Pil Notes - Up 2009

Public international law
Finals reviewer
PROF. HARRY ROQUE
* Bok * Ceejay * Tif * Gem * Tin *
This Finals Reviewer would not have been possible without the help
of the following:
~ Lora ~ PJ ~ Carol ~ Jerome ~ Ben ~ Cathe ~ Easter ~ Mike ~ Marco ~

Dave ~
UPLAW 2009B
Public international law finals reviewer 1
1. IN GENERAL1
How is international law defined in the light of developments in international legal

relations since the end of the Second World War?
International law is a body of legal principles, norms and processes which regulates the
relations of States and other international persons, and governs their conduct affecting the
interests of the international community as a whole.
2. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Art. 38, ICJ Statute:

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties
agree thereto.
Article 53, 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties

Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (“jus cogens”)
- A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
What are the sources of international law?
As identified in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, these sources are as follows:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; and
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Sources of law refer to norms derived from international conventions or treaties, customs,
and general principles of law. The distinctive character of these norms is that they are
created, or they acquire binding effect through the methods pointed above.
Treaty and custom are the primary sources of international law. While a treaty is a legal
instrument which constitutes a material source of norms, treaty- making is a norm- creating
process, a method of formalizing the consent of States by which they intend to be bound by
the treaty. The formation of custom is as well as a norm- creating method. A formal source of
customary norms.
A number of writers have distinguished formal sources from material sources of

international law. What is the distinction?
Formal sources consist of the methods and procedures by which norms are created, and
material sources are the substantive evidence of the existence of norms. A rule, for example,
will be considered legally binding as customary norm or custom on account of the process or
method by which it was created through the formation of general practice accepted as law.
Hence, custom as a norm-creating process is a formal source of law. Its content in terms of
state practice arising from a sense of legal duty is its material source.
1 Thanks to Bok, PJ, and Lora for this part.

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b
The material sources supplies the substance of the rule to which the formal sources gives
the force and nature of law.
What are the elements of international custom?

The elements of custom or customary international norm are :
1. general practice, characterized by uniformity and consistency
2. opinion juris sive necessitates, or recognition of the practices that are legally binding
State practice as an element of customary law must be “both extensive and virtually
uniform”.(North Sea Case) Some degree of uniformity is required. (Anglo- Norwegian case)
In the Asylum case, it considers general practice as “constant and uniform usage practised
by States in question.” But in any event, universality of practice is not required.
Repetition of practice or actions of states is necessary. A customary norm of international

law arises in consequence of the repeated action of states. The element of repetition is basic
to the formation of a rule of conduct. In the majority of instances the repetition of specific
actions in analogous situations can lead to the consolidation of such practice as a rule of
conduct.
According to Judge Hudson: “elements which must be present before a principle of

international custom can be found to be established”:
a. concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling

within the domain of international relations
b. continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time
c. conception that the practice is required by or consistent with prevailing international
law
d. general acquiescence in the practice by other states.
How is opinion juris understood?

In the formation of international law norms through custom, States create law by what they
do in practice or by their conduct. Opinio Juris means that in doing so, they must believe that
the practice or conduct is obligatory. They do so for the reason that the practice is required
by law, and not merely because of courtesy or political expediency.
Are judicial decisions and teaching of publicists sources of international law?

They are not sources of law as such. They are merely “subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law”. They are regarded as evidence of norms of international law.
They are the means by which the rules of law may be verified. In other words, they may be
regarded as evidence of law.
What is a jus cogens norm?

A jus cogens or peremptory or is a norm which States cannot derogate or deviate from in
their agreements. It is a mandatory norm and stands on a higher category than a jus
dispositivum norm which States can set aside or modify by agreement.
In general, how do norms of international law come into being?

They are created by States through definite norm-creating methods accepted or recognized
by them as means of expressing their consent as to the binding effect of those norms.
Hence, international law is based on their normative consent.
The methods of creating or recognizing norms are referred to as sources of law. By means
of treaty or convention and custom, States create or recognize norms as binding law. Norms
created by treaty are on the whole called conventional international law; those by custom are
called customary international law.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949)

Kuroda, the commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the RP during WWII,
was charged before the AFP formed Military Commission, for having unlawfully disregarded
and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members
of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war.” Kuroda contests the legality of of Executive Order No. 68 which established
the National War Crime Office to prosecute those who have offended war crimes. Kuroda
argues that since the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare, he is charged of ‘crimes’ not based on law, national and
international.”
RP Consti. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation. EO68 and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war
criminals is valid and constitutional since Art. 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3,
that “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” So even
without local legislation, the Constitution has provided for the application of international law.
The rules & regulations of the Hague, Geneva Conventions form part of & are wholly based
on the generally accepted principles of international law. Even if RP is not a signatory to the
Hague Conv. and signed the Geneva Conv. only in 1947, it can’t be denied that the rules
and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conv. form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were
accepted by the 2 belligerent nations, US and Japan, who were signatories to the 2
Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if
RP was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Consti has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules
and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory.
Yamashita v. Styer (1945)

Yamashita was the former commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines, and now charged before an American Military Commission with the most
monstrous crimes ever committed against the Americans and Filipinos. This is his petition for
habeas corpus and prohibition. Yamashita contends that the MC was not duly constituted,
and, therefore without jurisdiction and that there is against him no charge of an offense
against the laws of war. The Court held that his petition for habeas corpus is untenable since
he seeks no discharge from confinement but merely his restoration to his former Prisoner of
War status. Likewise, his petition for prohibition can neither prosper since the MC is not
made party respondent in this case.
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

International law (in particular IHL) evolved from custom & practice throughout history. Many
of the basic ideas which prevail today in the customs and usages of nations and became
part of the international law emerged from the human mind centuries before the Christian
Era. Such is the idea that prisoners of war are entitled to humane treatment, that treasons of
war should be discountenanced, and that belligerents must abstain from causing harm to
non-combatants.
RP is bound to comply with established rules in treating war criminals. Impelled by

irrepressible endeavors aimed towards the ideal, by the unconquerable natural urge for
improvement, by the unquenchable thirstiness of perfection in all orders of life, humanity has
been struggling during the last two dozen centuries to develop an international law which
could answer more and more faithfully the demands of right and justice as expressed in
principles which, weakly enunciated at first in the rudimentary juristic sense of peoples of
antiquity, by the inherent power of their universal appeal to human conscience, at last were
accepted, recognized, and consecrated by all the civilized nations of the world. Under these
principles, Yamashita is entitled to be accorded all the guarantees, protections, and
defenses that all prisoners should have, according to the customs and usages, conventions
and treaties, judicial decisions and executive pronouncements, and generally accepted
opinions of thinkers, legal philosophers and other expounders of just rules and principles of
international law. The seriousness or unfathomable gravity of the charges against him must
not be taken into consideration in order that true justice may be administered in this case.
Nicaragua v. US (1986)
Nicaragua filed an Application instituting proceedings against the US in respect of a dispute
concerning responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua
(mining of ports, air space infringement, support to the contras, economic measures).
Nicaragua contends that the US, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing,
supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and
paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua, has violated and is violating its express
charter and treaty obligations to Nicaragua, and in particular the UN Charter, the Charter of
the Organization of American States, the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, and the
Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The US
declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute contained a reservation excluding from operation of the
declaration: "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty
affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United
States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction". Invoking its multilateral treaty reservation,
US argues that adjudication of claims based on those treaties (i.e. UN Charter, OAS
Charter) is barred. Thus the effect of the reservation in question is not merely to prevent the
ICJ from deciding upon Nicaragua's claims by applying the multilateral treaties in question; it
further prevents it from applying in its decision any rule of customary international law the
content of which is also the subject of a provision in those multilateral treaties (that all
principles of customary and general international law are barred, as these are subsumed
and supervened by the provisions of the UN Charter.) The Court held that such acts of the
US constitute breaches of obligations under customary international law not to intervene in
the affairs of another state, not to use force against another state, not to violate the
sovereignty of another state.
Customary law operates independently of treaty law. It rather demonstrates that in the field
in question, customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas
governed by the two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have
the same content. But even if the customary norm and the treaty norm were to have exactly
the same content, this would not be a reason for the Court to hold that the incorporation of
the customary norm into treaty-law must deprive the customary norm of its applicability as
distinct from that of the treaty norm. There are a number of reasons for considering that,
even if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear identical in content,
and even if the States in question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law
and on that of customary international law, these norms retain a separate existence. This is
so from the standpoint of their applicability. In a legal dispute affecting two States, one of
them may argue that the applicability of a treaty rule to its own conduct depends on the other
State's conduct in respect of the application of other rules, on other subjects, also included in
the same treaty. For example, if a State exercises its right to terminate or suspend the
operation of a treaty on the ground of the violation by the other party of a "provision essential
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty", it is exempted, vis-a-vis the
other State, from a rule of treaty-law because of the breach by that other State of a different
rule of treaty-law. But if the two rules in question also exist as rules of customary
international law, the failure of the one State to apply the one rule does not justify the other
State in declining to apply the other rule. Rules which are identical in treaty law and in
customary international law are also distinguishable by reference to the methods of
interpretation and application. A State may accept a rule contained in a treaty not simply
because it favors the application of the rule itself, but also because the treaty establishes
what that State regards as desirable institutions or mechanisms to ensure implementation of
the rule. Thus, if that rule parallels a rule of customary international law, two rules of the

same content are subject to separate treatment as regards the organs competent to verify
their implementation, depending on whether they are customary rules or treaty rules.
Court must make a determination of state practice & opinio juris. Bound as it is by Art. 38 of
its Statute to apply international custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law",
the Court may not disregard the essential role played by general practice. In the field of
customary international law, the shared view of the Parties as to the content of what they
regard as the rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in
the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.
Conduct of a state must be consistent with the rule. The Court does not consider that, for a
rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely
rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the
Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with
such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should
generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of
a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule
itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
Opinio juris can be deduced from attitude of states toward certain GA resolutions. This
opinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from the attitude of the Parties and
the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions, i.e. the "Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the UN". The effect of consent to the text of such
resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of a "reiteration or elucidation" of the treaty
commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves.
The principle of non-use of force, for example, may thus be regarded as a principle of
customary international law, not as such conditioned by provisions relating to collective
security, or to the facilities or armed contingents to be provided under Article 43 of the
Charter. It would therefore seem apparent that the attitude referred to expresses an opinio
juris respecting such rule (or set of rules), to be thenceforth treated separately from the
provisions, especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-law
plane of the Charter.
Recognition that a rule is fundamental or a jus cogens establishes CIL. A further

confirmation of the validity as customary international law of the principle of the prohibition of
the use of force expressed in Article 2 of the UN Charter of may be found in the fact that it is
frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of
customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law.
Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits states that the principle prohibiting the use of force
embodied in Article 2 "has come to be recognized as jus cogens" (jus cogens: a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character. – Art. 53, Vienna Convention.)
The US, in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, found it
material to quote the views of scholars that this principle is a "universal norm", a "universal
international law", a "universally recognized principle of international law", and a "principle of
jus cogens".
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have submitted to the Court certain differences
concerning 'the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in
the North Sea which appertain to each of them. The Court is requested to decide what are
the applicable 'principles and rules of international law'. Germany proposed that delimitation
of the continental shelf between the parties is governed by the principle that each coastal
State is entitled to a just and equitable share.” Germany contents that making use of the
equidistance method of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Continental Shelf Convention, had not
become customary international law and was not under the circumstances the appropriate
method. The equidistance method could not be used where it would not achieve a just and
equitable apportionment of the shelf. As for Denmark and the Netherlands, delimitation
should be governed by the principle of Art. 6, par. 2, and that where the parties were in
disagreement as to the boundary and special circumstances did not justify another
boundary, then “the boundary between them is to be determined by the application of the
principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea of each State is measured. The boundary should be determined “on the
basis of the exclusive rights of each Party over the continental shelf adjacent to its coast and
of the principle that the boundary is to leave to each Party every point of the continental shelf
which lies nearer to its coast than to the coast of the other Party.”
Netherlands and Denmark argue that the use of this method is not in the nature of a merely
conventional obligation, but is, or must now be regarded as involving, a rule that is part of
the corpus of general international law;-and, like other rules of general or customary
international law, is binding on Germany automatically and independently of any specific
assent, direct or indirect, given by the latter. This contention has both a positive law and a
more fundamentalist aspect. As a matter of positive law, it is based on the work done in this
field by international legal bodies, on State practice and on the influence attributed to the
Geneva Convention itself,-the claim being that these various factors have cumulatively
evidenced or been creative of the opinion juris sive necessitatis, requisite for the formation of
new rules of customary international law. In its fundamentalist aspect, the view put forward
derives from what might be called the natural law of the continental shelf, in the sense that
the equidistance principle is seen as a necessary expression in the field of delimitation of the
accepted doctrine of the exclusive appurtenance of the continental shelf to the nearby
coastal State, and therefore as having an a priori character of so to speak juristic
inevitability.
The Court does not agree with the contentions of Netherlands and Denmark. In considering
the equidistance method, the International Law Commission's discussions reveal that not
only was the notion of equidistance never considered from the standpoint of its having a
priori a character of inherent necessity: it was never given any special prominence at all,
and certainly no priority. The Court notes that the principle of equidistance, as it now figures
in Art. 6, was proposed by the ILC with considerable hesitation, somewhat on an
experimental basis, at most de lege ferenda (ideal norm), and not at all de lege lata or as an
emerging rule of customary international law. This is clearly not the sort of foundation on
which Art. 6 of the Convention could be said to have reflected or crystallized such a rule.
Denmark & Netherlands further argues that even if, at the date of the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf, no rule of CIL in favor of the equidistance principle and no such rule
was crystallized in Art. 6, such a rule has come into being since the convention, partly
because of its own impact, partly on the basus of subsequent state practice. The Court does
not agree…
Provision should be norm-creating. It would be necessary that the provision should, at all
events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded
as forming the basis of a general rule of law. Considered in abstracto the equidistance
principle might be said to fulfill this requirement. Yet in the particular form in which it is
embodied in Art. 6, and having regard to the relationship of that Article to other provisions,
this must be open to some doubt.
In the first place, Art. 6 is so framed as to put 2 ND the obligation to make use of the
equidistance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation to effect delimitation by
agreement. Such a primary obligation constitutes an unusual preface to what is claimed to
be a potential general rule of law. Without attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon
any question of jus cogens, it is well understood that, in practice, rules of international law

can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases, or as between particular parties,-
but this is not normally the subject of any express provision, as it is in Art. 6.
Secondly the part played by the notion of special circumstances relative to the principle of
equidistance as embodied in Art. 6, and the very considerable, still unresolved controversies
as to the exact meaning and scope of this notion, must raise further doubts as to the
potentially norm-creating character of the rule.
Finally, the faculty of making reservations to Art. 6, while it might not of itself prevent the
equidistance principle being eventually received as general law, does add considerably to
the difficulty of regarding this result as having been brought about (or being potentially
possible) on the basis of the Convention: for so long as this faculty continues to exist, and is
not the subject of any revision brought about in consequence of a request made under Art.
13-of which there is at present no official indication-it is the Convention itself which would, for
the reasons already indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Art. 6 the same norm-
creating character as, for instance, Art. 1 and 2 possess.
Widespread & representative participation in the convention including specially affected

states. Regarded necessary before a conventional rule can be considered to have become a
general rule of international law might be that, even without the passage of any considerable
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might
suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected.
Passage of time immaterial in the formation of a new rule of CIL. Although the passage of
only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule
of customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule,
an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected,
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-
and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a
rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
* Sir: The ILC composed of experts is created by the UN GA to codify CIL. Since, their work
deals with customary norms, their drafts/works are subsidiary means of discovering CIL.
Southwest Africa Case (2nd Phase, 1966)

Southwest Africa (SWA) contends that South Africa, exercising administrative powers over
the their territory by virtue of a mandate practiced apartheid, i.e., has distinguished as to
race, color, national or tribal origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants of
the Territory; that such practice is in violation of its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the
Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; and that the Union has
the duty forthwith to cease the practice of apartheid in the Territory. Furthermore, South
Africa, by virtue of the economic, political, social and educational policies applied within
SWA has failed to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants of the Territory; that its failure to do so is in violation of its
obligations as stated in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of
the Covenant; and that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease its violations as aforesaid
and to take all practicable action to fulfill its duties under such Articles.
Court can only rule on legal rights/obligations. It had been attempted to derive a legal right or
interest in the conduct of the Mandate from the simple existence, or principle, of the "sacred
trust". The sacred trust, it was said was a "sacred trust of civilization" and hence all civilized
nations had an interest in seeing that it was carried out. But in order that this interest might
take on a specifically legal character the sacred trust itself must be or become something
more than a moral or humanitarian ideal. In order to generate legal rights and obligations, it
must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal form. The moral ideal must not be
confused with the legal rules intended to give it effect. The principle of the "sacred trust" had

no residual juridical content which could, so far as any particular mandate is concerned,
operate per se to give rise to legal rights and obligations outside the system as a whole.
*Sir: This is a legal challenge brought by Ethiopia & Liberia against South Africa WRT the
practice of apartheid (although never mentioned here!!) The action is based on the mandate
given to South Africa to promote the material & moral well-being & social progress of
inhabitants of the South West African territory. The Court did not decide on the merits
because it did not consider the case as involving a legal issue because there was no law
prohibiting apartheid. The Applicants tried to derive a legal right or interest in the conduct of
the Mandate for South West Africa from the simple principle of the “sacred trust”. The
principles set forth here have been obliterated in latter cases. Fundamental equality is now
considered an erga omnes obligation since it is a fundamental human right.
Asylum Case – Haya Dela Torre (Columbia/Peru, 1950)

Colombia cotends as the country granting asylum that it is competent to qualify the offence
for the purpose of the said asylum, within the limits of the obligations resulting in particular
from the Bolivarian Agreement on Extradition, and the Convention on Asylum, and of
American international law in general and that Peru, as the territorial State, is bound in the
case now before the Court to give the guarantees necessary for the departure of Haya de la
Torre from the country, with due regard to the inviolability of his person. Peru, on the other
hand, contends that the grant of asylum by the Colombian Ambassador at Lima to Haya de
la Torre was made in violation of Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 2, paragraph 2, item I
(inciso primera), of the Convention on Asylum."
Custom = constant uniform usage. The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must
prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the
other Party. The Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that
this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty
incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the Court,
which refers to international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” In
support of its contention concerning the existence of such a custom, the Colombian
Government has referred to a large number of extradition treaties which, as already
explained, can have no bearing on the question now under consideration. It has cited
conventions and agreements which do not contain any provision concerning the alleged rule
of unilateral and definitive qualification such as the Montevideo Convention of 1889 on
international penal law, the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911 and the Havana Convention of
1928. It has invoked conventions which have not been ratified by Peru, such as the
Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939.
The Convention of 1933 have, in fact, been ratified by not more than eleven States and the
Convention of 1939 by two States only. It is particularly the Montevideo Convention of 1933
which Counsel for the Colombian Government has also relied on in this connexion. It is
contended that this Convention has merely codified principles which were already
recognized by Latin-American custom, and that it is valid against Peru as a proof of
customary law. The limited number of States which have ratified this Convention reveals the
weakness of this argument, and furthermore, it is invalidated by the preamble which states
that this Convention modifies the Havana Convention.
Kookooritchkin V. The Solicitor General (1948) (to be read in connection with the asylum
case)
Kookooritchkin, a former Russian citizen, filed a petition for naturalization, accompanied with
supporting affidavits of 2 citizens, copy of a sworn declaration of intention and proper notice
of the hearing. But due to the Japanese invation, the case was suspended and the
documents presented were destroyed. The case was reconstituted after the war and a
resolution was eventually issued granting the petition.

What constitutes a stateless refugee. Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of
Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He
is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much less to the
present Government of the land of his birth to which he is uncompromisingly opposed. He is
not against organized government or affiliated with any association which upholds and
teaches doctrine opposing all organized governments. He does not believe in the necessity
or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance
of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy. He is not
suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. Appellee's testimony,
besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of
modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless refugees
or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said
dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression,
concentration camps and blood purges, & it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones
who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment
to the hells which were formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of
stateless refugees.
Certificate of arrival not essential, declarations or intention to become a Fil. citizen is

sufficient to grant citizenship. The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of
intention to become a Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle
for the liberation of Manila, & the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.
Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the validity of
a declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as Sec. 5 of Commonwealth Act
no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.
Nuclear Test Cases (1974)

The Court has found that the claim of New Zealand/Australia no longer had any object and
that the Court was therefore not called upon to give a decision thereon. The proceedings
instituted before the Court concerned the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by
France in the South Pacific; the original and ultimate objective of New Zealand/Australia is to
obtain a termination of those; France, by various public statements made in 1974, has
announced its intention, following the completion of the 1974 series of atmospheric tests, to
cease the conduct of such tests; the Court finds that the objective of New Zealand/Australia
has in effect been accomplished, inasmuch as France has undertaken the obligation to hold
no further nuclear tests in the atmosphere in the South Pacific; the dispute having thus
disappeared, the claim no longer has any object and there is nothing on which to give
judgment. With regard France’s declaration, the first of these statements is contained in a
communiqué which was issued by the Office of the President of the French Republic on 8
June 1974 and transmitted in particular to the Applicant: ". . . in view of the stage reached in
carrying out the French nuclear defence programme France will be in a position to pass on
to the stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests planned for this
summer is completed". Further statements are contained in a Note from the French
Embassy in Wellington, a letter from the President of France to the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, a press conference given by the President of the Republic, a speech made by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the United Nations General Assembly and a television
interview and press conference by the Minister for Defence. The Court considers that these
statements convey an announcement by France of its intention to cease the conduct of
atmospheric nuclear tests following the conclusion of the 1974 series.
Unilateral acts may have the effect of creating legal obligations. It is well recognized that
declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have
the effect of creating legal obligations. Nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any
subsequent acceptance, nor even any reaction from other States is required for such
declaration to take effect. Neither is the question of form decisive. The intention of being
bound is to be ascertained by an interpretation of the act. The binding character of the
undertaking results from the terms of the act and is based on good faith interested States
are entitled to require that the obligation be respected.
In the present case, the Applicant, while recognizing the possibility of the dispute being
resolved by a unilateral declaration on the part of France, has stated that, in its view, the
possibility of further atmospheric tests has been left open, even after the French statements
mentioned above. The Court must, however, form its own view of the meaning and scope
intended to be given to these unilateral declarations. Having regard to their intention and to
the circumstances in which they were made, they must be held to constitute an engagement
of the French State. France has conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
intention effectively to terminate its atmospheric tests. It was bound to assume that other
States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. It is true that
France has not recognized that it is bound by any rule of international law to terminate its
tests, but this does not affect the legal consequences of the statements in question, the
unilateral undertaking resulting from them cannot be interpreted as having been made in
implicit reliance on an arbitrary power of reconsideration.
Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the

Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France)
Case (1995)
The Court handed down its decision that New Zealand's Request for an Examination of the
Situation in accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's 1974 Judgment in the Nuclear
Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), made on 21 August 1995, "does not fall within the
provisions of the said paragraph 63 and must consequently be dismissed." Consequently,
New Zealand's request for provisional measures and the applications for permission to
intervene submitted by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia as well as the declarations of intervention made by the last
four States, all of which are proceedings incidental to New Zealand's main request, likewise
had to be dismissed. The Court limited the present proceedings to the examination of the
following question: "Do the Requests submitted to the Court by the Government of
New Zealand on 21 August 1995 fall within the provisions of paragraph 63 of the Judgment
of the Court of 20 December 1974 in the case concerning Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v.
France)?". In the Court's view that question has two elements. The first element concerns
the courses of procedure envisaged by the Court in paragraph 63 of its 1974 Judgment,
when it stated that "the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute"; the other concerns the question whether the
"basis" of that Judgment has been "affected" within the meaning of paragraph 63 thereof. In
its examination of that question the Court found in the first place that by inserting in
paragraph 63 the above-mentioned phrase, the Court did not exclude a special procedure
for access to it (unlike those mentioned in the Court's Statute, like the filing of a new
application, or a request for interpretation or revision, which would have been open to the
Applicant in any event). Secondly, however, the Court found that that special procedure
would only be available to the Applicant if circumstances were to arise which affected the
basis of the 1974 Judgment. And that, it found, was not the case, as the basis of that
Judgment was France's undertaking not to conduct any further atmospheric nuclear tests
and only a resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere would therefore have affected it. It
is not possible for the Court now to take into consideration questions relating to underground
nuclear tests; and that the Court cannot, therefore, take account of the arguments derived by
New Zealand, on the one hand from the conditions in which France has conducted
underground nuclear tests since 1974, and on the other from the development of
international law in recent decades - and particularly the conclusion, on 25 November 1986,
of the Noumea Convention - any more than of the arguments derived by France from the
conduct of the New Zealand Government since 1974. It finally observes that its Order is
without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment,
obligations to which both New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed
their commitment
Legality Of The Use Of A State Of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

The Secretary-General of the United Nations officially communicated to the Registrar the
decision taken by the General Assembly to submit a question to the Court for an advisory
opinion: to request the International Court of Justice urgently to render its advisory opinion
on the following question: 'Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance
permitted under international law?'."
Constitutes a legal question. The Court observes that it has already had occasion to indicate
that questions "framed in terms of law and rais[ing] problems of international law . . . are by
their very nature susceptible of a reply based on law . . . [and] appear . . . to be questions of
a legal character".
It finds that the question put to the Court by the General Assembly is indeed a legal one,
since the Court is asked to rule on the compatibility of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
with the relevant principles and rules of international law. To do this, the Court must identify
the existing principles and rules, interpret them and apply them to the threat or use of
nuclear weapons, thus offering a reply to the question posed based on law. The fact that this
question also has political aspects, as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many
questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a
"legal question" and to "deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its
Statute". Nor are the political nature of the motives which may be said to have inspired the
request or the political implications that the opinion given might have of relevance in the
establishment of the Court's jurisdiction to give such an opinion.
The applicable law: UN charter, IHL, particular treaties. In the light of the foregoing the Court
concludes that the most directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which it
was seised, is that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter and
the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct of hostilities, together with
any specific treaties on nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be relevant.
Unique characteristics of nuclear weapons: highly destructive. The Court notes that in order
correctly to apply to the present case the Charter law on the use of force and the law
applicable in armed conflict, in particular humanitarian law, it is imperative for it to take
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive
capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to
generations to come.
Provisions of the charter relating to the threat or use of force: not weapon specific. The
Court then addresses the question of the legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear weapons
in the light of the provisions of the Charter relating to the threat or use of force. In Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations is prohibited. This prohibition of the use of force is to be considered in the
light of other relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. A further
lawful use of force is envisaged in Article 42, whereby the Security Council may take military
enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter VII of the Charter. These provisions do
not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons
employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific
weapon, including nuclear weapons.
Necessity & proportionality. The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article 51 is

subject to the conditions of necessity and proportionality. As the Court stated in the case
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: "there is a specific
rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed
attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law".
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in
self-defence in all circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is proportionate
under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the
law applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law. And the Court notes that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the
profound risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in mind by States
believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defence in accordance with the
requirements of proportionality.
In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States sometimes signal that they
possess certain weapons to use in self-defence against any State violating their territorial
integrity or political independence. Whether a signaled intention to use force if certain events
occur is or is not a "threat" within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon
various factors. The notions of "threat" and "use" of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal - for
whatever reason - the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be
lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in
conformity with the Charter. For the rest, no State - whether or not it defended the policy of
deterrence - suggested to the Court that it would be lawful to threaten to use force if the use
of force contemplated would be illegal.
Rules on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear weapons as such. International

customary and treaty law does not contain any specific prescription authorizing the threat or
use of nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain circumstances, in
particular those of the exercise of legitimate self-defence. Nor, however, is there any
principle or rule of international law which would make the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons or of any other weapons dependent on a specific authorization. State
practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from
an absence of authorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition.
No treaty which expressly prohibits nukes. It does not seem to the Court that the use of
nuclear weapons can be regarded as specifically prohibited on the basis of certain
provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Regulations annexed to the Hague
Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The pattern until now has been for
weapons of mass destruction to be declared illegal by specific instruments. But the Court
does not find any specific prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons in treaties expressly
prohibiting the use of certain weapons of mass destruction; and observes that, although, in
the last two decades, a great many negotiations have been conducted regarding nuclear
weapons, they have not resulted in a treaty of general prohibition of the same kind as for
bacteriological and chemical weapons.
The Court notes that the treaties dealing exclusively with acquisition, manufacture,
possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, without specifically addressing
their threat or use, certainly point to an increasing concern in the international community
with these weapons; It concludes from this that these treaties could therefore be seen as
foreshadowing a future general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but that they do not
constitute such a prohibition by themselves. As to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga
and their Protocols, and also the declarations made in connection with the indefinite
extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it emerges from these
instruments that:
(a) a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons in specific zones
(Latin America; the South Pacific) or against certain other States (non-nuclear-weapon
States which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons);
(b) nevertheless, even within this framework, the nuclear-weapon States have reserved
the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances; and
(c) these reservations met with no objection from the parties to the Tlatelolco or
Rarotonga Treaties or from the Security Council.
Cannot determine WON there’s opinio juris. The Court then turns to an examination of
customary international law to determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such flows from that source of law.
It notes that the Members of the international community are profoundly divided on the
matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over the past fifty years constitutes the
expression of an opinio juris. Under these circumstances the Court does not consider itself
able to find that there is such an opinio juris. It points out that the adoption each year by the
General Assembly, by a large majority, of resolutions recalling the content of resolution 1653
(XVI), and requesting the member States to conclude a convention prohibiting the use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance, reveals the desire of a very large section of the
international community to take, by a specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear
weapons, a significant step forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The
emergence, as lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris
on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the doctrine of deterrence(in which the
right to use those weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against an armed
attack threatening the vital security interests of the State is reserved) on the other.
International humanitarian law. After sketching the historical development of the body of
rules which originally were called "laws and customs of war" and later came to be termed
"international humanitarian law", the Court observes that the cardinal principles contained in
the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of
attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to
cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that
second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons
they use.
Martens clause. The Court also refers to the Martens Clause, which was first included in the
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and
which has proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military
technology. A modern version of that clause is to be found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, which reads as follows:
"In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements,

civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience."
The extensive codification of humanitarian law and the extent of the accession to the
resultant treaties, as well as the fact that the denunciation clauses that existed in the
codification instruments have never been used, have provided the international community
with a corpus of treaty rules the great majority of which had already become customary and
which reflected the most universally recognized humanitarian principles. These rules indicate
the normal conduct and behaviour expected of States.
Turning to the applicability of the principles and rules of humanitarian law to a possible threat
or use of nuclear weapons, the Court notes that nuclear weapons were invented after most
of the principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict had already come
into existence; the Conferences of 1949 and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there
is a qualitative as well as quantitative difference between nuclear weapons and all
conventional arms. However, in the Court's view, it cannot be concluded from this that the
established principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict did not
apply to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically
humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates the entire law of
armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the
past, those of the present and those of the future. In this respect it seems significant that the
thesis that the rules of humanitarian law do not apply to the new weaponry, because of the
newness of the latter, has not been advocated in the present proceedings.

The principle of neutrality. The Court finds that as in the case of the principles of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, international law leaves no doubt that the
principle of neutrality, whatever its content, which is of a fundamental character similar to
that of the humanitarian principles and rules, is applicable (subject to the relevant provisions
of the United Nations Charter), to all international armed conflict, whatever type of weapons
might be used.
Conclusions to be drawn from the applicability of international humanitarian law and the
principle of neutrality. According to one point of view, the fact that recourse to nuclear
weapons is subject to and regulated by the law of armed conflict, does not necessarily mean
that such recourse is as such prohibited. Another view holds that recourse to nuclear
weapons, in view of the necessarily indiscriminate consequences of their use, could never
be compatible with the principles and rules of humanitarian law and is therefore prohibited. A
similar view has been expressed with respect to the effects of the principle of neutrality. Like
the principles and rules of humanitarian law, that principle has therefore been considered by
some to rule out the use of a weapon the effects of which simply cannot be contained within
the territories of the contending States. The Court observes that, in view of the unique
characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use of such
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect for the requirements of the law
applicable in armed conflict. It considers nevertheless, that it does not have sufficient
elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would
necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in
any circumstance. Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter, when its survival is at stake. Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as "policy
of deterrence", to which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for
many years.
Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed as a whole, as examined
by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court is led to observe that it
cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival
would be at stake.
Obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament. Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in
applying the law on the use of force and above all the law applicable in armed conflict to
nuclear weapons, the Court considers that it needs to examine one further aspect of the
question before it, seen in a broader context. In the long run, international law, and with it the
stability of the international order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from the
continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as
nuclear weapons. It is consequently important to put an end to this state of affairs: the long-
promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of
achieving that result.
In these circumstances, the Court appreciates the full importance of the recognition by
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of an obligation to
negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmament. The legal import of that obligation goes
beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to
achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects - by adopting a particular
course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith. This
twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the 182 States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the
vast majority of the international community. Indeed, any realistic search for general and
complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all
States.
The Paquete Habana (The Paquete Habana And The Lola) (1900)

The Court held that the capture of the fishing vessel was unlawful and without probable
cause, on the ground that, as a rule of international law, fishing vessels are exempt from
capture as a prize of war. The Court ordered that the decree of the District Court be
reversed, and the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, together with the proceeds of any sale
of her cargo, be restored to the claimant, with damages and costs.
Ancient usage ripened to rule of international law. By an ancient usage among civilized
nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast
fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been
recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war. The Court
discussed the history of the custom exempting coastal fishers from capture beginning with
King Henry IV’s orders to his admirals in 1403 to the relevant practices of France, Holland,
Prussia, and the US. The Court also noted cases in the past in different jurisdictions which
decided the issue in the same light. Also, the Court noted, legal writings and treatieses of
legal experts and luminaries which provide for the exemption of fishing/commercial vessels.
*Sir: The treaties which established the exemption of fishing vessels, though bilateral,
became source of customary norm because, during the period they were signed, there were
only very few countries. Also, the signatories being maritime nations, can be considered as
specially affected states. The technique used by the court to establish the norm is through
customary law and subsidiary means as evidence of the norm.
Preah Vihear Temple Case (1962)

The Court held that the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in territory under the
sovereignty of Cambodia and, in consequence, that Thailand was under an obligation to
withdraw any military or police forces, or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the
Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian territory. It also found that Thailand was under an
obligation to restore to Cambodia any sculptures, stelae, fragments of monuments,
sandstone model and ancient pottery which might, since the date of the occupation of the
Temple by Thailand in 1954, have been removed from the Temple or the Temple area by the
Thai authorities.
Application of doctrines (general principles of law) of estoppel & acquiesence. The map was
never formally approved by the Mixed Commission, which had ceased to function some
months before its production. While there could be no reasonable doubt that it was based on
the work of the surveying officers in the Dangrek sector, the Court nevertheless concluded
that, in its inception, it had no binding character. It was clear from the record, however, that
the maps were communicated to the Siamese Government as purporting to represent the
outcome of the work of delimitation; since there was no reaction on the part of the Siamese
authorities, either then or for many years, they must be held to have acquiesced. The maps
were moreover communicated to the Siamese members of the Mixed Commission, who said
nothing. to the Siamese Minister of the Interior. If the Siamese authorities accepted the
Annex I map without investigation, they could not now plead any error vitiating the reality of
their consent. The Siamese Government and later the Thai Government had raised no query
about the Annex I map prior to its negotiations with Cambodia in Bangkok in 1958. Thailand
had nevertheless continued also to use and indeed to publish maps showing Preah Vihear
as lying in Cambodia. Moreover, in the course of the negotiations for the 1925 and 1937
Franco-Siamese Treaties, which confirmed the existing frontiers, and in 1947 in Washington
before the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission, it would have been natural for
Thailand to raise the matter: she did not do so. The natural inference was that she had
accepted the frontier at Preah Vihear as it was drawn on the map, irrespective of its
correspondence with the watershed line. Moreover, when in 1930 Prince Damrong, on a visit
to the Temple, was officially received there by the French Resident for the adjoining
Cambodian province, Siam failed to react. From these facts, the court concluded that
Thailand had accepted the Annex I map. Even if there were any doubt in this connection,
Thailand was precluded from asserting that she had not accepted it since France and
Cambodia had relied upon her acceptance and she had for fifty years enjoyed such benefits
as the Treaty of 1904 has conferred on her. Furthermore, the acceptance of the Annex I map
caused it to enter the treaty settlement; the Parties had at that time adopted an interpretation
of that settlement which caused the map line to prevail over the provisions of the Treaty and,
as there was no reason to think that the Parties had attached any special importance to the
line of the watershed as such, as compared with the overriding importance of a final
regulation of their own frontiers, the Court considered that the interpretation to be given now
would be the same.
Corfu Channel Case (1949)

A british destroyer vessel struck a mine and was gravely damaged while passing through the
Corfu Channel in the territorial waters of Albania. The other destroyer was sent to her
assistance and, while towing her, struck another mine and was also seriously damaged. The
Court held that Albania had breached its obligation under international law to notify states
regarding the danger of passing through a body of water due to presence of mines in its
territorial sea.
Allowance for admission of circumstantial evidence, a general principle of law. The exclusive
control exercised by a State within its frontiers may make it impossible to furnish direct proof
of facts which would involve its responsibility in case of a violation of international law. The
State which is the victim must, in that ease, be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences
of fact and circumstantial evidence; such indirect evidence must be regarded as of especial
weight when based on a series of facts, linked together and leading logically to a single
conclusion.
In the present case two series of facts, which corroborate one another, have to be
considered. The first relates to the Albanian Government's attitude before and after the
catastrophe. The laying of the mines took place in a period in which it had shown its intention
to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters and in which it was requiring prior
authorization before they were entered, this vigilance sometimes going so far as to involve
the use of force: all of which render the assertion of ignorance a priori improbable. Moreover,
when the Albanian Government had become fully aware of the existence of a minefield, it
protested strongly against the activity of the British Fleet, but not against the laying of the
mines, though this act, if effected without her consent, would have been a very serious
violation of her sovereignty; she did not notify shipping of the existence of the minefield, as
would be required by international law; and she did not undertake any of the measures of
judicial investigation which would seem to be incumbent on her in such a case. Such an
attitude could only be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the mine
laying, desired the circumstances in which it was effected to remain secret.
The second series of facts relates to the possibility of observing the mine laying from the
Albanian coast. Geographically, the channel is easily watched: it is dominated by heights
offering excellent observation points, and it runs close to the coast. The methodical and well-
thought-out laying of the mines compelled the minelayers to remain from two to two-and-a-
half hours in the waters. In regard to that point, the naval experts appointed by the Court
reported, after enquiry and investigation on the spot, that they considered it to be
indisputable that, if a normal look-out was kept and if the lookouts were equipped with
binoculars, under normal weather conditions for this area, the mine-laying operations must
have been noticed by these coastguards. From all the facts and observations mentioned
above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield could not have been
accomplished without the knowledge of Albania. As regards the obligations resulting for her
from this knowledge, they are not disputed. It was her duty to notify shipping and especially
to warn the ships proceeding through the Strait on October 22nd of the danger to which they
were exposed. In fact, nothing was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, and these
grave omissions involve her international responsibility.
Chorzow Factory Case (Germany V. Poland) (1928)

The German empire had a contract with a company, where the company undertook to
establish for the Reich and forthwith to begin the construction of a nitrate factory at Chorzow,
Upper Silesia. Subsequently, Poland and Germany signed a Convention concerning the
Upper Silesia of Geneva (Geneva Convention). A Polish was then delegated with the full
powers to take charge of the factory, thus, causing the end of the contract between Germany
and the companies. Germany brought action in behalf of the companies against Poland for
the taking of the companies in violation of the Geneva Conventions.
State’s espousal of claims on behalf of its nationals. International law does not prevent one
State from granting to another the right to have recourse to international arbitral tribunals in
order to obtain the direct award to nationals of the latter State of compensation for damage
suffered by them as a result of infractions of international law by the first State.
Reparation = indemnity for damages caused. It is a principle of international law that the
reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the
nationals of the injured State have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to
international law.
In estimating the damage caused by an unlawful act, only the value of property, rights and
interests which have been affected and the owner of which is the person on whose behalf
compensation is claimed, or the damage done to whom is to serve as a means of gauging
the reparation claimed, must be taken into account. The damage suffered is equivalent to
the total value - but to that total only - of the property, rights and interests of this Company in
that undertaking, without deducting liabilities.
The reparation due by one State to another does not however change its character by
reason of the fact that it takes the form of an indemnity for the calculation of which the
damage suffered by a private person is taken as the measure. The rules of law governing
the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned,
and not the law governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongful act
and the individual who has suffered damage. The damage suffered by an individual is never
therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by a State; it can only afford a
convenient scale for the calculation of the reparation due to the State.
Reparation, defined. The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed.
When restitution not possible, then reparation. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible,
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution
in kind or payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.
Reparation, as applied in this case. This conclusion particularly applies as regards the
Geneva Convention, the object of which is to provide for the maintenance of economic life in
Upper Silesia on the basis of respect for the status quo. The dispossession of an industrial
undertaking (which is prohibited by the Geneva Convention) then involves the obligation to
restore the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the
indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which has become
impossible. To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of international law, must be
added that of compensating loss sustained as the result of the seizure. The impossibility of
restoring the Chorzów factory could therefore have no other effect but that of substituting
payment of the value of the undertaking for restitution; it would not be in conformity with the
principles of law or with the wish of the Parties to infer from that agreement that the question
of compensation must henceforth be dealt with as though an expropriation properly so called
was involved.

