx L".
clavicle. Dislocation ·L.
shoulder. Bilateral con-
tusions of legs.
'
:j l2A Fatality (Child) Extensive burns Neg" 9J Neg.
·,:
---...
I
12B n
Severe burns involving
about 75% of the body
along with multiple
internal injuries;
Neg. 9J
E)
associated with combined
ca~h~n monoxide and
.;
. •':! ·. <:'.:cyanidC)asphyxia 'l
12C
l2D
n
".
(Child) Extensive burns
(Child) Multiple ext en-

sive burns]associated
Neg.
Neg.
9J
9J
E -
with carhon monoxide
i asphxia.
'
:
- 5 -
OCCUPANTS OF COACH SECTION
. ·: .., ..
-. ·. .. .... ;.-,·:··
'
"
6 - . ",
OCCllPANTS OF COACH SECTION
SEAT LOCATION S"'JJfilIVOI-{ DESCRIPTION OF 'I'OXICOLOGY

UNKNOWN OR A INJURIES OR ALC co CN
FATALITY CAUSE OF DEATH - SOURCE: mg'/, % pg/rrl
n~mr C'()T'C"'m" ['(1Pn1<Tl<'R .1 S n1"1"Tl"'E
Unknown Fatality Multiple Fx's of upper neg. neg.

and lower extremities.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Exten-
sive burns of the body
with probable smoke
inhalation; associated
asphyxia
n
Unknown CAUSE OF DEATH : neg. 90 neg.
Multiple severe burns;
monoxide asphyxia
Unkn01m " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 neg.

Extensive burns
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEAT'n: Extreme 4.o 90 neg

burns with incineration
advanced;· associated
ca~bon monoxide asphyxia
Unknown " CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe neg. 90

external burns and
multiple internal in-
juries; associated with
~monoxide and
~asphyxia
n
Unknown CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Extensive burns of body

Extensive burns
.....
. unknown ti
CAUSE OF DEATH: 4.o 90 neg.
Extensive burns
n
Unknown CAUSE OF DEATH: 35.0 90 neg.
Extensive burns
·Unknown n
CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. 90 0.099
Extensive burns
~ ·.. ·... . ; ... . . . . .. . . . . . . .. ~ .. .......

; ........· .. ··... . ....
.-·· . ' . "' . . . r;
- T-
OCCUP.ANT.3 OF COACH SECTION (Cont'd)
SEAT LOCA'rIOH SURVIVOR DESCRIPTION OF TOXICO.LCY:·,y

UNKHOWN OR A INJURIES OR AIC co c:n
FATAIITY CAUSE OF DEATH SOURCE: -
COOK COUETY CORO!:ER 'S. OFFir.l
mg% % ;:r/,,.1
"-0 · · -
II
Unknrnm CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Severe burns
II
UnknDlffi CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Multiple severe burns
l
i
UnknDlffi " CAUSE OF DEATH: neg. neg. neg.
Extensive burns with
multiple injuries,
., extreme
'J II
Unkn mm CAUSE OF DEATH : neg. 90 neg.
Extensive burns and
multiple injuries,
extreme
Unkhmm " CAUSE OF DEATH :

Extensive burns 1iith
l9 - -
multiple injuries,
extreme
..
-
- .. - . ~·
..
.,
-~
OTHERS
CAUSE OF DEATH TOXICOLOGY

SOURCE: COOK COUNTY CORONER' s ...
AIC co Cl!
. OFFICE . m.g<j', 'f, JJ.g/rcJ..
Occupant of House CAUSE OF DEATH: Burns; neg. 69 neg.

asphyxia
)CC1,lpant of House CAUSE OF DEATH: F.xtriome burns, neg. 90 neg.

with advanced incineration;
asphyxia
.
',..- ·.
.
.'
/•
~
~ .._ r •.
:.~ ...
- 8 -
Federal Aviation Ad~inistration, Civil Aeromedical Institute,

Aviation Toxicology Laboratory, QJrJ_ahoma City, Oklahoma examined
specimens from three aircraft occupants. Results were as follows:
Capt. vinitoenouse .t/U COhle ..Lst c 1ass l:'e..s:;;:::r.
none detected none detected none detected

Acidic & Neutral Drugs (blood)
(Acid-Ether Extraction, ' (blood) (tissue)
UV Scan)
none detected none detected none detected
Basic Drugs (blood)
(blood) (tissue)
(Alkaline-Ether
Extraction, UV Scan)
none detected none detected 0. Ol2% ( l2 CD.g'f,)
Ethyl Alcohol (blood)
(Gas Chromatography) (blood) (tissue fluid)
carbon Monoxide 4o.4% Saturation Specimens Less than 1%

unsuitable saturation
(Conway Diffusion,
Palladiwn Chloride) for analysis
Hemoglobin 18.o rgn"/o
i
;
Cyanide
(Conway Diffusion,
Na OH)
~
)
Dnr:Yc·:I.; Nn. :1!1 lJ.")'.)
l"xrd.b i I; ~f". 3D
Nl\'l'IONl\T, '.rHl\NST'rJRf.'l\~:rnN s111•m:Y P.01\rnl

1tlt1J;/yj ngi;1111, J). r.. ~~0 J\J]
1
TRf\NSCRIPrIONS OF /ITC RECORDINGS, MIDWA:\'. TCWJilR

lllD>iAY AIRPffiT TRAFY!C CONTROL ronR
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 6<Hil8
D«ceml>er 8, 1972
(Reference To Time Are In Greet11fich lli!&n Tliae)
l. FACILITY Midway Airport Traffic Control Tower,
Chicago, Illinoia
2. SUDJECT Transcript of recorded conversation ~inent
to United Airlinee Flight 553
.3 . DATE AND TIME Deeember 8, 197 2 202'> to 2:028 11.ecordc lB
Channel 9, changed 2037 Dec..s..r u, 1972
!+. AGEMCIES Cooc:dinator l'eaiti011. at
Cll.I) cc Coardin&tar P041ition at:
O'Rare TOW9r
5. GE.RTIFicATION I liERESY Cl!RTIJ1Y that the followiug ill a true
transcript14n of the record.ad cotrYersation
Faeility Chief, Midway T"""r

!l"'!
WR cc Jtillt:2'
I~ ·~i~ ~·!S
y,o(. cc 2ti2(i1'
O& ec zo:r.,29
1'0·1 cc 202'.~ v.•ve ·..q p. - ~ , - ca.•t stw thu u enter
t1a dcJi&. •'• a Uttu t - c:i,Qff.
lilll> tt 2iJ2f>:34 Oby ~ ~ 11>1& Y th Mad; - t4 - l!p M

ti.. alfta.
.'9)'' ~
,•r
'~~·
W26:37 ~ U!>H:e4 f t - ttfl:y thHa 1'ill . . - • l&ooft
tW'I>, - odckY t1ilm ~nwf f . - I . . . to , _
~ cc 20:M>t43
J8lW cc .20'8!1J SatellU. HJ 0

I)
!ID iX 2028115
1'l!'.l>J Ct': 2621:15

ORI) ce tG:%tl:ZO
Hl1""1 •"'f; W:tS121
c.u.n cc 2llt8: Z2
~··;f;1..,; CcL 20'.!11:40
C© '-~G W2&:4l
t·~ cc ZC:ti>:43
0M ~c ZoS:4S 11".:.v
;,D>;;; c:~ 20!' ·:?f; Oloay - - 'GO& p&i<ltillg htin en- talldag tC' ht.a
')kl r:- CI: 2ozg,29 ~ t>ra';o Iii It 184iar,. 04 d1Mpp#' ..... 1tp,ht
J-t V-:.t fony .dn"eo 1 u.. i&. I f fwt~ ~ 11-
-.re
ho ~ <ie..aht.tt t don't knew if. ha '-a - - ·
TI&
{J~f1,t CG .. 2029 ::'.l'll
}i}<: cc ZOO!J ,40
iP1 cc ..U:Q) S..UU. ltlJUy 414 , _ ;,.vu h.W: froa TJ>.\lt4d iiw
ft.tty .....
!Jf"<.J) cc 2o:n,05 !WlpC:iW
~ GC 20i1:04 ,_ 1*1ut.U'v.1
~ cc 2031 :Ul SaUIUU~
01':.·o cc 2011:19 y. .
1-'2.il:J ;:Y,; lV:)l :20
OftD •'"......
·-~
2031:21
~.Cl: 2{\31:23
f.1RD ('T' 2';131·1'

'"
Hl!JWAY AIRPORT TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWE!~
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60fl1J
Decembe.r 8, ·1 1)72
(Rafer.,nce To Time Are ln c;rAflctwkh tieen Ti>>e)
Midway Airport Traffic Control Towe.-,

Chicago, Illinois
·.. SUBJECT Transcript of recorded cpnvermation
pertinent to United Airlines Flight 553
J. OATE _·<.~'I:c"Il=":=iE=o.... _ __ December 8, 1972 2024 to 2028, Reeordar ln

Channel .5, Changed 2037 D.>cember 8, 1972
•-: . AQENCJE'•.•• - - - - TWR Local. Control Position of Operation,

Midway Airport Traffic Control Tow-er
UAS53 Pilot of United flight 553

N9VS l'ilot of Aero-Commanrler N309VS
I>I.567 Pilot of Delta !'light 567
N32G Pilot of Helicopter N32G
N743L l'ilot of N743L

NJD Pilot of IUD
~l41IR Pilot of N4HR
N6.5T Pilot of N65T
CERTIFICATION__ _ I HERDT CERTIFY that the followiilfl ia a

trua tranvcription of the record~d
conversation pertaining to the subject
accident.
f.' "
·-~~1'--~--~y-~·~,~·'~~~-._......,:~~·-1 ~~ l.,,.L·-·-~~'"'-c=:.~~-
L
Facility Chief, !<i.dway To<nr
TllG!.
N9\lll 2017 :45 And nine "!9 h by the ioarker
TWR 2017:46 Nine victDr •up,s.r thra.e one left clear«<! to land
N9VR 2017:47 vs
TilR 2017:55 Joliet Delta cleared acro•s runway a.h thre" en.. right
NJD 2017 :SS Okay thank you eir
TWR 2018:23 Hotel rDmeo croH tlwl naxt run-y continue eaet bound
and ah over to two two left that 1 1 be the oecond
runway
!{4HR 2018:30 Qk.ay
N65T 2018:34 Baron si~ five tango ia ready to go
2018:37 Baron six five tango run~ay three one right cleared
for tai<aoff malt• a right turn out to ft h94din& of
zero nine zero
N65T 2018:45 Six five timgo
1!1567 2019:08 Midway T_,- Delta five sixty sevQn is with you ai1
coming up on Calumet
'fWTt io19,1z Delta five sixty s~ven report pasainy, thf::: outer cu1rker.
-DLS 67 2019:16 Okay we 1 11 csll pasaing Ke<lzic
iNVc' 2019:20 Aud niu.e VS' s got a rui~IJ
TUR 2019:24 Nine VS is ou a miee alright make ~.t1 immediate 1e.~t

turn to a hf!.B.ding of one nine z;ero
l"·T9V'S 2019:29 Nine VS
l;9VS 2019:38 Ah tower nine VS how about a circle beck to i t we could

keep the runway in sight
TIIR 2019:-'•2 Unable I got jet traffic inbound make a left turn to 1.1
one haadiD~ of one nine zero climb to twenty five
hundred and go back to approach on one t>ighteen four
N~)VS ?019:51 Nine VS

·.
TIME
1~1I:.~ 2020:06 Si:t. five tango right to :~rr1; ni.11e :::ero cont!lct
departure now 011e- one eigl!t point four
565T 2020:ll Sb: EivlO tango so long
Ti{({. 2020: 12 So long
'i'·T~'. 2020:26 Hot•il romeo poeition an<l holtl <>n two t"'o left
NLtHP.. 2020:28 Roger
TlYR 2020:53 Four hotal r011BeO maintai11 tvo thousand feat now
until further advised
N4HR 2020:58 Kay maiutain two thoua&nd
TH!' 2021: 00 Okay four hotel roaeo runway t = tuo le l't cle.ar10d
for takeoff maintain a beading of two two ><ero
N4HI·~ 2021:06 Two twenty ou the headinf roger
DI.567 2021:50 Delta five sixty aeven's Kedzie
'lW:( 2021:52 Delta five eixty eeven three one left cleared to
land report the ·runway in eight
DL.5 6 l 2021:57 Will cfu
TUR 2{)22:02 trour hotel romeo contact departure. now on one one
eight: point f.our good day
H4!1R 2022:06 So long you .. 11
Dt5ti'l ?022:58 And the runway in sight fl.'re ah six seven
nm 2023: 01 Cleared to land and I'd appreciate a brak.lng report

from you the san rutlW4ly ha8 been sanded ~ith uarea
JJL567 2023:06 Okay
':'WR 2023 :44 U..lta fiva Bixty aeven a right turn at the end and
taxi aaat. Cleared across three one right than
cba11l!e to ground on the othl!r side and hov'd you
find the braking
Par,1· J
THIE
207.3:.53 Ah on the 1 anding ~nd i t ah oeemed alt re..<!. good bur·

down fth this end its a little bit ah not quit<A so
good, I'd say itl but about falr down here
Okay thank you
20?4 28 And ah five oix aeven wae cleared acroae the oth._,,.
runway right
..:...,r-,..
{' Y641 air cleared acro"a and ah and juot better yet
make anot:her right -turn taxi aoutheaat that: ah
equi:p•mt i8 ~oun.a ba holding foT you
:JT.,5 (, 7 20?4 · l.;-1 On the TUnway oluty

I
~r;1.''.:. ?.024:51 And Tower nil:,. VS ie at Ked:r.ie inhound
"'~ 11\. 7.02'" 54 Nine victor aug&r r:unway one ah three one left
clearad to land re?OTt the left run""Y in sight
r1~.~v;-; 2024:59 Nin" VS
~r~ 2C 2025:21 Ah Midway Tower Police Copter thre<i two golf
.!.'1,-{J:'. ?.l'7.5 ; 2(· Three ~ golf Midway
;'[i~;· 2025. 28 Ah three two golf 11 on the south rawp sir, I'd ~.ik"
a s~i&l vn northbound
:;AS53 2025. 33 And tli.ch1ay Towar United tive five three were out of
three for two
·~1;.;r~ 2025 ·)7 United five five three report paasine the outer
mark.e.r > ntJ"Jd>er two in tlte. :lp!?rCIBch
l ~l,,~S:.~ 2025 :42 Okay report the outeT marker
'i.'\!!Z 2025 :45 Police copter three tvo golf hold on the e;roun<l
J~i.'":. 2025 ;l;B Three two golf
'('1·.t[ ~ 2025 ·SC Nine victor &~what's your airspe"d

Page 4
2025: 53 Ah iJere down to n hundred .and t""8n.ty k.not11
T\-iP. 2025:55 You'ra a hundred .and t\lenty oka.y
1026:00 Delta i1t the n.eirt intersectiou make a left turn ah

northll4llt thm a right turn into the gate, cliange
to ground When you're clear of the runway, could
you l!>qle<lite for me please.
DL567 2026:08 Surely
U"5:i3 2026:28 United five five thr- and ah Kedaie inbound
f'\.~R 2026:33 United fiva five three continue inbound. You're

numb_. tWD au the a.ppr<>ach. I.' 11 keep you advb ed.
UA553 2026 :37 Okay
tf9'1S 2026:38 And n1.ne VS hu the runway
TWR 2026:39 Nine VS Tutway thraa one laft ci.arM to land

Ff9VS 2026:43 Okay
·;:im 2026:45 Nine \18 do you have the right runway in aight by i1ny
chance
:!9 v:::' ?.026; li-13 Af f irmnti v.,

Th'l! 2026: !+9 Could you swing over to that ona and laru:l., there's a
.1 ct about two and dieregard that, okay I e"e you now,
you're cle~red to land on thirty ona laft.
7.027 . 02. United five fifty threa execute " milised appro<lcb
ma.ke a left turn to a heading of one eieht zero climb
to two thousand
\f!.'553 2027: r.c Okay left turn heading one eight ze..ro left turn okuy
'J.1·'ff~ ?.0.'2.7: l.2 Yes sir a left turn to one eighty
''"r;I 2027: lfi

l .• ~ Nine victor sugar I'm sorry ah out th<'lt \·There do
-'"OC
want t:o park on the airp<>rt
2027: 22 Wer" !fOin& to Ilut:ler
202?: '.~3 l!!xpedit" to t.h<a ond pl..aoa. MAke • <'i&ht t:urn 1mn
ele«red to er.a. rtl.tl.\My thr .. e one riaht.
:~027: 26
202} :28 Ah you got a patch of low cloud• right there . - r

th<l approach end of the runway and }"CIU dau' t • •
tha runway till -yo.a on tcrp of it.
TWYl 2027 32
TIIR 2027 :36 !Jnited five five thr- eenl:a<:t departure control
now - one eight !>4Jint four
1;7t~3·r_, 2027:45 Ah Midway uven zero faur thr"0 Una coming up
on Ked"iA
nm 2027. :~g Four thr•• ltma report pa.•ing K&dzie

TWf~ 2027: 50 United five fifty three did you copy
TTIT~ 2028; .c 9 United fiva fii,. thr... do you rend
'i:\~n ;;028:35 United five fifty thr.... Midway

Tr,.,,'R 2028: Sl1 Unit ad five fif'ty three do you read
'J.'\iJR 2029: ,;.3 Unit6d five !ifcy three Htd-y i f you read contttict:
0 na:r~ ou o~ one eight point four
1
1J1H:l\C!. l'lU. >iA 1 ~j"
flx:hib1 I. No. 3ll
NA'l'IONAI, '.l'll/\NGPORTATION S/\FJ<:TY BO/UID

'tlashington, n. r.. :-:0591
PERSONNEL STATEMENTS
Midway Ai:rport Traffic Cont:r<>l Tower
570() Soutl" Cteero A•enue
Chiell&O, Illinois 60638
Decedler 8, 1972
i1y name i3 Jnck E. Marr,otta. My addr..,.a is 614ll South Kolin Avenue.

Chicago, Illinois 60629. I ,... amployed a. an Altabt4nt Chief AJ.r Traffic
Conl.:rallu by tba ~edarsl Avl.aU,on AdlooilliatraU.on at tha Midway Attf>91't.
Tt&ffic Control Tower, Chi~, Illtnoia.
During the period 1400 GMT Deceiober 8, 1912 to 2200 Gift Dacmabsr 8, 1972
I was on duty in the lli.dway . T - . I _ . wwki.11¥ the Loe&! C.Ctrol
~ositiou from 1924 GMT to 2040 Gier J>ecembtir 8, 1972.
At approximately 2025 GMI United 553 called laavit1£ 3000 for 2000. This
was the first contact I bad with Uni&<MI 553. I t:h9'l 1-W at the radar
duplay to sea hm.r far Untted "3 - bellW - Aero Cc 4a, Jl309"m,
..tao had p:uviou.aly r~rud ~1.ua tha llL o...ter llllrk«. I ®••Nil
N309VS atod Uni.ted 553 _,;e ~ two and - U l f (l\) t41 clu'ee (3) 11fl-
apart = tlla radar di.apl&)'. I &dyiead lhrlt.ed 553 he - I a t - on
the approach ~ I would kee> him &:fviaed. I then aaUli. ~ .._his
airspeed "'14 Aud he said, llt ~. Unj.tilt '53 ched:ia4 nu tM 3U. Ovtar
!~ket: !afore ll309Yll repo~ the ~y hi. •iglat:.
After lO{)<IVS t1'f>Orted tha ~ 1n •iaht, 1 aH.d UM cwlcl ch-.e <>YU

and land on 3llL I trum ,.,... that 113eM - Uo close to touch-do¥& to
chAnse runways And recleared hba to la.I 01l :n La!t. I t:bmt told lhdted
5.53 to execute a mined appro.m:h, - U a left turn bud.Ui& i.aOO, and climb
to 2000 feat. At this poiJlt .lln:lted 5$3 waa a.pproxbutely o.w and aaa·half
(1:1.;) miles fr°"' the end of t:f1~ r~, ad 'loecauM Gf cu cowl.1t:t.on of tht
runways , I didn't think ltlOflS ~cl e1-'. tlMa rum~ bet.e h.Ued 553
crone.cl the approa<tb ...i of eh.e rmwsy.
Uriit:ed 553 4cicru>wledg«l the llli»aed approach i.natruc.ti<>ns. I then chauged

United 5.53 t<> departur<> an.U:ol «1 113.4 wu1 !ltld rec.etved "'° reply. I then
looked at; the i:ad= display to Ne if tfl!iited .553 waa t:XllC1>ti.t>g the lllissed
approach, 1>ur becDUHe of " target that , _ on final f<>r o•nc. 32 Left,
1 couldn't &ee United 553 ou the radaic d1,aplay. I then attellpt:ed to eoatact
United 553 agAin, bot received no reply.
Midway Airport Traffic Control Tower
5700 South Cicero Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60638
January 10, .1973
My name is Jae:: E. Margotta. My address is 6148 South Kolin Avenue,

Chicago, Illinc-d.s 60629. I am employed as an Assistant Chief Air Traffic
Controller by the Federal Aviation Administration at the Hid<.-ay Airport
Traffic Control Tower, Chic<!go, Illinois.
During the period 1400 Gr.IT December 8, 1972 to 2200 GHr December 3, 1972
I was on duty in the Midway Tower. I """' working the Local Control
Position from 1924 ill-IT to 2040 GMr December 8, 1972.
During the time United 553 was on the approach to the airport, the high
intensity rumvay lights on Runway 31L were set on step 5, and the P..unway
31L ruil<Jay end identifier lights s:witch was in the ''On" position.
ad R.~a<-q~
V;~ E. Margoda
tlid.,•.ay .\.lrpoirt Traffic Control T""1<lr
5700 S!Jltcil Cicco A-ft<me
Chi~. !111-111 ~3
Dec""""'8r 8 , l9 72
Hy ,....., i• Albert II. Del>aav. Mo' addr-a u 5520 o..kdsl• Dri..,.., oak Lam.
Illblois f.66S3. I = tllipl.,,..d u ait Aa.iatllnt C2i:1-1'. by the W ir al
Aviation Adsdnillerttion at ti. Mt.i-y li~ ?Taffi<: C~l 'f'lllWow,
CbiellgO, Illin<>b.
During the .,erioo 1400 QI! ~ 8, 1912 to 2.200 llHl a.cam-- B, 1972
I "113 the ll&t:ch ~-.
At app'"'''r~aly :wza GMr ll.-c-*>eT a, 1972, r hes1f t:hs Local ~ll&r

a.t tell[Jtf.Ag to coni.:act Uaited SS3 on 118. 7 lllll&. I uM4 l:fle L4>cal C..CrellM
"'1at was --w;, ad h.r a.id Oat he bad 1--1 mise.pf .,pr a -t ~tioc.I
to Unit¢ 553 btil""5<1o h• - to& c l - to ll9Wll, 1111111 tlMit hi& tsaet W
disql't'ar...t fr= too r.ttt ..,_.... At :Pll'41lfmat:-el.:r 2030 G:ll!r I ~beil
cal i•
" t&la~ =11 from fflJl Raili.• &t.&t!ioa. -6 he Mid t1lail:. a T#i.t- lwl
>tqin& - aircraft Ui a· ' • ill cM Yiet.-.tty ol 9t. i.-t. ..r
Lawnhl• 6-Ni.. , - " ~ __. 1 _ . . . , . . _ o&!W alsl....... o:f- abcraft
cruh U 119't Stl'ff't *"4 t ·1 hl•.
I the callei- t<> --1.t a~. and d.nce ~ - • a ~edhilily

aglitq,i
that:Unit.<! S53 h.U cruhed, t told cb co Coowdhats to -,Uy th•
Chl.,.. Ike Dlf rtwwt and the l'lf.ekt llat6 - to ~t:ie t:lK l'otice
~· I t:ha1l tol.I the 4iliiu tMi: a U'atted fliahc ftad diem1;ear0d
from our raikr acep<!. dlani.d 9* ,elltlemm for lab Udw at!.im, ail
h"ng up. I ~ told the 1.<Jcal ~U.ar c. c.~ •ppruct..a w 41L
Hy name is C.r ald M. Pinto. Hy addraaa is 55 H. Che&tnut St:reet, Clacago,
Illinois 60610. I """ OS!ployed u an air traffic cQntrolbr by the F..derlll
Aviation .Adaiui¥tra.t:ion at. the !t1AlioRy Ai>rport Traftie Cowtrol T......-, Clticago,
Illinoia. I -.» on duty at tlle ~ 1'.ower fr°"' 1400 GMI t• 2200 Ql!f
Dec.,..r 8, 1972. Betwun the hllllU%'S <>f 1!124 GHr t• 2040 Qtt on~- 8,
1972, I _ . wocking the cab Cooriind.or !'oat.tioli.
A.t approx1-taly 2026 GMT, after cool:dinal:ion with t!N< Leeal Ceaeroller, I
infor-.d Chicago Approach Control via im:erpho1» tb&t Uftited 553 - l d ba
on a missed approach bec.wa" of iruou,fficient s-ep•ration tr.. p~.-ling
traffic. I infornied Aff'l"oec:h of Wat h-diug and altitude - l d he Uaued
to United 553. I tben uUyed thi.JI t<>. Loc&l Co>Krol at llt~. 1 hearil
the ~1 Cont:rolls Uett6 ~ app~ hatr11etiana to United .5S3 and
t:hs aeltnowUdgemint: by trn:kM SS3.
After a short tt.e I n<>tiead ..,. t~t - redas'. I ~tt<>&ed the~

Controller to see if ha hat! radio com:ect with Unted 553. liter ~ybg
that he did oot, - ·c~ that nti.thec •f ua were OlaarvUJa hi.&:ed 5.53
on radu &lld ne ttaa-1.e~ ware r.ceived~· Suwal I 111th• 'lllilre lmda
by - to ,lpp'coach c..trol o1 •ha . - nebre. Ro C91lt&Ct ...... utmlistwid.
Approximately thrae (3) 1llimltfl after tbe last interphone conversati<>n, I

relayed to AppToach Control t:kt I had been' 1.nfermed tha.t: it irpp.ared
United 553 had crash~. I oa:l4 tb&t I l30!ll.d k6ep hill! ...tviud.
I later a.d'viJled AJ'P1"onch Oontvol that

thb =<;ident """'
(7~
co.u.£7.
. ); . ·' .
( ·;:r, I
/ /y.__,1,JI., f;I
I /
I, /,,._, .. '.
Carald 11. Pinto
,.uum<:r 'Il!.nHlC CUllTBDL 'IOW&ll
CbicaKO'"(l 'llaze I.ut.erua tiooa l Jdr 1;ort.
P.O. Box 66036
ChiCM!I<'• Illinois l>Uo.66
Tlw foll.ouiati i• a rttpert concernin.g an noeidaat tD aircratt I.IA 553

at Cllicago • n
Ulloill; a
Dac....ar 1'172 at 2029 Qft.
il-,r - is .JGlm .J. BollJ!An. My .~. . U 900 W111U.- Court.

SclulWlllMag, lWooia. I - ~lo~ a• ao Air Traffic <:onuol
S?flCblUt oy ·the Fadlmtl kriad.on t.dld.ntattatJ.- • t Clat&a.,-0 'Hara
lDt.ecwti 1 AU-port ' - • CllUa-99. llu...Lla.
I
I 11u.r1.ag tba period 1300 to 2100 GIG'.. a n t er 1972. I va• on ~ in
c ·
i the O'llan ~. I - -ld.ag the - d i ..Ull.Ua PentiGll fnm

1941 to 2034 QG:.
I At approxi-.uly 21.U!n, ...... a »3 wa f i - .ailaa -a-•t of Pbat
I i-aeci;ioo., be - f l h.lladej)ZOJli..Uly four to f i - mil••
fr<M tae Kadd.e outer .rm, I ~ UI. 5.53 to redscs t:e hi•
appco&dl apeed t:o -inata ~atioa U - •t:lt19W..
1'09'9S we a11
~ on the appaadt ~ of lJ4 .5.53 llad bad pnry.t-...ly
a-.:..wd a .t.... prC>rl-te4 ~ titles fftla hdda a.ur -rlall,
1 iutwcr:a4 b1a to c~ * * - r - 118. 7.
When llA 553 - · ~~ tv<J •ad --botli ail.ea - ilaal,

lti-..y tuwei: adnllCd tMy ~ ¢Jig te at-
him a lid.Had app-rcacla
t>«cau.. be _ . coo cl<>se l:Q 009n. l!tt._y topr ·~ by talepb_.
thDt UA 553 - lloeina 1.-d • ka11't ... of uo"' au - •~Lt.de of
2000 feet. l>y Midluy ~. ~. I -il'•ii that. OA 5S3'a
l:arpt • B dri.ftillg •lightly to Qt rt~. ~·tf•~•ly ~ftar
the !IA 553 taq;et diM?l>6--1 kGm ta. re<lar aeo~. M14wy i:-r
callad - atM1 a.almd. if l - • WkkiBC UA. SS3. I ~liH tMC I ws
not: -ldl>g DA 553. I ftl)lied. tbat ~ 5SJ had di~ ttOll ary
=•x -pa.
n.. opentiellal COllliaar-Uoa of CM - - -telllte pGl>i.U- rl>daT
i!COP8 (IJi:lS
Ill, Type 11) vea ...SJ-tad - Lelt.a- chrlng tlHt porl<>d
I had !IA 553 ~ BY coattol:
'. 'i
/-;c/6{~,":_
/
I
2.
The A81l wa .<Xl ciw1111>el S ao.4 l uad t.he llCOp
i!1tmuiity, Jal gai.U Ml for ~1 la:.>ala with lin&tr poLtriwt:lon on.
The· !Ci'I ;gatlag -• adj-ted wt to 40 ld.lAa •
.--)
(
!
·;,'.,,.--
1c· .;•
I j'
• '"-
{
/ _.,
/"' ;t
~I l~"l •.
,,. • - /: / f .__ ..
.·::· '/
. jl}Jilf J •. !.W.DW1li
ATC8(T.)
~ig· :t~.r.w una:AH. ~
Clli.c•&O""O'lkra Inten.a:U.cmal Airport

!'. o. lox °'636
Chic.aio, llliDoia 6~
The folt!Alin~ ia a Tito><>rt concerniq "'" accidoent to aircraft UA 553

8t CJtlcago, llll1110b; i Dec ...... r 1972 at: 2029 GKI.
!Cy name is Byr<>n ll. 'tri9bla.tty addreff 14 7201 l<Mpeadaw, ~

Paick, IlUaoi.4. l ..,. .-plo,ed aa - Air 'fnffk Coattol Speciallat
by the Federal A'l'iat1- Adld:•iattaUoi> at Cdup O'lllR9 IIU:emaU.-1
Airi>()t't ~r, Cbicap, llli-1a.
Dtlring tfte period 1230 t. 2034 ·Qa • i lJec 'er 1972, 1 - • oa dnty
in th4! o•u.ra 1'-. 1-• tile ActiA& t . . ~aor Ln charge of
0 'Bare I11l ~ f:rc. 2010 . . JOJ4 cmr.
At l~ -dJls f f tea. ...perviaior ill CIUrl!IB of
local (2029Z} whila
t:aa In.=-· I - • nodtte;t ~Hr • .i-. laW&, tba -Ch At.alliw
costreller, of tM poa.. M~ duct 9Gf .... 5.SJ Ud ...- <kMa while
OB - D'JI. appr'CMl:c:h to C:W-• Ml$ S, airport. Ba antt4 . . all lJ'1
lftrlp on ta SSJ cBli l vro« tba tu. et 202• - t:a. a-L I aa.d
Mr. 1!111 ldlri.• u cocfira dliat. Jll. .7 r-. -• aR: talk1ac bl IJA 553.
l coutacted taa O'llare allai!IAll& mu.f 1a the ~ cu &ad M>t:l.£1.ed
him. of tile 1.Dci.dl!nt. *·
Otl the gro.md appro411Steq - -.t •taalt .U- t - a..,,
k W • "GPff• d that tlA 553 - • dsftaLtel.y
airport:.
l thee ma arr-as ta to Mirk tlla _ . d e r ta.-a. reli.eve t:be
controllers - " ' &.. tbeir r rtU-, aad i a f - tile tacil:lty
deputy chief of all av•ll•hla p;artl.cCllare -Hlliag UA 5Sl.
r· ( ,
n~~(.~. ~~· "' ,: .. 1•.

Acting 'taa. Supervisor
-- \
.,- . NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAl[ETY BOARD
Washington, D. c. 2059i
I
I
ERRATUM TO ATC GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF IlNESTIGATION
·.
·...
by
.Lloyd C. LaGrange
'
ERRATUM TO THE ATC REPORT OF THE ACCillENT INVOLVING UNITED AIR
LINES, INCORPORATED, FLIGHT 553, A BOEING 737-222, N 9031U, ON
DECEMBER 8, 1972
I. INTRODUCTION
Tpis erratum page corrects erroneous infonnation contained in the

initial report. The correction has been determined to be essential to
the report.
II. HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT, page 3, last paragraph.
The third sentence which reads:
At 2025:45 UA 553 was ~hanged to the Mbw tower frequency.
should be changed to read:
At 2025: 25 .UA 553 was cr~anged to the MDW tower frequency.
~µ{!_, ~fdw~
Lloyd·c. La Grange
February 23, 1973
·..
'
NATIONAL TRANSPOfilATION SAFETY BOARD
Bureau oi' Av.iation Sai'ety
ADDENDUM TO ATC GROUP CHAIFMAfT'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
BY
IJ.oyd C • La Grange
ADDENDUM TO THE ATC REPORT OF THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING UNITED
AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, FLIGHT 553, A BOEING 737-222, N903lU,
ON DECEMBER 8, l972
I. INTRODUCTION
This addendum has been prepared to include more precise

in.fonnation pertaining to the time seg_uence during which UA 553 was
reg_uested to comply with ATC speed restrictions and descent clearance.
II. DELETION
Delete the third complete paragraph on page three.
III. INSERTION
Insert in lieu of the third paragraph:
The Chicago approach controller issued clearances to

UA 553 for speed reductions and for descent in the following
sequence:
202l:55 United five five three slow to hundred eighty knots.
2023:l5 United five five three slow to hundred sixty knots.
2023:20 Yes sir then descend to ah two thousand feet United

five five three.
(The ARTS III printout indicates that UA 553 was maintaining

an altitude of 4,ooo feet and a ground speed of 2l0 knots when
the descent clearance was issued).
2023:45 United five five three start slmring to your approach

speed please.
(The ARTS III printout indicates that UA 553 was still

maintaining 4,000 feet and 2l0 knots when the approach speed
clearance was issued).
- 2 -
The approach controller stated that UA 553 was vectored to
the localizer course for Rwy 3lL at a point approximately 2-3
miles from Calumet. The controller also stated that when
UA 553 became established on the localizer course, there were
approx:!mately lO to l2 miles between UA 553 and N309vs while
N309VS was on a downwind vector. The controller advised
UA 553 that ATIS I) MIW information Oscar was current.
~~,~~
Lloyd C. La Grange
February 22, l9T3
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 3A
NATIONAL TRANSPORrATION SAFE~'Y BOARD.

Bureau of Aviation Sa.fety
Wushingbon, D. C. 2059l
ATC GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORr OF INVESTIGATION
By
LloyQ C. La Grange
. ~- '
Docket No, SA 435
Exhibit 3A
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SJ\FF:TY BOARD

Washington, D'. C. 2059l
ATC GROUP CHA1RMAN'S FACTUAL REPORr OF INVESTIGATION

DCA 'T3-A-3
A. ACCIDENT
Location: Approximately l . 'T statute miles southeast of Midway

International Airport, Chicago, Illinois
Date December 8, l9'T2
Aircraft: United Air Lines, Inc., Flight 553, a Boeing

'T3'T-222, N903lU
B. ATC GROUP
Chairman: Lloyd C. La Grange, Air Safety Investigator, NTSB
Member Captain D. A. Doud, United Air Lines, Inc.
Member Captain Richard P. Schultz, ALFA
Member Richard P. Shaf'tic, PATCO
Member Donald A. Willis, FM
c. SUMMARY
United Air Lines, Inc., Flight 553 (UA 553), a scheduled air carrier
flight, crashed approximately l.'T statute miles southeast of the approach
end of Runway 3l Left (Rwy 3lL) at Midway International Airport (MIW),
Chicago, Illinois. The accident occurred at approximately 2028:00 !Jon
December 8, 19'T2.
Six crewmembers and fifty five passengers were aboard the airplane
when it descended into a residential area. Three crewmembers and forty
passengers received fatal injuries as a result of the ground impact and
subsequent fire. Two additional persons who were in the area of the
crash site also received fatal injuries.
i/ All times used in this report are Greenwich Mean Time, based on the 24-
hour clock unless otherwise noted.
- 2 -
1. History of thc Flight
UA 553 departed Washl.nglun National ALi.:port (DCA), Wt1si1L11p;bm, D. C.,

at 1851:00 on December 8, 1972. The flight proceetlcd. in accorrlancc wi·i;h :;.r1
instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance to tho Midway Airport (MIM), Chicago
Illinois, via the Casanova (CSN), Virginia, VORTAC g/, Jet Airway 149 (J 149)
to Fort Wayne (FWA), Indiana, VORTAC, and thence via the 311° radial of ~VIA
and the 097° radial of the Chicago Heights (CGT), Illinois, VORTAC to CGT
direct to MDW.
After radar contact was established with DCA Departure Control,

UA 553 was cleared to maintain 7,000 feet J/. Departure Control effected
a radar handoff to the Washington ARTCC !±/ (Washington Center) when the
airplane was 10 miles northwest of the airport. UA 553 received progressive
altitude clearances from air traffic control (ATC) to a final assigned
altitude of Flight Level 280 2) (FL280). Washington Center initiated a
radar handoff of UA 553 to the Indianapolis ARTCC (Indianapolis Center) at
1916:12 as the flight was approaching the Elkins (EKN), West Virginia,
VORTAC and after the 'f-light had reported reaching FL 280.
While under the control of the Indianapolis Center, UA 553

traversed through the airspace of the Charleston high altitude sector, the
Appleton high altitude sector, and the Dayton high altitude sector. UA 553
requested a turbulence report from the Dayton high altitude sector controller,
and the controller advised that turbulence was reported at FL 280, FL 310,
and FL 350. UA 553 then requested and received clearance to descend to
FL 260. UA 553 was maintaining FL 260 when the Indianapolis Center effected
a radar handoff of the flight to the Chicago ARTCC (Chicago Center) at
1954:00, as the airplane passed north of the Rosewood (ROD), Ohio, VORTAC.
At 1954:40 Chicago Center received a request from UA 553 for a
lower altitude because "its bumpy here." At 1957: 00 UA 553 was cleared to
maintain FL 240 and the flightcrew reported reaching this altitude at
1959:50. At 2005:05 UA 553 received the Chicago altimeter of 30.04 and
Chicago Center cleared UA 553 to descend to 11,000 feet. One.of the
Chicago Center controllers recorded on a flight progress strip that UA 553
passed FWA at 2001:00. While under the control of Chicago Center UA 553
was subsequently cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, to fly a heading of
290° to intercept the MDW Rwy 31L localizer course, and finally, to continue
A colocated VHF Omnidirectional Range and Tactical Navigation Aid. These
facilities are capable of providing distance information as well as azimuth
to aircraft having distance measuring equipment (DME) on board.
J/ All altitudes referred to in this report are mean sea level altitudes unlccs
otherwise indicated.·
~/ Air Route Traffic Control Center. These facilities are established to
provide air traffic control service to aircraft operating on an IFR flie;ht
plan within controlled airspace and principally during the en route; phase Of'
flight.
A level of constant atmospheric pressure related to a reference datum of
29.92 inches of Mercury. Each level is stated in three digits that represent
hundreds of feet.
- 3 -
descent to 4,ooo feet. UA 553 reported leaving 6,ooo feet for 4,ooo feet
and Chicago Center effected a radar handoff and transfer of control of
UA 553 to Chicago Approach Control~/.
UA 5 53 was eg_uipped with a tr:rns1ionrl.cr wHh 4096-code cnpn.bili ty,

and with Distance Measuring Eg_uipment (DME). While UA 553 was .Ln the cm
route phase of the flight, each con l:rolln r wh<> received n rn.ilo.r hmia c;ff
identified UA 553 by means of the Im:NT rentnrc of the trnnspondcr. UA 553
was assigned discrete beacon code 0'(12 by the Chicago Center prior to
transfer of control to Chicago Approach Control.
UA 553 was preceded on approach to MDW by N309VS, an Aero Commander

680, and by Delta Airlines Flight 567 (DL 567), a DC 9. The pilot of
N309VS elected to terminate his first approach by executing a missed
approach, and the Aero Commander W'as subseg_uently vectored back to the
localizer course by Chicago Approach Control for a second approach to MIJW.
DL 567 completed a landing from his approach, conseg_uently landing ahead
of N309VS. DL 567 thus became the first airplane to land on Rwy 31L a:fter
the Midway Airport Traffic Control Tower (MIM Tower) had effected a change
in the direction of landing operations.
The Chicago approach controller reduced UA 553 to 180 knots, then

to 160 knots, and-at a point approximately 4 to 5 miles from the Kedzie
outer marker-the controller reduced UA 553 to his approach speed. The
approach controller stated that UA 553 was vectored to the localizer course
for Rwy 31L at a point approximately 2-3 miles from®alumet. The approach
controller also stated that when UA 553 became established on the localizer
course, there were approximately 10 to 12 miles between UA 553 and N309VS
while N309VS was on a downwind vector. The controller advised UA 553 that
ATIS J} MIM information Oscar was current.
At 2024:45 N309VS was changed to the MDW Tower freg_uency. The

approach controller stated that there were approximately 3. 5 miles spncing
between N309VS and UA 553 at this time, and he felt that this separation
would remain constant. At 2025:45 UA 553 was changed to the MDW Tower
freg_uency. At 2026:25 MIM Tower advised Chicago Approach Control that
UA 553-would be givenamissed approach. At 2027:02 the tower local
controller issued clearance to UA 553 to execute a missed approach. At
2027:10 UA 553 acknowledged for the missed approach clearance. This was
the final ATC recorded transmission from UA 553. N309VS landed without
reported incident on Rwy 31L.
The Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON) located at

O'Hare International Airport. This facility provides radar approach
control service for the Chicago, Illinois, metropolitan •1reo..
II Automatic Terminal Information Service. This is a service which provides
advance information to arriving and departing pilots concerning operational,
meteorological, and Notice to Airmen data. This is accomplished by means of
a controller-prepared tape which is continuously broadcast on a voice
outlet. Each message is identified by a specific phonetic alphabet ccide.
- 4-
The Chicago approach controller stated that after MIW Tower had
coordinated with him regarding the missed approach clearance issued to
UA 553, he noticed that the radar target for UA 553 was drifting
approximately 1/8 to 1/4 mile to l;be right of course. The approach
controller observed the course deviation for two sweeps, after which
the target disappeared from the r11dar scope. The approach controller
stated that he did not see any other targets in the vicinity.
2. Navigational Aids
There were no reported malfunctioning en route or terminal

naYigational aids considered pertinent to this accident.
UA 553 was executing a localizer approach to Rwy 31L at MIM.

Localizer course information only is proYided on this approach; no glide
path is associated with this procedure. The fix utilized in determining 'f-
the appropriate descent altitude when executing this approach ·is the Kedzie
outer marker. The approach procedure is depicted on Jeppesen Approach Ch~rt
number 11-2 for Chicag9, Illinois, dated November 24, 1972.
As noted on the approach chart, the minima applicable for a

straight-in landing on Rwy 31L utilizing this procedure were minimum descent
altitude (MDA) 1,040 feet and visibility one mile. The approach is conducted
on a localizer transmitting on a frequency of 109.9 Mhz. The inbound course j.
is 312° • The published missed approach procedure specifies a left turn and
climb to 2,6oo feet inbound to the Peotone (EON), Illinois, VORrAC via the
001° radial.
The following navigational aids for MIW were flight checked

subsequent to the accident on December 12, 1972, and certified to be
operationally normal by the Federal AYiation Administration (FAA).
1. Localizer (Rwy 31L)

2. Compass Locators
3. Mhz Markers
4. Lighting System
Additionally, the following notation was recorded on the FAA Flight

Inspection Report:
Radar vectoring service by Chicago Approach Control was used by the

flight check aircraft for the initial and missed approach portions
of the LOC Rwy 31L approach and the NDB Rwy 31L approach. The
performance of all parameters of the facilities used to support
these procedures was satisfactory.
3. Communications
En route and terminal air/ground cormnunications between UA 553 and

applicable ATC facilities were without reported discrepancies as the flight
progressed. UA 553 communicated with Chicago Approach Control on 126.05 Mhz
- 5 -
nnd with MDW 'rower on 118. 7 Wm. UA 5'.]3 was in camnunl.eu.b:I on with MDW Towr:r
when loss of connnunication occurred llG " result of' the accident.
Intra-facility and inte-e-f,icility connnunications wore without

reported 'liscrepr1ncies at Chicngo Approach Control und at MIW Tower. Nu
commlmications from UA 553· were recorded on f;he emergency receivers
(121.5 Mhz) which were being moni. tored continously at Chicago Approach
Control and MDW Tower.
4. Facility Recording Equipment
Applicable terminal and en route ATC facility recording equipment

was operating satisfactorily. Communications between UA 553 and ATC were
cecorQed from the time of initial contact at Washington National Airport
until the airplane crashed short of RwoJ 3J.L at MDW.
Certified rerecordings and accompanying transcripts were prepared

by the FAA of communications between UJ\. 553 and Chicago Approach Control,
between UA 553 and MDW Tower, and between Chicago Approach Control and MIM
Tower. A certified rerecording of connnunications between Chicago Center and
UA 553 was provided also. The ATC investigating group monitored the original
recordings of communications between Chicago Center and UA 553, between
Chicago Approach Control and UA 553, and between MIW Tower and UA .553. The
original recordings also contained inter-facility connnunications.
The time signals recorded on the ATC tapes at the Chicago approach
control facility were provided by Audio Chron. Audio Chron is a connnercial
facility which provides recorded time signals for TELCO (Bell Telephone Cci.)
in the Chicago local area. Audio Chron time signals are obtained from radio
station WWV, Fort Collins, Colorado. V/VN broadcasts continously, except
45 to 49 minutes after each hour. Audio Chron time signals are ac_curate
to within tolerances of 4o· milliseconds.
Chicago Approach Control feeds time signals via land line to MDW,
Merrill C. Meigs Field ( CGX), Illinois, Dupage County Airport (DPA),
Illinois, and to Palwaukee Airport (PWK), Illinois. Prior to the December 8,
1972, aircraft accident, Chicago Approach Control checked the facility time j-
with 'l.'ELCO once a week. Since that date, the facility checks the time every
24 hours at night. The Chicago Approach Control tolerances are listed .CJ.s
I seconds.
5. Weather Data
The MDW surface weather observation which was recorded at 1951:00

(pr:or to the accident) was:
Measured five hm1dred variable overcast) visibility one mile)

fog, temperature 27, dew point 26, wind 260 degrees, at 6 knots,
altimeter 30"05.
The MDW surface weather observation which was recorded at 2033:00

. ( ;_. ~ f~illle of' accident notification) was:
- '
0 -
Measured five hru1dred overcast, visibility one mile, f'og,

temperature 27, dew poin'G 26, >rlnd 250 degrees at 6 kilots,
altimeter 30.05.
The MDW- surface weather "boervation which was recorilcd n.t 2041:00
(first report subsequent to· accia_ent) was:
Measured five hundred variable overcast, visibility two miles,

fog, temperature 27, dew point 26, wind 240 degrees a.t 6 knoto,
altimeter 30.05, ceiling vari.able 400 to 600.
'rhe MIM _A_TIS for 2018:05 was:
Tlli.s is Chicago Midway AiJ:1lOrt Information Oscar. Weather moasured

ceiling five hundred overcast visibility one mile in fog. Temperature
two seven dew point two six the wind two six zero at six the altimeter
three zero zero five. Localizer runway three one left approach in use
landing and departing runways three one. Runways three one have been
sanded and treated with urea. Braking a.ction on three one left
rcporteil fair by a Unitecl. Airlines seven thirty seven. Notice to
Airmen the runway three one left localizer frequency is now one zero
niner point niner. The east ramp is closed for construction f'rom
runway three one left north to the- A Concourse. Runway three one right
is closed to jet aircraft. Runway three one right threshold is
displaced one thousand feet northwest. Runways nine two seven eight-
een and three six are closed. Inform the controller on initial
contact that you have received information Midway Oscar.
6. Radar
Primar-~{ a11d/or secondary radar tracking continuity was rn:iinta:in(·rl

continuously by ATC from the time that UA 553 departed Washington National
AiJ:1lort until radar and radio contact were lost after the flightcrew 'J.cknowlodp;ed
:for the missed approach clearance from MIM Tower.
Chicago Approach Control is equipped with ASR-4 'i}_) radar. The radar
antenna is located at the O'Hare AiJ:1lort. The antenna rotates at 15 RPM.
When the accident occurred the facility was utilizing radar channel B e.nd
beacon channel 1. The controller had the beacon intensity, sweep intensity,
and MTI 21
gains set at normal levels. Linear polarization ~ was being
utilized. The railar scope was set at a range of 40 miles and offset
approximately 12 miles to the north. The MTI gate was adjusted to 4o miles.
'i}_) Search radar which provides azimuth and range information at lower
levels of :flight within approximately a 50 mile radi.us of the aiJ:1lort.
21 Moving Target Indicator - An electronic circuit that cancels or attenua.t8s
video signals derived from stationary targets while permitting sign~.ls from
moving targets to be displayed normally. This permits aircraft to be
tracked over areas of ground return.
~ Normal radar transmissions that will cause an echo from anythine; thr.tt rw.c
mass.
- '( -
1
ri; .. ru vnr.:: ;_:L:_i,f('f-d "vii !.i1 1;·1 C'.tir1Lr·cd.l.t:1·:;, i.t1l.·l11d.i irr~
J~tt.: TF_n
:··q). :·vLu111·y JH..!J'UCJtltHd.) \·Jhen tl1t.: :;.1·1·id.t·11L ••{'('l!l."l"t.:d. :111t{:l'l~ Wt;J'I' .•1!;;11
t.:-V'/'. i: ('ilirl:rol1.l·.ro 1)11 a:ut,y :ln Liu 0 1 !1_:t:r•1• 'J.=tlWl.'"t' c:i.IJ) .LucaLc:a. ahnvc~ \;}it~
IFF, ~·-:.!11n.
'i1ie:i1SO Cr:11ter ts not .NAE; 31;asc A 11/ 1:i1u.i1)J1e1.l.

Gon:. H1qu1·11!;.ly]
aut,Haated ARTCC inter:fncc \./ith Chicago Approach Control,
:. WJ
·.,,,, '· _,, :\!\TS III g/ equipped. The ARTS III equipment at Chicago
il.pp1·cach Control has the capability to identify and track d·lscretely
~ a,f,·'l 3.nd non-diGcretely coded beacon ta.rgets by automatic or ma11ual
•• 1
".cqul sl ti•)n. The alphanumeric tag or data block associated with the
''"~'''ld'lry target for UA 553 on the video display included identity,
c ·,mput•:>rl ground speed, and Mode C (beacon derived) altitude. The
ground speed as displayed in the data block was expressed in knQ'I.;:.;,
roJn<±"d nff to the nearest ten. The ARTS III system at the Chict<gG
App:c·:u.ch Control facility has undergone three modifications since the
time of installation .
.Baromctrj .c pressure, expressed. in inclies of mercury, is ,.n IJered

int• l;hc i\R.J'G III computer via tho alphanumerics (A/H) keyboar1.L. 1\
faci1-i ty computer specialist stated. that a barometric prc;ssure nf :29. ')2
is (;ltt.ered.. into the ARrS III computer every morr1ing. The comp11tcr
spec:: ·'l:l:J t checks the station altimeter as it appears hourly on the
fai..; 111. '..y elect.rut-rri ter and., whenever there i.s a reg_l1iremer1t for a r.ha11gc,
tbe ""'-" barometric pressure ;, s entered into the computer. The computer
uGeS lohis information to convert Mode C altitude data to indicated altitude
whir•!i is displayed in the d.ata qlock in increments of 100 feet. On the <late
of the accident the ORD barometric pressure input was 30.02 at 1820: 5'.i ancl
30.01' at 2100:50.
~lystem data accuracy is d.epend.ent upon the discretion of' the

cGr.1lntcr specialist in performing altimeter or time change functions.
T'ne s9ecialist obtains time information from Audio Chron. He is required
to cr•.eck the barometric pressure information against that which is
cur-vained in the published weather sequence, hourly or cpecial. Barometric
p,,-essure tolerances are !:. .02, the same tolerances which m-e applicecble
els•··•·cl·,e1·e in the ATC system. A correction factor can be applh>d. within
the l"lnge of the tolerances. otherwise, published weather sequence
information must be utilized by the com;puter specialist in perfonniug
altL~eter change functions~
• l . NG.tlonaJ. Airspace System Stage A - An automatea. system uJ:' (~n route :1,J r'
!:..:=/
tr::tffic cor1trol Tlfhit.!h pro1rides flight data processing and t'aci_tJ.r d:-,t.•i
TJl'l)cessing capability. The radar controller 1s position \>fill QJap·! r·J.Y
~.'lpha.numeric fligr1t data associated. ·with the secondary radn:r i;{1.1:r;c-:t·,.
12/ Automated Radar Terminal SystemIII - An automated system of termin:1 I . i r
t;ro,f fj.c control which provides flight data processing ancl raclar iht'"
rrocessing capability. The raclar controller's position will d.1sp1'i.,y
~lphanumeric flight data associated with the secondary rad<ir targ<:I;. ,
- 8 -
T!1e AKrS III systen1 J..s dea'.i.gned so tl1at 1vhenever a beacor1 t.r-i.ru:et
is lest P1' too weak to correlate - U:'!:' when there are too many targets in
the s81!1e immediate area - the trd.i.!k. Ls _placeJ. in a coast ota;tus . rmen
coe.s1.ing ;:iccurs. the computer m<nres the data block along a predicted pEl.th
basecl. •rp,··.u the sto:r-ed history of target -,relocity and position) and the
Tett---rs 11 t:ST 11 displace the Mode C deri>red a.ltitud.e ana. gro11nd spcell
'"'.r.c.t ··-- ,,c.. ·in i.n the data block. \,Then a beaco11 target correlates withlu
:; .. 'c. .o.· .... 3 (sweeps), the coasting track's d.ata block will be repositioned.
to the correlated. position by the computer. If no target correlation
oc~urs within three successive scans, the d.ata block is dropped. and. tho
f'-ircra~ identification is placed in the coas·t-suspeud list. ·
ARrS III flight d.ata inf.'onnatlon is stored. by the computer by

r ...~rins
of magnetic tapes. Such tapes were utilized. to obtain a. CDmJJU """'
1irintout uf the active tracks of UA 553, of N309VS, and. of DL 567 on l;he
d.ay c.f the accident. Data contained. in the printouts included. aircraft
id.er,tif'icdion (ACill), computer derived altitude (with the exception of
N309V8 wh•) was not replying on Mod.e C 13/), beacon cod.es, azimuth change
pulse (ACF), range (from radar antenna}, and. computed. ground. speed..
Computer printout d.ata was utilized. by the FAA to construct a graphic
LlisplP.y of the ground. tracks of UA 553 and. N309VS overlayed. on a Chicago
SectL,nal Chart. Similar ind.epend.ent activities were accomplished. by the
Natior.al Transportation Safety Board. and. by United. Airlines, with the
res1Jl ts tu be correlated as the investigation progresses. Additionally)
the Ff!..A c0mpleted. a graphic display of the secondary target tracks of
UA 553 and. ~!309VS overlayed. on a depiction (to scale) of the ASR-4 vid.eCJ
dis2lay 9.t Chicago Approach Control.
'l'he MDW Tower cab is equipped. with a BRITE 1 !!±} display. Th"'
i:li:-c;p~u.;:,.r
.;.s used as a sequencing aid by the to"rrrer contr·ollers and is
flormal ..ly set at a range of 20 miles, off centered..
Ad.d.itional Information, Approach Control
The controller who was responsible for the control of UA 553

(south satellite position) stated. during an infonnal interview
subsequeont to the accident that operations appeared to be nonnal whi.le
he ·,ras i.n communication with the flight. He observed. the respective
gro,,r:<lspeed.s for UA 553 and. N309VS to fluctuate between 110-120 knots.
'.C'he co:c.troller described. his ground. to air communications workload. r,s
norm8.l. However, he was also performing radar hand.off duties for tbr;
sector and. he described his coordination workload. as moderate to hcnvy.
Tb~ c0ntroller stated that he had received some icing reports from
pilots, ;.;lJich he relayed. to the supervisor. He stated. that he had. not
0een fl_•J:r-~.,:;t::d of runway braking conditions at MDil.
DJ -~- t... · J.·~ctable method or system of' interrogatior1 pro1.riding automatic

R.]:L; ·:.·ua.e reIJorting capability.
~q./ Br:t _;!1t Radar Ind.icator To1>rer Equipment-Electronic equipment allovring
"' ' .. •~nc; of radar indicators under bright sunlight or high ambient
·;·it'!'"; l1•g cor1d.itions ~
- 9 -
The approach controller stated during the inf onnal interview that
be nonnally issues approach clearances to aircraft inbound to MIM. He
stated that he was not aware that he harl not issued approach clearance to
UA 553 until he-listened to the ATC tapes subsequent to the accident.
The Tenninal Air Traffic Control Hanubook 7110.SB ~' Section 13,
Ps£e ll0-1, _paragraph 981, contained the following directive:
Issue approach or other clearances as required, specifying the

destination airport as the clearance limit if airport traffic
control service is not _provided, even though this is a
repetition of the initial clearance.
MIW Tower _provides airport traffic control service in accordance

with a letter of agreement, dated May 15, 1971, between the Chicae;o-
O'Hlre Tower and MIM Tower. Procedures specified in the letter of agree-
ment are supplementary to _procedures contained in Handbook 7110.SB.
The Chicago approach controller was assigned to work the day shift
(O'(OC-1500 c.s.t.) and he had had 16 hours off-duty time since working his
_previously assigned duty shift. The approach controller had a total of
fou:r years ARI'CC experience; two years at the Anchorage Center and two
years at the Chicago Center. He has had a total of six years of tenninal
ATC experience; two years at Elmendorf, Alaska, and four years at the
Chicago approach control facility where he is _presently rated as a fully
qualified journeyman controller. Prior to his employment by the FAA, he
served four years _with the United States Navy as a controller. Additionally,
he _possesses the following ainnan ratings~
Commercial Pilot
Airplane Single Engine Land & Sea
Certified Flight Instructor
Instrument Flight Instructor
The approach controller 1 s immediate supervisor ~s an activ«:'!

controller who was assigned to perform the duties of acting temu
supervisor at the time of the accident. He stated that he regularly
rotates control duties with supervisory duties. The supervisor had been
on duty in the tower cab for most of the day, and he had been _perfo1min3
supervisory duties in the IFR room for approximately 10 minutes when the
controller called for supervisory assistance. The supervisor then re-
corded the time of 2029: 00 on the back of the IFR strip for UA 553. The•
supervisor stated that there were two visitors _present in the facility at ·f---
-l:li-.'.3 time; but the visitors were not located near the control _positions.
Aftrn- it was confinned that UA 553 was on the ground short of the airport
runwdy, the supervisor made arrangements to mark_ the recorder tapes,
relieve the controllers from their _positions, and infonn the facility
deputy chief of all known. particulars.
Handbook 7110.SB was effective during the month of December 1972 but
has since been replaced by Handbook 7110.8c. The directive cited was
extracted from change 6 to Handbook 7110.BB, dated July 1, 1972.
- lO -
8. Additl.onal lni'ormation 1 MOW Tower
rhc·~ MIJN Tower local cnrrtrol:Ll•r i:;l,11.l,r:1J d.iu·J.ng nn inf<i1·mo.J pi.:.;l.-

1
nccltlent interview thnt he obse.rvctl appr.'l1x.1.m:tl;•oly 2,~- tn 3 milt;i; upncln1\

between N309VS ond UA 553 when he eotabllsherl cwlio conLac_t wlth UA '.i~i.
Hto ascertaineil thi.8 spacing by ob:;ervin;:i; tk, rwln.r /..:o.rgets for bot,h
airplanes on the BRITE l display, and he obocrvccl no apparent ilcvl1:t1.irfft
from the localizer course by UA 553. Re indicated that the rcq_tli rf>d
minimum separation between successive arrivals is 3 mi.Jes as stJ.pu.ln.Led
in ·Handbook fll0.8B. The local controller stated that UA 553 reportod
over the Rwy 3lL outer marker before N309VS reported sighting the runway.
After N309VS reported sighting the runway, the local controller ac;ked
the pilot if he could land on Rwy 31R. Innnediately thereafter, the
controller established visual contact with N309VS as the airplane was
passing over Cicero Avenue. At this point, the controller stated.
later, N309VS was too close to the touch-down point to change runways.
The. intersection of Cicero Avenue and 63rd Street was identified as beinLl
·at the southeast corner of the airport and approximately 5/8 mile from
the control tower. The controller cleared N309VS again to land on Rwy
3lL and he cleared UA 553 to execute a missed approach. The missed
approach clearance consisted of a left turn to a heading of 180° and a
climb to 2,000 feet. The controller stated that he riever established.
visual contact with UA 553. However, by observing the BRITE l display,
the controller ascertained that UA 553 was l t miles from the approach
aid of Rwy 31L when he issued the missed approach clearance. UA 553
acknowledged for the missed approach clearance. When the local cont.roller
attempted to change UA553 to the departure control frequency, he received
no reply. The controller then checked the radar display for an indication
s.s to whether or not UA 553 was complying with the missed approach
clearance. The controller stated that he saw only "a blob" which changed
to a double slashed target and progressed in the direction of O'Hare
Ai~port. He later determined that this was the target of an aircraft
inbound on a final approach for Rwy 32L at O'Hare Airport, and the
controller so indicated in a subsequent signed statement. The local
controller received no further communication from UA 553 after the
acknowledgement for the missed approach clearance.
All fully qualified MIW Tower controller personnel are certified

as surface weather observers by the National Weather Service. The local
controller stated that he made the surface visibility observation, current
at the time of the accident, by reference to the Cracker Jack Stack l~/.
lS/ A smoke stack located on the Cracker Jack industrial plant. This is
c.c-prominent landmark located near the Midway Airport and it is an authorized
fix used by the controllers for surface visibility observations. The
smoke stack is located to the south of the airport.
- ll -
There is no requirement for the tower local controller to j:;uue

airport approach clearance to arrJ.vol traffic. Handbook 7ll0-8B rcqwl.res
the local controller to issue lrmd:lne information, including clearance• Lu
·land.· The MIM Tower local controller d1<i not wivise UA 553 to <OXJK:ct. a
missed approach clearance, and he J.:: not reyui.rcd i.o do Ao.
At 2013:00, the activ<· runway fox- Mllfl was chex1ged f.rom l(wy l3H
';n R·ry 31L. The controller activ1.1tc:: the localizer for the nelcc:l.o:d
.''JnWay by pooi tioning a toggle switch. The toggle switch may be
positioned so that the localizer can be selected. for either Rwy l3R or
Tu-ry 3lL, but not for both runways siml.iltaneously. Twelve seconds
elapsed· time are required for the electronic equipment to cycle from on"
selected position to the other. The controller is provided with a
monitor panel which gives him an indication of the operational status of the
selected localizer equipment by the illumination of red or green lights.
The local controller requested a runway braking condition report

f:rom DL 567, the air carrier flight which landed ahead of N309VS. '.Ihe
reply from DL 567 was as follows:
2023:53 Ah on the landing end it ah seemed ah real good bt1t

down ah this end its a little bit ah not quite so
good. I'd say its about fair down here.
The high intensity runway lights (HIRL) on Rwy 31L were ucl: on
step 5 during the time that UA 553 was on the approach to MDW, and the
runway end identifier lights (REIL) switch was in the "ON" position. The
VASI-L lights were on.
The MDW Tower local controller had l2 years ATC experience at

the fltcili ty. He is currently designated as an assistant chief at the
Ml.M ..rower. He was assigned to the o8oo-l6oo c.s.t. duty shift and the
ac~ident occurred on the first day of his schedl.iled work week. The
loc•. ~- controller's background also includes 2~ years experience as an
air traffic controller with the United States Navy, and 13~ years
experJ.ence as a radio operator on a military flight crew.
The MDW Tower local controller was assisted by a cab coordinator

whu was responsible for interphone coordination with Chicago Approach
Control. The coordinator's operating position is adjacent to the local
controller's operating position in the tower cab, and he had an unobstructed
view of fue BRITE l display. The coordinator stated that he observed UA 553
to be approximately 2 miles behind N309VS when N309VS passed over Cicero
Avenue and 63rd Street. The coordinator alerted the airport fire department
a..'Od the Chicago Fire Department ( CFD) at the direction of the supervisor.
The tnw"r cab is equipped with a direct line to CFD, which the controller
;;.lert:i by pressing a button.
The tIDW Tower cab was supervised by an Assistant Chicf/8er1:i.c1r

