People v. Balmores 85 phil.

493

Facts:
On the 22nd day of September, 1947, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of estafa thru falsification of a security
directly by overt acts. Then the accused teared off the bottom in a
cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real
unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at
the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number thus
the said number is a winning ticket in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes draw. But the said accused failed to execute all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of estafa
thru falsification of security as a consequence for the reason of
some cause other than his spontaneous desistance, for the reason
that Bayan Miller an employee to whom the accused presented the
ticket, immediately discovered the falsification and called the
police.

Issue:
WON the accused should be penalized with reclusion temporal
rather than prision mayor

Held:
The accused should be sentence of Prision Mayor in its Maximum
Period, for the reason of applying Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Ruling:
The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or falsification of
"treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations arid
securities" is reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been falsified,
counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of the United
States or of the Philippine Islands. This being a complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of an obligation or security of
the Philippines, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower
than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1
day to 12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by
the trial court is correct.

The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket

could cause no harm to anyone and would not constitute a crime
were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a
prize-winning number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real
offense was the attempt to commit estafa (punishable with eleven
days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer
for the serious crime of falsification of a government obligation.
We realize that the penalty is too severe, considering all the
circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a
lower penalty than that authorized by law. The exercise of
clemency is vested by the Constitution in the Chief Executive and
not in this court.

People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658

Facts:
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo
Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Limabanan,
Municipility of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife and his five
children. From there they went to live in the house of his Half
Brother, Zacarias Formigones, to find employment as harvesters of
palay. About in the months of December, in the Afternoon, the
defendants wife, was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house,
when suddenly Abelardo, gets his bolo and struck his wife at the
back hitting its lungs and cause for the body of her wife to roll and
fall to the ground. The defendant immediately get down to pick the
body of her wife on his arms, lay it on the floor of there house and
the defendant lay beside his wife for hours. He was found by the
people who have heard the shouts of their daughter. The defendant
signed a written statement attached in the Exhibit D, admitted that
he killed her wife out of jealousy because he often saw his wife with
his Half Brother and suddenly his wife has become indifferent to
him. During the trial, the defendant entered into a plea of not
guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of
two guards regarding the action of the defendant inside the prison,
the appeal was based on the theory that the defendant is an
imbecile and should be exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
WON the defendant is an Imbecile, and exempted from Criminal
Liabilities under Article 12 of the RPC.

Ruling:
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the
appellant is an imbecile. According to the evidence, during his
marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted
himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an
imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five
children, and supported his family and even maintained in school
his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally,
as a side line he made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs
of jealousy and take violent measures to the extent of killing his
wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief
that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were
justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her
faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of
justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that of an imbecile or a lunatic,
there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the
observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D,
it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of
his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his
grandmother, and his house was vacant.. However, after the family
of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented
said house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have
aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at
least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be
one of those unfortunate beings, simple and even feeble minded,
whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in
picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground,
dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside
her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his
loved one though he thought that she had betrayed him. Although
he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he made no
effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest
him. In his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his
wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and
expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared
to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent on proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not
alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or
in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the
benefit of the doubt and we therefore decline to find the existence
of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that
the accused is feeble minded warrants the finding in his favor of
the mitigating circumstance provided for in either par. 8 or par. 9
of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely, that the accused is
"suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense or communication with his fellow beings", or such
illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power". To this
we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the
same article, that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused
evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

U.S v Tanedo 15 Phil. 196

Facts:
The accused was a landowner, on the morning of 26th of January,
1909, the accused with his workers went to work in the dam on his
land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and few shells, with
the intention to hunt wild chickens. He work for hours with his
workers and went a short distance away and check how the work
he made in the dam affected the flow of the water. On the other
side of the stream the accused met with the deceased with his uncle
and his mother, the Accused ask the Uncle for a good place to hunt
wild chickens, but instead the deceased pointed out in the forest
and told the accused where to hunt wild chickens, the deceased
remained on the mangga tree tying something, the accused took
his gun, and started to hunt wild chickens. The accused testified
that, he saw one wild chicken in front of him and shot it, suddenly
he heard a human cry, he picked up the chicken and went to the
place near to the noise, after the accused saw that he have
wounded a man, he immediately went back to the dam and left his
shotgun, he then called Bernardino Tagampa, one of his workers
and told him about the occurrence, and when Tagampa heard
about it, they went together to see the dead body. Only one gun
shot was heard that day, and a chicken was killed by a gunshot
wound, chicken feather were found in the place, and the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred.
After that night, they burried the body of the deceased into a well.
It was proven that there was no unpleasant relations between them.
There appears to have been no motive.