(Some notes on the case from BP v. Libya: The Chorzow Factory case is the leading case
on the proposition that restitutio in integrum is a recognized remedy of International Law.
However, the judgment is not authority on the point, for the Claimant (the German
Government) did not claim restitutio in integrum, and anything the Court stated on the
availability of that remedy is obiter.)
*Sir: What is the general principle of law in the case? Reparation for the taking of property
requires compensation. Reparation is due when there is a breach of an obligation.
When an expropriation is legal, the amount of the reparation is the logistical value of the
property taken at the time of the expropriation. However, when there is an unlawful taking,
the amount of reparation includes the intangible assets (loss of profits).
Barcelona Traction, Light And Power Company Case (Belgium V. Spain) (1970)
The BTLPC, was incorporated in Toronto (Canada) for the purpose of creating and
developing an electric power production and distribution system in Catalonia (Spain). It
formed a number of subsidiary companies, of which some had their registered offices in
Canada and the others in Spain. Some years after the first world war Barcelona Traction
share capital came to be very largely held by Belgian nationals. The servicing of the
Barcelona Traction bonds was suspended on account of the Spanish civil war. After that war
the Spanish exchange control authorities refused to authorize the transfer of the foreign
currency necessary for the resumption of the servicing of the sterling bonds. Eventually, the
company was declared bankrupt. Belgium filed an application with the ICJ against the
Spanish government seeking reparation of damages claimed to have been caused to the
Belgian national shareholders of the company.
Municipal law applied to international law. In the field of diplomatic protection, international
law was in continuous evolution and was called upon to recognize institutions of municipal
law. In municipal law, the concept of the company was founded on a firm distinction between
the rights of the company and those of the shareholder. Only the company, which was
endowed with legal personality, could take action in respect of matters that were of a
corporate character. A wrong done to the company frequently caused prejudice to its
shareholders, but this did not imply that both were entitled to claim compensation. Whenever
a shareholder's interests were harmed by an act done to the company, it was to the latter
that he had to look to institute appropriate action. An act infringing only the company's rights
did not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests were affected.
In order for the situation to be different, the act complained of must be aimed at the direct
rights of the shareholder as such (which was not the case here since the Belgian
Government had itself admitted that it had not based its claim on an infringement of the
direct rights of the shareholders).
General Rule: State of the company can seek redress. International law had to refer to those
rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems. An injury to the shareholder's interests
resulting from an injury to the rights of the company was insufficient to found a claim. Where
it was a question of an unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign
capital, the general rule of international law authorized the national State of the company
alone to exercise diplomatic protection for the purpose of seeking redress. No rule of
international law expressly conferred such a right on the shareholder's national State.
Exceptional circumstances. The Court considered whether there might not be, in the present
case, special circumstances for which the general rule might not take effect. Two situations
needed to be studied: (a) the case of the company having ceased to exist, and (b) the case
of the protecting State of the company lacking capacity to take action.
As regards the first of these possibilities, the Court observed that whilst Barcelona Traction
had lost all its assets in Spain and been placed in receivership in Canada, it could not be
contended that the corporate entity of the company had ceased to exist or that it had lost its
capacity to take corporate action. So far as the second possibility was concerned, it was not
disputed that the company had been incorporated in Canada and had its registered office in
that country, and its Canadian nationality had received general recognition. The Canadian
Government had exercised the protection of Barcelona Traction for a number of years. If at a
certain point the Canadian Government ceased to act on behalf of Barcelona Traction, it
nonetheless retained its capacity to do so, which the Spanish Government had not
questioned. Whatever the reasons for the Canadian Government's change of attitude, that
fact could not constitute a justification for the exercise of diplomatic protection by another
government.
It had been maintained that a State could make a claim when investments by its nationals
abroad, such investments being part of a State's national economic resources, were
prejudicially affected in violation of the right of the State itself to have its nationals enjoy a
certain treatment. But, in the present state of affairs, such a right could only result from a
treaty or special agreement. And no instrument of such a kind was in force between Belgium
and Spain.
*Sir: What is the general principle of law in the case? A corporation has a juridical
personality distinct from its shareholders.
Texaco V. Libya (1978)

Libya promulgated decrees purporting to nationalize all of the rights, interests and property
of Texaco in Libya granted to them jointly under 14 Deeds of Concession. The Companies
objected to the decrees and claimed that such action by the Libyan Government violated the
terms and conditions of their Deeds of Concession. The Companies requested arbitration.
The Sole Arbitrator held that (a) the Deeds of Concession are binding on the parties, (b) by
adopting the measures of nationalization, the Libyan Government breached its obligations
arising under the Deeds of Concession and (c) the Libyan Government is legally bound to
perform the Deeds of Concession and to give them their full force and effect. Libya argues
that with respect to nationalization, municipal law should govern and not international law.
Several UN G.A. resolutions were invoked by both parties. Thus the court had to look into
the legal value and validity of such resolutions and their binding effect to the parties.
Legal value of resolutions to be determined on the basis of the circumstances under which
they were adopted & analysis of the principles they state. The legal value of the resolutions
which are relevant to the present case can be determined on the basis of circumstances
under which they were adopted (ex. voting pattern) and by analysis of the principles which
they state.
Resolutions in order to be binding must be accepted by the members escpecially those

specially affected. With respect to the first point, the absence of any binding force of the
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations implies that such resolutions must
be accepted by the members of the United Nations in order to be legally binding. In this
respect, the Tribunal notes that only Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 was
supported by a majority of Member States representing all of the various groups. By
contrast, the other Resolutions mentioned, and in particular those referred to in the Libyan
Memorandum, were supported by a majority of States but not by any of the developed
countries with market economies which carry on the largest part of international trade.
Distinguish between those stating an existing right & those introducing new principles. The
appraisal of the legal value on the basis of the principles stated, it appears essential to this
Tribunal to distinguish between those provisions stating the existence of a right on which the
generality of the States has expressed agreement and those provisions introducing new
principles which were rejected by certain representative groups of States and having nothing
more than a de lege ferenda (what the law ought to be); value only in the eyes of the States
which have adopted them; as far as the others are concerned, the rejection of these same
principles implies that they consider them as being contra legem (against the law). With
respect to the former, which proclaim rules recognized by the community of nations, they do
not create a custom but confirm one by formulating it and specifying its scope, thereby
making it possible to determine whether or not one is confronted with a legal rule. As has
been noted by Ambassador Castaneda, "[such resolutions] do not create the law; they have
a declaratory nature of noting what does exist"
Resolution 1803 reflect the state of customary law – based on adoption of majority of states
& opinio juris. On the basis of the circumstances of adoption mentioned above and by
expressing an opinio juris communis, Resolution 1803 (XVII) seems to this Tribunal to reflect
the state of customary law existing in this field. Indeed, on the occasion of the vote on a
resolution finding the existence of a customary rule, the States concerned clearly express
their views. The consensus by a majority of States belonging to the various representative
groups indicates without the slightest doubt universal recognition of the rules therein
incorporated, i.e., with respect to nationalization and compensation the use of the rules in
force in the nationalizing State, but all this in conformity with international law.
*Sir: The method of looking into voting patterns and employing the “specially affected” states
doctrine do not fully and totally assess WON a resolution is binding. State Practice + Opinio
Juris still has to be proved. Sir does not approve of this method.
BP V. Libya
BP Exploration Company (BP) had a contractual agreement with the Government of Libya
(Libya), which allowed BP to operate in Libya for the extraction, processing and export of
petroleum. The area in which BP was allowed to operate was called Concession 65.
However, Libya, in December 1971 passed the BP Nationalization Law, which nationalized
the operations of BP in Concession 65, restoring to the State ownership of all properties,
rights, assets and shares in the operations conducted in the said area, and then transferring
these to a new company, the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company. As a result of the
Nationalization Law (which was rapidly implemented) BP’s operations in Concession 65
were brought to a complete halt and its staff were immediately excluded from the premises
and facilities. The Arabian Gulf Exploration Company had taken over Concession 65.
Applicable law in the case. Clause 28 of the concession agreement provides that should
dispute arise, the applicable law shall be the principles of the law of Libya common to the
principles of international law, and only if such common principles do not exist with respect
to a particular matter, will resort be made to general principles of law. In the event that
international law and Libyan law conflict on the issue, general principles of law should apply
to resolve the question.
The governing system of law is what the clause expressly provides, that in the absence of
principles common to the Libyan and International law, general principles of law, including
those that may have been applied by international tribunals, should apply.
Specific Performance not applicable here. In the decisions of tribunals, while arbitral
tribunals can declare awards which include the declaration of specific performance against a
recalcitrant party, their powers and jurisdiction to do so rest carefully on the parties’ consent.
Examined in the light of general principles of law, the legal systems analyzed here offer
different solutions to the problem. Thus these municipal systems of law profess allegiance to
two divergent principles on the question. It is therefore NOT POSSIBLE to hold that under
general principles of law an agreement fundamentally abrogated by one party continues in
force and is to be specifically performed indefinitely until the innocent party terminates it, for
under English and American law the sole remedy is damages and in others specific
performance does not lie against the State.
It is clear then, that there does not exist a uniform general principle of law that an agreement
continues in effect after being repudiated by one party but not the other, and there is no
uniform principle which provides that specific performance is a remedy available at the
option of an innocent party.
Restitutio in integrum not applicable again. As to restitutio in integrum, while it has been
claimed, especially in the form of physical restoration, no tribunal has ever prescribed the
remedy with regard to such property or parties as in these proceedings. The concept has
rather been employed at times as a principle for assessing the amount of damages due for
breach of an international obligation.
The impossibility of restitution and specific performance. The claim would not even be
realistic; such an action, which has the effect of turning back the clock would upset the
current situation too profoundly and would have unforeseeable practical consequences.
Furthermore, if awarded now and the contract would still be allowed to exist indefinitely, the
amount would be so great it would be absurd.
A rule of reason therefore dictates a result which conforms to international law, evidenced by
state practice and the law of treaties, and to governing principles of English and American
contract law. The conclusion is thus: when by exercise of sovereign power a State
committed a fundamental breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it through a
nationalization of the enterprise and its assets in a manner which implies finality, the
concessionaire is not entitled to call for specific performance by the Government of the
agreement and reinstatement of his contractual rights, but his sole remedy is an action for
damages.
Payment of Damages. Under Public International Law, the norm is the payment of damages.
Under the applicable systems of law, BP is entitled to damages arising from Libya’s wrongful
acts. The principle of compensation is also recognized in the BP Nationalization Law.
*Sir: This case also involves a concession contract, a contractual undertaking as previous
cases, however, this case is different because one of the parties is a state. As a
consequence of which, specific performance and restituto in integrum is not available.
Take note, this is the only decision that the restituto in integrum is impossible. Although as a
matter of law, it is possible, but in this case, it is impractical to order specific performance
necause cannot compel a state because there is no coercive apparatus in international law.
General principles of law: The General principles of a contract such as autonomy, mutuality,
consensuality and obligatory are observed. An obligation must be performed. The law
between the parties must be complied with in good faith.
Here, it was not the LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY but IMPRACTICABILITY that restitution cannot
be ordered.
* Reviewer notes:
The framework of the Tribunal with regards entitlement to specific performance, restitution in
integrum and damages
Step one: Look at the principles of Libyan law common to international law. There are no
certain conclusions as to the position of Libyan law on the subject matter of the dispute.
Step two: Look at Public international law (Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties).
Vienna Convention does not provide for specific rules on remedies. Customary international
law (particularly the practice of international tribunals) does not provide explicit support for
the proposition that specific performance and restitution in integrum are remedies available
at the option of a party suffering a breach by a contracting party.
Step three: Look at the general principles of international law (municipal legal principles
existing in different legal systems).
English law – the norm is damages and specific performance is the exception; it is
only when damages are inadequate that specific performance is resorted to.
German law- specific performance is the normal remedy and damages are resorted
to only when it is not possible.
Danish law- same as German.
(The principles of these legal systems are principles of ordinary commercial law.
However, here, a State (Libya) is the respondent and normally, the remedies of restitution in
king and specific performance are unavailable against governmental authorities.
BP cannot ask for specific performance nor to be declared owner of any oil extracted in
Libya. The breach because of the Nationalization Law is made the basis of the amount of
damages in favor of BP.
Passage Case (Portugal V. India)

Portugal has a territory in the Indian Peninsula made up of the three districts of Goa, Daman
and Diu. The district of Daman comprises, in addition to its littoral territory, two parcels of
territory completely surrounded by the territory of India which constitute enclaves: Dadra and
Nagar-Aveli. Portugal has been passing through Indian territory through the years in order to
the enclaves of Dadra and Nagar- Aveli.
However in 1954, the Government of India prevented Portugal from exercising this right of
passage. Portugal claims that there was a local custom in its favor with the right of passage
over the territory. Portugal claims that the denial of passage by India was done due to India’s
open campaign to annex Portugese territories.
Existence of local custom between two states. The Court says that it is difficult to see why
the number of States between which a local custom may be established on the basis of long
practice must necessarily be larger than two. There is no reason why long continued practice
between two States accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis
of mutual rights and obligations between the two States.
The dispute arises at the time of the creation of the obstacles. The question was put to the
Court in respect of the dispute, which has arisen between India and Portugal with regard to
obstacles placed by India in the way of passage. It was in support of this contention that it
invoked its right of passage and asked the Court to declare the existence of that right. This
being so, it is the eve of the creation of these obstacles that must be selected as the starting
point which to ascertain whether or not Portugal possessed such a right.
Right of passage. With regard to private persons, civil officials and goods in general, there
existed during the British and post-British, periods a constant and uniform practice allowing
free passage between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a
period extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime in
respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became independent. Practice
was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a right and a correlative obligation.
In 1954, a right of passage over intervening Indian territory between coastal Daman and the
enclaves and between the enclaves, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, to the extent necessary, as claimed by Portugal, for the exercise of its sovereignty
over the enclaves, and subject to the regulation and control of India.
There was a clear distinction between the practice permitting free passage of private
persons, civil officials and goods in general, and the practice requiring previous
authorization, as in the case of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition.
There was no right of passage in favour of Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India
has been established in respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition.
The course of dealings established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with
respect to the passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such right. The
practice that was established shows that, with regard to these categories, it was well
understood that passage could take place only by permission of the British authorities. This
situation continued during the post-British period.
No breach of international obligation when custom was subject to regulation of the other
party. In view of the tension then prevailing in intervening Indian territory, the Court is unable
to hold that India’s refusal of passage to the proposed delegation and its refusal of visas to
Portuguese nationals of European origin and to native Indian Portuguese in the employ of
ART. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population;
b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
UN Charter:
ART. 4: 1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
ART. 32: Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is
not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall
be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down
such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.
ART. 35 (2): A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council
or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the
dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
ART. 93(2): A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.
ART 34, ICJ Statute:

1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.
2. The Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request of public international organizations
information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such organizations on their
own initiative.
3. Wherever the construction of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of an
international convention adopted thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify
the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written proceedings.
the Portuguese Government was action contrary to its obligation resulting from Portugal’s
right of passage. Portugal’s claim of a right of passage is subject to full recognition and
exercise of Indian sovereignty over the intervening territory and without any immunity in
favour of Portugal. India’s refusal of passage in those cases was, in the circumstances,
covered by its power of regulation and control of the right of passage of Portugal.
3. ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reparations For Injuries Suffered In The Service Of The Un (1949)

The UN GA asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion submitting the following legal questions:
1. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties
suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United
Nations, as an organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against the
responsible de jure or de facto government with a view of obtaining the reparation
due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to
persons entitled through him?
2. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I (b), how is action by the United Nations
to be reconciled with such rights as may be possessed by the State of which the
victim is a national?
Capacity, defined. Competence to bring an international claim is, for those possessing it, the
capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law for the
establishment, the presentation and the settlement of claims. (i.e. protest, request for an
enquiry, negotiation, and request for submission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court in so
far as this may be authorized by the Statute).
Capacity of a state. A State can bring an international claim against another State. Such a
claim takes the form of a claim between two political entities, equal in law, similar in form,
and both the direct subjects of international law. It is dealt with by means of negotiation, and
cannot, in the present state of the law as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a
tribunal, except with the consent of the States concerned.
UN’s international personality as evidenced by UN Charter, practice and conventions. The

UN Charter by giving the UN legal capacity and privileges and immunities in the territory of
each of its Members; and by providing for the conclusion of agreements between the UN
and its Members. Conventions to which the UN is a party-has confirmed this character of
the UN, which occupies a position in certain respects in detachment from its Members, and
which is under a duty to remind them, if need be, of certain obligations. The UN was
intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights
which can only be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an international plane.
Difference of rights possessed by a state and the UN. Whereas a State possesses the
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties
of an entity such as the UN must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or
implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.
UN Capacity to bring claim against one of its members for breach of international obligations
towards it. It is clear that UN has the capacity to bring a claim for damage caused to the
interests of the UN itself, to its administrative machine, to its property and assets, and to the
interests of which it is the guardian. When the UN has sustained damage resulting from a
breach by a Member of its international obligations, it is impossible to see how it can obtain
reparation unless it possesses capacity to bring an international claim.
Reparation guidelines. The measure of the reparation should depend upon the amount of
the damage which the UN has suffered as the result of the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant State and should be calculated in accordance with the rules of international law.
To illustrate, the damage would include the reimbursement of any reasonable compensation
which the UN had to pay to its agent or to persons entitled through him and the expenditure
in replacing a dead or disabled agent engaged upon a distant mission.
UN Capacity to bring claims for damage caused to a victim. The Charter does not expressly
confer upon the UN the capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the
victim or to persons entitled through him. But under international law, the UN must be
deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its
duties.
Organization has a capacity to exercise functional protection of its agents. In order that the
agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel that this protection is assured to him
by the UN, and that he may count on it. To ensure the independence of the agent, and,
consequently, the independent action of the UN itself, it is essential that in performing his
duties he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the UN (save of course
for the more direct and immediate protection due from the State in whose territory he may
be). In particular, he should not have to rely on the protection of his own State. If he had to
rely on that State, his independence might well be compromised, contrary to the principle
applied by Article 100 of the Charter. And lastly, it is essential that whether the agent
belongs to a powerful or to a weak State; to one more affected or less affected by the
complications of international life; to one in sympathy or not in sympathy with the mission of
the agent-he should know that in the performance of his duties he is under the protection of
the UN. This assurance is even more necessary when the agent is stateless.
The capacity of the UN to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by
necessary intendment out of the Charter.
When it claims redress for a breach of these obligations, the UN is invoking its own right, the
right that the obligations due to it should be respected.
UN Capacity to bring a claim against a defendant state which is not a member of the UN.
Fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community,
had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing
objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone,
together with capacity to bring international claims.
When the victim has a nationality, cases can clearly occur in which the injury suffered by him
may engage the interest both of his national State and of the UN. In such a case, there is no
rule of law which assigns priority to the one or to the other, or which compels either the State
or the UN to refrain from bringing an international claim.
It does not matter whether or not the State to which the claim is addressed regards him as
its own national, because the question of nationality is not pertinent to the admissibility of the
claim.
Mavrommatis Case (1924)

This dispute relates to Palestine and Britain’s wrongful refusal to recognize Mavrommatis’
rights acquired under contracts for public works to be done in Palestine. Greece took up
Mavrommatis’ case as it is a Greek subject.
Disputes, defined. A dispute is defined as a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict

of legal views or of interests between 2 persons.” Greece is asserting its rights by claiming
indemnity from Britain arguing that Britain treated Mavrommatis in “a manner incompatible
with certain international obligations which they are bound to observe.”
At first, the dispute was between a private person (Mavrommatis) and a State (Britain). But
Greece took up Mavrommatis’ case so it is now a dispute in international law.
Capacity of a state to bring claims from acts contrary to international law committed by
another state. A state can take up the case of its subjects when injured by acts contrary to
international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain
satisfaction through the ordinary channels. So WON a dispute originates in a personal injury
is irrelevant. Greece, in the eyes of Britain, is the sole claimant.
Greece has the right to ensure respect for rules of international law. It is not substituting
itself with the citizen, but is actually asserting its own rights.
Certain Expenses Of The UN (1962)

The UN GA asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion "Do the resolutions authorized by the
General Assembly to cover the costs of the UN operations in the Congo (ONUC) and of the
operations of the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF), "constitute 'expenses of
the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United
Nations"?
Expenses, defined. "Expenses" of any organization are the amounts paid out to defray the
costs of carrying out its purposes, in this case, the political, economic, social, humanitarian
and other purposes of the United Nations.
Expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of the United Nations in
the sense that if an expenditure were made for a purpose which is not one of the purposes
of the United Nations, it could not be considered an "expense of the Organization".
Purpose of the UN. The first two purposes as stated in paragraphs I and 2, may be
described as pointing to the goal of international peace and secunty and friendly relations.
The third is the achievement of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian goals and
respect for human rights. The fourth and last purpose is to be a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Responsibility of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. It is only the
Security Council which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor.
The Charter makes it abundantly clear, however, that the General Assembly is also to be
concerned with international peace and security. Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly
to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin,
which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations,
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting
forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations".
The powers of the UNSC and the UNGA. While it is the Security Council which, exclusively,
may order coercive action, the functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the
General Assembly are not confined to discussion, consideration, the initiation of studies and
the making of recommendations.
The General Assembly is given the power not only to "consider" the budget of the
Organization, but also to "approve" it. the General Assembly is also given the power to
apportion the expenses among the Members and the exercise of the power of apportionment
creates the obligation, specifically stated in Article 17, paragraph 2, of each Member to bear
that part of the expenses which is apportioned to it by the General Assembly. The provisions
of the Charter which distribute functions and powers to the Security Council and to the
General Assembly give no support to the view that such distribution excludes from the
powers of the General Assembly the power to provide for the financing of measures
designed to maintain peace and security.
Article II par 2 empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or

to the Security Council, or to both, to organize peacekeeping operations, at the request, or
with the consent, of the States concerned.
Acts of the UN. When the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. If it is agreed that the
action in question is within the scope of the functions of the Organization but it is alleged that
it has been initiated or carried out in a manner not in conformity with the division of functions
among the several organs which the Charter prescribes, one moves to the internal plane, to
the internal structure of the Organization. If the action was taken by the wrong organ, it was
irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the
expense incurred was not an expense of the Organization.
Both national and international law contemplate cases in which the body corporate or politic
may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires act of an agent. As the United Nations
Charter included no procedure for determining the validity of the acts of the organs of the
United Nations, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If
the Security Council adopted a resolution purportedly for the maintenance of international
peace and security and if, in accordance with such resolution, the Secretary-General
incurred financial obligations, those amounts must be presumed to constitute "expenses of
the Organization".
Expenses, as applied in this case. It is apparent that the operations were undertaken to fulfill
a prime purpose of the United Nations, that is, to promote and to maintain a peaceful
settlement of the situation. This being true, the Secretary-General properly exercised the
authority given him to incur financial obligations of the Organization and expenses resulting
form such obligations must be considered "expenses of the Organization within the meaning
of Article 17, paragraph 2".
Even though certain expenses are "extraordinary" and "essentially different" from those
under the "regular budget", they are none the less "expenses of the Organization" to be
apportioned in accordance with the power granted to the General Assembly by Article 17,
paragraph 2.
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter could lead to the simple conclusion that "the
expenses of the Organization" are the amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out
the purposes of the Organization.
A. STATES
1. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
If state sovereignty is said to be “absolute”, how is it related to the independence of

other States and to their equality on the international plane?
From the standpoint of the national legal order, state sovereignty is the supreme legal
authority in relation to subjects within its territorial domain. This is the traditional context in
referring to sovereignty as “absolute”. However, in the international sphere, sovereignty
realizes itself in the existence of a large number of sovereignties, such that there prevails in
fact co- existence of sovereignties under conditions of independence and equality.
The sovereignty of one state begins where the sovereignty of another state begins. That
limitation is built into the nature of state sovereignty under international law. To conceive it
as unlimited as to negate its existence in the context of the co- existence of sovereignties,
resulting in the negation of international community composed of juridically equal states.
How is state sovereignty defined in international law?

The right to exercise in a definite portion of the globe the functions of a State to the exclusion
of another state. According to widely accepted opinion of Judge Huber in the Island of
Palmas case, “Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein to the
exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The development of the national
organization of States during the last few centuries, and, as a corollary, the development of
international law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in
regard to its own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most
questions that concern international relations.”
Again, it is important to view sovereignty in international law as the sovereignty of one State
in relation to the sovereignty of another State in conditions of co- existence.
Island Of Palmas Case

The island of Palmas is a single, isolated island found between Mindanao and Greenwich.
Both US and Netherlands claim territorial sovereignty over the island. US bases its title by
cession from the Spaniards, claiming that Spain acquired title by discovery in the 1500s. The
Netherlands claims that the Dutch East Indies possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty
through conventions and agreements with the natives (Treaty of Suzerainty).
Territorial sovereignty, defined. It appears to follow that sovereignty in relation to a portion of

the surface of the globe is a legal condition necessary for the inclusion of such portion in the
territory of a particular State. Sovereignty in relation to territory is called “territorial
sovereignty.”
Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence, in

regard to a portion of the globe, is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other
State, the functions of a State. The development of the national organization of States
during the last few centuries and, corollarily, the development of international law, have
established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own
territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in settling most questions that
concern international relations.
Territorial sovereignty belongs always to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several,

States, to the exclusion of all others. The fact that the functions of a State can be performed
by any State within a given zone is, on the other hand, precisely the characteristic feature of
the legal situation pertaining in those parts of the globe which, like the high seas or lands
without a master, cannot or do not yet form the territory of a State.

Territorial sovereignty [TS] is, in general, a situation recognized and delimited in space,
either by so-called natural frontiers as recognized by international law or by outward signs of
delimitation that are undisputed, or else by legal engagements entered into between
interested neighbors, e.g. frontier conventions, or by acts of recognition of States within fixed
boundaries.
Disputes with regards territorial sovereignty, how resolved. If a dispute arises as to the
sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is customary to examine which of the claiming
States possesses a title—cession, conquest, occupation, etc.—superior to that advanced by
the other State. However, if the contestation is based on the fact that the other Party has
actually displayed sovereignty, it cannt be sufficient to establish the title by which TS was
validly acquired at a certain moment; it must also be shown that the TS has continued to
exist and did exist at the moment which, for the decision of the dispute, must be considered
critical. This demonstration consists in the actual display of State activities, such as belongs
only to the territorial sovereign.
Acquisition of title. Titles of acquisition of TS in present-day international law are either

based on an act of effective apprehension, e.g. occupation or conquest; or, like cession,
presuppose that the ceding and the cessionary Powers or at least one of them have the
faculty of effectively disposing of the ceded territory. In the same way, natural accretion can
only be conceived of as an accretion to a portion of territory where there exists an actual
sovereignty capable of extending to a spot which falls within its sphere of activity. It seems
therefore natural that an element which is essential for the constitution of sovereignty should
not be lacking in its continuation. So true is this that practice, as well as doctrine,
recognizes—though under different legal formulae and with certain differences as to the
conditions required—that the continuous and peaceful display of TS (peaceful in relation to
other States) is as good as a title. The growing insistence with which international law, ever
since the middle of the 18th century, has demanded that the occupation shall be effective
would be inconceivable, if effectiveness were required only for the act of acquisition and not
equally for the maintenance of the right. If the effectiveness has above all been insisted on
in regard to occupation, this is because the question rarely arises in connection with
territories in which there is already an established order of things. Just as before the rise of
international law, boundaries of lands were necessarily determined by the fact that the power
of a State was exercised within them, so too, under the reign of international law, the fact of
peaceful and continuous display is still one of the most important considerations in
establishing boundaries between States.
Correlative duty with regards territorial sovereignty. Territorial Sovereignty, as has already
been said, involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as
corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in
particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights
which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without manifesting its
territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circumstances, the State cannot fulfill
this duty.
Continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. Although municipal law, with its complete
judicial system, is able to recognize abstract rights of property as existing apart from any
material display of them, it has nonetheless limited their effect by the principles of
prescription and the protection of possession. International law, the structure of which is not
based on any super-State organization, cannot be presumed to reduce a right such as TS,
with which almost all international relations are bound up, to the category of an abstract
right, without concrete manifestations.
The principle that continuous and peaceful display of the functions of State within a given
region is a constituent element of TS is not only based on the conditions of the formation of
independent States and their boundaries, as well as on an international jurisprudence and
doctrine widely accepted.

Manifestations of TS asume different forms, according to time and place. Although
continuous in principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every
point of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of
the right necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are involved, or
regions enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again
regions accessible from, e.g., the high seas. It is true that neighboring States may by
convention fix limits to their own sovereignty, even in regions such as the interior of scarcely
explored continents where such sovereignty is scarcely manifested, and in this way may
prevent the other from any penetration of its territory, e.g. the delimitation of Hinterland.
If, however, no conventional line of sufficient topographical precision exists, or if there are
gaps in the frontiers otherwise established, or if a conventional line leaves room for doubt, or
if, as e.g. in the case of an island situated in the high seas, the question arises whether a
title is valid erga omnes, the actual continuous and peaceful display of state functions is, in
case of dispute, the sound and natural criterium [sic] of TS.
Intertemporal law. As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at
successive periods is to be applied (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be
made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which
subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands
that the existence of the right, i.e. its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions
required by the evolution of law.
Discovery is not enough, only an inchoate title. If, on the other hand, the view is adopted that
discovery does not create a definitive title of sovereignty but only an “inchoate” title, such a
title exists, it is true, without external manifestation. However, according to the view that has
prevailed since the 19th century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a
reasonable period by effective occupation.
An inchoate title could not prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of authority by
another State; for such display may prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward by
another State.
Principle of contiguity. Although States have in certain circumstances maintained that islands
relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is
impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that
islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its
territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size). Not only
would it seem that there are no precedents sufficiently frequent and sufficiently precise in
their bearing to establish such a rule, but the alleged principle itself is by its very nature so
uncertain and contested that even Govts of the same State have on different occasions
maintained contradictory opinions as to its soundness.
Dutch East Indies exercise of sovereignty. If the claim to sovereignty is based on the
continuous and peaceful display of State authority, the fact of such display must be shown
precisely in relation to the disputed territory. It is not necessary that there should be a
special administration established in this territory; but it cannot suffice for the territory to be
attached to another by a legal relation not recognized in international law as valid against a
State contesting this claim to sovereignty; what is essential in such a case is the continuous
and peaceful display of actual power in the contested region.
The acts of the Dutch East Indies are attributable to the state itself. The acts of the East
India Company, in view of occupying or colonizing the regions at issue must, in international
law, be entirely assimilated to acts of the Netherlands State itself. From the end of the 16 th
till the 19th century, companies formed by individuals and engaged in economic pursuits
(Chartered Companies) were invested by the State to whom they were subject with public
powers for the acquisition and administration of colonies.

It is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to a very far distant period.
It may suffice that such display existed in 1898, and had already existed as continuous and
peaceful before that date long enough to enable any Power who might have considered
herself as possessing sovereignty over the island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have,
according to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the existence of a
state of things contrary to her real or alleged rights.
The Netherlands has proved the exercise of some acts of State authority and the existence
of external signs of authority (flags, coats of arms). These facts at least constitute a
beginning of establishment of sovereignty by continuous and peaceful display of state
authority, or a commencement of occupation of an island not yet forming a part of the
territory of a state; and such a state of things would create in favour of the Netherlands an
inchoate title for completing the conditions of sovereignty. Such inchoate title, based on
display of state authority, would prevail over an inchoate title derived from discovery,
especially if this latter title has been left for a very long time without completion by
occupation; and it would equally prevail over any claim which, in equity, might be deduced
from the notion of contiguity.
*Sir:
US: Discovery “Inchoate title” Netherlands: Treaty

Huber: Discovery is not enough, Agreement of the Dutch with the natives
international law prescribed that not only allowed the Dutch to exercise
discovery but also effective occupation sovereignty over the islands through:
1. taxation
2. provision of defense
3. Spain never protested the
exercise of territorial rights by
Netherlands
Critical Date (definition) – regardless of what parties will do (subsequent events, etc.) – the
court will freeze the period of the controversy to the date when the controversy became ripe
for adjudication. And all the events after such date will be ignored.
Critical date in this case – treaty of paris (1898)
United States could have won the case if they had shown that at the time there was no
separation of church and state. By showing that there were priests, civil registrar, collection
of tribunes, etc., they would have shown Spanish occupation of the islands.
Principle of Continguity – presumption of sovereignty in favor of a particular state wherein

islands relatively close to the shores of a state belonged to them by virtue of their
geographical proximity to each other.
In this case, the tribunal disregarded this because: no precedent, so uncertain and
uncontested, contradictory opinions, lacking in precision, and arbitrary results
* Reviewer notes:
The Critical Period is a juridical technique in the use or exclusion of evidence consisting of
self- serving acts of parties at a stage when it was evident that a dispute existed.
The court held that there was indeed cession through the treaty of Paris. However, Spain
could not transfer to US more rights than she herself possessed; and Spain did not have the
island based on discovery. The island was only reported to have been seen but there was no
sign of possession or administration by Spain or any mention of a contract with the natives.
Although under international law in the 16 th century, “seeing” without occupation amounted
to discovery. However, IL underwent modifications. Based on the INTERTEMPORAL LAW,
the act which creates a right is subjected to the law in force at the time the right arises. But
the existence if a right must follow the conditions required by the evolution of law – the 19th
century IL which requires effective occupation to constitute territorial sovereignty.
SS Lotus Case (France V. Turkey)

There was a collision at the high seas between a French mail steamer Lotus with the Turkish
collier Boz Kourt. The Boz Court was cut in two and sank. 8 Turkish nationals on board died.
The officer on watch on board Lotus was Lt. Demons, a French citizen. Lt. Demons was
arrested by the Turkish authorities and was subjected to trial in the Turkish courts. The
French government protested the actions of the Turkish authorities, protesting his arrest,
demanding his release or obtaining transfer of the case from the Turkish Courts to the
French Courts. The parties submitted the conflict tot the Court at the Hague.
State discretion in applying local laws. The case under international law at present is that far
from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules. In other cases, every State remains free to
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
Territioriality of criminal law is not absolute in international law. Though it is true that in all
systems of law the principle of the territorial character of criminal law is fundamental, it is
equally true that all or nearly all these systems of law extend their action to offences
committed outside the territory of the State which adopts them, and they do so in ways which
vary from State to State. The territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute principle of
international law and does not coincide with territorial sovereignty.
Nationality of victim is not the sole basis of jurisdiction. It’s not necessary to consider the
contention that a State cannot punish offences committed abroad by a foreigner simply by
reason of the nationality of the victim. For this contention only relates to the case where the
nationality of the victim is the only criterion on which the criminal jurisdiction of the State is
based. Such argument could only be used in the present case if international law forbade
Turkey to take into consideration the fact that the offence produced its effects on the Turkish
vessel and consequently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which the application of
Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged, even in regard to offences committed there by
foreigners. But no such rule of international law exists.
Jurisdiction can be determined by looking at the elements [effects] of the crime. It is certain
that the courts of many countries, even of countries which have given their criminal
legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the
authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are
nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.
French courts have, in regard to a variety of situations, given decisions sanctioning this way
of interpreting the territorial principle.
Vessels are covered under the jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly. Vessels on the
high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of
the principle of the freedom of the seas (absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the high
seas), no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them. Thus, if
a war vessel, happening to be at the spot where a collision occurs between a vessel flying its
flag and a foreign vessel were to send on board the latter an officer to make investigations or
to take evidence, such an act would undoubtedly be contrary to international law.
But it does not follow that a State can never in its own territory exercise jurisdiction over acts
which have occurred on board a foreign ship on the high seas. A corollary of the principle of
the freedom of the seas is that a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the
State the flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory, that State exercises its authority,
upon it, and no other State may do so.

All that can be said is that by virtue of the principle of the freedom of the seas, a ship is
placed in the same position as national territory but there is nothing to support the claim
according to which the rights of the State under whose flag the vessel sails may go farther
than the rights which it exercises within its territory properly so called.
If a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its, effects on a vessel flying another flag
or in foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if the territories of two different
States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be drawn that there is no rule of
international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects of the offence
have taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its
territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the delinquent. This conclusion could only be
overcome if it were shown that there was a rule of customary international law which
established the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag was flown.
*Sir: The decision in the SS Lotus case has already been overturned by the UNCLOS.
Eastern Greenland Case

Norway, in its proclamation of July 10, 1931, said that it is taking possession of which is
“officially confirmed”, and which is “placed under Norwegian sovereignty” of Elrik Raudes
Land in Eastern Greenland. This proclamation was criticized for its failure to specify the
limits of the occupation but it must have been intended that on the eastern side of the sea
and the western side the “inland ice” should constitute the limits of the area occupied. This
1931 Proclamation of Norway triggered the controversy between Denmark and Norway.
Denmark claims that the sovereignty which it enjoys over Greenland has existed for a long,
time, has been continuously and peacefully exercised, and until the present dispute, has not
been contested by any Power. Also, Denmark claims that Norway, by treaty or otherwise
herself recognized Danish sovereignty over Greenland as a whole and therefore cannot
dispute it. Norway claims that Denmark possessed no sovereignty over the area which
Norway occupied on July 10, 1931, and that at the time of the occupation the area was terra
nullius.
Constructive Possession. A claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title
such as a treaty of cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two
elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign,
and some actual exercise or display of such authority.
Another circumstance which must be taken into account by any tribunal which has to
adjudicate upon a claim to sovereignty over a particular territory is the extent to which the
sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power. In most of the cases involving claims to
territorial sovereignty which have come before an international tribunal, there have been two
competing claims to the sovereignty, and the tribunal has had to decide which of the two is
the stronger. One of the peculiar features of the present case is that up to 1931 there was
no claim by any Power other than Denmark to the sovereignty over Greenland. Indeed, up till
1931, no Power disputed the Danish claim to sovereignty.
Loss of sovereignty by conquest. Conquest only operates as a cause of loss of sovereignty

when there is war between two States and by reason of the defeat of one of them
sovereignty over territory passes from the loser to the victorious State. The principle does
not apply in a case where a settlement has been established in a distant country and its
inhabitants are massacred by the aboriginal population. Nor is the fact of "conquest"
established. It is known now that the settlements must have disappeared at an early date,
but at the time there seems to have been a belief that despite the loss of contact and the
loss of knowledge of the whereabouts of the settlements one or both of them would again be
discovered and found to contain the descendants of the early settlers.
Loss of sovereignty by voluntary abandonment. There is nothing to show any definite

renunciation on the part of the Kings of Norway or Denmark. Also, despite having no
intercourse with Greenland, the tradition of the King’s rights lived on, and in the early part of
th
the 17 Century, a revival of interest in Greenland on the part of both the King and of his
people took place. That period was an era of adventure and exploration. The example set
by the navigators of foreign countries was inspiring, and a desire arose in Norway and
Denmark to recover the territory which had been subject to the sovereignty of the King's
ancestors in the past.
Norway: Denmark only possessed West Coast of Greenland. Court: Naaah!. The burden of
proof lies on Norway to prove that Denmark used the word “Greenland” only to mean the
colonies on the West Coast. The geographical meaning of the word "Greenland", i.e. the
name which is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be
regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. In the opinion of the Court, Norway has not
succeeded in establishing her contention. It is not sufficient for her to show that in many of
these legislative and administrative acts action was only to be taken in the colonies. The
fact that most of these acts were concerned with what happened in the colonies and that the
colonies were all situated on the West coast is not by itself sufficient ground for holding that
the authority in virtue of which the act was taken – whether legislative or administrative –
was also restricted to the colonized area. Unless it was so restricted, it affords no ground for
interpreting the word “Greenland” in this restricted sense.
Estoppel and acquiescence by Norway. the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and
Sweden (Sweden had control over Norway during this time), wrote to the British Minister in
Stockholm that the King of Sweden and Norway agreed to renounce in favor of the Kingdom
of Denmark their claims over Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. The letter was
written because Norway-Sweden was asking for the intervention of the British Prince Regent
in settling its differences with Denmark, especially with its financial obligations under the
Treaty of Kiel.
A second series of undertakings by Norway, recognizing Danish sovereignty over

Greenland, is afforded by various bilateral agreements concluded by Norway with Denmark,
and by various multilateral agreements to which both Denmark and Norway were contracting
Parties, in which Greenland has been described as a Danish colony or as forming part of
Denmark or in which Denmark has been allowed to exclude Greenland from the operation of
the agreement.
Also, Denmark maintained that the promise by in 1919 by M. Ihlen, the Norwegian Minister
for Foreign affairs, speaking on behalf of his Government debarred Norway from proceeding
to any occupation of territory in Greenland even if she had not by other acts recognized an
existing Danish sovereignty there.
*Sir: Although both sides were able to present evidence establishing their sovereignty over
the area, such as expeditions, granting of concessions, legislation, etc., what won it for
Denmark was estoppel or acquiescence because of the Ihlen Declaration. Although
acquiescence is not a means of acquiring title, it is a proof of a better claim.
There is equal preponderance of evidence presented by both states as to their occupation of

a certain portion of Greenland. However, Norway’s possession was not in the concept of a
title, i.e. there was no animus possidendi, which is one of the 2 requirements of sovereignty.
It did not have the intent to possess in behalf of a sovereign. Remember that it is not only
physical possession that is important. There must also be intent.
Minquiers & Ecrehos Case (UK v. France), (1951)

Proof of territorial sovereignty: exercise of jurisdiction, local administration and legislation.
Both UK and France seek to establish sovereignty over the Minquiers Group and Ecrehos
Group of islets and rocks by citing ancient title and treaties. UK won because of “ordinary
local administration,” specifically referring to: [1] Jersey courts exercising criminal jurisdiction
for nearly 100 years; [2] Jersey law requires the holding of inquests on corpses found in the
area; [3] houses built in the area were assessed for the levying of taxes; [4] licensing of
fishing boats; [5] real estate contracts relating to property in the area were registered in the
public registry of deeds; [7] Jersey customs authorities established a custom house for the
purpose of a census.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway), (1951)

Circumstances affecting delimitation. UK argues that the baseline should be the low-water
mark on permanently dry land and that the trace parallele method should be used. However,
ICJ allowed Norway’s method of delimiting the fisheries zone through the straight base-line
method reckoned from the outer line of the skjaergaard because [1] this is in consonance
with “geographic realities,” “diversity of facts” and “special circumstances;” [2] this gives a
simpler form to the belt; [3] general toleration of the international community; [4] the 10-mile-
maximium rule on the maximum length of the baseline does not apply because it has always
been opposed by Norway.
Skjaergaard; defined. A skjaergaard is made up of around 120,000 insular formations, lying

along the coast of the mainland. The clearest dividing line between land and sea is the
skjaergaard, not the coast of the mainland.
Straight baselines method; defined. This method consists in selecting appropriate points on
the low water mark and drawing straight lines between them. Method applies to well-defined
bays and cases of minor curvature of the coastline. The goal is to provide a simpler form to
the belt of the territorial waters.
Trace parallele method; defined. This method consists in drawing the outer limit of the belt
of territorial waters by following the coast in all its sinuosities. Method applies to ordinary
coasts.
Criteria provide courts with basis for their decisions. The following are fundamental
considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea. First, the drawing of baselines
must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast. Ratio for
this is because it is the land which confers upon the coastal state the right to the waters off
its coast. Second, the sea areas lying within the baseline must be closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. Third, the economic interest peculiar to
the region, as evidenced by long usage, should be considered.
Western Sahara Case (1975)

Area was not terra nullius at the time of Spain’s colonialization. Terra nullius means a
territory belonging to no one, over which sovereignty can be acquired by occupation. This is
because: [1] state practice indicates that a territory inhabited by tribes having a socio-
political organization is not terrae nullius; [2] Spain never treated its case as occupation, but
merely “protection.”
There are no legal ties so there can be no reversion to either Morocco or Mauritiana. Both
Morocco and Mauritiana claim to have legal ties with Western Sahara prior to its colonization
by Spain through. Morocco claims to have “immemorial possession,” and public display of
sovereignty, uninterrupted and uncontested for centuries, as evidenced by the Arab
conquest in 7th Century AD. The court rejected this contention because there was no display
of control, but merely of allegiance of some of the nomadic people.
Mauritiana bases its claim on the Mauritian entity, which denotes the cultural, geographical
and social entity existing in the tribes of Western Sahara. The court rejected this contention
because there was no common institution recognized by the tribes.
In addition, the ICJ took note of the following facts: [1] the practice of taxation was done by
the people of Western Sahara for themselves; [2] the nomadic nature of the tribes is contrary
to the concept of sovereignty; [3] there was no evidence the people recognized any further
allegiance outside their local leaders.

Preah Vihear Temple Case, (Cambodia v. Thailand), (1962)

Estoppel Principle. Siam (Thailand) is estopped from questioning the delimitation in the
maps because [1] Siam did not react to the map when it was so presented; [2] France
(Cambodia) relied on Siam’s non-objection.
Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), (1986)

The dispute relates to the delimitation of part of the common barrier between the former
colonies of Upper Volta (now, Burkina Faso) and Sudan (now, Mali), as inherited from the
French administration and existing at the moment of independence. ICJ used the uti
possidetis juris principle and looked into evidence of colonial heritage
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. This principle proves administrative boundaries or colonial
heritage during the colonial period, and imposes the obligation to respect pre-existing
international frontiers in the event of State succession. It aims to secure respect for the
territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. The rationale for this
principle is that the maintenance of the territorial status quo is seen as the wisest course in
order to preserve what has been achieved by people who have struggled for their
independence and to avoid a disruption.
Effectivites; effective occupation; defined. Effective occupation is a mode of acquiring title

which seeks to prove title to the territory. This concept deals with the exercise of sovereignty
of a state over a particular territory.
Effectivies; colonial effectivites; defined. State succession is a mode of acquiring title which
seeks to prove administrative boundaries. This concept deals with acts of administration.
Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), (1999)

A treaty between the colonial powers Germany and UK was entered into delimiting
Southwest Africa. Later, Namibia became independent from Germany; and Botswana was
formed in the former British territory. The dispute relates to the location of the boundary
around the Kasikili/Sedudu Island between Namibia and Botswana.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. There is no agreement in the treaty as to the exact boundary
line; and neither is there proof of effective occupation by Namibia and Botswana. In the
absence of these circumstances, Namibia and Botswana, as successors, must respect the
boundary set by the colonial powers.
Libya v. Chad, (1994)

A treaty between the colonial powers France and Libya was entered into delimiting its
frontiers. Later, Chad and Italy became independent of France and Libya, respectively. The
dispute relates to the expiration of the treaty with Chad citing the uti possidetis juris principle
and Italy arguing that there is no longer a boundary since the treaty has expired.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. Successor states must respect the colonial boundaries of
colonial rulers.
Theory of auto-imitatation. Notwithstanding the fact that the treaty provides for a mere 20-
year effectivity, the theory of auto-imitation provide that boundaries have a life of their own
separate from the treaty itself because a boundary established by treaty achieves
permanence. This is in line with the need to prevent conflict and instability.
El Salvador v. Honduras, with Nicaragua intervening, (1992)

El Salvador and Honduras became independent states after the disintegration of the
Spanish empire in Central America. Even before their independence, Spanish Central
America had overlapping administrative boundaries. Parties seek to have the boundaries
determined.
Uti Possidetis Juris principle. The principle will be used where the colonial boundaries are
not clear as is in this case where lack of sophisticated means of surveying led to cases of
overlapping administrative boundaries.
Effective occupation. The ICJ did not look into effective occupation because the territories
were subject to only 1 colonial power.
Colonial effectivites. In order to determine the colonial boundaries, the ICJ looked into the
colonial effectivites or contemporaneous acts, which refer to the belief of one that he belongs
to one or the other unit.
Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico), (1931)

Clipperton island is terra nullius considering the territory was uninhabited and without
administration. Sovereignty over the island was declared by France from the moment its
navy members landed on the island in 1858 and was published in a Honolulu journal, The
Polynesian in the same year.
Physical occupation; not necessary. France successfully acquired title by occupation.