Watch ~Jupervisor. The supervisor stated that, at approximate.l.y 21X::8: 00
1w hF>carre aware that the local controller had lost radio and ra.cl:n· contact
with UA 553, At approximately 2030: 00 he received a call from Ru.d.io Stati.on
- 12 -
WLS advisin£ him that a local resident had called the station with in-
formation that an aircraft had crnsl1cd in the vicinity of St . Louis anil
Lawnilale Avenues, anil another rr,r:J.rkrrt l:o.d called with information that
an .A.ircraft hail crRshed at 7lsl; Street allfl Inwndale Avenue. 'Tur·
supervi.sor instructed controller f.JUl"t:onncl to 11oti1'y CFD ond the polic:r:
ileparl;ment, ana. tu r:hrmge the e.ctivco rnnway Lo I0ry 4R. The supcr·v-·J.::•ir
stA.teil tM.t there were several clcvr' l.<lJlinCntal cnntrollcrs II} prr.::;• .rrl; i 11 +
the tower cab. The develo:pmentR.:L cuntro.Llt~.r.:.; vrcir-e si;o..ndin13 .in Li1c rc:~r
of the tower cab and .the supeJ"V:csor instructed them i;o go a.ownstn.irs.
Subsequent ini"ormal inteJ"Vicws with other FAA supeJ"Visory

personnel indicated· that there were no visitors present in the MJM Tower
cr:3.b when the o.c~ident occurred.
9, Flight Tests
A series of railar flight test runs were;, conilucto<l on D"cr.:rnbcc.r ·1.1+,

1972. The purpose of the flight teots was to verify the valiility of l'.ho
ARrS III computer printout data. The flight tests wore conductc'>rl by U1<
ATC invr=stigating group with the cooperation of the FAA and the United
States Coast Guard which provided a helicopter for the= first Gegment of
the flight tests. A member of the ATC investigating group was aboarrl
the helicopter ilurinc; the·test runs.
The helicopter was equipped with a radR.r 11.ltimeter and a four

digit transponder. The transponiler was located flush on the bottom oi'
the helicopter ne11.r the tail section. Since ARTS III is a be11.co11 trn.cl<i.nt'.
system, 'the difference in coni"iguration between the helicopter ml<l a
Boeing 737 was not considered a factor, Alphamnneric tac;s are proviclerl
for bE:acon targets only. During the flight test tho ASR-4 radnr '1t
Chicago Approach Control was set at a range of ~-0 ml.les and off-set
llJ miles to the northwest.
A. discrete UHF communications frequency was utill.zed for tho

first segment of the tests and there was no interference with nornnl
ATC operations in the Chicago terminal area.
When the helicopter was positioned visually over the cr0.sh oil;c:
by the helicopter flightcrew, the controller obtained a raile,r fix for the
crash site l! mile from the end of Rwy 311 and -/;- mile to the ric;ht 0f the
localizer center line. The helicopter was leveled off" at increments ,,f
100 feet and the helicopter flightcrew broadcasted the altitude. The
following data were obtained in the approach facility by members of thr,
A'rc investigating group:
flj A qualified air traffic control specialist who ls being l;:m.i.ru::•l

for a nevr position or procedure for career development.
- l3 -
/\ll.l'U HI 'J:MCK I 'I i.J:Mfll lY fU\]) I\ I\
I 'iO!J l'r., ·I. /\c• J, i Vl': None

li100 ['<:,,I: (\c· [;J '!'I: Nt1n1·
1.:::00 I'"" I: f\c' tJ. '10 Ijc 111c
L200 .l'<1ct f\.e·t,;:J.vr; rltn1c

1.100 J\:c L /\et Ive N()nc
1.000 feet Active None
Active l'f1.1ne
I 125 feet ')00 f'roet None
~adar -+ 800 feet CST
Altimeter)
The helicopter was facing northwest when the data.block indicated CST.
When the helicopter was positioned over the Kedzie outer marker
by the helicopter flightcrew, the controller obtained a radar. positi<>n fot·
Kedzie 3.4 miles from MIM and 18 miles from the radar antenna. The
following data were recorded:
ALTITUDE .(MSL) ARI'S III TRACK Plill!ARY RAD/\R
1600 feet Active Degraded

1500 feet Active None
900 feet Momentary
CST None
Boo feet CST None
On the first simulated localizer approach to Rwy 31L at MIJW,

the helicopter was descended to MDA. An active ARI'S III track was
retained during th.is test run.
On a second simulated localizer approach to Rwy 31L at MDW, the
ARI'S III track went into CST at 750 feet MSL and the following data were
recorded:
ALTITUDE (MSL) ARI'S III TRACK PRIMARY RADAR
1040 ·Active None

Active None
900
CST None
750
..
- 1 4 -
.The second. segment of tho flight test was nccomplished.,by
vectoring UA 553, the regularly scheduled. air carrier flight on
Deceinbe'r• 14, 1972, along the ''tJ>Jlt"llXImate flir.;ht track maintained. by
UA 55.3 qn .December 8, 1972. Thu "bsurvers noted. that· the seconclr1ry
rs.d.ar tareet ·for UA 553 was vin I Iii<! on i;he video display, at; 0hic1tgo
Approach .Control approximately ·1 () 11ri.les prior to the d.esignn:l;erl
Chicago Ce.nter hand.off point. 'Vite <'l:rta block for Ui\ 553 was d.rupper.I
aut6mat'}:cally at a point one· milo frnm the n.i.rport aJ.though ·/\RrS III
was. aole . to track the target to app.coximately 'ii mile .from the n.irport.
The track drop area is. determined. locally. The /\'.l.'0• investigating e;rrmp
1{as provided. with computer printout data for each helicopter run and. for
the a~proach to MIJW by UA 553.
~~<t.t..-l,~ J~_ .
Lloyd. . La Grange ~~
January 30, 1973 ·
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 3E
.·._'
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE:TY BOARD
GROUJIID TRACK CHART, AERO COMMANDER N309vs

f"::'.'.-~8~RK __: 7' t_
:,,J
i\ L-f°.' -o, "·

'' w- _, _, '7
,•-'
'4-i--t---t--r---r--t-t-l---t-t:--r-T-t-i--t·-'h-t-~~r-:li--t-+-t-+---t-c-t--1--+-+-+-+--i---f-+-+--+-+-+-f-+-+-+-+--+--1--jf---+--l--l-+--1---j
I \-L-.z. .,,. a.a ,,,
~'t-t-r-r-r-r-r-1-t-t-t-t-t-t-t-t-fi=.t-t-f-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+---l--l--l--l--l--l--l--i--_j__J
"''t---j--j---j--jj---j--J-t----t-t----t-r--t~r--t,---11--l--~'i''."''f''0'"1"'"~'1·e'-i'~'--l--t---t-+---t-+---t-l---l----ll--+---l--l---l-+--+-t--+~l---l--l---1----l--l----l--l----l--l---l--l---l--
I \
-311-t---t--t---t-t--r-t---t--lt---t--t-t--+-t--+-t--+'.-,-l---J.o"-T')c-•~~-,ry~t--+--t--t-t--t-l---t-1---f---l--f---l-+---+-+--+-l---l--l---l---/~-1---1-+---l-+---+-1----l--
,_ _...._ zjo., ·.lB" ,, 7
33;f-t-t-+-+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+~l--l---+---l--+:\:-r-t--:t---rc:Tc--+-+-1~t---t-+-+--+-+--+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+~l--l---+---l---l---+--l----l---l---l---l---+-I
'•I-+- 2p•' •01 i VT
3>5f--1---1---ll---+---l-+--+-+--+-1---l--1---l---l--+---l--l---l-+:~~i--.--~ko~ J-=.~9.a'f-"""'\--t-t--J--l---f---l--f---/-t---f-+--+-l---l--\---1-_Jl--~ii--t---1-+---+-+---+-l----J--J----
"i--j---jj---j---j--j--t-t--J--j---j--lj---j---j--j---j-f---j-f---j-'f.:±=-:toC-Oo;,.,,.,,~.os,--J;,,,-j--f---f---1-+---l-+---J-+---J-i---+-J---\-__!!---1---!--l----f-f---1-f---J--J----J--1---1-
\
_J
N309VS-/'C t:J.·B·TZ.
DASHED LINE' f uo1.s~ ·.:T/Ai-{ M/.55EO A!'Pll0,4CJ/
FL!Gf.<T PAT'-1
Sot.IP LINE' ~ TUM Af!otJ/VD ! Ftl--IAl ,4pp,eo.qc//
~,.,~\ ~ ~RTS llL
0
!;!-.f.-.TI
CO<rlPl.J l f:I"- RitAOoUT
14 DEC !CJ72.-P£CPAiJ.Cb
!
DOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-E

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTI1ENT OPERATIONS REPORT
' 1. Curtis W. Volkamer, Chief Fire Marshall

2; Edrrrund J. Enright, Chief, Battalion 26
.3. Thomas Linane, Division.Marshall, 7th Division
4. Albert Prendergast, 2nd Deputy Fir~ Marshall ·
5. R6bert O'Connell, Lieutenant, 7th Division· Relief
6. John O'Connor, Captain, H & L 41
7. John Carey, Acting Lieutenant, Engine Co. 88
8. Arthur C. Munin, Captain, H & L 31
9. James Foley, Lieutenant, Engine Co. 127
10. Edwin Zawacki, F. F l/C, Ambulance Co. 8
11. John R. O'Halley, F. F. l/C Ambulance Co. 12
12. Edward C. Brown, F. F. l/C Ambulance Co. 17
13. Joseph J. McCarthy, Supervisor, Ambulance Services
14. James B. Neville, 2nd Deputy Chief Fire Marshal
15. Carl F. Groth, 7th Division Marshal
I
J
l'nit0rl ,\irlines Pl:ine Cr:ish
'11:\'!E 142R Hon rs on Frirby, December 8, J 9 72
l /W,\ T!ll'-: Dox 21GGO, 70t.h Pince & L"wnrl:ilc
conR E CT LO CA TJOX :171 S - 20 - 22 - 24 \V. 70lh Pince
\YEA THEn C0"1'<"DITJOXS Overc8st., 27°, Dry
A CKNOWLEDGEMEXTS: Medical St2ffs of: Holy Cross Hospital

South Chi?ago Community Hosritnl
Little Company of :\Tary Hospital
Christ Community Hospital
Von Solbrig Hospitnl
Chicogo Hospital Council
Chicago Police Dep2rtment
Department of Public Works
Bureau of Streets and Sanltntion
Building Commissioner's Office
Red Cross
Salvation Army
Coroner's Sta ff
Suburb:Jn Fire Dep2rtment, \Vho sent equip1nent, \\'Orke
and offered assistance, although not requeste
by the Chicago Fire Depnrtmcnt
Comment: I wish to commenrJ the on-duty and off-duty members of the Chicago
Fire Department and all members of the above participating agencies.
Because of their cooperation and dedication, a tragic incident was
copE'Al with, with dispatch.
Curtis W. Volkamer
Chief Fire Marshal
.,._ -
File No. _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _____
Batt.:.Iion No, _ _ __ December 12 197~ 195 _ _
_ _ _TI ~'1_c_l.9t.m.rte1~~ __ Co, No, _ _ __ Address
TO The Fire Commissioner

A TTE:\'TJO N :
FROM Chief Fire :ITarslrnl C. W. V0lkamer
SUBJECT Supervision ano Coordination of Operations at Plane Crash
Sir:
I respectfully repo:-l that o;; Frioay, Decemher Rth at 1420 hotirs a still
Bnd hox D1rir1n response \VBS g:·:en by the EnglEnvoocI F_t\.O. for ri plane crn.sh
at 70tl1 :ind L1wndtlle. The response consisted of:
H2~ Hours: fi engines. ~ trnl'.'k companies, 1 helicopter, 1 dry chemical,

3 ambulances, St1pervision consLsted of 2 Battalion Chiefs,
J Division ~rarshal and l-2nd Deputy Fire lll3rsbal.
1435 Hours: 2 more amhufonces were dispatched.
1437 Hours: a second alarm was called for by the 2Gth Battalion. This dispatched
4 more engines, 2 more truck companies 1 con1munications \·an 1
deluge rig, Big John (\vhich \Vas not put in ser\~ice), a light \\'agonl
3 more ambulances, 2 snorkels, Chief Fire Marshal Volkamer, 2nd
·Deputy Neville, 1st Deputy Fire l\Iarshal Foley, Acting 2nd Deputy
1
Hart.
1440 Hours: Plan 3 was activated by 2-1-5. \\'hile enroute.
J 441 Hours: 2 more ambulances.
1445 Hours: Director nf F',ire Prevention Bureau, 1 squad company, Battalion Chief.
1·1·18 Hours: 1 helicopte>r.
1440 Hours: a third c.:,,rm w"s struck at the requ0st of the 7th Division ofarshal
and lhe following- equipment responded: 4 more engines, l truck ar;d
light \vagon.
l
. -·- ·- -
...•
File No. _ _ _ _ __
...
~-·-:·": '""""'.--:':! ~. r,.,...~ .. ..--: ..... ~~
c:-:-: O?
·--~- ....... ·~- .- ..... ~-·-·--'-•
Di\r:!sio:u. No. _ _ __
Battalion No. _ _ __ --------~. 196 _ _
____________ Co. ~o _ _ __ Address. _________________
Page 2
TO
FRO;\!
SUBJECT
Sir:
J 'iOO JI ours: ~rel hnlieoptcr
1£i02 TJours: 2 squ::id co1y1p~nies <inci n light \V3gon
1008 }fours: 4 rnnre truck con1panies
1512 Hours: 2 more squads
lf.i22 IIours: 1 J11ore light \\':igon. The Dis:Jster lTnit fron1 0 1Hnre Field \\"as
likewise dispatched.
1G17 Hour 0 : 2 more squnr.s and Civil Defense light wagons.
I \Vas in the Fi-re Cnn1n1issioner's office \Vhen the originol alar11t \'.'3S dis-
patched. I immediately called the Englewood Fire Alarm Office as to particulars
and type of pl:rne. At thnt moment they had no information. I asked that they
notify me as soon as the 26th Battalion reported. At 1437 hours the office no-
tified me it was a jet liner and they were striking a second alarm. I responded
from the City Hall and while enroute notified the Englewood office to put a Plan
~ into effect. Also notified the office to call Repair Shop to send mechanical
foam and have Chiefs Foley and Hart respond and send additional rescue equip-
ment in stock.
Notified the Englewood Alarm Office to contact hospitals in the area rhat
1hey could expect an influx of '·ictims and to notify the Chicago Hospitnl Council.
Hc•que,tc•cl, while enroute. th'1t several light wagons be dispatched. Xotified
the Eng·Jc•1v0od office to have a command post established and to set up the
pub] ic schnol :-it 70th & 1,.1\vnd:i le BS a ten1porary mo~·gue.
·- : :~
._,._ ..
u
File No. _ _ _ __
83.tblio:i i--r o _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,l9G _ _
______ en. 1\o. _ _ __ Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
TO
A TIE:\'TIO ;-; :
Fl~OM
s1:n.mcT
Sir:
On arrival, 3nd reporting on the scene at 1459 hours, I notified the Fire
Alarm ()ifi<:c to contact police to block all intersections around ihe entire area
to prevent private vehicles from entering. Was informed that Police Plan #3
was in effect.
In 1118king a qutc1\ survey of the situatiOn I found the fo]lo\\'i1:g: The l..,.ni:ed
Air]ines Flight ~;fl5:1, Boeing 7.'37, app8rently in losing oltitude strucl-: the tip of
the roof, or g;ible at the rear of a home at 3714 W. 7lst Street. It also did sli~::1t
damage to the home of :lfr. Ed Str:isek, 3710 and Mr. William Benecki, 3716 \\".
71st Street (north side of street).
It complet'ely leveled a bungalow, the home of :Mr. Zigmund :\Iorowski a:

3717, slightly damaged the home of Evan Cotter, 3715 and sheared off about 1/3
the full length of the roof of a bungalow at 3723 W. 70th Fla ce owned by :\Ir. Fr3nk
Ruffolo. These homes are on the south side of 70th Place. None of the a))o,·e
buildings \Vere involved in fire.
The final settling of the plane took place after completely leveling the hm:r,e
of ?lfrs. Veronica Cuculich. (3722 \\'. 70th Place - north side of 70th Place). :llrs.
Cuculich and her daughter Theresa perished in the crash. The homes on either
side of the Cuculich residence were likewise destroyed, 3718 to the ea st owned by
John Slnde\vsl~i, \Vho \Vas at \Vork, His \Vife Cind.Y \Vas in the hon1e at the ti111e of
the crash, but escaped from the wr·eckage through the rubble in the front. The
next residence east of the Sladewski home,. 3716, owned by Joseph Tworzydlos,
\vas just slightly d8.1naged.
ThC' clwe.llinp; to the> west of lhc Cuculich home, .')72'l, also cornplc<C'ly
destroyed \Vris O\Vnecl l)y Amy Busch.
.,;
File No. _ _ _ _ __
rt'-: . . . . ., __
?~
•.....
__________ ,196 _ _
_ _ _ Co. No _ _ __ Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
TO
Sir:
1'hc nose. or fJight cre\V S section. (Bbout 12 1 in length) cnme to rest up
1
tn the ~]Jc~)· :ilon~sicle of n tree and entered a fran1e garnge \Vhich \Vas destroyed.
1
The l:iil ~cciion projected sH;;htly over the front sidewalk with the center of the
fusel,1p:e, \\'hi ch included first class and coach area, completely torn away exposing
the entire interior of the plane. Several trees had also been sheared off by impact.
The entire ar(!a had been con1pletely enveloped in fire involving plar10 s nd the homes
at 3Gl8 - 3G22 a1od 3624, as weli a.s the frame garages in the rear. Chica[;o Fire
Department Helicopters landed at tJ:ie school yard just northwest of the accident,
prepared to take injured to the hospital.
One airline hostess was being extricated from directly behi;1d the crew
compartment. on the left side of the plane. She was alive. One male of the
flight crew was in a standing position with his h0ad above the ripped off fuselage
a11d his ar)11 resting 011 same .as though he \Vere attc1npting to evacuate. He h2d
expired from apparent inhalation of super-heated air and flame. Th( main body
of the fuselage cut through ti1e floor of the house with a portion of flooring midway
through the center of the plane. Tons of brick and rubble were on top and u;cder-
neath. Victims werG being removed as rapidly as they could be found and dc:g out.
Several persons, male and fa1nele 1 hsd earlier escaped through the right rer:.r
escape door, thi:s included the two hostesses and one male id0ntified as Harold
Metcalf. They had momenta Ty protection by being shielded by the skin of the.
tail section which was about 12 to 14 feet long. All other victims remo\'Gd \Yere
in the open area that was exposed to flame.
2nd Deputy Fire :llar,,hal Albert Prenderp;ast directed operations. romo,·al

and extinp:uishn1e.nt from center to re:1r. Chief Lin8ne \V8S ordered b.\· 111e to seek
out <1nd e~lricrite victin1s thro\vn by impact under bricks and debris just outside
of the p1nne. 'lhe lJuilding: to the east. the home of John ~l8c1('\VSk:i, \V3S so badly
darna"«:·d st1·ucturall)' that th.., hack wall was braced with larldGrs and planks so as
not to top;)le.:1nrl injure rescuers or other victims.
{
File No . _ _ _ _ __
- - - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
----------~Co. No _ _ __ Address. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page o
TO
<:;:_ •
• •, 1 •
2r1th Bntt:i1ion Chief Enright \Vas ordered h)' 1ne to sen1·r·h hon1es on eitber
sirlc for possible victims. Acting 2nd Deputy 7\farshnl Ifarl was ordered by me to
supervise rescae or remov<11 of persons aft of middle section. 2nd Deputy )Iarshal
Nevil lo \Vas ordered to take a team of 1nen and check for \'ictir11s in ho1r1es ~:cross
the street.
AlJ the injured ti~· this time had been removed and [ll] \VOrk \\'CJS directed at
ren1oving th(' de~ir1. S dece8sed hB<l been tnken to the tempor:l.ry n1or2,"ue - the
schooJ. 1t \V:lS \Vithont Jig-l'1t beCBuse of the crash. A Fire Dcpartn1er:t light \Yazon
\Vas sent to provide 1ip:ht. 1)ut by this tin1e Coroner Ton1an \Vas 0~1 the scene ar.d
indicated thnt all de8d be removed to the morgcie at Cook County llosrii;ni ir,:;1e8d
of the school. I had alrend)' issued orders that the plane sho1ild be kft intaet as
much as possil)}e and onJy such portions cut '1\Va3r or ren1oved 8S \'.'0re c:-:pciciic:1t
to the removal 0: victims.
i
11er1ical tenrns hrid :lrYi\·eO on the scene 8nc1 g<1\?e riid to t~ose needing :::.r.;-:~e
a.nd pronounced the dead. Srecial crews from United, and F. A. A. were now
assemblinrr and I informed tlwm on whnt action had been taken and cooperated with
~ ,.,'cl.;.~"~/~
them in search for voice records and other instrumentation.
All n12il 1J3gs 2nd loose n1ail \Vas turned over to post8l authorities \Vhor:i
I had notified. F. B. L agents were a.lso in attendance.
Police cooperation \Vas exce11ent ill cro\Vd control re1110\'8l of the de:id
1
fro111 iho scene as \Vell 3S ini.rentor3' of personal helonp;ings \Vhich \Vere found by
Fire ncpartment personnel and turned over to them.
Chic11g-orR Con1misf;io:ier of Dep3rtment of Public \\'or1.:::s. JR11;cs .J. ~rcDonou~

appC'nreu on the sc.ene and offered assistance in the form of heayy equipment and
personnel. ,Joseph Fitzgernln, Building Commissioner likewise responded end in
consullalion with myself checked structural stability of affected buildings.
--- ..
7
File No . _ _ _ _ __
r.:-...,"": --:-;·:.; - ....., ..........

.... ___ ----- -·--~-----·--
'""'."".~.-~
c:-::CtcGO
Div:sio:-. No. _ _ __
Bo.~iion No. _ _ _ __ ----------.lDG __ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C-0. ~o. _ _ _ __ Address, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page 6
TO
ATTF.C.:TlOc;:
FRO~!
SUBJECT
Sir:
Medi en] te~ms which included those sent from Holy Cross Hospital and
South Chi crigo Co1nn1unit:; Ilospita l \Vere assembled in a t\vo-ca r gn rage north
of ihe incident and administered to the injured.
At this time all the living had been ren)oved and sent to hospltr.ls. Little
Compan,• of :ITary Hospital had sent teams nnd medical supplies but were turned
back. Christ Community, and Von Solbrig Hospitals put disaster plans into
effect but were notified not to send medical teams.
Victims were found in every conceivable position and condition. Some

were found in the belly or lugg::ige area. l\Iany found under the fuselage in the
cellar of the home covered with brick, timber", roof sheating, mail bags, etc.
All victims I actually saw, which numbered the majority, had clothing
burned off, with almost complete body burns. There were mauy amputees. The
greater number of deceased were removed within the first hour.
Laborious and careful digging then tool.::: place, shifting building n1aterinls
in search for bodies. Several victims were found in the tail section, under the
flooring with what appeared to be the Food compartmented Unit of extreme
\\'eight on them. }\t,this ti1ne I requ.ested of Co111missioner I\IcDonough the ne0d
for a crane with a long boom, to Ji(t the unit so as to extricate the bodies. This
was on the site in a short time and used effectively.
Appro?:imatel;.• 12 to l;:} vi~ti1ns \Vere removed frorn the l)C?:lly 0rf':1 ir:clt~c1in~
one fernolc whose torso wtis cut in two. Several sections of the plone hod to be cm
with the rescue saw and lifted by the crane out of the building- foundation to e:-:t ricote
victilns.
f
File No. _ _ _ _ _ __
Divisiv:: :-.; o. ·-· _.
Bzt~!io:; :\o _ _ _ __ - - - - - - - - · 196 _ _
------------°'· No _ _ _ __ Address __________________
:Page 7
TO
SlTR./ECT
Sir:
Chica;:?;ors ::\fa;.·or P.i<:!::1rd D:ilc~· nnd the Chn_ir1n:in of the Fire and Police
ro111rr,j....;_:;fnn~ 1\lt10r. I3urke, \Vere on the scene and I reported to the :\la.ror the
circnn1st::1nces of events fronr time to time.
I conferred \VI th 1:nitc:c1 ..-\ i r] i ne TE'pres9nt::iti v0s n nd F ..q_. ;.... . personnel

\Vh0n2\·ur Lhe- need arose to r12}11ove a section of the plnne to effect 8X"\ric::ition.
The cr.ane \'nlS utilized extensl\·eiy throughout the evening.
A nevi auto1nohiJe thnt h:id })een parJ.:::crl unattend0d \V:-ts fottr1d drr.gged \'."ith
the plnne and under the tail s-edion demolished.
By this time (0:00 P. :'!S.) most of the medical personnel h8d left the sce:1e.
Dr. Tucker and Dr. Cari, C. F. D. physicians did work with firefighters and re-
ma.ined till about 11:00 P. TIL
(
Firefighters assisted Postal authorities to retrie\•e i11ail bags ar..d a.ll loose
n1ai1. Personel belongings and effects, purses, lugg;age, etc, \Vere turned o\·er
to Evidence and Record Property Division of the Chicago Police Departme:1t for
inveraor}' and identificntion.
Supe,-visor of Arnbul::ir:ce Services, Joseph :\IcCarthy and Asst. Sup\'.

Smith were on the scene from the e~rly stages till late at night, expediting
remov;i1 of victi111s 1 arranging for blank:ets, bod~y bags, covers, stretchers,
etc. and inforn1ing- an·1bulance attendants as· the,y re1noved victims as to \Vhat
time they were pronou:1ced dead by a doctor or coroner's assistant.
'/
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DE?ARTMENi Or "i'i-lE CITY o:: CMlCAGO
Division No. ____
Batta.Jion No _____ - - - - - - - - - · 19G _ _

___________ Co. No _ _ __ Address. _________________
Page 8
TO
ATTENTION:
FRO.M
SUBJECT
Sir: There had been conflicting reports as to how many passengers Flight
#553 had carried. In requesting a head count of those injured in hospita.ls,
it was established tlwt Christ Community has received JG injured, Von Solbrig
Hospital had 3 D. O. A. and the morgue accounted for 40. Up to this time there
was no assurance as to victims that might be buried in !be rubble of the tlestro;:c·d
homes. Search bad been made commensura.nte with safely of the firefighte1·s as
the buildings were structurally unstable and a really thorough search couVi not
be made till a crane could carefully dismantle the structure.
The sea.rch for victims continued tmtil about 2330 hours when I was in
contact \Vith United Airlines top executi\'GS through a conference crill in,·ol\·ing
several citi.es. In relating conditions as existed at that tine and the count from
both hospibls and morgue, which at that tin-e appeared to be 5P It \\'8S decided
to terminate operations for the night and resume about 8:00 A. ill. the following
morning when daylight would prevail. Dr. Joseph Cari concurred that if any
other victims were still in the ruins at this time, 9 hours after crash, that they
would inevitably be dead.
Mayor Richard J. D8ley was informed by me over the telephone at about

2345 hours that search would be suspended till the following morning.
Fires in the building had long been extinguished, but due to deep seatGd
smouldering and the possibility of a rekindle, three men were detailed with
charged hose lines from a jeep pumper to remain overnight or till relief was
sent, with orders not to disturb or touch ahything. All other units and personnel
were ordered back to quarters. Light wagons remained on the scene to kcc;1 the
area illuminated and lhe ranking Police officer given orders by me to keep a
security guard arow1d the entire area.
/t
File No . _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTJY1ENT 07 TME CITY Oi' CKICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ _ __ - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
___________ Co. No _ _ __ Addres~----------------
Page 9
TO
ATIF:NTJON:
FRO!.!
SUBJECT
Sir:
I left the scene at 2.34.'.l hours.
At 8:00 A. lVI., Sl!nda,-, December 8th, I reported to the scene ancl

ordered 1he Englewood Fire .l'°'larm Office to send the Chief of the 2Gth Dalla lion,
7th Di\·ision i\-farshal, 2nd De•puty Fire i\'T::rsha.l Johnson, a truck cornp2.ny, nnd a
• pumper with a booster to rept;•r,·t to me .
A Mr. Dale Medland <c:>f United Airlines, Vice-President Operations

Planning, arrived and ·conferred with me regarding further search, and surveyed
the entire area. I informed fttim that there was .a liklihood of se,·eral more victims.
On the arrival of 7th Division .Tlla.rshal Carl Groth and 2Gth Bnt1.alion Chief
Joseph Bronersky, I ordered that the basement of 3724 be µumped out. I t1lso
designated areas where mettL>K>dical digging and search should ag:iin take phce.
Within 15 minutes a victim identified later at the morgue as a male was found
alongside of the east foundatfon wall a.bout 18 feet from the front of the house
in the basement. This victirn was between the founda.tion and the remains of the
fuselage. Within another 20 ~ninutes the remains of a dog were found in the
rubble just west of the fuselage and forward of the left wing of the plane. Some
distance below the surface ire that same area, a second and last victim was found
face down with left leg sever·t:d. This victim appeared to be a. female, good size
but was later reported by a P•'Olice officer of having been a male.
11:any items, such as ·purses, personal belongings, portions of luggnge,

etc. were turned over to me by firefighters working in the debris. I turned these
items over to Police officers .Matuszak, Alberly and Korkowicz of Evidence
necord and Property Divisiom.
/I
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTrv\ENT 01' YHE CITY O:F CHICAGO
Division No. _____
Battalion No _ _ _~ - - - - - - - - - · l9G _ _
Co. No _ _ __ Address·---------------~
Page 10
TO
.ATTENTION:
FRO Ill
·SUBJECT
Building Commissioner Joe Fitzgerald was at the scene and I pointed out
the need for a crane wiih bctcket to skillfully remove the roof and dangerous wci!ls
of 3724 \V. 70th Pl. so a search of these premises could take pln.ce lo assure that
no other victims remained and also because of danger of toppling and doing damage
to the next building west.
Com1nissioner Fitzgernid arranged for NoYrli \\'recking Con1priny to nccom-

plish this l. ,_ The basement was pumped out and a search reve;1 kd no more
victims.
In tnlking with illr. Da'Je Medland, there was no need for the sen-ice of the
Fire D<:>partment, other tlrnn an ambulance to remain while F.A.A. <md United
perso .. c,el would remove and dismantle the plane. (This is a requirement by the
National Safety Board.)
Arrangements were made to cover this phase and I notified ilTr. i1Iedla;1d
that if he required the service of the Fire Department in any wa.y to contact me
or the Englewood Fire AL· 1·m Office.
On Sunday, December 10th, upon leaving the scene of a. 4-11 alarm fire, I
again reported to the crash site and checked with Mr. Dale i\Iedland if the Chic8go
Fire Department could be of any asE istance. The stand-by ambulance wa.s dis-
mi: 'ed at 1630 hours on Wednesday, December 13.
It has been definitely established that Mrs. Cuculich and daughter, Theresa,
had been killed and buried on December 12th. This accounts for all victims.
Respectfully submit~e~
~JJ.t/~~
Curtis W. Volkarner
Chief Fire l\Iarshal
File No. _ _ _ _ __
( '-
FIRE DEPARiW&:N7 Of THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
BattalionNo~2~G~-- December 8 197;\ 1%_ _
__________ Co. No·---- Addres.~_2_2_4_0_\_\_"._69_t_h_S_t._ _ _ _ _ __
TO The Fire Corn missioner
A TIENTION: Chief Fire Marshal
FR0~1 Edmund J. Enright, Chief, Bttn. 26·
SUBJECT Plane Crash
Sir:
I respectfull.v re.port thnt at 1429 hours today I responded by radio to a
still and box alarm given as" plane down near 70th St. 2nd So. l.2wnclale Ave.
At this line I was near 74th St. and So. Ashland Ave. As I reached 71.st St.
and California at the open area of Marquette Park I could see a heavy cloud
of black .••moke. H & L 31A arrived first on the scene and reported a jct
passenger plBne do\Vn ancl burning. Engine 88 'reported they \Vere lc~d;ng out.
At 7lst and Lawndale I was unable to turn north due to the heavy civilian traffic.
As I proceeded further west to Hamlin Avenue I saw the plane and three houses
heavily involved in flame. As I turi1ed north on Hamlin I was again blocked by
ci.vilian autos so I immediately notified the office that from my view I would
need a 2-11 alarm. Many arriving companies were forced to drive over lawns
ancl sidewalks to reach the fir.e scene at 3722 W. 70th St.
After arriving at the scene I found that Engine 88 and Engine 15 had led
out two lines and the extra line.s were manned by Squad and H & L companies.
H & L 31A had led out both of their booster lines. All of the engine companies
arriving at this time did the s2me. The fire ball unit of Engine 118 urrin·d and
used their foam but with poor results due to the cramped quarters of the plane
and the fallen brick walls around it. A survey was taken of the damaged houses
south of the crash and the fuel that was spilled. No victims were found nor any
fire problem from the spill.
The fire was contained to its original area. As the wreckage cooled, all
available manpower including off duty mernl;iers and other volunteers was used
to clig through the ruins for victims. I had concentrated ~y activities to the
front of the fire by order of 7t:h Division Marshal Linnane while he concentrated
on the re nr where rescue operations were first initiated.
'
i'
·.·- -
/.\_
File No. _ _ _ _ _
FIRE DEPARTMEN·~ Of THi: CITY OF CHICA(;O
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,l9G_ _
--------~='Co. No· _ _ __ Addres"-----------------

··=-===="===~·''-====~=======~==============
Page 2
TO
ATTENTION:
FR0111 :
SUBJECT
.Sir:
I do n_ot think that any one tyre of equipment not on the scene at the outset
of.the crash would have been overly helpful due to the condltions of a rlanc and
hous .. , being intermixed and so heavily involved in flame clue to the jet fuel [n-
volved.
I "Norked under the supervision of Chief Fire il'!nrsba l Volka mer, 1st
Deputy Foley, 2nd Deputy PrendergBst, Neville and Hart and 7th Di\·ision
Marshal Llnnane.
:Respectfully reported,
~d!~J~.&
/ Edmund J. Enrignt
Chief, Battalion 26
EJE/pl
/'f
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTMn·,;r Or THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No._7_ _
Battalion No _ _ __
__________Co. No _ _ __ Address 8120 S. Ashland Ave.
TO The Fire Commission('r
ATTENTION: Chief Fire Marshal
FROM 7th Division l\Iarshal
SUBJECT Plane Crash
Sir:
At approximately 2:28 P. l\I. on December 8, 1972 I resronclcd to a box
alarm from Station 24GG9.
Upon arrival at the scene there was a rlane (United 737) resti;ig on o
building at 3726 and between buildings at 3724 and 3728. All tl11·0c l>Ltilc1ings
were on fire as was the plane and the g;;rage in the rear of the mai1• buildill;.
Engine Co. 88, the still alarm engine, had dropped two lines in the front
of the building and Truck #31 manned one of the lirws I orclered bc•th lines to
confine the fire to the original area. I then went to the rear and fonnd t!JG nose
of the plane a gr< inst the garage and the tree. I ordered Engine 15 to lead out
two lines in the rear of the building. I then asked the Fire Alarm Office for
more ambulances and the Edison Co. It appea.recl at this time t.hut the fire was
contained, but I needed more manpower. for removal of bodies so I orde<·ed a
3-11 alarm. I then told my driver to walk out of the alley to confirm the 3-11 with
the Fire Alarm Office and to notify them that we had approxfmate!y 53 pccple on
the plane.
\.\-'hi le this '\vas going on one of the firen1en told me he hcaTd son1eone n10~1 ning
in the front section of the plane. While checking the front of the rlnne I found one
of the airline stewardesses alive and trapped in the front of the plane, behind the
cockpit. At this time 2nd Deputy Marshal Prenclergest arrived on the scene. I
then ordered a line turned into the cockpit to extinguish the flames so that we could
get into the plane to remove her. This was.clone by going into the top o[ the plane
through a hole that was torn at impact. She was then removed to Holy Cross Hos-
pital by Ambulance 12. I then ordered the removal of the bodies of the three crew
men who were also in the coclqiit. We then checked buildings to the east and west
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTMENT Of THE CITY OF CMICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No·---- - - - - - - - - - · 196 _ _

___________Co. No _ _ __ Addres~-------------,-----
Page 2
TO
ATIEN'TION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
of the scene where Engines 12D and 64 were working their lines, while the rest
of the members converged on the pbne fuselage and began remo\"iClg bodies. All
the while we had I.~" lines on the plane for hot spots. \Ve also hnd lo put lwo
ladders against the wall of the building east of the plane to keep it fc·om faliin~~ c'n
the men. Chief Prendergast ordered all va!ual)[es given to poliee in llt8 yard of
3724 W. 70th Place.
Chief Fire l\Trirshal \'olkBmer .\Vas no\v in chC1rge of the fire in front of the
building. All members worked until about ·13 bodies were removed. At about
2300 hours Chief Volkamer ordered Chief Prendergast and I to secure the scene.
Vie secured the scene with a jeep from Engine SO's quarters and 3 dt!Lailed men.
They were to remain on Lhe scene until relieved at 0300 hours.
All officers and members of the Chicago Fire Department performed !heir
duties in the truest tradition of the Fire Service and it would be impossible to
single out any one for meriloriotis service commendation.
Respectfully submitted,
~~uz- /0aq~
Thomas Linane
Division Marshal, 7th Division
TV Pl
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTMENT Of THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ December 12 191?196 __

Headqua!t_e_rc..::.s_ _ Co. No, _____ Address 55 8 W. D~e~h,_,·o"-v"'e"'n"-'S"-t'______
-'- _
TO Fire Commissioner
FHOM 2nd Deputy Fire Marshal Prendergast
SUBJECT J.. ctivity at Plane Crash ~ 70th PL & Lawndale

December 8, 1972
Sir:
I respectfully report my activities at plane crash on December 8, 1972.
I responded on still and box, 70t:h Place & Imvnd3le from quarters,
Engine 8. While enroute a 2-11 a.nd subsequently a 3-11 by 2-2-7 y;as struck.
On my arrival at scene a large volume of fire was evidenL. The 3T8'1

involved wr.s three l} story brick homes with the plane having cornpleteiy
destroyed the center home and vigorously burning.
T\vo engine companies \Vith 2~ 11 line each \Vere led out in front 2r1d
directing stream on burning plane. The front of each home adjacent to plane
was sufficiently open due to crash that streams could temr1orarily be diverlocl
to control possible communication of fire to other homes both east am1 west of
crash scene. There was no communication beyond origlnal crash areo..
Io .lered ambulance personnel assembled in front to check builcHngs

on south side of 70th Place which had sustained damage, for trapped or injur2d
victims. Ordered Engine 129 to cover exposure to east.
7th Division Marshal Linane came from rear and informed me tlit!re \\'as
a woman victim in plane still alive and trapped in wreckage, I immediately went
to rear and observed cockpit of plane resting half into a wood gan ge, which Y."as
on fire, but under control as there were engine compa•1ies led out in area
working streams on both fuselage and homes.
Chief 12th Battalion Bedick, with personn8l of Ambubnce 12 0'1\Talloy

were in cockpit of plane working to free victim who was conscious anrl talking.
File No _ _ _ _ __
..
I )
FIRE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ - - - - - - - - - · 195_ _
___________Co. No _ _ __ Address. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Page 2
TO
A 'ITENTION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
H &. L 31 had a hand line west of plane a.nd was covering exposure in
this area ..
Victim was a. stewardess who was trapped by debris across her legs. She
was extricated and transported to hospitnJ by Ambulance 12. I onlc·red two
additional Flying Squads to the scene.
Chief Fire l\Iarshal had arrived on scene a:.:J I remained in rear v.'orking
nnder his command.
As fire was curtailed in plane and house re.sting on plane victims were
removed and transported by ambulance and squa.drol .!J mor·gue. Fi:·es were
controlled and victims extricated from debris and remove·j lo morc,'l.t2. I
returned at 0145 hours December 9th.
tltl-eJ--f2;,r_,cfu ""~------
Albert Prendergast (
2nd Deputy Fire Marshal
AP/pl
-,
---· -.:.. --·~ ·-· ~
"//')
File No. _ _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTMENT OF 1HE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __
December 11 1D\2i.96 _ _
E.12.gine llBeo. No _ _ __
_______ Addres,,____
5_8._37_S_._C_e_n_tr_a_J_ _ _ _ __
ATIENTJON: Chief Fire Marshal
FROM J.obert O'Connell, Lt., 7th Div. Rel.
SUBJECT Work Performed at Box 24GG9
Sir:
I respectfully report the work performed at 3-11, Box 246G9 by abo1·d

companies, December 8, lf'72.
Compa.nies responded on Box at 1430 ·hours. Reported to 26th Blin.

Chief Enright at 3722 \V. 70th Place. Ordered to use foam on tnil r;ection.
Led out hard line. Used 20 gallons foam in tail of plai;(, through rear (;Ooc·.
Assisted J~ngine Co1npnn:{ \Vith lines, then entered re:::.r section nnt.1 folir:d
bodies. Sent for bod_y bags and xemo\red \rictirns fron1 se~t.s \Vith cnrc as
bodi.es \Vere en·'·:ingled at1d ensnared. Vision \Vas h~~n1pered b:,r sn10:-~e.
Companies assisted in removing 8 to 10 victims.
ordered back to Midway Atrport by Chief Volkumer. In service

1756 hours. • ' ·
P:h~tY
Robert O'Connr: 1
Lieut., 7th Div. Relief
RO'C/pl
--
·---- ~· 7
File No _ _ _ _ __
"·
FIRE DEPARTMENT Or THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Divisior. No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ December 11 197f'9G _ _
______H~ =L,____eo. No __4~1~_

&~. Address. _ _c2:::;2::_4o.:O~V.c..'.'-"6c-'9.-cth"-"S'-'t-'-._ _ _ _ __
ATTENTION: Chief Fire Ma rs ha I
FROM. John O'Connor, Captain, H & L41
SUBJECT Company performance at jet airliner crash.
Sir:
I respectfully wish to report the following account of the activities of
H & L 41 at the jet airliner crash on December 8, 1972 at 3726 W. 70th Pl.
Upon arriving at the scene of the crash I saw the tnil section of 8 c0rn-
mercial jet a irHner protruding from the front lawn of whJt was once 0 hm:~:e
locat0d nt. 3726 W. 70th Pl. The rest of the plane covci·ed the entire Jot. area,
the cockpit section at the alley. Both i.he houses to lhe east and west were
involved to the e.:-.-i:ent that they were almost completely destroyed. Tlw entire
fusila.ge section of the plane and the three houses were totally engulfed in flames.
I ordered the mc·n on my company to lead out 3 3" line from Engine Co. 101
(by then pumping from a hydrant at 3730 W. 70th Pl.) Vic worked lhe line from
the exposure to the east of the fire area until such time as it was possible to
gain access to the plane.
We then participated in the removal of victims from the plane nnd continued
to search among the debris for possible victims who may have been in tho houses
at the time of the crash.
Company ordered to quarters by 2-1-5. Company returned to r;Lw,·tcrs at

2344 hours.
~o~,·~~
Captain, H & L 41
JO'C/pl
.. -.-.--'--
-.
File No _ _ _ _ _...:'..:
_
FIRE DEPARTt.\ENT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _____
Battalion No. _ _ __ December 11 197?1%~-
_ _ _ _E_n~g_in_e_8__8_ _ _ Co. No _ _ _~ Addres 8 _ _3_5_0_0_\v_·-~6_0_t_h_S~.t~·-------

FROM Acting Lt. John Carey, Engine Co. 88
SUBJECT Plane Crash
Sir:
Company responded to still alarm at 70th & L1wndalc (airp:.1ne clown)

correct address - 3718 \V. 70th Place. On arrival not.iced tail of United Air-
plane at 3720 W. 70th Place, immedia.tely dropped two lines. Comp::iny tcx,J-:
2~" line and played stream immediately en airplane f 'nking of the people: in
the airplane. Building at 3718 and airplane at _3720 \-.. '10th Place complco<'I:>
involved in flame on a.rriv2i, also \Vorked strea1n on building at :3'71G \ ,~. 7(llh
1
Place. Later helped ir1 the re1noval of bodies. \\'orked under SU(.'Crvision of
Chief Enright, 26th Datta lion, Chief of 7th Division Linanc, 2nd De;n1ty J\:~;·chnt
Prendergast, Chief ):'ire Marshal VolkamGr.
9f- ~ {Llt_~ 71_

Uo1m Carey U·
Acting Lt. , Enr;ine Co. 88
JC/pl
---··;,.-
------·- --·--·- ·~·- -

File No _ _ _ _ __
:. I
FIRE DEPARTMENT Of' THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ December 11, 19~4.96 _ _

Flying Manpower Squad :J
H & L ;31 Co. No, _ _ __ Address 7659 S. Pulaski
A 'ITENTION: Chief Fire Marshal
FROM A. C. Munin, Captain - H & L 31

SUBJECT Plane Crash
Sir:
The following is a brief summary of my recall of the conditionr, rid the
work procedure followed by these companies at the plane crash.
Enroute to the scene at approximately 73rd and Pul2ski all members noticed
black: smoke rising fron1 the scene. A fe\v blocks later \Ve could 2Jso see flnme.
Our route followed Pulaski to 71st and then eas.t to Hamlin, liamli1; lo \'0th Place
and then east to the scene. Apparatus H & L 31A was first imms·.liatcly followed
by F. M. S. 3 and Hook & Ladder 31. The tail of the plane was visiblu on nrrirnl
when H & L 31A reported on the scene. No persons were seen on the north side
of the street near the wreckage. We led out with the booster line to the ;car to
cue' the a1:ea where a stewardess was trapped. Also assisted Engine 88 and
Engine 15 to lead out two lines each to front and bad:. We then assisted i.n the
removal of the stewardess from behind the cockpit and genera 1 fire anj rescue
duty and the removal of numerous bodies.
A. C. Munin
Captain, H & L 31
CCM/pl
- '··
---
File No _ _ _ _ __
: z.
FIRE DEPARTMENT pf THE CITY OF CHICAGO

Division No. _ _ __
Battali.on No _ _ __ · December 11, 197~

196 _ _
Engine 127 Co. No _ _ __ Address 6411 S. Centr3l
FJWM James Foley, Lt., Engine 127
SUBJECT Aircraft Crash
Sir:
I respectfully report that on December 8th, 1972 this compsny responded
to a box alarm from station 24669 at 1430 hours. Reported to 7th Division
Marshal Linane and were ordered to stretch 400 ft. of 2~ 11 line to rear of fire
:i.nd work stream front section of aircraft, garages and fire buildings. Assisted
in removing a live woman from front section of aircraft. Later, we were ordered
to attach di,rider and tv. 0 l~tt lines and wa.sh d~\Vn, and dug through cleb1~is f('r
1
bodies.
Ordered to quarters by 31st Battalion Chief.
Hydrant at 373 0 \V. 70th St.

Fire Buildings at 3720 - 22 and 24 W. 70th Place
Company in service: o• 5 hours, 12-9-72.
cff;:::~
, Lieut. , Engine Co. 127
JF/pl
File No _ _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ December J J. 19,n\lG _ _
- - - -Ambulance
-- 8 Co. No _ _ __ Address 5218 S. Western Avenue
AT, El-iTION: Chief Volkamer, Fire Marshal
FROM Edwin Zawacki, Ambulance 8
SUBJEGT Fire and Plane Crash
Sir:
Ambulance 8 to box 24669 - 3-11 - 3720-24 W. 70th Pl.
Reported to Chief Enright, Chief 26th Bttn. Removed from tlrn scene
three male persons to Holy Cross Hospital from the airplane crash. Also
removed one person to County l\Iorgue. Returned to SC·Jt~8 of pla1::; era,:::.
Ordered to standby. Assisted Ambulance 12 and Ambulcnce 18 8nd Poli.cc
Department in removing people from the plane crash.
Ordered back to quarters by Chief Volkamer, Fire !"larshal.
Res~ef(ully submitted, ~;
~,a,~__, e~·.:U.-<.ra.c--c:.~
Edwrn'Zawacki, F.:i:) l/c, Ambulance 8
Time at the scene of the fire and plane crash:

l.eft quarters - 1430 hours
· Returned - 2125 hours
EZ/pl
- .··
~ -
File No _ _ _ _ __
FIR!; DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY Of CHICAGO
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No _ _ __ December IL 1972, 196_ _
Jance.12 __Co. No _ _ __ Address 5559 S. Narragansett
The Fire Commissioner

Chief Fire Marshal
John B. O'Malley, Ambulr.nce 12
Activity report from 3-11, Box 24609
I respectfully submit the following report:
Ambulance 12 responded on Box 24669 at 1440 hours, to 70th and L3wndale

J2-8-72. Notified F. A. 0. on scene. Ordered by Police to pull into alley, near
front of plane!. We were notified of a stewardess trapped in the plane. Firefighter
J. O'l\lalley •,vent inside !'he plane to cover her face, bandaged arm and hand.
F. }". I-i. I\cnvalski g3ve bnndci.gos irom outside plane and held hand light. As \Ve
had to remove parts of rlane and honse parts that hsd her pinned from lhe waist
down. F. F. Kowalski brought the stretcher and fracture board. Stewardess
:i\Irs. l\L McCiausand had fractures lo both legs, possible other fractures and
incisions and abrasions, unknown amount of burns. When we completed digging
her out by hand we placed her on the stretcher and fracture board and carried
her to the a1r.bulance. We did administer E & J inhalator while nurse and doctor
gave an I. V. Transported to Holy Cross Hospital, released by emergency team
of doctors about lGlO hours.
Ordered by F. A. 0. to return to fire scene. Reported to Deputy Chief

Prendergast. Ordered to assist in search and removal. We did and assisted in
placing in body bags several D. O.A. victims. We then found body of Congressnrnn
George Collins, placed in body bag, carried on stretcher to Ambulance 12. \\'e
retLirnecl and found ma.il - turned it over to F. B. I. Returned and found unknown
female 10 to 14 ye:ns old. Placed in body bag. Carried on stretcher to Ambulance
12. Orde1·ed to Cook County l\Iorgue. Arrived there and had victims pronounced at
1800 hours, by Dr. Blasker. Then waited to remove victims inside the morgue.
Bp;t. John Motzny, Star #1971, removed victims' belongings and refused information
asked as to contents and/or amounts . .When leaving morgue F. A. 0. ordered us to
return to fire scene. We did so and reported to Chief Fire Marshal Vollrnrner -
ordered ~o further assist in search. We did so until ordered by Supv. of Ambu-
lances Col. McCarthy io return to quarters. Ambulance Co. 12 return sent in
at 21:40 hours.
File No _ _ _ __
FIRE DEPARTME'IJT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
Division No.
Battalion No _ __ - - - - - - - - · 196_ _
------- -·- __Co. No _ _ __ Addre~s•'-----------------~
Page 2
TO
ATIENTJON:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
We then cleaned and checked the equipment and found the following:
1 each ambulance cot from Ambulance 35, notified and picked up.
1 each chair stretcher from Ambulance 33, notified.
1 each wooden fracture board from Ambulance 18, notified and picked up.
1 each salvage cover from H & L 59, notlfled and picked up.
We were missing the following equipment:

1 each E & J Inh. bottle, Size ''D"
2 C. F. D. red ambulance blankets (replaced 12-11-72 by Chief Smith)
4 out of a set of 6 jet splints
2 each plastic bod bags.
F. A. 0. notified and Supv. of Ambuiances, Col. McCarthy.
CJfL v? LW!~f;j
John R. O'Malley,
F. F. 1/c, Ambulance 12
JRO'MipI
F,O, 2A-2SM
CG
File No _ _ _ __

Division No., ____
Battalion No._ _ __ December 8, 1972 , 196 _ _
. ___A mb_ulanie~ p ___ ~--Co. N o · - - - - Address 3112 W. lllth St.
TO The Flre Commissioner
FROM Edward C. Brown, F. F. 1/c, Ambulance 17
SUBJECT 3-11 from Station 24669,.Alrplane Crash
Sir:
I respectfully wish to report that on the 8th of December, 1972

Ambulance 17 responded to a 2-11 alarm of fire from Station 24669, later
0
followed by a 3-11. Upon arrival we helped man a hose line with Engine 64.
We then later reported to Col. McCarthy. We helped dig for victims that
were buried in the wreckage. We removed two bodies to the County Morgue .
. One male and one female. Both bodies were unknown. We reported back
to the scene and were ordered to stand by and help search for bodies. We
were released from the scene by 2-1-5. Company responded to the fire
at 14:40 and returned to quarters at 23:40.
,-:~~ c . ~ ~ ......... 'fr·d-· Ye
Edward C. Brown, F. F. l/c

Ambulance Co. 1 7
ECB/pl
File No. _ _ _ __
Division No. _ _ __
Battalion No·~--- December 12, 19\!l.96_ _
---~~adqu~rt.~e~r~s__ Co. No~--- Address___558 W. DeKoven St,
ATI'ENTION: The Chief Fire Marshal
FROM ,Joseph ,r. McCarthy, Supervisor, Ambulance Servlce
SUB.TE CT Plane Cresh, December 8, 1.972

70th Place and Lawndale
Sir:
1. On R December 1972, at approximately 1430 hours, I received a radio call
advising of a plane crash at 70th Place and Llwndale Avenue. At the tlme, my
assistant, Chief Crawford Smith, and I were assisting in conducting a session
at the Illinois Research Hospital, which dealt with emergency action necessary
at the time of a crash of a cargo plane. Chief Sm.lth and I advised the Fire
Alarm Office that we would leave immediately for the crash scene.
2. Upon arrival at the scene we found there already were three or four Fire
Department Ambulances present which were removing injured persons to Holy
Cross Hospital, as well as Police Department squadrols and ambulances from
nearby suburbs.
3. We reported to Chief Fire Marshal Curtis Volkamer and operated under his
supervision during the entire time we were at the scene.
4. Mr. George Behnley, Deputy Cook County Coroner, had set up an emergency
morgue in the gymnasium of the nearby Hurley School and asked that Chief
Crawford Smith assist him there. However, when it was learned, after several
bodies had been removed l:o the gym, that the electricity (and heat) were off in
the school, he requested that all bodies be taken directly to the Cook County
Morgµe. ·
(By this time there were twelve (12) Fire Department Ambulances at the
scene, making removals to the hospital and the morgue on a "round-trlp" basis.
They were, of course, augmented by the Police Department and their vehicles.
F.D. 2/\ - ZSM

l'1Ie N O · - - - - -

Division No. ________ _
Battalion No _ _ __
· - - - - - - - · 196_ _
_________ c-0. No_ _ __
Addre'""---------------
Page 2
TO
ATI'ENTION:
FROM
SUBJECT
Sir:
!i, It was approximately 21 :45 hours when Chief Smith and I left the scene of
the disaster and at that time we had two (2) Fire Department Ambulances re-
maining at the scene on a "standby" basis.·
6. It should be noted that the Chicago Fire Department Ambulances did not
have an ample supply of body bags and it was necessary to borrow this type
""··- of equipment from the Police Dei:nrtment and other responding agencies.
JJMcC/pl
F.D. 2A-1SM
Flle .NO·------
Dlvhlon No.... · - --·

Btittallon No ______ _ December 1!;, 19 72. 196___ _
_ _ _H_eadqua_:t;f'.:_s__ ~Co. No _ _ __ Addre8J! Room l 05 Clly_H._....e_.11..__ _ __
ATIENTION: Chief Fire Marshal
FROM 2nd Deputy ,James B. Nevllle
SUBJECT Duties at December 8th Air Crash
Sir: I respectfully report that on Friday, December 8, 19n. upon beqoml·ng

aware of the gravity of the situation, I responded to 7oth Street and Llwndale
from my office at City Hall.
Upon my arrival, I reported to Chief Fl re Marshal, Curtis Volkamer, \\'ho

ordered me to conduct a search of damaged and demolished buildings In and around
the crash site since the main body of fire had already been knocked down and extri-
cation of victims from the plane and crash area was well under way.
I organized four teams of six firefighters each (many off-duty men were on
the scene) and designated the buildings they were to search and then I patrolled in
supervision.
After I received reports that there was no evidence of victims in the

surrounding buildings, I detected an odor of gas near the demolished building
across the street from the crash and celled in Peoples Gas. I directed the
poll ce ti) stop all smoking in the area.
Next I went in to help 2nd Deputy Albert Prendergast, who was directing
the main body of extrication. I worked until released about 0100 on Saturday,
December 9, 1972.
I returned to the crash site at 1030 hours on December 9 and took on the
responsibility of providing work maps for the Transportation Safety Board (F. A. A.·
and United Airlines investigation teams. Assignment completed about 1330 hours
on Monday, December 11, 1972.
ctfully s_ubmitted,
~/d.7~
s B. Neville
2nd Deputy Chief Fire Marshal
F.D. 2A- 2SM

Fiie N O - - - - -
Division No... ..3. -·

Battalion No __.. ·-· December 9, 197?_, 196 ___ .
7th Divllon .. Co. No _ _ __ Add re...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

ATIENTION·. Chief. Fire Marshal
FROM 7th Division Marshal Groth
SUBJECT Activities at ruins of airplane crash
Sir:
I respectfully report that on the above date at 0800 hours I responded on

Specla.l Duty to the ruins of an airplane crash. The crash had occurred on
the previous day (12-S-72) at about 1429 hours.
I reported to Chief Fire Marshal Volkamer and was ordered to check the
.'- ruins in the area of 3718-22 W. 7oth Pl. for two bodies that were missing
after the crash. 2nd Deputy Marshal Johnson, 26th Battalion Chief Bronersky,
F.M.S. 3, H & L 59 and Engine 101 were also on the scene. We searched
the area and at about 0925 hours we found one body along the east wall about
the center of the basement at 3722 W. 7oth Pl. and about 25 minutes later the
other body was found in the debris about the center of the basement near the
. plane at the same address. They were removed to the police squadrol, who
removed them from the scene. Later we were ordered to search through the
debris for any valuable or Important articles that could be found. We turned
them over to the following members of the Edidence and Record Property
Division of the Chicago Police Department - Officers Matuszak, Aeberly and
Korkowicz.
'At 1528 hours I returned to quarters by orders of 2nd Deputy Marshal

Johnson.
~~-E~ct~
Carl F. Groth
7th Division Marshal
CFG/pl F.D. 2A- 25"4

lJOr.h.l; Ii l'lfl. ; •I\ If-.))
Exf1Lb:Lt No. 3c
NATIONAL TPJ\NSPORTATION SAJi'.ETY BOARD