Issue:
WON, the accused is guilty of Homicide?

Held:
No
Ruling:
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly
held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in the
performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without
intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33;
State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec, 417; Bertrong vs. State,
2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C, 292; U.
S. vs. Heather, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752;
State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the
part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the
accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the
case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.

People v. Rodriguez

Facts:
On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal
possession of fire arms. The accused filed a motion to quash, in the
ground that, he alleged that the crime being charged of him is a
component element in the crime of rebellion which he is charged
with. In the preliminary investigation, the accused tried to proved
that, the said firearm and ammunition in question did not belong
to him and was only left by another person who had disappeared.
The justice of the peace of court found a probable cause regarding
the crime committed and ordered to transfer the record to Court of
First Instance of Laguna for trial on the merit. When the cased was
called for arraignment the accused filed again a motion to quash
alleging the defense of double jeopardy arising from the fact that
an essential element of another crime is being used to file a
separate crime against him.

Issue:
WON the crime being alleged which is Illegal Possession of
Firearms, is already absorbed by the charge crime which is
Rebellion

Held:
Yes.

Ruling:
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime
with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already
absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of
rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other
persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was
convicted. Thus, the record (Shows that on August 6, 1951; the
house of the accused in Calamba, Laguna, was raided by a
combined force of military and police agents, and among the
articles they found therein, which they confiscated was one (1) Colt
Pistol (Auto) Cal. .45 SN- 413307. This gun, with the confiscated
articles, which we assume to be ammunition, was introduced by
the prosecution as evidence in the case of rebellion. On October 24,
1951, the crime for rebellion was filed which became Criminal Case
No. 16990 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the other
hand, the record also shows that the information in the present
case was filed on October 80, 1956, which involves the charge of
illegal possession of "one (1) Colt Pistol, Cal .45 Serial No. 413307",
and some ammunitions. Considering that, as held by this Court,
"any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as
a means to or in furtherance of, the subversive ends described in
Art. 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and can not be
regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves * * * and can
not be considered as giving, rise to a separate crime that, under Art.
48 of the code, would constitute a complex one with that of
rebellion" (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., 68),
the conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the
rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him
in double jeopardy.
While it is true that in the crime of rebellion there is no allegation
that the firearm in question is one of those used in carrying on the
rebellion and that the same was borne by the accused without a
license, the same would not make the present charge different from
the one included in the crime of rebellion, for it. appears from the
record that one of the firearms used in furtherance thereof is the
same pistol with which the accused is now charged. In fact, that
pistol was presented in the rebellion case as evidence. Nor is the
fact that there is no allegation in the rebellion case that the
carrying of the firearm by the accused was without license of any
consequence, for it can be safely assumed that it was so not only
because the accused was a dissident but because the firearm was
confiscated from his possession.
The claim of the prosecution that the trial court erred in not
holding that the ground on which the motion to quash is based is a
matter of defense which the appellee should establish at the trial of
the case on the merits is also of no avail, it appearing that the fact
concerning the inclusion of the same firearm in the crime of
rebellion as well as its presentation as evidence therein has been
brought out by the defense in his petition to quash and that fact
was not disputed by the prosecution.
Finally, we find no importance in the claim that in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Justice of the Peace Court of
Calamba, after his motion to quash has been denied, the accused
attempted to exculpate himself by trying to prove that the firearm
did not belong to him but to another person who merely left it with
him to be delivered to the authorities, because that attempt is not
incompatible nor can defeat his defense of double jeopardy.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de
oficio.