Physical occupation is not required where: [1] territory is terra nullius; [2] at the time the
occupying state makes its appearance there; and [3] taking of possession and intent to
possess is shown by a pubic declaration of sovereignty.
Eritrea v. Yemen, (1998)

The dispute relates to ownership over the red sea islands between Eritrea which claims title
by succession, and Yemen which claims title by reversion and historic title.
No title by succession. Italy, Eritrea’s predecessor, did not obtain title to the territory under
the Treaty of Lausanne because it was provided that the allied powers have yet to agree on
who can claim sovereignty over the territory. Therefore, Eritrea did not gain title by
succession.
No historic title. Medieval Yemen had no concept of territorial sovereignty. Therefore, Yemen
cannot claim title by automatic reversion.
Primary question in territorial disputes. Splitting of award. The court will determine who has a
better claim. The group of islands need not be awarded to one claimant.
Effective occupation. Effective occupation, such as petroleum concessions, is prima facie

evidence of title.
Portico doctrine. This is a method by which off-shore islands can be attributed to a State’s
sovereignty. Islands near coastal states must pertain to such states. The Mohabbakahs
islands, located within the territorial sea of Eritrea, properly belongs to it.
Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia)
Indonesia and Malaysia lay claim over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. Both countries cite
treaties, colonial effectivites, and title by succession as proof of ownership.
Effective occupation. ICJ rule in favor of Malaysia because effective occupation was proved
by its “effective acts of administration,” specifically: [1] its regulation on gathering of turtle
eggs; [2] its building of lighthouses; [3] its declaration of a bird sanctuary.
China’s Claim to the Spratly’s Islands, Roque

When oil was discovered, many countries lay claim over it. China bases its claim on
discovery, effective occupation, and recognition. The Philippines bases its claim on effective
occupation after Japan renounced its title over the islands. The article discusses the modes
of acquiring territory.
Modes of Acquiring Territory:

Effective occupation. Effective occupation is the official exercise of exclusive authority by an
occupying state or any authorized person, with or without physical occupation depending on
whether or not the island is uninhabited (Clipperton Island Arbitration). Note that territory
must be terra nullius.
Acquisitive prescription. Acquisition of territory results where there is long and continued
possession.
Other Principles Insufficient for the Acquisition of Territory:

Estoppel. Estoppel is a general principle of international law which precludes another
claimant from acquiring title.
Discovery; inchoate title. Discovery alone gives the claimant merely an inchoate title. This
must concur with effective occupation for there to be acquisition of property (Island of
Palmas Case). Note that territory must be terra nullius.
Possession. Possession is a strong evidence of title when coupled with effective occupation,
but is not enough on its own for the acquisition of title. Note that possession requires animus
possedendi.
Constructive possession. There is constructive possession of the whole island or
archipelago where a coast of the island, or an island/islet/rock of the archipelago have been
actually occupied by another state. There can be no constructive possession where the
occupied island is so far distant from the others in the group.
Contiguity. Contiguity merely raises a presumption of occupation.
Conquest. Conquest is a means by which territory can be acquired by an enemy through the
complete and final subjugation of the territory, coupled with the enemy’s declaration of its
intention to conquer. Conquest was once an accepted norm, but is now illegal.
2. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (UNCLOS)2
a. INTE
RNA
L
WAT
ERS
Internal
waters are
all waters
landwards
from the
baseline of
the territory
(rivers,
lakes, bays,
etc).
Sovereignty
over these is
the same in
extent as sovereignty over land, and is not subject to the right of innocent passage.
However, in Saudi Arabia v. Aramco the arbitrator said that according to international law
ports of every state must be open to foreign vessels and can only be closed when vital
interests of the state so requires. But according to Nicaragua v. US, a coastal state may
regulate access to its ports.
2Thanks to Gem, Carol, Ben, and Jerome for this part. Also, the Art. 6 referred to in some of the cases is Art. 6 of the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Bays are well-marked indentations whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its
mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the
coast. To be considered a bay, the area of the indentation must be as large as, or larger
than, that of a semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that
indentation (the semi-circle test).
Historic bays are those which are treated by the coastal state as internal waters on the basis
of historic rights acknowledged by other states.
* Sir: foreign vessels without a right to call on ports UNLESS there is a Treaty of Commerce,
Friendship & Navigation. For internal waters, the coastal State has absolute territorial
jurisdiction, thus it may exclude all foreign vessels from its ports. If the foreign vessel is
merely passing through, the flag State has jurisdiction (French rule). If the vessel is docked,
the coastal State may exercise jurisdiction (English rule).
Nicaragua v. US (1986)
US military laid mines in Nicaraguan internal waters and in its territorial sea and along
Nicaraguan ports causing material damage to Nicaragua and innocent vessels. The US
Government did not issue any public and official warning to international shipping of the
existence and location of the mines.
Internal waters. Coastal State’s Sovereignty extends to internal waters and airspace. Coastal
State’s Laws apply in Internal Waters. The laying of mines within the ports of another State
is governed by the law relating to internal waters, which are subject to the sovereignty of the
coastal State. The position is similar as regards mines placed in the territorial sea. It is
therefore the sovereignty of the coastal State which is affected in such cases. It is also by
virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports. On the other
hand, it is true that in order to enjoy access to ports, foreign vessels possess a customary
right of innocent passage in territorial waters for the purposes of entering or leaving internal
waters.
Freedom of Navigation hampered. Such is guaranteed, first in the exclusive economic zones
and beyond territorial waters and on the high seas, it follows that any State which enjoys a
right of access to ports for its ships also enjoys all the freedom necessary for maritime
navigation. If this right of access to the port is hindered by the laying of mines by another
State, what is infringed is the freedom of communications and of maritime commerce. At all
events, it is certain that interference with navigation in these areas prejudices both the
sovereignty of the coastal State over its internal waters, and the right of free access enjoyed
by foreign ships.
b. TERRITORIAL SEA
This is the belt of sea outwards from the baseline and up to 12 nautical miles beyond.
Regarding its width, the original rule was the “cannon shot” rule, where the width was
measured in terms of the range of shore-based artillery. This later became the 3-mile rule.
Under the UNCLOS, the rule is now 12 miles. Take note, however, that where the
application of the 12-mile rule to neighboring littoral states would result in overlapping, the
dividing line is instead a median line equidistant from the opposite baselines. But this
equidistant rule does not apply where historic title or other special circumstances require a
different measurement.
The extent of the territorial sea depends on the baseline. The baseline is the low-water line
along the coast as marked on large scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
The width of the territorial sea is measured from this line. There are 2 ways of drawing the
baseline. The “normal baseline” is drawn following the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. This line follows the
curvatures of the coast and therefore would normally not consist of straight lines. There is no

fixed norm for determining this low-water line or mark, but the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case suggested using the mean between the high and low tides.
Archipelagic states instead use “straight baselines.” These are drawn connecting selected
points on the coast without appreciable departure from the general shape of the coast. This
was the method used in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, and is now in Art. 7(1) of
UNCLOS. This article provides that straight baselines may be used where the coastline is
deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate
vicinity. Some guidelines to be observed in using this method:
1. the drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast
2. the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters
3. the baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations
4. take account of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage
5. this method may not be applied in such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of
another State from the high seas or an EEZ (ex. Singapore)
The sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea, the airspace above it, and the
seabed is the same as its sovereignty over its land territory. However the sea is subject to
the right of innocent passage by other states. The rule on innocent passage applies to ships
and aircrafts. Submarines however must surface.
Innocent passage is navigation through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner,

which is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. Some
examples of passage which is not innocent are fishing, polluting, weapons practice, spying,
research activities, and any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. Coastal
states do have rights of protection, which is the unilateral right to verify the innocent
character of passage. Thus, they may take necessary steps to prevent not innocent
passage, and they may temporarily suspend the right of innocent passage if this is essential
for the protection of its security.
Take note that islands and rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life
have their own territorial sea.
Within the territorial sea, the flag state has criminal and civil jurisdiction. However, there are
exceptions. With respect to criminal jurisdiction, the coastal state can exercise its criminal
jurisdiction in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage if:
1. the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state
2. the crime disturbs the peace of the country or good order of the territorial sea
3. the ship’s master or diplomatic agent/consular officer of the flag state requested the
assistance of the local authorities
4. it is necessary to suppress illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
The coastal state may exercise its civil jurisdiction by levying execution or arresting the ship
only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course
of or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal state.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951)

In 1935 Norway delimited a certain fisheries zone which was exclusively reserved to its
nationals. This delimitation, using straight baselines, was opposed by the UK. The coastal
zone involved has a distinctive configuration (long and very broken). The Court upheld this
Norwegian delimitation.
Use the low-water mark. For the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is
the low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides,
which has generally been adopted in the practice of States. This criterion is the most
favourable to the coastal State and clearly shows the character of territorial waters as
appurtenant to the land territory.
Straight baselines method. This method consists of selecting appropriate points on the low-
water mark and drawing straight lines between them. This has been validly done, not only in
the case of well-defined bays, but also in cases of minor curvatures of the coast line where it
was solely a question of giving a simpler form to the belt of territorial waters.
Norway’s baselines were valid. But the Norwegian delimitation is still subject to certain
principles which make it possible to judge the delimitation’s validity under international law.
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true
that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is
competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends
upon international law. Certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial
sea bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with
an adequate basis for their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts in question.
Among these some reference must be made to the close dependence of the territorial sea
upon the land domain. It is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the
waters off its coasts. It follows that while such a State must be allowed the latitude
necessary in order to be able to adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local
requirements, the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general direction of the coast. Another fundamental consideration is the more or less close
relationship existing between certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or
surround them. The real question raised in the choice of base-lines is in effect whether
certain sea areas lying within these lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to
be subject to the regime of internal waters. This idea, which is at the basis of the
determination of the rules relating to bays, should be liberally applied in the case of a coast,
the geographical configuration of which is as unusual as that of Norway. The last
consideration is that of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage.
El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening (1992)

The legal status of the islands located in the Gulf of Fonseca became an issue of dispute;
the question of the land frontier followed in 1861. Border incidents led to mounting tension
between El Salvador and Honduras and, ultimately, to an armed conflict in 1969
Islands of the Gulf of Fonseca. None of the islands had been terra nullius in 1821, the date
of independence. Thus, sovereignty over the islands had been achieved according to the uti
possidetis juris principle (colonial boundaries are continually adopted). However, the
application of this principle suffered from the lack of documents that might have testified
clearly the appertainance of the islands to one administrative district or the other. Thus the
Court was forced to concentrate more on the behaviour of the parties with regard to the
islands after 1821. On this basis the Court found that El Tigre appertained to Honduras and
Meanguera and Meanguerita to El Salvador.
Gulf of Fonseca = Juridical Bay under UNCLOS and Historical Bay under Customary
International Law. Considering the dimensions and proportions, the Gulf would today be
regarded as a juridical bay in accordance with UNCLOS. However, the Gulf was not a single
State bay but constituted a so called historical bay, which is neither defined in the 1958
Convention nor in the Convention of 1982. From this fact the Court concluded that its
decision had to be taken on the basis of customary international law. Court looked at the
Central American Court of Justice of 1917 conclusion that the Gulf of Fonseca effectively
constituted a "closed sea" belonging to all three coastal States communally, with the
exception of a three mile zone established unilaterally by each coastal State. Thus, the
Central American Court viewed the Gulf of Fonseca as a condominium resulting from the
succession of the three States from Spain in 1821. Until then, the Gulf had been a single
State bay belonging to Spain alone. According to the Court, the decision of the Central
American Court underlined the fact that at the time of independence, no boundaries were
delimited in the Gulf and thus the waters had remained undivided.
Court held that Gulf of Fonseca was a case of "historic waters", whereby the three coastal
States had succeeded to communal sovereignty. In contrast to the frontier delimited on land,
the waters of the Gulf had never been divided or otherwise delimited after the independence
of the three coastal States. Thus, the communal succession for the three States was a
logical consequence of the uti possidetis juris principle with regard to the sovereignty of the
Gulf.
United States vs. California (1965)

Case involves the interpretation of some terms used in the Submerged Lands Act. State of
California and the Federal government are trying to determine who owns and has jurisdiction
over the subsoil, seabed of the continental shelf and the resources located therein along the
California. To resolve such, the Court discusses the definition of relevant maritime terms.
Jurisdiction. Federal government owns and has exclusive jurisdiction over such beyond 3
miles seaward from the coastline. California owns and has exclusive jurisdiction over such
within 3 miles or the tidelands along its coast (defined as the shore of the mainland and of
islands, between the line of mean high water and the line of mean lower low water).
Definitions. Court adopts the definitions in the International Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone:
“Coastline” - (Art. 8 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone)
(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on islands, and on low-tide
elevations lying wholly or partly within three geographical miles from the line of mean lower
low water on the mainland or on an island; and
(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.
This includes modifications by natural or artificial means, and includes the outermost
permanent harbour works that form an integral part of the harbor system
"Island" - a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above the level of
mean high water;
"Low-tide elevation" - a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water at mean lower low
water, which is above the level of mean lower low water but not above the level of mean high
water;
"Mean lower low water" - the average elevation of all the daily lower low tides occurring over
a period of 18.6 years;
"Mean high water" - the average elevation of all the high tides occurring over a period of 18.6
years;
"Geographical mile" - a distance of 1852 meters (6076.10333 U.S. Survey Feet or
approximately 6076.11549 International Feet).
“Roadsteads” - waters between islands, and waters between islands and the mainland are
not per se inland waters.
"Inland waters" (Par. 2(b) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone)
waters landward of the baseline of the territorial sea and includes:
(a) Any river or stream flowing directly into the sea, landward of a straight line across
its mouth;
(b) Any port, landward of its outermost permanent harbor works and a straight line
across its entrance;
(c) Any "historic bay," as that term is used in paragraph 6 of Article 7 of the
Convention, defined essentially as a bay over which the United States has
traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations;
(d) Semi Circle Test
Any other bay (defined as a well-marked coastal indentation having such
penetration, in proportion to the width of its entrance, as to contain landlocked
waters, and having an area, including islands within the bay, at least as great as the
area of a semicircle whose diameter equals the length of the closing line across the
entrance of the bay, or the sum of such closing lines if the bay has more than one
entrance), landward of a straight line across its entrance or, if the entrance is more
than 24 geographical miles wide, landward of a straight line not over 24 geographical
miles long, drawn within the bay so as to enclose the greatest possible amount of
water. An estuary of a river is treated in the same way as a bay.
US v. Louisiana (1969)
The issue is about the correct definition of “Inland Waters”. U.S. argues that the definitions of
inland waters contained in the International Convention on the Territorial Sea (ICTS) should
prevail over Louisiana’s contention that it should be the “Inland Water Line” (IWL) fixed by
the Commandant of the Coast Guard in 1895.
Sustained the California cas. Court sustains the adoption of the ICTS definitions in the U.S.
v. California case. The ICTS definition prevails and it is as follows - "the line of ordinary low
water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters."
Baseline. The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, is also to be drawn in
accordance with the definitions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.”
Historic title. Whether particular waters are inland has depended on historical as well as
geographical factors but as we said in United States v. California, it is generally agreed that
historic title can be claimed only when the "coastal nation has traditionally asserted and
maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations."
3 Zones of Navigable Seas under General Principles of IL

Inland, or internal waters Marginal, or territorial, High seas
sea
Nearest to the nation's Beyond the inland waters, Outside the territorial sea,
shores are its. These are and measured from their which are international
subject to the complete seaward edge, is a belt waters not subject to the
sovereignty of the nation, known as the. Within it the dominion of any single
as much as if they were a coastal nation may exercise nation.
part of its land territory, and extensive control but
the coastal nation has the cannot deny the right of
privilege even to exclude innocent passage to foreign
foreign vessels altogether. nations
Stable Coastline Policy – not convincing enough. The policy in favor of a certain and stable
coastline, strong as it is, would necessarily outweigh countervailing policy considerations
under the Submerged Lands Act. We recognized in California the desirability of "a single
coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and the conduct of our
future international relations."
c. STRAITS
Straits used for international navigation (to navigate between one part of the high seas or an
EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ) are under the purview of UNCLOS, but
the legal regime in such straits in which passage is regulated in whole or in part by long-
standing international conventions in force specifically relating to such straits is not affected.
Through these waters, ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed “transit passage,” as
long as they proceeded without delay and without threatening the bordering states.
Transit passage is the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of expeditious and continuous transit (thus they must proceed without delay) of the
strait. During transit passage, foreign ships, including maritime scientific research and

hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey activities without the
prior authorization of the bordering states. Transit passage is inapplicable in three instances:
1. if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or an EEZ of similar
convenience, in which case the freedoms of navigation and overflight would apply
2. if the strait is formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland, and
there exists seaward of the island a route to the high seas or EEZ of similar
convenience, in which case the right of innocent passage would apply
3. if the strait is between a part of the high seas or EEZ and the territorial sea of another
state, in which case the right of innocent passage would apply.
Bordering states have the following duties:

1. not to impede the right of transit passage
2. to give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over
the strait of which they have knowledge
3. not to suspend transit passage.
Ships and aircraft exercising the right of transit passage have the following duties:
1. to proceed without delay through or over the strait
2. refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or
political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any manner in violation of
the principles in the UN Charter
3. refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of
continuous and expeditious transit unless necessary due to force majeure or distress
4. to comply with the other provisions of UNCLOS.
Also, foreign vessels may not carry out research and survey activities without the prior
authorization of the bordering States.
Take note that these duties (of bordering States and foreign vessels) are also applicable to
archipelagic sea lanes passage.
States alongside the straits however are able to regulate navigation and other aspects of
passage.
Corfu Channel Case (1949)

A squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander, and the destroyers
Saumarez and Volage, left the port of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel
previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait. Several ships struck a mine and were
damaged. UK sues People's Republic of Albania
Albania’s failed its Duty – it is liable. Obligation incumbent upon Albanian authorities
consisted in notifying for the benefit of the shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in
Albanian territorial waters and in warning the British warships of the imminent danger to
which the minefield exposed them.
BASIS of such an obligation:

1. elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than
in war
2. the principle of freedom of maritime communication
3. every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States. Albania was aware of the minelaying since the geography of
the strait easily allowed Albanian lighthouse watchers to view such activities.
Innocent passage through straits is a right recognized by international law. The decisive
criterion is its geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of
its being used for international navigation. The nature of the Channel satisfies this criterion.
It has been a useful route for international maritime traffic. A total number of 2, 884 ships
have passed through the Channel in a period of 1 year and 9 months. Passage through it

therefore cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace. Combat formation
determines if a passage is innocent.
* Sir: international straits are subject to non-suspendible rights of innocent passage.
d. ARCHIPELAGOS
Archipelagic states are those which are made up wholly of one or more archipelagos. For
these states, the straight baselines are drawn between the outermost points of the outermost
islands, provided these points are sufficiently close to one another and that within such
baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the water area to land area
ratio is between 1:1 and 9:1. All waters inside these baselines are archipelagic waters. Some
guidelines in drawing the baselines:
1. the length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to
3% of all the baselines may reach up to 125 miles
2. the drawing of the baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago
3. such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations
4. these shall not be applied in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or EEZ
the territorial sea of another State
While archipelagic states have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by the baselines, all
other states enjoy the right of innocent passage through designated sea lanes. Foreign ships
and aircraft also have the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage, which refers to
continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed passage in sea lands and air routes through or
over the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea of the archipelagic state in
transit between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an
EEZ (similar to transit passage). An archipelagic state shall respect existing agreements with
other states and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the
immediately adjacent neighboring states in certain areas, including the maintenance and
replacement of submarine cables, falling within archipelagic waters.
Take note that under UNCLOS, the waters inside the archipelagic baselines are called
archipelagic waters. And while archipelagic states may designate sea lanes and air routes
suitable for continuous and expeditious passage over these archipelagic waters, if the
archipelagic state does not designate such lanes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage may still be exercised through routes normally used for international navigation.
This is criticized as being unduly burdensome for archipelagic states. (Archipelagic waters
also inside baselines, like internal waters)
Under the Philippine Constitution, all waters connecting the islands are internal waters. Thus
when the country ratified the UNCLOS, a declaration was added, providing that:
“The signing of the Convention… shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign
rights of the Republic of the Philippines under and arising from the Constitution… Such
signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic… under and
arising out of the Treaty of Paris… and the Treaty of Washington… The provisions of the
Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the
sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not deprive
it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security….”
e. THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE
This is an area of water not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline. It thus extends 12
nautical miles from the edge of the territorial sea. The coastal state exercises authority over
that area to the extent necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitation authority over its territorial waters or territory and to punish such infringement.

Take note that the power of control does not change the nature of the waters. Beyond the
territorial sea, the waters are high sea and not subject to the sovereignty of the coastal state.
* Sir: this was added as a response to ships which would linger in areas beyond the State’s
jurisdiction, thus beyond the State’s criminal jurisdiction, but would do acts inimical to the
coastal State. Remember that the jurisdiction is limited; beyond the 4 areas, follow the
regime of the EEZ. Take note that this is the only optional regime.
f. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
This refers to (a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal
state but outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth allows exploitation; and (b) the seabed and subsoil of areas adjacent to islands.
Under specified circumstances the continental shelf can extend up to a distance of 350
miles.
The coastal state has the right to explore and exploit its natural resources, to erect needed
installations, and to erect a safety zone over its installations with a radius of 500 meters.
These rights do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express
proclamation. This right does not affect the right of navigation of others. Moreover, this right
does not extend to non-resource material in the shelf area such as wrecked ships and their
cargoes. Coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine
scientific research on the continental shelf.
Take note that artificial islands or installations are not islands under UNCLOS, though
coastal states may establish safety zones and prescribe safety measures around them.
Islands do have their own continental shelves.
* Sir: compare the rights of the coastal State for the EEZ (resources = all encompassing)
and the continental shelf. For the latter, only for living resources permanently
attached/sedentary.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

This case concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea, which
involved Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany. Denmark and the Netherlands both
wanted to apply the equidistance principle, while Germany opposed as this would
disproportionately reduce its area, due to the concave German coastline.
Delimitation is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an area already, in

principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination de novo of such an
area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same thing as awarding a
just and equitable share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a number of cases
the results may be comparable, or even identical.
Inherent right to territory. The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental
shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in
an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its
natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In order to exercise it, no special
legal process has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its
existence can be declared but does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does
not depend on its being exercised. It follows that the notion of apportioning an as yet
undelimited area, is quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept of continental
shelf entitlement.
Equidistance method not obligatory. It has never been doubted that the equidistance method
of delimitation is a very convenient one. Yet this does not suffice to convert what is a method
into a rule of law, making the acceptance of the results of using that method obligatory in all
cases in which the parties do not agree otherwise, or in which 'special circumstances' cannot
be shown to exist.
Appurtenance (of the continental shelf) to a State ≠ Proximity. Thus the question of which
parts of the continental shelf 'adjacent to' a coastline bordering more than one State fall
within the appurtenance of which of them, remains to this extent an open one, not to be
determined on a basis exclusively of proximity. Even if proximity may afford one of the tests
to be applied and an important one in the right conditions, it may not necessarily be the only,
nor in all circumstances, the most appropriate one.
More fundamental: natural prolongation or continuation of land territory or domain or land

sovereignty of the coastal state, into & under the high seas, via the bed of its territorial sea
which is under full sovereignty. Submarine areas do not really appertain to the coastal State
because they are near it. What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to
the coastal State in respect of its continental shelf is the fact that the submarine areas
concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the coastal State
already has dominion, in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a
prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the sea. Thus whenever
a given submarine area does not constitute a natural extension of the land territory of a
coastal State, even though that area may be closer to it than it is to the territory of any other
State, it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State; or at least it cannot be so
regarded in the face of a competing claim by a State of whose land territory the submarine
area concerned is to be regarded as a natural extension, even if it is less close to it.
Opposite v. Adjacent. For opposite States the natural prolongations may meet and overlap,
and can only be delimited by a median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and
minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by
other means, such a line must effect an equal division of the particular area involved. This
type of case is different from that of laterally adjacent States on the same coast with no
immediately opposite coast in front of it. Whereas a median line divides equally between 2
opposite countries areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of the
territory of each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to 1 of the States concerned
areas that are a natural prolongation of the territory of the other. The distorting effects of
lateral equidistance lines under certain conditions of coastal configuration are nevertheless
comparatively small within the limits of territorial waters, but produce their maximum effect in
the localities where the main continental shelf areas lie further out. There is also a direct
correlation between the notion of closest proximity to the coast and the sovereign jurisdiction
which the coastal State is entitled to exercise and must exercise, not only over the seabed
underneath the territorial waters but over the waters themselves, which does not exist in
respect of continental shelf areas where there is no jurisdiction over the superjacent waters,
and over the seabed only for purposes of exploration and exploitation.
Delimitation must be by agreement, arrived at in accordance with equitable principles:

(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an
agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior
condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of
agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are
meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position
without contemplating any modification of it;
(b) the parties are under an obligation to act in such a way that, in the particular case, and
taking all the circumstances into account, equitable principles are applied; for this purpose
the equidistance method can be used, but other methods exist and may be employed, alone
or in combination, according to the areas involved;
(c) the continental shelf of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and
must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another State.
Inequity of the equidistance method, in certain geographical circumstances:

(a) The slightest irregularity in a coastline is automatically magnified by the equidistance line
as regards the consequences for the delimitation of the continental shelf. Thus it has been
seen in the case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance method is
employed, then the greater the irregularity and the further from the coastline the area to be
delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. So great an exaggeration of the
consequences of a natural geographical feature must be remedied or compensated for as
far as possible, being of itself creative of inequity.
(b) Where there is no outer boundary to the continental shelf, it happens that the claims of
several States converge, meet and intercross in localities where, despite their distance from
the coast, the bed of the sea still unquestionably consists of continental shelf. A study of
these convergences shows how inequitable would be the apparent simplification brought
about by a delimitation which, ignoring such geographical circumstances, was based solely
on the equidistance method.
Can use different methods. No objection need be felt to the idea of effecting a delimitation of
adjoining continental shelf areas by the concurrent use of various methods. Equity does not
necessarily imply equality. There can never be any question of completely refashioning
nature, and equity does not require that a State without access to the sea should be allotted
an area of continental shelf, any more than there could be a question of rendering the
situation of a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State with a restricted
coastline. But here, there are 3 States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact comparable in
length and which, have been given broadly equal treatment by nature except that the
configuration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance method is used, deny to one
of these States treatment equal or comparable to that given the other two. An inequity is
created merely because one coastline is roughly convex and the other concave. It is not a
question of totally refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation but, given a
geographical situation of quasi-equality as between a number of States, of abating the
effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment
could result.
Criteria to consider:
1. Geology. The continental shelf is an area physically extending the territory of most
coastal States into a species of platform. The appurtenance of the shelf to the
countries in front of whose coastlines it lies is a fact, and it can be useful to consider
the geology of that shelf in order to find out whether the direction taken by certain
configurational features should influence delimitation.
2. Geography. The principle is that the land dominates the sea; it is consequently
necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration of the coastlines of the
countries whose continental shelves are to be delimited. Since the land is the legal
source of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to
seaward, it must first be clearly established what features do in fact constitute such
extensions.
3. Unity of any deposits. The natural resources of the subsoil of the sea in those
parts which consist of continental shelf are the very object of this legal regime. Yet it
frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the line dividing a
continental shelf between two States, and since it is possible to exploit such a
deposit from either side, a problem immediately arises on account of the risk of
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of the States concerned. All that is
needed is to refer to the undertakings entered into by the coastal States of that sea
with a view to ensuring the most efficient exploitation or the apportionment of the
products extracted.
4. Reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to
equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf
appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines,
these being measured according to their general direction in order to establish the
necessary balance between States with straight, and those with markedly concave or
convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. The

choice and application of the appropriate technical methods would be a matter for the
parties.
Libya v. Malta (1985)

This concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf between Libya and Malta. The
Mediterranean is bordered by Tunisia (east), Italy (north), Greece (west) and Libya (south).
Malta is a group of islands situated in the Mediterranean, to the south of Italy and to the
north of Libya. Libya’s coast is significantly larger than that of Malta.
RE: UNCLOS, which provided that the delimitation of the continental shelf be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, in order to achieve an equitable solution. The
Convention sets a goal to be achieved, but is silent as to the method to be followed to
achieve it. It restricts itself to setting a standard, and it is left to States themselves, or to the
courts, to endow this standard with specific content.
Relation to EEZ & legal basis of continental shelf rights. The two institutions - continental
shelf and EEZ – are linked together in modern law. Since the rights enjoyed by a State over
its continental shelf would also be possessed by it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any EEZ
which it might proclaim, one of the relevant circumstances to be considered for the
delimitation of the continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the EEZ
appertaining to that same State. This does not mean that the concept of the continental shelf
has been absorbed by that of the EEZ; it does however signify that greater importance must
be attributed to elements, such as distance from the Coast, which are common to both
concepts. Although the institutions of the continental shelf and the EEZ are different and
distinct, the rights which the EEZ entails over the sea-bed of the zone are defined by
reference to the regime laid down for the continental shelf. Although there can be a
continental shelf where there is no EEZ, there cannot be an EEZ without a corresponding
continental shelf. It follows that the distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf
as well as to the EEZ. What this means is that where the continental margin does not extend
as far as 200 miles from the shore, natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical origins
has throughout its history become more and more a complex and juridical concept, is in part
defined by distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-
bed and subsoil. The concepts of natural prolongation and distance are therefore not
opposed but complementary.
Equitableness of result is primary. The delimitation of a continental shelf boundary must be

effected by the application of equitable principles in all the relevant circumstances in order to
achieve an equitable result.
Some equitable principles: the principle that there is to be no question of refashioning

geography, or compensating for the inequalities of nature; the related principle of non-
encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other (the coastal State enjoys
sovereign rights over the continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent authorized by
international law in the relevant circumstances); the principle of respect due to all such
relevant circumstances; the principle that although all States are equal before the law and
are entitled to equal treatment, "equity does not necessarily imply equality", nor does it seek
to make equal what nature has made unequal; and the principle that there can be no
question of distributive justice.
Factors which weren’t considered in this case: landmass, relative economic positions of the
Parties, security considerations, and the principle of equality.
Proportionality is considered. What the Court intended was proportionality was to be used as
a means of identifying and then correcting the kind of distortion that could arise from the use
of a method inapt to take adequate account of some kinds of coastal configuration.
Delimitation process:

1. Make a provisional delimitation by using a criterion and a method both of which are clearly
destined to play an important role in producing the final result.
The law applicable to claims relating to continental shelves located less than 200 miles from
the coasts of the States on a criterion of distance from the Coast or on the principle of
adjacency as measured by distance. Thus the choice of the criterion and the method to be
used to arrive at a provisional result should be made in a manner consistent with the
concepts underlying the attribution of legal title. In this delimitation between opposite coasts,
the tracing of a median line between those coasts, by way of a provisional step, is the most
judicious manner of proceeding with a view to the eventual achievement of an equitable
result. Take note that the median line drawn is only provisional. Were the Court to treat it as
final, it would be conferring on the equidistance method the status of being the only method
the use of which is compulsory in the case of opposite coasts. Under existing law, it must be
demonstrated that the equidistance method leads to an equitable result in the case in
question. To achieve this purpose, the result to which the distance criterion leads must be
examined in the context of applying equitable principles to the relevant circumstances. Also
remember that, to achieve an equitable result in a situation in which the equidistance line is
prima facie the appropriate method, all relevant circumstances must be examined, since
they may have a weight in the assessment of the equities of the case which it would be
proper to take into account and to reflect in an adjustment of the equidistance line.
2. Examination of the provisional solution in light of the requirements derived from other
criteria, which may call for a correction of the initial results.
Due to the great difference in length of the coasts and the general geographical context (the
Maltese islands appear as a relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea), in order to
ensure the achievement of an equitable solution, the delimitation line must be adjusted so as
to lie closer to the coasts of Malta. Within the area with which the Court is concerned, the
coasts of the Parties are opposite to each other, and the equidistance line between them lies
broadly west to east, so that its adjustment can be satisfactorily and simply achieved by
transposing it in an exactly northward direction. This line meets the requirements of the test
of proportionality, and is equitable, given all relevant circumstances.
Guinea v Guinea-Bissau (1985)

The case regarding the marine delimitation was removed from the list of cases of the ICJ
because both parties mutually dropped the case. Their main reason was that both parties
agreed on establishing an international agency for the join exploitation of the maritime zone
in question.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (1978)

Though the Court was primarily focused on the issue of jurisdiction in this case, the relevant
issue is whether or not certain islands under Greek sovereignty are entitled to a continental
shelf of their own and entitle Greece to call for the boundary to be drawn between those
islands and the Turkish Coast.
No jurisdiction. ICJ has no jurisdiction since Turkey did not accept such jurisdiction in the
Rome Communique.
Turkey’s Theory: “islands in question are mere protuberances of the Turkish continental
shelf and have no continental shelf of their own.” (Court did not decide on this issue since it
had no jurisdiction but I think Sir. Harry agreed with Turkey’s theory since based on the map,
to grant continental shelves would encroach in the territorial sea of Turkey)
The issue of whether these islands have their own continental shelf concerns matters of
entitlement (do the island deserve shelves), delimitation (whats the area of these shelves)
and territorial status (will it encroach on established national boundaries)
*According to the other reviewer, Sir said that in this case the principles in the Sipadan case
and Eritrea-Yemen arbitration would apply. In our discussion, Sir said that the method of half
effect could be applied.

Tunisia v. Libya
Libya and Tunisia requested the ICJ to determine what principles and rules of international
law may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to
Libya and to that of Tunisia; decide according to equitable principles, and the relevant
circumstances which characterize the area, as well as the new accepted trends in the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea; and clarify the practical method for the application of
these principles so they can delimit without difficulty
The Method of Half-effect. The delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equitable

principles considering all relevant circumstances. The area to be delimited constitutes a
single continental shelf as the natural prolongation of both States, so principle of natural
prolongation cannot be used.
The area is delimited by two lines. In defining the angulation of the initial line, the Court took
note of the existence of the line employed de facto by each Party dividing their petroleum
concessions. As for the second line, the change in direction of the coast is a fact which must
be taken into account. Note that in this case the land territory of the two States is adjacent
but because of the change in direction of the coast of Tunisia it seems opposite at some
point. The initial delimitation line indicated by the ICJ will therefore extend from the outer limit
of the territorial sea until its intersection with the parallel of latitude of the point on the coast
of the Gulf of Gabes. In determining the angulation of the second like the existence of the
Kerkennah Islands (Tunisia) should be considered. The Kerkennah Islands is surrounded by
islets and low-tide elevations. Some effect must be attributed to it. The Court has to take
into account not only the islands, but also the low-tide elevations which, while they do not, as
do islands, have any continental shelf of their own, do enjoy some recognition in
international law for certain purposes. However, if the ICJ lets the line run parallel to the
island coastline that would be giving the islands too much weight. Hence, half-effect must be
used. The technique involves drawing two delimitation lines, one giving to the island the full
effect attributed to it by the delimitation method in use, and the other disregarding the island
totally, as though it did not exist. The delimitation line actually adopted is then drawn
between the first two lines, either in such a way as to divide equally the area between them,
or as bisector of the angle which they make with each other, or possibly by treating the
island as displaced toward the mainland by half its actual distance therefrom.
Anglo-French Arbitration (1979)

This involved the delimitation of the continental shelves of France and UK in the North Sea.
In this case, the Court considered the effect of certain geological features to the delimitation.
The Equidistance-Special Circumstances method. Under Article 6 the equidistance principle

ultimately possesses an obligatory force which it does not have in the same measure under
the rules of customary law. But the equidistance-special circumstances rule means that the
obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the condition "unless
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances". The role of the "special
circumstances" condition is to ensure an equitable delimitation and the combined
"equidistance-special circumstances rule", in effect, gives particular expression to a general
norm that, failing agreement, the boundary between States abutting on the same continental
shelf is to be determined on equitable principles. Consequently, the question whether the
use of the equidistance principle or some other method is appropriate for achieving an
equitable delimitation is very much a matter of appreciation in the light of the geographical
and other circumstances.
Opposite states. Throughout the English Channel where the coasts of France & the UK are
opposite each other the boundary should, in principle, be the median line equidistant from
the respective coasts. The relationship of "opposite" or "adjacent" States is nothing but a
reflection of the geographical facts. The distinction drawn between the two geographical
situations is one derived not from any legal theory but from the very substance of the
difference between the two situations. Whereas in "opposite" States a median line will
normally effect a broadly equitable delimitation, a lateral equidistance line extending
outwards from the coasts of adjacent States for long distances may result in an inequitable
delimitation by reason of the distorting effect of individual geographical features. It is the
combined effect of the side-by-side relationship of the two States and the prolongation of the
lateral boundary for great distances to seawards which may be productive of inequity and is
the essence of the distinction between "adjacent" and "opposite" coasts situations.
First step: the legal frame to be used is that of delimitation between “opposite” States. The
first step should be to determine the course of the median line within the Channel. Take note
that the Hurd Deep-Hurd Deep Fault Zone, a geographical feature, wasn’t considered by the
Court given the essential geological continuity of the area (the Hurd Deep were just
discontinuities in the seabed and subsoil which didn’t disrupt the essential unity of the
continental shelf).
Features of the Channel considered in this case. The Channel Islands (not constitutionally
part of the UK, but direct dependencies of the British Crown which were treated as part of
the UK, since the UK was the responsible authority wrt the continental shelf) are situated on
the French side and within the arms of a gulf on the French coast. The presence of these
islands in that particular situation disturbs the balance or the geographical circumstances
which would otherwise exist between the Parties in this region as a result of the broad
equality of the coastlines of their mainlands. The legal framework is that of two opposite
States one or which possesses island territories close to the coast of the other State.
Factors not considered: navigational defence and security interests in the region.
Principle of natural prolongation, not absolute. The question is what areas of continental
shelf are to be considered as legally the natural prolongation of the Channel Islands rather
than of France. In international law, the concept of the continental shelf is a juridical concept
which connotes the natural prolongation under the sea not of a continent or geographical
land mass but of the land territory of each State. This means that the scope and the
conditions for its application are not determined exclusively by the physical facts of
geography but also by legal rules. Moreover, it is clear (given the special circumstances
provision & emphasis on equitable principles) that the force of the cardinal principle of
natural prolongation of territory is not absolute, but may be subject to qualification. The
principle of natural prolongation of territory cannot be said to require that the continental
shelf to the north and northwest of the Channel Islands should be considered as
automatically and necessarily appurtenant to them rather than to France. Yet, if the force of
the principle of natural prolongation of territory were absolute, a small island would block the
natural prolongation of the territory of the nearby mainland in the same way, if not always to
the same extent, as a larger island. The question of the appurtenance to the Channel Islands
of the areas of continental shelf extending to their north and north-west is not therefore
resolved merely by referring to the principle of natural prolongation. The principle of natural
prolongation of territory is neither to be set aside nor treated as absolute in a case where
islands belonging to one State are situated on continental shelf which would otherwise
constitute a natural prolongation of the territory of another State. The application of that
principle in such a case has to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geographical and
other circumstances, as well as on any relevant considerations of law and equity.
Principles of equity. Under customary law, the method adopted for delimiting the boundary
must ensure that the delimitation accords with equitable principles. The question is whether
the Channel Islands should be given the full benefit or the application of the principle of
natural prolongation in the areas to their north and northwest or whether their situation close
to the mainland of France requires, on equitable grounds, some modification of the
application of the principle in those areas. The doctrine of the equality of States cannot be
considered as constituting such an equitable ground (as this would have the effect of
refashioning geography). Any ground of equity is to be looked for in the particular
circumstances of the case and in the particular equality of the two States in their
geographical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel.
Characteristics of the area: approximate equality of the mainland coastlines, resulting in
equality of their geographical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel, if the Channel
Islands are left out of account. If the Channel Islands are given full effect, this will result in a
substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would accrue to France. This
fact appears to be, prima facie, a circumstance creative of inequity and calling for a method
of delimitation that in some measure redresses the inequity. If this conclusion is tested by
applying the equidistance-special circumstances rule, the presence of the Channel Islands
must be considered, prima facie, as a "special circumstance" justifying a delimitation other
than the median line.
The two-fold solution wrt Channel Islands: First, to maintain the appropriate balance
between the two States in relation to the continental shelf as riparian States of the Channel
with approximately equal coastlines, the primary boundary between them shall be a median
line. In delimiting its course in the Channel Islands region the Channel Islands themselves
are to be disregarded, since their continental shelf must be the subject of a second and
separate delimitation.
Second step: to delimit a second boundary establishing, vis-à-vis the Channel Islands, the
southern limit of the continental shelf held by the Court to be appurtenant to the French
Republic in this region to the south of the mid-Channel median line.
Features considered. The essential continuity or the continental shelf of the English Channel
and Atlantic region has been emphasized. It is also common ground that, geologically the
slight southwesterly trend of the continental shelf of the Channel extends westwards into the
Atlantic region along the line of the Hurd Deep Fault Zone. The continental shelf of the
Atlantic region is not confined within the arms of a comparatively narrow channel but one
extending seawards front the coasts of the two countries into the open spaces of the Atlantic
Ocean. In consequence, the areas of continental shelf to be delimited lie off, rather than
between, the coasts or the two countries. A further consequence is that the continental shelf
extends to seawards of the coasts of the two countries for great distances. The actual
coastlines of the two countries abutting on the continental shelf to be delimited are
comparatively short, and that their geographical relation to each other vis-à-vis the
continental shelf to be delimited is one of lateral rather than opposite coasts. Another is that
the UK’s coastal frontage project further into the Atlantic than that of France. This has the
tendency to make the UK coast obtrude upon the continental shelf situated to seawards of
the more westerly facing coast of the French Republic in that region. Another is France and
the UK aren’t the only States which abut on the Atlantic continental shelf.
Legal framework used. Under Art. 6, in the absence of agreement and unless another
boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is to be the line which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured. There is nothing in the language of Art. 6 to imply that in
situations failing under paragraph 1 the virtues of the equidistance principle as a method of
effecting an equitable delimitation are in any way superior to those which it possesses in
situations falling under paragraph 2. The appropriateness of the equidistance or any other
method for the purpose of effecting an equitable delimitation in any given case is always a
function or reflection of the geographical and other relevant circumstances of the particular
case. In short, the equitable character of the delimitation results not from the legal
designation of the situation as one of "opposite" States but from its actual geographical
character as such. Similarly, in the case of "adjacent" States it is the lateral geographical
relation of the two coasts, when combined with a large extension of the continental shelf
seawards from those coasts, which makes individual geographical features on either coast
more prone to render the geometrical effects of applying the equidistance principle
inequitable than in the case of "opposite" States. The greater risk in these cases that the
equidistance method may produce an inequitable delimitation thus also results not from the
legal designation of the situation as one of "adjacent" States but from its actual geographical
character as one involving laterally related coasts.
In this case, due to the separation of the 2 coasts by a wide expanse of sea, the area
(Atlantic region) is considered as a case of opposite States.

A special circumstance: the prolongation of the Scilly Isles (UK) some distance further
westwards than the Ushant island (France), which justifies a boundary other than the strict
median line. However this doesn’t authorize the use of any method in order to effect an
equitable delimitation.
Modified equidistance method. In a large proportion of delimitations, where a particular

geographical feature has influenced the course of a continental shelf boundary, the method
of delimitation adopted has been some modification or variant of the equidistance principle
rather than its total rejection. Here the problem also arises precisely from the distorting effect
of a geographical feature in circumstances in which the line equidistant from the coasts of
the two States would otherwise constitute the appropriate boundary. The appropriate method
is to take account of the Scilly Isles as part of the coastline of the UK but to give them less
than their full effect in applying the equidistance method. Just as it is not the function of
equity in the delimitation of the continental shelf completely to refashion geography, so it is
also not the function of equity to create a situation of complete equity where nature and
geography have established an inequity.
Half-effect. In one instance, the method employed was to give half, instead of full, effect to
the offshore island in delimiting the equidistance line. This method consists in delimiting the
line equidistant between the two coasts, first, without the use of the offshore island as a
base-point, and, secondly, with its use as a base-point; a boundary giving half-effect to the
island is then the line drawn midway between those two equidistance lines. This method
appears to be an appropriate and practical method of abating the disproportion and inequity
which otherwise results from giving full effect to the Scilly Isles as a basepoint for
determining the course of the boundary.
* Sir: the method of half effect = proceed first as if the island doesn’t exist, then shift the
lines.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1933)

Denmark sued Norway for occupying certain territories in Eastern Greenland. Both countries
are claiming that the have the superior claim over this area.
Doctrine of “Sovereignty Actually Exercised”. Two elements each of which must be shown to
exist:
a. the intention and will to act as sovereign
b. some actual exercise or display of such authority
Examples: Tax collection, monopoly activity/grants, law making and enforcement
Authority, recognition in conventions/treaties, public utilities concessions,
hunting/fishing expeditions, maritime permits authority, lighthouses!!!
WON “Greenland” as used in the documents of this period intended to include the East
Coast because at that time, the East Coast was yet unknown – Yes! An examination of the
maps of the 17th and 18th centuries shows that the general features and configuration of the
East coast of Greenland were known to the cartographers. Even if no evidence of any
landings on the coast have been produced, the ships which hunted whales in the waters to
the East of Greenland sighted the land at intervals and gave names to the prominent
features which were observed. Indeed, "Greenland" as a geographical term was even more
used in connection with the East coast than with the West coast, as the term "Straat Davis"
was often used to describe the West coast, or colonized area, of Greenland.
g. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Before the acceptance of the doctrine on the exclusive economic zone, all waters beyond
the contiguous zone were considered high seas over which no state had control. The
doctrine developed due to the desire of coastal states for better conservation and
management of coastal fisheries.

The EEZ is an area extending not more than 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline. The
coastal state has rights over the economic resources of the sea, seabed, and subsoil – but
this right does not affect the right of navigation and overflight of other states. Coastal states
also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine scientific research in the EEZ.
The provisions on the EEZ are both a grant of rights to and an imposition of obligations on
coastal states relative to the exploitation, management, and preservation of the resources
found within the zone. Coastal states have 2 primary obligations. First, they must ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the living resources of the
EEZ are not subject to over-exploitation. This includes the duty to maintain and restore
populations of harvested fisheries at levels which produce a maximum sustainable yield.
Second, they must promote the objective of “optimum utilization” of the living resources.
They must determine the allowable catch of living resources, and if they don’t have the
capacity to harvest the allowable catch, they must grant access to other states. Highly
migratory species of fish and marine mammals are accorded special protection.
The delimitation of overlapping EEZs between adjacent states is determined by agreement.