Washinp;ton, D. C. 20591
TRANSCRIPrIONS OF ATC RECORDINGS, CHICAGO APPROACH CONTROL

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CHICA00-0 '!!AU APPROhCH CONTROL
SOUTH IATll.Llll POSIT ION
8 OECIHBD 19 71
2015:10
DL 567: Ah Chicago approach Delta five six sevens with you we're out
of forty •even for four - bllve oacar
2015:20
CHI APC: Delts five .w.ty se"Yen radar contact two ninety haading to
intercept thirty ona left. for Midway fly it inbound localizer
approach
2015:25
DL 567: Okay two ninety to intercapt
2015 :45
MDW TWll: Satellite ·Midway
2015 :45
CHI APC: Yah
2015: 50
MDW Tiffi.:
Three six five tango ia a ltaron he'd be going to thirty one
and South. Bend at five
2015:55
CHI APC: . Ah sixty five tango okay
2015;55
MDW TWR: He '.s re lea aed huh
2015: 55
CHI APC: Yah you can let him go
2015:55
MD"1 TWR: Okay
2016:00
CHI APC: Looks like it will be a little delay for thi• guy huh
2016:00
HDW TWR: That's too bad
2.
2016:00
CHI APC: Yah
7-016: :JO
MDW TWR: That's his cboice
2016: ()(J
CHI .~.?C: Okay Delta five sixty aeven will be b,.hind •h zero nine victor
sugar .
2Ul6:ll~
''IDW fWR: Okay
2 U16: li.J
Cl!! APC: Zero nine V S is four miles from Kadzie char ed for tlia approach
I'll have one more turn for you
20lb:l5
N09VS: Zero nine V S ••Y again
~016:20
CHI Al-'C; Y.ou 're four mile11 from Kedzie air clMreJ for the approach
I'll have one more turn for you
i.Ulu!2)
;:roq,,s . Ok<ly nine V S
2016:2~)
!'.DI>/ TWP.: Oscar is current ah Loyde
2016:3()
CHI APC: Okay
0 016: 5:;:
CHI APC: Zero nine V S turn left heading three Lwo zero intercept call
the tower now one eighteen seven
2Gl6: J5
!W9VS: :line V S
3.
2017:10
MJJW TWll: liatallita Midway thia Hotel Jlomeo uid hi' ll go to t,.., twc laft
for d•partura can h• go lih•n ha IP't• there
2017: 15
CHI APC: Yah
2017:15
MOW TWR: Okay
2017:20
ARTCC: Satellite Big llun
2017: 20
CHI APC: Yah
2017:20
ARTCC: Just by Joliet .-ven.zere four three Lima c11ena three ten
aix thousand landiq Midway G C
2017 :25
CHI APC: Okay radar
2017:40
N7043L: Approach seven zero four three Lima level eix with November
2017:45
CHI AI'C: Seven zero seven thr8& Lima radar contact fly the zero nine zaro
heading descand to four thousand vector for a thirty one left
localizer approach at Midway
2017:55
N7043L: Zero nine zero leaving six for four ah for a thirty one left
2018:0G
CHI Ai'C: Yes sir Oscar is now current let me know when you have i t
2018:00
N7043L: I'll get it
2018: 05
G!U Al'C: Ali right
2018:10
CHI AFC: Delta five aixty aeven desoend to two thouHnd five hundred
2018:15
DL 567: Five aixty seven out of four for twenty fiva hundred
2018:.30
CHI Al'C: A1 a !lllltter of fM:t Delta five •ixty .-v•n yo11 'r• three wiles
from calumet int•r-Cion olured for the appl'OOlch and ull Midway
tower _,, on one aia;btaen MIVen
2018140
DL 567: Cleared for the •PPTOa<lh and w '11 call the tower
2018140
CHI APC: So long
2018:50
ARTCC: South aAtellite Nil.ea
2019:00
N7043L: Forty three Li<llll haa Oioar
2019100
CHI APC: Thank you sir
2019: 05
ARTCC: South satellite Niles
2019: 15
CHI APC: Satellite
5.
2019:20
AR'.l'CC: South of Plant iive United five five three a ...ven thirty aeven
four thousand two ninety for Kedzie
2019:20
CHI APC:
' 2019:30
·'' !1DW TI/R: Satellite Midway with " odued approacl1
2019: JS
CHI APC: He can't do that
2019:40
MIJW TWR: Yah I know he can't nine victor augar a miaa we 1 ra 5ending him
left to one eight zero giving him twenty five hundred feet and
coming to you what fsequeuey
2019:40
MDW TWR: Ah eighteen four
2019:40
UA 553: And Midway approach United five five three we're at four
thouaand understand three one left
2019;1;5
MOW TWR: Eighteen four okay and cilat other clown i• ~•tbound that
sixty five taugo
2019:45
CHI APC: Okay
2019:50
UA 553: Do you read United five fi''" three
2019:55
CHI APC: Yes eir I was busy on the phone over there in radar contact
two ninety heading intercept thirty one left localizer for
Midw3y Oscar is current
6.
2020:00
\Ji. 553: . OllAy truinlL JO'I . . got Oecar .ii i:- ni.,.cy • ta. W.d!Da
iata'cept ta. - - 0.- 1.tt
2.\>20105
CHI APC: y.,, dr
2020:10
M09ft:
2020:10
CllZ APC: Ni.mavictor ....,.r radar -tact aCNth hM.tuls ~ thouuad
five llUn.tnMl wectoc for all tlllRy - i.tt ...ta
2029:15
Jf09Va:
2020:.10
CHI Al'Ct 11ici1My a t , - tell,.,.. -•n OD ~llala
2020:35
MllW Tlfll: No no .,.. tol.4 -
2020:40
CHI APC:
All tijjlt ve ' n lattiag tlli• llotel Romo go aad we 're gotn&
to a...i hi111 atraigjlt: GJ't ~ that lllis•
2020:45
CHI APC: Ot.ay
2020:45
MOW nlll: Off of two ~ -11 4D you~ Ila to hol4 lUa to CV. <>T de
yov to (aaial*lllpble)
Chieeao dafMlrbaa ..,r_ lkn ,1; ... r tar- •ix fi,,.. UJO&D out:
of two for tlaree
2020:50
A.rec: o'S.n aouth .atalUu uacer (wiin.telligibl•)
2020:50
CHI APC:
2"20: 50
MW TWI.: All dpt va'U bold hiat to to-.
1020: S()
CliI AIC: 'Ell ill tll• aidat of cll
Ah six fivo ta'1&0 - 11 .. ~..
~ lavol oU ac .Ut altitu.da ,,_ llavo Cha• -4 ~~ fly m
uat U.di.. . air
2020:55
1!16.ST: Six five taap 1 - 1 off at i : - - , - ~d
2021:00
CRl AJIC1
2021t05
N6ST: Ab wa 'd Ulte to gU lligjwlr •• llOOCl as poaaibl.a - 're picldJlj!,
up!·at thie altituda
2021:05
ARl'CC:
2021:05
C'AI APC: Yea 8Lr there 1 11 traffic at bMlva o 'cloclt and •bout " 111ile
and he's about ah fif~ i>""*-d feet above you "" aooa aa
I get: you by him - d a cauple of others I'll have l'\i~r for
)'OU
B.
2021:10
N65T1 Six five ta~ thaak you air
2021: 15
Clil APCI
2021:20
Clil APC: Zero nine V I tun. laft. h11&ding one three MllrO
2021:20
AIITCC: O'Hare SQUth aatallita south .i.p.rture1 on the 1even sixty
fiv• lU.
2021: 20
N09YS: Left to one three dro nine V s
2021120
Clil APC: Y.,b.
2021: 30
ARTCC: miue ia seven throe four !tl)tel romeo Midway ~n.s climbing
to aeventaen a gt.tlf atr,,...
2021: 35
CH! Ai?C: He ebol.lld be off vary sh~rtly
2021: 35
AR'ICC: !le should be off ahortly h..U
2021:40
Clil APC: Yoh
20:21:4(.1
ARTCC: Okay good-by
2021:40
CHI A~: Yah
·-'
9.
2021145
CIU Al'C: Six five ta1110 aliM to thi'e« thouHnd and I' 11 have lligher
for you in about another !iV<> mil••
2021 :50
N65T: Six five tanao 1. .ving two for three
2021:55
CHI AFC: United five fiva tbrae alov to hunctrad eiahty knots
2022:00
UA 553: Hundred eighty -.....~ fiva fiva thr..
2022:U
N34HR: And departure Ho~l -ao-o h with you heading two tvo &ail>&
to two thouaan4
2022:20
en APC: Hotel l.oaao radar contact a..S. clilllb and maintain one ae,,_
thousand ff'l'itld:ffll tllou-4
2022:25
N34!lR: Roger on up to oll9 aevan oil
2022:30
CHI APC: Zaro nine V S deacand to two tbouland faet
2022 :30
N09VS1 Nina V S down to two
2022:45
CHI AFC: Zero nine V s tu~n laft ca~ nine zero
Zero nine zaro nine V S

10.
20ll: 55
CHI APC:
2022155
AlttCCI
2023:00
Clll. APC: »crtb of ltl.l.. . t1IO i• nx f1- ca.., I'• ljC>i. . t.e i..ep ilia
for a Utt.la ~la
2023:00
AftCC: I 'f I.
2023:05
Citt APC: Oh ,.h
20llt05
Arl'CC:
2023:05
ClU APC: BR lu
202.3: 05
CHI Al'C:
2013:05
uttc:
21J23:l0
CHI A.PC:
20%3:10
A.an:c: Forget it. be Ullode4 at .Joliet
Okay
2023: 10
AJl.TCC: LJ
ll.
2023: 1.5
CHI APC: Zero nine V S turn left: headina zero two zero
2023: 15
NO<JVS: Zero t'Wo .zero
2023:15
CHI APC: United five fiv• three 1l<>W to hundr•d aixt:y knot:'S
2.023:20
UA .553: Hundred sixty knou five five thr-
2023:20
CHI APC: YH sir then deaaend to ah two thoueand feet Unit:ed five
five thret
2023: 2.5
UA 553: Down to two thoulland five Ii,,. thr•• leavin& four
2023:30
Clll Al'C: Forty three Lima 4e90end to two thoueand five hundred
2023:30
N7043L: Out of four for two point five forty three LiDUI
2023: 35
CHI APC: And z .. ro nine V S what ii your air spe"d now
2023:40
N09VS: Ah hundred forty
2023:40
CHI Al'C: That's okay keep th•t for a while please
2023:40
N09VS: Okay
r. u.
JOUt.U.
cm ucs ........ f i - f i - dttee •urt -~- to ~ ....- - ......
,.J.M
lllZ3t~5
DA S53t
2G:ltJO
Clll AJCt
1023:5-0
ll7043L:
2023;53
Clll &PC: DU.r&y four llDcel a.-o peer
2026110
Clll AIC:
cl•e-t I.- die •Pfr:OM!l •7
(tm1.,.Utpjtla) \! JI tua Wt II.Melina Ch.:ee tvv un -
witk •
int.rcept
2024125
Clll APC: Six fiw ta-.o cU.mb to fiw tbcn>. .nd c o - t CM c..ter one
tWc ~ po1M two
2024;30
CHl Al'C:
ZQ2fu45
CHI APC: z.ero .U.ue Y a ~ a• . - speecl •• lOll& •• JO& cav. air u 11
the tCNer - oae upteet ••en
l. 3.
202.4:4,
M09VSt
2024:55
Clil.APC: iland off south
2024155
ARTCC: Yah
2025:00
CHI APC: East of Big Run four mil•• is ah four Hotal Romeo
2025:00
ARTCC: Radar
20.25100
CHI APC: Yep
2025:10
CHI APC 1 Hotel Jlomeo pro<!eed direet Peotone call. tha centftr now o""
twenty five two
202,5: 15
N34HR: One twenty five two ao long
2025 :15
CHI AFC: So long
2025:25
CHI APC: Unitad five five three call the tower now on one eighteen
a even
2025:·30
UA 553: Eighteen se~n for five five thrfle
202fi..:OO
CHI AFC: Four three Lima turn left zero two zero
14.
2026100
117°"-lL:
2026100
Clll: APC:
2026:00
"1f71>43L:
202612.5
MDII 'l'Wl.t
2026:30
Clll Al'C:
2-026:30
Clll APC: All rlpt
l026:30
MDII TWR: Cauae - 011.ly got one ~y we .:an't give thiu - cocmand&x
the right he'• (-1utelliail>le) too close
2{)26:35
CHI APC: Olr.ay forty tlu:aa J.ima ia a th4I uxt ooe comiae 1ap on tha
,.,.r1r;er
2026:40
Nl:JW 'Iii&: All ripe Uait&<l f i . - fUt..y thne v1.ll 0. oa a left turn
one e1.pq ~ ~ feet: c..tJlg to JIOll
202.6:4-0
CHI Ai'C:
15 ..
I
2026:55.
i 1~HT··APc:
1
Forty three Lin1A tnrn 1 efr. hel\d"ing two nine-· zero you ret goin.g
! to go through " little bl.t to intercept
2026.:55
N7043L; Two nine zero
2027:30
c.ttr./\!'C: Forty three Lima ie three miles from Kedzie cleared for the
appro&ch call ~lidway t""er now on one eighteen seven
2027:30.
N7043L: Gcod day
2027:30
·CHI' APC: Good day
2028:15
Mr~.r: TWR: Satellite Midway
2028: LS
CHI l\PC: i'.ah
202·s·:: i.s
Cfff.'1 'f\-JR: You got United five fifty three okay
202.8 :·20
CHJ '1\PC: No I' L" not talking to him
2028 :.20
Klf..i TWR: You' re not talking tr.• him
2023 :'20
CllT 'APC.: l:!egati vP.
,. - - ..
io?g:4o
~w,.r"T\ffi: Y1/H 1:.nlk:i.ng to him
i·
16.
2028: 40
CHI AJ'C:
1.028:1+0
MllW TWR: Yan - too
2UW:45
Clil APC: OkAy
2019:00
CHI Al'C: 11111.ted five n- three witb -
2\UY:25
CRI APC: Forty thr.., Lim11 do you have ground contact
2.0Z9:25
MDil TWE.: (unintelligible)
:!029:30
CHI Al'C: Okay he's·diuppeariug ~ d.1sa1>peared r13ht wh .. re juat.· _.bout
where forty tbree u.i.•s et if forty thr- Li- bse ground
contact I don 1 t kllOw if he <lnee doae or oo t he '• not 011 the
acope thougli
2029:40
HDW TWR1 Ille we don• t heve him ei tiler
2029:40
CHI A:?C: Oh
2031:0~
;{!Ji 'lWR.1 satellite Midway did you ever h . . r from Unit.ltd !iVQ Hfty
three
2031:05
Clll AK::
...
·.: ·.
. '
17.
2031: 05:
l-:!IJW 'ThlR: Oh beautiful
7.031:20
:.mwTW.R: Sate111.te Midway
2031; 20'
CHI APC: Yah
2031: 20·
_H[A.l'T1:1R:
L,ook·s like United_ five ~ifty' three went: down
2031:·20·
G!U AFC: · Y.ih
2031:25
Ah we got a call on the phone I' 11 k""P you advised
MI:M •1-WR:
2031: 25
CHI APC: Okay
7.031: 45
L:HI Al'C: Cl1icago Heights inbound on the. seveu s:ix five·
2031: 50
ARTCC: 'riho' d you want
/.031:55
CHI APC: 'lah ah United ah want the Heights
20.:01:55·
ARTCC: Yah
o
2 32'·.: o:i5 ' Okay ah United five five three looks like':.he. ,;;:;,t. in ahout
CHI APC:
a mile short: of 11idway ah what type of machine ,... ;, he saven
thirty seven
2032 :05
A.R'J.Y..:C: Ah let 1ne drag a strip yah seven thirty $even
1<1.
2032: 10 .
CHI APeJ. ·Otpy
2032:10.
Ante: a. - ill
20321.15
CRl .APCI Yllb llA 'a ab. be u - t in about a mile an aa lf .i. two mi laa
alicnt of tbe ~Y
2{}31:15
Anet: Okay
2032:55.· '
J.r.rcc:
2032:55
CBI Al'C: Yah
2033100
AK'l'CC: Three .Ula ...i: of the 'Ii&U ia two three eight wtlfore •
gulf Krua two leWl aix lallif (s,..ntelligil>t:.) lltl.d!My
2033:.00
' ')lti)W nm.: Satellite M1<Nay (U'Cintellfgtlll.e)
2033:05
Clll AFC:
2033:03
Ancc:
2033:05
CHI.APC.: - Olay l"adar
2.033.:05'
AR'.ICC: .Big Mother
19.
2033:05
CHI APC: Okay
'·':.;.': ...,'.
2U33:10
CHI APCt Say again ditl you cRll Midway
2033: 15
MDW ·TWR: Yah I got a departure for you
2033:15
CHI A?C: Go ahead
2033:20
MDW TWR: Five twenty three Joliet delta ceaana citation he' e got
Moline and he'e got Bradford at one aigllt ob off st two two
2033:25
CHI APC: Bradford one eight oh okay he'a releaaerl
2033:30
HDW TWR: Ah right I've got vercol.a ~nty eight ah
2033:30
CHI APC: Just a minute just a minute
2033:30
N23U: Chi~go approach ah gulf stream two three uniform •ix thouaand
with Miiliuly Oacar
2033: 30
CHI APC: Vercola twenty eight
2033:30
MDW TWR: Yah ah twin beach Roberta "r
2033:35
C!lI APC: Okay
"
.~··
2033:35
Oll APC1
2033:40
~ 'l'wt.: h4 tbat'a all I pt tGr - -·re·ptna to llol.t .,..ryt!U.Dg
•he uatil .. fi.. . llbet '• ti.a -.1 with u.tud
21l33:40
Clll AlC: Okay
2033:50
CHI A.PC: ~ tbr- aigltt . m i - ra41ir ~ct ,..ro 1d.aa aero bM<ii.D;g
vector for thirty - le.ft ea 1-al:lJ••r appir09Cb ia ah Mi411ay .
2033:50
1'12311:
2036:05
MIJW TWl.1
2036:10
illlW nm: Sat.allite Midwey
20)6:25
CR:t APC: Yah
2G36:25
MW T14: Li8t•n we 're going to tutve to get off this. thirty one Approach
till thla thing ill out of the vay
2<}36: }()
CliI APC: (fao y ..tut t
2v'.l6: JO
•·{!)W Th'.R: All ri.gbt - 'r" going to hsv& to go to four that's the 0<1ly one
"" got laft
21..
2036:35
Cfll APC: Okay the first one will be thirty eight uniform he' a about: sh
s4lven mi lea awiiy from Heniiau now
2036.: 35
HW TilR: Okay
Ill J«>RE FPLLOWS

Docket No. SA 1~·35
Exhibit No. 3G

CHICAGO-O'HARE TOWER JIJ'ID 1-ITDWAY TOWER

LETI'ER OF AGREEMENT
·.,
!
;
•.
.-- {\::::.. --- --·.--'-------··
--- ...
J ,. . •.
. ' .··~. ..
;
.~
:
. ": ···<.
~-::
I
i ,.
CHICAG0-0 'HARE .TOWER AND MIDWAY TOI/ER
·.:.
LETTER OF AGREEMENT
EFFECTIVE: 15 Hay 1971
SUBJECT: Midway•Control Zone Procedures'

0
Th e following agreec::ent betwe.en 0 'Rare Tower and Mid"1ay Tover is supple:nent.ary

to the proceGures contained in the Handbook-7110,~E.
1. PURPOSE._ The purpose of t..'"ie agreement is to cover the use of Midway Tower
radar in the contr'ol of IT:a traffic arriving and departin~ Xid•..;ray> and to
delegate airs?~ce to per~it Hid-way Tower to conduct IFR/Special VFR
.operations as outlin7d in.current MA.i.\OPS.
2~ AIRSPACE U~DE!f }11DWAY TOl·!ER JURISDICTION. 'The airspace from 2000 P...SL and
below \..•ithin that part. o= :1id·way 1 s con::rol zone vhich lies south 0£ t:b.e
.073° radial of ~aperville (excluding the extensions) is -Oelegated to
Midway Tower for the purpose of conducting IFR/Special VC'R·operaciocs.
:
3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF =AGILITIES.
A. Midway Tower
1. Shall separate all aircraft that ·have been released to Nidway from
all aircraft operating special VFR or IFR under Midway's contra~.
2. Sha 11 not release any IFR/Specia 1 WR departure i.•i thin 45° either
side of• the ap?roach course ia use at. the tirae (XDW-1-!XT, KLJ.3 4-R)
without prior coordination wi.th Chicago Approach Control.'
'·
11
3. Shall call Chicago Approach Control, "south sat:ellite posicion
advising when an IFR d~?arture is storting ta~eoff. This c~:l
shalJ include ch2 identification, ty?e, iix, airway, altitude
and de?arcure runway (24D Cessna Naperville V6. 1 4000, de?<:iTtint:;
runway 4).
j~
4~ Shall restrict all departures to the altitude specified by
' Chicago A~proach Control· as indicated in 3 B-1.
'·
....
•.
·~-~ ···-· . ...___ - .. , ...... ~.

...
.' '..
~.--·
;t 'I
-. '' I•{.
..·•
:r .. ' .
·./
.:
. ·.. . . :
~
...
}
2. ,. . . ::. -~ .. ...... . •
5 •. Shall nor~~lly restrict a11 departures routed over

the fixes
-.' listed below to the appr~priate head~ng:
~ Heading
..
Uaperville** 220°
.;
Joliet* 220°
\· Robei-ts* 220°
Peotone* ' 190°
Crib*** 090°
*When approaches to runway 4 are in progress, Joliet, Robercs

a'nd Peotone departures sh.all be i~sued a 180° heading.
,, **W'nen approaches to runway 4.are.in progress, Naperville

' departures shall be issued a_.270° heading.
***Crib departures wust be coordinated prior to takeoff because

o~ possible confliction vith ~eiga 1 departures.
6. Shall, in the event of successive departur~s over the same rou~e.

issue he.:;dings that will maintain pro;:ier course separa.:ion until
under Chicago Ap?roach Control's jurisdiction.
7. Shall restrict all IFR/Speci~l VFR departures whose flight p.;:;th

will use.i t north of XD:.I to COalplete their t.urr.-out. south of
the 073 radial of Naperville (within three miles of the field).
8. Sh~ll norrr~lly change all IFR departures to Chicago Departure

Control within one mile from end of the run~ay. If this is
not possibl~, they sha 11 be handed off a ft er sepera ti on from
all other IFR/Special VFR departures has been established.
'· 9. Shall keep Chicago Approach Control advised of any ?ertiuent

changes in weather) field conditions or status of n.avic;a io;.-.al
tiids and the desired interval between successive ap?roact-ies.
i: 10~ Shall forward off times to Chicago Center.

,.'·
' B. Chicago (O'Hare) Ap?roach Control
i
1. Shall at the start of each shift (or lw"hen ap?roaches' are ch<inged)
inform llidw2y .'?Olw"L:!r what altitude restriction sha 11 be ap;ilied
to all IFR deparcUres.
"
--.... ·'.
---=···-··---··-· ·--·-·· ----------:-· -·-- -·-· .
-·- ... _..,..,....-- - - ··--:-·· ........ ~

. ···-~-~--- ··~- --
. .. " . :'.
.. ; ,.
......__
. }..
.:l··
.,<, . , . .. ... ::.1,:•

~·- 3• ..
I
t \
I
""'.,
/
0
Normally> .the follot..iing restrictions Will be utili.zed as appr 0 -

·' ' pr1ate in conjuuctiou vi.th the type of approaches in progress
at 0 •Hare.. \
;
..
AE:Eroaches Restriction
:..'. ...
.··:
Parallel 32 1 s 2000 MSL* ···.·
! Single 32R/L 25 00 MSL ti 11 past DuPage/Big Run/
V92 or 1/026
14-22-27-4 3000 MSL till past DuPage/Big Run/
V92 or 1/026
.! *Eastbou~ds shall be restricted to 2000 until east of the 340°

radial of Chicago Heights t.~en 3000 until 1/026 ..
...,' .· South/Westbounds shall be restricted to 2000 until west of the
318° radial of Chicago Heights then 2500 until DuPage/Big Run
·.or V92, 'Whichever is appropriate .. ·
···.
"-I The O'Hare IFR Room coo=dinator shall be responsible foi advising
·the Midway su?ervisor 0:£ the appropriate· res.triction to apply.
.2. Shall) except for traffic landing at Y..idway 1 insure that all
IFR 'troffic under or:Hare 1 s control ~ithin three miles of Midwr.ay's
control zone (as defined in para. 2) is 1000 above the departure
altitude in use as specified'in B.. 1.
3. Shall vector all Midway IFR ·arrivals that are beloq 3000 so as
to rer;:iain three miles clear of th~ Midvay control zone until
they are turned on to· th~ app.roach course.
4. Shall, after establishing the arrival on the approach course;

, .. ad.vise the pilot to contact Y..idway on the app~opriate freque:-.cy
at the points listed beloY:
Approach Contact/Release Point
.1 l3R ILS Outer Marker

31 ILS 5 miles from field on approach course
4R NDB Herman NDB
5. Shall advise Midr...•ay of t.he idenCity of an arrival and in the event

- J. of successive a??roaches 1 shall advise YJ.dvay of the se~~ency ?rior
I to the first aircraft ?assing the approach fix.
i
I
6. Shall not change the routing until t~e departure has left the
I Midw'ay z9ne or has reached an altitude 1000 feet above the initial
I alti tud2 being utilized for departures.
' 1
7. Shall coordinate with Midway Tover.prior to the use of visual

approach es •.
-·· ----·-·------......:·----- -----··--------~---· --··-·-···
'
.
-.,..~ ~~-----~-w --c:"~---·--•r• ·..-.,-...
·..·
... -..
'' (; .
.... ,... .· ~~- ....•.
. .. .
.-...
. : '. ,.
~--~
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~
;..
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: : ·..
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,f - ,1·
. ...._,_ 4. ••• j· .•·;
:: .. ~: . .
.· . .· ..
(. . y 1) ..
·1:. ·. '.
-:· .
,::- ·-· •,'
4. GE~~E?.AL OPERA':::ING P?,OCEVJ?.ES
...• ,,·>
A.. Prim;iry Ap?rooch Systems
... ..
·.; l. Runwav in USC Approach SysteQS ·.·.
.: .
;'
f.
1
13 J1DW
I 4 NDB 4R
I ·31
22
MXI
MXI
B. When }iDW ap.?roaches are in progress> Midway shall assume c~ntri:>l

of the arrival at the outer .c:;.3rker a;i.d insure that the aircraft
•. ~ill continue inbound ~atil south of the 073° radial of Naperville.
~ ~never ne ssary to conduct surv ill<l...nce ap;>roach s at Midway J'

~
I
I-.(~~~~ ~ 1£ . c tion or ?ilot reqaes s) Chic~ go sou t..1 satellite.
(/ IJ.fi r:
control~ er shall release the a· craft in suffici t tirr.e to permit
. 1
Mid;.,ra to establish coa::nunic2 ons and t?. c.a·~e ne final turn:n. {

,· HoT• ver, the changeover shal not be tl<lde unt: the arrival is
~c ear of all conflictin2 t- ffic.
~Y,h'b.en Y..i.C.way 1 s radar is inoperative·, t...1.e inter facility coordination

· light shall be used in the folloWing manner:
·1. 0 1 Hare shall activate the light Wen the I.FR arrival is six
flying c~les fro~ th~ ap?ropriate approach fix (Herman, KDW/
MXr outer .marker).
2. Y~dway shall clear the light when·the IFR arrival is under their
... cont'rol •
5. CANCELlATIONS. This letter cancels the Joint Chicago-0 1 Hare Tower -

Midway Tower Agreement cl.a ted l l·:a y 1969, Subject: Y..iciva y Control Zone
Procedures.
"
\
.; . - _j
. ~ .
i~ Daniel X. Vucurcvicil Nick Molsen
Chief, Chicago-O'iiare ToW"er Chief, Midvay Tower
I
I
·1·. ·.·.
.......
.
'
·--
' -- ··- -·-:- ·-·------ ....--- --.--------· --· -----· ------- ·~---~--· , ___ .. ---·-·· ---- ·-----· ....
.;.....
'..
. ~· .
---- -------- - -.... ,....-~- ..- -- ···-------~

'·
. ....,,._
UNITED AIR LINES
P.O. Box 66100, Ch1."cago,Oli'nois 60666
Jar:i.uary 31, 1973 -- -----·· -·
Mr.• W. Lamb
1[at.i'ortifl Transportation
Safety Board
Bur~au of Aviation Safety
wa'shingtcin, D. C. 20591
Dea.r Mr. Lamb:
; Attached are the statements of Stewardesses. D. J. Griffin,

K. ,.s. Duret and M. J. McCausland, as 'request.ed by
., Mr. W. Hendricks in his phone call to Mr. Wilson on
i January 30, 1973.
Sincerely,
J ;~·])_.• >smith
Vice'President
Flight .•Safety and Industry Affairs
.-~.
LOcation: Elk Grove 1btt-'nship, lllinois,on Ru1.1te 62, one-hWf1nili:: west of Route 83
___-·;:
/" _,.___ -- I
J. D. SMITH
JAN 26 1973
ACCIDENT REPORT
TO; CPT J. D. Smitfi

Flight Safety Dept.
United A. L. EXO .
P. O. Box 66100
Chicago, IL 60666
FROM; M. J, McCausland, Fi,rst Ste1<ardess, DCASW
SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident, Flight 553, December 8, 1972
\\'hi le approaching "IDW from DCA aboard Flight 553 on December 8, 19'/2,
r:was sitting in the forward jump seat on th.e aisle side with my seat belt
fastened. I had checked seat belts in the forward cabin and had secured
the buffet before sitting down. I do not recall if I had made the "No
Smoking announcement.
11
The only thing unusual I remember before impact was noting that the
aircraft was descending rapidly, I do not recall anything else until
1 regained consciousness. On awakening, 1 found myself pinned by debris
inside the aircraft. I screamed and firemen came to my aid. I do not
know how long I \\'as unconscious.
M •. J.,-; McCAUSLAND, DCASW

{/'
WITNESS:
6
January 31, 1973
Report requested for·preliminary investigation af flight 553 on December 8, 1972.
Plane Type. B-737, #9131, enroute from DCA to MDW. Emergency occurred at_
2:25 CST while on final approach into Midway Airport.
Crew Members: Captain W. L. Whitehouse

First Officer W. 0. Coble
Second Officer B _ J. Elder
Stewardess M. J. McCausland
Stewardess D. J. Griffin
Stewardess K. S. Duret
53 Ticketed Passengers
2 Infants
I Handicapped - board in forklift
I Elderly
The Captain had announced that we would be landing at Midway Airport in five
minutes, the seat belt sign was on and Mrs. McCausland gave the final landing
announcement as the no-smoking sign came on. Mrs. Duret and I checked the
cabin making sure all seat belts were fastened all cigarettes had been extinguished,
all seat backs and tray tables were in the full upright position and all carry-on baggage
had bee·n placed under a seat. We then took our seats on the rear jump seat. I was
on theleft hand side and Mrs, Duret was on the right. We fastened our seat belts in-
cluding shoulder harness, Shortly thereafter I heard the engines trying to apply
,_ more power, I looked out the window and could see nothing. The engines kept
trying for more power as if to gain altitude. There were 2 or 3 surges. It is
difficult for me to say if there was any change in the planes attitude during this
time. I cannot recall for this report the actual feeling of the initial impact. The
liquor compartment and ovens, which had all been checked and found secure before
landing, broke loose, the interior of the airplane started falling and flashes of fire
could be seen on the left hand side. There was scraping of metal and I remember
thinking how similar it was to the mock-up we had been through in stewardess school.
Then all semmed quiet except for a hissing sound and I knew we had crashed and stopped. My
shoe was embedded in the windscreen and as I got up I managed to pull my foot loose by
leaving my shoe. The jumpseat had to be pushed up before I could open the left cabin
door. From looking out the small round door window, I felt the exit was useable. As
I opened the door I saw flames and realized it could not be used as an exit. The flames
started to come in around the side of the door and I immediately tried to close the
door. This was difficult to do because the hooked slide had come loose from the packet.
However, the door was closed. Mrs. Duret was openina ihP. rear buffet door durinq
?
Page 2
this time so I went into the cabin shouting for the passengers to come to the back
of the pl one and get out.
The evacuation was hampered because the overhead bins and seats on the left
hand side had collapsed blocking the aisle, The passengers who were not pinned
excaped by climbing over the partically collapsed seats on the right hand side.
The plane was rapidly filling with smoke and I had to run to the door (where
Mrs. Duret was assisting passengers out) for air before going back in to assist the
cabin. I kept shouting for passengers to get out the back of the plane and was
trying to release passenger in l6B whose leg was '.angled in the wreckage,
Also, the West boy who was pinned under seat 15B. I could not release their
pinned limbs. J·turned to the little Sherwood girl pushed het to Mrs, Duret who
in turn got her out of the airplane. Passengers were stil I coming out and I
returned to the cabin to assist. The smoke by now was very thick. I went to the
·door for air and went back one last time, The smoke was so black by now that I
could see no one else. I went back to the door, told Kathy to leave and left behind
her. As I turned to look back at the plane, smoke was pouring out the door from which
we had just left, I assisted a passenger after, outside, that could not walk away
from the wreckage along with another man. Some man came over and asked to help the
___p_assenger for me which he did. I shouted for people to get away from the plane, Mrs.
Duret and I tried to get to the front of the airplane. We walked around two houses
but couldn't get through. When we couldn't, we went back to aid thepassengers
who had escaped. They were al I scattered among the crowd that had gathered. The
fire department had come and some ambulances. Some people were bringing blankets
and were also trying to help. I was with a passenger who had an injured back and
was possibly in shock. A United Agent came to me and insisted I put on a coat and
stand on the passengers blankets since I had no shoes, After an ambulance came and
took the man, the United Agent insisted I get into a polic car, He then got Mrs.
Duret. The officer asked where we wanted to go and we wondered if there was any-
thing we could do at the crash site to which he replied no-. He offered to take us to
Holy Cross Hospital and we thought possibly we could do something there so we went,
:J.~n;,_J~
D. J. Griff:r-rr---
Stewardess ..
8
December 15,
Report requested for preliminary investigation of Flight 553 on December 8, 1972
Plane Type B-737, #9131, en route from DCA to MDW. Emergency occurred at 2:25 CST
while on final approach into Midway Airport.
Crew Members: Captain W. L. Whitehouse

First Officer W. 0. Coble
Second Officer B. J. Elder
Stewardess M. J. McCausland
Stewardess D. J. Griffin
Stewari:less K. S. Duret
53 ticketed passengers
2 infants
1 handicapped - boarded in forklift
1 elderly
REPORT OF MRS. K. S. DURET
The cockpit had announced that we would be landing in Midway in approximately
five minutes. Mrs. Griffin and I had closed up our buffet; we went through the
cabin to check for carry-on baggage, check seatbelts and check that the children
had been belted in by their parents and that infants not on tickets were being held
by parents. The No Smoking Sign came on. We again went through the cabin to
check seatbacks, that all smoking material had been extinguished and, as is our habit,
we checked the buffet a second time. We generally double check one another.
We went to our jumpseats and we felt a surge in the engines, after we had been on the
jumpseats for perhaps a minute. It was a very powerful surge. I think what went throug.h.
both our minds was that it was a wave off; it was a missed approach and we were waiting
to feel a leveling off. Instead, there was a second surge, what I am almost positive was a
~
9
second surge on the engines, and then within seconds on the left hand side of the
aircraft, you could see flashes of white and gold, not smoke, not fire, but just
flashes and popping· noises. At the same time the buffet, liquor compartment came
out asweli as the oven units, and there was a tremor or series of tremors. If we yelled
anything or not, I do not recall at all. I had the impression that there was a few seconds
of silence and light, and I had the feeling we were settling or, we were drifting down-
wards. There was no motion, no noise. We both got out of our jumpseats and Mrs.
Griffin went to the left hand door which was directly by her seat. I went to the
buffet door and I had a great deal of difficulty opening this door because the amount
of debris on the floor seemed to be blocking not necessarily my getting to the door, but
getting the door opened.
The cabin seemed to become very, very dark, I was aware that a male passenger was
assisting Mrs. Griffin with the door. He came to assist me and between us we were
able to get this door to swing open and to clear enough stuff away so that it could swing
'· open. As I pushed the door open and latched and came back around, a woman passenger
that I recall being in Seat 16F, was in the doorway, and when I swung the door open,
I realized that we had sort of settled on a basement entrance and there was drop of about
six feet, but to the right rear of the aircraft, within two feet, there was a ground area.
There was a lot of burning debris and wood. I pulled the inflation handle on the slide
which filled up this hollow in the basement stairs. I ran back into the cabin, as far
back as I could get into the cabin. The seats had oecome dislodged in the area that I
could see and the ceiling had collapsed. From what I could see, the right hand side of
the aircraft was, well, you could not see anything on the rJght hand side of the aircraft.
The left hand side was just a jumble of seats.

'.
/0
~ .'
We rcn to the door to get fresh air and then would go back into the cabin and try to get
people back toward the door. At one point, I felt something around my feet and it was a
child. I grabbed the child and ran to the door and started shouting to this man outside
of the aircraft to take the child, which he did. I started to go back into the cabin --
at that point, the smoke became extremely black and extremely thick and seemed to iust
, gush through the cabin. I told Mrs. Griffin to get out and we both got out the door iust
as the smoke seemed to bi !low out. We shouted for people to get back. We ran around
a house and tried to get toward the front of the aircraft, thinking there might be
passengers on the ground or there was scme way that we co6.ld get in the front of the
cabin if it was not on fire. We could not get close enough to the airplane so we ran
around a second house and it appeared that the entire front of the aircraft was completely
encased in the house. We could see no way that we could get back into the front and we
did not see any people. We ran around again to the tai I.
DOCKET NO. SA-435
EXHIBIT 6-C
r;-·
:

-·---- -·-
.... .·
FLIGHT,A'.ITENDANT STATEMENTS
l. Mrs. Margurite J. McCausland
2. Mrs.·D. Jeanne Griffin,
3. Mrs.'Kathleen S. Duret
''
i
I
I'
I
I
I ' \.
Bud~t Bureau No, J9-R02-4.J,
NATfONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 31
1
!
Ci -
Place '. ~~7--~---~h~---
' .
.;4-,.__,.·~ :;- /'.../-
7.1 ~ r _,.<·.._/)~.... ~~1.d/.~- :~...u..--
Date
-
-~c- .... - --/ r-: ·9- J... .:- Z 2-
-'--7-----------------~--n-::L .....!. ------------
1, . . . . . . 'I h
I. ~o~n~-4·-';;-S:s:3__:±-!:'.:.:.:<=_<;'._______________ Date-'.L'.::.:::....:!.J,: ..!£.Z:O-...... Hour .«.:~3-}J'." 1 •
IL Aircraft ...7.2..1 _________________ ._______ FAA Certificate No. and Symbol ·---------------------------------------·-··------·-·
III. What is your name4c}-:2'1h!.?G-..

~ ~
-~"'-+v Address ... ~-~--<~::.......
v·
A L/-s
ge ......
IV. Occupati~n "!:J';~*-"-'---~'i-''~-!... By whom employed <2_<'::.<?!.~&..L..:~l<'....,~{c:c.1_/;;.-;j
V. Where were you at the ti~e of the accident-2:...-:..~.. /}__ _€ _______________________________________________________ _
VI. Tell in your own words what you saw before and at the time the accident occurred.
NTSB Form Gl20.11 (Use reverse side of sheet for diagram and additional statement)
U.S. GOV(RNMENT PRINTING orrro:: 1%7--0--265·261
...., '
,;.
.?'!. ::. ...._..,_/
., !~-
•,·-·
I. . 31
DEPARTMENT OF TRAH5PORTATIOH
HATIONAL TRANSPORTATIOH SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
---------IP>iaOHS!cSs,;e!lR'l<l~F<eHr~-------- records indicate that you were a passenger aboard
United Airline ----1-.~-------- , Flight_S....5c;.;;3~----
from wa sh i ngt op DC (Nat i._aun_.,a,__,J__,__ _ _ _ _ __ to Cb 1 Ca go ( MiP,'-'wa""'-y.,_,_l_ _ _ _ __
which was involved ir. an accident on _.i.Due=.c"e"-mUJ.1b.;:ei::..ir_ _.s...._,_J,__.9c.7'--'2~, at --~Cuh~i~c~a'-'g,._,.o~,~I~l~l~i~n~oui~s~
National Transportation Safety Board, a Federal agency, is charged by an act of Congress with th
investigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of preventing future mishaps. In order rha
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it will be appreciate1
if you will answer the following questions on the reverse side of this letter: (1) where and when you boarde1
the aircraft; (2) what seat you occupied, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat wa:
on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center o
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of the flight; (4) any occurrences while on board which appeare1
unusual to you, prior to or during the accident; (5) other facts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of the National Trans
port at ion Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your assist
ance.
Yours truly,
Investigaror-in-Chargt:
Bureau of A viacion Safety
(Use reverse side for answer:.)

. 'J
;: T
On December 8, 1972, I boarded United Airlines 737, Flight 553, in
Washington, D.C. I was accompanied by my four-year-old daughter, Jennifer,
and my 17-month-old son, Arieh. We were assigned the three seats in row 10,
ft.,;4\
on the left side of the plane; my daughter sat next to the winaoW', my son sat
f/oS) (:oG).
in the middle sea~, And I was in the aisle seatA During the takeoff, Jennifer
and I looked out of the window to determine the point when the plane became air-
borne. This seemed to take an unusually long time, with the plane appearing
to taxi down the whole runway. The remainder of the flight, prior to the ap-
preach to Midway Airport, was relatively uneventful.
Prior to arrival, the pilot informed us over the public address system
that we would be landing at Midway Airport in about five minutes. We fastened
ou~.seat belts, ad~csted the seat backs to the upright position, and prepared
for landing. At this point, I could not see the ground because of the clouds.
At this time, the engine sounds were consistent with normal landing pro-
cedure. However, approximately two minutes later, the engines began to accel-
erate, and I suspected that the pilot was trying to pull out of his landing de-
11
scent. There was some turbulence, I thlfiil heard a passenger say There 1 s snow on
the ground:". I looked out of the right window and noticed that the ground was
slanting away from the front of the plane at what appeared to be a 45-degree
angle. We were underneath the cloud cover and very close to the houses beneath
us. The engines were quite loud at this time.
Because of the position of the plane in relation to the ground (closeness,
and nose-up position) and the acceleration of the engines, I thought that the
airplane might be in trouble. The possibility of a crash was never announced
by any crew member.
The impact was extremely violent. However, the specific details of the
crash sequence were a blur. I felt myself being thrown forvard and up within
the confines of my seatbelt. The airplane cabin lights went out and tearing,
shattering sounds could be heard.

page 2.
The interior shell of the cabin was ripped loose; it fell over my fam-
ily's seats, trapping us and cutting off our visual access to the rest of the
plane. The fire started almost immediately after impact and was located be-
side my row of seats, preventing us from using the exit door over the left wing.
My seat (aisle) and my daughter's (window) seat were relatively intact. My
baby's (center) seat had collapsed over him, and he could not be seen. My
daughter began to scream, ''Mommy, Mommy, there's a fire!" I released my seat-
belt and Jennifer's and pulled her from her seat. We fell to the ground behind
our row of seats and were momentarily trapped in some debris, under the fallen
interior shell. The fire was raging next to us, along the left side. I held
Jennifer and crawled back to my Ari's seat and tried to unfasten his seat belt.
The belt was jammed. A person was in front of me, and I pulled at that individ-
ual, asking him to help me get my son. The person was able to pull Ari from
under his seat and handed Ari to me. As the cabin was very dark, I could not
see who helped me. (I was later told that it was Mrs. Linda West.)
I then carried both children into the main part of the cabin and walked
toward the opening at the back of the plane (the only source of light that I
could see). We were not given any assistance at this point (and I did not hear
any instructions to evacuate). When I reached the galley door, I handed my child-
ren down out of the plane to Mr. Shaughnessy, Mr. Stachura, and other people who
were standing on the ground near the galley door exit. Then, the stewardess in-
side the plane and the people on the ground helped me to climb down out of the
plane, a distance of approximately five feet. I stepped onto a pile of rubble
covered by what appeared to be a deflated life raft. By the time we were a few
yards from the plane, the whole crash site was burning.
~"' . ,
·,
•
IDCKET NO. SA-435

EXHIBIT 6-B

'
PASSENGER STATEMENTS
1. ·Marvin E. Anderson
2. Howard H. Christeson
3. Wilbur v. Erickson
4. Harold W. Green
5. Harold R. Metcalf
6. Nancy Parker
T· .~/alter L. Patterson, Jr.
8. ·Pelores M. Pendrey
9. ;John H. Rauen,, Jr.
10. Mrs. Judith Sherwood
11. Mrs. Linda S. West
12. Aloyious E. Wieser
"
...'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -/+
WASH!NGTOt-1, D.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
_ _,l,,,:_'f'.Alwl'-LTJEi~Q:...1___--"-lj-::J__,l'-LRI.lL-LiLN.IL-,t:.E.;:.,.\;______ records indicate chat you were a passenger aboard a
·(/)../;Tc:D A!Rl1Ne --"-8"---~/_,_.3~/~----, Flight . 5--;$"" 3

from Wg,5/-/JJ.JGTON _-L-L''-C>c.-'---- to O/;C/l6'o L
"'.hfrh was involved ir. an accident on 0ECRVBt:;;!<5 /'?).;/,at ,;;?,' 3 0 PfZl.

National Transportation Safety Board, a Federal agency, is charged by an act of Congress with the
investigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of preventing future mishaps. In order chat
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it will be appreciated
if you will answer the following questions on the reverse side of this letter: ( 1) where and when you boarded
the aircraft; (2) what seat you occupied, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether scat was
on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of the flight; (4) any occurrences while on board which appeared
unusual to you, prior to or during the accident; (5) other facts which you f~el relate to th_e accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of r.he National Trans-
portation Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your assi:•t-
ance.
Yours truly,
Investigator-in-Charge
(Use reverse side for answers)
'
•.1
1• .. r111 /\pprUVf'1I· Aui'<T t 111I t"llH,N tl I' 1J ! •!,·I
.I 11., -2-
-----· December 13, 1972 -~
(Date)
MARVIN E. ANDERSON'S ACCOUNT OF UNITED AIRLINE Is ..
FLIGHT jfo553 IS CRASH ON FRIDAY. DECEMBER 8. 1972
From all appearances, the flight appeared to be normal un-
til the very last few seconds, possibly 30 seconds before the
crash. The pilot announced over the P.A. system that we bad
arrived over Gary, Indiana, and were at an altitude of 4,000
feet; that we bad been cleared for landing, and that we would
be on the ground in approximately five minutes. The pilot gave

no further instruction or announcement after that, Sometime
after that, the No Smoking sign came on, the Seat Belt sign had
'
already been turned on earlier, and one of the stewardesses
announced that we were about to land anrl +-"ar To>a ~i-,~,,1rl ~t"r<1<""-
en our seat backs to the upright position, etc. The flight

seemed to proceed normally and I observed that the front slats
had been fully deployed with the rear wing flaRS only partially
I
t
deployed. (I do not recall hearing the landing gear being
I
lowere_sL_} Continuing to look out the window, being seated in I!
Seat 1fo9-A which is on the left side of the coach cabin, one or
two seats behind the emergency exit I could observe t~
bient conditions and was looking for the time when we would
break through the clguds and se,e the grQund,

I
Almost exact]y
II
at the time we did break thr011gh the cl 011ds, which seemed to
be extremely ] ow ] ike 500 feet or less, the pilot re,rsre d 11p
the engines which sounded as though they responded properly,
yet there was not the feeling of acceleration but the change of
(Sl;:.r1ntu:re)
NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last pai:ie.)
(Page 1)
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. 1i'553
. .
Form Appn1vrd• !311d11:<"l nur• '" 1 Ni '· l•1 ROJ•I ·.. -3-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued) -----·----- ·- - -·-- -- - ·- .U.LJ.llil. _.
· (tJnlC")
<lttitude by the rotaU on ...oL the ai=.a.ft about ..i.t.s__wing __ axe.s_·_

rum a decent .angl_e_ of aJW_t'.Q_x-1ro-<Lt_e_ly___Fh_q, t;__NQJJ_ld_gp~_tu_b e
five degrees to an inclined angle of 10 or 15 degrees, putting
the plane into a stall. This rotation took place within iust a
few seconds. There was no sensation of an upward thrust. It
was a matter of only a few more seconds. possibly three to five,
and it appeared to me as though the tail section struck the top<
of houses with a very sharp. jarring action. Instantly, of
course, after that tbe entire plane was crasb:!ng OD top and
,
through tbe bo11ses, gr:!nding to a ball:, apparently jn the mj cjdl <
of one of the homes which caused the total darkness to envelop

the fuselage over tbe entire section of the coach cabin It
was also noted that the engines remained at high power all the
way into the final contact with ground.
When the aircraft came to a halt, all i:iower went off and
there was relative silence for a moment. There were no visible
lights nor could one see any i:iassengers or exit lights. This
guietness was followed by a number of screams and hollers which
were a1'1'arently from Ee OE le in the cabin, as well as QOSSibly
even outside the cabin. During the final crash, I felt my head
essentially bury itself into the back rest of the seat directly
in front of me 1 but I don't believe I was knocked unconscious.
I first attemi:ited to get UQ and found that the seat belt was
very securely fastened and found it slightly difficult to un-
latch because of the tremendous impac;;t, pQssibly cm1sing de for-
ma ti on of the tongues of the latch to imbed themselves into the
(Sl~nature-)
HTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page,) GPO 924-379
(Page 2)
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. #553 12/13/72
-4-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued)
mating part of the buckle. Once I was freed of the seat belt,
I moved forward to the left hand emergency exit, whereupon I
found a man attempting to open it. Since he was having diffi-
culty, I grabbed the handle and succeeded in opening the window,

only to find at about the same instance, flames of a major pro-
portion broke out over the left wing. We then shut the window
again and sought other means of escape.
Looking about to the right hand emergency exit, it too
was already engulfed in flames. At that point I sat down, which
must have been for a fraction of a second, and thought that we
were really trapped. But then moving towa'rd the back to find an
opening, I did see the light peering in from the right hand side
of the plane (to my left as I moved to the rear of the cabin)
and I saw some passengers escaping through this exit. As I pro-
ceeded further, a stewardess who stationed herself by the door
was encouraging people to escape through this exit. This exit
opened over an open basement with the foundation wall just adja-
cent to the right hand side of the door. The air chute was par-
ti ally inflated and blocked full view of the basement. It was,
however, relatively easy to jump from the opening to the founda-
tion edge and step on the ground from there, at which point I
proceeded to run across the street aw.ay from the aircraft, only
to turn around and see another fairly substantial ignition of
fuel with an attendant mushroom cloud of flames and smoke rising
above the buildings it was lodged in.
(Page 3)
-
M. Anderson's Account of U.A. #553 12/13/72 -£""-
Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued)
While observing the crash scene, the fuselage portion in
which I came out of looked as though it were nearly intact.
However, one could not see beyond the flames of the houses which
seemed to be midsection of the aircraft, so that nothing could
be said about the integrity of the fuselage from either the view
on the inside of the aircraft or that on the outside beyond the
coach section of the aircraft. The time that it"took to exit
the plane from the moment the aircraft stopped could not have
been more than 30 to 150 seconds.
At this juncture and writing of this commentary on the
crash, it is incredible to think that with ambient conditions
such as they were, we were directed to land on a runway that
was not provided with modern equipment for instrument landing.
In this day and age of moon flights and our advanced knowledge
and technology in automatic guidance and instrument landing
systems, with the great expenditures in many facets of the
federal and local government, it is clear that something is
wrong with our priorities when there is a need to expand the
landing facilities for the Chicago area and those that are
available haven't even been properly equipped. Further, it is
unbelievable to me that in such a situation, the aircraft is

not equipped with ground sounding radar to give absolute alti-
tude measurement, but rather senses altitude by atmospheric
pressure. If this fails, the pilot has no knowledge of his
(Page 4)
F11rin Appru111'lf' llud1t<'I !II 11'l'IOJ N
"·. \U !-?II I 'I I
M. .Anderson's Account of U.A. 1f553

Crash on 12/8/72 (Continued) -··------ -··- - ---··· __ 12/13/72 --
cnnt1')
ai::.t.u.al al ti tu de _an.d_in_ a foggy , __ c lQJ.ldy:. s i tua.tiou, . he. ..i.s._fl.)'.ing_
as .though..w.e..YJexe. in.._the d1rrk_a..&..e'3~ ____1.Q.e ~QTI!b_in3'ltion of inade-

quate ins..t.rume_u.tfili.ou_ru::..ovi.d,,d b_y__ th_e a:i,r:[ie1_<;l_ on this _Qarti-
i::JJlar runway and the aggarent lack, of knowledge of altitude,
flag gosition and gossibly air sgeed by !:he 12ilot seemed to be
.
the causes of this crash.
As a matter of record in answer to guestion (12 on the
reverse side _of this form, I boarded U.A. Flight 1fa553 at Na-
tional Airgort in Washington, D.C. at about 1:30 PM E.S.T. on
Friday, ..!2fil;_ember 8' 1972
Finally, r would like to commend the Chicago Fire and
Police Degartmen ts for their quick resgonse and action. It
seemed that it was only a matter of one to two minutes before
both the Fire Degartment and Police Force were at the crash
scene. Further, the forces mobilized at the Holy Cross Hos12ita
were substantial and effective.
Lastly, I would like to request a COJ2Y of the NTSB's
re go rt on their investigation of the cause and circumstances
surrounding the crash.
~'U', =."z ~ (Sli;"nllture)
NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, u:<1e additional paper and sil{n Inst page.) GPO 0!24.379
(Page 5)
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-11-
WA5HlNGTON. O,C. 20391
Tie · staten1rn t 1::1
1 purposP n f t. l us · ·111 Il'lli l C"l l ~o l1' l y 1·or 11:-;,." 1'11 1l1•l1•r1111"111'11"
,... ll1n f:il'I~;. 1•n11tlition~ :,nd 1·i1·c11111
stanl'cs, and the probnble rausc of the subject aeeidc•nL
Date _____ Jan.u.aq_.l8.,_l9.23 ________ _
I. Place of accident ___ .Ghicagn.,_Illinois. ___ Date __ D.e.c.emb.er._8. __l'172. ______ Hour _2;A5.~p • .m.
II. AircraftUniteiLElight_.5.ll_ FAA Certificate No. --------------------------------------------

III. ·what is your name _________\iilb=_Er.i.ckSQJL ____________________ Age ___ _;;_s_________________ _
IV. Address ____ 2J_.!f_Q _SQ.>tth _l.0.9_th_ .$_1;,t eJ;>J:_____ - __Qll!1'b.ii~-US'l>_t.1'\§ l>A __ g§]._4.4_------------ ---------
V. Occupation _____ J'.:i::esJ.d.eu.t:________________ By whom employed _Tue_J_~<l.ei;iJ._l__ l;,1'.[1._d__!l1'.[1.X_Qj'__

' Omaha
VI. ·where were you at the time of the accident ________ Se.a.t._10 (!!)__________________________________ _
The flight from Washington to Chicago had been very routine. As we ap-
proached Midway, the pilot made a rather routine announcement over the
intercom telling the passengers that we had made better time than antici-
pated and that we would be landing on about schedule, together with a
report on the temperature and weather in Chicago, which appeared very
normal for that time of the year. The approach seemed normal. We had
been in the landing glide pattern for some time when suddenly the engines
were turned on. At that point I glanced out of the window and could see
the housetops below. This gave me no particular concern as we were
beginning to pick up speed, and I assumed that we would go back up and
come in for another landing approach. A few seconds later I heard the
sound of the airplane wings striking_ trees or housetops, with the crash
occurring almost immediately thereafter.
I think my seat belt was fastened quite snuggly as this is what I routinely
do. My head apparently struck the seat ahead of me and I blacked out. I
am not sure how long I remained unconscious, but I assume it was probably
5 or 10 minutes. When I regained consciousness, I called to a business
associate who had been sitting in lOF, asking him if he was all right.
His reply indicated that his leg, or legs, were severely injured. I
think my seat belt held all right, and that I routinely unbuckled it .
.q,,t~ (bo,., /..,hr 1"'· .,,, "1, o,,(.,.. · "'~ ], Ft '11J.,. or y/q,._,)
It was ~ dark in the piane,.._'.'nd it was ti~ted to the right. There seemed
to be a good deal of debris inside the plane (possibly broken seats,
sections of the luggage rack, and styr:_~~~=~~~i~-~~~ .~~-om•,
(811(1'.WltUr-e)
NTSB Form lllt.11 (Use reverse side of sheet for diagram and additional statement)
--/Z--
etc.). As I looked about for a possible way out, I saw only two men who
were across the aisle near the emergency exit at Row 8. I heard one of the
11
men say "we can't go out here, we'd better try the right side. Then I
saw them come across the plane and disappear, apparently through an exit
on the right side.· At this point my traveling companion, Walter Patterson,
said "I am going out now," and I saw him crawl forward towards what I t11ougbt
was the wing exit at Row 8. There was no further sound or mov<~ment in the
plane. I started toward the Row 8 exit on the right side very soon after
Mr. Patterson 1 s exit. I found an opening and came out apparently onto the
wing. Fire which apparently traveled down the outside of the plane had
evidently just reached the opening about the time I got there. I received
some burns as I crawled out, and continued to feel heat and flames as I
jumped down off the wing and made my way back along the side of the plane
to the street near the tail of the plane. I found Mr. Patterson sitting
on the steps of a house across the street, talked with him very briefly,
walked around for a few minutes in an effort to keep my blood circulating
to ward off the cold. When I spotted an ambulance (fire or police depart-
ment), I got into the front seat, rolled up the windows, and waited for the
ambulance to be filled. I remained in this seat until we arrived at the
Holy Cross Hospital.
The only unusual situations which I recall follow:
1. The engines came on with a good deal more force than 1 remembered
experiencing on one or two previous occasions when it was nec-
essary to go back up and make a second approach. The plane
actually seemed to jerk as the engines came on.
2. Shortly after the engines came on, the plane tilted sharply to
the left and then straightened out. It seemed more of a dip
then a bank.
3. It seemed to me that the pilot had pulled the nose of the plane
up and that we were beginning to ascend at the time of the crash.
I did not sense that the plane had stalled in any manner.
-/3-
Dl!PARTMEHT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHll-IGTON, 0.C.
PASSENGER STATEMENT
-~l!~«~~'~T~&_-::~D~-~A~~l~R~.~Ll~~N~E~S~-------records indicate rhat you were a passenger aboard a
&l;\/1 TED A-1BL14L~ -~B~-~2~3..,__2"'------' Flight__...o'?-<.5.-'3_ __
from ''Jashington D,C, Midway
which was involved in an.accident on December 8, 1972
National Transportation Safety Board 1 a Federal agency, is charged by an act of Congress with the
investigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of prev~nring future mishaps. In order thnt
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it ·o;vill be appreciated
if you will answer the following questions on the reverse side of<his letter: (1) where and when you boarded
the aircraft; (2) what seat you occupied, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat was
_on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of.the flight; (4) any occurrences while on board which appeared
unusual to you, prior to or during the .accident; (5).other facts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of the National 'I'rans-
portacion Safety Board, is enclosed for convenience in returning-your Statement. Thank you for your assist-
ance.
Yours rru1y,
Investigator-in-Charge
(Use reverse side for answers)

Form Approved: Budget Bureau No, J9·R019.4
-/4-
necember 29 1972
(Date)
----ll..L boerrled tlie airplane at national Airnort, :.rashington DC

on December 8, 1972 at 8bout 1:30 ~8T in the afternoon •
...2l.L WAS !l!l!lte:..o~d. seat BF <inrl ~nent the whole flight thP.re.
j) ThA flir'.ht ~··•Amed cnmpl0tely no=11l s'lr'I nnevenl;ful nn.til
the vr;ry J.qst mlnnt;e. A. wi were over Indt:ana at c;ooo Ft.
0
the pilot notified 11s that the ceili~g at Midway was 500
i<"t. with ab011t J mile vissbil.ity and that we would be
loo sine; Hl ti tude towa· d our finR.l apnroauh shortly. ··;ri.0n
we were at abQJJt l 000 Ft. tl·e pilot again come on the PA
and told 'BS we we·~e i•1to our final anproach and at this
time the ";To 'lmoki'lg" arrl "Fasten Seatbelts" lights were
on. The StswP.rdess came P.roung to check that seat backs
and trav tebles were all in the upright position. ~e
continu8d to "escend and everything seemed normal until w
began to break ~hrough the overcast. At this time we see es
to be pretty low ,,nd 't snrl(lenly the nose came up anrl the
pil nt appl 1 ed what seemed 1·.o be flill throttle to the
engines and he seemed to stqrt a l8ft bank. At this time
I tho11gbt n1.1e 1re goir1cr~11nd no-3jn 11 b1Jt we seemed to be
so low and tlte 1Jland assumed a n~se high attitude and
began to sh11dder as i f Pie e,-,gJnes Were unable to lift it
higher. ~.t this time, beinG unable to see. the field I
he_gan ta feel _1,~e mJ ght he in tronbl e S11ddenl 'T we ho1Jncec1
a. couple of times and then crune the impact. I was thrown
forward against the seathel t yri th conei derabl e force.
Every thing loose seemed to 'Qe flying forward especially
dirt, g r j t and a saot7{ like s11petance T11is djrt etc.
seemed to fill t:Hl8 air lilce a liquid almost and rnade
breathing diftfic11Jt )1CT1en the planei; f1nall>r came to a
halt a.11 the flying substance sifted downward and I could
see and bv.eath once more 1\rT'r seat was tilted forward and
only my seatbelt held me in it. My feet could not touch
the fl oar or snyth1ng 11ntil, reaching aro1Jnd, I J.TRS able
to put my foot on what seemed to b" a. cable(approx. ?,· inc
1 n d!tameter) wllrich ran from fro1--t tayrard t11e rAar of the
plane. Supporting my weir:ht on :;his cable I war. able to
release the seatbelt hJc~le end lower myself toward a hol
through whic.h I could se"' light coming through the side o
th" plane f11selag0 I think tlie flopY' l19d collapserl :.i.nc' I
w~s down in the J:ower comnartment. I wa:l:Ji:ed out the hole
anr) fa11nd myself an the rnhbl e of 3 ho1J se 011 the right
side of the plane. Fire .Wfl.S begginni ng to my left anrl wns
pretty close to the sine of the nJ ane, To my right the ·e
WRs also fire but it WRS more out in the house, about 1C:
feet fY>om the pJ sne Si nee I co11l d el QQ see j·be streAt
to my right I went thR t way, toward the ta:Ll of the plane
'·Ihei> I got ta tbe renr aOor the steJ..rardesses 1.rere helpjng
people out (some women and chi:iRdren) and I wa.s abbe to
bel p some of them to cl ilnh ant.a the rnhhl e pdil e in order
NT5R Forill 6120.9 Gf'n \l~4.'.!/9

-IS-
(D.ite)
4) '['here were no unuS1:a 1 occurances during the flight as

far as I know.
[)) I k11ow of no further facts which I feel hBve a bearing on
the cr~sh.
MTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page.) GPO 92.4-379
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -16-
r . WA~HINGTON, D.C. .
PASSENGER ST ATE ME NT
·/ I ( 1
____t~_·,.1~lL1~-k~·'~v~-~@""""-''-t,._/;_,·'-l@u·""',_{_______ records indicate that you were a passenge.r aboard a
/./;-vhc/ Flight ..);.,:;~3

I I
~,~
which wns involved in an accident on
NatiClnal ·rransportar)on Safety H0nrd, a Federal ngt'ncy, i~ charged by an act of Congress with the
investigation of accidents inVolving civil ai:rcraft as a meabs of preveniing furure misHaps: In order chat
the Board might have the benefit of your observations in conducting the investigation, it will be appreciated
if you will answer rhefollowing questions onrhe reverse .side ofrhis letter: (1) whe-re aAd When you boarded
the aircraft; (2) what seat you.occup}ed, (Give seat number if possible. Otherwise, indicate whether seat was
on the left or right side of the pl~ne, oit. the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief statement of the history of the flightj (4) any occurr.ences whil~ on board which appeared
unusual to you, prior to or during the accident; (5) other faCts which you feel relate to the accident.
A Government postage-free envelope, addressed to the appropriate field office of che Nation a! 1'rans-
portadon Safety Board, is enclosed for con'venience in returning your statement. Thank )'ou fdr your assist-
ance.
Yours truly,
In ve.stigator-i n-Chargc
(U.se reverse :>ide for ."lnswers)

J."orm Approv.,d• Bud .
~
-
t B urorc.G.u N o, 39' RO l 9 .• -I?-
(Dnt.,)
On December 8, 1972' at approximately 1: 30 p.m. EST, I boarded
·-
United Air! ines Flight Number 553 schedu I ed to depart Washington, D. c.

