Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that
they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in
Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June
11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither
the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in
the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent,
after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime.
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San
Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

 4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private International
Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

2.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional
rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April
20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed
as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment
and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition
for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of
the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-
52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it
is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its
jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by
his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive
right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is
said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun;
and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint.
We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the
state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that
the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis
supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering
our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States
court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court
here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery,
26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the
situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in
the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a
Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the
National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation,"
where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband
the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the
forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce
should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as valid also in
the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his obtaining an absolute
divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has
carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have
sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be
allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce
between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that
their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of
the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a
Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.

In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely because of the
National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American husband is concerned
but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation,"
where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the
undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband
the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of
the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the
forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce
should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.

The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the husband
was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce insofar as the Filipino
wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5, 29.

2 Ibid., 6, 29.

3 Ibid., 7.

4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.

5 Ibid., 7, 178.

6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.

7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.

8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.

9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.

10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.

11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.

12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.

13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.

14 Ibid, 105.

15 Ibid., 11.

16 Ibid., 311-313.

17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.

18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10,
1988.

19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).

20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).

21 Rollo, 289.

22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
 23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).

24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).

25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by
Executive Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to re under Philippine law.

26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).

27 Footnote 20, ante.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for
the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal
was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and
Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and
the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required
documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it
found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6
partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an
heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as
one of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the
case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November
1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved
in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is

clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes
them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo.
The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of
heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,

among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from
the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To
this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence
as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the
issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the
finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the
trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at
the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a
Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it

did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present
proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original
of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an
American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly,
the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue
requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court

should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to
be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for
forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions
must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances.
There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The
present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.
Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of

Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead
of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should he limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as

Blandina Padlan in the proceedings before the lower courts.

1 No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.

2 Id., p. 367.

3 Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an
express declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art.
191, par. 4 of the same Code provided that the husband and the wife
may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage, subject to judicial approval.

4 Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC- Br. 105,

Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants;
CA Rollo, p. 15.

5 Art. 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and
sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

6 Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.

7 Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower

survives with illegitimate children, such as widow or widower shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children
or their descendent, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other
half.

8 Decision penned by Justice Pacita Cañazares-Nye with the

concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-
Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.

9 Id., p. 42.

10 Id., p. 180.

11 Rollo, p. 196.

12 CA Rollo, p. 29.

13 G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

14 CA Rollo, p. 30.

15 Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.

16 Rollo, p. 206.

17 Brief of Oppositors-Appellant, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.

18 Brief of Appellee: Id., p. 17.

19 Rollo, pp. 225-226.

 20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1979 Ed., Vol. III, p. 264.

21 Rollo, pp. 129-132.

22 Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

4.)

Today is Monday, July 29, 2019

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts,
both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized
on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and
applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
– respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained
by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage
with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family
Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

 "(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in
1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted
on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to
his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented
on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53
(d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59
and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.
2
Rollo, p. 10.
3
Ibid, p. 9.
4
Rollo, p. 37.
5
Ibid., p. 47.
6
Id., p. 44.
7
Id., p. 36.
8
Annex "I"; temporary rollo, p. 9.
9
The couple secured an Australian "Statutory Declaration" of their legal separation and division of conjugal
assets. See Annexes "3" and "4" of Respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 48.
10
Id., pp. 33-35.
11
Id., p. 39.
12
Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.
13
Id., pp. 77-78.
14
Id., p. 43.
15
Rollo, pp. 48-51.
16
TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.
17
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
18
The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court's receipt of the
Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent,
signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December 10, 1999.
19
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.
20
43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
21
Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law," Journal of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.
22
"ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
23
"ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.

xxx xxx xxx

"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
25
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67,
71-72, March 7, 1933.

"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a).

"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987).
26
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174
SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.1âwphi1.nêt
27
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
28
Ibid., p. 143.
29
For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295-300. See
also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;
30
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

"Public documents are:

"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx xxx x x x."

31
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself."
32
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.

xxx xxx x x x."

33
"Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court."
34
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office."

See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia
Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.
35
The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were presented in
court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same documents were
attached to the records (Records, Index of Exhibit, p. 1.).
36
TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
37
TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
38
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November 10,
1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196,
203-204, August 14, 1998, Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942,
November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
39
Art. 15, Civil Code.
40
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 566.
41
Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.
42
Ibid., p. 384.
43
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 56, 2000, p. 7.
44
Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 839, December 29, 1959.
45
274 CJS, 15-17, §1.
46
Ibid., p. 611-613, §161.
47
27A CJS, 625, §162.
48
Rollo, p. 36.
49
"SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

"(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
50
In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the
formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will
not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126); Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
 Philippines, 197 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p.
42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).
51
Records, pp. 1-3.
52
Ibid., p. 4.
53
Id., p. 5.
54
Id., p. 180.
55
Id., pp. 170-171.
26
Id., pp. 84-89.
57
Id., pp. 181-182.
58
Id., pp. 40-41.
59
Id., pp. 183.
60
Id., pp. 184-187.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
 DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question,
presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent?
Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines
(CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that
this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained
by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this
case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for
annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not
even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino
spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent
is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited
evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15,
2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby
SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 20-22.
2
Id. at 27-29.
3
Id. at 21-22.
4
Id. at 105.
5
Id. at 106-110.
6
Id. at 110.
7
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
8
Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, 286, citing
Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA 729, 737.
9
Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
10
No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
11
G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
12
Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850, 855.
13
Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
14
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15
Id. at 451.
6.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca
assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another
Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private
respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to
Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March
25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders
and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
 The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old,
to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil
Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they
executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property
which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No.
362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with
attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca,
however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that
she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and
that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC,
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot
v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it,
Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause
of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5,
2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship,
as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to
speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery
and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with
bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is

DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is
hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to
Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up
during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order,
Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent
court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order
dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No.
01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated
August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a
cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27
Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no
cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente
declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign
divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another
marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino
citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still
a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also
did not indicate the nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her
life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied
for and eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year
before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case
No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam,
USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an
American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her
citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse
was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance
of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the
implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE
FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED
AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES

TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO
PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS
SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS

ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A
GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the
success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree
of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a
Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and
shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce
judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether
the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli
is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented
herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage
certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she
stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification
(ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778
would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-
emphasized, however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation
by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued
by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

 This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph
and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and
whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of

Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,

Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213
signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly
affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8,
2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on
October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from
the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued
on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the
Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only
on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error
with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court
takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be
spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the
affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter
1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory
services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens."
Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by
the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen

clearly provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its
date of approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the
Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate
shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any
Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall
prominently indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13,
2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming
the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of
close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No.
RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of
Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8,
2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport
a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her
original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC)
obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a
perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with
the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996,
the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in
the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said original petition
were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on October 11,
1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to form part of the
petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No.
01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as
attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage
Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No.
RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during,
and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of
the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x.
The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of
age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of
Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court
represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special
power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe
all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States
of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996
after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil
Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca
was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can
be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the
national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an
American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted
by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge
the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law,
albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the
decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x
x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence

of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in

order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while
Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican
Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the
June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in
determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from
the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife
to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving
them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of
Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the
valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their
family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during
their marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca
M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which,
per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that,
"THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996
in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged
and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of
said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus
estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's
conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the
other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim
for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more
marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support
the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his
duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note
that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27,
2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She
would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way,
the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both
Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering
that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in
G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to
that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
2
Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.
3
Id. at 40-41.
4
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
5
Id. at 575-583.
6
Id. at 145.
7
See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo
(G.R. No. 155635), p. 213.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
9
Id. at 214-217.
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
11
Id. at 154.
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
13
Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
14
Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.
15
Id. at 236-237.
16
Id. at 126-144.
17
Id. at 156-204.
18
Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
19
Id. at 338.
20
Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
21
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
22
Id. at 592-593.
23
Id. at 38.
24
Id. at 852-869.
25
Id. at 850-851.
26
Supra note 5, at 583.
27
G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
28
Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116825 March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in
violation of said legal right.
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
30
Id. at 22-23.
31
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
 32
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592,
600.
33
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18, 1995 with expiration date
on January 17, 2005.
34
Supra note 15.
35
Adopted on April 15, 1999.
36
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
37
Id. at 147, 214-215.
38
Supra note 10.
39
Supra note 31.
40
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
41
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
42
Id. at 501-502.
43
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
44
Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
45
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
46
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
47
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
48
Van Dorn, supra note 44.
49
G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252; citations omitted.
50
Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.

7.)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of
the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters
of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order
denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as
widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted
by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion
for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law
on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue
and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments
and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that
the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent,
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract
a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines
in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason
to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during
the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule
v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile
– of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make
a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
41
(Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.
She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address,
and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993.
At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect
on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating
the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise
cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family
Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according
to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of
the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will
render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of
the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the
strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may
arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
2
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
3
Id. at 391-393.
4
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by
Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
5
Records, p. 125.
6
Id. at 137.
7
Id. at 116.
8
Id. at 1-5.
9
Id. at 10-24.
10
Id. at 30-35.
11
Id. at 38.
12
Id. at 39-138.
13
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
14
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
15
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
16
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
17
Records, p. 259.
18
Id. at 260.
19
Id. at 262-267.
20
Id. at 270-272.
21
Id. at 288.
22
Id. at 301.
23
Id. at 302-303.
24
Id. at 306-311.
25
Id. at 318-320.
26
Id. at 339-349.
27
Id. at 350-354.
28
Id. at 391-393.
29
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
30
Supra note 14.
31
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
32
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because the
records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that
the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
33
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
34
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
35
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
36
Id. at 75.
37
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
38
G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
39
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
40
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
41
Id. at 199-200.
42
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
43
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R.
No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
44
Records, pp. 76-78.
45
Id. at 60-75.
46
Id. at 79.
47
Id. at 80.
48
Id. at 81-83.
49
Id. at 84.
50
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the
value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded ₱200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
51
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued
by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary,
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are
hereby defined as follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of Las Pinas,
Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x
52
Supra note 14.
53
Id. at 139, 143-144.
54
Id. at 144.
55
Supra note 31.
56
Id. at 664.
57
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
58
Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.
59
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990
ed., p. 263.
60
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
61
Id. at 447.
62
Supra note 58.
63
Id. at 119-121.
64
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
65
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
66
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
67
Supra note 14 at 144.
68
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
69
Id. at 264-265, 268.
70
Supra note 60.
71
Id. at 448-449.
72
Records, pp. 118-124.
73
Supra note 60 at 451.
74
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
75
Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
76
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
77
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
 78
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451
SCRA 494, 506.
79
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
80
Id. at 686.
81
Id. at 679, 686-687.

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