And take note that islands have their own EEZs.
Spain v. Canada (1996) [ Facts only]

This is a dispute relating to Canada’s amendment of the Canadian Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act, by virtue of which Canada pursued, boarded and seized a fishing vessel the
Estai; flying the Spanish flag) on the high seas in order to put a stop to the overfishing of
Greenland halibut by Spanish fishermen.
Arguments:
European Community’s position - “the arrest of a vessel in international waters by a State
other than the State of which the vessel is flying the flag and under whose jurisdiction it falls,
is an illegal act under both the NAFO Convention and customary international law, and
cannot be justified by any means.”
Canada’s Position - dispute concerns the adoption of measures for the conservation and
management of fisheries stocks with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area
and their enforcement
Spain’s Position - Spain argues that the term “conservation and management measures"
must be interpreted in accordance with international law, so it must exclude any unilateral
measure by a State which adversely affected the rights of other States outside that State's
own area of jurisdiction.
Doctrine:
In international law only 2 types of measures taken by a coastal State could, in practice,
be regarded as "conservation and management measures":
[1] those relating to the State's exclusive economic zone; and
[2] those relating to areas outside that zone, in so far as these came within the
framework of an international agreement or were directed at stateless vessels.
Measures not satisfying these conditions were not conservation and management measures
but unlawful acts pure and simple.
*Sir: mustn’t submit vessels guilty of illegal fishing to incarceration, but must promptly
release them upon the posting of a cash bond.
M/V "SAIGA" (No.2) Case (1999)

The Saiga is a Cypriot oil tanker that was arrested and boarded by Guinean authorities when
it was sailing south of the southern limit of the exclusive economic zone of Guinea. The
applicants are challenging the validity of the arrest and want damages. Guinea is insisting
that they had jurisdiction to arrest and invoke hot pursuit.
Saiga’s Nationality – UNCLOS GENUINE LINK TEST. Article 91, paragraph 1, of the
Convention provides: "There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship." Two
questions need to be addressed in this connection.
(a) The first is whether the absence of a genuine link between a flag State and a
ship entitles another State to refuse to recognize the nationality of the ship.
(b) The second question is whether or not a genuine link existed between the
Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines at the time of the incident.
EEZ – Guinea could only apply its customs laws with regard to artificial islands, installations
and structures. (article 60, paragraph 2). The Tribunal notes that, under the Convention, a
coastal State is entitled to apply customs laws and regulations in its territorial sea (articles 2
and 21). In the contiguous zone, a coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its
territory of territorial sea.
However, in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction to apply
customs laws and regulations in respect of artificial islands, installations and structures
(article 60, paragraph 2). The Convention does not empower a coastal State to apply its
customs laws in respect of any other parts of the exclusive economic zone not mentioned
above.
Exception – State of Necessity (ART 58 - “OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW”

phrase). 2 CONDITIONS FOR STATE OF NECESSITY TO APPLY– NOT MET. As set out
in article 33, paragraph 1, of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, are:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the
State against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards which
the obligation existed.
In endorsing these conditions, the Court stated that they "must be cumulatively satisfied"
and that they "reflect customary international law".
Hot Pursuit – defense denied (Article 111 UNCLOS) All the requirements must be
cumulatively complied with. Guinea did not comply with several. No visual or auditory signals
to stop could have been given to the Saiga. and the alleged pursuit was interrupted when the
patrol boats were recalled before they resumed the chase.
Camouco Case (2000)

The Camouco is a fishing vessel flying the flag of Panama. Its owner is "Merce-Pesca
(S.A.)", a company registered in Panama. It was boarded by the French surveillance frigate
Floréal in the exclusive economic zone of the Crozet Islands. The French refuse to release
the vessel and the Master until a bond is posted (exhaust local remedies)
Local remedies need not be exhausted in order to file an application. Article 292 provides for
an independent remedy and not an appeal against a decision of a national court. No
limitation should be read into article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very
object and purpose. Indeed, article 292 permits the making of an application within a short
period from the date of detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies could
Municipal authorities are allowed to attach provisional liberty with the posting of a bond
provided the amount is reasonable. Article 292 of the Convention is designed to free a ship
and its crew from prolonged detention on account of the imposition of unreasonable bonds in
municipal jurisdictions, or the failure of local law to provide for release on posting of a
reasonable bond, inflicting thereby avoidable loss on a ship owner or other persons affected
by such detention. Equally, it safeguards the interests of the coastal State by providing for
release only upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security determined by
a court or tribunal referred to in article 292, without prejudice to the merits of the case in the
domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew.

Reasonableness of Bond Amount. The basis is the value of the detained vessel and of the
cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form but the
value of the vessel alone may not be the controlling factor in the determination of the amount
of the bond or other financial security if there is no evidence to support the assessment.
h. DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES
Regarding the delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts, neither of them is entitled to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines of each of them, unless
they agree to do so, or if historic title or other special circumstances make it necessary to
delimit the territorial seas in other ways.
The delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts must be done by agreement on the basis of international law (ex. equitable principles
which have a normative character as part of general international law). Pending this they
may make provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and they must not jeopardize or
hamper the reaching of a final agreement. If no agreement can be reached within a
reasonable period of time, the parties shall resort to peaceful means of dispute settlement.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases it was held that the equidistance method did not
represent general international law. Since then, certain equitable principles have been
recognized as guidelines for delimitation:
1. Delimitation shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law.
2. The principle of non-encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other.
3. Prevention any cut off of the sea ward projection of the states concerned.
4. Delimitation is to be effected by applying equitable criteria and by using practical methods
capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographical configuration of the area and other
relevant circumstances, an equitable result.
5. There is a presumption that the equitable solution is an equal division of the overlapping
areas of the continental shelves of the disputing states.
The application of equitable principles makes reference to relevant circumstances, such as:
1. General configuration of the coasts of the parties
2. Where there is a geographical situation of quasi-equality between a number of states, it is
necessary to abate effects of an incidental special feature which might result in unjustified,
different treatment. ( to avoid the effects of a concave coast, the location of islands of one
state near the other, and the eccentric alignment of small islands lying off a peninsula).
3. The geological structure of the sea-bed and its geomorphology (or surface features)
4. The disparity of coastal lengths in the relevant area.
5. The general geographical framework or context.
6. The conduct of the parties, such as the de facto line produced by the pattern of grants of
petroleum concessions in the disputed area.
7. The incidence of natural resources (oil and natural gas) in the disputed area.
8. The principle of equitable access to the natural resources of the disputed area.
9. Defense and security interests of the disputing states.
10. Their navigational interests.
11. Consistency with the general direction of the land boundary.
In the Libya v. Malta and Gulf of Maine cases, the delimitation was done in two steps. First, a
provisional delimitation line was provided. Next, the provisional solution was examined,
taking account of special circumstances. If necessary, the initial results were corrected.
In the Gulf of Maine case, the ICJ stated that there are no rules, in general customary
international law, specifically prescribing the application of any particular equitable criteria or
the use of particular practical methods in delimitation. Instead customary international law
merely contains a general requirement of the use of equitable criteria and practical methods
capable of implementing them. It is special international law that must be looked into, to see
whether that law includes some rule specifically requiring the Parties, and the ICJ/arbitral
tribunal, to apply certain criteria or specific practical methods to the delimitation (ex. 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf).
Art. 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention provides for a single technique for continental
shelf delimitation (a median for maritime areas between opposite coasts, and a lateral
equidistance line for coasts of adjacent States). This method is inspired by and derives from
this equitable criterion: that the equitable solution, at least prima facie, is an equal division of
the areas of overlap of the continental shelves of the two States. However the applicability
of this method is subject to the condition that there are no special circumstances in the case
which would make that criterion inequitable (i.e. unreasonable division). This articles states:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental
shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified
by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories two adjacent
States the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by
application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest point of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(1994)
In this case, Canada & the US asked the Court to delimit both the continental shelf and the
exclusive fishing zone in the Gulf of Maine area, using only a single boundary. The Gulf of
Maine area is a broad oceanic indentation, which is shaped like a rectangle, bordered on the
3 sides by land, and on the fourth by the Atlantic Ocean.
1. Determine the starting point of the line. In this case, the starting point was chosen by the
Parties (point A). While the Court may use another starting point, it won’t for in the
delimitation of a maritime boundary, both conventional and customary international law give
priority to the criterion that delimitation must be sought through agreement between the
Parties.
2. Some factors. Geological factors are insignificant, given the essentially continuous
geological structure of the strata underlying the whole of the continental shelf. There is unity
and uniformity in the whole sea-bed, as the continental shelf of the area is just an
undifferentiated part of the continental shelf of the American eastern seaboard; thus
geomorphological factors are insignificant. The same goes for the water column. It isn’t
possible to discern any genuine, sure and stable “natural boundaries” in so fluctuating an
environment such as the waters of the ocean. It would be futile to seek any element which
could be a stable natural boundary. Thus, the great mass of water in the delimitation area,
just like the sea-bed, also possesses that character of unity and uniformity which makes it
impossible to discern any natural boundary capable of serving as a basis for carrying out a
delimitation.
3. The applicable principles and rules of international law. (What are the rules, methods
applicable?)
Principles under Art. 6. Any delimitation of the continental shelf effected unilaterally by one
State, regardless of the views of the other/s concerned, is in international law not opposable
to those States. States have a duty to negotiate with a view to reaching an agreement and to
do so in good faith with a genuine intention to achieve a positive result. Any delimitation
must be effected by agreement between the States concerned either by the conclusion of a
direct agreement or by some alternative method which must be based on consent. And any
agreement or other equivalent solution should involve the application of equitable criteria -
those derived from equity which are not in themselves principles and rules of international
law.
Fundamental norm in delimitation: the boundary be “determined according to the applicable

law, in conformity with equitable principles, having regard to all relevant circumstances, in
order to achieve an equitable result.” A more complete, precise reformulation of the
fundamental norm, prescribed by general international law for all maritime delimitations
between neighbour states:
(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent coasts may be
effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected
by means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the
genuine intention of achieving a positive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a third party possessing the
necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable criteria and by
the use of practical methods capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration
of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable result.
Continental Shelf Convention inapplicable. If the goal is only a delimitation of the continental
shelf, then the mandatory application of Art. 6 is undisputed. However, the goal of this
proceeding is to draw a single delimitation line for both the continental shelf and the
superjacent fishery zone. It is doubtful whether a treaty obligation which is in terms confined
to the delimitation of the continental shelf can be extended to a field which is evidently
greater and fundamentally different. To do so would make the maritime water mass over the
shelf a mere accessory of the latter, and this is unacceptable.
Equitable criteria. There has been no systematic definition of the equitable criteria for use in
international maritime delimitation. Examples of criteria used: (classic formula) that the land
dominates the sea; the equal division of the areas of overlap of the maritime and submarine
zones appertaining to the respective coasts of neighboring States, in cases where there are
no special circumstances; whenever possible, the seaward extension of a State's coast
shouldn’t encroach on areas that are too close to the coast of another State; the prevention,
as far as possible, of any cut-off of the seaward projection of the coast or of part of the coast
of either of the States concerned; and in certain circumstances, the appropriate
consequences may be drawn from any inequalities in the extent of the coasts of two States
into the same area of delimitation. The essential fact to remember is that the criteria are not
rules of law and therefore mandatory in the different situations, but "equitable", or even
"reasonable", criteria, and that what international law requires is that recourse be had in
each case to the criterion, or the balance of different criteria, appearing to be most
appropriate to the concrete situation.
Proposed methods by the Parties. The US proposed the method of the perpendicular (a
vertical line, perpendicular to the general of the coast). Canada relied on the equidistance
method.
Regarding the method to be used. None of the potential methods for delimitation has
intrinsic merits which would make it preferable to another in the abstract. There is no single
method which intrinsically brings greater justice or is of greater practical usefulness. The
greater or lesser appropriateness of one method or another can only be assessed with
reference to the actual situations in which they are used, and the assessment made in one
situation may be entirely reversed in another. Nor is there any method of which must be
preferred, a method with whose application every delimitation operation could begin, albeit
subject to its effects being subsequently corrected or it being even discarded in favor of
another, if those effects turned out to be clearly unsatisfactory. There must be willingness to
adopt a combination of different methods whenever that seems to be called for by
differences in the circumstances that may be relevant in the different phases of the operation
and with reference to different segments of the line. Thus the Court decided this
independently of the proposals.
Adjacent v. Opposite. Art. 6 contemplate 2 distinct hypothetical situations, but this doesn’t
mean that the basic criterion (equal division) behind these provisions are different, or that the
method doesn’t use the same technique. The distinction is only due to the different
geographical situations referred to (lateral equidistance line for adjacent coasts, median line
for opposite coasts). In appreciating the appropriateness of the equidistance method as a
means of achieving an equitable solution, regard must be had to the difference between a
'lateral' boundary between adjacent States and a 'median' boundary between 'opposite'
States." The coasts of two States may be adjacent at certain places and opposite at others
(as in this case). On this latter hypothesis, difficulties might arise of a practical nature in
particular since every effort should be made to prevent the partial relationship of adjacency
from ultimately predominating over the partial relationship of oppositeness, or vice-versa. It
might become apparent that adjustments were necessary for this purpose, or even recourse
to a different method.
Applicable equitable criteria in this case: geography + auxiliary criteria. Remember that this
involves a delimitation of 2 distinct elements by means of a single line. This precludes the
use of any criteria which are inappropriate for the delimitation of either element. The Court
will apply criteria derived from geography, mainly the geography of coasts, which has
(primarily) a physical aspect and (secondarily) a political aspect. Some corrections must be
made to certain effects of its application that might be unreasonable, so that the concurrent
use of auxiliary criteria may appear indispensable, such as length of coastlines, the
equitableness of correcting the result when a coastline is cut off, and the presence of
geographical features (islands, groups of small islands).
Applicable practical methods. The practical methods can only be methods appropriate for
use against a background of geography. Moreover, the methods used must be just as
suitable for the delimitation of the sea-bed and its subsoil as for the delimitation of the
superjacent waters and their fishery resources. Thus, only geometrical methods will serve.
Given the configuration of the Gulf of Maine coastline, the delimitation line isn’t a
unidirectional line. Take note that at the northeastern sector the coasts are laterally adjacent,
while at the closing sector the coasts are opposite. Thus in the first sector, the boundary is a
lateral delimitation line. In the second, the line is a median line.
4. The Delimitation
a. First Segment. The practical method to be applied must be a geometrical one based on
respect for the geographical situation of the coasts between which the delimitation is to be
effected, and at the same time suitable for producing a result satisfying the criterion for the
division of disputed areas. Thus the equidistance method isn’t used, but the method of
drawing perpendiculars. Accordingly, one may justifiably draw from point A two lines
respectively perpendicular to the two basic coastal lines. These perpendiculars form, at point
A, on one side an acute angle of about 82' and on the other a reflex angle of about 278'. It is
the bisector of this second angle which should be adopted for the course of the first
segment.
b. Second Segment.
Stage one. This involves the determination of the median line. Remember, the choice of
method is essentially dependent on geography. In this case (given the rectangular shape of
the area and the quasi-parallelism between the lines used in the delimitation, and the fact
that the coasts are opposite), the application of any method of geometrical origin can in
practice only result in the drawing of a median delimitation line. Such a line can only be one
approximately parallel to the approximately parallel lines of the two opposite coasts.

Stage two. The back of the Gulf is entirely occupied by the continuous coast of Maine, a
component state of the US, and the terminal point of the international boundary with Canada
is situated much farther to the northeast in the Grand Manan Channel, at a corner of the
rectangle which geometrically represents the shape of the Gulf proper. Thus it is impossible
to disregard the difference in length between the respective coastlines of the two States
which border on the delimitation area. A correction is thus needed. The total length of the
US coastline in the Gulf is approximately 284 nautical miles. The overall length of the
Canadian coastline is approximately 206 nautical miles. The ratio between the coastal fronts
of the Parties on the Gulf of Maine as is thus 1.38 to 1. This ratio should be reflected in the
location of the second segment of the delimitation line. The appropriate method should be to
apply the ratio selected to a line drawn across the Gulf where the coasts of Nova Scotia and
Massachusetts are nearest to each other. It would then be proper to shift the median line
drawn in such a way as to reflect this ratio along the line Cape Cod-Chebogue Point. The
presence of some islands and isles must also be considered, i.e. Seal Island. It is some two
and-a-half miles long. However it would be excessive to treat the coastline of Nova Scotia as
transferred south-westwards by the whole of the distance between Seal Island and that
coast, and it is appropriate to give the island half effect, so that the ratio to be applied for
determining the location of the corrected median line will be approximately 1.32 to 1 in place
of 1.38 to 1. Since it is only a question of adjusting the proportion by reference to which the
corrected median line is to be located, the island’s effect is a small transverse displacement
of that line, not an angular displacement, with limited practical impact. The central segment
of the delimitation line will correspond, over its entire length, with the corrected median line
as so established. It will begin where this line intersects, within the Gulf, the bisector drawn
from point A and constituting the first segment, and end on reaching the closing line of the
Gulf.
c. Third Segment. This is the longest portion. This is the segment which lies outside and
over against the Gulf of Maine. In principle, the determination of the path of this segment
must depend on that of the two previous segments. The portion of the line now to be
determined will inevitably be situated in the open ocean. From the geographical point of
view, there is no point of reference, outside the actual shores of the Gulf that can serve as a
basis for carrying out the final operation required. It is obvious that the only kind of practical
method which can be considered for this purpose is a geometrical method - the drawing of a
perpendicular to the closing line of the Gulf.
In conclusion, taking point A as a fixed point and assigning letter B to the meeting-point
between the first two segments as above defined, letter C to the meeting-point between the
second and third segments on the closing line of the Gulf, and letter D to the point where the
first segment reaches, to seaward, the last place on its path where the claims of the two
Parties overlap, the delimitation line fixed between the maritime jurisdictions of Canada and
the US will be the line successively connecting points A, B, C and D.
5. Verification of the equitable character of the result. This is necessary only for the third
segment, which is the real subject of the dispute due to the potential resources of the subsoil
and the fisheries. Some enquiry whether, in addition to the factors provided by the
geography of the Gulf itself, there are no others that should be taken into account, is an
understandable step. It might well appear that other circumstances ought properly to be
considered in assessing the equitable character of the result produced by this portion of the
delimitation line. These other circumstances may be summed up by the data provided by
human and economic geography, and are thus ineligible for consideration as criteria to be
applied in the delimitation process itself, may be relevant in assessing the equitable
character of a delimitation first established on the basis of criteria borrowed from physical
and political geography (ex. Historical presence in the area, activities pursued like fishing
and conservation of resources, & socioeconomic aspects) . In this case, the Court concluded
that there are absolutely no conditions of an exceptional kind which might justify any
correction of the delimitation line that was drawn. The delimitation was effected in
compliance with the governing principles and rules of law, applying equitable criteria and
appropriate methods accordingly, thus producing an equitable overall result.
i. THE HIGH SEAS
These are all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a State. The high seas are subject to 6 freedoms:
1. freedom of navigation
2. freedom of overflight
3. freedom of fishing
4. freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines
5. freedom to construct artificial islands and structures
6. freedom of scientific research.
Freedom of overflight belongs to both civilian and military aircraft. Freedom of fishing also
includes the duty to cooperate in taking measures to ensure the conservation and
management of the living resources of the high seas.
Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the
high seas. The flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its ships on the high seas to the
extent not limited by agreement. By legal fiction, a ship is a floating part of the flag state. A
warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship can board the latter only if there is
a reasonable ground for suspecting that:
1. the ship is engaged in piracy
2. the ship is engaged in slave trade
3. the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag state of the warship
has jurisdiction
4. the ship is without nationality
5. though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is really of the same
nationality as the warship.
Piracy refers to the following acts:

1. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and
directed: on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft; or against a ship, aircraft, persons or property
in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
2. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a known pirate ship or aircraft;
3. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating any of the above acts.
Take note that the contiguous zone is part of the high seas.
Hot pursuit is allowed where there is good reason to believe that the ship has violated laws
or regulations of a coastal state. This must commence when the foreign vessel is within the
internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial waters, or the contiguous zone of the
pursuing state. It may continue to the high seas if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is
not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or contiguous
zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the
territorial sea or contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is in the contiguous zone, it may be
pursued only for violations of the rights of the coastal state in the contiguous zone. Mutatis
mutandis, the right of hot pursuit shall also apply to violations of applicable laws and
regulations of the coastal state in the EEZ or the continental shelf including the safety zones
of the shelf. Hot pursuit must stop as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial waters of
its own state or of a third state. Hot pursuit may be carried out only by warships or military
aircraft, or any other ship or aircraft properly marked for that purpose.
Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such
practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued is within the limits of the
territorial sea or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone, EEZ, or above the

continental shelf. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to
stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.
In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high
seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in
the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such
person except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the
State of which such person is a national. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued
a master's certificate or a certificate of competence or license shall alone be competent,
after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is
not a national of the State which issued them. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a
measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag
State.
j. CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF LIVING RESOURCES OF THE HIGH

SEAS
All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to
their treaty obligations, the rights and duties of coastal states, and the UNCLOS provisions.
In line with this, all states have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other states in taking,
such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of
the living resources of the high seas (e.g. determining the allowable catch).
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (1999)

Australia and New Zealand alleged that Japan had failed to comply with its obligation to
cooperate in the conservation of the southern blue fin tuna (SBT) stock by undertaking
unilateral experimental fishing for southern bluefin tuna in breach of its obligations under Arts
64 and 116 to 119 of UNCLOS in relation to the conservation and management of the SBT.
They are also asking for provisional remedies in the form of an order commanding Japan to
desist from such unilateral experimental fishing.
Highly Migratory Species must be protected! Under art 64, read together with arts 116 to
119, of the Convention, States Parties to the Convention have the duty to cooperate directly
or through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory species.
SOUTHERN BLUE FIN TUNA, A HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES OF FISH! The list of
highly migratory species contained in Annex I to the Convention includes southern bluefin
tuna: thunnus maccoyii;
Provisional Remedies granted – catch limit set (Japan made a clear commitment that the
1999 experimental fishing programme will end by 31 August anyway). PROVISIONAL
MEASURES AIMS TO PRESERVE RIGHTS AND HARM TO ENVIRONMENT. In
accordance with art 290 of the Convention, the Tribunal may prescribe provisional measures
to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to
the marine environment. MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PRESERVE RIGHTS AND
AVERT MORE DETERIORATION. Although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the
scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a
matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the
southern blue fin tuna stock.
k. RIGHT OF LAND-LOCKED STATES TO AND FROM THE SEA
A land-locked state is one which has no sea-coast. These states have the right of access to
and from the sea and the freedom of transit through the territory of a transit state (a state,
with or without a sea-coast, situation between a land-locked state and the sea, through
whose territory traffic in transit passes). Traffic in transit shall not be subject to any customs
duties, taxes, or other charges, except those levied for specific services rendered in
connection with such traffic.
l. INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA
These are areas of the seabed and the ocean floor, and their subsoil, which lie beyond any
national jurisdiction. These are the common heritage of mankind and may not be
appropriated by any state or person. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority (the International Sea-Bed Authority)
shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the
Area, however, may only be alienated in accordance with the relevant provisions of
UNCLOS. The Enterprise is the organ of the Authority which shall carry out activities in the
Area directly as well as the transporting, processing, and marketing of minerals recovered
from the Area, and shall have its principal place of business at the seat of the Authority.
m. MARINE POLLUTION
Marine pollution prevention and control arising from land-based sources, sea-bed-activities
subject to national jurisdiction, activities in the Area, vessels and others are covered quite
extensively under UNCLOS. States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution from
any source and are liable for damage caused by violation of their international obligations to
combat such pollution.
* Sir: marine pollution cases are different from quasi-delicts, for the latter requires proof of
negligence in order to recover damages. Under the TOVALOP and CRISTOL, there is no
need to prove fault for there is an immediate duty to pay for the clean-up. However, shipping
and oil companies are required to pay only up to a certain amount (based on an oil fund).
This arose as a response to the Exxon incident. Take note that the US doesn’t recognize a
ceiling. Also, in cases of gross negligence, the companies will lose the benefit of limited
liability and will become liable for the amount needed for the clean-up.
n. NAVIGATION
Every State has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas. It is the State’s right to
decide the conditions by which it will accord the right to fly its flag. No ship may change its
flag during its voyage except in case of transfer of ownership or on the basis of change of
registry. If a ship sails under the flag of 2 states, it is considered as having no nationality and
may not claim any of the nationalities represented by these flags with respect to any other
State. Only the flag state may exercise criminal jurisdiction over the master or any person in
the service of the ship. This is a departure from the SS Lotus case. Also the flag state shall
have the duty to require the ship’s master, without danger to the crew or passengers, to
render assistance to any person at sea in danger of being lost, or to rescue persons in
distress.
o. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory. If a bilateral settlement fails, UNCLOS

requires submission of the dispute for compulsory settlement in one of the tribunals clothed
with jurisdiction. The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Convention.
p. PEACEFUL USE OF THE OCEANS
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under UNCLOS, states shall refrain from
any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied
in the UN Charter.
q. ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL OBJECTS

States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at
sea.

INTERNAL TERRITORIAL ARCHIPELAGO CONTIGUOUS EEZ CONTINENTAL HIGH SEAS

WATERS SEAS ZONE SHELF
Definition Waters on An adjacent belt of A grp. of A zone An area Seabed and All parts of the
the landward sea, which does islands, contiguous to beyond and subsoil of sea that are
side of the not exceed 12 including parts the territorial adjacent to submarine not included in
baseline of nautical miles from of islands, sea that may the areas that the exclusive
the territorial the baselines. interconnecting not extend territorial extend beyond economic
sea. Includes Under the waters & other beyond 24 sea, which the territorial zone, in the
waters of UNCLOS, natural features nautical miles extends 200 sea throughout territorial sea
lakes, rivers, roadsteads are which are so from the nautical the natural or in the
ports, and part of the closely baselines miles from prolongation of internal
bays territorial sea. interrelated that the baseline its land territory waters of a
such form an to the outer State, or in
intrinsic edge of the the
geographical, continental archipelagic
economic & margin, or to a waters of an
political entity, distance of 200 archipelagic
or which miles from the State.
historically have baselines
been regarded whichever is
as such greater.
Sovereignty, Coastal state Coastal state has Archipelagic Coastal state These are Coastal state Not under
Jurisidction has absolute sovereignty (over state’s does not limited. has certain jurisdiction,
civil & airspace, seabed, sovereignty exercise Sovereign sovereign rights sovereignty of
criminal subsoil) , limited extends to the sovereignty but rights only over the any state
jurisdiction by the right of archipelagic protective for the continental
innocent passage waters, the jurisdiction. purpose of shelf, though it Ships under
airspace above exploring, doesn’t form the flag of 1
Flag state these waters, Coastal state exploiting, part of its state shall be
exercises civil, the seabed, has jurisdiction conserving, territory. These subject to the
criminal jurisdiction subsoil, and the only over and sovereign rights exclusive
with resources. This customs, managing don’t affect the jurisdiction of
EXCEPTIONS sovereignty is fiscal, the natural legal status of such state.
1. Criminal – exercised immigration, or resources, superjacent
consequences subject to the sanitary laws & living or waters and For collisions,
extend to coastal right of regulations nonliving, in airspace over no penal

state, disturbs the archipelagic sea the waters, the waters. proceedings
peace, good order, lanes passage. seabed, may be
request for and subsoil. instated
assistance, drug except before
traffic Jurisdiction the judicial or
2. Civil – those is limited, administrative
incurred by ship with regard authorities of
itself, connected to artificial either the flag
with the voyage islands and state or of the
installations, state of which
marine persons in the
scientific service of the
research, ship is a
and national
protection,
preservation
of marine
environment
Rights of To adopt laws, To suspend the Coastal states To explore, Sovereign rights FOR ALL
the Coastal regulations relating right of passagemust make a exploit, to explore, STATES:
State to innocent wrt specified
claim to its conserve, & exploit natural Freedoms of
passage areas if
contiguous manage resources the high seas
essential for the
zone for their natural (mineral & other - navigation
When necessary protection of the
pertinent rights resources, nonliving - overflight
wrt navigational state’s securityto exist (this living orresources of the - lay
safety, require and without
zone is only nonliving, in seabed & submarine
foreign ships to discrimination optional, the the waters, subsoil, & living cables,
use sea lanes, among foreign others are seabed, or organisms at the pipelines
traffic separation ships mandatory). subsoil. harvestable - construct
schemes The stage, either artificial
To designate contiguous To immobile on or islands,
Rights of sea lanes & air zone if claimed construct, under the installations
protection routes will be operate, & seabed or are - fishing
(includes right to superimposed use artificial unable to move - scientific
temporarily Prescribe traffic on the EEZ. If islands & except in research
suspend innocent separation there is no installations constant

passage if schemes for claim, the area physical contact To visit

essential for safe passage of will be part of To lay with the seabed warships
protection of its ships via narrow the high seas. submarine or subsoil)
security) channels in cables & Hot pursuit
such lanes Exercise pipelines To construct,
necessary operate & use Immunity of
Substitute other control to Freedoms artificial islands warships,
sea lanes, traffic prevent of & installations ships owned
separation violations wrt navigation & or operated by
schemes customs, overflight To lay a state & used
fiscal, sanitary, submarine only on gov’t
immigration Establish cables & non-
safety pipelines commercial
Punish zones service
infringement of around Exclusive right
the laws artificial to authorize &
related to the 4 islands, regulate drilling
areas installations on the shelf
To exploit the
subsoil via
tunneling
Duties of Not to hamper the Respect rights Conserve & Not to FOR ALL
Coastal innocent passage of third states manage the infringe/interfere STATES:
States of foreign ships under existing resources with rights & To fix
agreements freedoms of conditions for
To give Promote other States, grant of
appropriate Recognize optimum e.g. navigation nationality to
publicity to any traditional utilization ships (right to
danger to fishing rights, Not to impede fly its flag)
navigation, of other legitimate the laying,
which it has activities of maintenance of Exercise
knowledge, within adjacent cables, pipelines jurisdiction &
its territorial sea neighboring control in
states In laying administrative,
cables/pipelines, technical,

Respect existing to have due social matters

submarine regard to those over ships
cables laid by already in flying its flag
other states & position
passing through To render
its waters assistance
without making
a windfall To prevent,
punish the
Allow the transport of
maintenance slaves
and
replacement of To repress
such cables piracy
Rights of NO right of Right of innocent Right of Right to To lay To lay
Third States innocent passage innocent innocent submarine submarine To suppress
passage passage passage cables & cables and illicit traffic in
No charge may be pipelines pipelines narcotic
EXCEPT levied on foreign Right of Right to transit drugs,
when the vessels by reason archipelagic sea passage Freedoms To repair psychotropic
establishment only of their lanes passage of existing cables, substances
of a straight passage navigation & pipelines
baseline overflight To suppress
encloses as unauthorized
internal broadcasting
waters those
which had not Punish the
previously breaking of
been submarine
considered cables
as such
Duties of Submarines, Ships and To abide by Due regard In laying To cooperate
Third States underwater aircraft in the rules and to the rights cables/pipelines, in
vehicles must archipelagic sea regulations set & duties of to have due conservation,
navigate on the lanes passage by the coastal the coastal regard to those management
surface & show shall not deviate state state already in of living

their flag more than 25 position resources

miles to either Comply with
Comply with side of the lanes the laws,IF BEYOND
coastal state’s during passage regulations 200-MI. ZONE:
rules, regulations of the The duty to
relating to innocent Respect coastal make annual
passage applicable sea state payments or
lanes and traffic contributions in
When required, separation Foreign kind after the
foreign ships must schemes ships must first 5 years of
use designated respect the production
sea lanes, traffic safety except in case
separation zones of a developing
schemes established state, which is a
by the net importer of
Foreign nuclear- coastal mineral
powered ships, State resources from
those carrying its continental
nuclear, inherently shelf
dangerous/noxious
substances, during
innocent passage,
must carry
documents &
observe special
precautionary
measures

3
3. JURISDICTION & IMMUNITIES
Bernas, An Introduction to International Law (for easier reading; Higgins & Brownlie articles are
in the digest)
> Jurisdiction – authority to affect legal interests.
Kinds:
1. jurisdiction to prescribe norms of conduct (legislative jurisdiction)
2. jurisdiction to enforce the norms prescribed (executive jurisdiction)
3. jurisdiction to adjudicate (juridical jurisdiction)
> 5 traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crimes under international law: Territorial,
wherein jurisdiction is based on whether jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is
committed (Lotus case); Protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the
offender (Nottebohm case); Protective, wherein jurisdiction is based on whether the national
interest is injured; Universal, wherein jurisdiction is conferred in any forum that obtains physical
custody of the perpetuator of certain offenses considered particularly heinous and harmful to
humanity (Eichmenn v. Atty-General of Israel); Passive Personal, wherein jurisdiction is based
on the nationality of the victim.
> Effective nationality link doctrine (Nationality Principle) – determines which of 2 states of
which a person is a national will be recognized as having the right to give diplomatic protection
to holder of dual nationality (Nottebohm).
*Sir:
Jurisdiction
1. Territorial jurisdiction
2. Universal jurisdiction regardless of where, what nationality of victim or offender.
Ex. Act so offensive, crimes v. int’l order, piracy, war crimes, crimes & crimes against humanity,
torture, genocide
3. alternative bases for exercise of jurisdiction: nationality – offender (RP Civil Code)
Brownell v. Sunlife
Action to compel payment on an endowment policy payable to a Japanese, under the Trading
with the Enemy Act.
Exclusive jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the nation within its territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power
in which would impose such restriction. All exceptions to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow
from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. The consent of
a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be express; it is
enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
Ratification can be given tacitly as well as expressly. Tacit ratification takes place when a State
begins the execution of a treaty without expressly ratifying it.
The ratification of or concurrence of the RP to the agreement for the extension of the Philippine
Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the RP and of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of RAs 7, 8, and 477. US laws have no
extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the RP is based concurrently on said act
(Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the conduct of the RP
Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
3 Thanks to Tin and Cathe for this part.

People v. Lol-Lo And Saraw
Appeal against conviction for piracy.
Universal jurisdiction over piracy. CFI has jurisdiction over the crime of piracy, which is robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in
the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a
crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against
all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."
*Sir: Even without domestic executing law—so why not for enforced disappearances? Extra-
judicial killings? Against Osama, who has 2 Filipina wives—if he hides here, can we use People
v. Lol-lo? YES! The lack of domestic law does not make the act any more legal.
RPC – extraterritorial clauses now, restating cases
Tubb & Tedrow v. Griess

Petition against US prosecution for misappropriation.
Limit on sovereignty. Since such part of the US Army is stationed in the RP with permission of
our government, & petitioners, who belong to the military personnel of that army, are charged
with violations of Articles of War for offenses committed in areas under the control of the US
Army, a settled principle of international law gives said army jurisdiction over their person & the
offenses charged. IL rule: a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil & criminal
jurisdiction of the place; the agreement for the stationing of the US Army or a part of its forces in
the RP implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over their troops during the time covered by such
agreement, & permits the allied general or commander-in-chief to retain that exclusive control &
discipline which the government of his army may require.
Haw Pia v. The China Banking Corporation

Petition to compel cancellation of mortgage with sequestered bank.
Sequestration v. confiscation. Confiscation is not allowed under the Hague Regulations. There
was no confiscation here but a mere sequestration. Under international law, the occupying
power can effect a liquidation that is in the form of a mere sequestration. In the effort of
occupying powers to control enemy property within their jurisdiction in order to avoid their use in
aid of the enemy and to increase their own resources, they had to resort to such measures of
prevention—which do not amount to a straight confiscation, as freezing, blocking, placing under
custody, and sequestrating the enemy private property. Measures of prevention are not
repugnant to Hague Regulations. This is based on [1] writings of well-known writers on
International Law, [2] express authorization granted under the Army and Navy Manual of Military
Government and Civil Affairs of US and of other civilized countries, and [3] Trading with the
Enemy Acts of the US and other civilized countries. Thus, there was valid tender of payment to
BOT which discharged Haw Pia’s obligation.
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa (District Court)

Alvarez sues US & paid kidnapper after he was acquitted on charges for which he was brought
to the US.

Kidnapping not an actionable norm under ACTA. On the Alien Tort Claims Act: US does not
recognize a prohibition against transborder kidnapping, nor can it be said that there is
international acceptance of such a norm. At the time of Alvarez's abduction, the US-Mexico
Extradition Treaty did not extend to transborder abduction and there was no separate treaty with
such a prohibition. Our review of the international authorities and literature reveals no specific
binding obligation, express or implied, on the part of the US or its agents to refrain from
transborder kidnapping. Nor can we say that there is a “universal” consensus in the sense that
we use that term to describe well-entrenched customs of international law. Because a human
rights norm recognizing an individual's right to be free from transborder abductions has not
reached a status of international accord sufficient to render it “obligatory” or “universal,” it cannot
qualify as an actionable norm under the ATCA. Aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation.
But, extraterritorial application does not automatically give rise to extraterritorial enforcement
authority. That Congress may have intended the reach of a criminal statute to extend beyond
our borders does not mean that Congress also intended to give federal law enforcement officers
unlimited authority to violate the territorial sovereignty of any foreign nation to enforce those
laws, or to breach international law in doing so. Although we recognize that the kidnapping and
murder of DEA agents abroad necessitates the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction,
absent a clear directive, we cannot conclude that Congress has given the DEA unlimited
enforcement powers abroad. Alvarez's arrest, and hence his detention, were arbitrary because
they were not “pursuant to law.” Consequently, Alvarez established a tort committed in violation
of the law of nations.
On the Federal Torts Claims Act: Although the injuries were suffered in Mexico, the proximate
cause of such injuries (planning, scheming, etc.) were done in the US, and so it falls under the
headquarters doctrine exception to the foreign activities exception. And although the waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FTCA excludes intentional torts such as false arrest, this
exclusion is followed by an important proviso: It does not apply if the intentional tort is
committed by an “investigative or law enforcement officer.” The DEA agents who orchestrated
Alvarez's arrest are law enforcement officers as defined by the FTCA because they are
“empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of
Federal law.” Because the primary tortious act was the initiation and planning of Alvarez's
abduction by the DEA agents, his claim falls squarely within this law enforcement proviso, and
thus the intentional tort exclusion does not apply.
*Sir: Valid extradition under int’l law – treaty and offense must satisfy rule of double criminality
(both at time of happening or commission and at the time of request, the offense must be
defined in both territories). [2007 Bar]
You are not required to extradite (for torture, etc.) from a country notorious for violation of
torture, etc. (incluing the death penalty) treaty
Political crimes are defined in Extradition Treaty as being non-extraditable; person accused for
such may apply for refugee status, be an asylum seeker.
Sosa v. Machain (Supreme Court)

Claimant seeks damages for illegal arrest & wrongful detention.
ACTA only jurisdictional, no cause of action given. FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all
claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or
omission occurred. The Alien Torts Statute is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action. The reasonable inference from history & practice is that the ATS was intended to have
practical effect the moment it became law, on the understanding that the common law would
provide a cause of action for the modest number of IL violations thought to carry personal
liability at the time: offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, & piracy. In
deriving a standard for assessing Alvarez's claim, it suffices to look to the historical antecedents,
which persuade this Court that federal courts should not recognize claims under federal
common law for violations of any IL norm with less definite content & acceptance among
civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar when the ATS was enacted. (“[F]or
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become–like the pirate & slave trader before him–
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind”) In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, “Actionable violations of IL must be of a norm that is specific, universal, & obligatory.”
A single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful
authorities & a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary IL so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy.
*Sir: SC: show injury from an official act; requirement: no break in the causation of events
(commission must be in the US territory). On Sosa: ACTA is available for victims of int’l crimes;
if served by summons in US. ACTA does not apply—jurisdiction-giving only; no cause of action
provided in the law; kidnapping is not included in the list of actionable crimes.
ACTA: for Hilao v. Marcos—damages for political murders, enforced disappearances.
ACTA: amended by Bush; now, available only for torture (before, included violation of law of
nations—war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, torture)
Is kidnapping an int’l crime?
Eichmann v. Attorney-General Of Israel

Appeal of conviction for crimes against humanity during the Holocaust.
Universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity; manner of arrest does not affect jurisdiction.
On jurisdiction: The principle of territorial sovereignty merely requires that the State exercise its
power to punish within its own borders, not outside them; that subject to this restriction every
State may exercise a wide discretion as to the application of its laws and the jurisdiction of its
courts in respect of acts committed outside the State; and that only in so far as it is possible to
point to a specific rule prohibiting the exercise of this discretion . . . is a State prevented from
exercising it. That view was based on the following two grounds: (1) It is precisely the
conception of State sovereignty which demands the preclusion of any presumption that there is
a restriction on its independence; & (2) Even if it is true that the principle of the territorial
character of criminal law is firmly established in various States, it is no less true that in almost all
of such States criminal jurisdiction has been extended . . . so as to embrace offences committed
outside its territory. . .
However, it is the universal character of the crimes in question which vests in every State the
power to try those who participated in the preparation of such crimes, and to punish them
therefor. It follows that the State which prosecutes and punishes a person for that offence acts
solely as the organ and agent of the international community, and metes out punishment to the
offender for his breach of the prohibition imposed by the law of nations. . . .
On manner of arrest (kidnapping from Argentina):
(a) In the absence of an extradition agreement between the State to which a "fugitive
offender" has been brought for trial and the country of "asylum" . . . and even if there existed
such an agreement . . . but the offender was not extradited . . . in accordance therewith, the
Court will not investigate the circumstances in which he was detained and brought to the
area of jurisdiction (Sir: the “Ma-and-Pa” doctrine, originally from Ker v. Illinois).
(b) This also applies if the offender's contention be that the abduction was carried out by the
agents of the State prosecuting him, since in such a case the right violated is not that of the
offender, but the sovereign right of the State aggrieved.
(c) the aggrieved State may condone the violation of its sovereignty and waive its claims,
including the claim for the return of the offender to its territory, and such waiver may be
explicit or by acquiescence.
Appellant is a "fugitive from justice" from the point of view of the law of nations, since the crimes
that were attributed to him are of an international character and have been condemned publicly
by the civilised world; therefore, by virtue of the principle of universal jurisdiction, every country
has the right to try him. This jurisdiction was automatically vested in the State of Israel on its
establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. Therefore, in bringing the appellant to trial, it
functioned as an organ of international law and acted to enforce the provisions thereof through
its own law. Consequently, it is immaterial that the crimes in question were committed when the
State of Israel did not exist, and outside its territory The moment it is admitted that the State of
Israel possesses criminal jurisdiction both according to local law and according to the law of
nations, it must also be conceded that the Court is not bound to investigate the manner and
legality of the [arrest and]…detention...
Ker v. Illinois
Ker was kidnapped from Peru & brought to Cook County, US to face larceny & embezzlement
charges.
Irregularity in manner of getting custody does not affect jurisdiction. ‘Due process of law’ is
complied with when the party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court, has
a trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such trials, and when in that trial and
proceedings he isn’t deprived of rights to which he is lawfully entitled. For mere irregularities in
manner in which he was brought into the custody of the law, he isn’t entitled to say that he
shouldn’t be tried for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment.
This treaty (of extradition), or any other treaty, doesn’t provide that a party fleeing from the US
to escape punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which
he has fled. It isn’t contended that Peru couldn’t have ordered Ker out of the country on his
arrival, or at any period of his residence there. Nor can it be doubted that Peru could, of its own
accord, without any demand from the US, have surrendered Ker to an agent of Illinois, and this
surrender would’ve been valid within the dominions of Peru. The right of the Peruvian
government to voluntarily give a party, in Ker’s condition, an asylum in that country is quite a
different thing from his right to demand and insist upon security in such an asylum. The treaty,
so far as it regulates the right of asylum, is intended to limit this right in the case of one who is
proved to be a criminal fleeing from justice; so that, on proper demand and proceedings had
therein, the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him up to the country where
the crime was committed. And to this extent, the treaty does regulate or impose a restriction
upon the right of the government of the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from
removal. In this case, the treaty wasn’t called into operation or relied upon.
*Sir: origin of the “Ma-and-Pa” doctrine.
Bernas: Immunity from Jurisdiction

General rule: the jurisdiction of a state within its territory is complete and absolute.
Categories of exceptions: Sovereign immunity, which covers both a head of state and the state
itself, & Immunity of the representative of states or diplomatic and consular immunities.
State immunity – the principle that the state may not be sued without its consent found in the
Philippine Constitution is both municipal law and also international law applicable to foreign
states. This is based on the principle of equality of states: par in parem non habet imperium.
The immunity of the sovereign head is seen as also communicated to the sovereign state.
Diplomatic and consular immunities - much of the law governing diplomatic relations is
customary law. Official representatives of a state are given immunities and privileges, which are
personal (they benefit the person), when they are within the territory of another state. But the
purpose of the immunities given is functional, that is, to enable them to perform their functions
properly. On the part of the receiving state there lie certain obligations to protect the
representative and his property and office.