National Airport at 1:40 p.m. Prior to boarding I advised the ground
-
hostess that I was a Special Agent with the Bureau of ~larcoti cs and
Dangerous Drugs and that I was carrying a firearm. I then advised the
captain of the same fact upon boarding the aircraft. Having received
his consent to board, I then proceeded to my pre-selected seat B-17,
last row, aisle, left side.
The aircraft departed on schedule; there was nothing out of the
ordinary about the take-off or c I imb to cruising altitude. Uoon
reaching cruising altitude the captain advised that we would encounter
headwinds and would be a I ittle behind schedu I e for our arrival at
Midway. The f Ii ght continued in a norma I and uneventful fashion. The
seat belt I i ght was on for a part of the flight, but I ittle turbu lance
was encountered.
As we neared the end of our journey, about five (5) minutes prior
to the crash (using 2:29 [i.m. CST as time of crash) , the captain
announced that we were above Gary_ l Indiana and would touch down in about
five (5) minutes. He further advised that visibi I ity at Midway Airport
was one ( 1) mi le and the cei I inq five hundred (500) feet.
In about two (2) or three (3) minutes the 11

No Smok i ng 11 sign came
on and the stewardess advised passengers to 11

ext i ngu i sh a I I smoking
.I
r.•
mater j a Is and rAttJrn seat backs and tray tables to tu I I uorjqht position
in pc~parat j on for landing. " The plane continued on a s Ii ght downward

course for a minute or so. During this part of the descent there was no
v Is i lb i I i tv of the around.
(CONTINUED)
(Si~nature)
MTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional .paper .imd ~41n lo.st page.) GPO 944.379
-18-
Paq" 2
Al I of a sudden ·the pl~ne's engines were advancod rapidly to ful I throttle,
where they remained unti I impact. I glancP.ci out tl10 window and for the first time
could see tlie ground_, some four hundred (400) to five hundred (500)feet below.
We then entered more clouds. At this same time the nose of the plane came up
sl is1htly above the horizontal. The plane then turned flatly or "crabbed" to the
left.
Jt should be noted that as the plane veered left it vibrated or shuddered

rhythmica I Jy. At this same time I noticed that the flaps of the plane were .not
fu I I y extended to their downward position.
I then noticed that the ground was again visible about one hundred (100)
feet below. The plane continued in a slight nose down course.
Based on the above mentioned observations and my prior experience as an

air traveler I was certain that the plane was out of control and about to crash.
then bent forward placing my hands in front of me and awaited the crash.
The impact came and with it the cessation of the engines and the failure of
the cabin I ighting. I was thrust forward hard against my already tight seat belt,
water and other debris rushed by my feet, and something hard struck my heel.
Then suddenly the plane had stopped - only darkness and si Jenee.
J undid my seat belt and got out of the seut. My seat and the overhead
clearance seemed to be intact; the aisle near my seat was clear.
I turned toward the rear of the plane, where, in the dim I ight, I could see
the stewardesses were already at work, attempting to open the rear emergency exits.
J then helped open the left rear exit. As it opened flames began to come into
the cabin. The stewardess had the presence of mind to order the door closed in
order to keep the flames outside of the cabin.
Vie then turned to the right rear exit. The handle was jammed, but after a few
yanks it came free and the door released, but would sti 11 not shove outward so
that it could be opened. A plastic pack mounted on the door had shifted and had
to be forced back before the door finally pushed out and away.
As the door was opened I could see the tai I section had come to rest on a
foundation where a house had stood. Directly beneath the door and down about
ten (10) to twelve (12) feet I could see the basement floor.
The stewardess then releaserl the inflatable chute which did noi' extend fill ly
bec~use of the debris but rather afforded a platform from which one could re~~11
the ground . . At this time I looked around and saw several people, perhaps three
(3) or four (4', waiting to exit the pla~e. The stewardess and I helped one woman,
whose face 11as quite bloody, to the chute. The other people exited under their
own power.
CONTINUED
-19-
We then looked back up the aisle and cal led to people that the back exit was
open. No one else came and I could hear no other voices. The stewardess then
to! d me to jump• Csh.e wou l.d not go before me). I jumped from the chute to the
ground and the stew,eirdess exited after me.
As I reached the ground and looked back I could see that the tusilage was
still identifiable by it's roofline and the fire was still burning,.along the
I eft side outs i·de fn·e: cabin. There were i hen a coup I e of f I us hes of ti re f I ar i ng
up, nnd flames· and smoke rolled over the top of the plane obscuring my vision.
I looked about, and the stewardesses Vlere aiding the injured who were ou·t of tho
plnnc.
People from the neighborhood were in the street, and wdhin a minute or two
1~hica~10 Pol ice were there. I talked to one patrolman who relayed my information
ewer his car radi.c>. Next arrived the Fire Department ambulances· who beuan
rounding up the (ijjured. Myself and Mr. Marvin Anderson were driven to Holy
Cross Hospital by ·i'l ChTcago Pol ice Officer where I was treated and released.
j)
Harold R. Metcalf
Budtret Bure&u No, 39-R024.3.
-20-
STATEMENT OF WALTER L. Pi.mR:'lON, JR.
~'S.~~1~~~.t
Udt9d. 11.ipt 553 _:. 22.-
Decelli>er B, 1972
'IM il~ltt va• I'9Utiae fr9111 Waehingt.• te eur app,..._dl te

Midva:r ilq>ert. 0..ly dight air tu-bulence. We were teld e!
tlte eTerca•t aJad weather c•aditie•a in Clrl.cage. De•cent inte
tit• Clticag• area •• ... d uermal. We vere tald ta f••ten eeat
b•lts and put seate •rrl tray tables in uprigltt pesitift• far
final appreaclt.
Th• plane finally descended eut ef the clauds---tlte cleud cevar

•eemed very lev and we were very lew te the gr.UAd---11Jlu•ually
lew, I felt, te •et be ever tlo.a runway er te aee tit• I'UllWay fer
a lalklint;. I did Ht ••tic• a.nytltiJtg u.uaual abeut the plane '•
pesitiea at tftis p•iat. We centinued te desce•d &Jtd I ••ticed
ve were uausua.lly cl.. e te tit• gr.UA<l aACi lleuaet9P•· At tld•
.,-i•t tile •eee ef tu plaiu• weAt up and tile right w111g tilted
te tile gre\llld u if we wer. geing te male• a butlciag tura,
'!}tere wu aJl attempt 'k gain pever witll the ellgin. . bll.t tlley
did net r.epe:ad, nde vas wltu I r.alized tltat Hmetlliag wae
wr••g uld we were gei.Bg t• crash, Ne va:nrl.ng was gi wa.
~· plae still llad its naoe up •lightly a•d tlte rlgllt wing dftll
ia a banking pesitiea a• we began Aitting tr..e11, lleuau etc.
a•d crasltad te tll• greUJld, It llappeued ver:r suddenly.
'lbe i.Jl!pa°' inte tile lteuHe ceuld be clearly lleard an tlte

uaderside ef w craft.
liter impact I de u t recall lt9'lring er e e"int: uytlli-.g iiuide

the airplaae. )It wu1 deatltly aileAt. I eAly Ilea.rd Mr. Wilbur
ErickHn call rq :a11111e ud I teld him I wu geing eut as I recall.
!11" ••at v~• tilted farward but I de aat remelliler ll.afasteaiJll
·Yrf aeat belt. I ~xit.r' t'1rauglt" split in tlte plane te rq rlg}lt.
I m•r"ly rec"ll turning :md ateppiag te tile greUid, and wa.lkiag
away te a tree stump. My left leg swok inte part a! tlw vi11g
eecti•• er debria wllen I teek rrr:J' first step. I aetic•d ill'--••
fire t• m:r left(!reat •f the rlan•) aad a small circular patch
ef fir• w tll• rigltt en tit• greuad. Wlo.ea I reaclted tit• tree
stump, I •lumped ta ti\• gnuad and eem•••• came t• lt•lp ma te
tile 11tepa •f a lt•u•e. Wlten I leeked back at tile pl1111.• at thi•
peiat, it was <0llgulfed in Ila.mes. After impact I wu atu-.ned
:uod in &hack but I de recall tlte events as described abeve.
l~Y? /7 )_, - 2.3-
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-26-
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIOH
W.4.SHlNGTOH, D.C.
PASSENGER ST ATEMENT
----'t~/1/JL.1Lc.kn_·~·U'-'J.,,_ __,/li<l-L.lf:::'·_,beL,Ou,fk:;.."'-'_______ records indicate" chat you were n pas:-;cng-cr nboar<l n
{!121 Ir· d __At 1-./11i e c

from (;W •5All?J /a vJ
which was involved ir. an acci<lent on
Nndonal 1·ransportation Safety l~n:Jrd, u Fcdernl agency, is charged by an act of Congress with thl'
inve;>stigation of accidents involving civil aircraft as a means of preventing future mishaps. In order char
the f~oard might have the benefit of your observations in condncring the investigation, it will be appreciated
~If you wiJ!answer the following questions on the reverse side ofthis letter: (1) where and when you b0nrded
the aircraft; (2) what ~enr you occupied, (Give sea.t number if possible. Otherwise, indicate wherher seat v..·as
on the left or right side of the plane, on the aisle or next to the window, in the front, rear, or center of
plane.); (3) a brief stntement of the history of the flight; (4) any occurrence:-; while on board which appeared
unusua.1 ro you, prior ro or durir·g the accident; (5) other facts which you fe{,>l relate to rht: accident.
A Government postage-free envelope 1 addressed tn the appropriate field offict· nf the Nacion<t! 'J'rnns-
portarion Safety Board 1 is enclosed for convenience in returning your statement. Thank you for your •lssist-
anc~.
Yours truly 1
Tove stig:uor-i n-Chatf'.,C'

(U!>f' rnvl'!r.~r· sid<' for nnswers)

,
Form Approved; Budget Bureau No, J9·ROl9,<: -2 ? -
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NTSB Form 6120.9 (If necessary, use additional paper and sign last page.) GPO 924-379
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JlliOlllt'
UNITED AIR LINES
P.O. Box ?6100, ChicaiO, Illinois 60666 February 1, 1973
Mr. W. Lamb
N'ational Transportation Safety Board
.. .
Wa'shington, D. C. 20591
De'ar Mr. Lamb:
Attached is the factual portion of the report on the condition
of the galleys of aircraft N9031U as found by Henri Bijl and
· repo_rted to Dick Coulter. In addition, we have included the
design_ "_G" loads as specified in Boeing Report D6-15 098.
Sincerely,
J. D. Smith
Vice President
Flight Safety and Industry Affairs
encls.
- .
Location: Elk Gro~·c Township. Illinois, on Route 6.1, one-ha/{ mile west of Route 83
If "·": ""· f 1' ;-........ •.· ' J
December 19, 1972 -2..-
~ C-90-25-30/22 Tri~ Report
On December 13, 1972, I made a trip to MOW air?ort for the purpose of
looking at the wreckage of the 737 accident, to establish the condition
of the galleys and galley equipment.
Since the ~ccident en December 8th, many people f~om the investigation
team, firemen, etc., have been through the rerrains of the airplane, and
in the meantime the wreckage was also moved fror.; the accident site to
a hangar at the airport. Because of all this handling, a great deal of
the evidence we needed to arrive at conclusive answers to our questions
was destroyed before my arrival.
Aby evaluation of the following observations should be made with the
above iri mind:
·wherever we feel that safety reasons justify campaign improva;ients of
the galley equipment, we are preparing COA's for early accomplishment.
The three main sections.of the fuselage that remain after the accident
are the tail section. including the 12 and #3 galleys; the left half of
the cockpit and the i l galley; the right side of the cockpit 1-.'as torn off
by impact. The tail section has no fire damage up to the rear pressure
bulkhead, the aft section of the right side of the cabin including the
twoealleys is damaged bynre. The left side of the cockpit is burned
out. The forward galley #1 was found virtually intact and without fire
damage and with the cabin flooring still attached to it. It is assumed
that this galley was torn out of the fuselage together with the right
half of the cockpit. ,
Galley #1 - This galley shows an amount of mechanical damage but little
or no fin: damage, the flooring and also the aisle side decora-
tive panel are still attached to it.
Starting at the top, the miscellaneous, five sided carrier box (alum.
·alloy) (1) is still in its cavity. The door was found in the ••reckage
ba-Oly mangled but clean and shiny.
The coffeemaker (3) is still in its place in its cavity, the water com-
partment door (2) and water cooler (4) are still in place.
The small triangular door (13) in the upper outboard corner was in place
and latched.
Inboard oven (5) in place, no door. Outboard oven (6) and door missing.
Refrigerated drawer compartment. ( 24} empty, no door, no drawer. Waste
container and door (33) in place. Inboard cold food carrier and door (7)
Ji{.
U$ I ~N. 1 1 -
~CO IP(U. a.A...
·~· ··~---
- - -
Trip Report (page 2) -~-
missing. Outboard cold food carrier (8) in place but no door; however,
ice tray and one ser,ving tray still inside carrier.
Outboard lower soft drink carrier and door (38) in place and latched.
Galley E2 - The upper miscellaneous carrier (1) was found beside the gal-
ley; however, the bottom panel -of the carrier and the galley
shelf it bears on show matching damage so that it i~ concluded that this
carrier was remov~ from the galley sorretime after the accident. Part of
the door was still in the carrier opening (rest was burned away) and some
of the contents were still inside the carrier.
The four cold food carriers (3) are in their cavities. The two inboard
ones still have doors on them. The two outboard doors are rrissing. The
liquor compartment (21) and crew baggage compartment (30) are cpen, the
doors are missing and the bottom is pushed up.
The galley skin on the outboard side is torn off.
From top to bottom the triangular compartment door (2) is still in place
but distorted, the rectangular door (6) below it is severely distorted
but still attach~. The refrigerated compartment door and drawer (2) are
missing. The lower stowage compartment door (10) is also missing.
Galley #3 - There is some fire damage on this galley but it is generally
intact.
The upper storage compartment door (6) was open but some of the contents
are still inside (coffee can). Door was found to be in good working cond--
tion.
The two upper outboard triangular doors (15 and 28) are in place and latched.
The coffeemaker is in place (7). The water compartment door (2) and the
water cooler (3) are in place and latched. The used cup drawer (4) is in
plate and latched. The waste container and door (35) are in place and
lat~hed.
The upper inboard and lower outboard ovens (5) are in place but the doors
and heater assemblies are missing. The upper outboard and lower inboard
ovens (8) are completely missing; however, the latches are in good condi-
tion. The oven compartments are also in good condition and there are no
detectable reasons why these ovens did not stay in. Were they possibly
removed after the accident?
Tbe lower refrigerated compartment (39) door, carrier and drawers are
.missing.
The drawer (metal) was found clean and undamaged which again ~~kes one
believe that this drawer was inside the carrier (carrier has no door)
and inside the galley during the fire. The c~rrier could not be located.
~-
.: ..
3
,· .,_._
•·
··.·. .·.:.·.
. ···· .:.•
FIGURE 12A DOOR AV-INS'):AL

·- . .-::.--:.:
,,
NO. 1 FORWARD GALLEY
: ·: f:-:· :::: ·~-' .':. -·. . ··.
...
:...t<-·
-. ·.
,.._.:,.. _ _ _ _ :..:;!..
...
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:.....
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10
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21 !..· •••
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FIGURE 12B DOOR AV-INSTAL

NO. 2 AFT GALIEY .··•··.·.
-.~-~-;- -t•
:...J
·.. n~ us .: rooit AT~""ll1$TAL. m2 ~ C\urr·
.. £(~~30-Ci: . lPC
.. :. .: :. ( &ll!Fl" 1. aF z ,.
:
. .' :..... _, .~. ., . .::... ;. ~ ..... ~
"- .... •, __._..-..,..'=-
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.-
..... ::;. .... ·

'· . -.-. ~, .•
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.- FIGURE 12C DOOR AV-INSTAL

NO. 3 AFT GAILEY
.·.
)Ylt"lll .~'I'-! 'iST~ t l'f' J " >T
.s>(.90-! ~::t '.\-!',;. 1 PC
.· .• . .·
... '....... .
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·I
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f -
. ·.• ·' .
. ~ ;·~ :__ ...t. ~--~.·~.{ .i':~..~~·.;_.~ f· .. ·.
.. ..
~~:';·: ·:;_~::~:: :.-~--::~<~~-;~?ffL·: .:~5- ·. ·
.. ..- . ••• - •• •• • <...,
.. ~-. ':-1,'
•
....
I tern 6
(a) The airplane seats and adjacent structure, including the seat tracks,
a re des·i gned for the fo 11 owing 1 oads, as· sp_ecifi ed· in Boei nc;' s Re-
port #06-15098: ·
Passenger Seats
~CTit'G 3EPAF~T:::...Y
8'fERGa!CY :,F'LIGlii };]31 oc·e:::::c
I1f DIREC'l'I011
?E:R ·CC::"DZ·J:Oii
cLJi-:===.:=.-- - - -
-·S!!O-.<: i Ll_'l"::l~ DC.S.iG!i
.._______________; F_._F.._.:R~ 25•/UJ. -100_. -2'.Xi
1
; O::;=:-d ; . -2.0 :I -3 •.20 ·'---'"~~------3"--'-
_, •1 " · ....
:;_ 1·.
_____,
.
;l
'
DO>c.l>lard 6.20 :0.15
11 F~r-•B.N 9.0
'
l . Si.d~-ard Lort or Right
Forward and Aft Attendant Seats
I l '
.-o-..._~ ":I'.""'\ -·
-·-..;.-~
' . " .. • •. :...C.·C!':
R -·-,,• <
··..
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~-· .. _~ ... :.-~~_::: .. ··· .-::
·' '"
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,' .
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page 2
..
Item 6 (Continued)
(a) (Continued·)
Cock2it Crew Seats
-.. -~- ....

-.-v:·__.
:. r.
Notes:
\
(1) All the up and.dOl'{Tl load factors exceed those specified in Ff.A
. ·. TS0-039 for p_as~~nger sea ts .
(2) All factors are increased by 33-1/3 t for the se.at attachment to
~ .....
the aircraft structure and for the seat b€lt attactF:ent to the
,. h.,.._
.:<: seat structure .. (Ref. Boeing's Report #0£-10881.)
l :. .. ;-.-~:;. to'. . '
(3) The seat· track is designed for a single seat stud load of 4400 lbs.
(which is the tear-out·value of the track lips) and a two stud load of
,. 5360 lbs. (which is the value of the track beam in bending midway .be-
tween two floor beams). (Ref. Boeing's Report #0£-10881.)
(b) The galleys and their SUPP-Orting structures are designed for the follow-
ing load factors, as specified in·Boe!ng's Reports ED6-15098 and ED6-10380:
- -:._... -~· . .•. . - - ·-

-
. ; '·- . ..·. .• - ·-
E!miGi;;;cy ?L!GET GUS'!' ro:.sr.::i
- ACTD:G SEP:e>.A'!'::::L!'. I:_..~l:(D:Il;G ~R C'0NTIITIC~ DF.SIG~t
~ · Tii DL':(,;,,"'!10!! SH~: '
;----- =- -- -/· .·'- . ! F.A.R. 25.}t , -1.00 _ -2C0 !
:~ -··
--·
-. - -
. ·. '. .. ~ ... - ... .:·. ....-. .. . -- ·. ..· ...
rt_._.;:- :- t::" •
.. ·- .-=-~... .. :.- '<;: ..•....._··
;.._· -:·
.
~-4..
.
~-
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.,
-....;.
·' '. ,.,. .
, .......
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.,_...... ____ ---·-·----·- -- - .

-,,1-
--·-··
page 3
Item 6 (Continued)
(c) All items .of equiprr,ent which could injure t.he passengers or crew, if
installation failure occurred, ar-e designed for ultirrate inertia fac-
tors shown·below. These items include the hatracks, ~er Boeing's Re-
port #06-15098.
t..C3~V 2EP.'.R:".T.2.iY
'11 ::ir;.::__,·c·rwSEO>"'.!:
:.5
(d) The main cabin floor. and supporting st~ucture is designed for the fol-
. lowing loading conditions, acting separately:
,
(1) Seat loads consisting of passengers and seats shall be as speci-
fied above under (a) and b~sed on six-abreast seating at 32 inch
fore and aft seat spacing .
..
(2) A unifonnly distributed load of 37.5 pounds per running inch
longitudinally and uniformly distributed laterally outside of
a 15 inch minirrrum center aisle (approx. 47 lbs./sq.ft.).
(3) The floor panels are designed for a 100 lbs. per square foot
loading.
The load factors specified under (a) also apply to the above
loadings under items 2 and 3 .
.(Ref. Boeing's Detail ·spec. #06-17375.)
... ...
.-......... , ·-
Docke L No. flA-41 'i
ElxMJJ Lt No. 2-G
NATIONAL TRAtlSIDRTATION SAFEm'. BOARD

EXCERPrS FROM UNITED AIR LINES TRAINING MANUAL

l. Turbojet Pilot Training -
•
...
Till~BOJJ\T PILOT TltA.fNING
Initiul, Trar.sition, and Upgrade
DC-8, B-727, B--737, B--747, DC'~lO, P..-720
OBJECTIVE
Training for·the purpose of meeting United Air Lines' proficiency standardi!
required for equipment qualification for all flight crew members, and to obtain
an FAA type rating for Captains.
E uc; I B.lLJT y
All Flight Officers must have completed B~wit; Turbine Tx-aining, ground lralning-
hours -- :W:OO, or Initial Second Officer Training (new hire), ground training hours --
70:00 •
. Initial Training. The training required for crew mL!rnbers who haye not qualified
and served in the same capacity o.n another turbojet airplane.
Transition Tr.aining. The training required for crew members who huve qualified
and served in the same capacity on another turbojet airplane.
Upgrade Training. The training required for crew members who h'1Ve quallfil!d
and served as First Officer or Second Officer on a particular airplane typ;.,, be--
fore they serve as pilot-in-command or second-in-command, resp<:ct!vely, on
that airplane. Flight crew members who have been inactive longer thnn three
ycurs on a particular airplane type, may be qualified by attendinl'," the neeeHsary
portions of th.e airplane transition course.
l. Principle Ground Training Subjects (Ddcte for Upgrade)
Training consists of classroom and Cockpit Procedures Trainer periods
covering qormal, irregular, and emergency procedures. Relevant systeme
information, as determined by Speclfiu Behavioral Objectives analysis, is
integrated throughout the training at appropriate points, assuring complete
coverage of all necessary information on the following subjects:
Aircraft General Ice and Rain Protection

Auxiliary Systems Hydraulics & Flight Controls
Avionics Performance & Planning
Electrical Sy9tem Pneumatics, Air Conditioning &
Emergency Equipment Pres:'3urization
Fire Protection Power Plant & Y.'uel 8y stern
Newly hired Second Officers will complete 84 hourn :rn required by Sec,ornt
Officer New !lire Tralninr;, Chapter 10. (Not applicable to Second Officers
previously qualified as third crew mt:mbcr on 11-7:!7).
.;; ,_
" '1;~0 Flight Operations Trainin}{ ManLal Page G--1
United Air Lines
1
JI. Traini!_!g DcviceH and Aids
Audio/Visual Presentations
Class.room Hesponder Systems
Cockpit Panel Fold-outs
Cockpit Procedures Trainers
Systems Mo_ck-ups (B-727. B-737, & B-nO)
Airplane Simulators
Airplane Flight Manuals
Ii I. Maneuvers? Procedurcsz Functions

'J'raira~rs
A. Crew 'l'rnininl:, ScssionH and Procctlures
(Simulntor if so indicated)
Code: l)rocedure~ Trainer - cvr

t'inl ulator - SIM
f\-727 1l-7:l7 fl-7~ 7 DC-10 ll-720

Systems DC-8
SIM CPT CJYr CPT Cl'T.
Prcesurization CPT
CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT
Pnetnnatics CPT
CPT Cl'T CPT CPT
Air Conditioning CPT CPT
SIM CPT CPT C PT
Fuel SIM SIM
CPT CPT CPT C:PT CPT c l''l'

Oil
CPT CV!' Cl')'l' CPT c [Yj'
Electrical CPT
c1>~r CPT CPT c !'1' CPT (; P'l'
I rydrn ulics
SIM SIM SfM SIM
Flight Controls SIM SIM
Malfunctions/ Failures
CPT CIYI' CPT CV1'
Electrical CPT CPT
(~VJ' CV!' CJYI' Cl'T
llyd1·:1ulic CPT CPT
SIM SIM SIM SIM
Flight Control SIM SIM
SIM SIM SIM Sli\'l
Flight Instrument SJ.M SIM
OIYl' CPT CPT OPT
Landing Gear CPT CPT
SIM CPT CPT CPT c f '1'

1 Slill
Flaps
l-'light Opc·raiirnrn Tr:d11i i;.; '.lfor.i.:l

P:1~,t· L-~
Un1tt:d Air l,in....: ')
11J.
t '
E1nc!'hl'ncy l>roccdurcs DC'~rl

---· L1.-727 ]\.... 7:.7 !\.... 7~ 7 lJC-10 I;,_ no
! Fires: Pbwcrplant CPT CPT CPT CPT cP.r CPT
Cargo Compt CPT
·--- Cabin CPT
Flight Deck SIM SIM CPT
Blee Smoke
& Fire CPT CPT CPT CPT CPT• Cl'T
APU CPT CPT C[Yf CIYJ'
Wheel Well ...... CJYJ' CPT CPT SIM
Smoke Control CPT CPT CPT CPT C PT*
Fuel Dumping SIM SIM CPT CPT• SfMll

1 1'lu:s~'
prooedurl's arc now listed as irregular procedures for the DC-10.
if This procedure iH now listed as abnormal procedure for tl\C I\.... 720.
Jl. Himulator(s), Visual Simulator (VS) and Aircraft (A)
Captain/First Officer/Second Officer

A maneuver or procedure shown in a Himulator may be rcr!'ormcd in a vi Hua I Himulalor
or ai1·planc; ii' shown in a visual simulator, may be performed in an uirplaiw'.
Initial 'J'rnn:-;ition
and "n<l
S/O to F/O F/C I lo Cn[>t.
Upgrade Upt.;rudc
l. Preflight
Visual lnspecti on A A
· Prestart/Start Procedures s
rraxiing A
2. Takeoffs
Normal A A
Instrument - 100' VS vs
Crosswind A /\.
J~:n~ine Fttilure before V~ /\. A
Night (at least one of above) /\. 1\
lh:jN:kd A VS (/\. in 'l'n11
:~... J•lig;ht J\rl:ineuvcrs ::nK1 I>rooedures

I~:1tc 1·al c;ontrol /\.
'l'uck an<l M'wh Huffct /\.
Hurwway and .rammed Stahilizc:r /\
fitecp Turns (Captain only) /\
Specific Flight Characteristics A
D/H/71 Flight Operations Training· Manual Pqge r;...::

Un1ted Air Linc:>
18.
initial 'fra11si ti on
and and
S/O to F/O 1-'/0 to Capt.
Upgrade_ ------~Xi~lo __
Approach to Stalls/St:1ll warning

devices: Clean, Takeoff. Landing; A
Maxin1um [.;ndurancc & Maxin1un1
ltangc l'roqodu res
l'ancl Training (oxc:opt S/O tu 11/0
I lp).(ratlc and 7:17)
t\nti-icing· and I)c-iuin~ l)l'oeedures S
PowerplaHt l•~ailure I. 1 roccdurc A
I;;mcr;<ency Descent/ ltapi<l tlopressuri;:ation S
•t • \!)~fr~ n..'.<:l.'!~_!_>roc_opur_re_,;l..!.\J'l'.1.:."' t.'!.~C;~

Arca Departure/ Arrival s s
Use of Navigation/Communication
I-:4uipmcnt (Failures) s s
llolding s :-:
IL'-i ,. F /D A J\
I u; - F/D, Engine Inoperative A J\
II.<; - Auto Couple1' (Autoland l\-747/DC-10) s s
Nc>n-precision Appro:tchns VH v:-:
Cit"c Ii ng Approach A i\
Missed Approaches
\.'rnm II~'-i
,\ i\
J\ ,\
I-:n1-.'1ne lnoperativc
From other than IIS vs v:-:
l'omplete Published M/ i\ Procedure s :-:
"· l :'!n<!ijig_s_ ~~-.0.P.P!:.'!.~ll~.'.'_lo )~!:_1'.'}.!l'l~

i\ ;\
N or1n :11
Frnrn I LS i\ppro:tch J\ 1\
l~I"OSS\.Vin<l i\ 1\
l•:nginu Inoperative i\ 1\
!ill'_:;, Thrust (C:iptnin only) i\ :\

~ Enµ;inc Mi~scd /\pp1·oach (('aptain -
IW-H, 1:-7~0 only) :-: :-:

'.I.em i"l:lp i\ppro:":ll (C:ipl.:cill <>Illy) /\ 1\
[.'n>Jll Circle (Capl::1 in <>nly) 1\ :\

A 1\
l u..~jecl:od J .anding·
Flight Ope rations "l'raininµ; Manual D/~/71

llni..cd J\·i r Linc s
tC.
Initial Transition
and and
S/0 to F/O F/O to Capt,.
Upgrade Upgrade
Manual Flight Controls (Approach & L'lndtng

OC-8) (Approach only B-727 & B-737)
(Not Req'd B-747, B-720, & DC-10) A A
Landing and G<>-around with Horizontal
Stabilizer ou~of-trim A vs
A A
Night (One required)
Hcference: Flight Manual, Flight Proficiency Chapter
C, Second Officer Functions
The Second Officer will demonstrate proficiency in the followlng items

in either the simulator or airplane.
Preflight Gockpit ln8)1eCtioft

Exterior Inspection
System Operation
Assigned Duties as Member oi Crew
Logbopk Write-up
standard Operating Procedures
Emergency :i;>rocedures
Irregular Procedures
D. &>eond Officer Pilot Training - Simulator and Airplane· (Not required

in B-747 and DC-10)
Turns wiib and without spoilers

Approaches to StallB
Instrument Approaqb Prooedµre (ILS)
Landing(a)
IV. Airplane Simulator /Devices
Cockpit Procedures Trainers

Airplane Simulators
Flight Operations Training Mantml Page 6-G

10/9/72
Unikd Air Lincoo
tD
c. ~-737 UJ2t:rade
-~
F/O to S/O to
Initial Transition Capt. F/O
Hours Hours ~
Hours
Ground School :i
27 27 3
Classroom 9
12 12 IJ
Cockpit Procedures 6 6
. \i 9
Crew Traln1nl! Session
Simulator - Crew Training Concept

20 20 12
Captain 15 15
15
First OCficer
Airplane
Captain - To Proficiency -
-
First Officer - Proficiency
To
Flight Check
Simulator/Training Devices & Airplane - As Required -
Days Days Days

Total PrQgram Duration !ApPI'OX. ) Days
J ~1
25 25
Captain 23 ) ii
23
First Officer 3 .12
3
Third Crew Member
Flight Operations Training ~r.ual 3/1/.1.2

Page 6-8
United Air Lines
J.e
·,
\'I. I
lniti:tl and '1'rant-iiLion - v:ri1..LL'D J'in:tl l'X:trninaLhlni oral vxaniinalion,

simulator :tn<l airplane fEghl cllccks.
llpµ;radc - oral examination, simulator and airpl:rnc [light cl1ecks.
n. DC-8, DC-10
[nitial, Transition and Upgrade - or:il examination (cxccpL DC-8 S/O

transition), simulator and airplane flighl checks.
DC-S S/O lransiiion - The assigned flight Operations lnslruclor is

rc•sponsib!e for determining salisf::wtory compt'tcncc in lrnowll'dg" of
L•<'1uipmcnt and procedures in lieu of oral examination. The sirnulalo1·
check airman shall be other than the trainee's a8signcd FOl.
l
ii/l (i:'.
Ii'light Operations Training Manc.ai
United Air I.ine'
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 2-F
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY l:l:JARD

EXCEHPIS FROM UNITED AIR LINES B-737 FLIGHT MAl'nJAL
1. Normal Operations Section, Pgs. 2-18- thru 2-22

2. Flight Proficiency Section Pgs. 3i, 3~ thru 3C,
/3-1 thru 3-8
3. Profile View of Non Precision Approach
4. Bulletin #51 Pgs. 1 thru 10
CLIMB USE OF ANTI-ICING EQUIPMENT:
It is difficult to specifically define wllien
to use (or not use) anti-icing and to
F/O CLIMB EPR SET establish any appropriate set techniq·c:e. ·
Set the Climb EPR from Max. EPR
T~e following represent general guides
Gauge or Flight Handbook data. Adjust on operation: (When in doubt, use it).
as required to stay within limitations.
1. When flying in clouds below 20, 000 ft.
C&
with temperatures at or belm•r freezing,
F/O FUEL SYSTEi\I . Monitor
use Engine Anti-Ice. Use Wing Atti-lce
If ccmter tank fuel was used, turn the
if icing is indicated or known to exist.
Center Tank Fuel Pump S'Nitches OFF
after observing the Master Caution, 2. When cruising in clouds above 20, GOO ft.
Fuel Annunciator, and Center Tank Low with low outside air temporatures,
Pressure lights illuminated. These
Engine Anti-Ice can usually be le~ OFF.
lights should go out after turning the However, if the t:l ightest indicatim. of
Center Tank Fuel Pump switches OFF.
1 icing occurs (i.e. EPR flucluatiors or
! a trace cif icing in an unheated wim-
-..l Monitor fuel quantity gauges for proper shield area). turn on Anti-Ice
balance. i=ediately.
C NO SMO?:ING & FASTEN BELT 3. Regardless of altitude, turn on Anti-

S\VITCEES • As Required Ice prior to C". ~ering areas of k:no'"--;11
icing corld{tions, such as fronlal znues
C&
or cumulus clouds.
F/O ALTIMETER Set
Set to 29. 92 climbing through 4. Turn on Wing Anti-Ice no litter tha.~ tile
18, 000 feet.
first indication of ice on the v,:inz
leading edge.
CRUISE 5. In icing conditions, maintain eng·in.e

RPM above appi C'c:imatoly 55% N for
satisfa·ctor:r anti· ··::r;. 1
F/O CRUISE TlffiUST . Tutermine
& Set
If ice does form on the engino inlot,
disturbance of the airflow can produce
engine sµrging, high EGT's. fl~.me-out,
/ etc. With even a small amount of ice
present, tm·ning on Engine Anti-Ice will
cause the melting ice to go through tre
engine and may cause violent engine
surging at intervals of one to two miru:tes.
Throttle adjustments should be slow ~nd
deliberate to avoid exposure to engine
/ flame-out.
(
I
SEl' 23/71 737 FLIGHT MAHUJ1L 958
2-18 REFEREHCE AND REYlE\'f
OPERATION IN SEVERE TURBULENT AIB:
Flight through severe turbulence should be

-
~;.!d
UNITED
6.
NORMAL OPERATIONS
ALTITUDE - Allow altitude to vary

(large variations are possible in
severe turbulance). Sacrifice altitude
avoided, if possible. When flying at 30,000 in order to maintain the desired
fL or higher, it is not advisable to avoid attitude and airspeed. DO NOT CIIASE
a turbulent area Ly climbing: over it, unless ALTITUDE.
it can obviously be overflown well in the
clear. For turbulence of the san1e inten- 7. TlIIHIS:!'_- Mak<e an i11itial lhrn>l
sity. greater "buff"etu margins are achieved setting ror the laq~l'( ainq'<.!ted.
by flying the recomrnencl<:d speeds at CJIANUI·: TIIHUST tl~LY IN CASE OF
reduced altitudes. EXTHI-:MI·: i\11\Sl'El•:IJ VAIUJ\Tf(J~{.
U ~.evere turbul-r·nce is unf'xpectcd}y or 8. Under 110 r.ondi~.!.''..'."; o;hould thl' landing

una voict'ably encountered 1 the recommend-ed gca1· ht• extencl<.!cl ~i~· a di'ag· IJrulle in
procedures are: turbulence. 'l'hc l"l'.Sttlting piteh
changP c<>uld be suific:iL·ully violent
1. AIRSPEED ·· Severe tu1'bulence as to cause structural dun1:ige, 2..nd
can cause large and r:i11id variations the nose gear doors may Lie turn
in airspeed indicati•Jns. DO away.
NOT CHASE THE AITISPEED.
9. On all flights, it is rccommcnr.!C'd that
buffC't 1Jou1H.lary spcl'ds Lie dclurr.1incd
Y.\W DAJ\'IF .. R - Check ON for tht' 1. 5G condition and tlw air-
speed indicator bui;s bl' '"'''d lo
display tilL'Fl' \'alUl'S. (Hdc:r l.o the
3. AUTOPILOT - Positiur· to TURB. Flight llandi>uok fur d;li:i.)
l\!ODE, if ,,,,ed.
C&
4. ATTITUDE - Illaintain \'.'ings level F/0 CJRC'LIJT JHlE:\hl·:I\S . . . . . IN
and the desired pitch a ttjwde. l'se Prior lo starting ck·:-~evnl., ch1:C'k to
the attitude indicator as the primary see lli:tt all·circuiL brvHLl·r:::. nre in.
instrument. In extren1e .,..drafts 11 ,
large attitude changes 11:.ay 'occur.
DO KOT USE SUDDEN L\RGE
CONTROL L\PUTS.
The pilot Oying- will vcrl.J:dly l!onfirm the

5. STABILIZER - Use the elenmrs to
cleared altitucl0. The· pilot nol r1, ing will
maint.lin control. After establishing
call off 30,000 rt., 20,000 ft., 10.000 ft.
the trim s-e.tting for pen:~::ralion
and 5,000 fl. (if a 1 .. opriatc·) rl111·inr;
speed, DO XOT CHANGE
descent, anti l. oou rt. afy_1\ '-' !lie c-lc;ired
STABILIZER TRD!.
altitude.
1
947 737 FLIGHT MANUAL -MAY ~:J/'iO
REFER:EHCE AND REVIEW 2-19
NORMAL OPERATIONS
Descent rates of less tfian 4, 000 FPM are

--
UlllTl!D
APPROACH DESCENT CHECK LIST

r
sufficient for :tll normal operations. A
descent rate of I, 000 FPM is aboot the To be checked by pilot tiot flying and
maximum that will allow for a precise yet announced as campleted
comfortable level off. This shonld be
monitored closely ~hen within 2, 0-00 ft. MASTER CAUTION CHECK
of the ground.
v SET
C OR F/O ALIIl'ODE ALERT. Set REF SPEED
-. C & FfO ALTIMETER • . Set GO-AilOUND EPR SF.T

Set the altimeters to field barometric
leaving F. L.. 180. ALTIMETERS SET
C #1 AND #2 T.Ah'K FUEL

PUMPS . •
C FUEL CHOSS FEED

• • • • • ON
FINAL DESCE?JT i
VALVE . . CLOSED C FUEL HEAT
SWITCHES . • . • . . As Required
C FASTEN BELTS SWITCH ON or If temperature conditions require, move
AUTO the Fuel Heat s'.vitches to lbc ON positic,n.
F/O HYDRAULIC PRESS& C NO Sl\IOKI:·W SW • . . AUTO or O~<

QTY . • • • • • • •
. . • Check Place the' switch to ON or :\!l'l'O as
Observe Hydraulic Brake &nd System desired. Tf AUTO is used, ll>2 NO So.IOK-
Pressure Gauges ta- see that A & B lliG signs \Vill co1ne on \\'bt!n 1,bc·! f~C~ir
systems are indicating: normal extends.
operating pressures. Che-ck the
Qu<mtity gauge for normal level F/O W1NG FLAPS As Ordered
and the B Low Quantity Light out. On order, move the Win~~ Flap J.cn·cr to
the requested position. Check Lhe flap
C & F/O LANDING DATA . • Set position inr1icrttor and the I.uadinrr, F:d~e
&t EPH Bugs to the Go-Around EPR lights for agreement with tltc fi;ip
based on reported field OAT. Set the position.
large Bug on the air5peed indicator to
V f or V Adjusted. F/O LANDING GEAR LE\'J:H ])01\'"N
Re Ref I on order
C MASTEH CAUTION PANEL The three gear red lights will illtunlnate
RECALL while the gear is in transit~ Cheek to
see that the three gear red lights go out
and the three gerrr green li[;"hls illumiioate,
indicating gear extendccl and lockecl.
JB
NOV 23/72 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 93~
2-20 REFEREHCE AHO REVIEW
NORMAL OPERA TIO NS
·--,_
above field elevation, flight instruments
F /0 HYDRAULIC PRESS &
check" . . . or nature of discrepancy.
QTY • . . • Check
After operating the flaps and gear.
CAUTION: 00 NOT/' CTUATE TTIE
observe the Hydraulic Pressure allld
Quantity gauge for proper indications. RADIO ALTIMETER TEST
BUTTON AFTER FLIGHT DIRECTOR
C SPEED BRAKE LEVER . •• ARMED
. GLIDE SLOPE ENGAGEl\IENT AS THIS
Place the Speed Brake Lever to the WILL CHANGJ' THE J\UTOMATlC
ARMED position and check that the ATTENUATION. (LOCKOUT CHtCUIT
Afu\1ED light illuminates. PREVENTS TEST DUlUNU AlJT·WILOT
APPROACH.)
CAlTTION: 00 NOT LAND WITH THE
"DO NOT ARc,l" LIGHT TLLlThllNATED At 500 feet above field elevation as
AS THE SPEED BRAKES MAY EX'l""END determined by baromr,.tric ullimc.:tcr. the
AUTOl\IATICALLY BEFORE TOUCH- F /Cl will announce: "GOO feel alio1·e field
DOWN IF BOTH THROTTLES ARE elevation". Starting at BOO feet abo\'e
RETARDED TO IDLE. A DA.,.'>GEROUS- field elevation and at ap;wo:-:imalely each
LY HIGH RATE OF DESCENT COffLD 100 feet increments, he will call out only
RESULT. displacement or deviation errors as
pertinent. (1 dot clisplaccmc·nt on
localizer, :'._ l clot on the glide Alope.
FT~AL DESCEi'iT CHALLENGE-RESPOND deviations greater than pin~ JO k1»ob or
ininus 5 knots ft·on1 tn1'[rul app1·oach speed
CHALLENGE RESPOND
and ralc-of-cll~sc;ent in e:«:css of 1000 feel
'_) (PILOT N'OT FL 11NG} {PILOT FLYING)
min.) At arpro:-:imrrtc>ly 100 fc,ot above
FLIGHT & NAY rnini1nurn altitude by use uf the li:~rc 1 1netrf1
INSTRl':">!ENTS No Flags altit11etcr, ho \':ill announce 11 ..\pprn~chin1.'
(Cross-checked by !\1inin1un1s 11 • At rninirnu111 a!lilt1c1e by ust
pilot not flying} .. of the Lwromclrie altinwlc'l' (Hadlo
Lf\N'D!XG GEAH Down 3 green Eights Allimo'0r for CAT ll appt·oach), he will
11
SPEED BHAKES ARMED, Grn. Lt. announce I\1inin1urns 11 • l·'ro1n n1inirnu1n
WING FLAPS Pcis __, Grn. :Lt. altitude to touchdown. he wlll call nut
Pressure & Fluid airspeed chnngcs in 5 knot inc;.1·en1cnts.
llc will also call out any unn,;ual attitude
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED
belo'.v J)l! for landing and lhroup;h r~o
around. If the Captaid c·xc·cutes a missed
C & F/O FLIGHT & NAV approach he \Vill annOil11l'C nGoin~~ 1\roun1
1
INSTRU:OIE N"'J'S . . . Check Wilh weather 4000 Il\'H L1l' lieltcr. or

The Captain will make all approachccs visibility 3/4 mile or l.ic•!lcr. lhc pilot not
and landings in RVR less than 4000 f.eet flying will make the at'i'tC>Jlritile t::ill out»
or visibiJit.}r I.r:·ss than 3,l'4 of a mile_ During \'1''l"l aµproaclius. ca1 l uuts should
After comp let ion d the Final Descerat include 1000 feet AG, GOO feel AG, anr.l
Check List, ilie Captain will ""'10Unce deviations of +10 -5 in airs peed rind
the target apr->roach speed. \\hen the rales-of-descenl in cxcc-ss of 1000 feet
airplane is 1•}00 feet aoove field elevation. per minute below GOO feel 1\C.
the F/O will cross-check the.flight
instruments and announce: "10-00 f~t
.JC. _________,___
··--..----------------=:...:::.._
939 7S"1 FLIGHT MANUAL NOV 23/72
REFERENCE >.HD REVIEW 2-21
NORMAL OPERATIONS
category II Operation
A. The First Officer will constantly
monitor approach perlormance
5. Jf VFR, establish a landing profile to
enable touchdown between 500' m:rl
·1
against coclq:ilt instnimentatian to 1000' from the threshold. On ILS the
touchdown and throughout rollout or touchdown target Is 1000' ± 500' from
go-around. the threshold.
B. Pilot-In-command will disengage
6. Ideal rates of descent are about 600-800
autopilot for landing.
FPM. At 500' AG the approach should
C. :Maximum devLation at 100' is 1/3
be stnbilized and remain stabilized or
of a dot arr localizer and± 1 dot
a go-around must be executed.
on glides] c1pe.
7. Maintain the proper constant attitude
STABILIZED APPROACH TECHX'IQUE during approach to toucbdow1i, mid
-avoid any tendency to dive for the end
L Maneuvering flap to the outer marker, of the runway. This tendency c2:1
or if VFR, to a position of beginning result from the illusion presented
final approach. (When maneuvering when breaking out ur~:.ion1cail1 a low
in icing conditions, it is recommended ceiling from a normal ILS appro:ach
that flaps not be extended more than and will result in a high rate-of-
position 5 until on final approach over descent n8ar the ground.
the outer marker. This reduces the
8. During the final 200-300' of descent
exposure to ice build-up on the flaps.)
to the runwriy, the hendwi nd component
2. As glide slope ls being approached, often dec:rcases, resulting in a drop off
extend gear. Landing flap may be in airspeed approxi rn rilely equal to the ..'
applied in . ,ne or more increments as steady he:lclwind corroc;tion. \\~1UE it is
dictated by airspeed and allier not. intended that a pilot should reduce
conditions. thrust (:o achieve tl1ls airs peed l1l8"doff,
the occurrence is norrnaJ. and can be
3. Follow descent path, speed decaying
expected. The airplane shonlcl be
to specified approach spee<\ then
flo\vn so d_S to crvss ihe ihresholli at
stabilized. (See Flight Handbook for
planned threshold speed. Thrust ls
approach speed).
reduced during the flare so as to
Final landing configuration must be
arrive at idle thrust at tclllchdown.
established by 500 ft. above ground
unless the approach procedure (ADF,
The advantages of this type o.f approni!h are:
VOR, CIRCLING) requires an inter-
a. - Improved constant airsp2ecl control.
mediate level off before final descent
b. -Improved c:lpabllity to realize proper
to the airport. In this case, the
threshold speed.
final landing configuration should be
c. - Constant attitude & "trim-out" dming
established, and speetl stabilized, as
entire final approach.
the final descent from this minimum
d. - Better control of desired touchdown spot.
altitude is lY~gun.
e. - Improved autopilot apµroach clue to the
Retrim to maintain light control
stabilized airplane configuration.
forces during the entire approach.
f. - Improved go-around perforrnrince since
4. Control the touchdown spot by keeping engine acceleration from the higher
thrust on (Engines "spooled up") approach thrust settings will be rapid.
during the approach.
J [)
NOV 23/72 737 FLIGHT MANUAL . '
,< REFERE~Cl AND REVIEW
2-22
FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 3-A

REQUIRED MANEUVERS (CAPTAIN'S) 3-B
REQUIRED MANEUVERS (FIRST OFFICER'S) 3-C
MANEUVERS
PREFLIGHT. 3-1
TAKEOFFS 3-2
INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES 3-3
INFLIGHT PROCEDURES 3-7
LANDINGS AND APPROACHES TO LANDINGS 3-9
NORMAL AND IRREGULAR PROCEDURES 3-111
EMEHGENCY PROCEDURES 3-11
JUDGMENT 3-12
COMMAND 3-12
PROFILES
NORMAL TAKEOFF 3-J.4
ENGINE FAILURE DURJNG TAKEOFF 3-l!l
NON-PRECISION APPHOACHES 3-lG
LANDING PATTERN - TWO ENGINES 3-17
LANDING PATTERN - ONE ENGINE 3-18
!LS APPROACH AND MISSED APPROACH - TWO ENGINE . 3-1 ~I
l LS APPROACH AND MISSED APPROACH - ONE ENGINE 3··20
STUDY UUIDE 3-:!J
-·-
946 737 FLICHT MANUAL MAY 23/70

REFEREHCE AND REVIEW
3-i
-737
J.' LlCllT PHOPJCH:NC \'
·-· FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
This section lists .required maneuvers for ratings and proficiency checks, and describes
the maneuvers, and. techniques that are utilized in training and checking.
Training, the rating ride and the proficiency check are operational, emphasizing instrument
approaches, landings, takeoffs, missed approaches and normal, irregular, and emergency
procedures.
The minimum crew complement for all inflight checking will consist of the pilot being checked
:incl the check pilot. FAA requires that the pilot seated at the controls, other than the pilot
being checked, be qualified to act as pilot-in-command; however, this should in no way affect
the crew concept of flying. The pilot at the controls should always use his crew to aid him in
performing to the highest degree of safety and efficiency. The normal line crew complement
may be used in the simulator portion of the proficiency check.
Each crew member is expected to have in his possession, and use as needed, all regular
equipment, such as charts, manuals, etc., normally required in flight.
The pilot's performance is judged on adherence to standard operating procedures, including

the use and execution of all check lists. The procedures outlines in the FAR's, the UAL
Flight Operations Manual, and the 737 Flight Manual apply to all flight checks.
The flight director should be used in the appropriate mode when applicable. lts use is man-
datory when performing !LS approaches to low minimums.
The maneuver descriptions and profiles in this section are for general f;Uirlance only. The
pilot is expected to use his judgment in execution of procedures and selection of airplane
configuration and speeds as appropriate to the existing situation and conditions.
A list of typical Questions and References, categorized by system is located at the back of
this section to assist you in self-evaluation of your knowledge of the airplane.
94G 737 FLIGHT MANUAL. JV1A Y 23/70

REFEREHCE AND REVIEW '?- ,\
FLIGHT PROFICIENCY --- .......
REQUIRED MANEUVERS
TYPE RATING AND CAPTAINS PROFICIENCY CHECK
Simulator (In airplane -if not done in simulator)
l. REJECTED TAKEOFF (may waive).

2. AHBA DEPAHTURB and ARRIVAL (may waive one).
3. HOLDING (may waive).
4. STEEP TURNS (may waive).
fi. APPROACHES TO STALLS (may waive 2 of 3).
G. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS (may waive).
7. POWER PLANT FAILURE -- may be required.
8. NORMAL and IRREGULAR PROCEDURES.
~- EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.
Airplane (* - May be performed in visual simulator)
1. PREFLIGHT (visual portion may be waived).

2. TAXIING.
::. TAKEOFFS: Types maybe combined but must include; NOHMAL, *INSTRUMENT,
C:l\OSSWJND (If practical), and * ENGINE FAILURE.
+ 4. !LS - NOHMAL (autocoupled or manual).
G. ILS - ENGINE OUT (manual).
1 fi. NON-PRECISION APPROACHES: Two required, one may be certified by Instructor
in non-visual simulator during training.
·• 7. CIRCLING APPROACH.
8. MISSED APPROACHES: Two required; at least one from an !LS in the airplane, the
t other may be done in a visual simulator. A complete missed approach procedure
must be demonstrated at least once and a simulated engine failure may be required
for any missed approach.
Ll. POWER PLANT FAILURE: may be required.
10. LANDINGS and APPROACHES: Minimum number of actual landings required is three
(two on PC) and one must be to a full .stop. Types of landings may be combined but must
include: NORMAL, FROM !LS, CROSSWIND (if practical), ONE ENGINE OUT, * FROM
CIRCLE, *REJECTED and *NO FLAP (rating only).
MAY 23/76 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 946

:J-Tl REFERENCE AHO REVIEW
l"LIGHT PHOFICIENCY
REQUIRED MANEUVERS
FIRST OFFICER PROFICIENCY CHECK
SIMULATOR {l'.1 airplane if not done in simulator)
1. REJECTED TAKEOFF (may waive).

2. AREA DEPARTURE and ARRIVAL (may waive one).
3. HOLDING (may waive).
4. APPROACHES TO STALLS (may waive 2 of 3).
5. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS (may waive).
G. POWER PLANT FAILURE -- may be requirerl.
7. NORMAL and IRREGULAR PROCEDURES.
8. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.
Al Fl PLANE ('· May be performed in visual simulator)
J. l'IU;FL!GIIT.
2. TJ\.,Xl!NC,.
:i. TAKEOFFS: Types may be combined but must include; NOH.MAL, 'INSTRUMENT,
CROSSWIND (if practical), and *ENGINE FAILURE.
* •l. !LS - NORMAL (autocoupled or manual).
G. ILS - ENGINE OUT (Manual).
* 6. NON-PRECISION APPll.OACHES: Two required, one may be certified by instructor in
non-visual simulator during training.
7. MISSED APPROACH: Only one required and it must be from !LS to facility. May be
required with a simulated engine failure.
8. LANDINGS and APPROACHES: Minimum number of actual landings required is two
on the initial PC (one on subsequent PC's); one must be to a full stop. Types of land inc
may be combined but must include: NORMAL, FROM ILS, CROSSWlND (if practical),
ONE ENGINE OUT AND *REJECTED LANDING .
.zc
94fi 737 FLIGHT MANUAL MAY 23/70
REFEREHCE AHO REVIEW
3-C
uilJJo FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
MANEUVERS
I. PREFLIGHT
A. Equipment Examination (Oral)
An oral examination is required for a type-raling or proficiency check. The

pilot must demonstrate a practical knowledge of: All airplane systems, opera-
tional and performance factors, limitations, normal, irregular and emergency
procedures.
fl. Preflight Inspection
The pilot will be required to perform a visual inspection of the exterior and
interior of the airplane aa outlined in the Operations Section of this manual.
Preflight inspection also includes use of prestart check list, starting·

procedures, checks of all radios and electronic equipment, and selection of
proper navigation and communication facilities prior to flight.
C. Taxiing
Taxiing· will be evaluated on compliance with instructions issued by the

appropriate authority and the exercise of judgment with regard to safely and
technique. The pretakeoff check list will be accomplished in accordance with
lhe Operations Section of this manual. It should in no way distract from the
taxi operation.
The 1-'irst Of'ficer is expected to taxi lhe airplane only lo lhe extenl praclicalile
from his crew position.
D. Power Plant Checks
Each pilot is expected to give attention to proper engine acceleration, EPH,

EGT, rpm and pertinent temperature and pressure indications either prior to or
immediately after start of the takeoff roll depending on the type of takeoff --
from a standing start or rolling onto the runway.
94G 737 FLIGHT MANUAL

REFERENCE AHO REVIEW
l'vIAY 23/70
3-1
.FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
II. TAKEOFFS
A. Normal Takeoff
Reference: Airplane manual Operations Chapter and profile page of this

chapter.
A takeoff is considered to be "normal" when initiated from a standing start or

rolling takeoff (as opposed to a takeoff following a touch and go). The
maneuver may be combined with the crosswind and/or instrument takecff
listed below. The requirement for a Normal Takeoff may be satisfied when
a Takeoff with Simulated Engine Failure (B below) is satisfactorily performed.
F'actors to be considered are: Use of flight director; thrust application; brake

release; use of nose wheel steering; runway alignment; proper use of controls
in crosswind or gusty conditions; Captain's hand on throttles transitting V 1 ;
proper rotation at Vn; gear retraction; noise abatement procedures; flap retrac-
tion and thrust reduction to climb setting; completion of after takeoff check
list. The pilot not flying is expected to monitor engine and flight instruments.
11. Takeoff with Simulated Engine Failure
Reference: Profile pa?;e of this chapter.
hp.mediately following V1, but prior, to Vz, one engine will be retarded to idle,
using approximately three seconds for the thrust reduction.
Hudder should be used to counteract yaw and maintain heading. This will aid
in avoiding undersirable aileron input and spoiler action. A centered control
wheel is an indication of correct rudder use. Proper use of the STEER mode of
the Flight Director will maintain the desired heading during the takeoff profile.
The ball in the turn-and-slip indicator should be used as an additional reference.
In addition to lhe considerations mentioned under normal takecff, performance

will be evaluated on directional control, climbout al Vz (if higher speed is already
attained at time of engine failure, reduction to ·v2 speed is r10t necessary), and
adherence to climboul profile. In the airplane, engine shutdown will be simulated
unless an actual failure has occurred.
2£.
MAY 23/70 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 94ii
3-2 REFERENCE AHO REVIEW
l.'l.fc;ll'I' /'ft(ll•'ICll·:N<'Y
c. Takeoff Under Simulated Instrument Conditions
At approximately 100' above the airport elevation instrument conditions will be

simulated. This maneuver may be combined with the normal takeoff, or with
the engine failure on takeoff. The same criteria mentioned in A and B aoove will
be used for evaluation purposes.
D, Crosswind Takeoff
Where practicable, a crosswind takeoff shall be made. It may, however, be

combined with any other takeoff. Emphasis will be placed on directional ancl
lateral control throughout the takeoff.
E. Rejected Takeoff
This maneuver will be accomplished in the airplane during training. On the

Proficiency Check and/or Type Rating, it will be done in the simulator or it
may be waived.
Emphasis will be placed on prompt throttle reduction, spoiler extension, proper

use of brakes, directional control and the use of reverse thrust, if applicable.
III. INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES
A. Area Departure and Arrival
Departure and arrival clearances will be concise and conform to the normal
practices employed by ATC. Adherence to clearances, the proper use of avail-
able navigation facilities and compliance with airspeed restrictions are essential
to satisfactory performance. Either the departure or the arrival may be waived
on a flight check, but not both.
B. Holding
Holding will be judged on proper airspeed and method of entering, maintaining

and leaving the holding pattern. It may be waived on proficiency check and type
rating. The autopilot may be used if desired.
C. !LS and Other Instrument Approaches
Captain's ILS training will be to CAT II minimums. The First Officer will receive
training on ILS approaches to 200' but on certification will be required to demon-
strate proficiency to 250 1 •
979 737 FLIGHT MANUAL DEC 2:Ji'IO

REFERENCE AHD REVIEW 3-3
1·1:1c:ll'r l'HO!i'lCtl·:NcY
1. Normal JLS
-
An ILS is considered to be "normal" when all engines and the appropriate
ILS facilities and airborne equipment are operating. A "normal" ILS may
lie autocoupled or manually flown with the flight director.
It is good practice when tuning an ILS to select ADF on the VOR/ ADF s,vitehes.
The pilot tuning the !LS should verify positioning of the VOR/ADF and marker
receiver switches. Both pilots should verify OM passage by the aural/visual
signal and the ADF needle swing and the G/S altitude is as published.
It is important to follow standard procedures for cross-monitoring all instru-

ment indications throughout the approach. At Decision Height the airplane
should lx~ in position to land with minimum maneuvering.
Factors considered in the evaluation of performance are: proper use of flight

director a\¥1/or autocoupler; airspeed and alignment at the outer marker; use of'
final c1w<:l~ 1 list; stabilization of approach speed, glide slope and localher;
reco~nition of, and prompt corrective action for, departures from desired
parameters; recot,'1'.lition of Decision Height and appropriate action.
2. ILS Approach with Simulated Failure of One Engine
Reference: Profile page of this chapter ........
Prin1· to the outer marker, one engine will be retarded to idle, and the lLS
will be performed simulating one engine inoperative. The same evaluation
factors listed in C. 1 apply.
Wht'n m nking thrust or speed changes, proper trim is essential for best
nirplvne and flight <.lircetor performance.
:;, 2!10-J /2 and Cctll'go:rv lf Cei'lification
a. 'I'hl· Captain 1 s 200-l /'l, ;ind (~u.tegory II initial Cl!t·tific:ation and

recurrent quali[le:1Lion requires:
J} An autoeouplncl JLS approach with all engines operating to 100'

followed by ll l;rnding.
'.;) A flight dircc1."r JLS ~JJproach with one engine inoperative to 100'
followed Ly D .1issed approach.
----·~----
MAY 23/70 7 H FLIGHT MANUAL 94H
RErf.REHCE ,.\HD REVIEW
J-~
- FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
These approaches also satisfy C. land C. 2 above. The 200-1/'.' approal'li

authorization i~Qa.sed upon use of the barometric altimeter for flccisinn
Height, while the CAT II authorization is based on use of the radio al-
timeter.
Category II certification also requires: preflight test of the radio

altimeter and flight director; proper use and understanding of the auto-
coupler; cross-monitoring of instnrrnents; recog11ition of Dec:ision Height;
prompt rotation for positive climb performance when executing missed
approach or continuation of proper profile to landing.
b. The First Officer may be.certified by a Check Airman to perfor111 First

Officer duties in connection with CAT II approaches in one of the following
ways:
1) During the airplane portion of a proficiency check or training, by

performing his duties on a CAT II approach.
NOTE: This may be accomplished by having the Check Aim "m

make a CAT II approach under VFR conditions while the
First Officer (on instn1rnents) performs F/O Category Jf
duties.
2) During the simulator portion of a proficiency check or durinp; sb1.ulalm

training:
a) Perform First Officer duties during a CAT ll approach by the

left seat pilot, and
b) Execute an autocoupled ILS approach to 100' and Janel.
4. Other Approaches
Any one non-precision approach procedure that the pilot is authorized to utw
is required on the PC. During training an ADF, VOR, Back Course ILS, II:
ASR/PAR will be accomplished in a synthetic trainer.
Reference: Profile page of this section.
737 FLIGHT MANUAL . MAY 23/70

REFERENCE ANO REVIEW :i-:;
L
FLIGHT PROFICIENCY
-
On D.n ADF, VOR, Back Course ILS, or ASH (without reoomrn encled aliitu:lc s)
approach, the following procedure is recommended. ff a straight-in approach
is anticipated, gear should be extended prior to tho fi:i.al approach fix. Flap.-<
should be cxio11ded and spcccl reclncc<l prior t" sUu·ting <lcsecni to Minirnu 111
Du:<ccnt Altitude (MDA). A r'tto or <i"S<"t'llt shot1lci /i(• 111:1int:.ii;te<I which wiiJ
ensure reaching MDA early enough to perm it alignment with the runway ai1<I
to SP.t up a normal landing profile. I ,andi11g Oaps should be t;dcctcd when , " a
position to intercept a normal descent profile for landing.
a. ADF APPROACH - Tune the radi.o facility accurately and check tho VOH;
ADF switches properly set for both pilots.
b. VOR A PPilOACH - DME may be usecl to monitor procedure turn limits.