People v. Belbes

Facts:
On February 16, 1990, at 9:00 o’clock in the evening, inside the
campus of Pili National High school Domingo Belbes with
treachery, taking advantage of night time, employing means to
insure of afford impunity, with the used of high power firearm, and
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack with an armalite
rifle Fernando B. Bataller, while the latter was intoxicated, upon
there hitting him with multiple serious and mortal wounds. During
the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty, the accused
defense was, that he was at Pili National High School with P/Cpl.
Jose Pabon because the were detailed by their station commander
at 9:00pm that somebody was making trouble at the back of the
temporary building. He alleged that, they were attack by Fernando
with a Knife, including Pambon, he was hit at his shoulder, and
Fernando tried to grab his firearm, for the reason that his armalite
was a semi-automatic, during the process of grappling for armalite
he could not recall how many shots came out. During the cross
examination, Jose Pabon belied the fact that the accused fired a
warning shot, he also failed to mention anything about aggression
on the Part of the parties.

Issue:
WON the act of the accused is in response of self-defense

Held:
No.
Ruling:

Thus, appellants claim of self-defense could not prosper. The

evidence on record, however, reveals an incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the
Revised Penal Code. A person incurs no criminal liability when he
acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. But we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying
circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such right or office.In the
instant case, only the first requisite is present; admittedly
appellant acted in the performance of his duty. However, the
second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary
consequence of the performance of his duty. His duty is to
maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior Prom. But
he exceeded such duty, in our view, when he fired his armalite
without warning. No doubt, the concept of mitigating
circumstances is founded on leniency in favor of an accused who
has shown less perversity in the commission of an offense.Though
his protestation of innocence is unavailing, his offense could only
be characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.

On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime
as to rule out murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the
killing itself. For the same to be considered as a qualifying
circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of
means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the
safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the
part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or manner of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender. There is no showing that the shooting was premeditated
or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means,
methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended victim might make.
Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply
treachery.
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was
intentional. Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was
killed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent
handling; or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones
house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over
the balcony front; or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight,
fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout
continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet
ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. In this
case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY
the victim.

We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by

the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one
mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should
be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate
sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken
from prision mayor.

People v. Mateo

Facts:

On October 30, 1996, (10) counts o rape was allegedly reported,

committed on 10 different dates against Efren Mateo. Efren was
the guardian of the complaining witness, with intimidation has
carnal knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house. The
accused plead for not guilty, Imelda recalled that, each time the ten
time rape incident was committed, her mother Rosemare, was not
home, Imelda said that, each of the rape was committed in
invariably the same fashion. All were perpetrated inside the house,
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda
prompted the defense to ask her whether she had, at any one time,
taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape
incidents. She replied that once she had requested her brothers
and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at night but
appellant had scolded them. On the night of the fourth rape, she
narrated that she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant
entered her room that night, she was not able to retrieve the bladed
weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of
it. Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the
malicious “retribution” of a vengeful stepdaughter. Allegedly, on
11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son,
Marlon Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual
intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room of their
house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that Sharon
Flores, a neighbor and a friend of private complainant, had caught
his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising position. In
anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then
forbade her from going out at night and leaving her siblings alone
in the house. Rosemarie the wife of the accused, also testified that,
ever since shw got home from Jeddah, she never spent any night
outside there house. Also quite telling were some discrepancies in
the testimony of private complainant regarding the whereabouts of
her mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the
incidents. According to private complainant, it was when her
mother Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit
the dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda
contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda herself would appear
to have made irreconcilable statements. According to her, on 07
October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to
Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however, she said that
Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later
say that, at that time, Rosemarie had already resigned from
work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that
Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a
quick turnaround, she remarked that her mother did go to Bamban
not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda
said that 07 October 1995 was a working day, and that she had
gone to school the following day. Judicial notice could be taken of
the fact, however, that 07 October 1995 was a Saturday and that
the following day, a Sunday, could not have been a school
day. With respect to the rape committed on 12 January 1996,
Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet,
when cross-examined, she told the trial court that on that day
Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin. All
the statement of the complainant is not consistent. The Solicitor
General have decided to acquit the accused. But the Trial Court,
has found the accused guilty and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua

Issue:

WON the accused is guilty of rape

Ruling:

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the

Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on the
crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are
convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to
convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from
the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates
the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of
primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face
with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that
has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual
issues. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122,
Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the
resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995,
in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly
involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent

records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.