*Sir: Seeming difference between sovereign immunity and immunity of an IO: none really, when
we agree to limit territorial jurisdiction via the Bases Agreement (among others), employees are
immune for both functional and full immunity.
Tendency: narrow construction of immunity: covers only sovereign acts
Limits on Sovereignty:
-US-RP Bases Agreement – transitory provision: complete immunity to limited immunity (limited
to sovereign acts as opposed to proprietary acts)
-but when sovereign? Proprietary? What about when building bases? Or the ZTE contract (state
enterprise—act of Chinese state? China has no concept of private entities)? When buying
helicopters, armaments (for defense)—still sovereign acts. Difficult cases: transportation—
civilian and sovereign character, if during on-going armed conflicts, private vessels
commissioned by the state, if there is no conflict?
-RTC of Makati: no complete immunity
Tests:
1. Nature of act – whether sovereign or proprietary.
2. Personality of contracting parties – trumped by purpose test (armaments sold by private
entities to state to be used for defense).
Ex Parte Pinochet
Pinochet extradited by Spain while he was in London seeking medical treatment, for crimes
committed, primarily in Chile, during his term as head of state of Chile (he became head of state
after a successful coup).
Double criminality doctrine; sovereign & functional immunity. Not all the crimes as charged are
extradition crimes, so, Pinochet can be extradited WRT charges after Sept. 29, 1988 (date when
Torture became a crime in the UK). Principle of Double Criminality requires that the conduct
complained of must constitute a crime under the law of both Spain and of the UK. The relevant
date is the conduct date—meaning, that the conduct should be a crime in the UK at the time it
was committed, and not at the time the extradition was sought (request date).
Pinochet as a former head of state enjoys immunity ratione materiae, but torture as defined
under the Torture convention cannot be a public function, so he does not enjoy immunity WRT
these acts committed after 09-29-88.
Torture is now an international crime on its own. IL prohibiting torture has the character of jus
cogens or a peremptory norm, i.e. one of those rules which have a particular status. Universal
Jurisdiction over torture is justified by its jus cogens nature. Important points from the torture
convention:
1) Torture under the Convention can only be committed by "a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity", but these words include a head of state. A single act of official
torture is "torture";
2) Superior orders provide no defence;
3) If the states with the most obvious jurisdiction (the Art. 5(1) states) do not seek to
extradite, the state where the alleged torturer is found must prosecute or, apparently,
extradite to another country (universal jurisdiction).
4) There is no express provision dealing with state immunity of heads of state, ambassadors
or other officials.
5) Since Chile, Spain and the UK are all parties to the Convention, they are bound under
treaty by its provisions WON such provisions would apply in the absence of treaty obligation.
Chile ratified the Convention with effect from Oct. 30, 1988 and the UK with effect from Dec.
8, 1988.

4
RATIONE PERSONAE RATIONE MATERIAE
of the Ambassador Under the Vienna Convention
Immunity of Head of state:
- State immunity probably grew from the historical immunity of the person of the monarch.
Such personal immunity of the head of state persists to the present day: the head of state is
entitled to the same immunity as the state itself.
Immunity of Ambassadors
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 19615 covers the immunity of the
Ambassador. It provides that:
 the Ambassador shall enjoy his immunity and privileges from the moment he takes up
post.
 After his post is over, he shall still enjoy these privileges and immunity until he leaves
the country or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that
time, even in case of armed conflict.
He shall continue to enjoy immunity with respect to acts performed in the exercise of his
functions (Art. 39(2); limited immunity; ratione materiae).
-Basic Principle Of IL that one sovereign - immunities & privileges the Ambassador
state (the forum state) does not adjudicate enjoyed ceases the moment he leaves the
on the conduct of a foreign state. country after his post. But, to preserve the
integrity of the activities of the foreign state
during the period when he was ambassador, it is
necessary to provide that immunity is afforded to
his official acts during his tenure in post. If this
were not done the sovereign immunity of the
state could be evaded by calling in question acts
done during the previous ambassador's time.
- foreign state is entitled to procedural -This continuing partial immunity is different from
immunity from the processes of the forum that enjoyed ratione personae while he was still
state. in post.
- immunity extends to both criminal & civil
liability.
- head of state is entitled to the same -Since he no longer represents his state, he
immunity as the state itself. merits no particular privileges or immunities as a
- diplomatic representative of the foreign person.
state in the forum state is also afforded the
same immunity in recognition of the dignity
of the state which he represents.
-Immunity is ratione personae, attaching to -Under Art. 39(2), the ambassador, like any other
the person of the head of state or official of the state, enjoys immunity in relation to
ambassador and is a complete immunity, his official acts done while he was an official.
rendering him immune from all actions or This limited immunity is to be contrasted with the
prosecutions whether or not they relate to former immunity ratione personae which gave
matters done for the benefit of the state. complete immunity to all activities, public or
private.
There is no established rule of IL that requires state immunity ratione materiae to be accorded in
respect of prosecution for an international crime.
4immunity by reason of the subject-matter; attaches to the official acts of every acting or former State organ
5Art. 29- immunity from arrest
Art. 31- immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction
Art. 39 (1)- the ambassador's privileges shall be enjoyed from the moment he takes up post
(2) “When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and
immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so,
but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the
exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist."
*Sir: without abandoning the customary norms on immunities, the Lords ruled that immunity
extends only to sovereign acts.
International crime – duty to prosecute; acting in behalf of the international order.
Pinochet case – but acts were committed while he was the sovereign of Chile & sovereigns
have immunity from suits
Extradition in UK – criminal
House of Lords – reviewed the nature of his acts; immunity pertains only to sovereign acts, not
including commission of international crimes—Rome Statute: immunity is not a defense against
charges of international crimes.
Hilao v. Estate Of Marcos

Does the US have jurisdiction over a case involving foreign sovereign for acts done in the RP,
with no nexus to the US (after Court found that Marcos was not immune, acts of torture are not
acts of state, acts of torture violate customary int’l law)?
No sovereign immunity against charges of torture. US Alien Tort Statute provides a forum for
claims by aliens for torture that has occurred elsewhere. It requires a claim by an alien, a tort
and a violation of international law. The prohibition against official torture carries with it the force
of jus cogens norm which enjoys the highest status in international law. All states believe that
torture is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to
torture its own citizens. Under international law, any state that engages in official torture violates
jus cogens. Note that RP filed a brief stating that its foreign relations with the US would not be
adversely affected if claims against Marcos were litigated in the US.
*Sir: -Cory waived immunity – important since immunity could still be claimed. Victims of
Japan’s comfort women policy—ACTA claim for enslavement during wartime dismissed since
Japan didn’t waive immunity (if it did, sovereign acts can be prosecuted).
Normative value of law: even sovereign acts are not immune to make it unwise to commit the
violation
Jusmag Philippines v. NlRC

Petition assailing Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction over termination of an employee of an agency of
the US.
Sovereign immunity: contract in discharge of governmental function. A suit against such as

agency is a suit against the US Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint.
Considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper. Immunity of State from suit is a universally recognized principle.
In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its
organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the
sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).
The doctrine of Immunity is restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperil) and
cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts (jure gestionis) The contract
was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign state cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
US v. Reyes
Discrimination case against store manager in an exchange in JUSMAG.
No functional immunity WRT acts outside official duties. Bradford was sued in her private or
personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of
official functions, the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction, for example, under Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations which admits of exceptions of the general rule of a diplomatic agent’s
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state: (c) an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State
outside his official functions.
*Sir: jurisprudence in this regard is in flux (excess of authority = not w/in ambit of immunity)
Wylie v. Rarang
Libel case against US army personnel in charge of the publication.
No functional immunity WRT tortuous acts. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if
the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit The doctrine cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic. An act or omission that is ultra vires cannot be part of official duty, but is
a tortious act.
*Sir: SC: act in official capacity because of the nature of the publication (attached to the
organization) or because of function/capacity in which you acted.
Nature of immunity: jurisdiction not application if sovereign act.
SC: no immunity because the act constituting quasi-delict (is this consistent with doctrine?)
coverage is not applicable to negligent or bad faith act.
WHO v. Aquino
Smuggling case involving a WHO official.
Invoking functional immunity: certification from DFA. RA 75, meant to safeguard the
jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic officials in the Philippines, declares as null and void writs or
processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public
minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a
penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party
or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or
process. Judge Aquino should have quashed the search warrant application. Court bound by
DFA certification as to official capacity.
*Sir: Case is authority for: WHO is not subject to local jurisdiction. There is a procedure to
invoke immunity from suit before local courts: submission to court of a certificate from the DFA
characterizing the organization, to which local courts should defer.

US v. Ruiz
Action to compel US to award of harbour works contract.
State immunity not lost when state enters into sovereign contracts. The traditional rule of State
immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them—between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. But, the restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the US and the RP, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The correct test for the
application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a state but the legal nature of
the act.
Lyons, Inc. v. USA

Collection case under a stevedoring contract at the US Naval Base.
State immunity lost when state enters into proprietary contract. Case dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies but SC said, generally, the sovereign cannot be sued in its own
courts, or in any other, without its consent and permission. However, considering that the US
Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for
stevedoring & miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay area, a US Navy Reservation,
it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that
political entity may assume under the contract.
Minucher v. CA
Iranian Labor Attache claims damages after he was “framed” of heroin trafficking by a US drug
enforcement agent.
No functional immunity WRT personal acts.Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from
tort, there can be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts
committed outside his official functions duties. CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
civil case on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply-because of the [self-serving]
Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting
the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the Calzo
enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he
committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity
would bar any suit against him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages
arising therefrom.
In Shauf v. CA: “Authorities state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may haw mused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.”

*Sir: MFR ruling is wrong, No basis to give immunity to a DEA agent. DEA agent definitely not a
diplomatic agent (under the Vienna convention). [twice asked in last 5 Bar exams]
In RP, our diplomats have multiple designations. Third Secretaries are also Vice Consuls,
accredited (determines diplomat status).
There shouldn’t be immunity, no legal basis for immunity, no bases agreement, VFA is
problematic—limits exercise of sovereignty over offenses by visiting forces in RP (offenses in
unofficial acts, under US authority who certifies that it is service-related), specialized regime as
to custody WRT unofficial acts, US can request custody pending litigation but after trial until
decision, RP gets custody upon request.
Holy See v. Rosario

Action for reconveyance & damages by first buyer against seller Holy See, after failure to
complete payment.
DFA certification confirms sovereign immunity. The Vatican City represents an entity organized
not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and
object, it has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the
Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and
the demands of its mission in the world. Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign
relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City,
one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.
RP has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The property was donated to
the Holy See for it to establish its diplomatic premises but was forced to sell after failure to evict
squatters.
Test: whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the
Memorandum and Certification of the DFA. The determination of the executive arm of
government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a
political question that is conclusive upon the courts (ICMC v. Calleja). Where the plea of
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the
country's foreign relations (WHO v. Aquino).
Remedy: a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels
*Sir: involves a sovereign mini-state
SEAFDEC v. Acosta
Illegal termination case.
Functional immunity for international agency. SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying

diplomatic immunity, enjoying functional independence and freedom from control of the state in
whose territory its office is located. One of the basic immunities of an international organization
is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs & processes issued
by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient
medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of
its member-states. Important: non-political purpose + autonomy.

ICMC v. Calleja
Petition for Certification Election of rank and file members of the labor union in ICMC, a Vietnam
War refugee processing center, non-profit & UN registered.
Functional immunity for IO. “International Organization” is generally used to describe an

organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary
international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal
personality such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are
organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the
member states have an interest. The UN is an international organization dedicated to the
propagation of world peace. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is
clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to
avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The
exercise of jurisdiction by the DOLE would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to
shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from
political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the
organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
Liang (Huefeng) v. People

“Bitch” oral defamation case against an ADB economist.
DFA certification disregarded. SC disregarded the “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that
Liang is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and th RP regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the RP. The MfR focused on the
diplomatic immunity of officials and staff of ADB from legal and juridical processes in the
Philippines and the constitutional and political basis of that immunity. It should be made clear
that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely.
*Sir: calling someone a “bitch” is not related to a sovereign function.

The certificate (Liang was entitled to immunity) required in WHO v. Aquino was disregarded.
John Doe v. UNOCAL

Burmese citizens sue for enslavement under the ATCA, alleging that private security guards
forced them to dislocate & then make dams.
Successful ACTA claim. For purposes of establishing standing to seek injunctive relief to halt
American corporation's involvement in gas pipeline project in Myanmar because of alleged
continuing violations of human rights, Burmese citizens living in refugee camps in Thailand
demonstrated existence of credible threat that they would be subjected to human rights
violations allegedly committed in furtherance of pipeline project by showing that they are in
danger of being forcibly repatriated to Myanmar, either as result of Burmese attacks on refugee
camps or Thai refoulement actions. If plaintiff establishes standing to seek damages, court need
not undertake separate standing inquiry for equitable relief. Issuance of injunction to halt
American corporation's involvement in gas pipeline project in Myanmar because of Burmese
government's alleged continuing violations of human rights was not likely to halt alleged human
rights violations, where bulk of corporation's initial capital investment had already been made,
and operation of pipeline was within discretion of parties who were not parties to lawsuit.
*Sir: John Doe v. UNOCAL: pipeline in Myanmar; indigenous people forced to leave & then
work. Claim in Federal Court under ACTA. UNOCAL was invested in as a separate company
(joint venture). Myanmar: controlling shares in local subsidiary. Issue: why principal company
was held liable? Minority shares, management was with the ruling junta. Relation of acts of junta
& personality of the mother company (passive investor). Court: enforced slavery prohibition,

even by non-state actors. Federal Court said: no control over Myanmar. Special Circuit Court:
reversed, held UNOCAL liable.
Congo v. Belgium
International arrest warrant against Congo Foreign Minister protested as violation of customary
IL WRT diplomat’s absolute immunity; Minister has since left the government.
Functional immunity violated, state responsibility.Diplomatic and consular agents, certain high-
ranking officials in a state, such as the Head of State, Head of Government, and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other states, both civil and criminal.
Immunities accorded to ministers of foreign affairs in customary IL are accorded to ensure the
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their states and not for their personal
benefit. After the ICJ considered the nature of the functions exercised by a minister of foreign
affairs, it concluded that his functions are such that, throughout the duration of his office, he
when abroad, enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. This immunity and
inviolability protect the individual concerned from any act of authority of another state which
would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties. There can be no distinction from
acts which were performed in an “official” capacity and in a “private” capacity.
ICJ is unable to conclude that there exist exceptions under customary IL in regard to national
courts upon examination of the rules concerning immunity or criminal responsibility of persons
having official capacity contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal
tribunals. State Practice also does not show the existence of exceptions to the ministers of
foreign affairs’ immunity under customary IL. The decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
international Military Tribunals and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia do not deal with the question of immunities incumbent ministers of foreign affairs
before national courts where they are accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Belguim violated the immunities of the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Congo. The mere
issue and the circulation of the a/w, WON it significantly interfered with Yerodia’s diplomatic
activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards Congo, in that it failed to
respect the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and the inviolability enjoyed by him under IL.
USA v. Purganan & Crespo

Jimenez contests arrest warrant issued against him ICOW an extradition request by the US.
Extradition; treaty.The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the

request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes & the evidence that may be
adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; &
whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused—or the fugitive who has illegally escaped—back to its
territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein. By entering into an extradition treaty,
RP is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal & judicial
system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability & the willingness of the latter to grant basic
rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
Extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the
accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity. Potential extraditees
do not have the right too a hearing for the issuance of a warrant of arrest nor the right to bail
granted by the RTC.
Bernas:
> Extradition – the surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to
the state under whose laws he is alleged to have committed a crime or to have been convicted
a crime. It is a process that is governed by treaty. The legal right to demand extradition and the
correlative duty to surrender a fugitive exist only when created by treaty, which may cover
specific crimes only or all offenses considered criminal by both states. Most treaties exclude
religious and political offenses, although the latter have never been precisely defined. But a
state may surrender a fugitive if surrendering him is not contrary to the state’s constitution.
> Principles on Extradition:
1. No state is obliged to extradite unless there is a treaty
2. Differences in legal system can be an obstacle to interpretation of what the crime is
3. Religious and political offenses are not extraditable.
> procedure is normally through diplomatic channels (how extradition rules ca be bypassed: US
v. Alvarez-Machain; how due process requirements work in an extraditin case: Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion; USA v. Purgana & Crespo).
4. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Art. 2: internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consists of an action or omission:
a. attributable to the State under IL; &
b. constitutes a breach of an int’l obligation of the State.
Attribution of Conduct: Organ of state (Arts. 4, 6, 7); individual or group (Arts. 5, 8, 9, 10, 11).
Art. 12: breach - act of the State is not in conformity with what is required by the obligation.
Art. 16: State aiding or assisting another State in committing an internationally wrongful act (IWA).
Art. 17: State directs & controls another State in committing an IWA.
Art. 18: State coerces another State in committing an IWA.
Defenses against attribution: wrongfulness of the act precluded if done:
Art. 21: in lawful measure of self-defense under the UN Charter.
Art. 22: as a countermeasure under these Draft Articles.
Art. 23: due to force majeure.
Art. 24: done to save a life in distress, no other reasonable means.
Art. 25: in necessity.
Art. 26: no preclusion if wrongfulness is ICOW an obligation arising under a preemptory norm of general IL.
Art. 29: legal consequences of IWA do not affect continued duty to perform the obligation breached.
Art. 30: obligations in case of IWA:
a. cease the act, if continuing;
b. offer assurances of non-repetition.
Art. 31; responsible State obliged to make reparation for injury caused. Injury includes any damage, whether
material or moral, caused by the State’s IWA.
Art. 32: internal law can’t justify failure to comply with obligations
Art. 35: responsible State obliged to make restitution (re-establish situation before IWA) to the extent that
restitution is not materially impossible & burden is not out of proportion to benefit of restitution rather than
compensation.
Art. 36: responsible State obliged to compensate for damage caused, if no restitution possible, covering any
financially assessable damage including loss of profit established.
Art. 37: responsible State obliged to give satisfaction if no restitution or compensation possible, consisting of
acknowledgment of breach, expression of regret, formal apology, not out of proportion to injury, not in a way so as
to humiliate the responsible State.
Art. 40: rules apply WRT serious breach under an obligation arising under a preemptory norm of general IL.
Art. 42: injured State invoking another’s responsibility, if breach is owed to:
a. the State individually
b. group of State, including injured one, or int’l community as a whole& the breach:
i. specially affects the State
ii. so radically changes the position of other states WRT further performance of the obligation
Art. 48: non-injured State invoking responsibility – obligation breached is owed to group of states, including that
State, & is established for protection of collective interest, & obligation owed to int’l community as a whole. Claim
under first part: for cessation & promise of non-repetition, & reparation, for the injured State or of beneficiaries.
Art. 49: injured State taking countermeasures against responsible state to induce compliance with obligation;
limited to non-performance at time of taking the countermeasures, in such a way as to allow resumption of
performance.
Art. 50: countermeasures do not affect: obligation to refrain from threat or use of force, fundamental human rights
protection, humanitarian obligations prohibiting reprisals & obligations under preemptory norms of general IL.
Taking countermeasures won’t excuse from dispute settlement procedure & respecting inviolability of
diplomatic/consular agents, premises, archives, documents.
Art. 51: commensurate countermeasures: gravity of IWA, rights affected.
Art. 52: before countermeasures, demand fulfillment of obligation & notify responsible State of decision to take
countermeasures & offer to negotiate. If necessary to protect rights, take countermeasures, but not if (or suspend,
if already taken) IWA has ceased & dispute is pending in appropriate tribunal/court (restraint or suspension not
required if responsible State fails to implement settlement procedures in good faith).
Art. 53: terminate countermeasures upon compliance with obligation.
*Sir: what if a RP Army private shot a US Army personnel while drunk? Could a foot soldier
bring about state responsibility assuming attack against the state? The act will engage SR
because he is an agent of the state so he acts as part of an organ of the state (army). Is it being
an ultra vires act a defense? No.
2007 Bar: Mayor’s EO banning contraceptives in private clinics so poor people lost access to
family planning technology. Is this constitutional? No. Privacy (number of kids)—expanded due
process rights. Is this a violation of int’l law? Could Mayor engage SR in behalf of the state? Yes
(even ultra vires acts).
> When do you incur SR? Requisites (Art. 2):
a. breach of int’l obligation
b. attributable to state (attribution)
> Source of the principle of SR: ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility. How binding? See
North Sea Continental Shelf cases: ILC Articles (Continental Shelf Convention)—mandate of
ILC is to codify int’l law; composed of experts (subsidiary source of IL) nominated by states but
acts independently & representative of all legal regimes of the world; reflects or is evidence of
customary law
> Evidence of Customary Norms ILC codified the norms:
1. State practice: representative of decisions held by courts all over
2. opinion juris: not under any compulsion to codify norms under IL but only norms they feel are
law.
> Does the Draft Articles say when there is SR? Sir: no, it only says when there is breach of a
treaty or a norm. To determine SR, look at substantive law. After 80 years of drafting, there is no
conclusion on SR because there is no Convention adopting it. The only way to finish the project
was to leave the identification of SR to substantive law.
Int’l Tribunal: between State and person in its territory. Now, beyond the nationality principle, no
distinction as to nationality.
> Minimum standard for treatment of people in your territory: not fixed; based on circumstances.
Duty: due diligence in protection of aliens and their property in your territory. Gives rise to
breach of obligation WRT treatment of aliens and their property.
Draft Articles:
1. Prove both elements: breach + attribution
2. new obligation arises: responsibility to cease and desist, assurance of non-repetition &
reparation (restoration to status quo ante or compensation if no restoration possible;
extinguish all consequences—Chorzow Factory case) .
> State responsibility in a nutshell:
1. Art. 2-if there’s a breach, new obligations arise
-this article is the contentious article: what constitutes “breach”
2. Art. 30-to cease & desist; to guarantee non-repetition
3. Art. 31-reparation to status quo ante
> Who can engage state responsibility:
1. State organs - Art. 4: always (least problematic); “Organs” under IL includes all branches &
instrumentalities of the gov’t as defined under constitutional or internal law.
2. private individuals- (most problematic)
Art. 5- empowered
Art. 8- acting upon instruction or control (Nicaragua v. US)
Art. 9- de facto
Art.10- successful insurrectional movement
Art.11- acts ratified by the State itself
> Illustrations: Pinoys employed as security guards in US Bases in Iraq. The contras in
Nicaragua (US funded but Court said that low level support is insufficient to engage SR). Are
they acting as agents? In Burma, UNOCAL used security guards against indigenous peoples to
drive them away from their ancestral domains and then to force them to build dams, US
provided funds; claim was WRT slavery; had a compromise agreement but preliminary ruling
was that US was liable for agency; defense: for security. In RP, private security guards used in
cell sites against NPAs, if they engage in firefights, under IHL, are the security guards
combatants (for the state) in non-int’l armed conflict?
Bernas:
> Standard for the protection of aliens:
Doctrine of “national interest” or “equality of treatment” – aliens are treated in the same manner
as nationals of the state where they reside. Good: same benefits. Bad: it the state is tyrannical
and its municipal laws are harsh and violative of human rights even of its own citizens, then
aliens would also be subject to such harsh laws.

“Minimum international standard” – however harsh the municipal laws might be against a state’s
own citizens, aliens should be protected by certain minimum standards of humane protection.
Widely accepted standard but abstract.
> Corporations and shareholders:
Barcelona Traction case: Belgium lacked jus standi to exercise diplomatic protection of
shareholders in a Canadian company with respect to measures taken against that company in
Spain. When a state admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals it is bound
to extend to them the protection of the law and to assume obligations concerning the treatment
afforded them. But such obligations are not absolute. In order to bring a claim in respect of the
breach of such an obligation, a State must first establish its right to do so. Whenever a
shareholder’s interests are harmed by an act done to the company, it is to the latter that he has
to look to institute appropriate action.
Corfu Channel Case

UK claims against Albania’s mines planted in the Corfu Channel; Albania claims that its
sovereignty was violated when UK later swept the Strait for more mines.
Failure to protect aliens in territory. The laying of the minefield could not have been
accomplished without the knowledge of Albania (location, length of coast as to strait, guard
posts as strategic places). It was her duty to notify shipping and especially to warn the ships
proceeding through the Strait on Oct. 22 of the danger to which they were exposed. Nothing
was attempted by Albania to prevent the disaster, & these grave omissions involve her
international responsibility.
Albania would have been justified in view of these exceptional circumstances, in issuing
regulations in respect of the passage, but not in prohibiting such passage or in subjecting it to
the requirement of special authorization. The passage was innocent both in its principle, since it
was designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly denied, and in its methods of execution,
which were not unreasonable in view of the firing from the Albanian battery on May 15 th. The
Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force
which cannot find a place in international law. As regards the notion of self-help, the Court is
also unable to accept it: between independent States the respect for territorial sovereignty is an
essential foundation for international relations. Certainly, the Court recognises the Albanian
Government’s complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions and the dilatory nature
of its diplomatic Notes as extenuating circumstances for the action of the United Kingdom. But,
to ensure respect for international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the
action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France)

French agents destroyed a Greenpeace, Int’l vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, while in harbour in
New Zealand. New Zealand prosecuted 2 captured French agents of the Directorate General of
External Security.
Acts of organs of state. A communiqué from the Prime Minister of France confirmed that agents
acted under its instructions, & promised reparation. Dispute over France’s demand for release &
New Zealand’s claim for compensation. The UN Secretary-General's ruling required France to
pay US $7 million to New Zealand and to undertake not to take certain defined measures
injurious to New Zealand trade with the European Communities. The ruling also provided that
Major Mafart and Captain Prieur were to be released into French custody but were to spend the
next 3 years on an isolated French military base in the Pacific.
US diplomatic staff and consular staff in Iran (US v Iran)

US Embassy & staff in Iran were seized by protestors, without Iranian authorities attempting to
prevent such but with later statements of support by the Ayatollah.
Ratification of private acts. The Court said that the initial take-over of the embassy was not
attributable to the state. Attribution would be present only when it is established that the acts
were carried out in response to specific instructions from a competent organ of the State. The
first statements made by the Iranian gov’t were not sufficient to make the militants the agents of
the state. But as to the second statement, the showing of support and encouragement of the
detention of the hostages made the militants’ acts that of the Iranian State. This gave rise to
Iran’s international responsibility for the acts.
*Sir: Art. 11 state acknowledges and adopts the conduct

1. no evidence to link mob’s attack to Iran
2. failure to protect the premises of the embassy/diplomatic mission
Chorzow Factory Case

Poland’s alleged illegal expropriation liability to German owners.
Failure to protect alien’s property rights. Poland has a positive duty to respect and afford
protection to the property rights of aliens living in its territory. In international law, any breach of
an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation (note: wipe out as much of the
consequences & return to status quo ante, & restitution or compensation).
 State Responsibility, Harris Case book (1994 & 2004 editions)
*Sir: IL breach: gross negligence in duty of protecting aliens

> Standard (not a definitive formula): nationality, and minimum standard of treatment
> Substantive norm: Neer Claim
> In the RP, the Melo Commission said that there was command responsibility liability only as
far as Palparan went. So if GMA praises Palparan in her SONA for a job well don, is there
ratification under Art. 11?
1994 edition
Union Bridge Company Claim (US v. Great Britan)

Union Bridge claims damages arising out of the removal of the material from Port Elizabeth to
the Imperial Military Railways, Bloemfontein, by Harrison, the storekeeper of the Cape Gov’t
Railways at Port Elizabeth, an agent of the British gov’t, without Union Bridge’s consent, and its
subsequent sale.
Act of state organ. Harrison purported to act upon instructions given to him, and in doing so, he
committed 2 mistakes in as much as it 1) was neutral property; and 2) was intended for a road,
an not a railway bridge. The consignment of the material to Blomfontein was a wrongful
interference with neutral property, and it was within Harrison’s duty, as railway storekeeper, to
forward material by rail, and he did so under instructions which fix liability on the British gov’t.
This liability is not affected by the fact that this was done under a mistake, or that the British had
no intention to appropriate the material. Applicable ILC Draft article: Art. 4
Youmans Claim (US v. Mexico)

A mob killed 3 US nationals & Mexican police’s attempt to quell the mob, under the Mayor’s
instructions, led to the open firing upon the house & more killings.
Act of state organ; failure to protect aliens in territory. Mexico is liable for the acts of the soldiers
whether 1) outside the scope of their authority; or 2) done in a private capacity. Clearly, it is not
intended by the rule to say that no wrongful act of an official acting in the discharge of duties
entrusted to him can impose responsibility on a gov’t under IL because such wrongful act must
be considered to be “outside the scope of his competency.” If this were the meaning intended by
the rule, then no wrongful act committed by an official could ever be considered as acts for
which the gov’t could be held liable. The soldiers’ participation in the murder cannot be
considered as acts in their private capacity when it is clear that at the time of the commission of
these acts, the neb were on duty under the immediate supervision and in the presence of a
commanding officer. Duty: to exercise due diligence to protect the person and property of
aliens. Applicable ILC Draft articles: Arts. 4 & 7
Zafiro Claim (Great Britain v. US)

Claim WRT acts of a Chinese crew of the Zafiro, a private ship commissioned by the US
military, in looting houses in Cavite during the Spanish-US War of 1898; defense: soldiers on
shore leave.
Act of state organ. US is liable for the whole damage as the Chinese crew of Zafiro are shown
to have participated to a substantial extent, and the part chargeable to unknown wrongdoers
cannot be identified. But interest is not allowed because a considerable, though unascertainable
part of the damage is not chargeable to the Chinese crew of the Zafiro. There was no effective
control of the Chinese crew at the time when the real damage took place. The nature of the
crew, the absence of civil or military control ashore, and the situation of the neutral property,
were circumstances calling for diligence on the part of those in charge of the Chinese crew to
see to it that they were under control when they went ashore in a body. Applicable ILC Draft
article: Art. 4
Bolivar Railway Company Claim (Great Britain v. Venezuela)

Claims were brought by Bolivar arising out of the revolution in Venezuela that brought Castro to
power & against Castro himself, after his assumption to power.
Successful insurrectionists. Claims in respect of contractual obligations incurred by both the old
and new governments were allowed, but claims incurred by an unsuccessful revolution against
Castro were not allowed. If the personal responsibility of Castro were the question for decision,
it might be possible to hold him responsible for the claims incurred by the 2nd revolution as
growing out of the revolution he had led. However, such is not the ground on which successful
revolutions are charged, through the gov’t, with responsibility. Responsibility comes because it
is the same nation. Nations do not die when there is a change of government. These are but
expressions of a change of national will. The nation is responsible for the debts contracted by its
titular government until the obligation is discharged. The nation is responsible for the obligations
of a successful revolution from its beginning, because, it represented ab initio a changing
national will, crystallizing in the finally successful result—success demonstrated that from the
beginning it was registering the national will. App. ILC Draft article: Art. 10.
*Sir: Art. 10 is the codification of this case.
2004 edition
Neer Claim (US v. Mexico)

US claims damages for Mexico’s failure to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the murderer of
an American.
Standard of treatment of aliens in territory. The proprietary of governmental acts should be put
to the test of international standards, and that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an
international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or
to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency. Whether the
insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws
of the country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international standards is
immaterial.
Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran

Claimants contend that their property interests in the housing Project have been unlawfully
taken by the Government of Iran which has deprived them of the effective use, control and
benefits of their property by means of various actions authorizing, approving and ratifying acts
and conditions that prevented Starrett from completing the Project.
Expropriation Even Without Nationalization Law. The Court noted that the Government of Iran
did not issue any law or decree according to which the Zomorod Project or Shah Goli expressly
was nationalized or expropriated. However, it is recognized in international law that measures
taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the
State does not purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally
remains with the original owner.
Assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and immediately
justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus requiring
compensation under international law. In this case it cannot be disregarded that Starrett has
been requested to resume the Project. It has been proved that at least by the end of January
1980 the Government of Iran had interfered with the Claimants' property rights in the Project to
an extent that rendered these rights so useless that they must be deemed to have been taken.
Claimants rely on precedents in international law in which cases measures of expropriation or
taking, primarily aimed at physical property, have been deemed to comprise also rights of a
contractual nature closely related to the physical property. In this case it appears from the very
nature of the measures taken by the Government of Iran in January 1980 that these measures
were aimed at the taking of Shah Goli. The property interest taken by the Government of Iran
must be deemed to comprise the physical property as well as the right to manage the Project
and to complete the construction in accordance with the Basic Project Agreement and related
agreements, and to deliver the apartments and collect the proceeds of the sales as provided in
the Apartment Purchase Agreements.
*Sir: no need for direct taking, there may be a serious interference in property rights so as to
render them useless= creeping expropriation or constructive expropriation
> US v. Iran Tribunal: Art. 5 should not be strictly construed, even without a nationalization law.
Rankin v. Iran: US ex-pat left Iran & claims unearned wages. Basis of claim: failure to observe
due diligence in protecting property rights of aliens. He said that Iran supported the expulsion of
aliens, cancelled contracts & allowed general turmoil & disorder to propagate. He must prove
wrongful, arbitrary act (breach) & attribution. Court: no breach; the Revolutionary Guards were
not insurrectionists; no proof that the Guards coerced him to leave; he felt unsafe & freely
decided to leave; no compensation.
> Dr. Breger’s Case: no breach: given 6 months to leave; all aliens don’t have the right to stay, it
must be with the consent of the state.
> Amoco v. Iran: 30-year-long Khemco Agreement. Revolutionary Gov’t declared the agreement
null & void via 1980 Single Article Act for the nationalization of Iranian oil industry, gov’t took
over. Court: nationalization is not illegal per se but it is illegal if done to escape obligations
entered into by the state, & if there is no prompt & adequate compensation (includes lucrum
cessans).
>State organ
-which state must espouse before the ICJ?

Nottebohm case: claimant of Liechtenstein citizenship. Guatemala says that he is German so it
confiscated his property as prize of war (as an Ally). Liechtenstein says that there was a breach
since he is not German. Court: State with genuine link with him was Germany (born there;
applied for Liechtenstein citizenship—ordinarily requires residence for 3 years, but he asked for
dispensation of such without explanation; no permanent residence or business in Liechtenstein;
temporary visits only; has lived in Guatemala & wants to stay; hasty application for citizenship).
Liechtenstein can’t espouse.
5. VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
> “Treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation (Art. 2, Vienna Convention the Law
of Treaties [VCLOT]).
> International Organizations (IOs) cannot enter into treaties. Only states can enter into treaties
> Convention which allowed IOs to enter into treaties never took effect.=> states are still
unwilling to vest IOs with the power to enter into treaties.
> do not confuse IOs with the persons authorized to enter into treaties.
> Immunity of international organizations
IOs – an organization that is set up by treaty among two or other states. Thus, only states are
members of IOs (Advisory Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons). IOs have international
personality (Reparations case: international personality of the UN). In the case of other
organizations, the charter itself might specifically endow it with international personality. But if it
does not, it may be implied from the functions of the organization, as in the case of the UN. IOs’
powers and privileges are limited by the constituent instrument that created them (Advisory
Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons).
Immunities – basis is not sovereignty but the need for the effective exercise of their functions.
> Cases for definition of treaties: Abaya and Vibal

> Treaties:
1. unless there’s a specification that ratification is required, mere signature =
intent to be bound
2. principle of autonomy= binding only upon signatories/ parties
3. what agents must show to bind the state in a treaty: FULL POWERS
4. effect of signature authentication of text
5. heart of a treaty= pacta sunt servanda6 -Art. 26
6. Binding nature on parties: on whom:
General Rule: signatories only: principle of autonomy under domestic law
Exception:
a. Codifies customary norm – binds all, treaty restates it only, no signing needed.
b. Art. 35 – express acceptance (pacta tertiis: intended to be binding on third states
provided they accepted in writing)
c. Art. 36 – assent prescribed; pour autrui – grant rights to third states
7. When treaties are invalid:
a. lack of full powers
b. violation of jus cogens
c. new customary law/emergence of new norm
d. fraud and inducement
e. corruption
f. coercion
6Latin for "pacts must be respected." This means that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith.
g. error of fact of situation
8. Grounds for non-compliance:
1. Fundamental change [Art. 62, VCLOT]
2. new customary law in conflict (valid now invalid) (wars, now illegal - crime of aggression)
[Art. 64, VCLOT]
3. Fraud in inducement [Art. 49, VCLOT]
4. Coercion [on representative, Art. 51; by threat or use of force, Art. 52, VCLOT]
5. Error of Fact [Art. 48, VCLOT]
6. Supervening impossibility of performance [Art.61, VCLOT]
> exception to consensuality of states: peremptory norm of general IL or jus cogens 

customary norm that is non-derogable = all countries, WON they were injured, can sue
> Art. 62-rebus sic stantibus7 has never been formally invoked!
> Barcelona Traction Case: erga omnes obligation—remedial principle, allows all states to have
standing. On the other hand, jus cogens—substantive/normative principle
> if treaty requires ratification? Overt act required to be manifested, deposit instrument of
ratification with the body specified as depositary or to the UN Secretary General if none is
specified (Vienna Convention: in Bern, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs
> effect of non-deposit with UN SG? Can’t be enforced in any UN agency, including the ICJ.
Some Principles in the VCLOT:
ART. 11. Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty: The consent of a State to be bound by a
treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.
ART. 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force: A State is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.
ART. 26 Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith.
ART. 27 Internal law and observance of treaties: A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Art. 46.
ART. 31 General rule of interpretation: 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including
its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
7Latin for “things thus standing.” This is a doctrine in international treaty law that stands for the proposition that a treaty may
become inapplicable owing to a fundamental change of circumstances.
ART. 43 Obligations imposed by international law independently of a treaty: The invalidity, termination or
denunciation of a treaty, the withdrawal of a party from it, or the suspension of its operation, as a result of the
application of the present Convention or of the provisions of the treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any
State to fulfil any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under international law
independently of the treaty.
ART. 45 Loss of a right to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending
the operation of a treaty: A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from
or suspending the operation of a treaty under ARTs. 46 to 50 or ARTs. 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware of the
facts:
(a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in operation, as the
case may be; or
(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its
maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be.
ART. 53 Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens): A treaty is
void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Definition of “treaty”
Abaya v. Ebdane
Petition challenging the award of a road project to a Japanese firm.
Loan Agreement + Exchange Of Notes = Executive Agreement. The procurement process for
the implementation of the CP I project is governed by EO 40 and its IRR, not RA 9184. EO 40
expressly recognizes as an exception to its scope and application those government
commitments WRT bidding and award of contracts financed partly or wholly with funds from
international financing institutions as well as from bilateral and other similar foreign sources.
Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated Dec. 27,
1999 between the Japanese Government and the RP Government is an executive agreement.
The Exchange of Notes expressed that the two governments have reached an understanding
concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed
at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the
private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the
parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the
usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent.
The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.
The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy
procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval.
It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations,
memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international
instruments binding at international law." Both the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 1986
Vienna Convention do not distinguish between the different designations of these instruments.
Instead, their rules apply to all of those instruments as long as they meet the common
requirements.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments: treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchange of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" or
"protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements, whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise, begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.

*Sir: Test in IL: whether the act is sovereign or proprietary in character
Dbm v. Kolonwel Trading; Vibal v. Kolonwel; Deped v. Kolonwel (Abaya Ii)

Petition contesting award of World Bank-ADB book project for the DepEd to Vibal, et al. in spite
of earlier finding of conflict of interest. SC said that RTC lacked jurisdiction due to the failure to
comply with the protest mechanism: 1) the protest must be in writing, in the form of a verified
position paper; 2) the protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring entity; and 3) the
payment of a non-refundable protest fee. The protest mechanism is a built-in administrative
remedy embodied in the law itself. It was not prescribed by an administrative agency tasked
with implementing a statute through the medium of interpretative circulars or bulletins. There is
no reason why the policy behind Section 55.l on the procedure for protest cannot be applied to
foreign-funded procurement projects & RA 9184 doesn’t show that Congress intended such a
variance in the protest procedure.
The question as to WON foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions (Loan
No. 7118-PH) partake of an executive or international agreement within the purview of the Sec.
4 has been answered in the affirmative in Abaya, which declared that the RP-JBIC loan
agreement was to be of governing application over the project and that the JBIC Procurement
Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the procurement of
goods necessary to implement the main project. Under the fundamental international law
principle of pacta sunt servanda, embodied in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 9184, the Philippines, as
borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan No. 7118-
PH. Thus, the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord primacy to, the WB
Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the bidding/procurement process in question.
*Sir: Regarding the protest requirements under Sec 55:-this is not true! There was already an
award hence, no need to protest. RA 9184 not only prohibits but also penalizes conflict of
interest why? Coz it defeats the purpose of competitive bidding!
Definition of “ratification”
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Constitutionality of the Balikatan joint exercise by the US and RP military.
Binding Treaty. The holding of "Balikatan 02-1" must be studied in the framework of the treaty
antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT). It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it
seeks to reaffirm. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage
of years. But since the terminology used in the VFA is ambiguous, we refer to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing interpretations of
international agreements (Article 31 & 32): the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an
examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention
likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to
as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the
aforesaid context. On “activities,” SC has the view that it was deliberately made that way to give
both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in
Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may
include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation's marine
resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief
operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and
humanitarian missions, and the like. But they cannot engage in combat.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded way before the
present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international
obligation.
In Philip Morris v. CA, it was stated that “the fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national
law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation. “
[But SC said that[ A treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt
servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
SC cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the
saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, SC does not take cognizance of newspaper or
electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but
for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence.
The determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. The present subject matter is not
a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari.
*Sir: whatever you call it, treaty, exec agreement- does not matter it is still binding it’s all the
same
Bayan v. Zamora
Constitutionality of the VFA.
Valid Treaty Despite Treatment As Ea Only By The Other State. A treaty is defined under Article
2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as "an international instrument concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in 2 or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation."
Section 25, Article XVIII reads: "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except (1) under a
treaty (2) duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and (3)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State." Under this provision, it the VFA a treaty?
Yes, the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. US need not submit the VFA to the US Senate for
concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, because this is to accord too strict a meaning to the
phrase.
It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA merely as an executive agreement (EO)
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. In
international law, there is no difference between treaties and EOs in their binding effect upon
states, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. In any case,
the records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the
US government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US
acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under
the treaty, there is a compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
An EO is binding. Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading states that EOs are
binding even without concurrence of the Senate or Congress because “the right of the Executive
to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval

has been confirmed by long usage…The validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by our courts.”
Ratification is an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the
case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. It is equivalent to
final acceptance. The consent to be bound is expressed by ratification when:
[1] the treaty provides for such ratification,
[2] it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should
be required
[3] the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or
[4] the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full
powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.
The power to ratify is vested in the President and not in the legislature. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. The role of
the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character. The President acted
within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. Even if he erred in
submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under Section 21, instead of Section 25, still,
the President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an
abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
*Sir: issue: VFA-concurred in by our senate, but not by the US senate.

SC: VFA still binding on us/is still a binding treaty because it is not our business to dwell into the
domestic law of the other contracting party; we are satisfied with the Senator’s pronouncement
that the US will recognize it.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

Mandamus petition to compel transmittal to the Senate the signed copy of the Rome Statute of
the Int’l Criminal Court (being held the DFA) for ratification, claiming that Senate has the power
to ratify & the RP has a ministerial duty to ratify the treaty since we signed it already.
Ratification Is Executive; Can’t Compel Transmittal. SC: no to both. Isagani Cruz on the treaty-
making process:
1. Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this
task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials
known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed
treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent
negotiations.
2. Signing is the step primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for
the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, it does not indicate the final
consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The document is
ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is
allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
3. Ratification which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts
the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to
enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests
4. Exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the
treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is
dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed
effective upon its signature.

The DFA signing is not equal to ratification. The signature does not signify the final consent of
the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact,
the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the
provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty
signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
Philippine representative WON to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that
were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held
that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its
plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the
refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is
a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by SC via a writ of mandamus. SC has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.
*Sir: ratification is compliance with the process to make it binding: 1) signing of senate; 2)
concurrence of senate
> Senate concurrence: what triggers it? Transmittal by Executive, not a ministerial act. But after
signing, bound not to defeat the spirit of the treaty & comply with requirement of ratification—
transmittal to Senate.
Issue on procedure: EO 459, Sec. 7: “shall” (no discretion on submission for concurrence).
Salonga Petition
Challenge to RTC order transferring Daniel Smith from the Makati City Jail to US custody under
an agreement based on the VFA. Issues:
(1) WON the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) applies to the VFA - there is no room for application
of the MDT in the VFA as there is no external armed attack on the Philippines to speak of.
(2) whether the word visit means what it says, as applied in light of the understanding and the
assurances made during the ratification by the Senate of the VFA and, more importantly, in the
context of current practices of the US armed forces - it is incumbent upon this Court to inquire
as to the actual length of time US military personnel stay in the Philippines, especially those in
Mindanao, under the guise of a visit pursuant to the VFA - US military personnel are in the
Philippines the whole year round, without any geographical and time limitations. Such presence
could not, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as temporary visits.
Grounds
1. MDT does not apply to the VFA/ contrary to the clear intent of the VFA, US military forces do
not merely visit the Philippines but stay on indefinitely – see issue 1
2. GADALEJ in entering into patently unconstitutional agreements with US Ambassador and
transferring custody over Smith the US Authorities, considering that:
a. VFA derogates and infringes on the exclusive power of the SC to promulgate rules of
procedure (Art. VIII Sec. 5 par. 5 1987 Constitution)
b. VFA violates petitioners’ rights to due process and equal protection – on custody of
Smith
3. VFA is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 25 Art. XVIII of the Constitution. It cannot be used
to justify the transfer of custody of Smith.
4. CA’s GADALEJ in recognizing the agreement between US Ambassador and Sec. Romulo
as binding on the Philippines and declaring the Smith petition moot – see Constitutional
requirements cited in Bayan v, Zamora WRT Art. XVIII, Section 25.