Tlle FlighL Director may /Je usc'd in tlie VOH/ LOC mode. The rilot htning
a VOH should verify that VOH/ADF swilc:hes arc in the von position ror
both pilots unless ADF bearing is required for ideniification of intersec-
tions.
c:. DACK COURSE ILS - Setting the FRONT course in tho Course Indicator
wi I l provide proper sensing· on the Course Dar of tlw Cl. ll11 nol use
Flight Director in VOR/LOC or appronch modes.
cl. ASR - Make use of other oper:ating aids to monitor position throughout
approach.
e. PAH and ASR with Recommended Altihtrlcs. LancH11g· flaps should

be e:;.i:ended in increments when approaching the finn J des cont path, and n
stabilized approach with landing flap Is used as in the !LS approach.
D. Circling Approach
'.l.eference: Profile page of this section.
A circling approach may be initiated from llil instrument approach or from vectors
to a position where a landing can be made. The landing runway must l.ie at least
90° from the final instrument approach course.
Once under the cloud base the pilot must remain contact and circle within sight of
the field. Maneuver the airplane to stay within prescribed distance limits without
exceeding 30° bank. A 25 flap setting and 140 Kts. are recommended during; both
the instrument approach and the circle. Descent to lllilCl shoulcl be started as neces-
sary to follow normal profile. This may occur beforo turning on to the final appro:wl:
Landing flaps should be extended so as t;; he in the final approach configuration and
on approach speed as the descent prufile is intercepted.
FEB 2~l/71 737 FLIGHT MANUAL

3-6 REFERENCE AND REYI EW
l"L!GHT PROFJCIENCY
E. Missed Approaches
Reference: Profile page of this section.
As the missed approach is initiated, the pilot should advance the throttles and
rotate to the go-around attitude (approximately 15°), simultaneously calling for
takeoff thrust and flaps to the missed approach setting.
Follow the missed approach profile as appropriate. Limit bank to 15° until
obtaining maneuvering airspeed for the flap configuration.
Missed approaches required for proficiency check and rating:
1. One missed approach from an ILS approach.
2. One additional missed approach (Captain only).
One of the missed approaches must be a complete missed approach procedure.
Performance will be judged on: proper thrust application and rotation; gear
re(1''1dion upon positive rate of <.:limb; directional control and use of trim.
rv. INFLIGHT PROCEDURES
A. steep Turns (45° bank, 250 knots)
steep turns will be accomplished in training but are not required for the First
Officer certification flight and may be waived for the Captain on proficiency check/
rating.
8nter the turn with thb airplane trimmed for level flight at 250 knots.. As the bank
nngle steepens, a slight increase in pitch attitude and thrust may be required. Cyru
precession may cause vaJ:iation in the pitch indication during a steep turn, while
constant altitude is Lei11g maintained. lnstantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IV0-,1)
readings will be erroneous rolling into and out of the turn.
NOTE: N<:ither gyro precession nor accelerometer error is present in the sirnuln ··
tor.
Steep turns will be done for at least 180° lwading change in each direction. i'lu1, "r
minus 100' and 10 Kts are the normal tolerances; however, these may be l.ibernli7.ed
if adverse meteorological conditions warrant.
fl4fi
737 FLIGHT M~UAI..
REFERENCE ~D REV1EW MAY 23/70
3-7
F LICHT i'ROF!Clf:NCY
B. ApProaches to stalls
It is not desired that the airplane be allowed to stall, shake or decelerate below
the initial buffet or stick shaker speed. The approach to the stall will be continued
only to the first warning indication.
Normally; stall approaches are entered from level flight. When the pilot is pre-
pared for the entry, the instructor or check pilot will set a suitable thrust setting.
The pilot will not be required to calculate or recall the thrust setting for entries,
or the trim termination speed.
ENTRIES:
Configuration: Recovery Flap:
Clean -- Genr up, flaps up. 1
Takeoff -- Gear up, flaps 15. 15

(15° bank)
Landing -- Gear down, flaps 40. 15
At first warning of impending stall advance the throttles and lower the nose,
simultaneously calling: for takeoff thrust and flaps to the recovery setting; gear
up at first indication of positive rate of climb. From the banked entry, level the
wings after lowering the nose. Pull up from descent and regain maneuvering speed
for the flap setting.
Performance will be judged on recognition of impending stall, technique and prompt-

ness of recovery and avoidance of a secondary stall. Emphasis will be placed on
positive recovery rather than minimum loss of altitude.
C. Specific Flight Characteristics
This maneuver may be waived. It is designed to demonstrate re0overy from a

flight characteristic that is peculiar to the airplane.
D. Engine Failures
A simulated engine failure may be given at any time. The pilot should analyze the
problem and take corrective action as necessary.
MAY 23/70 737 FLIGHT MANUAL 94G

:l-R REFERENCE AHO REVIEW
--~·
CIHCLING: FI..A PS 25/140 c;Ts
GJ!.:Al{ JJO\VN
INnOUND STnAIGJIT-IN: LANDING FLAPS

.FLAPS 15/150 KTS
'(;EAR .DOWN
FINAL DESCENT CHECK ,- -=-
( ...-c , '' ,,.. ;.:@'!
~ fr
(<
TI~E CHE CK
DESCENT RATE: APPROX 1000 fpm
\
~-:-PRClA r..:t·J (~(JN'FJ(; •
-~
.· - - --:--...=---·...::::.____:::
*APPROACH COlffTGUHATION:
N('\.j3.t.1/1.L 1-fANJc:UVBHING -or
./
FLA.PS 25/''ltEF + l~ K1'S
FLAI'S 30/VREF + 5 KTS
TWO Ef'·JGIP·!t::S
-A7:'U:'.G;::,:--:~L-:,:--,-;,_;::,:;-1·------------------....;L.___ .. ___ -
- 737FLIGHiMNW.'L 951
3-16 REFERENCE t.HD i(: (fl:\'/
' '·;
I •: , :::,P;..:)~': .. ; ,
737 FLIGHT MANUAL -'REFERENCE AND REVIEW
BULLE.TIN *51 .
JUN9/72
FROM: FLIGHT AND DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING - SFOEU
Please in.aert in Chapter 1 - BULLETINS. Record on the "Bulletin Check List", Remnve
Bulletin .#35,
Crew responsibilities as listed in the Flight Operations Manual apply tCJ this S(l P .
. Irrespective of prior checks by the Second Officer, the Captain and First Officer will
perform iill cockpit preparation items as listed in Chapter 2 of the RC'i'erencc ;md Hcview
Manual.
SECOND OFFICER SOP

PREFLIGHT GENI<;llAL
INSPECT LOG BOOK, CHECK

WITH INBOUND CREW ON AIR-
PLANE'S CONDITION IF POSSIBLE.
r
924
I'i'lr:i:· • f\r,· -in

In the PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION COCKPIT P!U:PAHATION :1nd l'AHKfN<;
proccdureH, the items shown are done only on or!1~i11:il in1: trips or whc11 :i er"'' chiu1µ;o takeF
place, unlesA marked hy an asterisk(*). AHtcriHkcd i/<·1111-1 11111.ct lie :1ccornplislwd on all
trips, Including through (en route) stops with no crew c:hnnµ;c. !"or all olher portionH of Lhis
SOP, the procedural steps must always he done.
PRELIMINARY COCKPIT PREPARATION to the 0.'.'1 position and release.

S/O This connects g-round ?OWer to
the airplane electrical syste.m.
BATTERY Check
BUS OFF LIGHTS,
Place the DC Meter Selector to BAT and TRANSFER BUS OFF LIGHTS,
observe the voltage. STANDBY PWR OFF LIGHT. .OUT
NOTE: If the ammeter shows a charge, EQUIPMENT COOLING Check

pull the Battery Charger circuit The Equip Cooli.ng Off Light should be
breaker before observing the OUT and the Equip Coo Jing Switch in
voltage. NORMAL. This provides fan coc.iing of
electronic equipment. Selection of the
BATTERY SvVITCH . . .. ON ALTERNATE pnsitlon actiYateR an
identical, alternar.e fan. lf the Equip
NOTE: Do not turn off the Battery Switch Cooling Off Light ls ii)urninated, check
while the APU is running. with mainter,ance, as there 1:iay be a
possibility of electronic equipment
GALLEY SWITCH. ON damage.
Allows use of galley power.
NO SMOKING SWITCH Al' TU
GROUND POWER or APU ON
FASTEN BELTS SWITCH . ON
If APU is running: (If APU is not
running see Additional Procedures
AIR CONDITIONING . CJN
for starting.)
Turn the APTT Bleed S\vi tch or., if the
APU EGT . . Check in limits
APU is operating. This e:oH.bles the
APU to supply the air cc;nditionint>: pack
If APU Gen Off Bus Light is ON:
with compressed air. Both the left and
APU Generator Switches
right needles on the Pneumatic Duct
(One at a time) ON
Pressure Gage should in di c;ite n rise
APU Gen Off Bus Light OUT
in pressure if the isolation valve is
open (check Isolation Valve :iwitch in
Either Left Tank Fuel Pump ON
AUTO).
If Ground Power is connected: Turn the Right P :ick Swi le h ON. The
Grd Power Available Light . ON right pack provides efficient n.ir •.·ondi-
This indicates only that ground tioning on the ground. using the AP'C.
power is connected. Momen-
Set the Cabin and Cockpit Temperature
tarily place the GRD Power Switch
Selectors to the de81red temperatu:-e in
the upper part of the dials. and temper-
• ature will be controlled nutorr.atic:i.lly .
924
BULLETIN #51
PAGE 2 OF 10
EXTEIDOR LIGHTS ON HATN REPELLENT • Check
Anti-collision, Wing and Wheel The manual shut-off ·:alvc shoulrl he
Well switches should be ON for the open. Cheek the reservoir fo see
exterior inspection. NA V light 1.haL the float is nhovv thf' rerill
switch should be OSC & FIXED. lr·vel on the si~ht. J-;:11q!.:f' :ind J lint th1
rending- on the prcs:->urt: h·:1ugc·. ii'
MASTER CAUTIQN LIGHT • • • . Push installed 1 i::; in the g· r·ecn h~111d.
Extinguishes Master Caution and
*ALL CIHCUIT Bltl<:i\KJ•:JL<.; IN
Annunciator lights in preparation for
the overheat test. ltADJO MASTI':Jc S\\'l'J'l~JII·:s lJN
ENGINE & APU FIRE WARNING Cl{EW OXYGEN VALVE OPEN

SYSTEM . . . . . . • • . . • Test
COCKPIT EMERG EQUIP. Check
The test Is made at this time to avoid
Check the stowage anti readiness
delays in the event of a malfunction,
of the smoke goggles, escap<' straps,
since the system is a dispatch item.
fire axe, co 2 fire extinguisher. :rnd
OVHT DET SWITCHES NORM portable oxygen bottle.
TEST SWITCH . . .OVHT SPAlU: DULBS. . . Check
The Eng Overheat Lights, Ovht Check the First Officer's sidewall
Det Annunciator Light, and both to see that spar0 hulhs arc• rivailable.
Master Caution Lights llluml-
OXYGEN MASK AND HEt;ULATUil
nate.
Test
TEST SWITCH • • • . . . FIRE Oxygen Supply Switch . . Safetied On
The Fire alarm bell rings stead- Hold mask away from the face ard
ily, the APU fire warning horn place the Mask Se lee tor to
(main wheel well) sounds inter- TEST MASK (to blow out any debris).
mittently, and the 3 Fire Handles,
Wheel Well, and the Master Fire
Warning Lights illuminate.
BELL CUTOUT SWITCH • • Push
Silences fire bell and APU horn.
Also puts out both Fire Warning
lights. Pressing either Master
Fire Warning Light will also
silence the bell and horn.
NOTE
Release the Bell Cutout switch
before releasing the Fire Test
switch to prevent possible APU
shutdown.
EXT TEST SWITCH • l'ush/Release
The three extinguisher test
lights illuminate, then go out
when the switch is released.
-------·---.--~...,_____1../8. -·- ·--·-
924 BULLETIN /!:ii
PAGE :l OF l O
Put the mask on and adjust for fit.
Place the Mask Selector to NORMAL
- FORWAlllJ FUSELAGE
and while breathing !nu; the mask, l. AillSTA[H ITANDRAILS Secun..-l

obfierve fiow indicator operation with
the Oxygen Selector in NORMAL and 2. AIHSTA Tl{ l•:XTEllN AL CONTHOL
in 100%. Place the Mask Selector HANDLE . . . . . . . "ecured Flush
to EMERGENCY and check flow
indicator operation. Return the :1. STALL WAilNING SENSOH
Mask Selector to NORMAL, and Check Condition
leave the Oxygen Selector in 100%
for the remainder of the flight. 4. PITOT STATIC PROBES
Check Condition
Check for oxygen mruik microphone
output with the Oxygen Mask Mike 5. ALT STATIC PORTS
Switch in NORMAL and in P.A. -, . Check Condition
After check, return the Oxygen
Mask Mike Switch to the guarded 6. TEMPEllATURE PROBE
NORMAL position. Check Condition
IPASSENGER CABIN INSPECTION - S/O I 7. RAIXlME . . Undamaged
8. COMPAHTMENTS AND ACCESS

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT .Check DOORS . . . . . . . . . . Closed
Check the storage and readiness of
the portable oxygen bottles, fire 9. NOSE WHEEL WELL AREA
extinguishers, escape slides, first . . Check
aid kit, EMER EXIT switch, and Check light, strut extension, lines,
the No Smoking and Seat Belt signs tires, taxilight, doors, general
ON. Test the megaphone. condition and leaks.
FASTEN BELTS SWITCH . . OFF 10. F/O's SLIDING WINDOW LATCH

Secured
EXTERIOR INSPECTION - S/O
11. OXYGEN SERVICE PANEL AND
DISCHARGE DISC Checked
(Only for originating trips or crew change)
If the airplane hrui been parked outside for 12. RAM AIR DEFLECTORS AND
a prolonged period with precipitation and DOORS . . . . . OPEN
temperature below freezing, give special
attention to the control surface areas. 13. ANTICOLLISION LIGHTS . ON
924
BULLETIN 11'51
PAGE 4 OF 10
'RIGHT WING AREA 5. NAVIGATIUN l.[(;JTT:-i . .(lN&OSC
1. FLAPS, SLATS, FLAP SEAL PLATES, G. I•:LJ•:VATUlt l'ITOT i'HUBT·::-;
AILERONS AND ST A TIC . . . . . . . Cheek CGnclition
WICKS. . ~ Check Condition
7. AFT ENTRY DOOR . . . C'losed
2. WING LIGHT . . . ON
3. NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON & OSC LEFT ENGINE AREA
4. FUEL PANELS Closed Repeat of right engine area.

5. DRIP STICKS . Aligned & Flush
LEFT WING AREA
6. RAM AIR VENT SCOOP • • • . Clear
RIGHT ENGINE AREA Repeat of right wing area except
no fuel panels.
1. COWLING AND FASTENERS
. • . . . • • . . . Check Secured
COCKPIT PHEPARATION - S/O
2. INLET AND EXHAUST
. • . Clear & Undamaged
FLIGHT RECORDER Set & Test
WARNING: THRUST REVERSERS CAN Observe that the Off Light is il lumi-
CAUSE FATAL INJURY. nated and the Trip and Date Light is
out. Set the trip number and date
MAIN WHEEL WELL AREA with the manually ope rated counters.
r 1. LANDING GEAR , • . . . . .Check

Check struts, wheels, tires, brake
Push and hold the Test Button and
observe that the Off Light goes out.
Push and hold the Repeat Button.
pins for wear, and hydraulic lines
for leaks. Observe the Trip and Date Light
illuminates. Check the tape remaining
2. GENERAL CONDITIONS & LEAKS dial for an indication of sufficient tape.
• . . • • . . . . . . • . Check Indicate in the Log Book that service
Check hydraulic quantity, accum- will be required if less than 10 hours
ulators for pressure and fire of tape will remain at trip termination.
extinguisher bottles for pressure. Release the Repeat Button, and
AFT FUSELAGE observe that the Trip and Date Light
remains on; then release: the Test
1. MAIN OUTFLOW VALVE .OPEN Button. (On some ai rpl:incs the Test
2. ACCESS DOORS & PANELS. Closed Button is replaced by a guarded two
position toggle switch. )
3. APU AREA , . . • • • • . Checked
Check the inlet door, fire extin- MACH AIRSPEED WARNING . Test
guisher diB-Oharge discs, fire extin- Push the test button and listen for
guisher pressure. The APU .access the clacker.
door should be closed.
4. STABILIZERS, R{)'DDER, ELEVATOllS,
& STATIC WICKS . . Check Condition
924
BULLETIN #51
PAGE G OF 10
--
!"
"II STALL WARNING • • • . • . • Test
- FUEL CROSSFEED . . Test & CLOSED
Hold the switch to the TEST position and Place the switch to the OPEN position
I
observe that the Off Light goes out, the and observe proper illumination of the
indicator rotates, and the stick shaker Valve Open Light. Return the switch
actuates. Re lease the switch to the to the CLOSED position mid observe
NORMAL position. that the Valve Open Light goes out.
PASSENGER OXYGEN • Check Tll-1, 2 and :J • • • • . . . . Check
Check that the Pass Oxygen Switch is in Observe DC volts & 'imps within
the Guarded Normal position, and that limits.
the Pa.ss Oxy On Light is out.
STANDBY POWEll . . . . . . Test
REVERSER OVERRIDE SW'S Place the Standby Power Switch to the
Safetied NORMAL BAT position and observe that the
Standby Pwr Off Light is not illumi-
LIGHTS SW • . • • • • • • • TEST
nated. Observe AC voltage and fre-
With the switch in the Test position,
quency and DC voltage within limits.
observe that all appropriate lights in
the cockpit illuminate. NOTE: Disregard any vibration of
Captain's gyro horizon while
STANDBY HYD LOW QTY
in BAT position.
LIGHT • • • • • • • OUT
Place the Standby Power Switch to the
STANDBY HYD LOW PRESS
OFF position and observe that the
LIGHT OUT
Standby Pwr Off Light illuminates.
ALTERNATE FLAPS
Return the switch to the Guarded AUTO
MASTER SW • • Safetied OFF
position (Standby Pwr Off Light - OUT).
In this position, the Alternate Flap
Control Switch is de-energized.
ALTERNATE FLAP
CONTROL SW • • • OFF
SPOILER SWITCHES Guarded ON
YAW DAMPER SW • ON
Observe that the yaw damper light
is out.
BULLETIN if51 924

PAGE 6 OF 10
GENERATOR DRIVE DJSCONNECT GROUND INTJ•;H('( >NNEC'J' .
SWITCHES CLOSIO: I
/
Safetied
I llYll SYS A Pl'MJ> Sl\'J']'('JWS . CIFI
BUS TRANSFER SWITCH AUTO
llYD SYSTEJ\lS A K· B Pl{l·:ss & QTY
EMER EXIT LIGHTS SWITCH
Che cl
Guarded ARMED The Sys A Quantity indication should
Observe that the NOT ARMED
show full and the Sys B Low Quantit.'
light is out.
Light should be out. Check the ll~u
Sys Pressure Gage to see that the
WINDSHIELD 'NIPER OFF A & B needles indicate zero. Check
the Hyd Brake Pressure Gage to set'
WINDOW HEAT .ON that the A and B nt'edlcs indicate at
Turn ON all window heat switches, least preload pressure.
and observe illumination of the ON
lights, indicating power is being NOTE: If Sys B pumps a rv on. the B
supplied to the windows.
Sy,.; Pressure :Uld Brake
NPcdles should indic:itE'
On hot days, the On lights may not nor111aJ opC>rating- pre.s::;urL·~.
illuminate when the window beat is DO NUT turn B pumps OFF
turned on, since the windows are unlPss certain that \\heels
already warm enough. In this case, are chockE'd.
a Power Test can be made by holding
the Test Switch to the PWR position, VOICE RECORDER . . Test
observing illumination of the ON Push test button and observe t\\O
lights, and releasing the Test Switcb deflections of the monitor needle.
to neutral. DO NOT hold the Test
Switch to PWR for more than a AIR TEMP SELECTOR . ST;PPL Y IJUCT
moment, as full power is being The temperature in the supply duct
applied regardless of window tem- is normally monitored for an indic-
perature and then danger exists of ation of air condition in.:: pack output
cracking a pane. temperature.
PITOT STATIC HEAT . . • . Test DUCT OVERHEAT LIGHTS .Ol'T

Place both Pitot Static Heat Switches
ON and observe illumination of all DUAL BLEED LIGHT Check
associated lights. Return switches The Dual Bleed Light is normally
to the OFF position. on at this time because the APU
bleed valve, both engine bleed valves,
and the isolation valve are usually
open.
r
924 BULLETIN #51
PAGE 7 OF 10
RAM DOOR FULL OPEN LIGHTS • ON
-
* Vl, VR, V2 . . . . . . . . Determine
(If Required)
FWD OUTFLOW CLOSED LIGHT. OUT llRlnK a.Ir temperature, field
<:lev:lilon, nnd planned t:ikeolf
GASPER FAN • . • • . . . AB Desired wciKht, determine the V1 , YR· V:.'.
Turn the Gasper Fan Switch on, if 8pceds (for the planned t:lkcoff fl:ip)
additional cabin or cockpit ventila- from the Flight H:lndbook.
tion is desired; Operation can be
checked by feellng the increased
airl'low from the "eyeball" outlets.
PRESTART CHALLENGE - RESPOND
OVHT TEST BU l"IUN • • • • • . Push
Observe illumination oi both Wing- Challenge (S/0) Respond (Capt.)
Body Overheat Lights, the Air Cond.
Annunciator Llght, and the Master HYD A & B PUMPS A's OFF,
B'.~ ON
Caution Li~.
GRD INTERCONNECT CLOSED
ISOLATION VALVE SW AUTO FUEL PUMPS ON
The valve is normfilly open at this
time becanse <>De pack switch is EPR Bugs Set
OFF. Equal left and right~
pressure indications verify that STANDBY ATT. IND. ON
the valve is open.
FUEL QTY Lbs. Cleared
PACK TRIP OFF' & BLEED TRIP with__, lbs~
OFF LIGHTS • • • • • • • • . OUT
OIL QTY __ , Gals.
ENGINE BLEED SWITCHES. • • ON

HYD PRESSURES Normal
This allo.v s compressed air to
reach the engine starter valves. PARKING BRAKE Set
ENGINE START SWITCHES OXYGEN MASKS & QTY Checked

Guarded OFF
RADIOS Set
* TAKEOFF EPR • • • • •
• Determine
(If Required)
Using air temperature and field
elevation, determine the Takeoff STAB TRIM Set__, Percent
ThNst setting (EPB) from the
Flight HandboGt. ZERO FUEL WEIGHT Set
BULLETIN *51
PAGE 8 OF 10
STARTING ENGINES l'HI<:'l'i\KEOFI•' CIIALLJ•:NGI·: - IH-:Si'()NJJ
#2 ENGINE OIL PRESS & LIGHT Challenge (S/O) Hespond (Capt/F/O)

. . . • . . . . . • Monitor
TRIM (3) Set
Observe the #2 oil pressure gage
START LEVERS IDLE
for a rise in oil pressure within a
WING FLAPS Pos--J Orn. lit.
few seconds after starter rotation.
Observe that the #2 Low Oil Pressure Handle in det('nt
COMPASS
Light has gone out when oil pressure
INDICATOHS Aligned
increases.
ALTIMETERS Set
ENGINE
#1 ENGINE OIL PRESS & LIGHT
GENERATORS ON Bus
. . . . . . . . • . Monitor
ENGINE & WING
Observe the #1 oil pressure gage
ANTI-ICE AH Hequi recJ
for a rise in oil pressure within a
PITOT HEAT ON
few seconds after starter rotation.
FLIGHT CONTROLS Free
Observe that the #1 Low Oil Pressure
ENGINE START
Light has gone out when oil pressure
SWITCHES FLIGHT
increases.
ANTISKID ON - Lights Out
MASTER CAUTION
HYDRAULIC SYS. A PRESS . . • Monitor
PANEL Lights Out
Observe the "A" needles on the
Hydraulic Brake Pressure &
System Pressure Gages for
AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST
normal operating pressure.
Mo11itor
HYDRAULIC QTY & PRESS . . • Monitor
Monitor hydraulic quantity and
pressure carefully, with particular CLIMn
attention to brake pressures at
this time.
FUEL SYSTEM . . . Monitor
Monitor Fuel Quantity gages for
COCKPIT (CABIN) OOOR . LOCKED
proper balance,
Observe that the door ls closed,
then push the Cab Door Unlocked
CLIMB EPR . . . . Determine
Light and check that the light
(lf Required)
goes out.
CRUISE
CRUISE EPil . Deterrnine

(If Required)
924
BULT.E1'1N #!:il
PAGE 9 OF 10
CIRCUIT BREAKERS . Monitor
- LANDING ROLL
HYDRAULIC PRESS & QTY • • Monitor
ENGINE INSTRUMENTS . Monitor
LANDING DATA . • . . . • Determine Observe engine instruments
(If Required) within limits.
APPROACH DESCENT CHECKLIST

. . . . . . . . . . . . . Monitor
TAXI-IN
.___ _ _ _F_IN_A_L_D_E_s_c_E_N_T
_____ ~I APU START.
HYDRAULIC PRE8S & <"1-::'Y }lonitcr

HYDRAULIC PRESS & QTY ;\lonitor Obser7e the hydrat:!lic .::;~·ste.ct.
After flaps and gear are operated, quantity· r~nci ;Jressure gag·es fer
observe tbe Hydraulic Pressure nor n1a1 indi<:> .:ttion!:: at i.Pte:-"al f.:'
and Quantity gage for proper
indications.
FINAL DESCENT CHALLENGE-RESPOND PA:R£,;:ING

Respond
Challenge (S/0)
(Pilot not flying) RADIO MASTER S\HTCHES . . Cff
(Terminating Trip Only)
FLIGHT & NAV
INSTRUMENTS No Flags MARKED CIRCUIT BREAKERS
(Cross cllecked by pilot flying) . Pulled
(Terminating Trip Only)
LANDING GEAR DOWN,
3 Green Lights
SPEED BRAKES ARMED,

Green Light
WING FLAPS Pos__,

Green Light
Pressure &
Fluid
AUTOPILOT DISENGAGED
r
'f
BULLETIN #51
PAGE 10 OF l~
('
Docket No. SA 435

Exhibit No. 2-C
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE:rY l'OARD

Bureau of Aviation ~afety
. Washington, D. C. 20591
TRAINING RECORDS - CAfTAil'l WHITEHOUSE
1. Proficiency Training October 26, 1972

2. P:r'oficiency Check • April ll, 1972 .
3. Line Check August 30; 1972
4. Recurrent Ground Training November ?O; 1972
5. Proficiency Training November .16, 1971
6. Proficiency Check April 3, · 1971
7. Line Check October 6~ 1971
8. Recurrent Ground Training Novemoer 4, 1971
9. Proficiency Training October 29, 1970
10. Proficiency Check-Recheck May 13, 1970
11. Additional Time Form May 12, 1970
12. Proficiency Check April 29, 1970
13. Line Check November-17, 1970
14. Recurrent Ground Training December 31, 1970
... ~
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO:
1, HOME DOMICILE
J..OENFN/TK FILE
I SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION Of AIACnAFT MANUAL
~PPllOVED TRAINING COURSE NAME
-w{ CE*' (,_;;C

d. FUGHT OFFICER .r. . . .
y T.
~!Clf1CtE Ot<E) , '
S/O ""--...
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DOMICILE
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7
.OBSEAVEA·SIM
bBtJCJlG
- ,_ lj·1 ... K5tf .r
EVJ:C,NG. GOMPL. JNST1SIG. (). ' ' DATE ORAL RECOMMENUA noN INSTR. S!G. E . ...
l.L.:1 (fr,,_£ ut: (c {I.."(). . f!!i?</lz..
•D
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PAn1 121zovED1tJSTA,.~A ! DATE BAJEFTIME
ts l"s"slv,z ' /.3 i/r,
I
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A!AGHAFT TYPE &/NUMnEA

-, PLACE N BLOCK TIME FLICHT 1'ME
...
'"MUI MO" NUMBER JSIMULA!Un l!M•'• [' -1 !'f'F {;!At
Jl 731 DE 5 Q J - s-ov .. ~IJ\HI\:
I
~ -·-·1RADE I TIME DATE CHECK AlnMAN SIGNATUnE • - -- --·-·- ~ GiiAu1No ceo,No,--·--,-~INC0Mf-ilf'ri=-R1 itiFri
f\I
{IWT l\fQ Plf!
------·-·· L __!_ ·---·-

S ·SA rJSFACTOllY
.. ~~~~.flSFACTOAY
PAC\flCll:NGY)
W. W~!\'.f_D (f.XCt:Pl f'(J
w 11/AIVI ll
MAY Ul
6....:...!;_llJl'l~tH
' • !:IMUlATOH
VS· V!~UAL SIMUl.AT0!1
IF f!f HEOUlllED - V1~.UAL
A vs s • MAY BE ncau1nro JN A/C
·-- -- ·-- ·- ----· - - A vs--
--··
~
1. PREFLIGHT w LANDINGS: (CONT"D)
.· 'R~J§_g_TE_~
- - -
2. TAXJING ·ZERO FLAP {RATING ONLY)
-- -- --·
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS
--- .. ,,\ 50% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG, A/C
-·---· -··-··---
4. TAKEOFF:
------
NORMAL. X .WINO
s 50% POWER CAPT. - 4 ENG. A/C
RE~~R~~~~-J~~-~~~.~!.9R A/CAT AL 1:· . - -·- · -
---
"ENG. OIJT, INST. s ENGINE OUT (F/O AND 4 ENG, CAPT.)

- - · - ..... --
REJECrED
-
w ,C: FROM CIRCLE I O<:.n110. !I /:'ll/1~7 • RATING ONl 'Y
f!·/:'7 11! Rt.JltJU e. 1•1c
·-· - -
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OR 2 W l.Q 16, NORMAL/ ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
-·-· .. ··--·
6. HOLDING
----
w
s
·~-
N~ C::M.G:.r /NOF ·-·
7. JLS APPROACH: NORMAL {A/P OR MANUAL) µ,; D .&ilf.!_L I GS --'
-- -
ENG. our (MAtlUAL}
)
~
('
STR l,}LS 1.v j_f~ H f - - -,----
-- _R_!db)_fi!:JA~
.1' S,1!dili£1ze:_:____
8. NON PAEC. APP. ADF, VOR, BK CRS, RADAR
-c;,:rAitiOri11 -1
fLJC:-8110, fl·T?Ol/4/ • RAllNr. ONL'( 17. EMERGENCY PR CEOU/lES
..9 C.!f!Gt ING -APP. f!.f2lfl37 · RATJNO & !'/(,
-- --- - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - · -- "
10. MISSEfJ APP.

_,, - - -·-· .
TO rACIUTY FROM ILS u;l/aeL lc,e.// Fire.
S . -·----·--- ----·---- ---· ----·--
uT "" _;:_"'=- e '--]: _:;,'?'.<}_A e.o }:_/:)~S:_____ - . ---
r
6t!_fr, 0 OTHE11 {CAPT. ONLY)
. ~--
11 STEF.P TURNS (CAPTAIN ONLY)

----------· . w .s
,Chi f>.rj'- !JC: 5 C (JJ-')f
- - ··--·- ----- ·-··--·----·
~- --- . ..
12. APPnOACHES
- . --- . - .. .
TO STALLS (l!i"' BANK) 2 OF 3 w s
£µG-. f-!Pc
- - ·--·-·---------- ·--- .
13. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS w • 1 18. COMMAND - JUDGMENT
-------- - -e-
AA TJNG - IN A/C LINE our NON APPLICAGl.E
14. rov:EnPLANT FAILURE
--··-· PIG. IN SIM Lr 19, INITIAL CERTIFICATION (200 - ll {CATl!.l.- •.
' ·.
20. MHII~ I ft:ll'Jg,/pERFORMED
- " ··--
15. LANDINGS: NORMAL, X YI/IND ==-ir (CAT II)
••
--
FROM JLS ih; ;,:c 21. F/0 DUTIES (CAT 11)
REMARKS
------ TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER TRANSPORTATION FROM Tf_1AlNING CENTER

---·-··-
DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORK(O TRIP. LT c
--
·-
__L_, .-. -- .-·=-=

UNITED A!R LJNE:.
PILOT PROFICIENCY ----/INITIAL /
SEE PROFJClEl\/CY SECTION OF AIRCRAFT MANUAL
APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME
RAND START DATE
6. HOLDING
7. !LS APPnOAGH: rJCTRMAL (A/Pon MANUAL)
9. c1nr.u1ir; APP. lllC/l1Ul.ll-t,'()!/.tr il/\lltlflONlY

u n1,,,:11 11111nir; & PIC
--· . - - - - -·- -----·----'---+.-:--.I-----
~
('
17. EMERGENCY PROcrounES
______ _'.'.'_"~_c'_"'.:' 'R_".M_IL_s_ _-JI~~'-- $_ -~f::i~~r:SJ_~=?·0_~~- ,_ ..

o_N_L_Y_l_ _ _-1::::..-1---1-
OIHER (Cfl.J_'_'__ ~J'"__.,.I.:.... ___ -.c~0...-----~~~- __:--y__L_ -
11. STEEP TURNS (CAPTAIN ONl Y)
lrv &z/62~~ P/~:
w
--+-·-;
12. APPROACHE~ __ rn_sr_A_L_Ls_"_'_"-"-A-t1K_1_2_o_F_3_ _ _ _ _ _w+-+--+=5c:_lc'=L=.c::=-=-~'--"6c::7"'_
. 0· ~ijc:_ c_,
13 SPFC!F!G F! JG! !T CHAnACTERISTICS w J-v ~~~-M_A_~~-~-J_u_o_GMEN__r _________________ lS
RA TltlG ·IN AIC
PIC ·JN SIM
I<" 19. INIT!AL CERTIFJCATIO~J LINE OUT NONAPPUCA£JLE
{200 • Jl ... _(~AT _l_I_I_ _ _
~-=-~-~Dlil_':3_~·-__N_o__R_M_A_L_,_x_w_1N_o_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.~s"-·-l-·-'-'---!--2_0_._M_A_'N_T_A_1N_E_o_1_P_ERFORMED (?.00 •• il ~~ 5

FROM !LS , _ ,5'1····· 21. F/0 DUTIES (CAT JI)
----·=-=,=~-==================:=!~='=='="-=!-------------·---------- ·~ ==-··--·--· -"·· ;
fR ANSPORTATfON TO TRAINING CENTER TRANSPC2~~~0_N FROM TRAIN~G CEN1:§£!_

~-------~.~-~
RIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKFD TRIP, ETC. DATE TRIP Dl!ADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC.
___ J - - ·---· - --
SCHEDULE TRIPS M!SSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICAT!ON BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
CHECK J',iflth'\/J (Si.'.1J :OIGNATURE DATE
REVIEWED .7 j~r· U
tPERA TIONS ·SIGNATURE
,{ 1_ /-)( 1 (_ C{ {_ { d'----_
.
ORIGINAL-EMhOYEE"S FILE
FLIGHT CREW EN ROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
DUPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
---- SEE REGULATIONS 2S·_4
t=='v.7.':S'i~r====:'~~-=~=-~p==.~=({__=.$"",e-"'"
. ~<o=-: PLA71~ T~~~5tLIG HT NU:~E7~?
0
_ _ _ _ E?t/~p
--i-.~!../dL, E_££_G_/Z," OM };2Cd) ______ JJTU) To
S~D v,~ YMW

N~:i76R-'- EVALUA~ [J ____ ---~----~-------
FLIGHT TIME DAY . : [) NIGHT
--·- - . L. OVER-ALL __
- 1. _;:::-:::_ _ _ _ _ ------'
I. l·l.!CIL'l' PRHPARA'l'ION
~~1:1SFACTO~\'.__[J.J!r:i_s.~_T!~F-"rCTO"Y D
See No, 7 below
INITIA"" FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
COMMENTS
l 'niforin and Equipmt.•nt ' ~ ;1.}~ ,-,
_qa0'1r~~~-
j·J;~ht l'l.1nning
___('.o:·kpic J•r_:pa_rati~_n - - - - - - - ·
z. PRE'J'AKE-C)FF p COMMENTS
;;::) fl/Ylod-J -/n-x r~

I nspecrion and Cockpit Serup
1:ngine Srnrting and Taxi
Engine Run_up~---------
----- - . 0--------COMMENTS------·-··
3. TAKE-OFF AND CLIMB
lake-off 1'echnique
Sor /J / 1 o , , , , 0
()bscrvarion of VI, VR, V2
CiOtJD K?Jf7+/T2,;J ~ ;ve:W /VO/Se
Gear and Flap Management
Speed and Altitude Control
G . ?A. J C!.. e:e'Dc.
Traffic and Anti-noise Procedures
•\., ENROUTI
--'---~efl.2_--~~~-·~---~
C')MMENTS
:;;5,~ft[
Cruise Conu-ol
Traffic Alertness
Corn mu nicarions
Use of Radar
-------··-------------------
5. APPRt)ACI-l COMMENTS
Dcscco' and Speed Control
A pp roach Procedures
llse or Auto Pilot and Flite Director
-----·---
Landing 1"echnique
Reversing, Braking and flngine Shutdown
-----------------------
6. G.ENE!{AL
d41-:
---~--------- - -----COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
KnowlL'd£e of Take.off and Landing I.imitations
Equiprncnr Knowledge
Adhcn·nc·c to S.O.P.
l 1se of Na;•igation Equipment
Pub!it: Relations - PA S}'stern
Comn1and Ability and Cockpit Management
__u_::_o_r ~-~-1_alleng:e and

Ilcspo_n_>e_L_i>_<>_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~--~--~---~--·----·----------------· - - - -
7. This completes Inirial Flight Assignment requirements for fl. RE~1ARKS ANO RECOb-iiiENOATIONS
rype aircraft in accordance with FAR 121.4-25 as follows:
----_I_ L + - - - - - J - - - + - - · _ _ _ _ , - - + - - - 1
I /
I I
----1-- I
----1 _
~1
_!'7_ "
----1-----+·-----+----f
- __ [_ :-;~j-_-_ _-_ -+ - -
... FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUNu TRAINING RECORD
SEE REGULATIONS 25 -4
)LJTE COPIES: , CHECK MONTH DUE
- fuGHT OFFICER PERsO~L FILE Captains, Second Officers First Officers
-filGH.T OFFICER ~ FHght Navigators
DECEMBER, 19 D JUNE,19
1 STATUS/~~;;~ IN
ME 1 • -~ . DOMIC!lE
WHITEHOUSE, WL 737 DCA
TIME CREDIT A.LLOWANCES - RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING
-- --·-
· - !.ry_AlNING TIME ACC:>M~l:_I!~
------·-·- -·· --
* 1. CLASSROOM TRAINING
/; 3 (l
A. Systems and procedures review (each PT) - 1:30
B. Systoms and procedures review (each PG brif\flng nnd warm-up) - 4:00
L/ ~ 0 (I
C. Second officer annual oral review conducted by Technical Speclallst Aircraft Systems - 4:00
----- - ------ - ----------- .. - -·· ..... -· -···· ·-·- - ---·------- -- --
* 2. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS EXAMINATION
Completod pr!or to Proficiency Training (PT), Time Included for home study of FHght Mnnuals - 3:30 3'.30
- ----·····-·- . . . - . --- ----·- -------. ----
* 3. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL EXAMINATION
3 I :J
Time Included ror home study of Manual and revisions - 3:30 ' --' (!
-- ~·------ -··· ---
* 4, RECURRENT EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES TRAINING - 3;00 3'.o ('
- ----· --· ---·--·-··-. -- ----
5. AUDIO VISUAL PRESENTATIONS (For times involved see current AN presentation list Jn Regulations 25-4,)
NOTE: Approach and Landing A!V presentation required annually.
A/V TITLE TIME DATE AN TITLE TIME DATE
'13] AC'\.>.. -·t:\ (·<. i ~, "\·":" 2 s c ~~',;,'(, . ·:-'-\_ q- ..,_ $

tLT- -r._,::1 ·-) 2 (j-L.l. ,,_ 'v- (" <> ·>·-' • .l .,_, ( '( · ·i (,_,
D ,.-\-_-., r, ~ .,-:-:;-__ _ _ll_ G
l
-1., (, (·.
. .,.....1~· \'._. C• t-. ___:,_i_'.:t __ _::L=_c.'.
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.. l.S _J_. l. I [:lv ~;,--~~\, '- 1· _/..:.._ L·~:;- . -3. ~1-
--:I. ' ('. -· (<.. 11 u t-J ------ . LD-·i '(

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~'" "' .:.· F· (1 ~ '' ~,j_~ - ..: [ L~- I G..: .-.:. 2- ..
--- -·---- ·--·· - - - -
-------
-·
1·.-1.Lf
-----···-- -
·- ..
5, SCHEDULED INSTRUCTION on systems and procedures In classroom or CPT
(Specify date, subject, time and Instructor name.)
µ I - -:::s- "" ( -v::__ t' \ "" \ () c
l A,>-.! ~ ' ;...i c-. \ ... "'\--' "--<.

y,\ \""..
·5 0
F'i N1-; - Noi s .::- \, \ ~ ·'--\._ I 0 0
. --- .. ----·-· ·----- ----···--· ···----···-·· -·-

7. RECURRENT OVERWATER DITCHING TR.A.INJNG {Required annually by ell overwater qunlilled flight officnr•1l 5:00
···- -- -
REQUIRED ANNUALLY
JTAL HOURS REQUIRED ANNUALLY - Piiots - 25:00 Flight Navigators - 16;00 TOTAL HOURS COMPL TED: ·is. L..'f- · - -
--- ··- .. ---·· -·-· -----· - ·····--- D . r "tiT'fMt:;AGEiilGN'ATi:J - - - -- -uArE-· ·
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO:
1. HOME DOMICILE
SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION VF A!ACnAFT
MAN_u,~'"Lii=====t~~~~~!Arm-sriw'o;m:----
1'- 1• E ANO START DATE
2, DENFN!TK FILE
3. ;:l.IGHT OFFICER ~) )
''--;~~:tu:~T~A~IN~'Jc~l§.m~°kr~"¥~~N~'"''=_~"'/,".,"/""'J".'-,-~;-:_=-:._~'""h-r;~=o:'«=. ~=,,,=..=_=,=.=,==Ti:v"O"M"'~'°'"''"~==T.F'Tig~9;;;"'"~"""'y"'"""'11=~,0',;B"°s'°e1'~~,-~~-.~-~,~··~~==j:~=~--~-~-==r_o~_""-t'*""v"'"'""·A'°1°'c~="~_·-
. ..
~.V~A(F..""'~~~~~~t::~::;~=~~~!:-;:;;.s~"1~ul:;,A11T'EE_J..:Y,,.i'~oRAL RECOMMENDA n0NN.ttlN:;;s51r~RC°.sSir'Go-:.~~~:t=-t--11coJ;AGr'Eerll-1r1===i1:::::7"""1"
~Z.v_,;_ !/;1.J/7; -- __::___:~-;-: ' / e1cl2:SJ
PART121APlV'J?1:::C. <0<(o.?(; !!/tG ry; :;.,7;'!£' GI~;~ ADF( r:rs~rii!"J'.'."/VOR<:
! - - i Rf CtllCK
ORATING
"'",:_t.~0ro1/1N(JMRER 'JJ~,t7:nMe
"'ARAPP
ArRct{;vPe.NuMeen PLA'f)- "'"cKnMe p110"' (;Mc- / '__ ClsPiciAL(SI

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ORAL
~h 7=~---l~=~t::._-_N_==_...l.______.L
IGnADE ITIME DATE CHECKAJRMAris1GNATUnF. - - - - - - -
. ~J aRAOINGLEGENo.
L VCJ
1
Ill M,\llK:;r
-1NcoM'P'L!.iE(lJitiE 11ii
(Nor f!EO P/TJ / / s - SA l ISFAClORY PROFICIENCY!
c~c:-:-~c-,~ci,"'i"" ,c:,:c,,c.,~---~---e'",-:"';":t"'c'iiclt...1"~=~,-"~A-<0-A-~----,--A-r-V-S-r-s-r-.M-A~~~~;;~~~;-I; ;JC ~:_U1:1SAJ!~F ACT(l~IY

w:::, w - WAl~Q (E~; )"T ~~f)c-
=-~---------"C,,~,,'-',"',"''°"'""'""'1"0"-'~,"',,~UA~\-----+--+-+-,_.+--L-A-'N-Dl NGS: (CONT'ci) - +-· --- -
1. PREFLIGHT
-------------------------+--+,...,.-/--' ----· --
W _ °" · RF.JECTED
·-····---.------~------------- - --~'--
2. TAXIING ;.:':. •zERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
-3.-P-O_W_E_R_P_LA_N_T_C_H_E_C_K_S_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-t--+~+-S-+---S-O-%-P-O-W-E-R-(·C-A_P_T-.)-2·-.-3-E_N_G_.-A-/C---------· · - - -·
--------------------------t---t-,,-;-ct..-:;ct----·-:----·-------- - · · · · - - · - - - - - - - - - - ! - - - - --
4. TAKEOFF: NORMAL, •:tif
X-WJND ·:::::;.-/;':
---------~~--------------+--+"-"-+=+--"R0oE0oOcoU:::IR_ED ~J-~!~.l!~ATO_f2!..~~~~Sf-._T,-"A"L._T._.- - - - - - + -
50% POWER CAPT. - 4 ENG. A/C
•ENG. OUT, INST. ~- Ef"!GINE OUT (F/O AND 4 ENG. CA.PT.)

-----------~--------+--+-+--~--~-·--~--=-·-----=-~---4~+---
REJECTED w e J t>C-8110, a-nOl7H - flATING ONLY
-._) FROM CIRCLE I D·l21·7~i. HATING&. P/C
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OR. 2 W

s 16. NORMAL/ ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
6. HOLDING w
7. ILS APPROACH: NORMAL (AJP OR MANUAL)
ENG, OUT (MANUAL)
8. NON PREC. APP.

CAPTi<IN ONLY
9. CIRCLING APP.
ADF, VOA, BK GAS, RADAR
Ioc.a110, 6·7201747. AATINO ONLY
B·7271T37 • nATINO t. PIC
.. ·_::·,
: ... 17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
- '
10. M.ISSED APP. TO FACILITY FROM ILS

~'--~,--_-~~~~~~~~~+----f2"-B1+---'-;;~~~~-'-'-...::.::...-=-~~~~--J-l--
">· "5 R!l f' I J>
D t'!_r:J f<. 'Z 5S ~
f;JG- o uT orneR1cAPT.0Nt.v1
_ _ _.c.__::...:.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _l--+-+"~4---'-----'-~-----------~-1'--+--·-
CK' f/JJ<?.rf Des.c..C'./JT . .'.:
11. STEEP TURNS (CAPTAIN ONLY)
-------------------------+--+--+--+---~-+-~-~-----------------·!---
w s E /)q r- ft'e.., ---f-•
...!
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS (15° BANK) 2 OF 3
--------------------------t---t---tl-.,-+-~~1,----1,~-~-----------------t--·1-~~
w -.5 J9p'o Ffre.
13. SPEC!FJC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS W VV 18. COMMAND-JUDGMENT (
14. POWERPLANT FAILURE

RATING· IN A/C ..S: · 19. INITIAL CERTIFICATION
LINE OUT NON APPLICABLE
P/C - JN SIM (200-!) (CATI!)
15. LANDINGS: NORMAL, X WIND 20. Md±Af ? bD/PERFOAMED

(CAT 11)
FROM ILS 21. F/O DUTIES (CAT Il)
REMARKS
r·.~·····.-~···-· -···--~···· . . ·: ':"~~r··~· ! ••• l.
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER TRANSPORTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER

--·
DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TA!P, ETC. DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKEO TRIP, ETC.
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TAAIN!NG SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT,, OFFICE.

DATE
// v
:::HECK AIRMAI~ SIGN DATE
UN!Tli:O AIR LINE~
PILOT PROFICIENCY I INI!IAL_

ROUTE TOI
1, HOl.11: ooMJCIL.f:
2. 0£NrN/TK rtL.f:
·!.·
..
r Sf.E PRO-FICJ~NCY SECTION' OF AIRCRAFT i .-:mT,iI"" - _·
APPRoVEO"'.TR'XfN1Na COURSE NAME---·-·- - - l Ami
·.·--t·· /
.1,··11-
r
/V" ...)_ .
~. CJLjA·k-"N"u"M~•~.-,-A--H-,-,-,-...,RT QA.Tl·-·-
M< l"IJ_r;H'T nF,..ICllR · · •· , 1 •• \,

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FILE
"~~ /~) ,J~ / ; /h "7t"'MO ,.,,, <; <" ) ./."!(/-?&°CJ,-)<;--:; JZ- F(!.~-' 1-l.
"'""'!....:....._. • . •
C TRNG COMPL. INSTR SIG
...--····- DATE ORAL RECOMMEN01'TION INS R, SIG. \
~1cCJ
' PATE
-·--" I I 3 r·n;& I
~:.121 APPROVED ~ucToiy/
<_;?k;<'/P"? / /~
L.)'J/i~-&" :~/E -:>' '7 BRIEF T 1f..-E: JT;;G.rTi......-:: __ ~-F) II~
·H:s OG-7 T ·-"> /I/-/< 3 0 f°""rC/-'.:> .
CRs lvoR "'ADAAAPP L-1
~
IBt<
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-~ LJRATl<G
AIRCRAFT TYPE a-. NUMBE1. p~,,~-==)'(..../ BLOC,~K/T~C FLIGHT TIME SIMULATOR NUMBER !SIMULATOR TIME c=JspECIAL (.!;
$-J.j--,·7·-' 702,/ /./~'f 7:_, ;3;/ 3 REMARKS) /..'_-50
ORAL ~--.....L-~=---~-'--"-'--""-----l-----
G AADE TJ/>-E OATE CHECK AIRMAN SJGNATURE JGAAOJNG LEGEND: I· INCOMPLETE (OTHER T
I c;
tNor REO P/TJ /i~OO i-// / s-SATISF'ACTORY PROFICIENCY]
"w"-~_,~,~,-.~,~.~'"'"'"'"!-""'"-...J-'-'-..:C~.--~,~.M"""f,,~',';·0?1,,L__.,~·L1L___~-~-,--~------------ _u_-_u_<_.5~_1s_F_A_C_T~':_Y_ _ _ _ _ _w_-_w_A~IV_E_o_(EX~~P..!!..!.::.!
;...;..1FtPL,>.NE vs.VISUAL SIMULATOR A VS 5 MAY BF- REQUIRED IN A/C A VS
-,-_~P~R~E~F~L~IG-HT----------,,-,-;~,-,~,~,-,~.~,-,~,~_~,~.-,-,-,-,--+--+--+--+---;-'-R-~-~-1-~-i;,,~s-~~(c-o··NT-"'o~J-----------·------- :::,-f-----
---------------------------+--+--+--+---- -------·----------------·---·-·- ---
2. TAXIING tzERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
--------------------------+--+--+--+--------- ·---------- ----··----·-
+- ENG. OUT. INST.

-------------------------t-~+-1--- ·----·· ---· ------------- --·-----· -------+
(4 ENG. A/C • RA TING ONLY) c•
;5
REJECTED
FROM CIRCLE (2
-----------~--------------+-+-+~- -----·- ·-·--· -
& 3 ENG. - RATING & P/C)
-·- -·--- ----·-- -·--·-·-----¥::._+--1--
7
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OR 2 W 3 16. NORM<\U ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

-----------------------------+--+--+--c---·-·--·-·-·----------·--···--------f--f--1-
6. HOLD ING W 7
- - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - + - + / ' - + - - ' ' . : J " . -~ 5/ffe,"17"" -----·---+·-- - - f - -
7. ILS APPROACH: NORMAL (A/P OR. " " ' 11 '1 I s· "" "
..L1
'riv· ":/
.-h.I:; .£2:..Lv.r-10
' " 1==-A:T~C//;> e-
-~----------·
-·
-·-t--+-·
ENG. OUT (MANUAL) S /~ ~ .. <
--------,,-,------------+-+--+-+~~~~¥~~~1?~/~%-<=c'?~""~~------~-+---+~--
8. NON PREC. APP. ADF /y~-) BK CRS, RADAR <"'" .Y'J .. • '
-I..:~ _/ ~--, '·J f'l_--'-<.1'.(l~· ~·- ~ ··' ·-~-
CAPTAIN ONLY , --------1-·-·+--+-·
9. CIRCLING APP. {
4 EH<>INE /o./C. RATING ONl..Y
f!ATINt> 5 17, EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
----------- 2 & 3 ENGINE - & PC
··----·-----------------+-·-+-·-+-·
_1O_._M_IS_s_E_D_A_P_P_._ _ _ _._~__r_o_F_Ac_1_L_1r_Y_F_R_n_M_l_L_s_ _-+-.5-+---+--+-_L~-Y-!:!.:_.£:_1_LL!Z£'1.£.fr_J222--:.:_JZ O - - - - - ·-
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY) I J 1I - 5 - I
--~-----------------1---+--+-+-VLLl+R. .<J..f..-_a:L.-L.t::;_pC,:-<;: . ··--- ··-- -··-
11. STEEP TURNS {C~PTAIN ONLY)--------------w-t--+-+~5--+-=Z~)~>;v,-{~_~~):;~.~----·----·------
1_2_. ~-PP_R_O_AC_H_E_S_T_O_S_T_A_L_L.S
__1_1s_'_s_A_H_K_l_2___o_F_3_________w·+--+-+_5- ~~ ~--- ,;i//"{.!:::L_~- 5-0-1 :JC-6.. r__n-11. u/<.e
.. ·-·- -··--- .. ·----- -
13, SPECIFIC FLIGHT, CHARACTERISTICS w I.A/
·- ~
u./ 18. COM!YIAND - JUDGMENT .5
5 s -- -
5 s;
FROM ILS
"·--===~---·=============;=========""=""=~"'-~--"---
REMARKS
s ·- ...... -- I
'.
- TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER

-- -- TRANSPORTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER
·- DEADHEAD,
:=--i:3~~~HEAD. ~~:::~~TRI~~:-~-·- ~
DATE TRIP OMC, W°DRKED TRJP, ETC. DATE
--·
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FL!GHT OFFICE,

ORIGINAL-EMPLOYEE'S FILE
---------
DUPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE FLIGHT CREW ENROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
SEE REGULATIONS 25-4
lJsc of Radar
5. APPROACH l COMMENTS
Descent and Speed Control
Approach Procedures U_)?l <. - M AVA/ <:-·1>
lJse of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL
s·cJP COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of Take·off and Landing Limitations
.Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Use of Navigation Equipment
Public Relations· PA System
Command Abilicy and Cockpit Management
_:U::>::e:_:o::f:_:C::h::a::l,::le:'.n'.!g:'.e:_:a::n::d:_::R::e>~po::'.:n'.'.'::c::Li::'>:.:<>:__:__ _ _ _ _ _ __i.~:.L-..- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · - - · - - -
7. This completes Initial Flight Assignment requirements for R. HE~fARKS ANl) REC()M~tENDA"I"lONS
_T_Rl_P~N=O=.~===-tyo_;_E_a_i_'°_',_aft_::_o_:_cc_o,_c_d_a~_:_e--1-wic_:_:_:_o_:__:_:__,_,4_~;~t~; ~j~ ;~ ~lo_w,_'_',~'&'~o"~ ~'r',1c~ ~-" 5-"0rpf10 JV fl( f

1 2
y ~~/Y/00;;/ Q
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~ ~ HL l f-1.s- f'€~_fs
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
TOTAL
CREW ME~ lSIGNA
\>-J. -J.
.... ' ~- ...,,,.. ........
FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING RECORD
ROUTE COP1ES:
J.- - FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE Captains, Second Officers First Officers
2. - FLIGHT OFFfCER . Flight /"Javigotors
DECEMBER, 19 JUHE. 19
NAME STATUS/EQUIPMENT DOMICILE
-::tx-
* l. CLASSROOM TRAINING
A, Systt-111., nnd p1.-:icedur"s ,,,.·~iew {eoch PT)· 1:30

(},System .. and p1oc:f'd11rr,~ review (eoc:!1 PC hriefing and worm-up) - .1:00
C, SccoOd olf1cer onnuul ornl revic-w conduct,,d by Technical SporiolhJ Ai1<:1ofl ~y .. lrni•. • ,j:OO
* 2. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS EXAMINATION

Completed prior to Proficiency Troiriing (PT). Time included for home s~udy o~_:.h'.~~.:..u~I~~~ ~--
l ~
c3:30
··--3+3--.0.
* 3. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MJ..NUAL EXJ..MINATION
Time included for home study of Monuol and revisions· 3:30 3:30
* 4. RECURRENT EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES TRAll"ING • 3:00 1-: 0 ()
5, AUDIO VISUAL PRESENTATIONS (for times involved SllHt current A/V presentolion list in Regulotions 25·4.)
NOTE: Approach and Londing AIV presentation required annually.
A 1VTJTLE TIME DATE AIV TITLE TIME DATE
tl:td. 4-' 1~ ':i-5·]( \ct. Q6 l ~ \·DO 1 f-t5:··1r

~v- ~ <.>~v- lif\!l;V _1_·_.3S '• A "'-ka IJ\,l<>:t .3 1.-
.,
F\ '-:-'-:!:- :< !I:\... A~"- \ '. 3 g_ " Aff2 CJ_L~AJG :s <g" ~.21_ ;~g
"f L;. :SS: Q~.~ "'.> 0 «
- , c 0 ,_, 3:> ---·--
~~ '±::?-- -----
~ '-'' '-. Q~ h>-' \·· ·.jL
".
{\ I\'-\"- ~ .e. -t_.v ~ '- 51;' ' ·---
y: ~~ \_, .} 0 .,
6. SCHEDULED INSTRUCTION on systems and procedures in classroom or CPT

{Specify dote, subject, time and instructor name,)
...
7. RECURRENT OVERWATER OITCHtt.IG TRAINING (Required annually by oll 01<erwoter quolified flight officers) 5:00 r:...\ /:.....
·---t--V::--9 ~· ~~.
* REQU!RED Al'INUALLY
TOTAL HOURS REQUIRED ANNUALLY - Pilots· 25:00 Flight Navigators -16:00 TOTAL HOURS COMPLETED! -i-S·.~9
At~(r-
This 1~ 10 certify thot I hove carnpleted 1he obo1<e recurrent ground training
duiing 1h,,. 12 month period ending with the abo"e dote.
L 1
Pl\ rr
vrol ft:.lJ Alf:! LfN.._
PILOT PROFICIENCY
ROUTE TO; SEE REGUL:ATIONS 25 4
1. HOME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME CLASS NUMBER OATE·
2. OENFN/ TK Fl LE
~,FLIGHT Ol"FICER
SECOND OFFJ GER OBSERVER
BLOCK TIME FLIGHT TIME SIMULATOR NUMBER SIMULATOR TIME

C=1sPECfAL
REM,..RK~
,- DATE ORAL RECOMMENDATION DATE GRADING LEGEND· INCOMPLETE !OTHER Tl

Yet~ ;_._&-:' - '_"_'_'_R_.__
f~ /-:(/ .-
'_"_·_______ _----- I-~-'----'-"U-"U;"N~ATl<FACTORY
I 5-SATISFACTORY PROFICIENCY!
W WAIVED [EXCEPT plrJ
"~ ,~:J;-£37
-
l/~X~;,: ~:;; A~_T"_'"-~.I.! "'_____ I'~-
__.S' 1_____
~/''.L'.~'.J':'..:::-..:=.-L.._::=:'.'._.J_
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--':~':1t:L0. 1:'t"1"'~0
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I ,0 0N "1 .7' =0'1"-- - - - - - -·-----------+- ·--1- -·-
ORAL CHK AIRMAH !HCllATllf•f a,. U"TI
I - LANDI N·G-,,---.,
,
-'-·-'"_D_l_R_E_o_e_'_T_l___________________ , __+-+--+--+---=50.:....''...c.",:_OY-'..!::.~_!_::·_~~-J~~!:_N_E~C: ______________ . - - - i - ..!

-
lF F"/r Rl"GUHHn - v1._u,.,1. W CAPT, - 4 [NG, A/C

,_2_._P_R_E_F_L_>G_H_r______________ ----------1---+-+---1------'~~_0~.l:_A,2:!J.~.OR A/C AT ALT. PLUS - · - - - - - - ----
---1--- I-
3. TAX I ING [·NGINE OUT IN A/C (ALL r Os)
---------------------------!--+--+--+--- ------·------------- ---·-------- -- ·- --·1-
4. POWERPLANT CHECKS 14 ~ fNr: "·c RATIN(; ONl YI
-------------·----------1---L-..to~:--.~~!~:-: ~!.l.~CI 1:___1~-~~-_.!_~l<_~.1.!_~_::.-~_l_'._S:_I_____ ,_._.
s. TAKEorr: NORM.O.L, x WJtlO REJ!;CTED 6 .
------------------------+-+--~=-1------------·- ·--------------------1-·----.~.:!
Et/G. OUT. INST. 'ZERO rL/\P {RATING ONLY)
REJECTED w 17. NORMAL/ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
6. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OF 2 W
5
_7_._"o_L_o_'"-G-----------------+--+--'----.-1--~~C/-4:.Z~--------------·---,.:
w
a. ILS APPROACH: NORMAL rA/P OR MANUAL) ~ ...v-::1 / < 7:, e_
----------------------·-"----- _ ... .- -· /.:"A_ __i/..". ,.,,../"#_ .. L.=~-----------+-
__________E_'_'G_._o_u_11_..,_A_"_u_A_L_'__________+- ._ _ __:?. __/-'i,_,.?~~--Cd//7£7~--:C-5 _____ ----
,.-.
9. NON PREC. APP. AOF, var~. OK r:ns, RAOAR 18. £Mf:RG[NCY PHOCEllUllES
r;,F>TAll'< UHl.r --
10. CJRCLING APP.
-- -~--l---1----=-t.0' f'._/5/(~.(_____ ------·----·- -
11_._"'_~~-1_:u_A_P_P..·_________,_o_r_'__c_1L_,_,_v_~-r~~-"'--'-L_s_ __j_ __j_ _,~_5:_..J-_L_,;z!,--YJ',.,,n(--:."~.L~.<:------· ---------
·-
,,_
13. APPROACHES TO STALLS ( 15° BANK) 2 or 3
-'-·~·__:S~P~E~C~l__:FIC~~F~L~l~G~H~T__:C~H~A-•_·_~C~T~E~R~l~S~T_l_c_s_________w-l--l--f-~-f-1~9~·c_:C.::.;OM~M__A_N__
D-_:J~u_u_G~M-"E-,-N:c,,~E;o--;D~U7l;--,H~O~N7A~P~P7L7•C~A-:-;;,7L~Ec-----j--- ~-==
RATING IN AIC ~
15. PQWERPLANT FAILURE pie IN SIM - INITIAL CERTIFICATION ( 2 oo _ !) (CAT!!)
~1~6~,_L:A~Nll_".D~l>~IG~0~-~1-~N~O~R~M"_":A:l~,_><X_W"".l_l~N~D~------------l---l-~~~~~!li~IA~il~i~i"A~l~H~E~D~/~P~E~R~F~D~R~M~E~D'__ll~2~0~0c._:-:_::~1--~IC~A~Ti:_ll~l~)---~-i------::::::
FROM ILS 3 F/O DUTIES (CAT 1!)
================"==~='=~================~·.'o:-_L---.'-
I
' ---- - ----- .
CHECK AIRMA>' SIGNArnRE cHEC~~ E.M~y~~~~-=]"1-E 'J;~~f\,f ;·~·~ ?~~~,
--···
""""'""'
D"E !'p
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER
DEADHEAD, DMC, WORKED

TllAN~Pon
rn•P.l'TG. ____ -
i=.1H)M Tr~1:~~-.;.~11
'~~'__- .
1 A TION
""" - { ~~:" "" o~._ .. WUR'l u '""" '"
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING ~"tlGHI !J/fl(IJ1.-.11.t1Ar11n~. '. ~~(J

It-,, ~ • ...._~
SUf-lJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE. - - - - .. ·- _ \_\_,j_: . ~ ""= ··=.:"~=. __ . ·.·: _ .
UNITED AIR LINES
. l PILOT PROFICIENCY
DOMICILE~.~
SEE RE:Gl..'l.,"'..TIONS .:!i•4
RO UTE TO:
1 HOME
AP PR 0 v E o~NGCO!TRS1: -NA Ml'-.: ------------ocCcC--.A<,<,"7NOU~M=acE=R--~A=T~E---
2. DENFN'TK FILE~
3, FLIGHT OFFICER
"["~'"
I IHI
,--:; '/ ; I(,
.,,jA1•1/Jt. I 1 1.1 111•
•• ·,I\ 11 ·.i •\'
ll•llj'./\lld·\• ,,.,
Ai•i·rH.lvi i_j 1ti·1r1"J1 1<.11i !>A 11 ',l/l.Jfl>lll\lll ". 11'1• '11·. \••II
W·MAY BE WAIVED *·REQtJlflED IN AIHLRAFT

ORAL 0Tlf!:H JN~.rnUMEtJ r APPrlO/\t,.!-1( •;
---,~'~l !',
!/\Df'J !V(1HJ !l'/\111 !tlK l HS! · ::1i .:~TSJ:. ·i,

20. NO J-"l.i\I-' /\PPR.Q/\C".H (H/\TINli 0Nt~1"J~----'-----f·-~I
2. PRE.-FLIGHT VISUAL-W
5
Ml~SED /\PPHt.ll\(!I !TO C..LIM!l COr.SFIGttnATfQNl
J. TAXIING
5 ~1
Ill Of! l HJ f!CAL E.NGINE INOI' !CAI-' I AlNl
' PO\'/ERPLANT CHECKS

5 22. CIHL Llr.j1, APPllOACH
·I
S. TAKE OFF rENGINE OUT, INSl"f~UMENTS)
* l /\Nl11Nf; rx WINO JF APPLIC/\RLE;.J II
6 lLS, ENGINE OUT
.. ___ * 5'.. HEJE.<.1!.:U l/\KEOFF wf
··- - -- - - - - - - · I
7. REJECTED LANDING
* 25 NOf~Mf,l ANll AUNOnMAL F"flOCC[IUfiES
IIIt
I
8. MISSED APPROAC"'H [TO FACILITY)
*
9. HOLDING PROCEDURE
w s. -----··· I
10. LANOlt~G. {50 ~POWER) l•E"'•O~•·-"•'•'c~'•'"'i-ii:0-1::1 Tl
* _5
it'J'+::,
0
11. TAKEOFF (NORMAL, X WINO JF PRACTICAL) C:::.
·~---· . --· - - - - - -·- ~7
12. Al1EA DEPARTUf1F. ISEE ITEM 16) 1 OF 2 W
'1J. srEEf-> I UHNS w 26. SIMLJl.ATF.D EMEllGE.NCIF.5
14. APPFH)Ar,HE~ TO STAL.LS 2 OF 3 W
A fAKf"Ol·F
B. CL LAN CONFIGURATION
I I
C LANDlt.jG CONFIGURATION 27, COMMAND
IS SPEC!Fi'.: f'"LIGHT CHAP/.-:TERISTICS flF A>"Pt !CABL.:;;) W 28. JUOGMEN r

-·- ··--- ·- -
16. AREA ARRIVAL (SEE ITEM 121 OF 2 W INITIAi. CERT 2QU I.' CAT II l
,,
17 IL5, ALL ENGINE /JETS: AUTO CPLD. TO
----- ---------
FT.J >I<
--+--+------ -
MAINTA!tlED
------
200-
s CAT
"
18 LAtJOING
5 FIQ DUTIES FOR 200- t} CAT II
i1 E /.1 A. f~K-S.
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING

....
...,
UNITED AIR LINES
ADDITIONAL TIME FLT/SIM

PART 1
Captain, F/O, S / 0 - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - Was giv..,
_ _ _ _ _,.,ours of Proficiency Training/Warm,Up in the - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
simulator. He requires additional time to bring his performance up to sr1ndard in the following areas:
Flt/Sim Instructor
PART 2
DATE
. Captain, l'/'Or&IO aJ, {.. . U);.!-1 TC:./#W'se_ W11 given
I +;J Z hours of Flt./J9i Training In the --~--·~7-~~7___. ,. .,_Airplane/simala:m on th.
fo"owin; maneuvers:
/ ..t. .:i 70 /00 I

/.
The above maneuvers were completed satisfactorily.
f rainino Manaadr
-W-M~E WAIVED
1. ORAL DAT£
INOT J!£O[/IREO·f' n
A. POWERPL,ANT CHECKS
-----··- ·- ·-· ----------------------- "'5
~.!5. TAKE OFF !ENGINE OUT, INSTRUMENTS! 23. LANDING (X-WIND JF APPLICABLE>
5
,. 6. JLS, ENGINE OUT 24, REJECTED TAKEOFF
7. REJECTED LANDING 25. NORMAL AND ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
B. MISSED APPROACH <TO FAClLITYl

s
-----------------------------·-·-f---t-----·---·---- ------·---- ·---.
• 9. HOLDING PROCEDURE w /.J
------==~~---.,----------------T·--r---~-----
LANOIN~~ow~
1:10. fF/O 1 ENGINE OUT)
-------+ * Li
- -
11. TAKEOFF !NORMAL. X WIND IF PRACTICAL! 5 5
- - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------+--+ -- ...
12. AREA DEPARTURE CSEE ITEM 161 1OF2 w
.s
13. STEEP TURNS
0J - - - - - - --· ···-- ··· - - -
------------------------b="='°"
w 26. SIMULATED EMERGENCIES
14. APPROACHES TO STALLS

-------------------------------<~~r.c~'t-------------·-------------·-------
2 OF
3
w wmwummm
A. TAKEOFF
----------------------------------<--~--------:-----·-····-----------·------
5
B. CLEAN CONFIGURATION 4)
--------------------------+·-+--,'-j-------------- --·----·---------- -- -
C, L.&.NDING CONFIGURATION 5 27, COMMAND ...5
-f-
~'"::..:.·~S~P~E~c::..:.rF_r~c~F~L~l~G-H_T_c_H_A_R_A_c_T_E::..:.R_rs_T_rc_s_•_r_F_A_P_P_L_•_c_A_e_L_E_'___
w.J.---"iL~_,_J-\-_z~a~·~J~U~D,,,.G~M=E:::N_T_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _r-_r-_ _ _ _ _ _ r-_k::lJ
-'.-:-:.-~-~-SN-~-:-~-NL_~_:_~_VG_A_'~_:_ ~_:_T_,T_sE_._:_u_:_0_,_c_P_L_o_._T_o
5 1 10
___1_c-CJ
___ __~_:_,_:-1-:', -~-~(,;./- t-~-:-~-'~-:-:-T-:_,:_E~0-T_F_O_R _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _:_:__ :-t--t-~~~~~~:~:~T-:-_-:_:_c~~
: __
REMARKS
/,; ~ RC'P«=--rE/) 5,.,....,.,
I I:>
"
r "l L.{)J!O"\...o,S.... E.#-Vr°~-j
IL ..5:
lo i...,•.:,.,~ ... r ALccvNr
f?e..,,_,,/:2_.-r-_e.a To
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING

SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
!JUPLICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
--·-· __ .. ________ _ FLIGHT CREW ENROUTE PROJ-1CIENCY CHECK
SEE REGU~TiONS 25-;
FLIGHT TIME
DAY NIGHT
OVER-ALL EVALUATION
5" No. 7 below
0 UNSATISFACTORY OtNITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
COMMENTS
5. APPROACH
/) COMMENTS
Appr"oach Pnxedures
r L. "ht./,{_/ c=-J>
Use of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking "and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL
COMMENTS
ATC Pnxedures
Knowledge of Take-off and landing Limitations
Equipment Knowledge b~JJ:> O'ccK'I//--~Q€6Pttk'c:
SnZJ~ ~ Y-- tU~ /Z,u fe1 ~
Adher"ence to S.O.P.
Public Relations - PA System
Corrimand Abiliry and Cockpit Management
Use of Ch.allenge and Response Lists
7, This completes ID.itia.l Flight Assignment requirements for B. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
type aircraft in accordance with FAR 121.425 ii.s follows;
. TRIP NO,
I I
DATE FROM TO LANDINGS OBSERVED
Fl.T. TIME
OBSERVER
IOOCl TIME
./ I
I II
I I
I I
I I
--- I I
TOTAL
CREW ~EMBE'._R !SIGNAT
\. {'.. ..__--,......_..___
UO 316 REV. 4-68 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
FLIGHT OFFICER RECURRENT GROUrW TRAINING RECORD
SE£:: REGULATIONS 25·4
ROUTE ·COP/E5:
CHECK MONTH DUE
J. FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE Captains, Second Officers
r;-i Flight Na.,ig~o..rs First Offic,.rs
2. - .FLIGHT OFFICER
NAME
-----~~-§.S:.E~~-R, 19
US, !.';QUI PMEN T --0
,{; D~u~~-:.. ~-'_
DOMICILE'"
~f, L. ... -- .b -?3 ·-·cf'.

TIME CREDIT ALLOWANCES RECURRENT GROUND TRAINING !RAINING Tl~E ACCD~PllSH[
------------- -
* 1. CLASSROOM TRAINING !CHECK ITEMS COMf">LETEDI
"8[ A. Each PC or PT briefing, d•brjefing - 1:30

;;5':CO
~-Oro! .. xaminollon, captains, fir.ii officer .. , second offic: .. r-., in conj1mction wirli PC :JO /; 3 c'
LJ C SDcond oflic"r onnuol or<J! r .. vic:w conductr.d by Technical Spacinli~t Aircruf1 $y'>lf'f11'> ,j 00
'2. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS EXAMINATION
* J. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL EXAMINATION
----T~im~e included for home study of Mon~-o~_o_d_,_•_~_i>_i':_n_•_-_6_:o_i:_ __ ._ _ _ /2_;00

INITIAL/RECURRENT EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES TRAINING 2:00 :;::2. : (} (}
5. OVERWATER DITCHING TRAINING (Required by all averwater qualified F!ight Officers)
A, Initial - ]6:00
B. Recurrent - 6 ;{JO
6. AUDIO VISUAL PRESENTATIONS !CHECK ITEMS COMPLETED!
~·Approach and !anding information - :30
0 B. Hand signal information - :20

D C. Equipment, Systems, or other required Subjects {list title and time spent below)
].
--------------- --· --·--·--·--
2. •· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·-
J .. - - - - - · - - · - - - - - - - -··
4.
7. FLIGHT OFFICER MEETINGS
Time used for instruction, information on new equipment, Company procedure::>, & operational problems. (List actual time)
a. HOME STUDY COURSES
list hours spent on cours"s issued by DENTK, SFOED
9. OTHER FLIGHT OFFICER IMPROVEMENT/STUDY ACTIVITIES !CHECK ITEMS COMPLETE DJ
Q" A. R.,1ticwini;i training or oponoliona! information conlained in "Cockpit", flight operations numbtH"d
r~ bu!letins, flight information letters, special information green bulletins. (list actual time) I :;;:cJO
[.] '"B. F!ight navigator enn;ivle proficiency ch!!ck debriefing
0 C. Activities not listed above or other required subjects (List :;ubject and lime 5pent below)
I. --- . - · - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - - - · - - · - - - -
'·------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·
3.
·------H-O_U_R_S~R~E-Q_U_l_R_E_O
_ _ .~-------- - - - ----
CVL, 8737, DC·6·20 HOURS - ---
PILOTS B720, 8727. DC·8·25 HOURS FLIGHTNAVIGATORS-16 HOURS TOTAL HOURS COMPLETED
rh1~ ;s to C:e•t•ft that r have completed the cbove recurrent ground train.mg ()A : I
luring the 12 month period "nding with the above date.

---·--···- ·-
Fl.IC.HT OFFICER l·GNATURE
·---·---~----·
. DATE:
~\- :L
>..;
'ANNUAL REQUIREMENT
~==-=----·--··"lo.IL{ ./-1 I
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit Noo 2-I
NA'l'IONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY PDARD

Washington, D. Co 20591
STATEMENTS OF PILOTS FLYING IN CHICAGO AREA
lo Milton W. Harding, Pilot of N 309 VS

2. Captain Ho E. Murphy, F/O D. C. Hunter of Delta
Flight 567
3. George W. Kipp, Pilot of N 7043L
4. F/O James w. McWilliams, F/O United Air Lines
5o Captain H. R. Trimble, United Air Lines
403 Plumtree Dr.
Vincennes, Indiana 47591
December 17, 1972
Mr. Martin Speiser BAS 14

National Transporation Safety Board
Dear Sir:
In accordance with our telephnne conver.'·at:lon T11esd1Jy

12th of Decembe1·, 1972 the following l<i an account of my
flight into Midway Airport, Chicago December 8th at approximately
2:30 CST.
My aircraft is an Aero Commander model 680 FL (Grand

Commander) NJ09 VS. This aircraft was relicensed .in No.vomber
1972, and both altimeters were removed, checked and certified
at that time, altimeters were replaced in the aircraft and a
check was made· on the static system and fourxl. to meet FAR
requirements for Instrument fli~ht.
I hold Airline Transport License #J.1';"!>759 with a current

Airplane and Instrument Flip:ht Instructor rating. My fli·ht
time ls approximately 12,000 hours of whict1 1900 hours of flight
time is in the above mentioned Commander. l also have Airframe
and Powerplant Mechanics #1~30155.
I filed from Indianapolis Weir Cooke Airport V97W LarsyeLta,

V7 Chicago Heir:hts, direct Midway and req11ested 8,000 feet.
I received a clearance from Indianapolis which read 309\IS is
cleared as filed, maintain 6,000 feet, squak lOA3, Departure
Grnt~ol ll'l.05.
After departing Indianapolis and reporting level at

6,000 feet I was then directed to proceed direct Lafayette and
to climb to and maintain 8,000 feet. North of Lafayette on V7
I then was turned over to Chicago Center wnich tnen decencied !'Je
to 4,000 feet.
Five miles south of the Chicago He\~hts VOR I then went to

Chicago Approach and was cleared to Midway on a 340 degree
heading at 4,000 feet until intersecting the 31L localizer and
fly it inbound. I was then told to decend from 4,000 feet to
a J.ower altitude and then cleared l.'or an approach. I crossed
Kedzie at 1,500 feet and 120 knots then decended to l,0110 :'.,eL
!IDA at which time I was still solidly in the colouds with an
1
- 2.
occasional hole where I could see the ground. At this time

the base of the clouds were between 150 feet and 200 feet
below me.
I had the fuel. vent and pitot heaters on and occasionally

windshield alcohol because of light rime ice but at no time
actuated the wing deicer boots as it was not necessary.
I proceeded inbound, at the middle marker I was still

in the clouds. As my time from Kedzie reached one minute 39
seconds I broke clear of the clouds and runway 31L was directly
below me. As I had already passed the runway threshold and
was at 400 feet I deemed it inadvisable to _try to land and
informed Midway tower I had a mis s.ed ... appr:oach. Midway tower
then i~structed me to turn left to 190 degrees end to climb to
either 2,000 or 2,500 feet. As I was executing the missed
approach I informed Midway tower I had the whole airport in
sight and requested a circling a pproach. I was told to
continue the missed approach as I had a ,Jet behind me.
I then went to approach control was vectored back to

the localizer and cleared for another approach. I again crossed
Kedzie at 1,500 feet descended to 1,040 feet at this time I
was still in the clouds and would occasionaly see the ground.
I crossed an open area just prior to the middle marker of about
l/8th of a mile wide again entered the clouds, crossed the
marker and broke clear of the clouds approximately 1/1,th to
l/Sth of a mile from the approach end of runway JlL, visibility ~
this point was at least 1 mile.
I reported runway in sig:ht to Midway tower and was cluar'"'

to land. At about 50 feet in the air Midway tower asked me if
I had runway 31R in sight. I reported affirmative. They then
said never mind we see you. I was then about to touch down.
Midway tower then told the United Aircraft to abRndon his
approach and gave heading and altitude .instr11ctions to him.
They then cleared me to the end of the runway with a ripht
turn off and to switch to ground control t0.Learing; tl1': t umwy.
While proceeding to the end of the runway I informed the tower
that the clouds on the approach came almost·up to the field arid y
were on top of the runway before you could see it. I tur·ned
off of the runway went to ground control, was cl.eared to Autlar
Aviation and parked the aircraft. I was not aware of the United
aircraft crash until I heard it on a Chicapo radio station e hc.ut
one hour later.
I have studied my fli~ht log and reviewed this ~li~ht arid

t,,,the best of my knowledge the above s b1 tement es I rememher
1 t is an Rccurnte account of my aoproact1 to Midvray· or1 Deceruhor S,
1972.
1A
/ ./.-. . '..·
~
(fOR INTRA COMi'AH'f CORRES?OHDEHCE ONLY)

D2LT.A
....... ·-· .. ..
~
DATE: 12-15-72
TO: Captain ·w. lT . .F'icldsa - _.r.\sst. Mgr. - Flt. Opns. - BOS
FROM: Captain H. E. Murphy
SUBJECT: Flight 567112-8-72
I was CaWi".1 of Flight 567, December 8, 1972, <;n<l Dave Hunter was
the First Officer.
We made an instrument approach at MDW and landed at 1528 Eastern

Time. I was aware that an aircraft before us made a missed approach.
The weather was reported at 500 feet overcast visibility 1 mile -
actually, the visibility was better than reported as we had intermittent
ground contact during the approach and had the vasi lights in sight for
over a mile.
we t!Xpefience llO turbulence, but We did have engine anti ice and "\Ving
heat on for the approach. We landed without incident.
The first time that we had knowledge of the accident was during boarding
for the return flight. A passenger told one of the stewardesses th1t a
United Air Lines airplane had crashed. She related this information
to us.
After landing, the tower asked us for a braking action report. I

stated the first half of the runway was good, the second half was fair .
. I
/ '
-/.
Isl
H. E. Murphy - .Captain
I agree with the above statement:
,.:-·- .( •. ,- . '
1'· ' i . 1·1 .....---··--
\.!\ .... <. '·<... ·:~:-:- .·~ ·'. ,.., ·. .. -
D. c:· Hunte ;-:: ..·~;j 1)___ _
z.,
AIR EXEC
RR # 2, Box 23n
Ft,· Madigan, Iowa 52627
December 12, 1972
Natl. Transportation Safety Board

Mr. M. Spei~er;
My etatement a~ reque~ted:
I wae pilot of N 7043L, a Cessna 31°, on the afternoon

of Dec. 8. Filed IFR from Ft. Madison to Chicago Midway
to meet a Northwest flight from the Eaet arriving I505
CST. Routing wae direct BRL, V-ln BDF, V-262 JOL, V-69
Big Run intereection direct. Was on top at 7nnn, Tope
of the overcast was around 4nnn feet and clear above,
Approximately in miles East of Joliet, was instructed
by approach control to decend to 4nnn feet on a 09n
heading. Entered the overca~t at 41"\l"ln and wae instruc-
ted to continue decent to 2800. on a n4n heading, local-
izer approach to runway 31L. Cleared for the approach
and at one mile from marker (Kedzie1, contacted tow~r.
Was in the overcast approximately 8 to 9 minutes. Ice
accumulation wae ~ to 1 inch. Had ground contact at
l! mile from end of runway, thresh-hold lights at 1
mile, cleared to land. The approach was normal, ceiling
a variable 51"\0 feet with a mile visibility.
aak
Bil.dpt BUl'el.U No. 31>-UO~,f,,3,

DEPARTMENT OF" TRANSPORTATION
WA9MINQTON, O.C. ~I
The purpose of this statement is intended solely for 1L9e in determining the facts, conditions and circum-
st&nces, and the probable cause of the subject acddent.
Date ____ .I__:?._-=/.!_=-_'{_*=--_____ _

... I. Place of accident --------------------------- Date ____ /_2..__-:: _ _g_::__ !l_..2,.____ Hour ----------
II. Aircraft -----------------"--- FAA Certificate No. --------------------------------------------

ill. What is your name __ ;J._A_&E.~______(N.! ___ JYJ.-S__f.J.i.Lf t_ft_~.i_ ____ Age _______ ;?,._g___________ _
. IV. Atd8~:irf s:_ ____ _£ ____ ~_.A:r_____~£,_T __t_Al:e_f:.d_<o!51.J____t_{:;~Q_, ___3'._0_~~2-----

v. Oecupation _Ej__.(_~±_ _____ f'-:f£;.c._er_ By whom employed __UP.!Li_~). ____ j_(fi ____ t':{e_.s
VI. Where were you at the time of the aecident __ ff!!_fi_Pll::fe _____ fn_c.J;___-.::3;?_~_f(b __________ _
of
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N 0 Ffi(ff....+ CoNft-o/ froh/-eM.r we.r-e_ No+ice-d..

~AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION D ARLINGTON FIELD OFFICE
SUITE 206, 4620 LEE HIGHWAY [] ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22207 0 C703J 522-950n
3229 Sherman Street

Fairfax, Virginia 22030
14 December, 1972
Nati ona I Transportation Safety Board

Washington, D .C. 20591
Dear Mr. Speiser,
On the morning of December 8, 1972 as pilot-in-command of UAL Flight 737, Aircraft

#9169, a Boeing 737 jet, we departed LAN at 1340 Zulu. (0837 EST) and landed ORD
at 1500 Zulu (0900) Actual elapsed time l :20.
Flight was unevm tful until just prior to PAPI intersection when approach control issued
vectors for traffic sequencing for landing in ORD on Runway 14L. Shortly thereafter,
our fllght was cleared to descend to 4000' and reduce airspeed to 160 knots to be
vectored l:e.hind a TWA flight. We were then adv_ised that an Air Wisconsin (STOL)
aircraft was being vectored in front of TWA due to an icing probl.em with his aircraft
and a discussion ensued with approach control as to what airspeed he (STOL) could
maintain on approach. He stated 135 knots. TWA and United 737 were requested to
indicate 160 knots until the outer marker. After we passed the 14L outer marker, TWA
was given a missed approach because the STOL was still on the runway. At approxi-
mately 200' and the runway in sight we were given a missed approach because the
STOL was still having difficulty finding a turnoff and was still on the runway. We
were vectored back into sequence and another approach was commenced to a Ianding.
The weather conditions during our descent into the traffic area and during approach was
icing conditions. Icing was encountered at approximately 7000' and continued to build
_quite rapidly to the point where we had approximately 2-1 inches built up on the bottom
screw of the windshield wiper arm at the time of approach over the outer marker. The
approach speed was selected at 135 knots with actual reference of approximately 120
knots, landing weight approximately 90,000# to the best of my memory. Slight buffeting
was felt using 40° (full) flaps and 135 knots, not enough to cause any great concern as
this hos happened to me before; however, on the pull out and during turns the aircraft
nose attitude was sensitive to control, and I remakred to my crew that the aircraft was
tail heavy and that we would use 30a flaps and airsgeed 140 knots for the next approach
and if buffeting was encountered we would go to 25 flaps. No buffeting was-observed
on the second approach using 30° flaps and airspeed 140 knots, except that the autopilot
had larger inputs to control the nose attitude but worked properly once stabilized on the
descent.
SCHEDULE WITH SAFETY 1-~ """ AFFILIATED WITH AFL.CIO

2
On taxi into the gate, the landing flaps were retracted to 25° position for deicing. Up;n
arrival at the.gate, I inspected the leading edge flap, trailing edge flop and rudder on the
entrance side of the aircraft. Ice accumulation on the leading edge flap and underside of
the trailing edge flop was noticeable, but I couldn't discern any accumulation on the fuselage
or rudder until the deicing operation was commenced; and then I observed small chunks of
ice being knocked off the leading edge of the rudder and tail area as the deice fluid was
applied by hos.e from deicer equipment. I did not observe the rest of the deicing operation
because I was satisfied it was being accomplished properly and that the aircraft was, in
fact, clear of ice for our departure to BUF, utilizing the same aircraft. Trip 330 (ORD-
BUF) deported ORD at 1615 Zulu (1115 CST) the same icing conditions were noticed on
departure during the climb out ta enroute clearance to BUF.
It is my considered opinion that moderate icing ~xisted over the Chicago oreo from the
times above mentioned and probably thereafter.
;,//
'-~~a~=_,,/::_':__(.._______,,
H. R. Trimble, Captain
United Air Lines
cc: John MacDonald
HRT :nd
Docket No. SA-435
· r~~xhtbi. i~ No~ 2-H

Bureau of Aviation SafGty
Washington, D. C, 20591
.EXCERITS FROM UNITED AIR LINES FLIGHT HANDBOOK
. l. Stall Speed Chart Pg. F-8

'
2. Reference Speed Chart Pg. F-22
3. Approach· Descent and Final Desc8nt ChallengG
Check Lists Pg. F-23
4. Flap Limit Indicated Air Speed (IAS) Chart, Pg. L-2
5, Anticice Limitations Pg. L-8
6. IAS Limitations Pg. L-10
'l
STALL SPEED
IAS
SPEEDS IN ( ) ,, 130'/& ST,\ LL SPEED
FOR USE IN AN ASYMIVIJ,.;TJUCAL FLAP CONDITION
.... -
GROSSWL
70 75 80 SG 90 95 100
1000 LB.
12:7 132 135 l.J 0 144 148 l . ~()

J~
0
(164) (170) (175) (180) (186) (191) (197)
104 106 112 llG 119 123 ' 12(;

1&2
(134) {139) (143) (14 'i) (152) (15 6) (1 G1)
101 104 108 112 115 119 122

5
(129) (134) (138) (142) (14 7) (151) (1~6)
----
99 103 106 110 113 117 120
0 IO
z
..... (126} (131) (133) (l3!J) (144) (l<l S) (102)
--
~ 15
96 . 100 103 107 110 114 117
w (123) (127) (131) (13G) (140) (144) (l •l :1)
en
'
p.. ----
:s
µ.
25 92 96 99 103 106 109 11~
(119) (123) (127) (13 :<) (I3G) (140) (H•J)
30 87 90 93 96 99 102 10•!
(112) (116) (120) (123) (l 2 7) (131) (J :J ;:;)
40 83 87 90 93 97 100 J03
(108) (112) (116) (120) (123) (12 7) (l :i J)
NOTE: Above speeds are for landi.nr; gear up c>r

down.
I
DEC 23/70 UAL 737 FLIGHT HANDBOOK 987

F-8
;
.I
1
.\
..... -· -·
"·'='
REFERENCE SPEED
40 Flaps (V ref)
Gross Weight 65 70 7[) 80 85 ao 9 fj 9S

Vref (KL"-S) 104 108 112 116 120 J 23 127 129
·---· ·Reference Speed Adjustment
2 Eng/30 ·Flaps. vref + ;,
- --
2 Eng/25 Flaps. • • • , • • . .Yref +12..
APPROACH SPEED
Vref (Adjusted) +Wind Corn'clion
I Wind Correction
Add - MAX. 20,K
1/2 Steady Head·.vind Component
plus
Full Gust Value
THRESHOLD SPEED
Vref(adju.stedj +full gust va!L1e (i\Iax. 20K)
NOTE
.Maneuvering, approach and threshold speeds are the
I target speeds. \Vhe•n Ui.ese speeds are being flown

deviation within plus 5 knots is considered acceptable.
APR 23/70 UAL 737 FLIGHT HANDBOOK 931

F-22
z.
[Af£ROACH D~~CSNT cflECl$__h-_IITJ
·Pflot not flying, check and 11.nnounee "C:u1nple!ed".
Master Caution. Cherck
Reference Speed _ _ _ Sel
!Go-Around EPR _ _ _ set
Altimeters • .. • .. ~ 0 • • • • • Set
JFINAL DESCENT CH/c\,,l~\:.J:0tD
.<PILOT NOT FLYING PlLQ_I_ .!::_1_YING
:t'light & Nav. Instruments ·No Flags
(Cross-checked by pilot not flying)
Landing Gear .D\VN, 3 Green Lts.
Speed Brakes ·ARMED, Green Light
Wing Flaps . -Pas_ _ , Green Light
Pressure & Fluid
----------------·---------------·--
Autopilot • • .
IP ARKJNG,~CH ALLEN GI::)
CAPTAIN
Anti-Skid • • ·.OFF
Parking Brake . . .Set ·
Engine Start Levers • .CUT-OFF
DME'S • . . • • . • -STAND UY
Radar & Transponders . -OFF
Window Heat. . • . . -OFF
Piitot Heat. • . . . • -OFF
Engine & Wing Anti-Ice .OFF
Hydraulic "B" Pumps • .OFF (Wheels Chocked)
Emergency Exit Lights .OFF (Term. Trip Oply)
Fuel Pumps • . . . . -OFF
(Left Tank Pump ON if APU ON)
I Landing Lights : . • • .
Standby Att. Ind. • . • •
· (If inst. , term. trip only} ·
.OFF
.OFF
Battery Switch . . • • • -OFF (If A PU OFF)
953 UAL 737 FLIGHT HANDBOOK JUL 2~/'70

F-·23
3.
. {
llMITATIONS
M:AXIMUM SPEEDS (TA&'}
ALT, S.L <) 10 15 20 23

SPEED 350 352 356 359 364 367 /, 84M
FLAPS
..-------·-. .--· Normal. operation:
1 2 s 10 15 25 30 40
230 23-0 225 210 195 190 J.85 170
Irregular oiieration:
210 when elthtt outboard slat is in FULL EXT.

230 when any Leading Edge device is not retracted.
All flaps must be retriwted above 20, 000 ft.

)
LAUDING GEAR
2'70/.8"2M ~
235 rmcracting
32 0/. 82M exteme,1
WINDOW HEAT INOPERATIVE (FWD or SIDE)

250 below HI, 000 ft.
MACH TRIM INOPERATIVE

.HM·
I j
'
OCT 23/70 UAL 737 FLIGHT HANDBOOK 97G

L-2
_,.. --.. • ·<"'~

-
LIMITATIONS
ANTI-ICE
Eng1nc anli-lc.:e nbould Ix> lurnc,d <lM p1·iot· lo. 11tirl t1Hud
during takaoff and inillal <:ilflli> wll{"n all o/' ll"' /'oli<>w;111:
conditions cxisl:
Visible rnoinhire. ·
Ambient tempcralurc 1G° For less.
Sum of tern per; <1.irc and dcwpolnt
78°F or less.
Do not operate wing or engine anti-ice at high engine

thrusts (Takeoff, Max. Continuous 01' Go-Around) c.t
ambient temperature above 5G°F on the ground or
io•c TAT in flight.
The wing and engine anti-ice may be operated in

Hight above 1o•c. TAT providi.ng Max. CJ irnb Tbru~l
is not exceeil:•d and visible moisture is present.
WINDOW HEAT
Window heat must be ON for all no1·r11:d f'll:{lit opvr: 'ill:.:;
and must be turned on 10 minuLt:i; p1·iu1· to takeoff.
WIND::rnELD Am im1r;t be ON wbcnuvcr a FWD

Window heat is inoperati\•e.
MISCELLANEOUS
CONFIGUHATION DEVIATION LIST (CDL)

When operation is scheclulcd wiLh oct"iain secondary
airframe and engine pniLs niissing; the airplane n1u~t
be operated in accordance with ti!Cl limitations spc•._,;nul
In the basic airplane flight manu:i.l and as amended hy
the Configuration Deviation List.
AUG 23/71 UAL 737 FLIGIIT 1!1\NrlDOOK HS3

L-8
SPECIFICATIONS
SPEEDS
-
CONDITION IAS .MACH
Climb, .cru:.:e, and Descent Schedule
320 . 73
I (FL230 transition)
Best Climb Angle
-200 ----~
S. L. -15, 000 1 2.10-250 -

Rough Air
Abv 15. 000 7 rFL270 transition) ·2so- . 70
. -··
Minimum Speed for-} to l *·.. v2 + 15 -
Starting Flap
Retraction to O -190 -
-
* Do· not exceed 15° bank below 17 O
-----
Maneuvering Flaps 0 200 -
Flaps 1 & 2 170 -
Flaps 5 lGO -
Flaps 15 150 ·-
Flaps 25 140
Approach and Threshold -
Consult pages F-2.2 or P-22 (Irregular) - .
Max. Demonstrated Crossv.'ind "
(T,0, & LDG.) 31
Minimwn Control Speed (Air) .,
94
'
---
·-
Minimum Control Speed (Ground)
--
~
20° F 40°F 50°F 59 ihru 90°F 100° F
. 84°F
-
0 104 104 104 104 103 100
2. 000 1 104 104 101 100 99 9G
4. 000 1 102 99 98 07 9G 93 -
5 000 1 100 98 96 !J5 . 94 92
MAY 23/71 UAL 737 FLIGHT HANDBOOK 931

L-10
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 2-E
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFE'l'Y P.DARD

Bureau of Aviat].on Safety
TRAINING RECORDS - SECmm OFFICER
1.. Proficiency Check Septem1ier 15, 1970

2. Certificate of •rraining . August 19, 1970
PILOT PROFICIENu'
11 MIS~[U APP.
ONt Y)
I?. '._1l[["p TUP.H.5 jCAPTAIM OfHYl w
13. APPROA(HI ~. TO ST.A.LLS t 15° 1-<.-.t-IKI 2 Of 3 w

·- - ----·-···----···-··· -·
.•
'/-((' pf.'r.1 /.t/tl llNll rn All~ l.INI ~'
•1fi·; 111.1111 I I I ;1 f J,Jr,HT Ol'I !?AllON', lf.'Alt~INf, l"ll l•/.f-l'IM. l~I
1!1••M ;·J/1Mlr I! I G-E'RTIFICATE OF TRAINING

.' IJJ I 11 r.. l i.
,I '1!.E 1'f"Cl/1 AllOI'<'. /'i '1
•. _, • ~·t
I 11 1
The u,ndersigned certifies that the above-named airman [~·l has 1 "]has not completed the following troining_course.
TRAINING MANALlb'R :SIGNATURCI . ) DATE

,,
" ';--~-··<.- '
" I lt', I
CERTIFICATION OF PILOT COMPETENCE
His knowledge of this equipment and ability to handle it is such that he is considPred qualified for as51gnmcr
as-------------------------c---------------· ---------------------·
on this type of airplane 1n scheduled airline operation.
NAM!" OF FAA INSPl::C. TOR OF/ l=,XAMlNf R - - · - - - - - - - ·
FLl(;HT MANAGf-fl !iT,\-1'.()AR!'JS
-------------- - -----·------ -- --·-··· --------·- -·---·- ---· -------

NOTE: A copy of thi: complctr:-d fonn, Pilot ln'.Jruotcr t Profic1cncy
Chc:ck, UO 109, '>hou!d bt' Qt!(ld1r.U lo th1<. retoid.
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:... i:c~·;]_:~rL2 ir1. t~le r: ~t:c. :l)"i..::ed c_j_1,Cle.
Docket No. SA 435
Exhibit No. 2-D
NATIONAJ, 'rRANSPORTA'rION Sl\FF;TY JJOARD

Bureau of Avio.tion Sal'ct~y
TRAINING RECORDS - FIRST OFFICER WALTER 0. COBLE
l. Proficiency Check - Recheck June 2l, 1972

2. United Air Lines Additional Time June 20, 1972
Form
3. Proficiency Check 'June l9;·· l972
4. Proficiency Training January l8, l972
5. Line Check Octo1Jer 25, l972
6. Recurrent Ground Training June 8, l972
7. Proficiency Check July 19, l971
8. Proficiency Training January l3., l97l
9. Linc Check December 9, l971
lO. Recurrent Ground Training June 30, l97l
ll. Proficiency Check Jilly l 7, .l970
l2. Proficiency Training February l3, 19'!0
PILOT PROFICIEl'J~r'.Y-~-- . I '
SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION OF A!ACRAF MANUAi
AOy°IETO:
1, tf()ME DOMICILE
2, DENFNITK FILE
:.-~::_ ... .-- C ASS NUMBER AND START DATE
3. FLIGHT OFFICER
~N (CIRCLE ONE)
~ i.J. o. coble
EVAC. TRNG, COMPL, INSTR, SIG, DATE
========~------+=~/,~~/-+===-~=~c~
PAAl 121 APPnovc:o INSTRUCTOR DATE £lRIEF TIME
~~~~~==~~=/~/=o-J'"""nLCHfl'K
ITnNc llME jADF l"s IBK CRS IVOR R/\DARAPP. ~. · · ,
/ [_-:JnATING
AIRCfiAFT TYPE &cN~U~M~e=rn=--------,.,~"L-,A"C~E~--"-~--+=e~Loc""'K""n~M"E~-~IFF~1u"o~H"r~r1·"M"'E~- · :..:1MU~TOR NUMB EH I SIMULA TOH rtME c=J:H'ECIAL (SE
=B-7--7'-'J=-7:__--,,==-rn=---+,=,:D=-Et=·-'-!-i==~===~.L.=-:---- __ oo '" MMlKsr

CHEhcK A'.''"]',s1hr".l.T_u,~ EC lJLA £;,c /
-ir~ADING LEGEND:
/;
1
ORAL IGRAD-E !TIME DATE 1 - INCOMPLETE (oittER'TI'.
(NOT AEO P!TJ S' f Q ; J- r /· ' _.,. ·SATISFACTORY PROFICIENCY)
: O (~ 1-! /
S • t;jMUU..TOR
J .2_ 1 • UNSATISFACTORY W. WAIVED IE.XCFPT l'fTJ
WI. VISUAL SIMULATOR )A VS S •MAYBEAEOUIREDINA/C A VS
1. PREFLIGHT
If f/E REQUIRED. VISl!AL
w t/;fyf $ ~~~JD~~~~6 (CONT'D)
--------------------t--+c±'b-::c-l-··---~-----------------1--jJ---+-
2. TAXIING :;/,'.;? :3 •zERO FLAP {RATING ONLY)
- -·-
s
~·-i--
3, POWEAPLANT CHECKS SOn/0 POWE.A (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C

-------------------------+--+-,,+-·+------- ---~-------+·-1--+-
4 TAKEOFF NORMAL. X. WJND 50"/o POWER CAPT. - 4 ENG, A/C · 4~r· 5
-·- - - - ' - - - - ---------------l--l-~f~-t---"-~9~_1i1_§'2_ !~~J~-~LATC?R, ORA/CAT ALT. . -- - - -f--.
•ENG. OUT, INST. ENGINE OUT (F/O AND 4 ENG, CAPT.)
-------·-------~-~---------t--t--1--1-------· ·~·-·- ----------------~
REJECTED \If FROM CIRCLE ll-/:'l-l;lr. !1Al1Nn .<. Plt:
. I !JC 11110, 0-/;>0/H/ · AATINC! ONL'I'
- .. - f-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + - + - - f - - 1 - - - - - - · · · · ---·-·-·--····-----···------ -· -·-
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL 1 OR 2 W 5 16. NORMAL/ ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
- - - - - - ----·--------------+-+--+--!---·- -·· ·--·- ·--.. -·-----------·---·-··
_s._H_o_Lo_1_NG_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ w 1----+-1--s-+-_LA'-'P'-"U.. ..£:V¢:-f?.J(.,1~· 14,£ I=_ - - - - - - - -
.. ·
_1_,,_,_s,_A_P_P__R_o_A_c_H__•_N_o_R_,_,_,,_,A_IP_O,_R_M_A_N_u_A_L_J_______-+---+-~-+---+---~-·~~~___i?.£J..__Q~"'-t~_,,,_________---j_ _ I
_ _ _ _ _ _ _E_N_o_.o_u_,_,M_A_r_iu_A_LJ_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-+--+-·--+ ·-+-~'~f'.j~~f.._L~I~.~~~~-{-~-------+->--"+-.

_•·_'·_·o_N_P~E~C~·-A_P_P_._A_o_F._v_o_R_.s_<_c_R_s._.R_A_D_,_"-------+-+--1-'--cf---F';~,Ll~t.;3" (_ JR <)J3~u:;:~.~~f\A~~-------->--
c Al'fA\N <INLY
llC-8110, fl·7WIH7. flATING ONLY .:.:
9. CIRCLING APP. l u 7?.11731 • flJl.litJG & P1C '''·;· 17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
. - ··- -
-----~---------------+-+-cc+-+------------------------·--+
.. ·' . .·... ,./.__
·-r-1--·~'----"L,, . c;- 1. BA-</i'=~-.c·~-'.,!',U
_ro_:r_A_r_s_sE_D_A~P_.________r_o_F,_c_1_L1_rr_F_R_o_M_1L_s___+--+-'-- ff'--_________ , __ __ ...
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _o_r_HE_R_(c_,_Pr_._oN_L_Yl_ _-+--t--+-+--L-L{J_,_,,YD~Q~~.f~l.U~""Lc;__~~- .. ---r

11, STEEP TURNS (CAPTAIN ONLY) w
-----~·----------------------+---+---+--+------------------------------ -·- ---
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS (1s~ BANK) 2 OF 3 w
- ------------------·-------+--f--f--jf------------- --------------!- - ··- -
13. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS W 18, COMMAND - JUDGMENT
- • -· ---·---------R-·,-,-11-,G---IN_A_/_C_______- j - - j - - ~ ---·-----·-·· - .. ----L-IN~E-O_U_T_N_O,_N_i\f>Pt ICAOLE . - . -·--
14. POWERPLANT FAILURE PIG· IN SIM 19. lNITIAL CER~l~~AT_l_~~---{2~':.::JL_ _ _t~.~T_f_ll_. __
15. LANDINGS: NORMAL, X WIND : 20. MAINTAINED/PERFORMED (200- J) (CAT II)
::::::::::::::::::FR:O::M:l:Ls:::::::::::::::::::::::::::i:::.:.··::::::2:1.:F:/:o:o:u::Tl:E:s:::::::::::::-======(C=,A=T~···=;'=I=_=_=_*-·
REMARKS
t .-
-
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENTER TRANSPORTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER
DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TR1f', ETC.
·- -·-·
·---· -
SCHEDULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
DATE FLIGHTOFF!G.E~ATURE /;1 _,. ., ,/
~~-~
f\ LjS-'f !r'f__ 6 J · L..dY''-'-- 1
):J:. CU,
·--+-D~A~T.oE-~--+-R"'E"'v""1~~~y~iFLIGHT OP,;_,npTl~NS. sioNi\iV'iiE-
( .-{ ~/ / l, , (_A:. t~~.-:r.I '<" 7• t"-
--~======== ===~==1==1=="°=='=°"'=-"·'==------~==~=~ =-~
....
..
UNITED AIFi LllUES
ADDITIONAL TIME
t) .
Training Alsignment 1 '' I,· ~ \, ~' 1•• Type Equipment __ : · "i '. ...!
Capt~ S/Q, _ __:_''_:.•_:__U::;:__l:.o.··~.,-"')i'-"\-""-~-----FN ~ ' 1 l ?. Y DO~~-'----·-
PART I c_ h« k
Was given I' 1 c:, hoursofr_ _ _ _ __,;:~~"-·~-."~·c___ _~-----------''..o·~:wil~~.
(Sirn, Pfane, or Ore! Rev!ew, etc.)
He requires additional time to bring his performance up to standard in the following areas,
/J. \-> r \ v ( ' •"''(.• \
' . ,· \ (
-\ .
\
(.
' ·-
. .
'~- .,.~.-\.. '-\
11111! uc1Br
4
F" /"I
PART II
DATE t,p .:.;_,./;, L,..
Was given, _ _,,,&...___ _ hours of_ _.;,_.,8--_?_Jf,_,_/___,,$«-'J_Al_,,,;f

__ . ______train inQ on th&
(Sim, Plane, o/ Oral R,evlew, etc.)
following maneuvers'
4' ~~-
The above maneuvers were completed satisfactorily.~.-"hu_.:,,:;-
, <:IL;;;·'\?d':.?e:t:::;L-----
nstrucior
/)"\ 11 ...
·. \ .' J l-... ( i' '.' .
\ \-."
~
J.-A.Jy_,g
-- .\::_v '~.
---
'.J ' · Training Manager
DENTK
·.•"
- -- ·-
Form U-9 ...:::I'.
PILOT PROFICIENCY ____.~'\·--//3J \
ROl.f,i:.To: SEE PROFICIENCY SECTION OF AIRCRAFT i.i!M'fCJii:L ( ~ ·
1. ~ME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING COURSE NAME ~ •• \ ..--- CLAS:\NUMBER AND START DATE
2. OENFN!TK FILE
3.. FUGHT OFF!C~~
\ .\.. . . . . . . ~--_..\ \/'\//,_
\"-r- --
AC. lliNG: COMPL INSTfl. SIG. Oo'\TE ORALRECOMMt:.NDATlON~STR.' IG. "9'\~ J._...:.-- 1 DATE r--1
, I I \ ~~ . l ; I ~.:SJ ['IC L _ rt
°'°'"'"°"°"""~""rn;;;;o;;;,0::;;;;'7--:,,....r----tn.*'-~--+-,,,""'°"""~"rn."'c;>;;""-'";;)-''T;co--.===="°'~T;;=fcc=;-Jt'_·'
V/
PAfn1217rOVEDINSTAUffiTO / / DATE BRIEFTlME 12RNG.TIMl: Al.JI- lru.sC" C-'
DKCnss~.oR .. rn.:cHu..:K
MUAHAPP. l----.1
__- /. / /, /• ;_.«._,..,_, / '.7 ~.., <' C-" C- r--inAflNO r (
, _ ~ _... _... J.- ·/_c? //·..J l_-.,~1 Z>V / I / / /:_) C.:'j. -· J ( .....;;. .> ...> .:> - -....., l__J
AFT TYPE
7 7
&
7
NUMBER" /"
L ,
. r/J,
I
BLOCK TIME FUGHTTIME SIMUt/\TOO NUMBER I SIMULATOO TIME r--1
L___J Sf'r'CIAL (SEE
- /':? . / <-'<' "> ./, . ~-hJe"r" 1::r1 I; Ir I /: 15 m.MARKS)
ORAL
{NOTREOP/T)
IGRjg IT!ME DATE
c;.;/ '°/? )..
CHEC~ ___A,N
Al'lf1
l~-
~IG, NATURE
--...
I GRADING LEGEND:
S-SATISFACTORY
I - INCOMPLETE (OTHER l HI
PROFICIENCY)
------~---~-----~~--'~--~--1--~-~-~-~---------~U~·~U~N~SATISFACTORY W - WAIVED {EXgQ>T_~~
~: ~l~~IB•E~AIVED e9': e:~~1~ULATOR A VS s • MAY BE REQUIRED IN NC A VS S
IF FIE rtEOU!Ral - VISUl<l. w s ,. LANDINGS: {CONTD)
1. PREFLIGHT
•.·
I'
..
"*REJECTED
2. TAXIING 5 I •ZERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
~------~-~~--~-------+~-t--~r----~r-~-~~-~---~~~-----------+---+----
s ~ 50% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C ')
c .':,,:H 50"/~ POWER CAPT. - 4 ENG. A/C !i\· .·,

x_-_w_rr_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1-~-~"1-·~
_._._rA_K_E_o_F_F_:_ _ _"_o_e_M_A_L_.__ •·. ··+..,-···+-~A-~?_U~!21§P. l~ ~!~-~LA TOR. ORA/CAT ALT. ~-
-- - -i--·~ -
s • ENG. our. INST.

----·----------------------+---+---+---1-------------· -- - - -- --- - - -·--·--------+-··
ENGINE OUT. (F/O ANO 4 ENG. CAPT.) C.)
-1---- ~
REJECTED w FROM ClllCLE
I PC IVHl. tl-l;>OIM7 - R/\llN(l UNtY
o-/"111;1r • llAllNCl '°' P1C
·-··---------------- -- ··-
c,
··-·-·--
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ARRIVAL , 011 2 w
,.
8, NON PAEC. APP.

CAPlAIN !lNLY
9. CIRCLING APP.
10. MISSED APP. TO FAC\UTY FROM ILS
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY)

---------------------------+---+---+--+----------------------------;-·· ~ r-
11. STEEP TURNS (CAPTAIN ONLY) w
--------------------------t--r--t--t--------------------------r-
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS (15~ BANK) 2 OF 3 w
- - -------------------------+--t---+---+------------ ·--·---------·-------. - -·-·-
13. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS w 18. COMMAND - JUDGMENT
- - - -------------R-A_Tl_N_G_·_l_N_A_/_C________+--t---t---t-------------·--·--L-lN_E_O_U_T_N_O_N_Afif>LiCAfil"E--
14 POWERPLANT FAILURE 19. INITIAL CERTIFICATION
.• P/C-INSIM __ (200··!) -~A.1:_~1L._ ___ _
NOA MAL, X WIND 20. MAINTAINED/PERFORMED (CAT II)

15. LANDINGS: (;>DO·-!)
FROM ILS 21. f/0 DUTIES (CAT Ill

=~================='o=~~·"-,='=====================·--·'--=-~·"'""
REMARKS (', 1.1 .... , ........._,f:. J , r· t.•
(\.,,
,t ..; tv 1•• ~~·~c.1-t.. •"'"•OJ,..•. <l•·· .1-> t"1·~~{·..::·\:1:·•'\ ,.1 .. tit,r.._l
,j /b. tl'-\d, \'IT·li. ;•1ot(',.J (' ,, _...,_.t~j ..-~, J,··.i
1: ;.;. t' \ 1 1I 11 f/
1 II 1•
I) Hr-· f-.'.,_v, -fc,.·,\~ - ·~•'"'

1::..,5;v1e. r~l;+ ~ -,.10-\- v~·ed
I _j \.I d c- \'YI .:!-v~·r- ., Q..-0,.,,.,..,:?c;t- I~' '"l V"' HJ l?i-..;f"r"~~-l.f VO. 'I-
"
~ ,_,;;. i' 1.-• • ('~ I •.-;:;.ct"_ uvf' S.
TRANSPORTATION TO TRAINING CENT TRANSPORTATION FROM TRA1N1NG CENTER

DATE TR1P DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. DATE TRIP DEADHEAD. OMC, WORKED TRIP, !!TC.
--- -
07
c H~E~C~~7~7r~RMCCCA7N~l~S~IM~)~S~lG=N~A~T~U~R~E---------------,D~A7T~E;o-----r.;FL~l~G~H~T~:_~~~F~IC~~~~~;-~S~l:~N~A~~~U~R"E~(--_--(.-~~-
0
--~---.-~~~~-------------~--
CC7H~E~c-\-c=""==""'==--+-+--------------f-~oA7T~E{,--~--h;R;;E;;V;<IEc;;W~t;J~M~OF F~IGfl r ~~ TJONS - SlGNA 1unE
---1-"-.=-----="'=="'========="""''':=·=b=·"'='='!"'=7=,.,"""'=='"(Y ~ }l C>~C-c>.-"7,LC -::.c'~···==~-~~=-· _

~oUT•E TO:
I. HOME DOMICILE
l, OE/'1,.-N/TK FILE
:I, FLIGHT OF'
-
.. _,_'}; ~- ·- -~-z.c:. (,
ll l[J_ ,DiJ
PL~i;J r~""'
l!RCRAF"T lYPE NUMBER 0LQCK
IM{··
12237- I
NOT flEQ P/T)
GRADE
1"'£ DATE rCHECK AIRMAN SIGNATURE
'I.MA~ P.E WAIVE:O

~
>.-Al R PLA"'E ' • 51MULATOR
V~- YJ:5UAL S!>AUL,t..TOR A vs s MAY
LAND1TiGs: fcONT'o)-·-·
I. PREFLIGHT " F/( Ri';QU!R([J.VJSUAL
w <;' •-~~-~~r~o
2, TAXIING •ZERO FLAP (RATING ONLY)
---·----·- - -----
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS ~ 5 0% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C
5 6% P<JNER- CAPT. - ·4ENG:A7c··--- ··
~- TAkEOFF: NORMAL, X-WINO
-.s __!:Q_Ul~EO _!~ ?l~LA.TOR, _2R _±IC A1:.~l:!.:._ _____
R
• ENG. OUT, INST.
lS ENGHE OUT (F/O ANO 4 ENG. CAPT_.)
--- __
s
REJECTED w
.s FROM
-·-~f4~G:-A/c:-RATING"QNL_y_J
CIRCLE (2 a, 3 ENG •• RATING 6: P/Cl

··- ···---------·- ·- ·-·- ------·-
5, AREA DEPARTURE/ ARRIVAL
--------· ----- -------- -----
1 OR 2 W
·--
s ···- -·--·
16. NOR~L./ ABNORlvlAL PROCEDURES
;_ H()U)ING
------ -- --·-·
. w
~-
}- M.1Nof> +.!>aaef/JJTo__ f(!_:~--
7. ILS APPROACH;
--
NORMAL (A/P OR MANUAL)
- -·------- -··----- -- l.J L.J> /j i . . FfJJ~uf<,F.-s_ ___ _
ENG. OUT (MANUAL}
-------··---- - · -·------- ~-
5 ... S i'.VI SlU. [fi/L_t!,_R..E;_;s __ _
I
3. NON PREC. APP. AOF, VOR, BK CRS, RADAR
\ -·--e._f.J;V/j'-'-!_A'(.SJ)'J!J/.L ~2f"!;___ ..
-C::iPTAIN ONLY
{ 4 E'..NC[IH:: >./C • llATINC·~z~·
3. C!RCLING APP. 17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
---·- - · - - - - - - - - - - - ·---------
:0:: & 3 E'..NCllH: • lll<TINC !ti PC
-···· -·---- -- ··---- --- ------------·--,-- ----
I 0. MISSED APP.
----
TO FACILITY FROM !LS
-
lS £L~c.-r:_2·/l]ok..t;-. or_ t;r'§J _____ _
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY)
--------· f1Li{?t.9__j)_fZf}Resi __ _
11, SITEP TURNS {~Y)
-·
w IS ,,(_~ed7L._1Zf:._5_c_~~-r-----1-+--+
F, ;7;_.
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS [15° BANK] 2 OF 3 w
~- __ Ll_j,:._;;:1..c__i:;_;,
________ _
!3. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
----
w
~-
't!_ 18. co MMAND - JUDGMENT
14. POWERPLANT FAILURE

RATING - IN A/C
_s 19, IN
- p/C • IN SIM
--
IS. LANDINGS: NORMAL, X WltJD .s 20.
-- --
FROM lLS ..5 21. F/
RE~AAR KS
-- -··
'" r.-
.!. - .... _ 0
-:·:-1.r·~···~ ... 1••

. - ---- --· --- -
TRAN SPORTA.TlON FROM TRAINING CENTER
··-·----- ---
- .. -·
DATE TRIP DEADHEAD, OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. DATE
['"'-. -~ DEADHEAD. OMC~ -WORKED T~~· ETC:._=~ ---
SCHE O ULE TRIPS MISSED DUE TO TRAINING SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY FLIGHT OFFICE.
CHECK Al DATE
D>.TE
ORIGINAL-EMPLOYEE'S FILE
FLIGHT CREW ENROUTE PROFICIENCY CHECK
DU~LICATE-TO EMPLOYEE
. ~ No, / t~low
(_]INITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
1. 1i1.1ciITt•ltHPARA1'1()N COMMENT.S- ·-····· . -
llniform and Equipment
Flight PI.anning
Cockpit Pn.•p:1.ncion
-l-.-P-R-E"rAK£--:-QFF -------··------ - - COMMENTS
InspKtion and Cockpit Setup
Engine Starting and Tax:i
Engine Runup
COMMENTS.
5.o~
Ta,ke-offTechnique ,4-1f/ut? Co<>i> 7~ 67<--;('<- . .::~
Observation of VI, VR, V2 :':,ft1oo7 rl 0 ;..) ~-D µ -r !('oL. 5
Speed and Aldtude Control
Traffic and Anti-nol~ Procedures
4. ENROUTE COMMENTS
Cruise Contt0l
Tnffic Alertness
Communications
Use of Radar
---·-----------~COMM EN-rs-----·--·---- - --
5. APPRC>ACli
Descent and Speed Control :s. 0 f7 C ,, "., !) S/'',;-,c::b C!.,::. ,<-<)A?'·' L
Approach Procedures f1fl oc JJ... s to i/L @. & w K'
l!se of Auto Pilot 1nd Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Braking and Engine Shutdown
6. GENERAL COMMENTS
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of lake-off a.nd Llnding Llmitarion!I
Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Public Relations· PA System
Command Abilicy and Cockpit Management
Use of Challenge and Response Lists
7. This completes Initial Flight Assignment requirements for 8, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
cype aircrafr in accordance with FAR 12 l.42 '5 as follows:
/~}./Cl-//
TRIP N_o_.f----DA_T_E_ _,f-'-"-o_"__.cf--·T_o_-+_L_A_N_D,_._G_'+~~~~~~:-'-~'eo'J"'~-·-+-''°~o~~'c~~'c.•~~~~~-1
I I
I I
I I
I I
I I
/ I
I /
TOTAL
"ouTe COPIES:
1. - FLIGHT OFFICER PERSONNEL FILE
2. - FLIGHT OFFICER
'110 GOBLE
* 1~ Cl..ASBROOM TRAINING I 'J' u

'
A. Systems and procedures review (each PT) - 1:30 L,L.'UU
8. Systems and procedures review (_each PC briefing and warm-up) - 4:00
C. Second officer annual oral revl6'W conducted by Technical SpeclaHst Aircraft Systems - 4:00
* 2. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS EXAMINATION <J 0
Completed pr!or to Proficiency Training (PT}. Time Included for home study of Fllght Manuats - 3:30 3E
* 3. FLIGHT OPERATIONS MANUAL EXAMINATION
Tfme Included for home study of Manual and revisions - 3:30
* 4. RECURRENT EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES TRAINING· 3:00
5. AUDIO VISU#,L PRESENTATIONS (For times !~valved see current A/V presentatlon list In Regulatlons 25·"4.)
NOTE: Approach end Landing A/V presentation required annually.
AN TITLE
;:;s-
; is-
::.,o '/
I>
,,.f'w.. J .)
6. SCHEDULED·INSTRUCTIOH on systems and procedures In classroom or CPT

(Specify date, subject, time and Instructor name.)
~~~·~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~·-~~~·~~~~~~~~--!~~~.
7. RECURRENT OVERWATER DITCHING TRAINING (Required annually by aU overwater qualified flight officers) 5:00
------------------~----------·--------------+--------
* REQUIRED ANNUALLY .
TOTAL HUlJRS REQUIRED ANNUALLY- PilotsL 25:00 Flight Navlgators-16:00·
This is to certify that I have comptoted the above recurrent ground training
during the 12 month period ending with the above dale.
=~~U=R_'_,t[J.<::__~~---_-_-:_-_-_-~~----_-_-_-_-_-:=-~-=-=T~--no~~:T~E~~~~y-_-->,;,--
NOTE: Jn accordance with FAA 121,401 (b) training may be- completed one month~efore or one month after duo month.
ROUT!:. 10:
I, HOME DOMICILE APPROVED TRAINING C0uR5E° N1\M€-------- ER ANO START DAT_E_ _
2. QENFN/TK FILE ..----1-_
3. FLIGHT
CAPT Al CIRCl.£ ONC) FILE NUMBER OB ERVER-A/C
<IlJ[:Y.
S/O t'f' $-?--'I
EVAC. CATE ORAL RECOMMENDATION INSTR. S
2. TAXIING •zERO FLAP (RATlf.iG ONLY)

-------------------· ·--· -- --- ----+--+----+
3. POWERPLANT CHECKS _5 50% POWER (CAPT.) 2 & 3 ENG. A/C
x- WINO ------t---t---r~,.,:-t------so<"/:· "POWERCAP-r~· -=--4ENG·:--A/AIC' ---- ·-···- - - -
NORMol..L.
__F_:_____________________-+--+---F;;>'---+~~RS9_Yl_~D._ IN_? !~!--A.""!:".~.!-Q_R___ c~"!_!.1:-T: ________ _
_4_·_T_A_KE_DF
• E~. OUT, INST. ; 45" ENGINE OUT (F/O AND 4 ENG. CAPT.) <
0
w I .t""'"""" - (4 ENG. A/c - -RAT'i'NG ot<LY)

RE£CTED
IJ FROM CIRCLE (2 &: 3 ENG._ RATING &: P/c)
------------------------+--+-....."'---+--------- -------1----+---+-
5. AREA DEPARTURE/ ARRIVAL 1 OR 2 W 5 16. NORMAL/ ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
-----------------------------t----t---+~-+---------
_s._H_oLD_rN_G- - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _w--t----+~-"s=-+---"LL"''/J"°- t:.,, J 0 / C:.. /-7,,.z__ es S _