5. Public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they transferred custody of Smith
to US authorities without court authority.
Reservations To The Convention On The Prevention & Punishment Of The Crime Of

Genocide
A State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or
more of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the
Convention if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention;
otherwise, that State cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention. If a party to the
Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is not a party to the
Convention; if, on the other hand, a party accept the reservation as being compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is a party
to the Convention. An objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet
ratified the Convention can have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon
ratification. Until that moment it merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual
attitude of the signatory State; an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to
sign or accede but which has not yet done so is without legal effect.
*Sir: you can make reservations on provisions as long as they are not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention hence, no reservation on the norm
Nicaragua v. US
US contested jurisdiction since Nicaragua allegedly had not yet ratified the instruments relating
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ.
Valid declaration of intent to ratify. The Court notes that the Nicaraguan declaration was valid at
the time when the question of the applicability of the new Statute, that of the ICJ, arose, since
under the system of the PCIJ a declaration was valid only on condition that it had been made by
a State which had signed the Protocol of Signature of the Statute. It had not become binding
under that Statute, since Nicaragua had not deposited its instrument of ratification and it was
therefore not a party to the Statute. However, it is not disputed that the 1929 declaration could
have acquired binding force. All that Nicaragua need have done was to deposit its instrument of
ratification, and it could have done that at any time until the day on which the new Court came
into existence. It follows that the declaration had a certain potential effect which could be
maintained for many years. Having been made "unconditionally" and being valid for an unlimited
period, it had retained its potential effect at the moment when Nicaragua became a party to the
Statute of the new Court. The Court considers that, having regard to the source and generality
of statements to the effect that Nicaragua was bound by its 1929 declaration, it is right to
conclude that the constant acquiescence of that State in those affirmations constitutes a valid
mode of manifestation of its intent to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It further
considers that the estoppel on which the US has relied and which would have barred Nicaragua
from instituting proceedings against it, cannot be said to apply to it.
*Sir: Treaty-making Process:

1. Preliminaries
2. Negotiations
3. Signing
4. Ratification
-if ratification is not required, signing enough; if ratification is required, signing is only for
authentication of the document and there arises another obligation: duty not to do anything to
defeat the purpose of the treaty prior to ratification.
-state agent must have authority to negotiate: full powers, lack thereof makes it void ab initio.

6. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS AND OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS
*Sir:
Diplomatic Immunities:
1. Ambassadors, consuls, etc full immunities
2. Spouses and kids
3. Diplomatic staff functional immunities
4. Household staff
Diplomatic immunity applies only:
1. To the accredited state
2. While in transit to & from the accredited state & the sending state/diplomatic station
-does not apply when he is on vacation!
Bernas:
> Act of State Doctrine – arose from a series of cases in the US where the issue was whether
US courts could consider the validity of acts of a foreign state alleged to be in violation of
international law.
> Diplomatic immunities – WRT political relations of states; codification of the law is the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).
Diplomatic relations are purely by mutual consent. Before the head of mission is sent to the
receiving state (RS), an agrement must first be obtained. RS is under no obligation to give
reasons for refusing an agrement (Art. 4).
Art. 1: which diplomatic representatives enjoy immunities; degrees.
Art: 3: functions of the diplomatic mission.
Art. 9: persona non grata.
Art. 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39: rights and privileges of the
diplomatic mission.
Art. 41: duty to respect laws of receiving state.
Art. 42: prohibition on professional or commercial practice for personal profit in the RS.
> Consuls and consular immunities - Consuls attend to administrative and economic issues
such as the issuance of visas; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967).
The head of a consular post is admitted to the exercise of his functions by an authorization from
the RS termed an exequatur. There is no prescribed form. RS may at any time notify the
sending state (SS) that the consular officer is persona non grata or that any other member of
the consular staff is not acceptable. SS shall either recall or terminate his functions with the
consular post.
Art. 5: Consular functions
Art. 27, 31, 33: RS must protect the consular premises, archives and interests of the SS.
Art. 34: freedom of movement
Art. 35: freedom of communication
Art. 36: communication and contact with nationals of the sending state
Art. 41: personal inviolability of consular officers
Art. 42: notification of arrest, detention or prosecution
Art. 43: immunity from jurisdiction
Art. 44: liability to give evidence
Art. 45: waiver of privileges and immunities

Vienna Conventions
Diplomatic Relations Consular Relations
Function Art. 3 Art. 5
s 1.representing sending State (a) protecting interests of SS, its nationals, both
(SS) in receiving State (RS); individuals & bodies corporate
2. protecting in RS the (b) furthering dev’t of commercial, economic, cultural &
interests of the SS & its scientific relations & promoting friendly relations
nationals, between SS & RS
3. negotiating with RS’(c) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions & dev’ts
Government, in RS’ commercial, economic, cultural & scientific life,
4. ascertaining by all lawful reporting to SS & giving info to persons interested;
means conditions & dev’ts in (d) issuing passports & travel documents to SS
RS, & reporting to the Gov’t of nationals & visas or documents to persons wishing to
the SS; (HLR: espionage; travel to SS;
allowed if not made available (e) helping & assisting nationals of SS;
elsewhere), (f) acting as notary, civil registrar, in similar capacities,
5. promoting friendly relations & performing certain functions of an administrative
between the SS & the RS, & nature, not contrary to RS laws
developing their economic, (g) safeguarding interests of SS nationals in
cultural & scientific relations. succession mortis causa in RS, per laws of RS
2. Nothing here shall be (h) safeguarding, per RS laws, interests of minors &
construed as preventing the persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of SS
performance of consular(i) per RS procedure, representing or arranging
functions by a diplomatic representation for SS nationals before RS tribunals &
mission. authorities, to get provisional measures for
preservation of rights & interests of absent nationals
(j) transmitting judicial & extrajudicial documents or
executing letters rogatory or commissions to take
evidence for SS courts
(k) exercising rights of supervision & inspection per
laws of SS in respect of SS’ vessels & aircraft & crew
(l) extending assistance to vessels & aircraft in (k) & to
their crews, taking statements regarding the voyage,
examining & stamping the ship's papers, &, without
prejudice to the powers of RS authorities, conducting
investigations into any incidents during the voyage, &
settling disputes of any kind between the master,
officers & seamen per SS laws
(m) performing functions entrusted to a consular post
by SS, not prohibited by RS laws or not objected to by
RS in the agreement
Classes Art. 14 Art. 9
of Heads 1. Heads of mission are 1. Heads of consular posts are divided into 4 classes:
divided into 3 classes: (a) consuls-general;
1. ambassadors or nuncios (b) consuls;
accredited to Heads of (c) vice-consuls;
State, & other heads of (d) consular agents.
mission of equivalent rank; 2. Par. 1 of this Art. in no way restricts the right of any
2. envoys, ministers & of the Contracting Parties to fix the designation of
internuncios accredited to consular officers other than the heads of consular
Heads of State; posts.
3. charges d'affaires
accredited to Ministers for
Foreign Affairs.
2. Except as concerns
precedence & etiquette, there
shall be no differentiation
between heads of mission by
reason of their class.
Preceden Art. 16 Art. 16
ce as to 1. Heads of mission shall take 1. Heads of consular posts shall rank in each class
Heads precedence in their respective according to the date of the grant of the exequatur.
classes in the order of the date 2. If the head, before obtaining the exequatur
and time of taking up their is admitted to the exercise of his functions
functions in accordance with provisionally, his precedence shall be determined
Article 13. according to the date of the provisional admission; this
2. Alterations in the credentials precedence shall be maintained after the granting of
of a head of mission not the exequatur.
involving any change of class 3. Order of precedence as between 2 or more heads
shall not affect his who obtained the exequatur or provisional admission
precedence. on the same date shall be determined per the dates on
3. This article is without which their commissions or similar instruments or the
prejudice to any practice notifications referred to in par. 3 of Art. 11 were
accepted by the RS regarding presented to RS.
the precedence of the 4. Acting heads of posts shall rank after all heads &,
representative of the Holy See. as between themselves, rank according to the dates
they assumed functions as acting heads per in the
notifications given under par. 2 of Art. 15.
5. Honorary consular officers who are heads shall rank
in each class after career heads, in the order & per
rules laid down in the foregoing paragraphs.
6. Heads shall have precedence over consular officers
not having that status.
Multiple Art. 5 Art. 18
Posts 1. SS may, after it has given Two or more States may, with the consent of RS,
due notification to RSs appoint the same person as a consular officer in that
concerned, accredit a head of State.
mission or assign any member
of the diplomatic staff to more
than 1 State, unless there is
express objection by any of
the RSs.
2. If SS accredits a head of
mission to 1 or more other
States it may establish a
diplomatic mission headed by
a charge d'affaires ad interim
in each State where the head
of mission has not his
permanent seat.
3. A head of mission or any
member of the diplomatic staff
of the mission may act as
representative of the SS to any
IO.
Art. 6
Two or more States may
accredit the same person as
head of mission to another
State, unless objection is
offered by the RS.
Temporar Art. 19 Art. 15
y head 1. If the post of head of the 1. If the head of a consular post is unable to carry out
mission is vacant, or if the his functions or the position of head of consular post is
head of the mission is unable vacant, an acting head of post may act provisionally as
to perform his functions, a head of the consular post.
charge d'affaires ad interim 2. The full name of the acting head of post shall be
shall act provisionally as headnotified either by the diplomatic mission of the SS or, if
of the mission. The name of that State has no such mission in the RS, by the head
the charge d'affaires ad interim
of the consular post, or, if he is unable to do so, by any
shall be notified, either by the
competent authority of the SS, to the Ministry for
head of the mission or, in caseForeign Affairs of the RS or to the authority designated
he is unable to do so, by the by that Ministry. As a general rule, this notification shall
Ministry for Foreign Affairs ofbe given in advance. RS may make the admission as
the SS to the Ministry for acting head of post of a person who is neither a
Foreign Affairs of the RS or diplomatic agent nor a consular officer of the SS in the
such other ministry as may be RS conditional on its consent.
agreed. 3. The competent authorities of the RS shall afford
2. In cases where no member assistance
of the diplomatic staff of the and protection to the acting head of post. While he is in
mission is present in the charge of the post, the provisions of the present
receiving State, a member of Convention shall apply to him on the same basis as to
the administrative and
the head of the consular post concerned. RS shall not,
technical staff may, with the however, be obliged to grant to an acting head of post
consent of the RS, be any facility, privilege or immunity which the head of the
designated by the SS to be in consular post enjoys only subject to conditions not
charge of the current
fulfilled by the acting head of post.
administrative affairs of the 4. When, in the circumstances referred to in paragraph
mission. 1 of this Article, a member of the diplomatic staff of the
diplomatic mission of the SS in the RS is designated
by the SS as an
acting head of post, he shall, if the RS does not object
thereto, continue to enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunities.
Persona Art. 9 Art. 23
non grata 1. RS may at any time & 1. RS may at any time notify SS that a consular officer
without having to explain its is persona non grata or that any other member of the
decision, notify SS that the consular staff is not acceptable. SS shall either recall
head of the mission or any the person or terminate his functions with the consular
member of the diplomatic staff post.
of the mission is persona non 2. If SS refuses or fails within a reasonable time to
grata or that any other carry
member of the staff of the out its obligations under par., RS may either withdraw
mission is not acceptable. SS the exequatur from the person or cease to consider
shall either recall the person or him as a member of the consular staff.
terminate his functions with the 3. A person appointed as a member of a consular post
mission. A person may be may be declared unacceptable before arriving in the
declared non grata or not territory of RS or, if already in RS, before entering on
acceptable before arriving in his duties with the
RS’ territory. consular post. SS shall withdraw his appointment.
2. If SS refuses or fails within a 4. In cases in pars. 1 & 3 of this Article, RS is not
reasonable period to carry out obliged to give to SS reasons for its decision.
its obligations under par. 1, RS
may refuse to recognize the
person as a member of the
mission.
Exemptio Art. 36 Art. 50

n from 1. RS shall permit entry of & 1. RS shall permit entry of & grant exemption from all
duties & grant exemption from all customs
customs customs duties, taxes, and duties, taxes, & related charges other than charges for
related charges other than storage, cartage & similar services, on:
charges for storage, cartage (a) articles for the official use of the consular post;
and similar services, on: (b) articles for the personal use of a consular officer
1. articles for the official use or members of his family forming part of his household,
of the mission; including articles intended for his establishment. The
2. articles for the personal articles intended for consumption shall not exceed the
use of a diplomatic agent or quantities necessary for direct utilization by the
members of his family forming persons concerned.
part of his household, 2. Consular employees shall enjoy the privileges &
including articles intended for exemptions specified in paragraph 1 of this Article in
his establishment. respect of articles imported at the time of first
2. The personal baggage of a installation.
diplomatic agent shall be 3. Personal baggage accompanying consular officers
exempt from inspection, & members of their families forming part of their
unless there are serious households shall be exempt from inspection. It may be
grounds for presuming that it inspected only if there is serious reason to believe that
contains articles not covered it contains articles other than those referred to in sub-
by the exemptions mentioned paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, or articles
in paragraph 1 of this Article, the import or export of which is
or articles the import or export prohibited by the laws and regulations of the RS or
of which is prohibited by the which are
law or controlled by the subject to its quarantine laws and regulations. Such
quarantine regulations of the inspection shall be carried out in the presence of the
RS. Such inspection shall be consular officer or member of his family concerned.
conducted only in the
presence of the diplomatic
agent or of his authorized
representative.
Tax Art. 34 Art. 49
exemptio A diplomatic agent shall be 1. Consular officers and consular employees and
n exempt from all dues & taxes, members of their families forming part of their
personal or real, national, households shall be exempt from all dues and taxes,
regional or municipal, except: personal or real, national, regional or municipal,
1. indirect taxes of a kind except:
which are normally (a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally
incorporated in the price of incorporated in the price of goods or services;
goods or services; (b) dues or taxes on private immovable property
2. dues & taxes on private situated in the territory of RS, subject to the provisions
immovable property in RS of Article 32;
territory, unless he holds it on (c) estate, succession or inheritance duties, and duties
behalf of the SS for the on transfers, levied by the RS, subject to the
purposes of the mission; provisions of paragraph (b) of Article 51;
3. estate, succession or (d) dues and taxes on private income, including capital
inheritance duties levied by the gains, having its source in the RS and capital taxes
RS, subject to par. 4 of Article relating to investments made in commercial or
39; financial undertakings RS;
4. dues & taxes on private (e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
income having its source in the (f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues
RS & capital taxes on and stamp duties, subject to the provisions of Article
investments made in 32.
commercial undertakings in 2. Members of the service staff shall be exempt from
the RS; dues and taxes on the wages which they receive for
5. charges levied for specific their services.
services rendered; 3. Members of the consular post who employ persons
6. registration, court or record whose wages or salaries are not exempt from income
fees, mortgage dues and tax in the RS shall observe the obligations which the
stamp duty, WRT immovable laws and regulations of that State impose upon
property, subject to the employers concerning the levying of income tax.
provisions of Article 23.
Art. 23
1. SS & the head of the
mission shall be exempt from
all national, regional or
municipal dues & taxes in
respect of the premises of the
mission, whether owned or
leased, other than such as
represent payment for specific
services rendered.
2. This exemption shall not
apply to such dues & taxes
payable under RS law by
persons contracting with SS or
the head of the mission.
Use of Art. 20 Article 29
SS’ flag & The mission and its head shall1. The SS shall have the right to the use of its national
emblem have the right to use the flagflag & coat-of-arms in the RS per provisions of this
and emblem of the sending Article.
State on the premises of the 2. The national flag of the SS may be flown & its coat-
mission, including theof-arms displayed on the building occupied by the
residence of the head of the consular post & at the entrance door thereof, on the
mission, and on his means of residence of the head of the consular post & on his
transport. means of transport when used on official business.
3. In the exercise of this right, regard shall be had to
the laws, regulations and usages of the RS.
Inviolabili Art. 22 Art. 31
ty of 1. Premises of the mission 1. Consular premises shall be inviolable to extent
premises shall be inviolable. The agents herein provided.
of the RS may not enter them, 2. RS authorities shall not enter that part of the
except with the consent of the consular premises which is used exclusively for the
head of the mission. purpose of the work of the consular post except with
2. RS is under a special duty the consent of the head of the consular post or of his
to take all appropriate steps to designee or of the head of the diplomatic mission.
protect the premises of the Such consent may be assumed in case of fire or other
mission against any intrusion disaster requiring prompt protective action.
or damage and to prevent any 3. Subject to par, 2 of this Article, RS is under a
disturbance of the peace of the special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the
mission or impairment of its consular premises against any intrusion or damage
dignity. and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the
3. Premises of the mission, consular post or impairment of its dignity.
furnishings & other property 4. Consular premises, furnishings, property of the
thereon & the means of consular post & its means of transport shall be immune
transport of the mission shall from any form of requisition for purposes of national
be immune from search, defence or public utility. If expropriation is necessary
requisition, attachment or for such purposes, all possible steps shall be taken to
execution. avoid impeding performance of consular functions, &
prompt, adequate & effective compensation shall be
Art. 30 paid to the SS.
1. Private residence of a
diplomatic agent shall enjoy
the same inviolability &
protection as the premises of
the mission.
2. His papers, correspondence
&, except as in par. 3 of Art.
31, property, shall also enjoy
inviolability.
End of Art. 43 Art. 25
function The function of a diplomatic The functions of a member of a consular post shall
agent comes to an end, inter come to an end inter alia:
alia: (a) on notification by SS to RS that his functions have
1. on notification by SS to RS come to an end;
that the function of the (b) on withdrawal of the exequatur;
diplomatic agent has come to (c) on notification by RS to SS that the RS has ceased
an end; to consider him as a member of the consular staff.
2. on notification by RS to SS
that, in accordance with par. 2
of Article 9, it refuses to
recognize the diplomatic agent
as a member of the mission.
Tax Art. 28 Art. 39
exemptio The fees and charges levied 1. The consular post may levy in RS territory the fees
n of fees by the mission in the course of & charges provided by SS laws for consular acts.
& its official duties shall be 2. The sums collected in the form of the fees &
charges exempt from all dues and charges in par. 1 of this Article, & the receipts for such
taxes. fees & charges, shall be exempt from all dues & taxes
in the RS.
Inviolabili Art. 29 Art. 40
ty of The person of a diplomatic RS shall treat consular officers with due respect &
agent/offi agent shall be inviolable. He shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack
cer shall not be liable to any form on their person, freedom or dignity.
of arrest or detention. The
receiving State shall treat him Art. 41
with due respect and shall take 1. Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or
all appropriate steps to prevent detention pending trial, except in the case of a grave
any attack on his person, crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent
freedom or dignity. judicial authority.
2. Except in the case specified in par. 1 of this Article,
consular
officers shall not be committed to prison or liable to
any other form of restriction on their personal freedom
save in execution of a judicial decision of final effect.
3. If criminal proceedings are instituted against a
consular officer, he must appear before the competent
authorities. Nevertheless, the proceedings shall be
conducted with the respect due to him by reason of his
official position &, except in the case specified in par. 1
of this Article, in a manner which will hamper the
exercise of consular functions as little as possible.
When, in the circumstances in par. 1 of this Article, it
has become necessary to detain a consular officer, the
proceedings against him shall be instituted with the
minimum of delay.
Art. 42
In the event of the arrest or detention, pending trial, of
a member of the consular staff, or of criminal
proceedings being instituted against him, RS shall
promptly notify the head of the consular post. Should
the latter be himself the object of such measure, RS
shall notify SS through the diplomatic channel.
Immunity Art. 31 Art. 43
from 1. A diplomatic agent shall 1. Consular officers & consular employees shall not be
jurisdicti enjoy immunity from the amenable to the jurisdiction of the judicial or
on; criminal jurisdiction of RS. He administrative authorities of RS in respect of acts
exception shall also enjoy immunity from performed in the exercise of consular functions.
s its civil and administrative 2. The provisions of par. 1 of this Article shall not,
jurisdiction, except in the case however, apply in respect of a civil action either:
of: (a) arising out of a contract concluded by a consular
1. a real action relating to officer or a consular employee in which he did not
private immovable property contract expressly or impliedly as an agent of the
situated in RS territory, unless sending State; or
he holds it on behalf of SS for (b) by a third party for damage arising from an accident
purposes of the mission; in RS caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft.
2. an action relating to
succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir or
legatee as a private person &
not on behalf of SS;
3. an action relating to any
professional or commercial
activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in RS outside
his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not
obliged to give evidence as a
witness.
3. No measures of execution
may be taken in respect of a
diplomatic agent except in the
cases under herein sub-par.s
(a), (b) & (c) of par. 1, &
provided that such measures
can be taken without infringing
the inviolability of his person or
residence.
4. Such immunity from RS
jurisdiction does not exempt
him from SS jurisdiction.
Waiver of Art. 32 Art. 45
immunity 1. The immunity from 1. SS may waive, WRT a member of the consular post,
jurisdiction of diplomatic any of the privileges & immunities provided for in Arts.
agents & of persons enjoying 41, 43 & 44.
immunity under Article 37 may 2. The waiver shall in all cases be express, except as
be waived by SS. in par. 3 of this Article, & shall be communicated to RS
2. Waiver must always be in writing.
express. 3. The initiation of proceedings by a consular officer or
3. Initiation of proceedings by a consular employee in a matter where he might enjoy
a diplomatic agent or by a immunity from jurisdiction under Article 43 shall
person enjoying immunity from preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction
jurisdiction under Article 37 in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with
shall preclude him from the principal claim.
invoking immunity from 4. The waiver of immunity from jurisdiction for the
jurisdiction in respect of any purposes of civil or administrative proceedings shall
counter-claim directly not be deemed to imply the waiver of immunity from
connected with the principal the measures of execution resulting from the judicial
claim. decision; in respect of such measures, a separate
4. Waiver of immunity from waiver shall be necessary.
jurisdiction in respect of civil or
administrative proceedings
shall not be held to imply
waiver of immunity in respect
of the execution of the
judgment, for which a separate
waiver shall be necessary.
Start & Art. 39 Art. 53
end of 1. Every person entitled to 1. Every member of the consular post shall enjoy
immunitie privileges & immunities shall herein privileges & immunities from the moment he
s & enjoy them from the moment enters RS territory on proceeding to take up his post
privileges he enters RS territory on or, if already in its territory, from the moment when he
proceeding to take up his post enters on his duties with the consular post.
or, if already in its territory, 2. Members of the family of a member of the consular
from the moment when his post forming part of his household & members of his
appointment is notified to the private staff shall receive the privileges & immunities
Ministry for Foreign Affairs or from the date from which he enjoys privileges &
such other ministry as may be immunities per par. 1 of this Article or from the date of
agreed. their entry into RS territory or from the date of their
2. When the functions of a becoming a member of such family or private staff,
person enjoying privileges & whichever is the latest.
immunities have come to an 3. When the functions of a member of the consular
end, such privileges & post have come to an end, his, his family’s, his private
immunities shall normally staff’s privileges & shall normally cease at the moment
cease at the moment when he when the person concerned leaves RS or on the expiry
leaves the country, or on of a reasonable period in which to do so, whichever is
expiry of a reasonable period the sooner, but shall subsist until that time, even in
in which to do so, but shall case of armed conflict. In the case of the persons in
subsist until that time, even in par. 2 of this Article, privileges & immunities shall
case of armed conflict. But, come to an end when they cease to belong to the
WRT acts performed by such household or to be in the service of a member of the
a person in the exercise of his consular post, provided, that if such persons intend
functions as a member of the leaving RS within a reasonable period thereafter, their
mission, immunity shall privileges & immunities shall subsist until the time of
continue to subsist. their departure.
3. In case of the death of a 4. But, WRT acts performed by a consular officer or a
member of the mission, the consular employee in the exercise of his functions,
members of his family shall immunity from jurisdiction shall continue to subsist
continue to enjoy the privileges without limitation of time.
& immunities to which they are 5. In the event of the death of a member of the
entitled until the expiry of a consular post, the members of his family forming part
reasonable period in which to of his household shall continue to enjoy the privileges
leave the country. & immunities accorded to them until they leave RS or
4. In the event of the death of until the expiry of a reasonable period enabling them to
a member of the mission not a do so, whichever is the sooner.
national of or permanently
resident in RS or a member of
his family forming part of his
household, RS shall permit the
withdrawal of the movable
property of the deceased,
except any property acquired
in the country the export of
which was prohibited at the
time of his death. Estate,
succession & inheritance
duties shall not be levied on
movable property the
presence of which in RS was
due solely to the presence
there of the deceased as a
member of the mission or as a
member of the family of a
member of the mission.
Respect Art. 41 Art. 55
for RS 1. Without prejudice to their 1. Without prejudice to their privileges & immunities, it
laws privileges & immunities, it is is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges &
the duty of all persons immunities to respect the laws & regulations of RS.
enjoying such privileges & They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal
immunities to respect RS laws. affairs of that State.
They have a duty not to 2. The consular premises shall not be used in any
interfere in the internal affairs manner incompatible with the exercise of consular
of that State. functions.
2. All official business with RS 3. Par. 2 of this Article shall not exclude the possibility
entrusted to the mission by SS of offices of other institutions or agencies being
shall be conducted with or installed in
through the Ministry for part of the building in which the consular premises are
Foreign Affairs of RS or such situated, provided that the premises assigned to them
other ministry as may be are separate from those used by the consular post. In
agreed. that event, the said offices shall not be considered to
3. Premises of the mission form part of the consular premises.
must not be used in any
manner incompatible with
functions of the mission per
the Convention, rules of
general IL or special
agreements between the SS &
RS.
No profit Art. 42 Art. 57
A diplomatic agent shall not in 1. Career consular officers shall not carry on for
RS practice for personal profit personal profit any professional or commercial activity
any professional or in RS.
commercial activity. 2. Privileges & immunities shall not be accorded:
(a) to consular employees or to members of the
service staff who carry on any private gainful
occupation in RS;
(b) to members of the family of a person referred to in
sub-par. (a)
of this paragraph or to members of his private staff;
(c) to members of the family of a member of a consular
post who
themselves carry on any private gainful occupation in
RS.
Armed Art. 44 Art. 26
conflict RS must, even in case of RS shall, even in case of armed conflict, grant to
armed conflict, grant facilities members of the consular post & members of the
in order to enable persons private staff, other than RS nationals, & to members of
enjoying privileges & their families forming part of their households
immunities, other than RS irrespective of nationality, necessary time & facilities to
nationals, & members of the enable them to prepare their departure & to leave at
families of such persons the earliest possible moment after the termination of
irrespective of their nationality, the functions of the members. It shall, if needed, place
to leave at the earliest possible at their disposal necessary means of transport for
moment. It must, if needed, themselves & their property other than property
place at their disposal acquired in RS the export of which is prohibited at the
necessary means of transport time of departure.
for themselves & their
property.
End of Art. 45 Art. 27

relations If diplomatic relations are 1. In the event of the severance of consular relations
broken off between 2 States, between 2 States:
or if a mission is permanently (a) RS shall, even in case of armed conflict, respect &
or temporarily recalled: protect the consular premises, together with the
1. RS must, even in case of property of the consular post & the consular archives;
armed conflict, respect & (b) SS may entrust the custody of the consular
protect the premises of the premises, with the property contained therein & the
mission, with its property & consular archives, to a third State acceptable to RS;
archives; (c) SS may entrust the protection of its interests & of
2. SS may entrust the custody its nationals to a third State acceptable to RS.
of the premises of the mission, 2. In the event of the temporary or permanent closure
with its property & archives, to of a consular post, sub-par. (a) of herein par. 1 shall
a third State acceptable to RS; apply. In addition,
3. SS may entrust the (a) if SS, although not represented in RS by a
protection of its interests & of diplomatic mission, has another consular post in the
its nationals to a third State territory of that State, that consular post may be
acceptable to RS. entrusted with the custody of the premises of the
consular post which has been closed, with the property
contained therein & the consular archives, &, with the
consent of RS, with the exercise of consular functions
in the district of that consular post; or
(b) if SS has no diplomatic mission & no other
consular post in RS, sub-pars/ (b) & (c) of par. 1 of this
Article shall apply.
Agent/offi Art. 38 Art. 71
cer who 1. Except insofar as additional 1. Except in so far as additional facilities, privileges &
is a RS privileges & immunities may immunities may be granted by RS, consular officers
national/ be granted by RS, a diplomatic who are nationals of or permanently resident in RS
permane agent who is a national of or shall enjoy only immunity from jurisdiction & personal
nt permanently resident in RS inviolability in respect of official acts performed in the
resident shall enjoy only immunity from exercise of their functions, & the privilege in par. 3 of
jurisdiction, & inviolability, in Article 44. So far as these consular officers are
respect of official acts concerned, RS shall also be bound by the obligation
performed in the exercise of laid down in Article 42. If criminal proceedings are
his functions. instituted against such a consular officer, the
2. Other members of the staff proceedings shall, except when he is under arrest or
of the mission & private detention, be conducted in a manner which will
servants who are nationals of hamper the exercise of
or permanently resident in RS consular functions as little as possible.
shall enjoy privileges & 2. Other members of the consular post who are
immunities only to the extent nationals of or permanently resident in RS & members
admitted by RS. However, RS of their families, &
must exercise its jurisdiction members of the families of consular officers in par. 1 of
over those persons so as not this Article, shall enjoy facilities, privileges &
to interfere unduly with the immunities only in so far as these are granted to them
performance of the functions by RS. Those members of
of the mission. the families of members of the consular post & those
members of the private staff who are themselves
nationals of or permanently resident in RS shall
likewise enjoy facilities, privileges & immunities only in
so far as these are granted to them by RS. RS shall
exercise its jurisdiction over those
persons in such a way as not to hinder unduly the
performance of the functions of the consular post.
Commonalities – Diplomatic Relations; Consular Relations

Articles 1: Definitions
Establishment by mutual consent:
“Art. 2. The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, & of permanent diplomatic
missions, takes place by mutual consent.”
“Art. 4.
1. A consular post may be established in the territory of the RS only with that State's consent.
2. The seat of the consular post, its classification and the consular district shall be established
by the SS and shall be subject to the approval of the RS.
3. Subsequent changes in the seat of the consular post, its classification or the consular district
may be made by the SS only with the consent of the RS.
4. The consent of the RS shall also be required if a consulate-general or a consulate desires to
open a vice-consulate or a consular agency in a locality other than that in which it is itself
established.
5. The prior express consent of the RS shall also be required for the opening of an office
forming part of an existing consular post elsewhere than at the seat thereof.
Size of Mission; Consular Staff: DR - Art. 11; CR - Art. 20: subject to agreement, RS may
require that the size of a mission be kept within limits considered by it to be reasonable &
normal, having regard to circumstances & conditions in RS & to the needs of the particular
mission, & RS may equally, within similar bounds & on a nondiscriminatory basis, refuse to
accept officials of a particular category.
Nationality of members of diplomatic staff of mission (Art. 8); of consular officers (Art. 22):
should in principle be of the nationality of SS. They may not be appointed from among persons
having the nationality of RS, except with the consent of that State which may be withdrawn at
any time. RS may reserve the same right WRT nationals of a third State who are not also
nationals of SS.”
Establishment of mission (Art. 12); or consular post (Art. 6): must be with consent of the RS
(which may allow consular officer to exercise functions outside his post).
Notification as to members of mission, family of a member of mission, private servants (Art.

10); as to members of consular posts, family member forming part of his household, private staff
(Art. 24. 1[a-d] & 2):
“1. RS Ministry for Foreign Affairs, or other ministry as may be agreed, shall be notified of:
1. appointment of _________, arrival & final departure or termination of functions with the
mission;
2. arrival & final departure of a person belonging to the __________ &, where appropriate,
fact that a person becomes or ceases to be a member of the family of a member of the
mission;
3. arrival & final departure of ________ of persons in par. (a) of this paragraph &, where
appropriate, fact that they are leaving such employ;
4. engagement & discharge of persons resident in RS as members ______ or private
servants [staff] entitled to privileges & immunities.
2. Where possible, prior notification of arrival & final departure shall also be given.”
Assistance/accommodation in getting facilities of the mission (Art. 21); of the consular post
(Art. 30): RS shall either facilitate acquisition on its territory by SS of premises necessary for
_____ or assist the latter in obtaining some other accommodation, including those for its
members.
Inviolability of archives & documents of mission (Art. 24); consular post (Art. 33): at any time,
wherever they are
Full facilities…of the mission (Art. 25); consular post (Art. 28): RS shall accord full facilities for
the performance of the functions of the _________.
Freedom of movement of members of the mission (Art. 26); consular post (Art. 34):

“Subject to its laws and regulations concerning zones entry into which is prohibited or regulated
for reasons of national security, the RS shall ensure freedom of movement & travel in its
territory to all members of the ______.”
Freedom of communication of the…mission (Art. 27); consular post (Art. 35):

“1. RS shall permit & protect freedom of communication on the part of the mission [consular
post] for all official purposes. In communicating with the Government, the diplomatic missions &
other consulates [consular posts], wherever situated, of the sending State, the mission [consular
post] may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic [or consular couriers], diplomatic
[or consular bags] and messages in code or cipher. However, the mission [consular post] may
install & use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of RS.
2. The official correspondence of the mission [consular post] shall be inviolable. Official
correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission [consular post] and its
functions.
3. The diplomatic [consular] bag shall be neither opened nor detained. Nevertheless, if the
competent authorities of RS have serious reason to believe that the bag contains something
other than the correspondence, documents or articles referred to in par. 4 of this Article, they
may request that the bag be opened in their presence by an authorized representative of SS. If
this request is refused by the authorities of SS, the bag shall be returned to its place of origin.
4. The packages constituting the diplomatic [consular] bag shall bear visible external marks of
their character & may contain only official correspondence & documents or articles intended
exclusively for official use.
5. The diplomatic [consular] courier shall be provided with an official document indicating his
status & the number of packages constituting the diplomatic [consular] bag. Except with RS’
consent he shall be neither a RS national, nor, unless he is a SS national, a permanent RS
resident. In the performance of his functions he shall be protected by the RS. He shall enjoy
personal inviolability & shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
6. SS, its diplomatic missions [its consular posts] may designate diplomatic [consular] couriers
ad hoc. In such cases, par. 5 of this Article shall also apply except that the immunities
mentioned shall cease to apply when such a courier has delivered to the consignee the
diplomatic [consular] bag in his charge.
7. A diplomatic [consular] bag may be entrusted to the captain of a ship or of a commercial
aircraft scheduled to land at an authorized port of entry. He shall be provided with an official
document indicating the number of packages constituting the bag, but he shall not be
considered to be a diplomatic [consular] courier. By arrangement with the appropriate local
authorities, the diplomatic [consular] post may send one of its members to take possession of
the bag directly & freely from the captain of the ship or of the aircraft.”
Social security exemption for a diplomatic agent (Art. 33); members of the consular post (Art.
48):
“1. Subject to par. 3 of this Article, _______ WRT services rendered by them for the SS, [&
members of their families forming part of their households,] shall be exempt from social security
provisions which may be in force in the RS.
2. The exemption in par. 1 of this Article shall apply also to members of the private servants
[staff] who are in the sole employ of a _________, on condition:
(a) that they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the RS; &
(b) that they are covered by the social security provisions which are in force in the SS or a third
State.
3. ________ who employ persons to whom the exemption in par. 2 of this Article does not apply
shall observe the obligations which the social security provisions of the RS impose upon
employers.
4. The exemption in pars. 1 & 2 of this Article shall not preclude voluntary participation in the
social security system of the RS, provided that such participation is permitted by that State.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning
social security concluded previously & shall not prevent the conclusion of such agreements in
the future.” [par. 5 is not in CR]
Exemption from military service of diplomatic agents (Art. 35); members of the consular post
& members of the families forming part of their households (Art. 52): RS shall exempt _______
from all personal services, from all public service of any kind whatsoever, & from military
obligations such as those connected with requisitioning, military contributions & billeting.
Inviolability in a Third State of a diplomatic agent (Art. 40); consular officer (Art. 54)
1. If a ______ passes through or is in the territory of a third State, which has granted him a visa
if a visa was necessary, while proceeding to take up or return to his post or when returning to
the SS, the third State shall accord to him inviolability & all immunities provided for by the other
Articles of the present Convention as may be required to ensure his transit or return. The same
shall apply in the case of any member of his family [forming part of his household] enjoying such
privileges & immunities who are accompanying the _______ or traveling separately to join him
or to return to the SS.
2. In circumstances similar to those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, third States shall not
hinder the transit through their territory of other members of the administrative & technical or
service staff of a mission [consular post] or of members of their families [forming part of their
households], through their territories.
3. Third States shall accord to official correspondence & to other official communications in
transit, including messages in code or cipher, the same freedom and protection as the RS is
bound to accord under the present Convention. They shall accord to diplomatic [consular]
couriers who have been granted a visa, if a visa was necessary, & to consular bags in transit,
the same inviolability & protection as the RS is bound to accord under the present Convention.
4. The obligations of third States under pars 1, 2 & 3 shall also apply to the persons mentioned
respectively in those paragraphs, & to official communications & to diplomatic [consular] bags,
whose presence in the territory of the third State is due to force majeure."
Provisions specific to each:

Diplomatic Relations:
Art 4
1. SS must ensure that the agrément of RS has been given for the person it proposes to
accredit as head of the mission to that State.
2. RS is not obliged to give reasons to the SS for a refusal of agrément.
Art 7. Subject to Arts 5, 8, 9 & 11, SS may freely appoint the members of the staff of the
mission. In the case of military, naval or air attaches, RS may require their names to be
submitted beforehand, for its approval.
Art 13
1. Head of the mission takes up his functions in the RS either when he has presented his
credentials or when he has notified his arrival & a true copy of his credentials has been
presented to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the RS, or such ministry as may be agreed, per
the practice in the RS which shall be applied in a uniform manner.
2. Order of presentation of credentials or of a true copy will be determined by date & time of
the arrival of the head.
Art 37
1. Family members of a DA forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the
RS, enjoy the privileges & immunities in Arts 29 to 36.
2. Members of the administrative & technical staff, with family members forming part of their
households, if not nationals of or permanently resident in RS, enjoy the privileges & immunities
in Arts 29 to 35, except that immunity from civil & administrative jurisdiction of the RS in Art.
31.1 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy
the privileges in Art 36.1, as to articles imported at the time of first installation.
3. Members of the service staff who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the RS
enjoy immunity as to acts performed in the course of their duties, exemption from dues & taxes
on the emoluments received due to their employment & the exemption contained in Article 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently
resident in the RS, be exempt from dues & taxes on the emoluments received due to their
employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges & immunities only to the extent
admitted by the RS. RS must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as
not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.
Art 46 SS may with the prior consent of RS, & at the request of a third State not represented in
RS, undertake the temporary protection of the interests of the third State & of its nationals.
Consular Relations
Art 7 SS may, after notifying States concerned, entrust a consular post established in a
particular State with the exercise of consular functions in another State, unless there is express
objection by one of the States concerned.
Art 8. Upon appropriate notification to RS, a consular post of SS may, unless RS objects,
exercise consular functions in RS on behalf of a third State.
Art 10
1. Heads of consular posts are appointed by SS & are admitted to the exercise of their functions
by RS.
2. Formalities for appointment & admission of the head of a consular post are determined by the
laws, regulations & usages of SS & of RS respectively.
Art 12
1. Head of a consular post is admitted to the exercise of his functions by an authorization from
RS termed an exequatur, whatever the form of this authorization.
2. A State which refuses to grant an exequatur is not obliged to give to the SS reasons for such
refusal.
3. Subject to Arts. 13 & 15, head of a consular post shall not enter upon his duties until he has
received an exequatur.
Art 14 As soon as the head is admitted even provisionally to exercise of his functions, RS shall
immediately notify competent authorities of the consular district & ensure that necessary
measures are taken to enable the head of a consular post to carry out the duties of his office &
to have the benefit of the Convention.
Art 17
1. In a State where SS has no diplomatic mission & is not represented by a diplomatic mission
of a third State, a consular officer may, with RS’ consent, & without affecting his consular status,
be authorized to perform diplomatic acts. Such performance by a consular officer shall not
confer any right to claim diplomatic privileges & immunities.
2. Consular officer may, after notification addressed to RS, act as representative of SS to any
inter-governmental organization. He shall be entitled to enjoy privileges & immunities accorded
to such a representative by customary IL or by int’l agreements; in respect of the performance
by him of any consular function, he shall not be entitled to any greater immunity from jurisdiction
than that to which a consular officer is entitled under the Convention.
Art 32
1. Consular premises & residence of the career head of which SS or any person acting on its
behalf is the owner or lessee shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues &
taxes, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.
2. Tax exemption in par. 1 shall not apply to such dues & taxes if, under RS law, they are
payable by the person who contracted with SS or with the person acting on its behalf.
Article 36. (US v. AVENA)
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to SS nationals:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with SS nationals & to have access to them.
SS nationals shall have the same freedom WRT communication with & access to consular
officers of SS;

(b) if he so requests, competent authorities of RS shall, without delay, inform the consular post
of SS if, within its consular district, a SS national is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained. Any communication addressed to the consular post by such person
shall also be forwarded by said authorities without delay. Said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a SS national who is in prison, custody or
detention, to converse & correspond with him & to arrange for his legal representation. They
shall also have the right to visit any SS national who is in prison, custody or detention in
pursuance of a judgment. Consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights in par. 1 shall be exercised in conformity with RS laws, subject to the proviso that
said laws must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under
this Article are intended.
Art 37. If relevant information is available to competent authorities of RS, such authorities shall
have the duty:
(a) death of a SS national: inform without delay the consular post in whose district the death
occurred;
(b) inform competent consular post without delay of any case where the appointment of a
guardian or trustee appears to be in the interests of a minor or other person lacking full capacity
who is a SS national. The giving of this information shall be without prejudice to the operation of
RS laws concerning such appointments;
(c) if a vessel, having the nationality of SS, is wrecked or runs aground in RS territorial sea or
internal waters, or if an aircraft registered in SS suffers an accident on RS territory: inform
without delay the consular post nearest to the scene of the occurrence.
Art 44
1. Members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses in the course of
judicial or administrative proceedings. A consular employee or a member of the service staff
shall not, except in par. 3, decline to give evidence. If a consular officer should decline to do so,
no coercive measure or penalty may be applied to him.
2. The authority requiring the evidence of a consular officer shall avoid interference with the
performance of functions. When possible, take such evidence at his residence or at the consular
post or accept a statement from him in writing.
3. Members of a consular post are under no obligation to give evidence concerning matters
connected with the exercise of their functions or to produce official correspondence &
documents, & are entitled to decline to give evidence as expert witnesses WRT SS law.
Art 46
1. Consular officers & consular employees & family members forming part of their households
shall be exempt from all obligations under RS laws in regard to the registration of aliens &
residence permits.
2. Par. 1 shall not apply to any consular employee who is not a permanent employee of SS or
who carries on any private gainful occupation in RS or to any member of the family of any such
employee.
Art 47
1. Members of the consular post shall, WRT services rendered for SS, be exempt from any
obligations in regard to work permits imposed by RS laws concerning the employment of foreign
labour.
2. Members of the private staff of consular officers & of consular employees shall, if they do not
carry on any other gainful occupation in the RS, be exempt from the obligations in par. 1.
Art 51 Death of a member of the consular post or of family member forming part of his
household, RS:
(a) permit export of the movable property of the deceased, except property acquired in RS the
export of which was prohibited at the time of his death;
(b) not levy national, regional or municipal estate, succession or inheritance duties, & duties on
transfers, on movable property the presence of which in the RS was due solely to the presence
in that State of the deceased as a member of the consular post or as a member of the family of
a member of the consular post.
Chapter III - Regime Relating to Honorary Consular Officers & Consular Posts headed by
such Officers
Art 58
1. Arts. 28, 29, 30, 34—39, 54.3 & 55.2 & 3 shall apply to consular posts headed by an honorary
consular officer. The facilities, privileges & immunities of such consular posts shall be governed
by Arts. 59—62.
2. Arts. 42, 43, 44.3, 45 & 53 & 55.1 shall apply to honorary consular officers. Facilities,
privileges & immunities of such consular officers shall be governed by Arts. 63—67.
3. Herein privileges & immunities shall not be accorded to members of the family of an honorary
consular officer or of
a consular employee employed at a consular post headed by an honorary consular officer.
4. Exchange of consular bags between 2 consular posts headed by honorary consular officers
in different States shall not be allowed without the consent of the 2 RSs concerned.
US Diplomatic Staff And Consular Staff In Iran (US v. Iran)

US Embassy & staff in Iran were seized by protestors, without Iranian authorities attempting to
prevent such but with later statements of support by the Ayatollah.
Failure To Protect Embassy & Staff. The failure of the Iranian security forces to protect the
Embassy or take any step to liberate the staff members amounted to a violation of Iran’s duties
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to take all appropriate steps to protect the
embassy premises and staff.
Case Concerning Avena & Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US)

Mexico claims breaches of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (WRT communication)
in the treatment of 52 Mexicans convicted & sentenced to death in the US.
Failure To Notify Of Rights. On notice, “without delay” is not necessarily to be interpreted as

“immediately” upon arrest, nor can it be interpreted to signify that the provision of the notice
must necessarily precede any interrogation, so that the commencement of interrogation before
the notification would be a breach of Art. 36. But the Court observes that there is still a duty
upon the arresting authorities to give the information to an arrested person as soon as it is
realized that the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person
is probably a foreign national. US was in breach of its obligations to 51 individuals.
There are 3 elements in Art. 36 (1b). If a State breaches its obligation under Art. 36 (1b) in not
notifying the Consular Post of the other state of the detention of the latter’s nationals, it also
breaches Art. 36 (1a) because it precluded the consular officers of the other State to
communicate with and have access to their nationals, as well as Art. 36 (1c) because it
precluded the consular officers of the other State from visiting their detained nationals and from
arranging for legal representation of their nationals.
The remedy to make good these violations of its obligations should consist in requiring the US
to permit effective review & reconsideration of these nationals’ cases by the US courts, with a
view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Art. 36 committed by the competent
authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal
justice. Thus, it should take account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna
Convention and guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused by the violation
will be fully examined and taken into account in the review and reconsideration process. Lastly,
review and reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the conviction.

8
B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE
Article 2(3), UN Charter

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,
and agree that, in carrying on its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf.
Article 25, UN Charter

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter.

The Security Council shall consist of fifteen members of the United Nations. The Republic of
China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security
Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-
permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first
instance of the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of
international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to
equitable geographical distribution.

Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of
nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall
refrain from voting.
Notes:
 General Rule: The UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force between members
against their territorial integrity or political independence (Art. 2[4], UN Charter)
Exception: (a) inherent right to individual or collective self defense (Art. 51, UN Charter)
(b) when allowed by the Security Council (Art. 42, UN Charter)
 If there’s already armed conflict, apply IHL; in general use, UN Charter
 Until when can you allege self-defense – until the SC has taken cognizance of the matter
(thus, self defense cannot be forever)
 “armed attack” is determined in Nicaragua vs. US
Caroline Case (1842)

SS Caroline was set on fire by British assailing forces while moored in New York, claiming that
the destruction was a public act of force, in self defense. The Caroline was used by American
8 Thanks to Tif and Eps for this part.
sympathizers of Canadian rebels against the British to provide arms and ammunitions. US
forces retaliated by burning a British steamer while in US waters.
Anticipatory self defense. US Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote to Lord Ashburton: “[I]t
will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show, upon what state of facts, and what rules of
national law, the destruction of the “Caroline” is to be defended. It will be for that Government to
show a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even
supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United
States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of
self defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”
*This case is authority on the concept of anticipatory self-defense.
Nicaragua vs. US (1986)

The US allegedly planned and undertook activities directed against the new government of
Nicaragua, specifically the mining of ports and waters, operations against oil installations and
naval base, infringement of air space, and support for the mercenary army, the contra force.
The US claimed collective self defense in behalf of El Salvador as justification for its actions.
The armed attack, necessity, and proportionality requirements. The general rule prohibiting
force allows for certain exceptions. First, the inherent right which any state possesses in the
event of an armed attack, covers both collective and individual self defense. The parties agree
that whether the response to the attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the
necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self defense. In the case of individual
self defense, the exercise of this right is subject to the state concerned having been a victim of
an armed attack. Reliance on collective self defense of course does not remove the need for
this. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another states to exercise the
right of collective self defense on the basis of its own assessment of the situation.
Request for exercise of collective self defense also needed. Thus, in customary international
law, there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self defense in the absence of a request
by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. The requirement of a request
is additional to the requirement that such a State should have declared itself to have been
attacked.
Principle of non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every

sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference. A prohibited interference must
accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very
essence of prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which
uses force, either in the direct from of military action, or in the indirect form of support to
subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. These are therefore wrongful in the
light of both the principle of non-use of force, and that of intervention.
Collective counter-measure in response to conduct not amounting to an armed attack. While an

armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self defense, a use of force of a
lesser degree of gravity cannot produce any entitlement to take collective counter-measures
involving the use of force. The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to
have been established and imputable to that State, could only have justified proportionate
counter-measures on the part of the victim States (El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica). They
could not justify counter-measures taken by a third State (the US) and particularly could not
justify intervention involving the use of force.

*ICJ rejected the US’s self defense argument and held that the US infringed the prohibition on
the use of force due to some of its activities.
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

The UN General Assembly requested the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the question: “Is the threat
or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”
Prohibition is subject to exceptions. This prohibition of the use of force (Art. 2, para 4, UN
Charter) is to be considered in the light of other relevant provisions of the Charter (Art. 51, on
the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs; Art. 42,
whereby the Security Council may take military enforcement measures in conformity with
Chapter VII). Resort to self defense under Art. 51 is subject to certain restraints (the conditions
of necessity and proportionality, submission to which is a rule in customary international law).
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self
defense in all circumstances.
UN Charter does not refer to a specific weapon. These provisions do not refer to specific
weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter
neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear
weapons.
Additional considerations. It suffices for the Court to note that the very nature of all nuclear
weapons and the profound risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in
mind by States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self defense in accordance
with the requirements of proportionality.
“Signaled” intention to use force. Whether a signaled intention to use force if certain events
occur is or is not a “threat” within Art. 2, para 4 of the Charter depends upon various factors. If
the envisaged use of force is in itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a threat
prohibited under Art. 2, para 4. If its is to be lawful, the declared readiness to use force must be
a use of force that is in conformity with the Charter. Possession of nuclear weapons may indeed
justify an inference of preparedness to use them. Whether this is a “threat” depends upon
whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a State, or against the Purposes of the UN or whether it would
necessarily violate the principles of necessity and proportionality.
Legality of the Use of Force – Yugoslavia vs. US (1999)

Yugoslavia applied for provisional measures to stop the US from using force against it. The US,
along with other NATO-member countries bombed various targets in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia
based the ICJ’s jurisdiction On Art. IX of the Genocide Convention, which the US ratified but
made a reservation.
ICJ has no jurisdiction because US did not consent to the submission of the dispute. Genocide
Convention does not prohibit reservations. Yugoslavia did not object to the US reservations to
Art. IX. Said reservation had the effect of excluding that Article from the provisions of the
Convention in force between the parties. In consequence, Art IX cannot found the jurisdiction of
the Court to entertain a dispute between Yugoslavia and the US alleged to fall within its
provisions. It cannot therefore indicate any provisional measure whatsoever in order to protect
the rights invoked therein.
Oil Platforms Case – Iran vs. US

Iran instituted proceedings against the US, claiming that attacks on Iranian offshore oil
production complexes by the US Navy constituted a "fundamental breach" of various provisions
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the US and Iran, as
well as of international law. Serving as backdrop for these attacks is the conflict between Iran
and Iraq in the 1980s. The US claimed that the acts are self defense measures, contemplated
under Art. XX, para 1(d) of the Treaty, to protect US interests as the reason for the attacks.
The Court points out that the US has not claimed to have been exercising collective self-
defense on behalf of the neutral States engaged in shipping in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, in
order to establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of the
right of individual self-defense, the United States has to show that attacks had been made upon
it for which Iran was responsible; and that those attacks were of such a nature as to be qualified
as "armed attacks" within the meaning of that expression in Article 51 of the UN Charter, and as
understood in customary law on the use of force. The United States must also show that its
actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack made on it, and that the platforms
were a legitimate military target open to attack in the exercise of self-defense. Evidence failed to
support the contentions of the US.
*Sir said that the Court had not decided on whether unilateral use of force is valid in this
instance .However, note that the Court held that US actions cannot be justified as measures
necessary to protect the essential security interests of the US under the Treaty, as interpreted in
the light of international law on the use of force
2. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in
accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

All members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
A State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.

Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice
in any case to which it is a party.
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the
Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an
advisory opinion on any legal question.
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the
General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope
of their activities.
Article 1, ICJ Statute

The International Court of Justice established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations shall be constituted and shall function in accordance with the provisions of the
present Statute.
Article 34 (1), ICJ Statute

1. Only States may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Court shall be open to the States Parties to the present Statute.
The conditions under which the Court shall be open to other States shall, subject to special provisions
contained in treaties in force, laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such conditions place the
parties in a position of inequality before the Court.
Notes:
 The ICJ was established by the UN Charter
 The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN
 The ICJ Statute forms an integral part of the UN Charter
 States Parties to the ICJ Statute:
o UN members are ipso facto parties
- each UN member undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which
it is a party; if there is failure to comply, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect
to the judgment
- States not UN Members may become a party on conditions determined in each case by
the GA, upon recommendation of the Security Council
 States not Parties to the ICJ Statute (Art. 35, ICJ Statute): Court shall be open to such
States under conditions laid down by the Security Council, subject to special provisions
contained in treaties in force
 International Organizations may initiate a proceeding as long as States are still the
parties.
A. APPLICABLE LAW

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as
are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting States;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto.

The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.
B. JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters
specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force.
The States Parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting
the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity
on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time.
Notes:
 How does Court acquire jurisdiction? By consent of the parties
 How does a State manifest its consent?
(a) ad hoc basis (or voluntary appearance, where parties refer the dispute to the Court)
(b) parties recognize the jurisdiction as compulsory in a treaty
(c) Optional Clause (Art. 36 (2), ICJ Statute) (or parties recognize the jurisdiction as
compulsory in a separate declaration)
- jurisdiction over a State is compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other State accepting the same obligation
- period of effectivity may be either:
 indefinite
 for a fixed period of years
 upon notification of termination (see Nicaragua vs. US)
- reservations may be made:
 ratione personae – reservations relating to other parties
 ratione temporis – reservations relating to time
 ratione materiae – reservations as to subject matter
- Such reservations do not limit the discretion of the Court to determine its own
competence since ultimately the ICJ can decide to take cognizance of the dispute.
- Can you withdraw unilaterally from such declaration? Yes, provided notice is given to the
other party within a reasonable time (Nicaragua vs. US)
 What is the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICJ? (Art. 36)
(a) any matter which the parties may refer to it
(b) matters provided by the UN Charter, treaties or conventions
(c) legal disputes concerning:
- the interpretation of a treaty;
- any question of international law;
- the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
- the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation
 Dispute: disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views of interests
between two persons; to constitute a dispute, no actual breach or harm is necessary.
C. ADVISORY OPINIONS

The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities.

The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body
may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a
request.

In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the
present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent which it recognizes them to be
applicable.
PROVISIONAL MEASURES

The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
INTERVENTION

Should a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the
decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene. It shall
be for the Court to decide upon this request.
Notes:
 3rd party intervening need not be an indispensable party
 Requisite: a legal interest in the subject matter of the case which may be affected by the
decision. (much lower threshold than the requirement in ordinary civil cases)
DEFAULT BY ONE PARTY

1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those
concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such
States forthwith.
2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this
right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.
Cases on Jurisdiction
Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua - Nicaragua v. US (1986)

In this case, Nicaragua asserted that the Court had jurisdiction over its application because both
Nicaragua and the US had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional
Clause. The US contended that the Court lacked jurisdiction on the following grounds: (1) that
Nicaragua’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ was not in force in 1945, for
failure to ratify the Statute of the PCIJ, such that Art. 36 (5) of the ICJ Statute did not apply to it;
2) three days before the application had been filed the US had filed a notification stating that the
compulsory jurisdiction shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State, said
notification to take effect immediately; and that 3) US had made a reservation in its Optional
Clause whereby disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, which could affect 3rd states which
are parties to the to the treaty but are not participating in the proceedings before the Court, were
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court.
ICJ held that it had jurisdiction. The ratification of the ICJ Statute by Nicaragua gave its
previous declaration under the PCIJ Statute the binding force which it previously lacked.
Moreover, the US declaration could only be terminated on reasonable notice. A declaration
under the Optional Clause was a unilateral and voluntary act. Once made, however, it created
a legal obligation binding upon the State which made it. Finally, the ICJ concluded that it would
be impossible for a ruling not to affect third parties such as El Salvador. Therefore, the
reservation of the US prevented the Court from entertaining the claims based on violations of
multilateral treaties such as the UN Charter and the OAS Charter. It however found that the
effect of the reservation did not exclude the application of principles of international customary
law, which were enshrined in treaty law provisions.
Lockerbie Case - Libya v. UK (1988)

A bomb exploded on board a Pan Am plane over Lockerbie, Scotland. UK and US accused two
Libyan nationals of placing the bomb aboard the plane and issued a declaration enjoining Libya
to surrender the two men. In its application, Libya seeks to enforce the obligations of the States
under the Montreal Convention, under which Libya had the right to investigate the alleged
offense and exercise domestic jurisdiction. The UK maintained that the Court lacked jurisdiction
because there was no dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention,
and even if such dispute existed, the UN Security Council Resolutions which required Libya to
surrender the two accused prevailed over the provisions of the Montreal Convention.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction. A dispute is defined as a disagreement on a point of law
or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interest between two persons. In this case, the parties
differed on the question of whether the destruction of the aircraft was governed by the Montreal
Convention. Moreover, the UN SC Resolutions were adopted after Libya filed its application.
Since admissibility had to be determined as at the date on which the application was filed,
subsequent cognizance of the SC and the issuance of said resolutions could not remove any
jurisdiction which the Court possessed at the date of filing of the application.
ELSI Case - US v. Italy (1989)

The application made by the US concerned the allegedly illegal requisition by Italy of two US
corporations. US claimed that Italy violated the provisions of the Friendship, Commerce and

Navigation (FCN) Treaty between the two. It also submitted that the doctrine of exhaustion of
local remedies was not applicable to an action brought under the said treaty due to lack of
reference to such doctrine. Italy, on the other hand, maintains that the claims should have been
brought before Italian municipal courts.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction, its jurisdiction being based upon the Statute of the Court
and the FCN Treaty. The Court stated the doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies was a
fundamental rule of customary international law and was not rendered inapplicable simply
because of the absence of words making it specifically applicable to a certain type of action.
However, since Italy failed to establish that a remedy existed under municipal law which was
available to the US corporations, the claim is admissible. (Notes: The doctrine of exhaustion of
local remedies is available when a state brings a case in the exercise of its diplomatic protection
of its nationals/ espouses a claim of its national. It is not required when the state brings a case
as the injured party (i.e. the injury is caused to the state itself such as in the US Diplomatic and
Consular Staff case).
South-West Africa Cases - Ethiopia and Liberia vs. South Africa (1966)
Ethiopia and Liberia instituted applications alleging contravention of duties by South Africa as
Mandatory under the League of Nations Mandate for South West Africa. Every mandate
contained a jurisdictional clause providing for a reference of disputes to the PCIJ, now the ICJ
by virtue of Article 37 of the ICJ Statute. South Africa however challenged the jurisdiction of the
Court by contending that since the League of Nations and PCIJ were dissolved then the rights
and obligations under the Mandate relating to the administrative supervision by the League and
submission to the PCIJ had become extinct.
The Court held that it had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the dissolution, because the obligation of
South Africa to submit to compulsory jurisdiction had effectively transferred to the ICJ. Although
the League ceased to exist in April 1946, the UN Charter had entered into force in November
1945, and the three parties had ratified such Charter and become UN members. By the effect of
Art. 92 and 93 of the UN Charter and Art. 37 of the ICJ Statute, South Africa had bound itself to
accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in lieu of the PCIJ. Deciding on the merits, the
Court rejected the claims of Ethiopia and Liberia. Court held that the individual member States
of the League of Nations had no right of direct intervention relative to the mandatories since this
was the prerogative of the League organs. And though States retained the rights which they
possessed as members of the League of Nations despite the dissolution of the organization, it
did not mean that by and upon such dissolution they acquired rights which they never did
individually possess.
Phosphates Case - Nauru v. Australia (1992)

Nauru was placed under UN Trusteeship, with Australia, New Zealand and the UK as joint
Administering Authority. Australia was to exercise full powers of legislation, administration and
jurisdiction over Nauru on behalf of the Administering Authority. Nauru instituted proceedings
against Australia, maintaining that it had breached its trusteeship obligations by failing to
rehabilitate parts of Nauru from which phosphates had been extracted. Australia claimed lack of
jurisdiction on two grounds: 1) since the case involved the responsibility of third States which
had not consented to the Court’s jurisdiction; and 2) it made a reservation in its declaration that
jurisdiction does not apply to any dispute where the parties have agreed or shall agree to have
“recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement.”
ICJ held that it had jurisdiction. As to the 1st ground, Court held that the fact that New Zealand
and the UK were not parties to the proceedings did not render the application inadmissible. The
present case differed from the Monetary Gold case since the interests of New Zealand and the
UK did not constitute the very subject matter of the decision which the Court would give. A
finding by the Court regarding the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might have
implications for the legal situation of the two other States concerned but no finding in respect of
that legal situation would be needed as a basis for the Court’s decision in this case. Moreover,
the interests of New Zealand and the UK are protected by Article 59 of the ICJ Statute (decision
only binds the parties). As to the 2 nd ground, Australia claimed that the termination of the
trusteeship should be considered as “recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement.”
ICJ held that Australia’s declaration expressly provided that this limitation on jurisdiction applies
to disputes between States, which Nauru was not prior to its independence.
Case Concerning East Timor - Portugal v. Australia (1995)

Portugal commenced proceedings against Australia, in which it maintained that by concluding
an agreement and continuing negotiations with Indonesia over the delimitation of the continental
shelf between Australia and East Timor, Australia infringed the rights of the people of East
Timor to self- determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and the
rights of Portugal as administering power. Australia contended that the Court could not rule
upon the application without ruling on the rights and obligations of Indonesia, which had not
consented to the jurisdiction of the Court.
ICJ had no jurisdiction. The Court refrained from exercising jurisdiction, as it could not rule upon
the dispute between Australia and Portugal without having to rule upon whether Indonesia’s
entry into East Timor was lawful. The very subject matter of the decision would necessarily be a
determination of whether Indonesia acquired power to conclude treaties on behalf of East
Timor, which determination could not be made without the consent of Indonesia. (Notes:
doctrine applies both to advisory opinion and contentious cases; case is authority for the
definition of erga omnes obligation)
*Sir said this case is authoritative in relation to the erga omnes obligation of sates to respect the
right to self-determination.
Cases on Provisional Measures
Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide - Bosnia v.

Yugoslavia (1993)
Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against Yugoslavia accusing it of responsibility
for the commission of genocide in Bosnia. At the time it filed its application, Bosnia asked the
Court to grant, as provisional measures, that Yugoslavia cease all acts of genocide and cease
providing support for any group engaging in military or paramilitary activities against Bosnia. It
also requested that the Court indicate that Bosnia had the right to seek and receive assistance
in defending itself.
The Court granted the request for provisional measures. It stated that it should not indicate
such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant or found in the ICJ Statute
appeared, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be
established. The object of the power to indicate provisional measures of protection was to
ensure that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which might subsequently be
adjudged to belong to one of the parties. Moreover, the Court could only indicate provisional
measures to be taken by the parties but not by 3 rd States who would not be bound by the
eventual judgment.
Lockerbie Case - Libya v. US (1998)

Libya requested the Court for provisional measures to enjoin the US from the use of any force
against Libya. Previous to this, the Security Council adopted Resolution 748 determining the
failure of Libya to surrender the two accused as a threat to international peace and security.

The Court denied the request for provisional measures. It reasoned that since Libya and the US
are UN members, they are obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.
Such obligation prevails over the duty of the parties under the Montreal Convention. An
indication of the measures requested by Libya would be likely to impair the rights, which appear
prima facie to be enjoyed by the United States by virtue of the Security Council Resolution.
Cases on Dispute
Admissions Case (1948)

The GA requested the Court to give an advisory opinion on whether a UN member may make
its consent to admission of other States dependent on conditions not expressly provided by
Article 4 of the UN Charter. It was contended by some States that the Court should not give its
opinion for the reason that the subject matter of the request was political.
Art. 4 of UN Charter set sufficient conditions for UN membership. Dealing with the preliminary
objection, the Court ruled that the question was a purely legal one. Interpretation of a treaty
provision is an essentially judicial task. Given its legal nature, the Court is not concerned with
the political motives, which may have inspired the request at hand. Dealing with the question,
the Court answered in the negative. It said that the conditions stated in Art. 4 are exhaustive,
namely: a candidate must be 1) a state; 2) peace-loving; 3) must accept the obligations of the
charter; 4) must be able to carry out these obligations; 5) must be willing to do so. These are not
merely the necessary but also the sufficient conditions for membership.
Free Zones Case – France vs. Switzerland (1932)

A series of treaties between France and Switzerland established customs-free zones. France
claims that by virtue of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, the regime of free zones had been
abrogated. The Court took cognizance of the case despite the fact the matters addressed to it
were of great economic importance, as the matters arose in the context of legal questions to be
answered. The legal dispute here is essentially France’s right to withdraw unilaterally from a
treaty. Deciding on the merits, the court said that there was no abrogation because the text
itself of the Special Arbitration Agreement states that the countries are to settle between
themselves the status of the free zones because of an inconsistency. An inconsistency does not
automatically operate to involve the abolition of the free zones.
Mavrommatis Case – Greece vs. UK (1924)

Greece brought suit against Britain in its capacity of Mandatory of Palestine to determine the
validity of certain concessions for public works in the Jordan valley granted by the Ottoman
authorities to Mavrommatis, a Greek national. Questions were raised as to a) whether there
was a dispute between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations, since
only States or members of the League of Nations may appear before it and b) whether there
was a dispute even if one of the parties denies the existence of the dispute.
The Court defined a dispute as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views
or of interests between two persons. At first, the dispute was between a private person and a
State. Subsequently, however, Greece took up the case. Once a State has taken up a case on
behalf of one of its subject, which it is entitled to protect under international law, before an
international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter, the State is the sole claimant. Also, it is the
function of the Court to determine if there is a dispute based on the facts of the case and not on
the assertions of the parties.
UN Headquarters Advisory Opinion (1988)

PLO established an observer mission in New York upon invitation by the UN. Years later, the
US Government passed a law making unlawful the establishment or maintenance within the US
of a PLO office. The UN Sec-Gen pointed out that the US is under obligation to permit PLO
personnel to enter and remain in the US to carry out their official UN functions, in accordance
with the Headquarters Agreement. When assurance was not given by the US, the UN Sec-Gen
said that a dispute existed between the US and UN and invoked the dispute settlement
procedure in Sec. 21 of the Headquarters Agreement. US countered that there was no dispute.
Dispute defined. Whether there exists an international dispute is a matter for objective
determination. PCIJ defined a dispute as a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of
legal views or of interest between 2 persons. Opposing attitudes of the parties clearly establish
the existence of a dispute.
Cases on Advisory Opinion
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons - WHO Request (1996)

The WHO Dir-Gen submitted the following question to the ICJ for an advisory opinion: “In view
of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or
other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO
Constitution?”.
The ICJ refused to give an advisory opinion. The question in this case relates not to the effects
of the use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view
of their health and environmental effects. Whatever those effects might be, the WHO’s
competence to deal with them is not dependent on the legality of the acts that caused them.
None of the WHO’s functions has a sufficient connection with the question before it for that
question to be capable of being considered as arising “within the scope of [the] activities” of the
WHO.
International organizations are governed by the “principle of speciality” – they are invested by
the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common
interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. To ascribe to the WHO the
competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons – even in view of their health
and environment effects – would be tantamount to disregarding the principle of speciality.
Monetary Gold Case - Italy vs. France, UK and USA (1954)

UK and Italy lay claim to gold taken by Germans from Rome. Italy claims the gold under the
allegation that Albania has committed an international wrong against Italy and must thus pay
compensation. UK was claiming the gold in satisfaction of the Corfu Channel decision. Albania,
who had not accepted the Courts’ jurisdiction, refrained from making any application to the
dispute.
The Court cannot decide such a dispute (WON Albania committed a wrong against Italy and
must compensate) without the consent of Albania. Here, Albania’s legal interest would not only
be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision.
Certain Expenses in the UN (1962)

The expenses involved are those relating to UN operations in Congo and the Middle East in
pursuance of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions. The UN GA requested an
advisory opinion on whether these are expenses of the Organization with the meaning of Art 17,
para 2 of the UN Charter.
The ICJ agreed to give an advisory opinion, saying that the power of the Court to give advisory
opinion is derived from Art. 65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character.
The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even by giving advisory opinions, depart from the
essential rules guiding their activity as a Court. Therefore, the Court can give an advisory
opinion only on a legal question. But even if the question is a legal one, it may nonetheless
decline to do so. The Court finds no “compelling reason” why it should not give the advisory
opinion requested. It has been argued that the question put to the Court is intertwined with
political questions, and that for this reason the Court should refuse to give an opinion. The
Court, however, cannot attribute a political character to a request which invites it to undertake
an essential judicial task, namely, the interpretation of a treaty provision.
Western Sahara Case (1975)

The UN GA requested an advisory opinion on the following questions: “Was Western Sahara at
the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” and, if yes,
“What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the
Mauritanian entity?”
The ICJ finds no compelling reason to deny the request. Art. 65, para 1 is permissive and, under
it, that power is of a discretionary character. In exercising this discretion, the ICJ, like the PCIJ,
has always been guided by the principle that, as a judicial body, it is bound to remain faithful to
the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory opinions. It has been said in
previous opinions that the reply of the Court represents its participation in the activities of the
UN and, in principle, should not be refused. The Court has further said that only “compelling
reasons” should lead it to refuse to give an advisory opinion.
In general, an opinion given by the Court will furnish the GA with elements of a legal character
relevant to the future treatment of the decolonization of Western Sahara. In any event, to what
extent or degree its opinion will have an impact on the action of the GA is not for the Court to
decide. The function of the Court is to give an opinion based on law, once it has come to the
conclusion that the questions put to it are relevant and have a practical and contemporary effect
and, consequently are not devoid of object or purpose.
As to lack of consent, the Court said that it recognized that lack of consent might constitute a
ground for declining to give the opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case,
considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an opinion. I short, the
consent of an interested State continues to be relevant, not for the Court’s competence, but for
the appreciation of the propriety of giving an opinion.
Bostwana vs. Namibia (1999)

The ICJ was requested to determine, on the basis of the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890 and the
rules and principles of international law, the boundary between Namibia and Botswana around
Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of the island. The request was made through a
Special Agreement between the 2 states to submit the dispute to the ICJ.
Neither Botswana nor Namibia is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, both
of them consider Art. 31 of the Convention as applicable in interpreting the Anglo-German
Treaty inasmuch as Art. 31 reflects customary international law.
*The ICJ acquired jurisdiction because the parties consented to the ICJ’s jurisdiction and
acknowledged that the Anglo-German Treaty is binding on them.
Eastern Carelia Case (1923)

The Council of the League of Nations requested the PCIJ to give an advisory opinion upon this
question: “Do Arts. 10 and 11 of the Treaty of Peace between Finland and Russia, signed at
Dorpat, and the annexed Declaration of the Russian Delegation regarding the autonomy of
Eastern Carelia, constitute engagements of an international character which place Russia under
an obligation to Finland as to the carrying out of the provisions contained therein?”. Russia and
Finland are in dispute regarding the Declaration, with Finland saying that it forms part of the
contract and that the Treaty was signed on the terms that the Declaration was as binding as the

Treaty itself. Russia argued that the Declaration was not by way of contract, but was merely
declaratory of an existing situation.
The Court refused to give an advisory opinion. As Russia is not a member of the League of
Nations, the case is one under Art. 17 of the Covenant (in the event of dispute between an
member and non-member, the latter shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership for
the purpose of such dispute, and if accepted, Art. 12 to 16 shall be applied with modifications).
Such consent, however, had never been given by Russia. On the contrary, it has on several
occasions clearly declared that it accepts no intervention by the League of Nations. It appears to
the Court that that there are other cogent reasons which render it very inexpedient that the
Court should attempt to deal with the present question. As Russia, refused to take part, it is
doubtful if sufficient materials would be available to allow any judicial conclusion on whether
Finland and Russia contracted on the terms of the Declaration as to the nature of Eastern
Carelia’s autonomy. The question put to the Court is not one of abstract law, but concerns
directly the main point of the controversy and can only be decided by an investigation into the
facts underlying the case. Answering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding
the dispute between the parties.
Palestinian Wall Case (2004)

The UN GA requested the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the legal consequences rising
from the Israel’s construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the
4th Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant GA and Security Council Resolutions.
The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, striking down all arguments questioning its power to
give advisory opinion.
Article 12, para 1 was not violated. A request for an advisory opinion is not in itself a
"recommendation" by the General Assembly "with regard to [a] dispute or situation". Under
Article 24 the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security". In that regard it can impose on States "an explicit obligation of compliance
if for example it issues an order or command . . . under Chapter VII" and can, to that end,
"require enforcement by coercive action". However, the Court would emphasize that Article 24
refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, competence. The General Assembly does
have the power, inter alia, under Article 14, to "recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment" of various situations. "[Tlhe only limitation which Article 14 imposes on the General
Assembly is the restriction found in Article 12." As regards the practice of the UN, both the GA
and the SC initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the effect that the Assembly could not
make a recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of international peace and
security while the matter remained on the Council's agenda. However, this interpretation has
evolved subsequently. Indeed, the Court notes that there has been an increasing tendency over
time for the General Assembly and the Security Council to deal in parallel with the same matter
concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. The Court considers that the
accepted practice of the General Assembly, as it has evolved, is consistent with Article 12,
paragraph 1, of the Charter. The Court is accordingly of the view that the General Assembly, in
seeking an advisory opinion from the Court, did not contravene the provisions of Article 12,
paragraph 1.
SC failed to act on the matter, thus the GA acted properly in requesting for the advisory opinion.
Resolution 377 A (V) States that: "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective
measures . . .". The Court observes that twice the Security Council failed to act as contemplated
in resolution 377 A(V). It does not appear to the Court that the situation in this regard changed
between 20 October 2003 and 8 December 2003.
The request for an advisory opinion was on a “legal question” within the meaning of Art. 96,
para 1 of the UN Charter and Art. 65, para 1 of the ICJ Statute. As regards the alleged lack of
clarity of the terms of the GA's request and its effect on the "legal nature" of the question
referred to the Court, the Court observes that this question is directed to the legal
consequences arising from a given factual situation considering the rules and principles of
international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention and relevant SC and GA resolutions.
The question submitted by the GA has thus, to use the Court's phrase in Western Sahara,
"been framed in terms of law and raise[s] problems of international law"; it is by its very nature
susceptible of a reply based on law; indeed it is scarcely susceptible of a reply otherwise than
on the basis of law. In the view of the Court, it is indeed a question of a legal character”.
Lack of clarity in drafting does not deprive the Court of Jurisdiction. The Court would point out
that lack of clarity in the drafting of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather,
such uncertainty will require clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of
interpretation have frequently been given by the Court.
Court may give an opinion even on an abstract legal question. The Court does not consider that
what is contended to be the abstract nature of the question posed to it raises an issue of
jurisdiction. Even when the matter was raised as an issue of propriety rather than one of
jurisdiction, in the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the
Court took the position that to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in
abstract terms is "a mere affirmation devoid of any justification" and that "the Court may give an
advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise"
That a party to the contentious dispute did not give its consent does not divest the Court of
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. The Court observes that the lack of consent (by Israel)
to the Court's contentious jurisdiction by interested States has no bearing on the Court's
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. "The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis
of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory
proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending
between States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding
force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the
giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to
obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take. The Court's Opinion is given not
to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it; the reply of the Court, itself an
'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activities of the Organization,
and, in principle, should not be refused." The Court did however examine the opposition of
certain interested States to the request by the General Assembly in the context of issues of
judicial propriety.
The issue is not a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine and it cannot deny giving an
opinion on that ground. Given the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions
relating to international peace and security, it is the Court's view that the construction of the wall
must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.
Giving of advisory opinion will not impede resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Court
is aware that, no matter what might be its conclusions in any opinion it might give, they would
have relevance for the continuing debate on the matter in the General Assembly and would
present an additional element in the negotiations on the matter. Beyond that, the effect of the
opinion is a matter of appreciation. The Court has heard contrary positions advanced and there
are no evident criteria by which it can prefer one assessment to another. The Court is conscious
that the "Roadmap", which constitutes a negotiating framework for the resolution of the conflict.
It is not clear, however, what influence the Court's opinion might have on those negotiations:
participants in the present proceedings have expressed differing views in this regard. The Court
cannot regard this factor as a compelling reason to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
That the construction of the wall is but one aspect of the conflict will also no prevent the giving
of advisory opinion. The Court does not however consider this a reason for it to decline to reply
to the question asked. The Court is indeed aware that the question of the wall is part of a
greater whole, and it would take this circumstance carefully into account in any opinion it might
give. At the same time, the question that the General Assembly has chosen to ask of the Court
is confined to the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, and the Court would only
examine other issues to the extent that they might be necessary to its consideration of the
question put to it.
That the Court does not have at its disposal requisite facts and evidence to enable it to reach its
conclusions will also not prevent the giving of advisory opinion. The Court observes that the
question whether the evidence available to it is sufficient to give an advisory opinion must be
decided in each particular instance. The Court has at its disposal the report of the Secretary-
General, as well as a voluminous dossier submitted by him to the Court, a written statement
updating his report, written statements submitted by numerous other participants which contain
information relevant to a response to the question put by the General Assembly. The Court finds
that it has before it sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give the advisory opinion
requested by the General Assembly. The circumstance that others may evaluate and interpret
these facts in a subjective or political manner can be no argument for a court of law to abdicate
its judicial task. There is therefore in the present case no lack of information such as to
constitute a compelling reason for the Court to decline to give the requested opinion.
WON the advisory opinion would serve a useful purpose is not important since it is the
requesting which has the right to decide on its usefulness. With regard to the argument that the
General Assembly has not made it clear what use it would make of an advisory opinion on the
wall, the Court would recall, what it stated in its Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons: "Certain States have observed that the General Assembly has not explained
to the Court for what precise purposes it seeks the advisory opinion. Nevertheless, it is not for
the Court itself to purport to decide whether or not an advisory opinion is needed by the
Assembly for the performance of its functions. The General Assembly has the right to decide for
itself on the usefulness of an opinion in the light of its own needs." It follows that the Court
cannot decline to answer the question posed based on the ground that its opinion would lack
any useful purpose. The Court cannot substitute its assessment of the usefulness of the opinion
requested for that of the organ that seeks such opinion. Furthermore, and in any event, the
Court considers that the General Assembly has not yet determined all the possible
consequences of its own resolution. The Court's task would be to determine in a comprehensive
manner the legal consequences of the construction of the wall, while the General Assembly -
and the Security Council - may then draw conclusions from the Court's findings.
C. THE INDIVIDUAL 9
1. HUMAN RIGHTS
Crash Course In Basic International Human Rights Law10
9 Thanks to Ceejay, Marco, Dave, and MJ for this part.

10 Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion.
What is the notion of human rights?
The concept of human rights refers to that corpus of internationally and universally-
recognized rights that are inherent in every human being, i.e., they are inextricably attached to
every person from the time that person becomes a human being11. In essence, these are the
rights that every aspect of human civilization recognize as the barest minimum that every
human being is entitled to without further qualifications; a residual core of an entire system of
rights that cannot further be reduced. This recognition based on absolute consensus of the
international community makes human rights universal in character. As a logical extension of
the inherent character of human rights, human rights are also considered inalienable, or cannot
be either disposed of or taken away voluntarily or involuntarily. They are also imprescriptible,
meaning they cannot be understood as having been waived or forgone by the mere failure to
assert or vindicate them through the passage of time. Human rights abuses, for example, could
go on for a number of years in one state without any ostensible opposition but such fact cannot
be used to argue that the people of that state have already surrendered or waived vindication of
their rights at any time in the future. Human rights are also inviolable. Any denial or
transgression of these rights constitutes a continuing violation; there may be justifications for
these, which would in certain cases be sufficient to exempt the perpetrators from any legal
consequence, but this does not change the fact that there has been a violation12. One
characterization of human rights that has spurred a lot of debates that are ongoing until now is
that human rights are indivisible. Ideally, this notion presupposes that human rights, being the
irreducible core of a system of rights, cannot be subdivided so that one portion can be denied
and the other granted. In essence, this argument proposes that the right to a fair trial, for
example, cannot be granted only to be nullified by the subsequent denial of the right against
cruel and unusual punishment. An accused, therefore, who has been given all the due process
requirements of an impartial trial but who, when found guilty, would be subjected to inhumane
conditions of confinement can claim a violation of human rights nevertheless. The
problematique comes in when certain human rights coincide with those that are perceived to be
“hard to attain” – for example, the right to life is undeniable, but the right to education remains a
matter of financial capacity.
Where do we find human rights in the present international legal system?
The concept of human rights can be found in numerous treatises and other scholarly
works, but those that fall within the rubric of the international legal system are those which
originated from the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The enshrinement of human rights in these instruments was motivated by the desire to
prevent the repetition of the atrocities committed during World War II. Particularly, in the UN
Charter, faith is reaffirmed “in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of every
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” 13. The
express purposes of the United Nations include achieving “international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
11 There is debate, of course, if the recognized human right to life would apply to the “unborn” or the human fetus at the time of
conception; but this is a different matter of debate altogether. For our purposes, we use human rights as the rights of every human
being, regardless of what each legal system defines as a “person”.
12 Contrast this to the modifying circumstances of criminal law where a person may not only be exempt from liability, but there
may also be a pronouncement that no crime has been committed in the first place. This is because criminal laws are defined by
legislation, and therefore the existence of a crime is a function of how one legal system defines the circumstances in which the
crime is considered to have arisen. In the case of human rights, since they do not arise from any legislation but are inherent in
every civilization’s notion of justice, their violation will always be considered violations although liability may also be modified
in a certain limited number of cases to be discussed infra.
13 Preambular Clause, UN Charter.

without discrimination as to race, sex, language, or religion” . The UN Charter’s reference to
14
“fundamental human rights” found an authoritative expression in 1948 when the General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a compilation of 31 articles
articulating what the international community believes are the most basic and fundamental
rights that every human being is entitled to.
What is the legal status of the UDHR?
A General Assembly Resolution of the UN may be evidentiary of the existence of a

customary norm of international law that is binding on all states. However, such customary
status would depend on many factors like the existence of opinio juris to the contrary, or the
number of states-signatories, or the normative character of the content of the resolution 15. The
UDHR, therefore, is not a legally binding instrument per se just like all other UN GA Resolutions.
The ICJ, however, has made a categorical pronouncement that the content of the UDHR
already embodies principles that are legally binding 16. On such basis, we can validly argue that
the UDHR principles have already been elevated to the status of customary law.
How are human rights enforced?
Ideally, human rights are enforced domestically, where legal systems have evolved their
own laws punishing the violation of human rights17. In default of such laws, one can have resort
to international law, but only if all other available local remedies have been exhausted. Human
rights conventions have put in place mechanisms for the redress of human rights violations that
can be brought even by individuals (no need for espousal by their states, especially if the state
itself is accused of the violation) – examples of these are the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights established under the American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Court
of Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In the absence of such
international mechanisms (as the case is in Asia, where the only human rights court established
was the one in the Arab conference), human rights violations may be addressed in the UN
Human Rights Council. The HRC, however, can only act on cases by investigation and
recommendation. It undertakes a periodic review of all UN members’ human rights records – no
country can be spared from the review – and make recommendations to the General Assembly
accordingly. It can also consider emergency situations of human rights violations and make the
same recommendations to the GA. Ultimately, then, further measures need to be sanctioned by
the GA. If an act is properly attributable to a state under international law, a human rights
violation would entail the international responsibility of that state18. A case can therefore be
brought before the ICJ provided that the cause would be espoused by a state, and provided
further that such state espousing would have sufficient legal interest in the dispute. In sum,
14 Article 1 (3), UN Charter.

15 In the 1951 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, the ICJ recognized that the Convention on
Genocide was approved unanimously by the UN GA, and so its normative content is necessarily binding on all states. Any
reservation to the convention, therefore, should only be confined to the non-normative provisions. Otherwise, the reserving party
may be deemed as not having been a signatory at all.
16 In US v. Iran or the Hostages Case, the ICJ held Iran liable for the “wrongful deprivation of liberty and the imposition of
physical constraint in conditions of hardship” towards the American hostages in the US Embassy. Such rights, according to the
Court, as embodied in the UDHR, are legally binding in character, the violation of which would constitute a breach of a state’s
international obligation.
17 Obligations to protect and promote human rights may be embodied in domestic legislation to give it full force and effect.
However, if a state has ratified a human rights convention, it cannot modify its treaty obligation through domestic legislation.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a State may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. Once a state signs a treaty, therefore, it can only enact domestic legislation
to implement the treaty, or even afford more protection than what the treaty provides, but it can never lower the standards of
obligation embodied in the treaty.
18 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1988).

therefore, human rights enforcement very largely is centered on domestic legislation and
international treaty obligations. In default of both, an individual would find it hard to litigate a
case of violation. The UN can only step in to bring a case before international attention. If the
human rights abuse becomes so widespread and systematic as to constitute a threat to the
peace or a breach of the peace, then the Security Council can step into the picture provided all
the requisites are present and all procedures are complied with as provided in Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter.
What is the position of international human rights law vis-à-vis international

humanitarian law?
Both of these bodies of international law aim at protecting the interests of every
individual. However, international human rights law applies at all times and at all places, given
their inherent and universal nature. In contrast, international humanitarian law becomes
applicable only during instances of armed conflict. Does human rights law apply during armed
conflicts? YES. Since human rights are inviolable and inherent, they can never be modified by
contextual realities, even of armed conflict. Human rights will follow every human being
wherever and whenever. In armed conflicts, therefore, both human rights and humanitarian law
would apply simultaneously.
Is the exercise of human rights absolute in character?
NO. International human rights instruments, which are the concrete codifications of the
human rights embodied in the UDHR, recognize that the exercise of fundamental human rights
(like speech, expression, assembly, liberty of movement, and religion) may be subject to certain
lawful limitations. For such limitations to be lawful, however, they should pass the three-fold test
of lawfulness: (1) THE TEST OF LEGALITY. The limitations must be embodied in the law so
that citizens, who have every right to exercise their human rights to the fullest extent, can be
validly given notice of such limitations. (2) THE TEST OF PURPOSE. The limitations must be
imposed for one or more specified legitimate purposes, and such purposes should also be
known to the public. (3) THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY. The exercise of human rights is
always presumed to be undertaken in a democratic society. Using these standards, the nature
and extent of the limitations on the exercise of human rights must be adequately proportional to
the purposes for which they were imposed. The test is not whether the limitations are desirable
or not harmful, but whether there is a clear and compelling social purpose that will be served by
such act of limitation.
What are the current existing human rights instruments?
MANY. Aside from the UN Charter and the UDHR, there are multifarious instruments,
conventions, treaties, and protocols regarding human rights. The most popular ones are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Optional Protocols to these two, the
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. For our purposes, we will tackle
the two most widely-recognized instruments embodying the most comprehensive list of human
rights – the ICCPR and the ICESCR.

Why is there a seeming dichotomy between civil and political rights on one hand and
economic, social and cultural rights on the other?
The split between the ICCPR and the ICESCR is reflective of the ongoing debates
between those who believe that human rights ought to be universal and those who say that they
are culturally relative. This universalism-cultural relativism debate owes to the fact that
developed Western states maintain that civil and political rights must be afforded protection
alongside economic, social and cultural rights, and such standard must be the same all over the
world. Cultural relativists, on the other hand, believe that the protection of rights is a matter
relative to the culture of a particular society. The notable adherents of this view (mainly the
strongman rulers of Asia like Mahathir and Lee Kuan-Yew) believe that, for example, Asian
communities do not find it objectionable to sacrifice a measure of their civil and political rights in
favor of economic rights , especially if economic development would result to benefits accruing
to the entire community (Asians, they argue, are communitarian in nature while Westerners are
individualist in orientation, hence the refusal to derogate civil and political rights even for the
sake of collective development). The debate is still ongoing, and the West have made many
pronouncements that the cultural relativist argument is being used merely to justify strong state
measures aimed at economic development but entailing sacrifices of civil and political rights. In
the meantime, the single human rights document formerly prepared by the UN Commission on
Human Rights were split into two after much debate. The ICCPR, notably, was more palatable
to all concerned states because it contains absolute rules that are easily concretized, while the
ICESCR (which prescribes as human rights such rights as education, employment, and
adequate standard of living) was viewed as heavily contingent on the level of economic
development of the state.
Are there common provisions to the ICCPR and ICESCR?
YES. Common Article 1 of the two conventions recognize the Right to Self-
Determination, by virtue of which all peoples have the right to determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development19. Further, all peoples may, for
their own ends freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources and that in no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence20. The recognition of the right to self-
determination arose from a UN GA Resolution which equated the subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination, and exploitation to a denial of human rights and a violation of the UN
Charter21.
What do states undertake upon being parties to the ICCPR?
Each State party “undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the...Covenant, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status”22. The legal duty to ensure enjoyment of these rights
implies an obligation to take positive steps to see to it first, that domestic laws are modified
when necessary in order to comply with the State’s international legal obligations; and second,
that these laws are indeed effectively implemented in practice by all public organs and officials,
19 Common Article 1, par.1, ICCPR and ICESCR.