_7_._,_LS_A_P_PR_o_A_c_H_:_H_OR_M_•_L_l_•_l_e_o_R_MA_H_u__•_L_,_______-+---t---t-::;;-+-_~-~--c::.~~~c.J_c/~-----------+·
_ _ _ _ _ _ _<_H_G_.o_u_T_l_M_'"-"~'-Ll----------+-+--~~<:+--~~.::.~~--------
<
_a.~N~O=N~PRE~C~.~·-PP_._AD~'·_v_o_R·-~_c
, ... PT ... IH OHL'( {
_<::::_"-+..&-# ~ __K ~C:.cC~ --------
_ _o_AA_______--t--+·-t'~
'4 f:HGIHC A/C. R,._TIHG OHl.Y
9. CIRCL1/'G APP. 2 6' 3 EHGWC - R ... TIHG .. f>C
17. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
-- ------~~--- - ·-- - . ·-----r--1----t--:i-··- ... -- --· - --·. ---··-··· -· -- - ------.--------
~~~- ~~:_s_Eo_•__P_P__•___________T_o_FA~~L~: ~Ro~:s_ _ _ ~ . s -- ~D_,_ .6
/& rif.
·-- ---+--+-~6z,C_f!?p,,£c_,_. ---·
OTHER (CAPT. ONLY)
11. STEEP TURUS (CAPTAIN ONLY) w )tt..V

-----------------~--+---+ -~:+-----· .---·---------
12. APPROACHES TO STALLS {15° BANK) 2 OF 3
_.c.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w ,.5 ------+-+-~+--+---------------- ------- -----
13. SPECIFIC FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS w tv 18. COMtviAND - JUDGMENT
14. POWERPLANT F Al LURE :;~ 1 ~~~ ~~MA/C ··t--f.s"-c:J--,-9-.-,-N-,-T-IA-L C~RTl~:l-~·;T~~~-·· ~i:~~u~·tON A~;~~c;t)LE ___ ... t".
-- -
1_s_._LA_N_o_1_NG_s_,__"_o_R_M_A_L_,_x_w_1N_o_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FROM ILS
-J---t---l_s"-:o~-20-._MA_1N_T_A_1_N_ED~-~~FoRM=.__i200 --~) =(lcc--A~TT_--!.r-rrll
~ 21. F/O DUTIES
- F· -
===-=-====r-===-~~~~=== "-=~~~-. - o- • •
REMARKS
. -
TRANS PO RTATION FROM TRAINING CENTER
- ·- r---·-
3~~AoHEAO, OMC,.-W°"KO~~~:ETC.
DATE TRIP OEAOHEAC 0 OMC, WORKED TRIP, ETC. CATE TRIP
-·---
CHECK AIRMAN (SIM) SIGNATURE

CATE
I
- - FLIGHT
_
"OFF:CE~S/G·~~-· - / ) -·-z~A' ~-
·\.J t_~t.<.,,.. l ........ ~. v·c._·--~-- _
---- .
·-- REVIEWED BY" MGR. OFJ:lGHT OPERATIO~S-SIGf<ATURE • ·--- ·-
7
...
'•, PILOT PROFICIEl'h..·•
'•· '•ltf I '·:. ''
), I fl ' I I '< / •• / 1" ~7 ,•
·1. r 1 •·.•••
! qi\'' ...... ,
I
\
,/ . '-·" " . ! I 'I 111-1 !;
'H•• HJ! I H 1,l't 1 ., "' ii

I
''
I '"
I" ... , :···'I',; ... l .
. dll :
-'j·oo I /
.....'
3. TAXIING +
-- ·--·--·--·- ---- ----·----
4. POW£RPL,t,.N f CH~ CK!.
-- - ·--·· -- -· .. ------- ' fiLJl'CfFD
5 TAKt.orr: NORM Al Y WIND
!"
• /l'RO ft.Id' lf<AJ !Nt• ONLY)
f'MG O!I r. J,_.Sl.
w 17. NOflMP.L/ A!1NORt.!AI 1'HOCf. f1UIH ~.

FltJf.CTf'O
I OF 2: W
& AREA OE:PAR1UR£/ARRIVAI.
7, HOLDING_
w /r'1' ~ ;;;;f///v S
_Y-'?.2 £-
8. IL~> APPROACH;
......_,_ . . .. . --
~ORMAL (A 1 P _t)H MAHllAl)
. --·-
//y,p£dv4C:. Hf_uL).£.L:L'Yj
/7di~-. -6eL '-· _/Vc:i '- / -1 '-'
- 18. f-Mf:Rc;f_NCY PRo,:rDlJ!H·_•,
9, NON Pl-it.I APP. AlJt. VOFI; Ill'. CtlS. RADAR
(. ~f'I
E../\!{,.-"j'/·!~ /:;(t c="
0
"I,. lHH • \ 1-lo<Gl>•I ,,.ft•""''"'"

10. LIRCl iNG /\Pf'. 1. •' .1 I"."'".' • "" 11 .. G
t: J.,c @z;r/.<wL .
!!.
l_l. Ml',f,[U APP 10 ~ACll llY tROM ILS 1"'/..~-c;;-

OTHt Fl \CAPT OM"l Y) __ '= IJ7~L_C,_&:/7- ()i _\[)i::-S'_Ce/'¢/
1? .rtrP !URN, !LAf'TAlM ONLYl w /?/!~ ?~ .:::~ /-1-/';.c? .
!'). li.!'PfU}Al'Hf'. 10 •.• rALLS 11 ~-· HAt<Kl 2 or 3 w
w 19, CllMN!AN[J • J!ID.'.;M[NI
\ '• 1'()1'>'i llPLAN r r A!LUIU

HAJlt-1(.,
pie_
jl'J
IN. ~IM
A.'t:
5-_ . '.NITlAL Cl JI I :I ILA I ON 1 ;>11<• It 1\ I Ii
1 f. ! ANf)IN(.', th)RMAI • x Wi"MD 5 MAINlAIN~ll 'Pl f<'fOllMl'll ·""l

1---+-=-l
I HOM JL5
f /o DU 111 '•
····-===--;-;;;!_-- :;-:_:::-:
I<[ MAH"-S
..,
r.Hf<;K Al.fjMAtt 1.• 1"4.. l ',H.t-i/\ lld•! 1llL ~II"//' 1• l!\ I""''· '•
; I ,I
(HI· t< ..\IHM"N '.l<,N-'Hl~l

···), ,•. /7 •
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NIGHT
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Se., No, 7 below
OVER-ALL EVALUATION
IJ"COMMENTS
INITIAL FLIGHT ASSIGNMENT
-'-~---~~~~~~---------'-~ur""-~S~A~T~ISe:FACTORY r.:::lYJ:l~AT_l?[ACTQ~~ . ···----
t. FLll;!iT PREPARATION
Uniform and Equipment ,:_:;op
Flight Planning
__ c?':.:~pit Prepantion ·------- - ------·-----coMME"fil--
2. PRETAKE-OFF
Inspection and Cockpit Setup
Engine Starting a.nd Taxi
- - - - - - · - - - · · ---~c=o~M~M~=E-NT=s~-
En_ginc Runup
Take-0tfTechniquc
Observation of Vl, VR. V2
Speed and Alcitude Control
~ffic and Anti-noise Proc_::ed:="c:."::...''----------- ------- COMMENTS
4. ENROUTE
Cruise Control
Traffic Alertness
Communicatioru
-------------c=o=M-M=E-N=T=s_ _ _ _ _ --·· - · - - -
Use of Ra.dar
5. APPROACH
Approach Procedures
Use of Auto Pilot and Flite Director
Landing Technique
Reversing, Br.a.king and Engine Shutdown
------------------·
COMMENTS
----·---
6. GENERAL
ATC Procedures
Knowledge of Take-off and Llnding Limitations
Equipment Knowledge
Adherence to S.O.P.
Public ~elations - PA System
Command Ability and COckpit Management
Use of Challenge and Response Lists B. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIOl'.'5
7. This complet~ Inidal Flight Assignment ceq~irements for
type airer~ in accordance wirh FAR 121.425 as follows:
OBSERVED OBSERVER
C/J4i ?,:.[=bU "UtP
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8, "'{JssED APPROACH ITO FACILITYt

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11. TAKEOFF I NORMAL. X WINO IF PRACTICALl
12. AREA DEPARTURE ISEE ITEM 161 OF 2 W
I~ STEEP TURNS
t'? / I '(_i) <ft I) L {_(. L I:

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A. "TAKEOFF
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17. !LS. ALL ENGINE I.JETS: AUTO CPLD. TO FT.l
* \5- s MAINTAINEO 200-~l ! CAT II: '
18. LANDING
I-?--~ F/O DUTIES FOR
20~~-v, r CAT ll !\.~: !<-·
1: •.
REMARt{S '
c~.~c:~ .Aji:"-.W/1,GNATu~"E - -· .F"JLE NU1-MBE-R TlFLIGHT ~F~l~GNAjt,JRE - • ' lR[\. .IEW~O flY ~ic.11" or l LIGllf
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\10 •-'·l •·"> V 17 ,.{I l-'0~11'.>T< ['"I IN II<'.'.:,_

PILOT PROFIClf1-<c_;l'
SE'.C Rf:GUL.A TJON~ l. !'i 4
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PART 1,;1 .AP.rROV.l:D INSTR!jCTOR
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I!> SPECIFIC Fl.IGHT CHARACTERISTICS nF APPLICABLE!
:······
lt> ARE"'\ ARRIVAL 1SEE ITEM 12l
1OF2 W ..!.; INITIAL CERT 200 'h I OT II
!7 IL~ ALL ENGINE 1JETS: AUTO CPLD. TO

t_·_4:J!_ FT.I i<- __'.,. MAINTAINED 200·\ti: l' CA'! II, ·· ..
CAT !I!,,_ ..
.S F/0 DUTIES FOR 200
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JI;! LAN;'JING
REMARKS
•,;'"iF.(-1<. .U~MAN SIGNATURE:

;'.'
I"''"w"" '" "'·" ,,, '' '"'" uern""''" ""'"· ····•
.... "/' .... .,_. TRA.N:- 0 oRTP..TION FROM TRAININt• <'..lil~l tcH
·DATE fH.r l [l~AilHIAU ()MC_ Wf)H~IU_fiill' J IC

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'-.Llt.! JEGT TO VERli' ICA.f ior.. BY ;:LlGl·r·r L)f'f'1C£.
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 2-B
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAF!'TY BOARD

Washington, D. C, 20591
DISPATCH DOCUMENTS
1. United Air Lines Planned Weight-Manifest

2, United Air Lines Letter dated January 12, 1973
3, Corrected United Air Lines Planned Weight Manifest
4. Fuel Chit
5, Flight Plan
.•. ...
·-- _
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1 ~ ·,_. Jl-ATIONS -40-& ' . ' ·("
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t , ~ C }'LT. DECK
' : 1-------------
3 ~ W• -CABIN (F ) 1MI8
·------
IN PIT6
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" MUST NOT O::CEEU 121 on "J..-

--· ··-
TO< fH.O..NCE -
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DO NOT BURN ·• vv
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IJTqUCTUAAL CHECK
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FUEL - CLEARED
ZEAO P"' YLOAO STRUCTURAL" ZFW

U'fES 1 2 THRV 1 <l
)r
,. ~FUEL POUNDS 1 EXCLUDIN(]
FUEL OF 14- )- I~ v 1
l\b lo]oiif6ii
1•
MUST NOT EXCEED
TAKE-OFF GROSS WEIGHT
LINES 12 OR 1• + 1.5 + 16 ~ A(,..-l&f/ lf]a
RVZ
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. THAU I CONFIRMED
BY RADIO
TIME
1'1.J\ G-""'
UlADl!ilJ LA.W.
...,,., ' jf-$'

OP~NS AGENT. ONA TL ISSUE OATE
1JQ9 ~ ~. 11-71 PFIANTED IN U.BA ~

I o/'</,..
1
~·.
uMDAIR LINES
PO. Box 66/00, Chicago. Illinois 60666
. January 12, 1973
Mr. W. Lamb
Dear Mr. Lamb:
During a review of the "Planned Weight Manifest" for

flight 553 of December 8, 1972, we have determined that
two errors were made in its preparation.
The two errors were:
1. Extending the weight for 41 passengers

rather than 42.
2. Arithmetical computation on line 12.
The corrected figure on line 9 in the "actual" column

should be 7140. Line 12 should be corrected to. 74394.
Line 18 should be corrected to 96394.
These errors, however, do not affect the percent M.A.C.
A corrected copy of this information was provided you on

January 11, 1973 in Chicago.
Sincerely,
ice President
Flight Safety and
Industry Affairs
?,,
Location: Elk Grove Township, Dlinois, on Route 62, one-halfmile west of Route 83
U i<O ' " ~·11 '"""~••US~.
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. fATION ~.:~:::::~~!)ER
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PLANNED ACTUAL
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EXCUJctNG
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CONFTRMED
BYAADIO
A.W. ISSUE DATE
1
1o ,,,..··
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SIGNED~~-VIJ""-·_:_·~-·~·~·-·~()~~~-~~·~-'--;·-
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National Tra~sportation
Safety Board
..
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!ADDO DCADD
nIADDDUA 12081706 2099 ·.. ·.
;r-.. ;~ ,·
553-08 9131 FJBG IAD4 ORDl I AD4 FPF . l. ·-: :·
01:45101:36 lOOHO 60 bo MSP· Rf I l . IAOOO :.

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5641~M 96111000 861/ 9il0 CLB 04-021 741 2 20 TTl.. . : .' <:[, .,, :
'·:.:J:·<.}" '<'
437 26110-096 341 17 30 190 .
RCA . 90 28 73 03 ,: ,; · :·.·,~.;: ~ .': .·
..·~. :
·.'
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POD 401 2fl 73 02 436 25123-099 3 '3 7 71
23063-030
•
17
63
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-l~D'I/ 73 :.•.L'.1
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., 100 M73 •
1 , ,
1
t
'.,' 961 01:49 •.• '·· ."1\ •• f, •
35 r I I ,
... t\i .. ' ·:)

I ~- !
960 01:47 . 99 M73 .. ' _-..:,·..

"
31
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't.,i I~_;.;:. ,t
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. 26 962 01: 42 101 )(
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'
'. ' 24 964 01:39 103 )( M73

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. ·. ); . _.,'.·.-.c•.
• :
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r .22 966 01:38 .105 )( M72 ' ;,
' 967 (11: 39 106 M69

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18 969 01:40 10 B )( M67 .'
, IJA553 B737/A 437 DCA Plfl40 280
'
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'
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" - DCA C9~ Jl 49 FWA FWA 31 lR CGT 097R CGT MOW 1 C/S '"' ·..
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-PYLD ESTMTO 12.0- .. .
'
RLS PER ABV FPF IFR IADDD HENRIKSEN !CW ORDDD •' ! ,·.
.I )'-..I I
'' .· .. !fl2.0B\70B 61+'•1 0100"<. .,

··.; . ~ . ', .
' ,
·'
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·Docket NCl. tJl\-435
Ex11.1lilt Nu. 2-K
~ATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D. Co· 20591
B-737 COCKPIT VISIBILITY DIAGRAM
1. Boeing Aircraft Co. Letter, February 8, 1973

2. Cockpit Visibility Diagram
'
d ·--e· "' ..
COMMERCIAL AIRPLANf t;f\Olll'
February 8, 1973
6-2810-2983-I/C
Mr • .NB.rty Spieser
Federal Office Building lOA, 8th Floor
8oo Independence Avenue Southwest
Subject: Pilot Visibility - 737
Dear .Marty:
Perhaps the enclosed will answer yOJ.r question a.bout the pilot's
forward and down visibility angle.
Fourteen degrees down ia the limit with the eye level close to the
reference eye :position. Model 7Cf1, 727 and 737 airplanes are all
the same in regard to visibility from the cockpit.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,
BOEill'G COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE COMPANY

(A division of The Boeing Company)
~
Enclosure
VISIBILITY AND EYE POSITION RELATIONSHIP
The diagram illustrates the visibility when a pilot is seated

with his eyes close to the reference eye position specified by
Civil Air Regulations. This provides adequate torward-
downward vision, and from this position he can substantially
improve his field of vision by moving his head slightly
forward or upward. This position affords a total forward field
of vision of approximately 33 d2grees, and also provides the
best view of the main instrument panels.
If a pilot is seated with his eyes below or aft of this reference

eye position, his normal forward-downward field of vision is
diminished. At 3 inches abovf: reference eye position, the
nose of the airplane becomes an obstruction and the pilot's
ability to improve his field of vision by head movement is
reduced. When he is seated below the reference position , his
ability to see the instruments over the control column is
impaired.
\
·~ ' Docket No. SA-435
EY.hibit No. 2-J

Washington, D. C. · 20591
·1
JEPPESEN CHARTS
1. Chicago Area Chart December 7, 1972

2. Mid.way, Localizer Runway 31L November 24, 1972
-
'f!_-~pp<rlen Appro,:uh Ch,irl NOV 24-72 <II])
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MIOWA¥low"' 118.7 119.2 126.2 Apr.Elev 619 1
-MIDWAY
LOC Rwy 3 1l
f~9.~~0 Appro•c~ Ri --lf ATIS 120.05 ] 09.9
T9:J~:-jR_I__ ,_ l-f-2-,}-~'7-,-------,
NOB Rwy
lllt l 09.9 IMXT
At\,<\
3 ll
gr._
121.7 c ~· 7 t•
;'11\)\\
t"-'11
'.'Ill!
1,-;u
I
.' ·c1
... I.JU
?18'
f •
-:. i ~I SO
' J,96a'
764' 756'
82.5'
"'0 • (;. !DC
109.9 IMX
> 847,b ' . /_OM
LlEDzif~ ,,
/11~ MX :::::J
ob b
-
0
0
.730'
I • 779'
n-sa 113.2 EON

I ijJ-40 114.2 CGT !AF B7-Ja
.1 020'
NOH:: final approach from ho!d!ng paltern at

• MX tOM not authorized •
]
MM LOM
-~
~
gl&
~~
0
');
EAST
10 NM
~"~1500' _,,?,\
2000'
~
• 0 (1389')
...... 311'.-[ltl (889')
~~~
TDZ RWY 3\t 611' ~ 2.7 ~~
APT.619 1 0 0.6 .3
PULL UP: Climbing LEFT turn to 2600 feet and proceed to EON VOR via
inbound R-001.
S RAIGHT ·JN LANDING RWY 31 t C!RCtE-T0°LAND
LOC NOB
MOA 1040' 429') MDA J] 20 1 509'
...___. ~ i-.,--,------'---""~·~·~·~·-+----------1~,--,----~··--------
A A
~ B B 1120 1 (501')-l
~ c c 1120'so1·-l 1h
D
~ 1180 1 (561')-2
Alt /NJA. l 040 1(429'} MDA 1120 1(509') E~g -------N;,-:s·kd ·------
~ ~"; J AB C:l D:ll/4 Jet 1280'(66/'J.2
~f,G~o~d~,-.-.~,~-K~,,--f,6~0-,~8~0.,-,l~0~0.,-;1~20,,,:71407,;',..;-16~0~N70~T~E~,~S~lid~l~o-g~,,-,7,,,-,,N~A.~----'-'----~-;
;h,~O~M:"."lo~M~A=P:"';:J_~3::):3~,~l8;:):;2~,z~9:):;'1,~5~9+;'1,~3~9+,~,~25;+.1~,~14~
CHANGES; tOCfr"<luency. 0 ··~ J£rPHEI" ~co. OEMVO,, Colo. u.s.1
J.ll"GHl"S RfSUVE!I
--- . ---·- -·---·
NUV 24-72@
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
MIDWAf fower J 18.7 J] 9.2 126.2 Apt. El~v 619'
Var 02~ E
ATIS 120.05 ] 09.9
CHICAGO Appro~d1 (RJ Dep~rt~r" [R)
119.35 119.35
.930'
(~ 260'
.-
825 ..
ii:• 965' 790'

'"1
'' '
<t •
o~B
..Q, 2300--T olo
,_
• 806'
::~ 894'• ~ cb838'.
• e899'
¢1·40
o. e730' • 779'
\,
I
e993' TAC.79
* PEOTONE /~,,
• 880'
113.2 EON .,
"
• 972' • 7-35'
0
.
1330 87-Se CHICAGO HEIGHTS VOR
lOM
I O NM _,S'-"O'-"U'-'T'-'H- i,~
~~
2300' --04zo
{1682') -........... 21 00' ~ ~
(1482') §#~~r.~42°
'{?
·~
.
_
TDZRWY4R618'
5. l 0 APT. 619'
PULL UP: Climbing RIGHT turn to 2600 feet and proceed direct to EON VOR
and hold /'~ORTH, RIGHT turns, 190° inbound.
STRAI HT-IN LANDING RW'r'4R C!RCtE.TQ.LAN
toe NOB
we NOB
l 040'(422') 1140 1(522') ,,,,,
MO_.. /.;DA
,,,,,
''
I
A A
l l 20'(501')-I 1140'(5'1')-I ~·
'0 B B
'' c c 1120 1 soP.:J112 1140'(521j:J1;,

71µ D
D 1180'(561')-2 1180' {561 'J-2
'
0
• MDA l 040'(422') "'0A 1140 1(522'}
•
3 ----
Non.Sl:d --No-;;:s~d
I
6Q - 80 100 120
A,B,C;
140
l D: l1/.o1
160
J" '" 1280' {661 ')-2
NOTE: SlidJng scale NA.
1280'(661'/-2
5.1 s-:06 3:5o 3:04 2:33 2: i 1 i :55

•, CHANGES. None. 0 1711 OfP•!~! N ~CO .. ll!NVI" • 010. (l.,.A.
All PIC,o<I\ '!",f•VIU
..
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS @) JUN 2.72 ~PPtJJen Approach Chet,-/

·MIDWAY APL NOTE: Airport of entry.
Elev619r 4l"47'N 87"45'W
VOT 11 l.0
.j
I
682'
(63').
678'
(59')
c
')675'
. (56')
-r---r-
732' 744'
~{113') J,1125')
B!d11 Area
Bld11 Are ..
Sule in Feet
1000 2DDD 3000
ADDITJONAL RUNWAY INFORMATION

USEABLE LENGTHS
LANDING BEYOND
l
RWY tJGHTING 0TRY"'~ii1HT Glide Slape TAKE-OFF
WIDTH
HIRL REil VASl-R an le 3"24' 5594' 5594'
·I H!Rl REIL VASl-R 150'
•' 5349' 5349'
" 22
R MIRL
5116'
4919'
4927'
4770' 150'
9 4155' 4155'
27 M!Rl 4306' 4306' 175'
13R0 HIRL HfALS SFL RVR 6055' 6055' 5204'
3Jl H!Rl REil VASl-l an le 3°24' 6141' 6141' 150'
13 l
MlRL 4718' 4569'
31R 5163' 4948' 150'
"a 36 MJRL 4448' 4448'

4326' 4326' 175'
0 Runway grooved.
6Avai!able only thru Control Tower.
AIR CARRIER TAKE-OFF ALTERNATE

f.O K£·0Ff .Ol IN flLfD WHHIN IA'-f Ol'f .O\fN FllfD W!IHIN AKE·OfFALIN
CEIUNG-V!SIB!tlTY
15 M,., P"'"" JO M•o J.,,i,,.,~ I H•2(~~ 2H•Jl.4f~9. NOT FllfD
Other
Ahn A t&Non.Skd A!! Carrie" ltS Approach Aopro,.ch
200 600-2
ceiling•
landinQ Non.~kd3&4EnoJel 800-2
Wealher
Minima
700-2
CAUTION: Tall b!dg~ &twn to 2049' 8,0 NM a FAR Part 135 Operalor.s: Rwy 13R 200 ceiling·RYR 24.
Northeast, plan de ,irture lo ,ivmd this area.
CHANGES: VASI rwvs 4R IS.. 31 l. 0 1, .. J( . . f$l,_ i CO. Of""' I•. COIO .. u.S •.o..
o.[LOJC.M~U~H>'(C>
Docket No. S/\_-435
Exhibit No. 9-A
NATIONAL· TP.A.NSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
SYSTEMS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACIDAL REPORT

OF INVESTIGATION
BY
w. B. Weston
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-A
Washington, D. C.
February l, l973
SYSTEMS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT
A. ACCIDENT
United Airlines Boeing 737, N903lU, on approach to Runway 31L Chicago

Midway Airport crashed l 3/4 miles short at 3724 West 70th Street at approx-
imately 1429 e.s.t.
B. SYSTEMS GROUP
w. Weston National Transportation Safety Board,

Group Chairman
w. Dixon Federal Aviation Administration
J. Cincotta Federal Aviation Administration
c. Tomasso Federal Aviation Administration
J. W!brthrnan United Airlines
c. Hunrpry United Airlines
o. Anderson United ·Airlines
w. Robertson Air Line Pilots Association
c. SUMMARY
1. Landing flaps were nearly fully extended.
2. Leading edge devices were extended.
3. All spoilers were stowed.

4. The landing gear was very nearly up.
5. The horizontal jackscrew measurement was equal to ~-1/2 units of

nose u,v trim.
6. The left wing anti-ice valve was closed. 'fhe right wing anti-ice
valve was destroyed.
- 2 -
7. The "A" system hydraulic pump switches were in the "off" position.
8. The "A" system hydraulic pumps appeared to be operational. The

"B" system pumps appeared to be operational.
9. The total air temperature - engine pressure ratio computer (T.A.T.

MAX E.P.R.) selector was in the "go around" mode.
10. Electrical power was available up to the time of crash, based upon
recordings of ill(pact on the voice recorder tape.
Cockpit
The cockpit was disrupted at impact leaving only the captain's instrument
panel intact, but burned. The pedestal was torn out and was recovered some
distance from the cavtain's station. The first Officer's station including
his instrument panel was missing. The center instrument panel was recovered
separately from beneath a large area of wreckage. The instruments normally
installed in the center instrument panel gave evidence of having been affected
by the ensuing ground fire. Several other instruments identified as first
o:f:ficer's were recovered from ashen rubble. These instruments were recognizable
by shape only.
Cockpit Instrumentation
Captain's Attitude Director Indicator S/N 400
The captain's A.S.I. was recovered and taken to the United Airlines
Maintenance Base for a complete investigation. The instrument was tested
and was found to be operational and normal in all modes except "go around."
Further examination disclosed that the command bars would not function because
of fire damage to components related to their movement.
Captain's Airspeed Indicator S/N AA8526A
The captain's airspeed indicator was recovered from the panel intact and
taken to the United Airlines Maintenance Base for examination. The unit met
the specifications for normal operation.
Captain's Radio Altimeter S/N 334

The captain's radio altimeter displayed effects of exposure to fire. The
indicator pointer was at zero and a flag was displayed.
- 3 -
Captain's Horizontal Situation Indicator S/N UAL MR 4l309-7l0
The captain's H .S .I. case was sooted. The course selected was 3l 7~
The compass card indicated a heading of 35l~ All flags were displayed .
Captain's Radio Magnetic Indicator
The captain's R.M.I. needles were freely rotational. The compass card
0
indicated 34l • The mode selector was set at "A.D.F."
First Officer's Instruments
Some of the first officer's instruments were found but were damaged to
the extent that they could not be positively identified.
Engine Instruments
All engine instruments were superfically burned. The number one engine
pressure ratio instrument S/N 0767 indicated l.66 w:ith l.97 showing in the
window.
The number two engine EPR instrwnent S/N D544 indicated l.90 with a
reading of l-95 in the window.
The number one exhaust gas temperature S/N Al4ll gauge pointer was missing.
The number two exhaust gas temperature gauge was damaged to the extent that
no reading could be·observed.
No. l Nl tachometer S/N D3478 indicated 110,. II

11
No. 2 N2 tachometer S/N C8593 indicated "O o
The number one N2 gauge S/N Xl8575 indicated l2"/o
The number two N2 gauge S/N D4275 indicated 83"/o
The number one fuel gauge s/N D0286 indicated 5300 pounds per hour.
The number two fuel flow gauge S/N UAL MR 73363-253 indicated 200 pounds
per hour.
The number one fuel g_uanti ty gauge S/N l223C indicated 5700 lb. The
nllinber two fuel quantity S/N l444 instrument indicated 5700 lbs. The center
tank instrument S/N 762c indicated 6000 lbs.
- 4 -
Auto Flig!lt Panel
The captain's flight director panel mode selector switch was in "VOR/LOC
11
position.
The first officer's flight director panel mode selector switch was "off."
The auto pilot switches were "off." The hydraulic system mode selector switch
11
was in B 11 position.
Pedestal
The pedestal was found in the main wreckage area torn entirely away from
the cockpit area. The flap handle was freely movable between the 30 unit
position and full down position. The speed brake handle was stowed. The
number one power lever was in mid range (cruise). The number two power lever
was in "idle detent." The number two start lever was in an intermediate pos-
ition. The stabilizer trim wheel was positioned at 6-1/2 units aircraft
nose up.
Lower Instrument Panel
Vertical Gyro Panel
The vertical gyro selector knob was sw.Ltched to "captain's auxiliary"

position.
Transponder Panel
The mode selector was fl'.W:l.tched to "A". The power switch was in "standby."
ADF Panel
The antenna selector switch was in the "ATIF position. The tuning band
selector was in the low range position.
Engine and APU Fire Panel
All levers were in and latched
Overhead Panel
The main overhead panel was incomplete because of impact damage. The
sub panels remaining are herein documented.
- 5 -
Fuel Panel
The fuel panel cros.s feed valve selector was in the "closed" position.
llie center tank fuel pump switches were 11 off." llie main fuel tank fuel
punrp swi•tch es were II on. II
Hydraulic Panel
llie hydraulic "A" system switches were "off. 11 llie 11

B 11 system STN.i tche s
were "on." llie ground interconnect switch was closed. '.!:his panel had been
handled before it was examined by the systems grou;p.
Anti Ice Panel
Both engine anti-ice switches were "on." Pitot heat switches were "on."
Window heat switch positions were determined electrically to be on. Filaments
in bulbs were stretched indicating window heat was on. Filii.ments in bulbs
associated with overheat were normal.
Pressurization Panel
llie panel was deformed. llie No. l bleed swi.tch was "closed." llie No. 2
bleed switch was "on." The APU bleed switch position could not be determined.
Both left and right pack switches were "off." llie isolation valve switch was
in the 11 norinal 11 position ..
Thrust Reverser Panel
Both thrust reverser switches were down and guarded.
Electrical Panel
llie gauges in this panel were unreadable. llie gauge selector switch was
11
in 11 standby... llie battery switch was "on" and guarded. llie galley power
switch was on. llie standby power switch was in "auto."
llie constant speed drive switches were "on" and guarded. llie bus transfer
switch was in "auto" and guarded. llie amp meters indicated "zero." The ground
power switch was "off." The APU generator switches were "off."
Flight Control Panel

J1
Both A and B flight control switches were on. II llie alternate flap switch
'iras "off." llie A and B spoiler switches were Tl
on. 1f The yaw damper switch was
IJ 0f'f' • II
- 6 -
Circuit Breaker Light Panel
The emergency exit light switch was in the "armed" position. This
panel was mostly destroyed by fire and impact.
Landing Lights
The left and right outboard landing light switches were in the center
position. The left and right inboard landing lights were in the down position.
The taxi light switch was in the "off" position.
Pneumatics
The left wing anti..;lj_ce valve was in the "closed" position. The right
wing anti-ice valve was destroyed. Both air conditioning pack valves were
in thenclosed 11 position.
Engine anti-ice and bleed valve positions may be found in the Powerplants
Group Chairman's Factual Report.
Landing Gear
The left main landing gear was found almost full up but not completely
within the up lock.
The nose gear was separated from the aircraft. The right main gear was
separated from the aircraft.
Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator
The main stabilizer trim actuator S/N 048-29AA was tested at the United
Airlines Maintenance Base and was found to be normal in all respects.
The auto pilot s/N 22121-28 stabilizer trim actuator motor was also tested
and found to be normal and within test specifications.
The horizontal jackscrew extension was measured at 14 1/2 " The associated
cables drum was intact.
Spoilers
Ground Spoilers
Inboard Panel Actuators
Left Outboard S/N 34

Left Inboard S/N '3fj
Right Outboard S/N 303
Right Inboard S/N 153
- 7 -
All were originally recovered from the accident scene with actuator
rods extended. Actuator rods extended equal spoiler panels retracted or
"stowed." Further X-ray and shop examinations at the linited Airlines
Ma.:l.ntenance Base supported the original findings.
Outbcn.rd 8poiler Panel Actuators
Each outboard ground spoiler panel has one actuator. Only the lef't
actuator, S/N 100 was recovered. The actuator was in the electrically
locked panel retracted posit~on.
Fliglit 8poiler Actuators
S/N 3!34618, S/N 3!34634, S/N 362 and MR 27695-5 (UAL No.) were recovered
f'rom the wreckage. All were retracted, which is the f'light spoiler "stowed"
position. X-rays and shop examination supported the findings of' "stowed"
position.
Slat Actuators
S/N 578, S/N 278 and S/N 134 were recovered f'rom the wreckage in the
extended position equal to slat· "extended."
The landing f'lap jackscrews were extended to within 5 threads of' the
mechanical stop.
Air Data Computer System
Captain's S/N Kll23 1st Of'f'icer's S/N Kl003
Both air data computers were recovered. Each computer incorporates a

pressure sensor module which drives its associated pilots altimeter when
the altimeter is selected to "servo mode."
The altitude module is not corrected f'or local barometric pressure

but operates on 29.92 in. hg, standard barometric pressure .. Barometric ad-
justments are accomplished in the altimeter as in any other pneumatic altimeter
f'or either mode of' operation.
At any given elevation, a pair of' altitude llJ'l!lc::t'<!>B will be positioned

within the altitude sensor in each unit by a barometric pressure sensing bellows.
The angular relationship of' the associated syncro rotor to the syncro stator
may be measured electrically, and translated to pressure altitude. This ex-
ercise was accomplished at the instrument shop facility of United Airlines Inc.
Maintenance Base f'or the Systems Group. The captain' s fine altitude syncro
No. l indicated a reading of 46.95°, equal to 552' msl. The first of'f'icer's
f'ine altitude module syncro readout was 43.o8 equal to 598• pressure altitude.
- 8 -
The above readings are not corrected for local barometric pressure.
The above readings were measured before electrical excitation was

applied to the units for further testing. When electrical power is re-
moved for any reason, the altitude syncros do not move but remain in the
position they were in. A test was performed to illustrate this condition
and there was negJ:fgibie coasting or movement of the syncros within each
altitude module. '
A second function of the altitude unit is to drive an altitude encoding

device wich provides an input to the iata.nsponder in mode "C" •· It is in
this mode that the transponder provides the A.R.T S. system with continuous
altitude reporting·at the Air Traffic Control Centers or the approach control
centers of the FAA facilities.
Further investigation into the operation of the air data control

altitude modules was performed at the Kollsman Instrument Company laboratory.
The units were subjected to loads up to lOGs in a centrifuge, along the
longitudinal axis and also at 90° to that axis. The results of the examination
are attached to this report and i.s embodied within the Kollsman report on the
air data computers.
A function of the air data computer is an airspeed sensing device wich

sends signals to the flight recorder. This function was found to be inop-
erative in the captain's ADC unit. The fault was believed to be caused by
an unmeshed pair of gears allowing the gear train to run to its limit which
is eg_ual to approximately 440 kts.
The case of both ADC units were sooted and slightly bent at the front.
A complete report on fue above tests may be found in the attached Kollsman
report.
Altimeters
Captain's S/N 7458 (From Maintenance Records)
The captain's altimeter was damaged in:bernally by heat. It could not

be operated in the servo mode because of overheated electrical components.
Pneumatic operation was eratic due to foreign material within, caused by
exploded electrical components.
lst Officer's S/N 4928 (From Maintenance Records)
The first officer's altimeter was gutted by fire. The pneumatic capsule
portion was missing. The electronics making up the servo mode of opeation
were burned. The glass was missing and the l0,000 foot pointer was ungeared
and free to take up any position. The ,hundred and thousand foot pointer were
geared together but their relationship geometrically was such that no meaningful
reading could be obtained from the burned face, even though the hands remained
on their respective shafts. A complete report on both altimeters may be found
in the attached Kollsman report.
- 9 -
Hydraulics
Riglit Elevator Boost Pack8£ie S/N 0056
The right elevator boost package was subjected to a thorough shop test
at the United Airlines I.nc. Maintenance Base '!-t San Francisco. All findings
were entirely-normal with completely normal l:lJ?8ration.
Left Elevator Boost Package S/N 0240
The left unit was tested similarly and found to be without defect.
No. l Engine Driven Hydraulic PLugp MB 29l47.l74o
This pump was examined by the Systems Group of the United Airlines Inc .
Maintenance Base. The pump was capable of normal operation, with the exception
of a broken solonoid.
No. 2 Engine Driven Hydraulic PLugp
This pump was similarly examined and was found to have debris in the
inlet. Further te!lr down disclosed a broken connector to the solonid unit.
Although the pump was not rotational because of the debris, there was no
damage to the pump internally. · All internal parts looked '.normal open dis-
assembly. There was evidence of heat absorption through the pump case.
R. H. "B" Hydraulic PLugp S/N MR. 29l48-l48
The motor was rotational but damaged by fire. The pump was damaged
to the extent that it could mt be turned.
L. H. "B" Hydraulic PLugp S/N MR 29l48-24l
This pump was severely fire damaged. The bearings were filled with
molten material.
Pitot Static System
A pitot probe S/N 576 was recovered nearly intact. It had been torn
away from ·its mounting approximately l/2" above the base. The probe portion
exhibited peening at the pi tot opening and was scrubbed along : i t9 length
in a pattern of appro:x:Lmately 3/8" wide. The wires associated with the
heater coils within,were broken away.
- lO -
A portion of one other probe, S/N )Sl3 was recovered minus the pi tot
tube.
The probe, S/N 576 will be subjected to further study and a report on
that investigation will be attached to the Systems Group Factual Report
as an exhibit.
The right and left static selector valves were recovered from the
wreckage. The valve passages were clear and unobstructed. ·The selector
handles were in the "normal" position. Both selector handles were operational.
Frequency Tuning
Captain's Frequency Selector Panel
The No. l NAV. head was selected to l09.90 MHz.
The DME/STBY Sw was in "standby." Both audio volUllle controls were pos-
itioned full clockwise.
Connnunications Panel
The No. l VHF Com. head was selected to ll8.79 MHz.
Co-pilots Frequency Selector Panel
The No. 2 NAV. head was selected to lll19.70 MHz.
The No. 2 VHF. Com. b.ead was selected to l3l .60 MHz.
The connnunications volUllle control was positioned full counter-clockwise
The NAV volUllle control was just off the counter clock-lri.Be stop.
Other switch positions were not available on account of damage.
Y. B. Weston
Air Safety InVestigator
Docket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 9-A
NATIONAL TRANSFl'.JRTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D. C.
February 20, 1973
SYSTEMS GROUP CHAIRNAN' S FACTUAL REFl'.JRT
ADDENDUM
A.t the accident scene, the captain's altimeter displayed a

baro~etric setting of 30.05 in. hg.
l
j Th.e first officer's altimeter displayed a barometric setting of
J' 30.'04 in .. hg. ·
j
I The horizontal jackscrew setting of 6~ units aircraft noseup is
based.upon The Boeing Co. method of interpretation; It is equal to
the Unifed Air Lines interpretation 9~ units aircraft noseup.
. _._::.; ·-....~::.._..~--~,;.. .... ~_:::..::..,._~~
. ':
~-~'·'•·,•· --::-;-:--·-··-··
Docket lfo. 435

EY.hibi t Ho. llB
NATIONAL TBAHSPORTATION SAFErY BOARD

DEPARTMENT OF TR4NSPORTATIOl'f
MAINTENANCE RBJORI:s GROUP

ll-B FLIGHT LOGS, PAGE3 595-13, 595-08
By
Noel D. I,a.wson
' ~' .
. ·-:--.{._ ,.
I
I
i
j
..... ~~ ..
UNITED AIR LINt':S C/IPT. SIGN DOMICILE DAT( ENTE11 i '
'
AIRPLANE L...LL~~~~,1'.,~'.!__~~~~L.:'~~fZ:___0_.J_JL._'.(~f_L~'>:__i,__{7~2:=L~~~~~~~~'~'~-rC,1-3~/~~~
FLIGHT LOG
fLO.
SEE UALM~\ 7.0
FLIGHT CREW MAKE ENTRIES IN WHITE AREA
LBS. FUEL AT STATIONS FLIGHT TIME INDICATE NUMBER & TYPE OF
FLIGHT NO. GALLONS CHECI<: ACCOti.1PLJSHEO MAINTENANCE RELEASE.
& DATE BOARDED BLOCK BLOCK SIGNATURES s:rA.
OE'.PT. ARR fROM TO OFF ON
"R MINS
OTHER r~o. J 5VC 110.l SVC A 0 c
/(-· 'i( _, - - ..
1.<r(i c 5 ~
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Docket N9. 435

ExhibitNI. llA
I
I
WASITTNGTON, D. C. 2059l
;
i
HAINTENA."ICE RECORDS GROU:? CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
By
Noel D. Lawson
.,
·''
~
.j
•
ij
NATIONAL TRANSPORTA.TION SAFETY BOARD
GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
A. ACCIDENT I
I
I
Location: Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois

Aircraft: Boeing 737, N9031U, United Air Lines, Flt. 553-8
B. RECORDS GROUP
Members: Noel D. Lawson, National Transportation Safety Board
Robert c. Sanchez, Federal Aviation Administration
J. H ~ Kearns, United Air Lines
Fred Ryalis, Airline Pilots Association
C. SUMMARY
The Record Group assembled on December ll, 1972, at 0800 P.s,t.,
I' however, the actual records review began on December l2, 1972, at
the United Air Lines,· Maintenance Facility, San Francisco,
California. A comprehensive examination of the complete maintenance
records and flight log sheets from September 1972 through Dec.ember 8,
I
;
'
1972, was accomplished. In addition, the records involved in the
last major inspection ("C" check - dated March 23, 1972) were reviewed.
A total of nine (9) specific items were covered as listed below.
l Item l . Flight log sheets 9/1/72 through 12/8/72

i Item 2. Nonroutine worksheets and cards (UAL Form 1338)
includes flight and ground maintenance writeups
''
~
plus inclusive inspection.
Item 3. Chronic Items
'.1
:'! Item 4. Deferred Item
:I
Item 5. Last major ins:pection ("C" Check)
"~ Item 6. Change order authorization (Engineering Order)
Item 7. Mechanical reliability report
Item 8. Flight/Aircraft mechanical irregularity
Item 9. Airworthiness Directives
D. AIBCRA."T AND POWERPLANT DATA
Aircraft Boeing 737

Registration N903lU, s/n 19069
Registered Owner United Air Lines, Inc.
;
'I
i
.l
'
- 2 -
Airframe total time as of l2/8/72: 7247 .38

Engines Two (2) Pratt & Whitney JT8D-7
Engines total time #l - 5852. #2 - 6554
E. RECORDS REVIEW
Item l. Flight Log Sheets (Exhibit llB)
Examination of the flight log pages showed six (6) repetitive
type flightcrew w.riteup/discrepancies. These were:
a. Captain's Air Data Computer

;
Six (6) w.riteups, all with corrective action taken.
~
I, The last such w.riteup occurred on November 5, l972,
' log page #593-l3. "Capt. altimeter will not stay in
.;'
! corrected mode. Chronic. A/C not suited for CAT II
j operations. Mock trim lite and altitude alert light
comes on when altimeter shifts to stby. suspect #l
j Air Data Computer."
' Corrective action: Replaced #1 CADC self test O.K.

i Pitot static leak check O.K.
~ b. Captain's Altimeter
j
Three (3) w.riteups, all with corrective action taken.
j I
One discrepancy was found on a B6 maintenance check and
j corrective action was taken.
j
J
' The most recent w.riteup was on November 5, 1972 - see
l
1
Item la above. On November 3, 1972, log page 595-08
a crew w.riteup was: "Capt. altimeter will not operate
in corrected mode.n
l
l Corrective action: Replaced altimeter static check O.K.
l
1 c. Captain's Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IVSI)
l
·1
1 Three (3) w.riteups_, all with corrective action taken.
:i
i The la.st.such discrepancy occurred on November 21, 1972.
~
d. "A11 & nB 11 Hydraulic Systems
! I
!
Three (3) writeups, all with corrective action taken.
i.I One discrepancy wa.s found on a B6 maintenance check and
corrective action was taken.
1l
The la.st discrepancy occurred on December 6, l972.
i ·.
\
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e. Numbers l and 2 Fuel Tank Indicators
Eleven (ll) -writeups, all with corrective action taken,

plus numerous maintenance -writeups. These were all
corrected with the last -writeup noted on December l,
l972.
f. Flight Recorder
Two (2) -writeups, with corrective action taken. One

discrepancy on a B7 Maintenance check and one discrepancy
on a #l service check both with corrective action taken.
The most recent discrepancy was on November 20, l972.
Item 2. Nonroutine Work Cards
All work cards dated 9/l/72 through l2/8/72, were reviewed.

Work cards and the inspection paper work was also reviewed
for the most recent "C" check (Maintenance Inspection) which
was accomplished on March 23, l972, at Chicago, Illinois. It
is noted that the work cards (l38•s) from LaGuardia Airport,
New York, never arrived at San Francisco. Therefore, could
not be reviewed. Also seven (7) work cards were missing in
the overall review, however, cross-referencing the maintenance
records showed no pertinent or noteworthy items to be considered.
Item 3. Chronic Items

··..
This review disclosed no maintenance items in an open status.
The Company defines a chronic item as an item reported three
(3) times within ten log pages.
Item 4. Deferred Item Form
There were three ( 3) deferred i terns on UAL Form UOl06DOV,

these were: (l) used spare seals left main strut, (2)
recheck right tunnel below forward mug service panel on
inside; E & E compartment right side and bottom and forward
pit floor aft to ·distribution bay. A/C cleared per GN/MM
4-0-6-4 for toilet leak corrosion. (3) Forward cargo door
seal torn midway forward edge about l inch. Accomplish on
telcoa 9-l087.
These items were deferred to the nert maintenance check.
'·
·- ·····-·-··---- --··--· .. .-
- 4-
'Item 5. Major Inspection (L3.st "C" Check)
No significant items noted. All work cards issued had

corrective action taken.
Item 6. Change Order Authorization (UAL Form SFR 3206)
All GOA' s accomplished were reviewed. The last GOA was

accomplished during a #1 service check at Detroit on ll/23/72.
Item 7. Mechanical Reliability Report
There were no MRR' s initiated on this aircraft from December

1970 to date.
Item 8. Maintenance Interruption Summary
This item was covered using UAL Form U087 (Flight/Aircraft

Mechanical Irregularity). It is used by UAL for all
irregulzrities. A total of sixteen (16) items were reported
and all had corrective action.
Item 9. Airworthiness Directives
A total of ten (10) airworthiness directives have been

issued on the B-737 aircraft. All applicable AD' s hail
been accomplished on this airplane.
Attacbments
'·
I
Docketd,fo. 435
,. , Ex:hibi t' No. 11-C
.
·!
NA:r'IONAL TRA1'1SFORrATION SAFE.PY BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF Tfo\HSFORTATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20591
MAINTENANCE RECORDS GROUP

11-C DEFERRED ITE."1 SHEET
; .
By
})oel D. Lawson
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D:Jcket No. SA-435
Exhibit No. 8A '

Washington, D. C.
February 23, 1973
POWERPLArlTS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

ADDENDA./ERPAT.A SKEET
A. ACCIDENT.
United Air Lines, Flight 553, B-737, N903lU, Chicago, Illinois,

December 8, 1972.
The folloWing additions and corrections have been incorporated

within the "POWERPLANTS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTI-
GATION", dated January 23, 1973. If appropriate, the affected
paragraphs are presented with the specific correction/addition
underlined.
Page 3; Section C; Items 1 and 8
Add the following to. these statements:
7. The No. 1 engine fuel shutoff valve, located on the wing front
spar, was open. Valve
8. Impact and ground fire damage
Page 4; l'aragraph 4
Add the following sentence to the end of the paragraph
Ducting do,mstream of the anti-ice valve was separated and was

not recovered.
/
Page 9; Paragraph 4; Bearings
-
Add the following statement to the beginning of the paragraph
The No. 1 bearing rollers were missing from the cage, the bearing
cage and inner race remaining on the hub journal.
Page 10; First paragraph; last sentence.
· Change this sentence to the following:

. '•.
.. ; .: -.. .. :·~·.. ~.:.~"..: ~ :-~·:·. _:::..... ;.-:'.'··~~.··: -::~·:. ::·::.:·: .. :·.·:~.·.~:.1·.. .~r .. · .. · .·:·~·· .. : ·· ... :·· ,:_.:;-:::."-..-.:;:.;:·.;
· :; ·, • ·s-tage"Sleed .a-ir ·manifold check· 'valves· operated freely. ,, .... :- ·
:. ~
-. . .- ... . .
.: ~ ;
·.
'Dbtket No. SA-43··
Exhibit No. 8A

Washington, D. C.
POWERPLANT GROUP CHAIRMAN'S FACTUAL REPORT OF. INVESTIGATION
By
Edward P. Wizniak
Bu:ceau of Aviation Safety
Washington, D. C.
January 23, 1913
POWERPLANT GROUP CHAIPJ\IAN 'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
A. ACCIDENT
United Air Lines, Flight 553, Boeing B-131, N9031U, Chicago, Illinois,
December 8, 19[2.
B• POWE.RPLANT GROUP
The investigation was conducted in two phases as described below:
(1) Phase I an on-site examination of the engines, cowling,

fuel system and thrust reversers accomplished between
12-9-72 and 12-13-[2.
(2) Phase II - a detailed disassembly of both engines at the

United Air Lines Maintenance Base in San Francisco,
California conducted between 12-15-72 and 12-22-[2.
The following individuals participated in the indicated investigative

phases as representatives of their designated organizati.ons:
E. P. Wizniak Phase I & II National Transportation

Safety Board - Group
Chairman
c. A. Fluet Phase I & II National Transportation

Safety Board
H. A. Young Phase I Federal Aviation

I
Administration
R. C. Avelino Phase II Federal Aviation

Administration
J. K. Goodwine Phase I & II United Air Lines
H. Lew, Jr, Phase II United Air Lines
w. R. Lambert Phase II The Boeing Company

Powerplant Group r.1,'<irman's Factual Report of Investigation - 2 -
B. POWERPLANTS GR'.'lro (cont'd)
P. J. Lou<:r~n Phase II - The Boeing Company
J .. C. Herg,,,nrother - Phase I - Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
D. Lester Phase I I - Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
James LeRoy Phase I - Air Line Pilots Association

John LeRoy Phase I - Air Line Pilots Association
R. L. Glassaway Phase I I - Air Line Pilots Association
D. Hoagland Phase I - International Association of

Machinists and Aerospace
Workers
J. Daleo Phase I - International Association of

Workers
B. Jiminez Phase II - International Association of

Workers
C. SUMMARY
1. Both engines received extensive damage to the compressors from

foreign objects and broken compressor blade ingestion as well as impact
forces. Rotational damage was substantially uniform in nature with blade
bending opposite to the direction of compressor rotation.
2. Metallic deposits (nonglobular) were found adhering to combustion

·chamber (burner can) domes, turbine blades and turbine vanes in both
engines.
3. A dried mud-like composition was evenly deposited on turbine blades

and vanes of the No. 2 engine.
4. Thrust reverser lock hooks on the No. 1 engine were disengaged, but
the thrust reverser was found in the forward thrust (stowed) position. The
No. 2 engine thrust reverser was found locked in the forward thrust position.
5. Vegetation and debris were found in the eighth stage engine and
aircraft bleed air system. The 13th stage bleed manifold diC! not contain
any debris or vegetation.
6. Both low-pressure turbine shafts were twisted.

Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 3 -
C. SUMMARY (cont'd).
7. The No. 1 engine fuel shutoff valve was open. Valve positi~·
determination for the No. 2 engine fuel shutoff valve was not possibl,.
8. Impact damage to both jet fuel controls precluded lever ar~

position det.erminations.
9. The main oil pumps of both engines were undamaged and free of
foreign material. The main oil filters of both engines were also ·free of
foreign particles.
10. The engine inlet and nose cowl anti-ice valves on both engines
were open.
D. DETAIIS OF INVESTIGATION
Statistics
The aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Aircraft
(P&WA) JT8D-7A turbo-fan engines.
Statistical data for each engine as of the time of the accident

is presented below:
POSITION SERIAL NUMBER TOTAL TIME (HRS.) THERMAL CYCIES
1 p655956 5852 8512

2 p65584o 6554 9156
The No. 1 engine combustion chambers were modified to incorporate
Pratt & Whitney Se1'vice Bulletin SB 2531, ("Reduced Smoke E!!lission
Configuration" ) . The No. 2 engine did not incorporate SB 2531.
Phase I - On-Site Investigation
No. l Engine
General Conditions
The No. 1 engine was located adjacent to the left side of

the fuselage in the area of the rear cabin door. As viewed from
the rear_, the engine vras resting 90° counterclockwise from its
normal mounting position. The forward portion of the engine was
lodged beneath the left wing. The fan inlet and front fan cases
separated from the engine and came to rest approximately 10 feet
ahead of the plane of separation. The forward area of the com-
pressor was subjected to localized ground· fire.
Separated engine components were located in several areas

adjacent to the engine. Recovered components were identified and
shipped to San Francisco for examination.
· Powerplant Group Chairrut" 's Factual Rc;port of Investigation - 4 -
Engine Condj ~·'on
All of the first stage fan blades were broken off above
the blade root platform. Most of the second stage fan blades
were bent opposite to the direction of compressor rotationj
however, four blades were bent in the direction of rotation in
an area where the "engine had sustained impact flainage.
The third stage compressor disk (PN 494903) was located

beneath the engine. Seven blade roots Temained in the disk;
all others were missing.
Twenty-four blades of the fouyth stage compressor disk

were broken or missing. All remaining blades were bent opposite
to the direction of compressor rotation.
External pneumatic system ducting sustained extensive

impact damage, consisting of bending and crushing; however,
the ducting remained attached to the engine. The left and right
air inlet anti-ice valves and nose cowl anti-ice valve were open
(supplying heated air to the inlet guide vanes and nose cowl).
The fourth stage turbine blade trailing edges appeared to

be undamaged. No metallic debris was observed in the exhaust
section.
The power control shaft (cross-shaft) to the jet fuel

control had all the rod ends attached, but was separated frcm
the accessory and component drives gearbox.
No. 2 Engine
General Conditions
The No. 2 engine was located approximately 20 feet from

the.right side of the fuselage, parallel to the fuselage center-
line. The engine was resting in approximately a 30° nose down
attitude with the inlet area covered by a large amount of debris,
including building construction material. As viewed from the
rear, the engine was rotated 90° clockwise from its normal
mounting position. Evidence of localized ground fire was noted
in the area of the accessory and component drives gearbox.
Engine Condition
Extensive foreign object damage was sustained on the leading

edges of the first and second stage fan blades. The blades were
bent opposite to the direction of compressor rotation.
Powerplant Group Chg_irman's Factual Report of Investigation - 5 -
Engine Cur1dition (cont'd)
Woe . brick pieces, and plasterboard debris were found .1 !1

tl1e fan l.::·:"' t duct and engine exl1aust section. se~reral fan
discharge va:;es were detached.·
PneU.7.9.t.ic system ducting received substa~.tial impact damage,

consistir:g c.f denting and crushing; hovrever) the duct sy-stem
remained attached to the engine. The left and right air inlet
anti-ice valves and nose cowl anti-ice valve were opeD.
The fourth stage turbine blade trailing edges did not

sustain any visible damage, and no metallic debr~s was found
in the exhaust section.
After the engine was removed from its initial resting place,
the fuel filter was disassembled and examined. The fuel filter
sump drain contained a small crystalline ice deposit. The fuel
filter element was blackened and separated frc~ its metal support.
No fuel 1'/as found in the filter or housing; ho·we 1er_, a small
1
deposit of condensation appeared on the inside of the filter

housing. The area around the fuel filter had sustained local-
ized ground fire damage.
The oil tank, which was crushed and leak:'.ng, remained

attached to the engine.
The forward engine mount was intact with the engine to

airplane mounting bolts broken.
No. 1 and No. 2 Engines - Joint Observations
Cowling
Most of the cowling remained attached to the engines aft

of the inlet area. In general, the cowling sustained extensive
impact damage; however) no evidence ¥.'as obser-.red cf an~r in-flight
fire) cowling or engine case penetrations due to the liberatio:i
of any rotating components from the interior of the e~gines.
Ground fire damage was present on the fo:rvard lower inboard

area of the No. 2 engine cowling.
All visible cowl latches were securedJ ar.d the thrust

reversers of both engines were found in the fori;~.. ard thrust position.
The nose cowls) which were separated frc::; the engi!1es; 1rere
located in areas slightly forward of their !'2spective poi·lerplants.
The nose co1-1ls sustained severe impact da.!!lage.
. Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 6 -
Fuel System
The crossfeed valve ( PN 6563, SN 2513) and No. 1 eng:ir.'.c

fuel shutoff valve (SN 2501) were located in an area of t)-,.,
left wing which had been subjected to localized ground fir·.
and impact. The crossfeed valve was closed ·and the No. 1
engine fuel shutoff valve was open.
Pieces of the No. 2 engine fuel shutoff valve were lcc'at0d

in an area of tl1e right wing, which sustained extensive .gru 1:-.r:!.
fire and impact damage. The remaining fragments of the valve
yielded no indication of the valve position at impact.
Although impact- and fire-damaged, the remaining left and

right wing fuel lines were located in their proper positions.
Five fuel boost pumps were located in the wreckage. Three

pumps were mounted in the left wing; one was mounted in the
right wing; and one was separated from its mount. The pumps
were subjected to ground fire.
APU
After removal of the cowls, it was noted that the auxiliary

power unit (APU) was located in its normal mounting position
and bore no visible evidence of malfunction or fire damage.
The APU turbine rotated freely and the APU fire bottle
was undamaged (the pressure gauge read 500 p.~.i.).
The APU door on the right side of the aircraft tail

section was closed. The cowl latches were securely fastened.
Components
The separated components from both engines were identified

at the scene and shipped to the United Air Lines Maintenance
Base in San Francisco for further examination.
Phase II Disassembly and Investigation at United Air Lines

Maintenance Base
No. l Engine
General Observations
Extensive impact and ground fire damage was evident at the

forward portion of the engine.·
Powerplant Group Chairman's Fnc:tual Report of Investigation - 7 -
General Observatior,c (cont'd)
The fan stages and the first three low-pressure compressor

stages were separated from the remai~der of the engine. The
front compressor rotor front tierods were broken and protruding
from the fourth stage compressor disk.
The engine was covered with debris from the accident scene;
the exterior cowling, although crushed and fractured, remained
attached to the engine.
The engine front mount bolts were in place with the threaded
portions missing. The aft mounting bolt was missing.
No evidence of case penetrations due to the liberation of

any rotating components from the engine interior was observed.
Accessorv Section
The accessory and component drives gearbox (referred to

subse~uently as gearbox) was fragmented by impact and damaged
by ground fire. Gearbox housing fragments remained attached
to some of the separated components.
The constant speed drive (CSD) and attached generator

were intact and free to rotate. The CSD oil cooler sustained
heat and impact damage; however, lines and fittings were not
broken.
The engine inlet gearbox was fractured. The No. 1 bearing

outer race was not located.
The tower shaft broke approximately 5 inches above the

gearbox internal splines. Evidence of twisting and a corres-
ponding reduction in cross-sectional area was present in the
failure area of the shaft. The shaft bearings were undamaged.
Inlet and Compressor Section
The fan inlet case was broken in half with eight inlet
vanes still attached to the outer and inner walls, four vanes
attached to the inner walls only, and all other vanes missing.
Stator vanes from the first three compressor stages were separ-
ated. Rotor blades and disks from the first three stages were
separated from the rear hub.
All first stage blades were broken off approximately 1/2

inch to l inch above the blade root platform. Damage to the
second through sixth stages generally consisted of blade
Powerplant Group Chairrran's Factual Report of Investigation - 8 -
Inlet and Compresc.0r Section (cont'd)
breakage and bhd•c l:·.;nding opposite to the direction of

compressor rotat.i cJ:.. Extensive damage attributed to in-
gestion of foreig~ objects and blades broken at impact was
evident through &Jl thirteen compressor stages.
The front fan cases were fractured at three locations

from impact .
Combustion Section
Examination of the engine combustion section revealed

the presence of small amounts of debris on the fuel nozzles.
The fuel nozzle holes were unobstructed. Both igniters were
broken off above the wrenching flats, ahd the igniter tips
showed evidence of rubbing.
Dust and debris were found adhering to the inside of the

combustion chamber outer case.
All the combustion chamber (burner can) domes had bright

silvery-colored metal splattered on the outer surfaces. The
No. 4 combustion chamber exhibited medium wear in the mounting
pin hole. The mounting pin showed light wear.
Turbine Section
With the exception of a broken shroud notch and light

leading edge shroud rub on the first stage turbine rotor,
the turbine blades and nozzle guide vanes appeared to be un-
damaged.
A bright metal splatter was observed adhering to turbine

blade and nozzle guide vane surfaces. Small pieces of vege-
tation were observed in the second and fourth turbine stages.
Slight rub marks were found 7.5 and l0.5 inches aft
of the shaft splines on the low-pressure turbine shaft. Low-
pressure turbine shaft torsional creep (shaft twist) was
measured to be 0.424 inches between the shaft tierod hole
plane and the shaft face spherical indentation plane.
United Air Lines inspection requirements for shaft torsional

creep limits are as follows:
(a) The spherical indentation located in the shoulder

(Index No. 3) must be within 0.030 inch of true angular
position in relation to a radial plane through the
axial center of the shaft and to the centerline of
· Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 9 -
Turbine Section (cont'd)
tierod hole (Index No. 2) located 30 degrees clockwise

from the top vertical centerline of the shaft flange
as viewed from the front.
(b) The spherical indentation located in the front face

(Index No. 4) must be located within 0.050 inch·of
true angular position in relation to the plane
described above.
Exhaust Section
The exhaust nozzle total pressure (PT 7 ) and exhaust gas

temperature probes were intact and undamaged. The thrust
reverser lock hooks were not engaged with locking rollers; how-
ever the reverser was found in the forward thrust (stowed)
position.
Bearings
The numbers 2, 4, 4 1/2, 5, and 6 bearings were in good

condition. A slight roughness was perceptible when rotating
the No. 3 bearing. The carbon seals were intact.
Engine Systems
Pneumatic System
All components and ducts associated with the engine/air-

craft bleed air system were located and,after removal from
the engine, were laid out in their approximate normal positions.
Except for impact damage) no other discrepancies vrere

note.d.
The system was examined for valve position, evidence of

vegetation and debris. The various locations where debris
and vegetation were found was documented.
Vegetation was found at the left and right entrance elbows

of the 8th stage bleed air manifold. Some nonmetallic debris
was found in the downstream side of the 13th stage bleed mani-
fold and on the downstream face of the pressure modulating valve
butterfly. No debris was found in the upstream side of the 13th
stage bleed manifold nor on the upstream face of the pressure
modulating valve butterfly. The pressure modulating valve was
found closed.
Pneumatic System (cc:;t'd)
A piece of vegetation was ·found on the central uost on

the upstream side of the left-hand 8th stage bleed air mani-
fold check valve. Vegetation was also found on the downstream
side of the left-hand 8th stage bleed air manifold. Both 8th
stage bleed air manifolds operated freely.
The engine bleed valve was open and was not damaged.
The precooler valve was closed. A considerable amount

of vegetation and mortar-like substance was found at the
inlet side of the precooler on the face of the heat exchanger.
A small amount of very fine debris was found on the lower aft
corner of the heat exchanger. The outlet was free of foreign
debris. The 8th/13th stage bleed offtake elbow duct assembly
(Boeing P/N 65-53886-16) contained a small amount of debris.
Insulation-type debris was also found on the outside of the
fan air bleed duct adjacent to the precooler.
The starter air shutoff valve was found in the open

position with the valve actuator partially separated from the
valve. A piece of molten metal was observed upstream of the
starter valve. No evidence of starter impeller rubbing was
found on impeller blades or seating surface. The manual over-
ride button on the starter valve was depressed (this would
cause starter valve to open in normal operation).
The engine inlet and nose cowl anti-ice systems vrere

removed from the engine and laid out in their approximate
normal positions. All sections of duct and the inlet elbows
were accounted for. The ducts were flattened and dented at
various locations. Some fire damage consisting mostly of
sooting was observed on the ducts and valve. The connec-
tions between the inlet elbows and ducts were broken. Debris
was also found in the inlet elbows. Other than impact damage,
no other preexisting discrepancies were noted. The various
attachment points between the various couplings and valves
were found to be securely fastened. The fractures appeared
to be typical of impact-type overload fractures.
Powerplant Group Chairc·,a'1' s Factual Report of Investigation - 11 -
Pneumatic Sy-ste;:: (cont 1 d)
The engini;;: };r•:::osu.re ratio transmitter) vrhich had sustaint:d

heat and iPJpact f1a;:;::.3e: v-ras partially disassembled and exam:i r.ed.
Results of the e:m;:;j nation are presented later in the component
test results section of this report'.
The fuel deicing air shutoff valve was not located.
Fuel System
The fuel oil cooler, which was subjected to impact and

heat damage, experienced mount fittings failures. Fuel and
oil lines to the cooler were separated at their attachment
flanges.
The fuel flow meter was subjected to heat exposure, but

exhibited relatively little impact damage. Fuel lines were
ruptured at the attachment fittings.
The fuel pump was separated from the gearbox. A section

of fractured gearbox housing remained attached to the pump.
The pump housing was fractured and parts of the housing were
missing. The fuel pump drive shaft was sheared at the designed
shear plane. The pump end of the shaft remained in the fuel
pump.
The pressurizing and dump valve was attached intact, and

contained a quantity of fuel. Some heat discoloration was
present and a mounting lug was broken.
The jet fuel control (JFC) was broken in two pieces with
one piece remaining attached to the fuel pump. The JFC was
subjected to severe heat and impact damage. The power and
start lever input shaft (cross-shaft) and compressor inlet
temperature housing were separated from the main JFC housing.
This made lever position determination impossible. The pieces
of the JFC were subjected to a radiographical examination and
disassembled. Results of this procedure are presented in the
component test result section of the report.
The fuel deicing heater sustained heat and impact damage.
Oil System
The external engine oil tank was severely impacted and

detached from the gearbox.
The main oil pump, which remained attached to a fragment

of the gearbox housing, was disassembled and found to be un-
damaged. The main oil screen did not contain any metallic
Oil System (cont'd)
particles; hoi·ie,.rer > the housing contained some oil soaked

deposits.
The .engine low oil pressure switch sustained neat

exposure damage and line breakage.
Ignition
The ignition exciter box was subjected to heat exposure.

Igniters were discussed in a preceding section of this report.
No. 2 Engine
General Observations
The engine was subjected to impact and ground fire damage

in the compressor area. The front of the engine was covered
with debris (wood pieces, plasterboard, insulation-type material
and downy feathers). The nose co1vl and some accessories ,.,.:;ere
separated from the engine, and extensive foreign object damage
was observed in the fan inlet area.
The engine front mount bolts were intact and the saddle
mount was attached to the engine. The rear mount bolt was
sheared.
The rear portion of the engine was relatively intact with

some impact damage observed on the cowling.
Accessory Section
The accessory and component drives gearbox housing (sub-

se~uently
referred to as the gearbox) was fractured and separated
at the split line.
The constant speed drive (CSD) and attached generator were

intact with indications of severe impact and fire damage ob-
served. The CSD spline was intact, and the CSD oil filter was
in good condition. The CSD oil cooler sustained heat and impact
damage but was intact.
The towershaft was sheared approximately 11 inches from

the internal spline end of the shaft. Evidence of twisting and
a corresponding reduction in cross-sectional area·was present
in the failure area of the towershaft.
· Powerplant Group Chair.nan's Fae Lual Report of Investigation - 13 -
Inlet and Compresso: Section
The forward eLgine cases exhibited fracture damage from

impact.
The fan inlet case was impacted with debris, and the
vanes were bent. Some first and second stage blades were
broken above the blade root platforms. The remaining blades
were bent opposite to the direction of rotation. Damage. from
broken blades and foreign objects ingested by the compressor
was evident throughout all thirteen stages of the compressor.
Blades which remained attached to their disks were exte:osively
dainaged and bent opposite to the direction of compressor
rotation.
The high-pressure compressor rear hub was oil-wetted,

and oily soot and debris were observed on the thirteenth
stage exit guide vanes.
Combustion Section
The engine combustion sectio~ fuel nozzle exit holes

were open and clear of any deposits. Some soot and a gray-
colored substance was observed on the faces of the fuel
nozzles. The number 2 fuel nozzle don:;e was shifted approx-
imately 3/64 inch.
Silvery-colored metal splatter, soot, and debris were

observed on the combustion chamber dorr.es, combustion chamber
inner outlet duct, and combustion chamber outer outlet duct.
The fan discharge combustion section outer duct exhibited

heat distress on the exterior and interior surfaces of tl1e
duct. The combustion chamber drain manifold assembly elbow
was pulled away from the finger valve cover exposing the
preformed packing. The packing was not damaged. The com-
bustion chamber outer case bore no evidence of heat distress.
' The combustion chambers (burner cans) ·were not damaged.

No mounting pin wear was observed. The combustion cha.n;ber
outer duct was ruptured forward of "K" flange, but no pene-
tration damage was evident.
Turbine Section
The turbine nozzle guide vanes were generally undan1aged.

Some leading edge burning was observed near the inner diameter
of twelve first stage turbine nozzle guide vanes. Light rub-
bing was noted on the aft side of the second and third stage
turbine seals.
·Powerplant Group Chairrna!1 1 s Factual Report of Investigation - 14 -
Turbine Section (cont'd)
Silvery metal splatter was observed on all the turbine vanes a -

blades (first thr;.::·~.~~h fourth stages). Debris havi;.g the
appearance of drir;c} c:<1.1d was found adhering t 0 the concave and
convex sides of the turbine vanes and blades with the greatest
accumulation of thJ s debris at the inne.r side of the turbiEe
blade shrouds. Li ;:ht rub marks were observed on the high-
pressure turbine outer air seal.
The low-pressure turbine shaft was in good condition

with light wear observed on the splines. The shaft torsional
creep (shaft twist) was measured as .084 inch between the shaft
tierod hole plane and the shaft face spherical indentation
plane.
Exhaust Section
The turbine exhaust case was ovalized ana bent and

contained some debris, including a brick. The PT T and ex-
haust gas temperature probes were intact and undamaged. The
thrust reverser vas intact and locked in the forward thrust
position.
Bearings
The number 1 bearing rollers were missing and the housing

was cracked.
The numbers 4, 5, and 6 bearings were in good condition.

The number 3 bearing exhibited roughness when rotated.
No. 2 Engine Systems
Pneumatic System
Some evidence of localized ground fire damage was observed

on the external surface of the left-hand 8th stage bleed air
duct in the vicinity of the 8th stage checl< valve. Fine debris
was also found adhering to the external surface of the right-
hand 8th stage bleed manifold duct wall. The 13th stage bleed
air duct was ruptured between the inlet elbow and the modulating
valve. The fan air duct was damaged. The outer casing of the
precooler also evidenced some impact damage.
All components and ducts associated with the engine/aircraft

bleed air system were located_ and, after removal from the engine)
were laid out in their approxi.mate normal positions. Except
for impact damage, no other discrepancies were ~oted.
PneLu:natic Systems (cont 1 d)
The system vas examined for valve position) evide!1ce of

vegetation and debris. The varj.ous locations ~..rhe:re debris
and vegetation were found were docli!l!ented.
Debris was found in the entrance elbow of the left 8th

stage bleed air ffianifold. The 13th stage bleed air manifold
entrance elbows and duct upstream of the pressure modulating
valve did not contain any vegetation or debris.
No debris was found on the upstream and downstream faces

of the pressure modulating valve butterfly. The pressure
modulating valve was closed.
Loose) wet) nonmetallic debris was found on the downstrea::i siCe
of the right-hand 8th stage bleed air manifold check valve.
Both check valves operated freely.
The engine bleed valve was open and was in good condition.
The precooler valve vras open. Some fine debris was fou1'd
on the face of the heat exchanger. The precooler outlet was
free of foreign debris.
The engir1e inlet and nose covrl anti-ice s:fstems were

removed from the engine and laid out in their approxicate
normal positions. All sections of duct and the inlet elbows
were accounted for, except for a small section of left inlet
anti-ice duct between the forward inlet elbow and the anti-ice
valve. The ducts were flattened and dented at various locatio'1s.
Some fire damage consisting mostly of sooting was observed on
the ducts and valves. The connections between the inlet elbows
and ducts were broken. Debris was also found in the inlet
elbpws. Other than impact damage, no other preexisting dis-
crepancies yrere noted.
The fuel deicing air shutoff valve actuator cover was

separated from the valve motor. The valve was in the closed
position.
The starter air shutoff valve was intact and heat damaged.
The valve was in the closed position.
The engine pressure ratio transmitter had been subjected

to heat and impact damage. The transmitter was disassembled
and examined. Results of the examination are presented later
in the component test results section of this report.
Fuel System
The fuel flow r.:°"ter was subjected to heat and impact

damage. Flow meter wires and fittings were brokerr.
The fuel pump was separated from the gearbox with a

portion of the gearbox housing remaining attached to the
pump. The fuel pump drive shaft was intact and bent .
The pressurizing arrd dump valve had three support lugs

sheared. Fuel was found in the valve.
The fuel deicing heater was not appreciably damaged.
The fuel flow transmitter was damaged by heat and

impact, and all wires and fittings to the unit were broken.
The jet fuel control (JFC) was broken in two pieces.,

with one piece remaining attached to the fuel pump. The
JFC sustained heat and impact damage. The JFC drive shaft
was intact and bent. The power and start lever input shaft
(cross-shaft) was intact and separated from the gearbox.
The lever arms were found intact and damaged by heat. The
pieces of the JFC were subjected to a radiographical exam-
ination and disassembled. Results of this procedure are
presented in the component test result section.
Oil System
The external engine oil tank sustained substar.tial

impact damage but remained attached to the engine.
The ends of the fuel oil cooler were sheared off. The
oil pressure transmitter and low oil pressure switch received
slight damage.
The main oil screen was examined and no metallic par-

ticles or foreign deposits were found on the exterior portion
of the screen.
The main oil pump was undamaged. Moderate wear was

noted on the pressure gear pocket.
Ignition
The ignition exciter was slightly dented. The igniter

plugs sustained some wear at the tips.
Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Inve.stigation - 17 -
Component Test Resultr.
Engine Pressure Rai: · o Transrni tters
Investigatic,~. of t.l1e I~os. 1 and 2 engine pressure ratio

tran·smitters was "'·,u;;rtaken on December 21, 1972, in the
presence of the Pm:·~rplant Group. Discussions of the results
of the investigat:io;: \·rere conducted beti·Teen cognizant me!llters
of United Air Lines Engineering Staff and members of the
Powerplant Group. Tl1e group requested that United Air Lines
perform any additional tests that were considered appropriate
to the transmitter i.:westigation and to prepare a report as to
the findings of the investigation.
United Air Lines Engineering Staff reported that:
Both units (United Air Lines MR 77128-872 and -1003)

were damaged. The back of the case of each instrument
was cut open to expose the sense head to determine the
present position of the transmitters. In both cases the
sense head was at the low end stop, somewhat below l.O EPR.
This is the position attained by the unit when power to the
transmitter is cut off, regardless of the pneumatic signal
being fe·d to the instrument. Physical damage to the m1its
held the sense arms in this position in such a way that it
was evident that this position had been attained prior to
the incurrence of the physical damage.
On January 2, the units were opened further to determine

if the gear train position (and, therefore, output s~rnchro
position) coincided with the sense head position, it taving
been determined that such need not be the case if the cam
tape had broken. On both units the synchro were shorted
which precluded electrical determination of position. The
cam tape in the unit identified as the one from number one
position was intact, and the gear train was found to be in
a position corresponding to l.05 to l.10 EPR. The cam tape
in the unit identified as being from number two position
was broken and the gear train was found to be in a position
corresponding to 1.50 to l.55 EPR.
Radiographic and Disassembly Inspection Results of the Jet Fuel

Controls and Fuel Pumps
A review and discussion between cognizant members of the

Engineering Staffs of United Air Lines, Hamilton Standard Division
of United Aircraft, Inc., and the Powerplant Group members con-
cerning the results of the radiographical e~amination of the
Power:plant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 18 -
Radiographic a!1d Disassembly Insuection Results of the· Jet Fuel
Controls and Fuel Pwnps (continued)
Nos. 1 and 2 engine jet fuel control units was conducted during
the afternoon of December 21, 19"{2. The group requested United
Air .Lines to disassemble and/or conduct any appropriate 'tests
relative to the fue.l control/fuel pump investigations, and to
report upon the results of these tests and/or disassembly.
A summary of the results of the investigation is presented

below:
The investigation was divided into two phases. Phase I

involved an attempt to determine the position of two servo valves
in each control at the time of impact. Phase II involved the
physical inspection of the fuel controls and fuel pumps as they
were disassembled.
The following general findings were obtained as the result

of the investigation:
1. The fuel controls and fuel pumps were received in such

damaged condition that it was impossible to conduct
11
as-received11 test bench runs .
•
2. During the disassembly of the fuel controls and fuel
pumps nothing vas found to indicate any unit rr:alfunction
prior to the accident.
3. It vas not possible to determine the positions of the

two fuel control servo valves at the time of impact
(which was the object of Phase I of the investigation).
This was because the valves vere found to be capable
of moving freely and normally in their housing when
the controls were disassembled. Renee the valves could
have shifted positions at any time between the time of
the accident and the time of shop disassembly.
Details of the Fuel Control Unit/Fuel Pump Investigation
1. Units Involved
Fuel Control MR73216-627

Removed from N9031U, No. 1 position
Engine 655956 (Q232)
FCU P/N 710777, S/N !+9602
TSO and TT 7,255 hours
Powerplant Group Chairman 1 s Fact~JaJ. Report of Investigatj.on - 19 -
l. Units InvoJ·;ed (cont'd)
Fuel r.ontrol MR73216-429

Remov"d from N9031U, No. 2 position
Engin" 655840 (Q,233)
FCU P/N 710777, S/N 57345
TSO and Tr 12,565 hours
Main Engine Fuel Pump MR73130-694

Removed from N9031U, Ifo. 1 positio'1
Engine 655956 (Q232)
Pump P/N 243600, S/N 1558
TSO 5,497 hours, TT 17,306 hours
Main Engine Fuel Pump MR73130-20l

Removed from N9031U, No. 2 position
Engine 655840 (Q233)
Pump P/N 243600, S/N 1096
TSO and TT 8,079 hours
2. Phase I Investigation
The fuel controls were inspected radiographically in

order to determine the position of the "3D" cam speed
servo valve and the throttle valves. The 3D cam speed
sensing servo valve is translated by fuel pressure on both
ends of the valve and its axial position has a direct re-
lationship to engine RPM. The throttle velve is a hy-
draulically operated valve and its axial position indicates
the amount of fuel being scheduled to the er.g:'.'1e. Using
the radiographic film, the positions of these two valves
were measured and the control speed and fuel floy,r "riere com-
puted. It should be noted that this data represents the
position of the valves only at the time of inspection and
not necessarily at the time of engi11e impact.
Approximate Fuel Control Settings - Based on Rediography
MR73216-627* MR73216-429*
N9031U-Pos. 1 H9031U-Pos. 2
Engine 655956 Engine 655840
3D Cam Servo Valve
Fuel Control Speed (RPM) 3,620 4,650

Engine N2 Speed (RPM) 10,150 13,050
Throttle Valve Position

Fuel Flow (PPR) 500 3,700
(Valve was at the
minimum flo'..: stop)
* UAL Radiograph film Identification Number
2. Phase I 1nvestigation (continued)
The fuel controls were then disassembled and the

:positions of t}:c two valves v.rere measured. From these
measurements ti,·:> following data was computed:
Table II
Approximate }"u<el Control Settings ~ Based on Disassembly
MR732l6-627 MR73216-429
N9031U-Pos. 1 N9031U-Pos. 2
Engine 644956 Engine 655840
3D Cam Servo Valve
Fuel Control Speed (RPM) 2,920 4,400

(Valve was at the
maximum RPM stop)
Engine N2 Speed (RPM) 8,220 12,200
Throttle Valve Position
Fuel Flow (PPR) 750 4,450

(Valve was .030 from
the minimum flow stop)
Note: The above data indicates the positi.ons of the parts

at disassembly. This data should not be expected to
be in agreement with the radiographic data because
the valves were found free and could have moved
during or bet1feen the radiographic inspection, clea~
ing, and disassembly operations.
3. Phase II Investigation
The fuel control was found to be broken in two at

the junction of the hydraulic housing and the linkage
housing. The hydraulic housing was still attached to
the fuel pump and indicated fire damage. The linkage
housing did not show fire damage. It was impossible
11
to perform an as-received 11 run due to the severe da:nag:::.
Both the shutoff lever and power lever were broken off
at the shaft. The power lever shaft was free. The PRV y
pilot valve and drive. shaft turned freely. The fuel
filter housing was broken off and. the screen was exposed.
The water trap housing, CDP g/ limiter housing, and the
minimum pressure and shutoff valve housing were broken
1/ PRV - Pressure Regulating Valve
?:./ CDP - Compressor Discharge Pressure
PoweI'J)lant Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation - 21 -
Fuel Control MR73216-627 (continued)
off and missing. The CIT.;:.temperature bulb and

cable l11ere missing. Several of the interr..al link-
ages were broken off and missing. The 3D cam servo
valve and. the throttle valve were both free in their
respective bores.
Inspection of the fuel control did not indicate

any excessive wear or other defect 1-rhich would cause
malfunction of the control.
The fuel control was found to be broken in two at

the junction of the hydraulic housing and the linkage
housing. Only the base of the hydraulic housing was
attached to the fuel pump. The "spider assembly" was
missing from the linkage housing. The hydraulic housing
indicated fire damage, but the linkage housing did not.
The shutoff lever and power lever were broken off at
the shaft. The power lever shaft could be turned nor-
mally. The fuel control drive shaft was bent but still
rotated normally. The water trap housing, CDP limiter
housing, and the minimum pressure and shutoff valve
housing were broken off and missing. The CIT housing
was broken off but was available for inspection. The
3D cam servo piston and the throttle valve were both
free in their respective bores. The throttle valve
which is located in the hydraulic housing had a heat-
discolored surface in the window area; the color pattern
indicated that the valve was in two different positions
while being subjected to excessive temperatures. One
position v.ras at or near maximum flovrj the otl1er position
was at minimlllll flow.
Inspectiqn of the fuel control did not indicate any

excessive wear or other defect which would cause mal-
function of the control.
Main Engine-Driven Fuel Pump, MR73130-694
The fuel pump was received with a portion of the

engine accessory case still attached by the ~uick
disconnect hardware. The quick-disconnect was correctly
locked in place and appeared to be structurally sound.
The fuel pump drive shaft was broken at the shear section
and one end was in the pump; the other end of the shaft
was missing. The filter body of the pump was broken off
and missing. The pump housing did not show any fire
* CIT - Compressor Inlet Temperature

Powerplant Group Chairman's Factt:al Report of Investigation - 22 -
Main Engin~-Driven Fuel Pump MR73l30-694 (cont'd)
damage. The damaged section of the drive shaft was

removed and a new drive shaft was installed. The
pump drive v1as found seized and impossible to turn
by hand. Upon further disassembly it was found that
foreign material was lodged between the gear teeth
and this prevented the gears from turning. The im-
peller drive gear was found broken at the shear
section; the impeller was free to turn.
Inspection of the fuel pump internal parts did

not indicate any excessive wear; erosion or other
defect which would cause malfunction of the pump.
Main Engine-Driven Fuel Pump MR73l30-20l
The fuel pump was received with a portion of the

accessory case still attached by the ~uick-disconnect
hardware. The ~uick disconnect was correctly locked
in place and appeared to be structurally sound. The
fuel pump drive shaft was found bent and was pulled
out off the pump housing at the time of impact. The
pump housing showed fire damage. The filter element
and many 11
0 11 rings were found in a charred condition.
A new drive shaft was installed but the pump drive
was found seized and impossible to turn by hand.
Upon further disassembly it was found that foreign
material was lodged between the gear teeth and this
prevented the gears from turning. The impeller drive
gear was broken at the shear point. Several of the
gears were blue, indic~ting excessive heat.
Inspection of the fuel pump internal parts did

not indicate any excessive wear; erosion or other
defect which would cause malfunction of the pump.
Recovered Components
The following engine components listed by manufacturer serial
number were identified during the investigation:
NAME NO. 1 Engine NO. 2 Engine
Low Oil Pressure Switch 6 88
40 K'VA Generator 23025 3783
Jet Fuel Control 49602 57345
Fuel Pump NL 1096

Powerplant Group Chairi;r." 's Factual Report of Investigation - 23 -
Recovered Components (continued)
NAME No. 1 Engine No. 2 Engine
Fuel Flow Transmitl'C!' 398 652p
EPR· Transmitter B-89' B-156
Pre cooler NL 127-312-1-l
13th Stage Modulatine; Valve · Pl462 NL
Pneumatic Press. Differential P935 P401

Regulator
Hydraulic Pump GS GS
Constant Speed Drive 211
Fuel Heater NL NL
Exciter Box 77937 84218
Fuel Oil Cooler 446467 B 541087Al
P & D Valve 6151124 616H592
Oil Pressure Transmitter NL, 79310-J8
N2 Tach Generator NF NF
N1 Tach Generator ;; 2692
Starter Air Valve P204l -1
Starter NL P2729
Inlet Anti-ice Valve (R/H) A5747 A3020
Inlet Anti-ice Valve (L/H) NL A3043
Nose Cowl Anti-ice Valve NL NL
Fuel Heat Valve NF 44

Exhibit No. 3F

''
GROUND TRACK CRARr, UNITED AIR LINES, nrc., FLIGHT 553

·~
.,, .t
,,, ',. ' .. " lY.1-..:1,~e:t
' Exhibit
;l
':!!
NATIOflf\J, TRl\NSPORT.l\.~:ION SAJi'E'rY JlOARD
Bureau of Avi~tion Safety. ·~i
Washington, D.·C.
.,
',
.,
••,
' .....
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. , . , :, ···~
I
SPECIALIST'S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER
' .
{"' :·::'"'~ .
•
·~ ... ' '1-· By
Jobn D. Rawson
.• ,,. \,i. ,,·
"•..
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NA1'IONJ\L TnAirnPOHTJ\TION Sfu7ETY 130ARI)

Washington, D. C.
February 12, 1973
SPECIALIST' S FACTUAL REPOilT OF INVESTIGATION ,,,.

COCKPIT VOICE RECOilDER '•'
·: ..~.f,.~r i I
A •. ACCIDENT
'
Chicago Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois
Location ..,
D~cember 8,
1972
Tu.te Boeing Modc=l 737-222, N9031U
Aircraft .~·
Operator United Air Lines
; ".,
Flight No.: 553
GVR Model :
Sundstrand (UCDD) V-557, S/N 1648
Ident .. No. : DCA 73-A-3
· · B. COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER GROUP

National Transportation Safety Board, Chairman
John D. Rawson , i
S. L. Huntington,
United Kir Lines "
United Air Lines
D. A. Doud ,
United Air Lines
F. E. Kabel , Air Line Pilots Association.
J. W. McWillia.ms, Federal Aviation Administration
R. D. Jones
c. SUMMARY J ;';
The subject Gockpit voice recorder (CVR) was recovered from the·
.,. JV·-
aircraft wreckar;e and hand-carried from the accidenti site to the
•F
National Transportation Safety Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety
offices in Washington, D. C., on rec ember 9, 1972, by two NTSB- .. ·¥.·. ~
designated members of the Air Line Pilots Association. A ree.:i=t ·' "; •.
of the recorder tape yielded pc:rtinent information which '{as tram;- .~ ,, ,.
.cribed and appears as an att'.l.cbment to this report. ..,. , W
D. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATIOH 1~·

.....';~"
. ) .Jlr.• •.
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l. Visua 1'D3J!llna ·ion
.
··'. f~...~·· ~··-"~
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A visual examination showed evidence of major mechanical a.ama.ge · ·''l'>,

and extreme fire arid beat damage to the external housing assembly. 'I'be ·~···
magazine cover was rer:ioved and the fiberglas inner cover fauna to be.'";" ; ·,,;
:''.usibJ}~,;.,;
'·
se:parated exposing the internal fibrous asbestos material. The ' ',;P .. "
.t
plug had melted due to beat exposure with no evidence of a measu..""3.ble. ,;t· .....-
amount of ethylene glycol/water solution remaining ·in the fibrous ... '"·.'
1
~.
material. """. .. , 1•
F..xamination of the tape showed numerous small areas where the"' . .' ,,.~.
magnetic particle impregnated coating wa~
missing, leaving only the · ·:'· t.
clear mylar base. !t vas noted that the irmer surface of the magaz:l,tle. ' .:·>
was damp; and several droplets of ~
clear wa~er-like
material were .. ~-<.~.i·t.
found. After removal of ·the tape, the magazine assembly was caref'ully ~· .7 ..
sealed and submitted to the Federal Buroau of Investigation (FBI) f'.rrr/i';,. iY;
·.·.: .'>""'.l·~
1
a ciuali tati ve . analysis of the. droplets. Samples of the standard ·lltf:""_,lt".• . ~
the'.,::..~:_,
comna::cisor!·.,;,r~·(!;,.
sealing compound and ethylene glycol solution were secured frol!l
manufacturer of the CVR and also forwarded to the FBI for
studies. The results were .not conclusi v8 due to the lack of ;;,noug4 1}', .. •·'•<:(.
, ';.
r.>J.terinl i:i. the subject inap.;azin8 for comparative analysis with the·r·"""'· ..r.,:,.
above-mentioned samples; .-~.,,ilJ)if:
·. ••··~. ' ' ·l.t'!°'
·.c ...;,.., I •
The interior of the magazine had been eo.."Posed to teopC"rat=es. ,.'.~'"'

approaching the tape m8lting point. This was evidenced by the :rac.t ~-/!" •
that the tave had fused to all four magnetic heads and had to oe' "ii.~,;,..~~.'
carefully separated to prevent additional tape d'.3.r!'.age. It >las ais,o; ;}.;ii
th~t ""ou.'Tts/dne.:''ii,~t'
!\~'"'.';;,-~·
,,1,' not'.'d all _f?"·:: record beads _'!ere lo;:ise on t:-teir base
to nea-c-inducea. .LO.JS of cemen-c aa.nerence. . . k ~· "',0:1;?-r#
,, :{J(r"~.
.. ;~,:.;; ..i:! j~J
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;'~'.~~f·~;:\
.·.~r..I' ,.k
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.
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..................................... 1111111111111111-1111111~~~~~~~·;~~~--,~~-"+~~~-~~-=-
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D. DNI'.AITB OJc INVJ<:GTJGA'l'fON (Cont'd)· , . .,. ~ ,-~:A~.rt. -~~(
The recorded tape wo.s removed, cleaned with ethyl o.lcohol,. arict:c:,.~~¥"'··
prepared for ini tio.l readout and rerecording. It was determined that "'"~""'I''
no pertinent data wo.s missing in the to.pe areo.s where the oxLde wa~'."·';·
~r. :;·c,~:,i;t;
'1\) 1V
.:i~ ·1~:~,r;, ·-.f~· .!
ruissing.
' .;:~~ ~~. ·, ~~~·~:
Tape Playback '.• •,.·. ".. ; .;:~ ·tft~ I
An unfiltered master copy and several stereo rerecordings were< ·• ;. :i.:•>..
made with various track combinations as well as both filtered and ·.~;~'.(~(; ?.1;-
unfiltered versions. Analyzing the subject tape voice connnunicati9q!3~.:"~f)}
and aural sounds reg,uired the use of special eg,uipment in the Al,ldio• ...:~1,,... ;i,.(:
Laboratory, such o.s a high speed pen recorder, the Voiceprint machine;·•l.. ,'.:,
a~d many other proven technici.ues used in audio re:o:ding and transcr~.:?:;:.l;i~';.
tion. ·'l "'"-'.. ._~.?,1-~;i."'i.'
_;,-
:~-:i )~·!:~~.
,. A .:prel1.minary transcript as well as a stereo rerecording· of the' . ., ·• ;
cocKpi t area microphone (CAN) track and first officer's radio track ~P".fl>~'§"
were mo.de as soon as possible and sent to the Invefitigator in Charge .....,,:·'(
at the accident scene to aid in the early st01ges of. investigation;,.'! ~·''i ·'·•
/
•• \~ ;; J
,·~:~IT.~:~
3. Simulator and Flight Tests . •. r ·f~·?'
Due to the nature of the accident and the fact that the flight:•:ioy•:•'t'!f . ' ·
'•
data recorder was inoperative at the till)e of the accident, the coch-:<;>it.·f,I..,
voice recorder data became the prime, if not sole source, for deter-.. .·•
.mi.nation of aircraft flight configuration and crew activities J?rior ,to ..! ..
and during the accident. This obviously reci.uired identification of· ·" •':'::
•.-. "~iilfl'
the aural sounds heard over the CAM, crew voice identification, ancl .,·l·~."t...1.
~. i. p ' • "'.I>!
message context .. ._. '.f• ,.Jl~
With these objectives in mind, the cockpit voice recorder grol!J? :"",''.
Linet"<'~.·~!'.:.
planned and conducted studies in the United Air Lines Boeing 737
simulator at Denver, Colorado, and flight tests at United Air
Overhaul Base, San Francisco,_ California. The flight· tests were nb't > : ;1.·
conducted as performance tests per se, but to record voice and cock-.·:·.,;·. •
pit sounds during cr.ew activities necessary to fly the aircraft tbrsugli"~I"
certain maneuvers and regimes. T'ne tests consisted of flying ~he·.,.,·;.,/'~·.,.
simulator and later the test aircraft to try to duplicate as nearl:/'>a~"'\:~,.
• possible .a series of profiles based on the CVTI readout and data supplied!,,
by the Federal Aviation Administration's Automatic Radar Terminal-system'
(ARTS) recorded on I:ecember 8, 1972, as pertaining to UAL Flight 553. ·:'~':
Flight plans and 'scripts were prepared for the simulator a.'1.d B-73T teit';'
flight. ·... ' ~· ··:,;;;,,,
The simulator tests were conducted on rec ember 14, 1972, at '• ·· '. ~ '.r·tl,-
Uni ted Air Lines Training Facility, Lenver, Co.lorado. The follow:Lng '"'. J,..J.,
-r·-
pers ons paTticipatcd in the tests: ./t, ..
John D. Rawson ,
·I
S. L. Huntington,
J. W. l'1cWillio.ms,
Jo.mes M. ]3:J.bb
F. E. Kabel )
Roger Casterline,
Gordon McKinzie
Jack Aasen
as fcllc~·rs :
Jo1u1 D. l~LJ.»ison , ::iu._tlel'v~so.1: 0.1.LJ. Ciqs....:.L'1,1e:r ( t.:...:utcr

S. L. Huntington, Captain (left seat)
J. W. Mc\'/illio.ms, First Officer (right seat)
Gordon McKinzie , Observer (rear left seat)
Roger Casterline, Observer
Jo.mC!S M. E:J.bb Observer
Obu~1vc:r arH.l Sl.rr1ul~.lt~r CorJrd:i.11ator
•.·'
,.
.. -
GVR S1:>eciulist' G J<'uctual Report (3)
D. DRf:AILS OF INV:E:S'J:IGATION (Cont'd)

·., . ~·x·,r·
' ,·11,;~~it'
Since no CVR was available in tho sinmlator, a portable high :::~:.:;i.~'.(~ti
q_uali ty" co.oc.;ettc rccora.,~r i·Ti.LS us eel to rec or a. the fl:ight tests. TheSe·-~_f,~;."' if' -..f
recorclin[SG rrcrc 1Jrotlc;:l1t 1Jt1c.:k and i·erecorclc<l i'or comparison studies · \~; .-..;j.;·
rri t11 tl1c original CVil to.po from Lhe subject acciclent.. The sirnulator ~:.·''°Y- ·>"-·.i' ;.:~:.-
tests covered the :follovring: ·
"•tr•'
., ,~,L . -_.
a. :cetermination o:f the number of switch G.nd le·ver position . ~- i::·~· ;·
G.ctions necessary to accomplish a planned altitude/aix·speed. ·· t/::~~~-?
''*'\'
profile in a st[lndard operating procedure descent to land >, ...
at the subject airport (~lidway Chicago). " "1·
:f
. '{,r:
. . ~~
b. Simulation, to the degree possible, o:f the gross weight and ~1t- ..,,,.·.
center o:f gravity o:f the subject aircraft.at the time o:f the 4(
accident.
c. Vary the combinations o:f the above-mentioned switch/lever'·

positions (G.nd resulting changes in aircra:f,t configuration)
to achieve a predicted pro:fiJ.e determined by' ARTS and the
., i'.'
GVR readout.
.;. : . ~--.
After completion of the simulator studies, a refined :flight test •· ~

schedule was prepared to try to achieve a flight profile or profiles '" ,,
., wli:;;cth compared favorably with the known facts without ccmpromise of ·;· :"'':lb
sa~e y. ·~
··t~ -:~... ~.-.
The :flight tests were conducted on the night of December l4, J,972,"" ",'.. ..
in United Air Lines B-737-222, N9038u. The flight departed San Franc;Lssq.dl<
International Airport at 194o P.s.t. and returned at 2l4C P.s.t .. Th9,., ;.'. ·
actual flight tesi:.s, which included approaches; were 'conductcd. near thE«· . ,,
Oekland International Airport. Prior to departure, a serviceable coek-';Q;.;·
pit voice recorder and cockpit area microphone of the same type as those'" .
involved in the accident were installed in the test airc;raft. The<~' ·»,
recorder, Sundstrand (UCDD) t;rpe V-557, S/N 1915, had b-een bench-checked .L,-.
~ .)
at Uni tea. Ai.r Lines engineering facilities prior to installation. 'P
-'."not her servi.ceable co:kpi t voice recorder, S/N 1635, was checked ':'-rtd.' _._;.·ti.'::';
installed a:fter the :flight tests for certain ground tests. A sernceabl:ef,;.;
:flight data recorder, Sundstrand (UCDD) F-542, S/N 6003, was checked.and!.. :
installed prior to the flight tests and the record removed for reference!, :·
if· needed. The :flight tests were conducted with duties assigned as;•. ~ ·' ,.''
follows:
s. L. Huntington, Captain (left seat) .,

J'. W; Mc Williams, First Officer (right seat) t .: .. ~
John D. Rawson Second Officer (right rear sea't) !~:i "' ~: ·,., '.'' ,.
Gordon McKinzie ', Observer-Coordinator (left rear seat) ~~~~. . y·
Roger Casterline, Observer .· •t' ·-~ '.' '."' . .-t::'.
F. E. Kabel Observer ·''. ~·:" ' ,:,,
' Obserrer . ·~ ~·.;._.1
•
,,,·.w
1_,~
._.. .:r ·~~ ,.:~

During the flight tosts, the cockpit voice recorder was started ..~;.'·~""'
and stopped by the use of the circu~ t breaker prior to and af'ter eacnJ .:,._; \;'
test run (descent) to corrnerve the 30-minute duration tape S>_!pply. . •';~', -
1
After the flight tests were concluded and the aircraft p2.rked. at the'':'"'.'.'.'\"!
ramp, the CVR wG.s replaced in order to conduct several annotateil .. :1:'·'l~;'·~,;
swi tcl_1/lever /control movements for future comparison studies. In ~· . .' <~(,,.;•''
addi tJ_on to the CVR, the ce.ssette recorde1' used in the earlier si~ .,,;..··-:;,.,~1,,,
..,.
tor work was used to duplicate the inflight and ground test record..i:riga'~. ·~:~'.'."-+.
.~.,'°~& '··
4. Spectrcrr::.rp11ic and Pe·-1 Rccord.c!.~ Stud.ies · _ ·. _ ·. 4~·~.'.-~ ~~_;'-» ~
. ' . - •-<...,· l·~·.~,.·r-
' ,.,
,fl _'f';J
"'1-
Gockpi. t voice recorder so·Jnd Spectrogrruns of gro~.rr_U.. a:!.C!. ~~ ·,f ./~!~~

tests conducted on December ll;, 1972, in rr9038u were st-u.cied and ··~J ~,e·
correlated li.th the spectro;;rams from 1'l903lU. In e.ddi tiorr, the cass.<;:!t~,.~~I
recorc1:i..ll{;S 1{.Gre u:::;cd 0.3 0. Sllpplcrr.c:nt during tl'!C examination.' i Certa:i:_:q..:·~!~.~·.~/;-.;;: ·
1
.'I speech, ns '.~ell ac; other o.ur:1l oounds, were stu•ii:ed on the spectrog:ti!nfa)"j!;i~:,• .. ,..
u11 d c omr,n.rcd tu P•-~t rt.::u\JrJ..i: 1r;t__; CCi"v-e.t.· i ric: tl:~ G·J.lllL: (trt to. :fo1: -'..;.i.~"O f:X11i•efJ~ecf:~-:~rf\.
])Ul'J•OOCof' lii:fiil'i.ng voi.C'.0 icl.e11tlflc:.tti Oll OJtd contc:-:t anil rlefJ.ning tha"' 1 ~·.'-·'~.
ootircc oi' o..11cli1J].c so11nds such uf.; fln.p lnnd.lc rnovemcnt, etc. As 9- re,~11.:f·e:;;jj:·~·
of these studies, ccrtuin pertinent inforrno.tion ·. .ras !1oted: '". ,f :.'.!14!.-'
1
' "' -~"1't
',' ;ti.' .,._"
,..,,,.,.
.-.... ' ~ ...~ ...:'.''l~t·~
...... y f;;J;!lj; ~
11· • .. ·it-- • .'.' -~ ~,":_,
, • . ' ·lf'•·'•<L""'"~··
"' .. -~ i-l0.· .• ,... d.l .lii$t •,
''-;11" ... '·I\,,'
, 1-,.c R~ \;K ._~...,;.:~,r .-

. ·"', , 1~ ..
'~""'· ~
•').'~"/.'
l(i-·
.\
"'"'1
..
.. ·. ~.~~ ··~-t
; i. ..
'.
,,l, if
t • : ·~."fl .l
CVR Spcdali.st' G Factual Heport (ii) ,;. .··<t,·f

:-q~.e ,. •·"•,"'
: !',~'.'
u: DETAIJ,S OF INVESTIGATION (Cont'd)
: '•' ..\ ,..
·~ '~;'.it~
'<.
a. Flap handlo movements in and out of detent were identified . .-.· .... · .,.,
In some ca.sen wl!uro <1 double click was identified, the hand.le
position was identified with respect to setting. '.
b.
'
The times of landing gear handle movement were identified.
' ..
/
c. The time of aircr:aft alignment with the Kedzie localizer was { ~-
established. .. ·--~~IQ
-~ ·.•
•, . . '-*' t1
.., " ;;~.,Vt~ .
d. The time of speed brake handle movement was identified.
• 1
e. The fact that the autopiJ.ot was disengaged· prior to the time ~
of tl1e accident was ascertaiP..ed. ·~ ·'\. ·~q
,
f. The initiation of the stickshaker warning signal was
identified.
!. Y'
,•
The time of landing gear warning horn actuation was determined.

··I:,,
~:;; ..
g. . 1~·
~;;µ
5. Timing
1: <ljo.•
Precise timing of the GVR data was made by first determining the
.... ~·,. :,
t,f.. ·t'"oi,,..:.•
accuracy of elapsed times betvreen recorded e·vents ~ In this pa.Ytic~

' ~~·
- ..·"
case, the following checks 1-rere made: t~ '--~ •. ~-:;,,_~ '
~ j.i~·.l~'
a. The outer marker tone identification signal at Kedzie (75 Ez) Y
has a repetition rate of 142. 5 Hz per ,;nnute. The Federal "'· r . ,,: . .
Aviation Administration FILO tests made after the accident ,.- ' '~<'Ji.'
-. showed that the Kedzie facility was transmitting within ···}·.il'.
prescribed tolerances. The pen recorder graph of the Kedzie · . ,..
outer m8.1~'1cer tones showed tb.:J.t the c;vR '\·Tas recording the ·. ~- t.
• ~ ···' ·\.1.,~..t·
tones (as heard on the ca·pto.;i n rs :radio channel)- Well ".fi thif! ...
total cumulative tolerances between the transmitter, GVR, ., .<!'
playback and/ or pen recorder.. The total error found was .;.,.; .t·
Ji. 2 percent or f. 71 seconds per minute. . : ;~.'.H;~.(~f.'.
'(. ' : ... ~,. ·.* ,_."
b. Elapsed times between Air Traffic Control (ATC) radio· '. ':}",;t;,.\, -··
communications were found to match on both the GVR and ATC · ;' ·. "
tapes prqduced by the Federal Aviation Administration. :.·~
,! •
•.:,,·'
c. Real time or Greenwich Mean Time errors of up to Ji. 5 seconds~. ;'~· ~!

between CVR and ATC were found with the maximum errors note a. :» '."
on Midway Approach and. Tower transmissiorrs and little or no ·': ..,,,if<'<·.
errors noted between CVR and Chicago Center transmissions. ' ,· ...;'.~.~;,
These small errors wer,e manifested when elapsed tiines were ,, ~·_,.,.; ,
added to previously co'rrected GMT times. ,.i.<
,.1 ... , .&,. :~ . . '
"t
d. DJ.ring the last 1:37.05 minutes of the recording, times were .w ··:ff'
measured to ·~he nearest l/100 of a second due to the :fact .:·>!'. . r·~·
that the pen recorder graph ·.ras capable of th'..s d<;~ree of .d '· i\!(:l·.
measurement. Since several' events occurred in close o:-:ae::!:" ·~ , · ,./'.:._~,"~"fl:i..~r.
and at times simultaneously, tima separation and seq_ue!"lcing· ,;.·~1i..1'.;
·was mand!,l.tory _ 'rhis was accomplisned by utilizing the \ ':#t ',
incremerit,El.l time breakdown offered by the pen recorder. ···~: ~ :,;: .•
-· ~; ' "-· ·;,·
Information derived.from recorded tapes covering the flight ~st~;.:,~:.;.
sjm·ulator :tests; .and the qriginal accident as well as spectro{:.--rapmc .p· >:i-t-· . ..,
and -pen reCOrding · stu.tl-Les are incorporated in the tran.sc~:.pt ".-·h:.Ch · ~·· c.. ·..·.'.~
~ -,
...--~.-,~, ...... - ---- .-...1...+ ....... i-..,, .. "..1 • ..1..._ ..1-..1 ...• ••
--.t-.L.·~-~'-' _ _. •-•- -•'-''-'w~"-•-••~••" ._.._ '-'•·-~
Attachment
·'
, ,_.
THJ\N:JCHJ'.Fl1l (JH CH: .I" 1:;1'\'1; JJTbL1' C(;c ;G)~1.'j.1 '!\;IC G i::::corr::!-: 1 : r:~,_T/I.• .
SUND::.i'l'f\A.Irn (UCDD) MODEL V- '5 5'(, :J/lT 101B) UHI'l1m AIH LII!I:s
J30EING 737- 222 , N9031U, FLIGllT '.:>53, C1D:CAGO MIDWAY AD1POHT,
CHICA.GO, ILLHTOIS, DEcmru.rn 8, 19 7 2 ,' •.I.·
LEG mm
..
.....
CAM Cocl~pit o.rco. mic:rophcne
.··~
Rro Ro.di o transmission :from N9031U .
"
. ... . ~
-1 Voice identifi ed as Captain
-2 Voice identifi ed as First Offi c er
-3 Voice identified as Second Offi cer
-7 Voice unidentified " .

9vs Radio transmis sion rrom Aero Commander 68<), N309VS
CHI CNTR Raclio transmission from Chicago Center
CAI'C Rudio transmi ssion fr om Chicag o Approach Control
Ml'WR Radto trn.nsminsion from Midway Tower
·M- Unintelli gible word/words ....

/ ·~
# Non.perti nent word

·-•.
~ Break in continuity
( ) Questionable text
(( )) Editorl a l inserti on
' •' ,'• •..1.·J "\
Paus e ,,
'<
Note: All t ime appears as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)

1' ....
. ·., 't
'"
• -,\.\ : :-I
,,1,. .
.,
·~ • . f
...- .. ,...
~
. ,, .
. .
"· l •
·~ ·"·! ·.~·~.
'... ~ ... ,u.
' .,J" /, ··°'h~ ~~:a
. f' t' 1-<• ::~,
·..,. .
·.. ·... ~
- l -
, ..
AIR-GROUWD co;4M!JNICATIOil'S
INTRA-COCiCT'IT
SOURCE
& TIME CONTENT
SOURCE - ... ,.,
& TIME CON'l'ENT \
i959:50.5 . United five five .three, an we're level two four OH
RJXJ-2
i959:56.o i
United five fifty three, unders-:and level t-,,o. four
CHI CNTR
OH
2002:49.5
( Shootin )' ILS to one three right 2005:04.5
CAM-? United five five three, descend and maintain eleven
CHI CNTR thousand, one one thousand, Chicego altimet,er tbree
zero zero four
2005 :11. 5 Three zero 'zero four, an down t.J eleven, United five
RD0-2
five three leaving two four OH
2005:16.0 United five five three, Roger contact Chicago one two
CHI CNTR
six point six, good day
2005:20.5 One two six point six, good day sir

RI0-2
2005: 51. 5 United five five three out of t'.o four OH f :r eleven
RD0-2
2005:55.5 United five five three, s~uawk code zero seven one
CHI· CN'l'R
two
2011:42.5 ,
·~
CHI CNTR
Five five three, altitude ... -.?
'•
2011.:45. 5 Eh, we' re about to leave f.Ollf~e.en: _fer eleve:i
-~.... . :·t...·;,-t~,,.. .. +.. -. : ... -~
RD0-'2 .· '>
:~ :'" -"::.::,~· .:~.: ; .i:.~ ~~ '~ . ·' -~.-.:: ,..

E.-:.! ":;·. ." -.. . :: -"' '_;; _ !. :J :..+'
.
!'~, t~l ~~ :;f:i: ~ ;~;;J~i~~l.t: .:· -~J;;·,. ~
·~- ~
_j,1 • ~- ~-·
,.
A:CR-GRQUND COMMUJ'fICATIONS
HlTPA-COCKPIT
SOURCE
SOURCE & TIME COl'l'L'El'TT
& TIME CONTENT
2011:48.5
· Level at eleven, Roger
~HI CNTR .I
} .
2011:52.0
Naw, I think you must ta misunderstood, I said we're
RD'.l-2
out of fourteen for eleven
2011:55.5
CHI CNTR Out of fourteen, okay, somewhere around there
2011:59.5
RD0-2 There you go
2012:18.0
CHI CNTR United five five three, you're cleared to five
thousand now
2012:22.0
RD0-2 Okay, down to five thousand
·.
2Jl5: lO. 0 !
about ninety-four?
C..'...~-~-2 ·-
CPJ:i-1 o:~ay
CA.l·l-2 Wiiat kind of flaps you goin' to use? .
Oh you' 11 need more thal:l that.• you could use

about ninety-seven
Ninety-seven
Thil'ty I ah, \falt

I .
·, 'l'hirty
. . •. - .,f ,1,·.
- ;--
" ->::. •
ooi-t~ ).· ~ 0ne'h~tdred n.nd. tyenty five? . ',,

. t ...~: ,,_,...::.'
:?;:.:c~,t.~. f ).~:~! ;"~
t... . .. ..,. ' . . .., ·'
."·-.··1!:ri .~i'~ ,~ ~- .;_ · ·}.~: ·:,- '/.,_\.• ..- :i .
..
AIR-GRO\Jlill COMMUNICATIONS
D'I'PA-COCKPI'J:
SOURCE
SOURC~ & TIME CONTENT
& TINS CONTENT
CAN-1 Naw, I think he means the other direction

.i
CAM-1 Three one, there's a localizer on three one
CAI-i-3 What's ya talkin' about?
Tln·ee one -- three twelve
C.t\..NI-3 Yeah, it's one oh nine nine 2017:06,0

Begirming of Midway ATIS "OSCAR" transiuission received
RD0-2
t
C.l\M-3 One oh n_ine nine
Ya got-one three:
CAM-2 Rigbt, wliat the # am I lookin' at?
2017:15.0
Yeah, but, ah·--- there's a Kedzie localizer too
CAM-2
Yeah'! :Sat tliree one is one oh nine nine too
Chll-:i. ...
Yeah, that's >·lhat I was thinkin' one oh nine nine
--- down here
CAM-l Is that a back course?
Yeah
CAM-2
. .
CAM-2 It's actually a front course
CAM-3 Actunlly a front cOUl'D<l ...

Srnnc fl'()CJ.\1cncy though.
..
CAM-2 , .
.-. - .·
/, .t\r.
'CAM;.J '
--..
.. ._~-· ~~..... i ..:-.. ·.::"'~-:~~.-- -·.-~-. . .

~
&11ne fl•eg_uenoy
·-:
•
-·
.
-~;,,,.;;-' ·:~-- . ~- . ..,:..-·,.. ~....
·?·•·\'i
'I
.. ~~~-:
-~ ' .. •.. C.1l:l'l, ':· .·.· • r: ;:Aotup.lly'. i+;·~fV'tha; Ba.\tlQ ~1•le?l~Y~~
r[ '·
_
"' "..
·'
llHiiA-COCKPIT AIE-GHOUND COMMU1'iJ:CATIONS
S01:.JRCE
SCURCE
& TIME CONTENT
&, Til•IB CON'BNT
2'Jl7:3T,5
CA£.f-l liuh?
2017:39.d
CHI CIIJTH .. United five five three, can continue down to four
thousand now, your altitude?
2017 :4J.O
RD0-2 Eh, we're about to leave six for four
ZJ17:46.5
C.:U.1-2 ~e're going to the same fre~uency as the front
cou.rse
Yeah
?.ight
2017:57.5
B.D0-2 Sml:1d of LOM IDENT ( (Hines, LOY!, ffiSH, ffiSH, IASH,
LOT, LOT) )
.?'.ll8 :Co7. 5
c.~-:-2 'kay you got Hines'on yours now, is that right?
And I have mine on Kedzie Sound of LOM IDENT ( (Kedzie LCIM, D\.SH, msa:, D\SH,
.LOT, LOT, msH))
c..u~-1 !'..ave you listened to the news lately,· they didn't
char.ge there a while ago, did they?
* ·» *
* ,'jo the airport ·'
.·.
'
... ·--
,,· ._,,,,-:
1T'~".J.:-.~ .. -.,_.
,, ~ c .• ,
-Jo.·; .,..
AT;l-GHOUND COMMUNICATIONS
ITi.rRA-COCKPIT ', ~- ...
SOUHCE
SOlJRCE CONTENT ,. ···~
& TIME
& TJ!.!E
•'
CAJ.;.• 1 Oh five
CAM-2 Oscar
Yeah, I'll get it
Did they, cla'lge the three one approach?
2Jl9 :20. 5 ·:: ..•·· --~

C~··i-2 Yep
CP2·1-3 Yec.~1.. '.l"ln.'ee one lef't

2019:22.5
CHI CNTR United five five three, call a:iproach now, one two
six zero five
One two six zero five, than.1<: y<Ju
1\ecorC.cor go off?
·- ··.·
('.tJ.f-3 Pn.rdo1;. rne?
2019:32.0
RJ.XJ-2 Ah, Midway approach, United fi•1e five tlcree, we're at
four thousand, understand it's three one left
Recorder go off?
Ye3.h
***
' .
8:!19:45.5 ' .· .
G.".M-1.
.
I
- '( -
SOURCE
Il·FfHJ~-COGKPIT
-
l\IH-CllOuND COMM1JJIJ"ICATIONS
soUTICE
CONTENT & TIME CONTENT
&. Tif.:E
2019 :52.0.
CHI APC Sir, I was busy on that phone over there, you're in
radar contact, two ninety heacing, intercej)t thirty-
one left localizer for Vudway, Oscar's current
2020:00.0
RIXl-2 Okay, thank you, we got Oscar, ah, two ninety on the
heading --- intercept three or.e left
2020 :o4.o
CHI APC --S) sir
2020:09.0
CHI APC Nine Victor Sugar radar contact south heading, t'"o
thousand fi V8 lJur;dred, vector for thirty-o.1e left
again
RIXl-2 Sound of LOM IDENT ( (Kedzie LCM, IASH, IASH, D\SH, IXJT,
IXJT, TASH))
2020 :37 ~ 5
C.\!1'.-3 Brakir>.g action repo;rted fair by a guppy
Fair?
On one, ah, three one left
C.~·1-3 The only change is the altimeter thirty oh :five·
c..~:-?
Som1cl.s to n:e a circuit breo.Jrnr, perhaps

.·.
2020: 52.:)
CAJ-1-3
" -{·~ ._;'
·t'c !.. .,__ -.

-.·.: '*• '·
. '
----~---- ------- ------ --
.soUTICE •
SOURCE & THIE CONTENT
, '
G.A.14-3 It, ah, -- indicates
Sound of several clicks ((appear between words

nal1 11 _s.:1d ninG.icates 11 above))
A '·rire on the :!:'eel to test
Sound of qeveral clicks
'.0'02l:lj.O
8.AJ.f-3 It tests
y
I think it's okay. I think it's working
***
2021:23.0
It says •)ff 2021:23-5 Zero nine VS turn left tc,-·one three zero
CHI APC
You got an "off" light :
0101-1
Yeah, l:"""' ah, the signal, the encode light
cor.es on
And it shows, indicating tape
CAM
Sound of two clicks ((similar to flap lever
l!'ovement)) 2021:56.5 'nited five five three, slow to a tundred an eigLty
cm APC
knots
\
~ ·~.._~\ --·~<•. ~<· .. ' '
·. kn~ts, i.'i:~
/ . i"'
·,
~ '--~ ~ ' ;; ;..'.. . -:f ~:, ~- : ;; ~ ' .. ~ ~~ ""·.. . '
.,. ,.
.,. -,,,,. -.: '
Hwidred an eighty
. ... " five•J'ive
~- ,,... thi-ee
..
.
;l· .·~;:.~~.t-.~>?92~.:f0}'oi'\~~~ ~"'i.-li --~~·.:;;~.~ i . '" ·• "" ~,.~, · -"' i'' .. c~
--~ ··,~
'~. --Y._._;: ~-
: "·_·""":~;,,,;CAM "'St-\;"'. '·le '$il\UJ.il·of ·.wo·oo.icl::s ((sim.t:J;o.i\ :Co":f'lAP. l.e:iOX' .,
mo\h;ir,:en·c) ) ·
I
AIR-GROUI\TD C0,~1UNICATIONS
SOURCE •
SOURCZ & TIME CONTENT
&. TIJ·;B COJITTENT
2022:26.5
CKI APC . Z'."ro nine VS, descend ta two thousand feet
Sound of clicks ((similar to electric trim

actuator))
2022:~2,5
C/'..N-2
Wonder why they put that in there, final approach
fJ:om holding pattern at Kedzie not authorized?
2022:45.5
CKI APC Zero nine VS turn left zero nine zero
Wh3.t would "be wror.g if you were there in the

Cl'.:c-2 holding pattern? You'd be 'back here anyway
Worcder why?
I don 1 t ~.::.no'..r
The b_old.1 ng pattern's probably higher tban fifteen

c>-~·~-l
1Tur.8.r'3d feet
CA:'.-2 That's probably true
Or it's not aligned with the runway

CA.:.:-3
Yeah 2023:22.0
CKI·APC Zero nine ys turn left beading zero two zero
2023:26.0
CKI APC Five fi V€ three, slow to a hund:~ed an .,siity knots
~·4 "'
2023:28.5
\ .. RD0-2,.
·:: " '\ " .
clicks ( (situilr.r to mov~ment of ·J: ,_, --~ ·;:'..
-.~
-~ r. - ( "· . -
~- ' .;--~·:
·..
- l·
',..~,
~ -, ·:-~ _: . . ~'"'· ~ .... -· ~ ~.. :;-: .,. ' ~ ' : --
'"
. '
AIR..Gl\Oill!D COMMUNICATIONS
sou:RCE · •
SOUPCE CONTENT
~,.&TIME
& Til,'fE CONTENT·
~)l>i"' '2023 : 30 • 0
CHI AFC S, sir, then descend to two thc:isand feet-· 'nited
five five three
.·(,,
2023 :33.0
:COvm to two thousand five fi ·re three, leavin' fo;rr
RW-2
CAl-1 Sound of clicks ( (similar to sound of stabilizer

trim actuation))
An zero nine VS what is your airspeed·now?
2023:49.5
cm AFC 'kay, keep it up for a while, r:lease
2023 :52.0
CHI
Five five three start slowi.n' to yer approach speed,
, APC
please
Okay, slowin' up
Scnncb of several clicks ( (similar to sound of
stabiEzer trim act-Uation)) ·
2024:08.5
ClIT APC
* VS, turn left heading three two zero now, intercept,
cleared for the approach, stay with me
2021;:3L 5
CA.1·!-3 C!':!'.'ist, I can't even find the circuit breaker
for thin
Over hc,re
CA.~!-'? * * * fli[;ht r0co1'der ...... -',.\.-

>
~ .. ..}"~
•* *. *
··}'.:
CAN-? "; 202~; if4. 5. • ":t;.. .:'~,,.
. ·.•
Nine VS, keep as-much ·spee.d as :i:o~:as:~'OU can sir,
~ ~
- -:·· :·.:... ~:.. ~ ·. ;.,~ ·~-- .:; {· - •• 41''

:t: • CHI APC ' y·
~.10,call ,tbe, toyer noy, ,cen.ll. e\ghte~1} sev,~n.~ _. .:l :.. ,c ,,_
_ _ _::"":_ ··- _.
:~ ·;)E1 :., ·~·~:;·~~}{~_-.':. t;"; ~;··t~ .·. '~·,.. .~ ,"/ .~. .· ~---
,,,.·:.,:'!-:..~: '
'
~
.
~
•,
.
;·~~-
~
~
.'!:
.f ··_.;
•
'>,· ""z~~ /#:b!~ · ;, ' ,; .': , ' . ·;' ~- ' .. · 'f:~·~<ot '" '...~'.}·_,~; ' ·, :i; ' 'i
.
'
'
"
- ------ -~---- --- _..,.. --------'"""'-- - ~---~-
- -~.!- -
AIR-GROUND cor.i;.;UNICATIONS
SOURCE
SOURCE & TIME CONTENT
&, Tii>2 CONTENT
2024:50.0
CAM-3 I don't know
CAM-3. Don 1 t know what to say

..
I get a reaction when I pull the, ah, AC
Wo :cecaction when you pull the DC though
;{ou 1·~arit .1ne to. cD.11 Iv1ainte11ance?
Call it in
Is this tape ·1 Or uh
202~:~.5
C.~-~-:- 3 I' 11 have ·~o call Dispatch
2025:25.0
CHI APC Five five three, call the tower now on one eighteen
. J
seven
2025:28.0
RD0-2 Eighteen seven, five five tbre<>
2025: 35.5 Jv'Jidway tower, United· five· five three, an' we' re out
RlXl-2
of three for two
2025 :39 .o . United five five three, report passing the outer JT3J'.'ker,
MJ:WR
number two on the approach ...
3J25 :41,0
C.tlJ·1-3 . Chico.go,· this iG five five th:r.ee ((second officer ',' -·
-r·':
c:i.liing i\RIHC)) ·-- · · . ·... ·. , - "·"" < *._,
~-:.f "~ i "'. t- ~•}; .•~ ~::. ·~.· ~- ~: -:~:j~>1-~i;;f ,,. ~ :. .

outer ma;.Y.e'r .
.
0
AIR-GHOIBm COI-u·fUillICATIONS
\
SOURCE •
SOl.GCE
& TIME
&: TIME CONTENT
2025 :lf6. 5
CAM-l Let 's have the gear down please ,
2025 :)Oo97
CJ\IvI- 3 Chicago, United five five tln:ee ((second officer
calling ARINC) )
2025:51.62
CA1~1 Sound of a click ( (similar to sound of landing
gear hF-~dle going into down a.etent))
Sound of chime ((simultanebus With click above))

"'
2025 :52.20
MTtffi Nine Victor Sugar, what's your .,irspeea.?
Ah, we 're a.own to ah, hundred tr.renty knots
2025:55.cG
8Alft ::r::lcre::cse in ambient noBe level ( (similar to
increo,se made by nose landing gear extended))
2025 : 56. 82 '
MrVIR Ah hundred and twenty, okay
2·:i 26 : co . e:. Soui1d of first cf fOlU' clicks in rapid seg_uence .

( ( sou:1ds similar to flap lever moved from fifteen
degrees "to 25 degrees posi tio11))
202C :OL 5J
Gexr· 1
0WY1
SOlu~d of several clicks ((similar to sound of

stabilizer trim actuation))
2026 :10.02
\ RIXl-1 Sow1d of beginning of second se::ies of Kedzie outer
ma.:t'.ker beacon tones
,. ,, .... ~'
.· '";!~.::~~--· Of second 'serie'si'io'~ ;--JCeclZie outer marker

,; .... ~· : -. "'· ~ ...,;:'"- '-
;.~,:-~1-
~
.... •
. '
- i:; -
.. ----
HlTHA-COCKPIT . AIR-GROuND COMMUNICATIONS
'.;
SOURCE
CONTENT.
"'CONTENT ,, .
-S: iJ:I_~IB
2026:24.66
Cril·-1-1 Final descent check
2026:25,66
Flight and nav
2026:27.ll
Cross-checked
rt."}' 0
\...-...~·~-:
***
n"»
v..-....:.·1 Soclild of clicks ((similar to sound of stabilizer
trim actUl3.tion))
2026:30.62
RL0-2 United five five three, an, at, Kedzie inbound
2J26:35.97.
,...,. 0
\.....;-....·.-. 2026:36.38
Ml.'WR United five five three, contir.ue inbounO,, ;.•ou 're nUlliber
.. two on the approach -- 'll keep you advised
2::;::;6:40.10
... ·'
c.:~.] Sound of several elicks ((similar to sound of
electrical stabilizer trim actUl3.tion))
2026:4o.46
RL0-2 Okay
2·:::·z.6 :1;,). 96
c..~...:.~-2 Cross-checked
.... ,, ..., With a glideslope flag
L --..:.·--.)
C:'.J-~-2 . No gli.deslope
2026: ~lJ. .10 .·.
9VS Eli, nine vs has the. runway
'.
·' . ..
-~. . .
Nine VS, :runway trll'ee one left cleared to land
·'l;
-· •. .-.
,. ,j·
i126 :41+.• 67
- C.~·1-3
..
'
A!R-GROUNb' C01'3':ul'JICA'l'IONS
~NTRA-COCKPJT
... SOURCE
SOURCE ~'~:tM8 CONTEfllT , .
& TIME CONTENT
2026:46.l8
9vs · ' Okay
2026; 48. 4o· ·

Jvll'WR Nine VS, do ya have the right runway in sight by
any chance?
2026:50.4l
C.f\l,i-"2 Tuvm, tbree greens
2026: 5l. 37 .
2026: 5l. 37 9vs Affirmative
-c;\~.:-3 S:peed. bl'ol<:e '?
Ah --- armed 2026:52.68

rua. you S"-1ing over to that and land.? There's a jet
~iTWR
about two rt-- and disregard tt~t, ah, okay, I see
ya now, you're cleared to land on thirty-'one left
2026: 5:+. 69
CAl-'. Som'd of click ( (similar to sou.'ld rr.ade by moving ;.
s:peed brake lever to anned )?Osi tion))
2026:56.04
CAM-3 Wing fla:ps
2026:58. 75
C.'U·!
Sound of click ( (similar to sou.'ld mg.de by fla:p
lever moving into detent))
2026: 59. 42
CAN-2 ·.. Thirty, green light, :pressure and fluid
,.
j""' t .
: -_,
- J.) -
• ;• j;;'c ...
SOURC3 j,' .•·<'it!J.§UROE

. . &".TIME
• CONTENT
& !l'Il1E CONTENT
.. .
2027:02.96
CAM-2 Disarmed
2027:04.ll ...
CAH-2 .Ah thousand feet
2027:04.50
MTWR United five fifty-three, execute a missed approac)J,
make a left turn to a head:'..ng Jf --- one eight zero,
11 11 11 11
climb to two thousand ( (beti.;ree1. 1-1ords 0£' and ori.e
there is a pause and a voice i~ the background says
"one eighty. 11 ) )
2027:05.74 •
Sound of sticksha.ker begins and continues to·
OAf.j
end of reC'.ording
2027:07.56
CW·!-?. ((Two to three hurried words at very low·
amplitude and masked by noise of stick-
sha.ker))
CAl·i Sound of click ( (similar to sound IDE1de by flap ·.

lever moving into detent) ) .,
2027:12.14
RIXl-2 Okay, le~ turn to one eight z2ro, left turn,
okay?
2021:13.83
c.Al·i~3 Want more flaps?
I
j 2021:15.33
Flaps :;:ifteen
Yeah, ms.ke left turn to one eishty
.>. _....... ~·· ,,'
.--' .·'
' ~- - ~ .. ',...,. -
''--~"'
~ '- .;_f • , .
~~.~:: .~.-~ ~
.--<
1• -·--"'
. _ ... f. :.~r: ;;( -'\

' -~ --~~ _· 4 - ;· ,,;:_':.--:;...· '~
__ :.
'i
\ - .-
-,-
lL -
AIR-GROUND COiYJl>!UiHCATIONS
SOURCE •
SOURCE &'TIME CONTENT
& TIKE CONTENT
20
L.
~c.~f ·. 1-0/ 0
4
CAM Sound of click ( (sound similar to landing gear J
lever moved out of down detent))
2027:20.14
CAN Sound of double click ( (sound similar to landing
gear le~er moved into up detent))
202'7 '. 2.0. t4

Sound of landing gear warning horn begins and
continues to end of recording '--- .
i
2'J2/:2.3.55
C/1~·~
So·cnd of i.nitial impact and garbled voice
2027:24.46
Sounds of impact and unintell: gible voice ·'. (over.
RD'.l-1
open micropLone))
2027:25.02
RD0-1 END OF REl'.JORDING
..
. ....... ~.-
... .. r
''
•
•
.
'
f ,,

Hunt Dorothy United Airlines Crash

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Hunt Dorothy United Airlines Crash

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Docket No.

NATIONAL TRA.~SPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

NATIONAL TRA.~SPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

I Exa.:m.ination conducted at:

a) United Airlines Maintenance Base, San Francisco, California

18, 19, 20 Dec. 1972

b) Kollsman Instr_ument Company, Elmhurst, New York

c) Kollsman Instrument Company, Syosset, New York

d) Kollsman Instrument Company, Elmhurst, New York

Mr. Wm. Weston NTSB Washington, D. C.

C. Tomasso FAA Des Plaines, Illinois

0. E. E. Anderson UAL San Francis co, California

W. Robertson ALPA Des Plaines, Illinois

J. Angus Kollsman Elmhurst, New York

P. Redmond Kollsman Syosset, New York

At times, others supplemented the above group:

J. Cincotta FAA San Francisco, California

F. Dilts UAL San Francis co, California

K. Humphrey UAL San Francisco, California

KOLLSMAN INSTRU1viENT CORPORATION -1-

UAL Flight 553

Date: 8 Dec. 1972

Place: Approach to Runway 31L

Elevation of site - 620 ft. MSL(approximately).

Reported Altimeter Setting - 3 0. 05 In. Hg abs

IV Identification of Equipment reportedly recovered from the accident

aircraft and studied in this examination.

Identification data was obtained from UAL maintenance records.

KI Type B38689 10 015, Serial No. 745A

2. First Officer 1 s Altimeter

KI Type B38689 10 015, Serial No. 492A

These are identified as -

UAL Type MR41101-121 Captain 1 s Altimeter

UAL reported dates of last servicing -

22 Sept. 1972 Captain's Altimeter

KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -2-

Identification of installation position supplied by UAL records

KI Type KS-200-117 Serial N9· 1123 Captain 1 s C~WC

KI Type KS-200-117 Serial No. Kl003 First Officer 1 s CADC

These are identified as

UAL Type MR 41113

Serial No. 1004 First Officer 1 s

UAL reported dates of installation are:

5 Nov. 1972 Captain 1 s Unit

16 Feb. 1971 First Officer 1 s Unit

The outside case paint was severely burned.

The nameplate, an adhesive backed foil, was missing.

The cover glass was cracked but not separated.

The baro setting noted at SFO was 30. 36 In. Hg.

No loose parts were noted when the altimeter was gently

Moisture was present on the inside of the cover glass.

Testing was conducted as follows:

a) Integral lighting operated

b) Integral vibrator operated

c) As soon as servo power was applied to the receptacle,

the fuse in the test equipment failed.

KOLLSMAN INSTRUMENT CORPORATION -3-

1) (a) Baro set 30. 36 as received

(b) Due to excessive case leak attributed to

burned gaskets, cracked cover glass, etc.,

the instrument was placed in a bell jar. The

bell jar was tapped externally to remove friction.

The motion of the pointer was irregular indica-

ting a higher than normal level of friction.