20 Common Article 1, par.2, ICCPR and ICESCR.
21 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960).
22 Article 2, ICCPR.

such as the courts (including administrative tribunals), prosecutors, police officers, prison
officials, schools, the military, hospitals and the like.
What are the rights guaranteed under ICCPR?
These are the right to life (art. 6;7), the right to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, including a prohibition on being subjected to medical or
scientific experimentation without one’s free consent (art. 7;8), the right to freedom from slavery,
the slave-trade and servitude [art. 8(1) and (2)], the right to freedom from forced and
compulsory labor [art. 8(3)], the right to liberty and security of person, including freedom from
arbitrary arrest and detention (art 9;9), the right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person (art. 10;10),
prohibition of imprisonment merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (art.
11), liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence [art. 12(1)], the right to be free
to leave any country, including one’s own [art. 12(2)], the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of
the right to enter one’s own country [art. 12(4)], certain legal safeguards against unlawful
expulsions of aliens lawfully in the territory of a State party (art. 13;11), the right to a fair hearing
in criminal and civil cases by an independent and impartial tribunal (art. 14;12), freedom from ex
post facto laws and the retroactive application of heavier penalties than those that could be
imposed when the crime was committed (art. 15), the right to recognition as a person before the
law (art. 16), the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy,
family, home or correspondence or to unlawful attacks on one’s honor and reputation (art.
17;13), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 18;14), the right to freedom
of opinion and of expression (art. 19;15), prohibition of war propaganda and of advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
(art. 20;16), the right to peaceful assembly (art. 21), the right to freedom of association (art. 22),
the right to marry freely, to found a family and to equal rights and responsibilities of spouses as
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution (art. 23;17), the right of the child to special
protection without discrimination; the right to be registered upon birth and the right to a
nationality (art. 24;18), the right to popular participation in public affairs; the right to vote in
periodic elections by universal and equal suffrage and secret ballot, as well as the right to have
access to public service (art. 25;19), the right to equality before the law and the equal protection
of the law (art. 26;20), and the right of minorities to enjoy their own culture, religion and
language (art. 27.21).
Can states derogate from their legal obligations under the ICCPR? Are there non-
derogable rights?
YES. Article 4 of the ICCPR is known as the Derogation Clause 23. The strict conditions
that govern the right of the States parties to resort to derogations from their legal obligations
under said Article are:
(1) the condition of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. The State party
envisaging a derogation must be facing a situation of exceptional threat that jeopardizes the
nation’s life, thus excluding minor or even more serious disturbances that do not affect the
functioning of the State’s democratic institutions or people’s lives in general.
23 Article 4 (1): In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin. (2): No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made
under this provision.
(2) the condition of official proclamation: the existence of a public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation must be “officially proclaimed”. As was explained during the drafting of
article 4, the purpose thereof was “to prevent States from derogating arbitrarily from their
obligations under the Covenant when such an action was not warranted by events” 24.
(3) the condition of non-derogability of certain obligations. Article 4(2) of the Covenant
enumerates some rights from which no derogation can ever be made even in the direst of
situations. These rights are: the right to life (art. 6), the right to freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7), the right to freedom from slavery, the
slave-trade and servitude (art. 8(1) and (2)), the right not to be imprisoned merely on the ground
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation (art. 11), the prohibition of ex post facto laws (art. 15),
the right to legal personality (art. 16) and, lastly, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion (art. 18). However, it follows from the work of the Human Rights Committee that it is not
possible to conclude a contrario that, because a specific right is not listed in article 4(2), it can
necessarily be derogated from. Consequently, some rights may not be derogated from because
they are considered to be “inherent to the Covenant as a whole”; one such example is the right
to judicial remedies in connection with arrests and detentions as set out in article 9(3) and (4);
others may also be non-derogable because they are indispensable to the effective enjoyment of
the rights that are explicitly listed in article 4(2), such as the right to a fair trial for persons
threatened with the death penalty. The Committee has further held under the Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR that “the right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute
right that may suffer no exception”.
(4) the condition of strict necessity. This condition means that the State party can only take
measures derogating from its “obligations under the ... Covenant to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation”; as compared to the ordinary limitation provisions dealt with
above, the condition of strict necessity compels a narrow construction of the principle of
proportionality, in that the legislative measures taken must as such be strictly required by the
exigencies of the emergency situation; and, secondly, any individual measure taken on the
basis of that legislation must likewise be strictly proportionate. It is thus necessary to consider
whether the measures concerned are strictly required in order to deal with the emergency
situation.
(5) the condition of consistency with other international legal obligations. On the basis of this
condition, the Human Rights Committee is, in principle, authorized to examine whether
measures of derogation might be unlawful as being inconsistent with other international treaties,
such as, for instance, other treaties for the protection of the individual or even international
humanitarian law or customary international law.
(6) the condition of non-discrimination. The measures of derogation may not “involve
discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin” (art.
4(1) in fine). This is an important condition since it is particularly in emergency situations that
there is a risk of imposing discriminatory measures which have no objective and reasonable
justification.
(7) the condition of international notification. In order to avail itself of the right of derogation, a
State party must, lastly, also fulfill the conditions set out in article 4(3) of the Covenant, by
immediately submitting a notification of derogation to the other States parties through the
Secretary-General. In this notification it must describe “the provisions from which it has
derogated and ... the reasons by which it was actuated”. A second notification must be
submitted “on the date on which it terminates such derogation”.
24 UN doc. E/CN.4/SR.195, p. 16, para. 82; explanation given by Mr. Cassin of France.
How are the provisions of the ICCPR implemented?
Under the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, there are three procedures for implementing
the provisions of the ICCPR: (1) the reportorial procedure25, (2) the inter-State communications
procedure26, and (3) the individual communications procedure27.
What do states undertake upon being parties to the ICESCR?
Each State party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
“undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
25 ICCPR, Article 40 (1) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit reports on the measures they have
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within
one year of the entry into force of the present Covenant for the State Parties concerned; (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee
so requests. (2) All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit them to the
Committee for consideration. Reports shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the implementation of the present
Covenant. (3) The Secretary-General of the United Nations, may, after consultation with the Committee, transmit to the
specialized agencies concerned copies of such parts of the reports as may fall within their field of competence. (4) The
Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such
general comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the Economic and
Social Council these comments along with the copies of the reports it has received from States Parties to the present Covenant.
(5) States Parties to the present Covenant may submit to the Committee observations on any comments that may be made in
accordance with paragraph 4 of this article.
26 ICCPR, Article 41 (1) A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare under this article that it recognizes the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State
Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be received and
considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the
Committee. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a
declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in accordance with the following procedure: (a) If a
State Party to the present Covenant considers that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of the present
Covenant, it may, by written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within three months after the
receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford the State which sent the communication an explanation, or any other
statement in writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to domestic
procedures and remedies taken, pending, or available in the matter; (b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both
States Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the initial communication, either State shall
have the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by notice given to the Committee and to the other State; (c) The Committee
shall deal with a matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been invoked and
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall not be the rule
where application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged; (d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article; (e) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the Committee shall make available its good
offices to the States Parties concerned with a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms as recognized in the present Covenant; (f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee may call upon the
States Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information; (g) The States Parties concerned,
referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be represented when the matter is being considered in the Committee and
to make submissions orally and/or in writing; (h) The Committee shall, within twelve months after the date of receipt of notice
under subparagraph (b), submit a report: (i) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall
confine its report to a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached; (ii) If a solution within the terms of subparagraph
(e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of
the oral submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report. In every matter, the report shall be
communicated to the States Parties concerned. (2) The provisions of this article shall come into force when ten States Parties to
the present Covenant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States
Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A
declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the
consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further
communication by any State Party shall be received after the notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by
the Secretary-General, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
27 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1: A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall
be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present Protocol.
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the ... Covenant by all
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures” (art. 2(1)).
Although the Covenant thus “provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the
constraints due to limits of available resources”, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights emphasized in General Comment No. 3 that “it also imposes various obligations
which are of immediate effect”. In the view of the Committee, two of these are of particular
importance, namely: first, the undertaking in article 2(2) “to guarantee that the rights enunciated
in the ... Covenant will be exercised without discrimination” on certain specific grounds; and
second, the undertaking in article 2(1) “‘to take steps’, which in itself, is not qualified or limited
by other considerations”. In other words, “while the full realization of the relevant rights may be
achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time
after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate,
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the
Covenant”.
What are the rights guaranteed under the ICESCR?
These are the right to work, including the right to gain one’s living by work freely chosen
or accepted (art. 6);
the right to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work, including fair remuneration for work of
equal value without distinction of any kind (art. 7); the right to form trade unions and join the
trade union of one’s choice (art. 8); the right to social security, including social insurance (art. 9);
protection and assistance to the family; marriage to be freely entered into; maternity protection;
protection and assistance to children and young persons (art. 10); right to an adequate standard
of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions (art. 11); the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health (art. 12); the right to education (art. 13;35); the undertaking to develop detailed plans of
action where compulsory primary education is not yet secured (art. 14;36); the right to take part
in cultural life, to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and to benefit from the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which
one is the author (art. 15).
Is the exercise of the rights under the ICESCR absolute in character?
NO. The ICESCR contains a general limitation in article 4, whereby the State may
subject the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant “only to such limitations as are
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and
solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”. Furthermore,
limitations relating to the exercise of specific rights are also contained in article 8(1)(a) and (c),
where the exercise of the right to form and join trade unions, as well as the right of trade unions
to function freely, may be subjected to no restrictions other than “those prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. From the travaux préparatoires
relating to article 4 it is clear that it was considered important to include the condition that
limitations had to be compatible with a democratic society, that is to say, “a society based on
respect for the rights and freedoms of others”; otherwise, it was suggested, the text might
instead “very well serve the ends of dictatorship”.
Can states derogate from their legal obligations under the ICESCR?

NO. Unlike the ICCPR, the ICESCR does not contain any provision permitting
derogations from the legal obligations incurred thereunder.
How are the provisions of the ICESCR implemented?
Under article 16 of the ICESCR, the parties undertake to submit “reports on the
measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the
rights recognized” therein, and it is the UN Economic and Social Council that is formally
entrusted with monitoring compliance with the terms thereof (art. 16(2)(a)). However, since the
early arrangements for examining the periodic reports were not satisfactory, the Council
created, in 1985, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as an organ of
independent experts parallel to the Human Rights Committee set up under the ICCPR. The
Committee consists of eighteen members who serve in their individual capacity. As is the case
with the Human Rights Committee, the reports submitted by the States parties are considered in
public meetings and in the presence of representatives of the State party concerned. The
discussion “is designed to achieve a constructive and mutually rewarding dialogue” so that the
Committee members can get a fuller picture of the situation prevailing in the country concerned,
thereby enabling them to make “the comments they believe most appropriate for the most
effective implementation of the obligations contained in the Covenant”.
2. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
International Criminal Tribunals28
A. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (THE

TADIC CASE)
On 30 April 1992, the Serb Democratic Party (“SDS”) conducted a bloodless take-over of
the town of Prijedor with the aid of the military and police forces. The actual take-over was
conducted in the early hours of the morning when armed Serbs took up positions at checkpoints
throughout Prijedor, with soldiers and snipers on the roofs of the main buildings. Military posts
were erected all over the city and the Serbian flag with four Cyrillic S's was flown from the City
Hall. Yugoslav People’s Army (“JNA”) soldiers, wearing a variety of uniforms, occupied all of the
prominent institutions such as the radio station, medical centre and bank. They entered
buildings, declared that they had taken power and announced their decision to rename the
Prijedor Municipality “Srpska opština Prijedor” (Serb Municipality of Prijedor). Muharem
Nezirević, the Editor-in-Chief of Radio Prijedor at the time, was summoned to the radio station in
the early morning of 30 April 1992. When he arrived, the radio station was surrounded by
soldiers. Milomir Stakić, who before the take-over had been Vice Chairman of the Municipal
Assembly and afterwards became the Chairman of the Serb Municipal Assembly, explained on
the radio what had happened and the SDS's intentions with regard to Prijedor municipality. The
attack on the nearby town of Kozarac on 24 May 1992, which included two days of artillery
barrage and an assault by a mechanised brigade of troops, resulted in the killing of some 800
civilians out of a population of around 4,000. When the town had been captured, the Bosnian
Serb forces proceeded to round up and drive out of the area on foot the entire non-Serb
population. During the course of the ethnic cleansing of Kozarac, many more civilians were
beaten, robbed and murdered by Bosnian Serb paramilitary and military forces.
28 Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion

During the occupation of Kozarac, Duško Tadić participated in the collection and forced
transfer of civilians. As the refugees were herded down the old Prijedor-Banja Luka road in the
direction of Kozaruša, many of them were singled out and, once removed from the column,
were shot by members of the Bosnian Serb forces. After the take-over of Prijedor and the
outlying areas, the Serb forces confined thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians in the
Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje camps. The establishment of these camps was part of the
“Greater Serbia plan” to expel non-Serbs from the Prijedor Municipality. During confinement,
both male and female prisoners were subjected to severe mistreatment, which included
beatings, sexual assaults, torture and executions. They were also subjected to degrading
psychological abuse, by being forced to spit on the Muslim flag, sing Serbian nationalist songs
or to give the Serbian three-fingered salute. Drinking water at Omarska was often denied to the
prisoners for long periods and was, in any event, unsuitable for human consumption, causing
sickness. There was very little in the way of lavatories; prisoners had to wait hours before being
allowed to use them, and sometimes risked being beaten if they asked to use them. Prisoners
were often forced to defecate and urinate in their rooms. There were no effective washing
facilities, and men and their clothes quickly became filthy and skin diseases were prevalent, as
were acute cases of diarrhoea and dysentery. The crowded rooms were stifling in the summer
heat and often guards refused to open windows in rooms crowded to overflowing, or demanded
the handing over of any possessions prisoners had managed to retain as the price of an open
window or a plastic jar of water.
On 7 May 1997, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgement, convicting Duško Tadić on
the basis of individual criminal responsibility (Article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal) with (1)
Crimes against humanity (Article 5 of the Statute - persecutions on political, racial and/or
religious grounds; inhumane acts), and (2) Violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3
thereof - cruel treatment). He was meted out a prison sentence of 20 years. Both the Defense
and the Prosecution appealed the Trial Chamber’s Decision on different grounds. The Defense
relies on the argument that there has been a denial of the right to a fair trial and that there has
been a mistake of facts. The Prosecution raises issues of international law, which will be
discussed below:
ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RAISED BY THE PROSECUTION ON APPEAL
Whether or not the victims were “protected persons” under Article 2 of the Tribunal’s
Statute (Trial Chamber held that some of them were not; Appeals Court found that the
victims are protected persons, and so the convictions of Tadic were increased)
1. When can there be grave breaches of international humanitarian law under Article 2 of the
Tribunal’s Statute?
When the conflict is international in character and the victims were “protected persons”.
2. When can a conflict be considered as international in character?
An armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. In addition, in
case of an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become
international if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii)
some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that other State.
3. What is the extent of control necessary to conclude that a group is a de facto organ of a
state?
International rules do not always require the same degree of control over armed groups or
private individuals for the purpose of determining whether an individual not having the status of
a State official under internal legislation can be regarded as a de facto organ of the State. The
extent of the requisite State control varies. Where the question at issue is whether a single
private individual or a group that is not militarily organised has acted as a de facto State organ
when performing a specific act, it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions
concerning the commission of that particular act had been issued by that State to the individual
or group in question; alternatively, it must be established whether the unlawful act had been
publicly endorsed or approved ex post facto by the State at issue. By contrast, control by a
State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall
character (and must comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or military
equipment or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the issuing
of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation. Under international
law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of
the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the
conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The
control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of
an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising, coordinating or planning the
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be
regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the
controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.
4. Who are “protected persons”?
Article 4(1) of Geneva Convention IV (protection of civilians), applicable to the case at issue,
defines “protected persons” - hence possible victims of grave breaches – as those "in the hands
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals". In other words,
subject to the provisions of Article 4(2), the Convention intends to protect civilians (in enemy
territory, occupied territory or the combat zone) who do not have the nationality of the belligerent
in whose hands they find themselves, or who are stateless persons. In addition, as is apparent
from the preparatory work, the Convention also intends to protect those civilians in occupied
territory who, while having the nationality of the Party to the conflict in whose hands they find
themselves, are refugees and thus no longer owe allegiance to this Party and no longer enjoy
its diplomatic protection. Nationals of a neutral State or a co-belligerent State are not treated as
“protected persons” unless they are deprived of or do not enjoy diplomatic protection. In other
words, those nationals are not “protected persons” as long as they benefit from the normal
diplomatic protection of their State; when they lose it or in any event do not enjoy it, the
Convention automatically grants them the status of “protected persons”.
5. Were the victims in this case protected persons?
YES. In the instant case the Bosnian Serbs, including Tadic, arguably had the same nationality
as the victims, that is, they were nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it has been
shown that the Bosnian Serb forces acted as de facto organs of another State, namely, the
FRY. Thus the requirements set out in Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV are met: the victims
were “protected persons” as they found themselves in the hands of armed forces of a State of
which they were not nationals. It might be argued that before 6 October 1992, when a
“Citizenship Act” was passed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nationals of the FRY had the
same nationality as the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the nationality of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even assuming that this proposition is correct, the
position would not alter from a legal point of view. Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV, if
interpreted in the light of its object and purpose, is directed to the protection of civilians to the
maximum extent possible. It therefore does not make its applicability dependent on formal
bonds and purely legal relations. Its primary purpose is to ensure the safeguards afforded by the
Convention to those civilians who do not enjoy the diplomatic protection, and correlatively are
not subject to the allegiance and control, of the State in whose hands they may find themselves.
In granting its protection, Article 4 intends to look to the substance of relations, not to their legal
characterisation as such. Hence, even if in the circumstances of the case the perpetrators and
the victims were to be regarded as possessing the same nationality, Article 4 would still be
applicable. Indeed, the victims did not owe allegiance to (and did not receive the diplomatic
protection of) the State (the FRY) on whose behalf the Bosnian Serb armed forces had been
fighting.
Whether or not crimes against humanity can be committed for purely personal motives
(Trial Chamber held in the negative 29; Appeals Court held that motives are an irrelevant
factor to consider in dealing with crimes against humanity)
1. Is mens rea relevant in crimes against humanity?
ONLY TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. It may be inferred from the words “directed against any civilian
population” in Article 5 of the Statute that the acts of the accused must comprise part of a
pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civilian population and that the
accused must have known that his acts fit into such a pattern. There is nothing in the Statute,
however, which mandates the imposition of a further condition that the acts in question must not
be committed for purely personal reasons, except to the extent that this condition is a
consequence or a re-statement of the other two conditions mentioned.
2. Can crimes against humanity be committed for purely personal reasons?
YES. The weight of authority supports the proposition that crimes against humanity can be
committed for purely personal reasons, provided it is understood that the two aforementioned
conditions – that the crimes must be committed in the context of widespread or systematic
crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his
acts, in the words of the Trial Chamber, “fitted into such a pattern” – are met. The conclusion is
therefore warranted that the relevant case-law and the spirit of international rules concerning
crimes against humanity make it clear that under customary law, “purely personal motives” do
not acquire any relevance for establishing whether or not a crime against humanity has been
perpetrated. The Trial Chamber correctly recognised that crimes which are unrelated to
widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population should not be prosecuted as crimes
against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes of a special nature to which a greater
degree of moral turpitude attaches than to an ordinary crime. Thus to convict an accused of
crimes against humanity, it must be proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a
civilian population (occurring during an armed conflict) and that the accused knew that his
crimes were so related. However, the Appeals Chamber does not consider it necessary to
further require, as a substantive element of mens rea, a nexus between the specific acts
allegedly committed by the accused and the armed conflict, or to require proof of the accused’s
motives. Consequently, in the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, the requirement that an act
must not have been carried out for the purely personal motives of the perpetrator does not form
part of the prerequisites necessary for conduct to fall within the definition of a crime against
humanity under Article 5 of the Tribunal’s Statute.
29 In the Judgment, the Trial Chamber identified, from among the elements which had to be satisfied before a conviction for
crimes against humanity could be recorded, the need to prove the existence of an armed conflict and a nexus between the acts in
question and the armed conflict. As to the nature of the nexus required, the Trial Chamber found that, subject to two caveats, it is
sufficient for the purposes of crimes against humanity that the act occurred “in the course or duration of an armed conflict”. The
first caveat was “that the act be linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed conflict”. The second caveat was that
the act and the conflict must be related or, at least, that the act must “not be unrelated to the armed conflict”. The Trial Chamber
further held that the requirement that the act must “not be unrelated” to the armed conflict involved two aspects. First, the
perpetrator must know of the broader context in which the act occurs. Secondly, the act must not have been carried out for the
purely personal motives of the perpetrator.
Whether or not all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent (Trial Chamber
held in the affirmative; Appeals Court reversed the decision, declaring that
discriminatory intent is not a requirement for crimes against humanity)
1. Does a textual interpretation of the Tribunal’s Statute warrant the conclusion that
discriminatory intent is necessary for all crimes against humanity?
NO. The ordinary meaning of Article 5 makes it clear that this provision does not require all
crimes against humanity to have been perpetrated with a discriminatory intent. Such intent is
only made necessary for one sub-category of those crimes, namely “persecutions” provided for
in Article 5 (h). A logical construction of Article 5 also leads to the conclusion that, generally
speaking, this requirement is not laid down for all crimes against humanity. Indeed, if it were
otherwise, why should Article 5(h) specify that “persecutions” fall under the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction if carried out “on political, racial and religious grounds”? This specification would be
illogical and superfluous. It is an elementary rule of interpretation that one should not construe a
provision or part of a provision as if it were superfluous and hence pointless: the presumption is
warranted that law-makers enact or agree upon rules that are well thought out and meaningful
in all their elements. The interpretation of Article 5 in the light of its object and purpose bears out
the above propositions. The aim of those drafting the Statute was to make all crimes against
humanity punishable, including those which, while fulfilling all the conditions required by the
notion of such crimes, may not have been perpetrated on political, racial or religious grounds as
specified in paragraph (h) of Article 5. In light of the humanitarian goals of the framers of the
Statute, one fails to see why they should have seriously restricted the class of offences coming
within the purview of “crimes against humanity”, thus leaving outside this class all the possible
instances of serious and widespread or systematic crimes against civilians on account only of
their lacking a discriminatory intent. For example, a discriminatory intent requirement would
prevent the penalization of random and indiscriminate violence intended to spread terror among
a civilian population as a crime against humanity. A fortiori, the object and purpose of Article 5
would be thwarted were it to be suggested that the discriminatory grounds required are limited
to the five grounds put forth by the Secretary-General in his Report and taken up (with the
addition, in one case, of the further ground of gender) in the statements made in the Security
Council by three of its members. Such an interpretation of Article 5 would create significant
lacunae by failing to protect victim groups not covered by the listed discriminatory grounds. The
experience of Nazi Germany demonstrated that crimes against humanity may be committed on
discriminatory grounds other than those enumerated in Article 5 (h), such as physical or mental
disability, age or infirmity, or sexual preference. Similarly, the extermination of “class enemies”
in the Soviet Union during the 1930s (admittedly, as in the case of Nazi conduct before the
Second World War, an occurrence that took place in times of peace, not in times of armed
conflict) and the deportation of the urban educated of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge
between 1975-1979, provide other instances which would not fall under the ambit of crimes
against humanity based on the strict enumeration of discriminatory grounds suggested by the
Secretary-General in his Report.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL)
The trial resulted from numerous war crimes attributed to the Empire of Japan (the entire
list of atrocities was cited in the decision and it is long. Very long.) as having been committed
during the entire period immediately preceding, and during, the World War II. The judgment of
the Tribunal first lists down all the sources of international legal obligations of Japan towards the
Allied Powers and all nations that they occupied during the war, such obligations having been

found to have been breached. These obligations, together with their corresponding sources,
are:
1. Obligations to preserve the territorial and administrative independence of China.
United States Declaration of 1901

Identic Notes of 1908
Nine-Power Treaty of 1922
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920
2. Obligations to preserve for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all
parts of China, the so-
called "Open Door Policy".
United States Declaration of 1900 to 1901

3. Obligations to suppress the manufacture, traffic in, and use of opium and analogous
drugs.
Opium Convention of 1912

League of Nations of 1925
Opium Convention of 1931
4. Obligations to respect the territory of Powers interested in the Pacific.
Four-Power Treaty of 1921

Notes to Netherlands and Portugal of 1926
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1920
5. Obligations to keep inviolate the territory of neutral Powers.
Hague V of 1907
6. Obligations to solve disputes between nations by diplomatic means, or mediation, or

arbitration.

Four-Power Treaty of 1921
Hague of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928
7. Obligations designed to ensure the pacific settlement of international disputes.
Hague of 1899
Hague of 1907
Pact of Paris of 1928
8. Obligation to give previous warning before commencing hostilities.
Hague III of 1907

9. Obligations relative to humane conduct in warfare.
Hague IV of 1907, Geneva Red Cross of 1929

Geneva P.O.W. of 1919
In addition, the relevant principles of international law enunciated in the decision of the Tribunal
were those made in response to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the accused Japanese
war officials. These jurisdictional defenses are:
1. The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to
include in the Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable "Crimes against
Peace" (Article 5(a));
2. Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as
an instrument of national policy does not enlarge the meaning of war crimes nor
constitute war a crime;
3. War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under
international law;
4. The provisions of the Charter are "ex post facto" legislation and therefore illegal;
5. The Instrument of Surrender which provides that the Declaration of Potsdam will be
given effect imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes as recognized by
international law at the date of the Declaration (26 July, 1945) would be the only crimes
prosecuted;
6. Killings in the course of belligerent operations except in so far as they constitute

violations of the rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents
of war and are not murder;
7. Several of the accused being prisoners of war are triable by court martial as provide
by the Geneva Convention 1929 and not by this Tribunal.
To these defenses the Tribunal quotes the same passage in the Nuremberg Tribunal decision
before which the same challenges were raised by German war officials. The passage reads:
“The Charter [referring to the Charter creating the Tribunal] is not an arbitrary
exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations but is the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation. The question is what was the
legal effect of this pact (Pact of Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed
the pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for the
future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it. After the signing of
the pact any nation resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the
pact. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war
is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, with
its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. The
principle of international law which under certain circumstances protects the
representative of a state cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as
criminal by international law. The authors of these acts cannot shelter
themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from punishment in
appropriate proceedings. The maxim 'nullum crimen sine lege' is not a limitation
of sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to
punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked
neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue for in such
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it
being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go
unpunished. The Charter specifically provides . . . 'the fact that a defendant acted
pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment.' This provision
is in conformity with the laws of all nations . . . The true test which is found in
varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations is not the existence of the
order but whether moral choice was in fact possible”.
The Tribunal also established the rationale for holding responsible government officials for the
ill-treatment of prisoners during the war. In placing the burden of ensuring the proper treatment
of prisoners upon the government (rather than merely the military officers actually engaged in
war in the field) of the state holding them in detention, the Tribunal ratiocinated:
“Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are in the power of the Government
which captures them. This was not always the case. For the last two centuries,
however, this position has been recognised and the customary law to this effect
was formally embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 and repeated in
the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of
prisoners of war and of civilian internees (all of who we will refer to as
"prisoners") rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This
responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance but extends to the
prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which
are forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by conventions are to
be prevented by the Government having responsibility for the prisoners.
In the discharge of these duties to prisoners Governments must have resort to

persons. Indeed the Governments responsible, in this sense, are those persons
who direct and control the functions of Government. In this case and in the above
regard we are concerned with the members of the Japanese Cabinet. The duty to
prisoners is not a meaningless obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a
specific duty to be performed in the first case by those persons who constitute
the Government. In the multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern
government there is of necessity an elaborate system of subdivision and
delegation of duties. In the case of the duty of Governments to prisoners held by
them in time of war those persons who constitute the Government have the
principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners, even though they
delegate the duties of maintenance and protection to others.
In general the responsibility for prisoners held by Japan may be stated to have
rested upon:
1. Members of the Government;
2. Military or Naval Officers in command of formations having prisoners in

their possession;
3. Officials in those departments which were concerned with the well-being

of prisoners;
4. Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct and immediate

control of prisoners.
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment
of prisoners and to prevent their ill-treatment by establishing and securing the
continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes.
Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill-treatment of
prisoners if:
1. They fail to establish such a system.
2. If having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and
efficient working.
Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he
neglects to do so he is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by merely
instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its
application. An Army Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must be at
the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders in this respect as he would in
respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance.
Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its
continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war crimes be
committed unless:
1. They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and having
such knowledge they failed to
take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of
such crimes in the future, or
2. They are at fault in having railed to acquire such knowledge.
If, such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had
such knowledge he is not excused for inaction if his Office required or permitted
him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not enough
for the exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he
accepted assurances from others more directly associated with the control of the
prisoners if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of
reports of such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should have been put
upon further enquiry as to whether those assurances were true or untrue. That
crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters
to be considered in imputing knowledge.
A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal organs of the

Government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved from
responsibility if, having knowledge of the commission of the crimes in the sense
already discussed, and omitting or failing to secure the taking of measures to
prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, he elects to continue as a
member of the Cabinet. This is the position even though the Department of which
he has the charge is not directly concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet
member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners, but elects
to remain in the Cabinet thereby continuing to participate in its collective
responsibility for protection of prisoners he willingly assumes responsibility for
any ill-treatment in the future.

Army of Navy Commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent
ill-treatment of prisoners. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. if crimes are
committed against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurance of which
they had, or should have had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for
those crimes. If, for example, it be shown that within the units under his
command conventional war crimes have been committed of which he knew or
should have known, a commander who takes no adequate steps to prevent the
occurrence of such crimes in the future will be responsible for such future crimes.
Department Officials having knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners are not

responsible by reason of their failure to resign; but if their functions included the
administration of the system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should
have had knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the extent of their
powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future that they are responsible for
such future crimes”.
C. THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
The trial resulted from the war crimes and other atrocities imputed to German war
officials during the World War II. Like the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the decision of the
Tribunal in Nuremberg lists down (at length) all the atrocities allegedly committed by Germany
during the war, particularly in European states that they have occupied and against the Jewish
people who have become primary victims of its Aryanist campaign. For the purposes of
international law, the following are some of the essential principles enunciated by the Tribunal in
response to the various defenses raised by the accused German war officials.
1. FIRST DEFENSE: The humanitarian law provisions of the Hague Convention do not
apply because some of the states who participated in the War were not parties to the
Convention. The Tribunal rejects this proposition and categorically states that the
provisions of the Hague Convention are articulations of customary international law
relating to warfare and so all states are bound to them regardless of conventional
obligations:
It is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in this case,
because of the "general participation " clause in Article 2 of the Hague
Convention of 1907. That clause provided:
"The provisions contained in the regulations (Rules of Land Warfare

referred to in Article 1 as well as in the present Convention do not apply
except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents
are parties to the Convention."
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to this
Convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this question.

The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly
represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their
adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that it was an attempt " to
revise the general laws and customs of war," which it thus recognised to
be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention
were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being
declaratory of the laws and customs of war which are referred to in Article
6 (b) of the Charter.
2. SECOND DEFENSE: The rules of warfare ceased to be applicable by the time the
occupied territories were incorporated into Germany because, by then, they are to be
treated as German territory and Germany can choose to deal with such territories as
though they were part of it. The Tribunal rejects this argument, saying that the doctrine
of subjugation is not applicable as long as there remains a force of resistance within the
occupied territories, and as long as such territories were not sufficiently shown to have
been incorporated into the occupying power through evidence:
“A further submission was made that Germany was no longer bound by

the rules of land warfare in many of the territories occupied during the
war, because Germany had completely subjugated those countries and
incorporated them into the German Reich, a fact which gave Germany
authority to deal with the occupied countries as though they were part of
Germany. In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case to
decide whether this doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon
military conquest, has any application where the subjugation is the result
of the crime of aggressive war. The doctrine was never considered to be
applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting to restore
the occupied countries to their true owners, and in this case, therefore,
the doctrine could not apply to any territories occupied after the 1st
September, 1939. As to the war crimes committed in Bohemia and
Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories were never added to
the Reich, but a mere protectorate was established over them.”
3. THIRD DEFENSE: There were committed no crimes against humanity during the war.
The Tribunal only partly disagrees with this, because there was no sufficient evidence to
establish that, before 1939, crimes against humanity have been committed. However,
after 1939, crimes against humanity have undoubtedly been committed either through
(1) war crimes, which are also crimes against humanity or (2) crimes committed in the
execution of an aggressive war, the latter being under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and
as such would also constitute crimes against humanity:
“With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt whatever that political opponents
were murdered in Germany before the war, and that many of them were kept in concentration
camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out
on a vast scale, and in many cases was organised and systematic. The policy of persecution,
repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to be
hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the
same period is established beyond all doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts
relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in connection with, any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and
horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done
in execution of, or in connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a
general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning
of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast
scale, which were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in
the Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they
were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore
constituted crimes against humanity.”

30
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Rome Statute)
Overview
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court. This was done so to create a
permanent tribunal which would deal with grave crimes that threaten the peace, security and
well-being of the world. This Tribunal shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
PART 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT
Art 1 Establishes the ICC as a permanent institution having jurisdiction over most serious crimes
of national concern and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.
Art 3 – The seat of the Court is in the Netherlands at Hague
Art 4 – The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity
as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.
PART 2 JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY, AND APPLICABLE LAW
Art 5 Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the following crimes
a) Genocide
b) Crimes against humanity
c) War crimes
d) Crime of aggression – Court shall exercise jurisdiction over this once a provision is
adopted defining this crime.
Art 6 Genocide
- acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Art 7 Crimes against humanity

-any of the following acts when committed as part of a (1) widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population (2) with knowledge of the attack
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
30 Thanks to mj navarro for this portion

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are
universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred
to in this
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
However, the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had
knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the
State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is
satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.
“Attack directed against a civilian population” in these context elements is understood to mean a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in article 7, paragraph 1,
of the Statute against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack.
Art 8 War Crimes

The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as
part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
• There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an

armed conflict or its character as international or non-international;
• In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that
established the character of the conflict as international or non-international;
• There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established
the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and
was associated with”.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
following acts:
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated
and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
Article 11 Jurisdiction ratione temporis
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into
force of this Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of
this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under article 12,
paragraph 3.
Article 12 Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction
1. State Party accepts the jurisdiction of ICC
2. Before exercising jurisdiction, one or more of the following States shall be Parties to the
Statute or shall have accepted the jurisdiction of ICC
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime
was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or
aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State not a Party to this Statute
-by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court
with respect to the crime in question.
Art 13 Exercise of jurisdiction if:
(a) referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party

(b) referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with article 15
Article 14
Referral of a situation by a State Party
Article 15 Prosecutor
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information
on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received.
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an

investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization
of an investigation.

4. If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material,
considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the
investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the
jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the
presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence
regarding the same situation.
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor
concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an
investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the information. This shall not
preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to him or her regarding
the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.
Article 16 Deferral of investigation or prosecution
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.
Article 17 Issues of admissibility
1. A case is inadmissible where:
(a) It is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it,
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
(b) It has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of
the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having
regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of
the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings made to shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially,
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to
carry out its proceedings.
Article 20 Ne bis in idem

1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with
respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been
convicted or acquitted by the Court.
2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which
that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under
article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the
proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance

with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Article 21 Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of
armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on
grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status.
PART 3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege (No crime if there is no law punishing it)
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted.
Article 23 Nulla poena sine lege

A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.
Article 24 Non-retroactivity ratione personae
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the
entry into force of the Statute.
2. In the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or
convicted shall apply.
Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs
or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing
the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of

such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution
shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of
the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit
genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by
means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances
independent of the person's intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort
to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable
for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person
completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.
Article 26 Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under eighteen
Article 29 Non-applicability of statute of limitations
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of
limitations.
Article 30 Mental element

1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements
are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;

(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be
construed accordingly.
Article 31 Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this
Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's
conduct:
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease

(b) The person is in a state of intoxication unless the person has become
voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances that the person knew, or
disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to
engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another
person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the
survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for
accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of
force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the
other person or property protected.
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or
of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another
person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat,
provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one
sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or

(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.
Article 32 Mistake of fact or mistake of law
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it

negates the mental element required by the crime.
2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the

jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A
mistake of law may, however, be a ground
Article 33 Superior orders and prescription of law
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a
person
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian,
shall not
relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government
or the
superior in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity
are
manifestly unlawful.
International Humanitarian Law
A. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS31
The First Convention
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
WHEN DOES IT APPLY

Art. 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof.
WHAT IS REQUIRED [who are the protected people; how to treat them]
Art. 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
31 Thanks to marco lainez for this portion

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
Art. 4. Neutral Powers shall apply by analogy the provisions of the present Convention to the
wounded and sick, and to members of the medical personnel and to chaplains of the armed
forces of the Parties to the conflict, received or interned in their territory, as well as to dead
persons found.
Art. 5. For the protected persons who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, the present
Convention shall apply until their final repatriation.
Art. 7. Wounded and sick, as well as members of the medical personnel and chaplains, may in
no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Art. 9. The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian
activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned,
undertake for the protection of wounded and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for
their relief.
CHAPTER II. WOUNDED AND SICK

Art. 12. Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who
are wounded or sick, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.
They shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party to the conflict in whose power
they may be, without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political
opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons,
shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exterminated, subjected to
torture or to biological experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and
care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be
administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex. The Party to the conflict
which is compelled to abandon wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military
considerations permit, leave with them a part of its medical personnel and material to assist in
their care.
Art. 13. The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and sick belonging to the following
categories:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority
not recognized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as
civil members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and
the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable
treatment under any other provisions in international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously
take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.
Art. 14. Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded and sick of a belligerent who fall
into enemy hands shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law concerning
prisoners of war shall apply to them.
Art. 15. At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without
delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect
them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead
and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be arranged,
or local arrangements made, to permit the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left
on the battlefield.
Likewise, local arrangements may be concluded between Parties to the conflict for the
removal or exchange of wounded and sick from a besieged or encircled area, and for the
passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that area.
DUTY TO RECORD THE WOUNDED/SICK/DEAD

Art. 16. Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible, in respect of each wounded, sick
or dead person of the adverse Party falling into their hands, any particulars which may assist in
his identification.
These records should if possible include:
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number;
(c) surname;
(d) first name or names;
(e) date of birth;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc;
(g) date and place of capture or death;
(h) particulars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of death.
As soon as possible the above mentioned information shall be forwarded to the Information
Bureau described in Article 122 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of 12 August 1949, which shall transmit this information to the Power on which these
persons depend through the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central Prisoners
of War Agency.

Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the same bureau,
certificates of death or duly authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and
forward through the same bureau one half of a double identity disc, last wills or other documents
of importance to the next of kin, money and in general all articles of an intrinsic or sentimental
value, which are found on the dead. These articles, together with unidentified articles, shall be
sent in sealed packets, accompanied by statements giving all particulars necessary for the
identification of the deceased owners, as well as by a complete list of the contents of the parcel.
RIGHT TO BURIAL
Art. 17. Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial or cremation of the dead, carried out
individually as far as circumstances permit, is preceded by a careful examination, if possible by
a medical examination, of the bodies, with a view to confirming death, establishing identity and
enabling a report to be made. One half of the double identity disc, or the identity disc itself if it is
a single disc, should remain on the body.
Bodies shall not be cremated except for imperative reasons of hygiene or for motives
based on the religion of the deceased. In case of cremation, the circumstances and reasons for
cremation shall be stated in detail in the death certificate or on the authenticated list of the dead.
They shall further ensure that the dead are honourably interred, if possible according to
the rites of the religion to which they belonged, that their graves are respected, grouped if
possible according to the nationality of the deceased, properly maintained and marked so that
they may always be found. For this purpose, they shall organize at the commencement of
hostilities an Official Graves Registration Service, to allow subsequent exhumations and to
ensure the identification of bodies, whatever the site of the graves, and the possible
transportation to the home country. These provisions shall likewise apply to the ashes, which
shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with
the wishes of the home country.
As soon as circumstances permit, and at latest at the end of hostilities, these Services
shall exchange, through the Information Bureau mentioned in the second paragraph of Article
16, lists showing the exact location and markings of the graves, together with particulars of the
dead interred therein.
THOSE WHO AID THE WOUNDED ARE NOT TO BE HARMED

Art. 18. The military authorities may appeal to the charity of the inhabitants voluntarily to collect
and care for, under their direction, the wounded and sick, granting persons who have responded
to this appeal the necessary protection and facilities. Should the adverse Party take or retake
control of the area, he shall likewise grant these persons the same protection and the same
facilities.
The military authorities shall permit the inhabitants and relief societies, even in invaded
or occupied areas, spontaneously to collect and care for wounded or sick of whatever
nationality. The civilian population shall respect these wounded and sick, and in particular
abstain from offering them violence.
No one may ever be molested or convicted for having nursed the wounded or
sick.
The provisions of the present Article do not relieve the occupying Power of its obligation
to give both physical and moral care to the wounded and sick.
Chapter III. Medical Units and Establishments

Art. 19. Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical Service may in no
circumstances be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to
the conflict. Should they fall into the hands of the adverse Party, their personnel shall be free to
pursue their duties, as long as the capturing Power has not itself ensured the necessary care of
the wounded and sick found in such establishments and units.

MEDICAL UNITS GONE BAD
Art. 22. The following conditions shall not be considered as depriving a medical unit or
establishment of the protection guaranteed by Article 19:
(1) That the personnel of the unit or establishment are armed, and that they use the arms in
their own defence, or in that of the wounded and sick in their charge.
(2) That in the absence of armed orderlies, the unit or establishment is protected by a picket or
by sentries or by an escort.
(3) That small arms and ammunition taken from the wounded and sick and not yet handed to
the proper service, are found in the unit or establishment.
(4) That personnel and material of the veterinary service are found in the unit or establishment,
without forming an integral part thereof.
(5) That the humanitarian activities of medical units and establishments or of their personnel
extend to the care of civilian wounded or sick.
Chapter IV. Personnel

Art. 24. Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or
treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in
the administration of medical units and establishments, as well as chaplains attached to the
armed forces, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances.
CAPTURED HEALTH WORKER/HELPERS

Art. 28. Personnel designated in Articles 24 and 26 who fall into the hands of the adverse Party,
shall be retained only in so far as the state of health, the spiritual needs and the number of
prisoners of war require.
Personnel thus retained shall not be deemed prisoners of war. Nevertheless they
shall at least benefit by all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. Within the framework of the military laws and regulations of
the Detaining Power, and under the authority of its competent service, they shall continue to
carry out, in accordance with their professional ethics, their medical and spiritual duties on
behalf of prisoners of war, preferably those of the armed forces to which they themselves
belong. They shall further enjoy the following facilities for carrying out their medical or spiritual
duties:
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically the prisoners of war in labour units or hospitals
outside the camp. The Detaining Power shall put at their disposal the means of transport
required.
(b) In each camp the senior medical officer of the highest rank shall be responsible to the
military authorities of the camp for the professional activity of the retained medical personnel.
For this purpose, from the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall agree regarding
the corresponding seniority of the ranks of their medical personnel, including those of the
societies designated in Article 26. In all questions arising out of their duties, this medical officer,
and the chaplains, shall have direct access to the military and medical authorities of the camp
who shall grant them the facilities they may require for correspondence relating to these
questions.
(c) Although retained personnel in a camp shall be subject to its internal discipline, they shall
not, however, be required to perform any work outside their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities the Parties to the conflict shall make arrangements for relieving where possible
retained personnel, and shall settle the procedure of such relief.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining Power of the obligations imposed
upon it with regard to the medical and spiritual welfare of the prisoners of war.

Art. 30. Personnel whose retention is not indispensable by virtue of the provisions of Article 28
shall be returned to the Party to the conflict to whom they belong, as soon as a road is open for
their return and military requirements permit.
Pending their return, they shall not be deemed prisoners of war. Nevertheless they shall
at least benefit by all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. They shall continue to fulfil their duties under the orders of
the adverse Party and shall preferably be engaged in the care of the wounded and sick of the
Party to the conflict to which they themselves belong.
On their departure, they shall take with them the effects, personal belongings, valuables
and instruments belonging to them.
Art. 31. The selection of personnel for return under Article 30 shall be made irrespective of any
consideration of race, religion or political opinion, but preferably according to the chronological
order of their capture and their state of health.
As from the outbreak of hostilities, Parties to the conflict may determine by special
agreement the percentage of personnel to be retained, in proportion to the number of prisoners
and the distribution of the said personnel in the camps.
Chapter V. Buildings and Material

Art. 33. The material of mobile medical units of the armed forces which fall into the hands of the
enemy, shall be reserved for the care of wounded and sick.
The buildings, material and stores of fixed medical establishments of the armed forces
shall remain subject to the laws of war, but may not be diverted from their purpose as long as
they are required for the care of wounded and sick. Nevertheless, the commanders of forces in
the field may make use of them, in case of urgent military necessity, provided that they make
previous arrangements for the welfare of the wounded and sick who are nursed in them.
The material and stores defined in the present Article shall not be intentionally
destroyed.
Chapter VI. Medical Transports

Art. 35. Transports of wounded and sick or of medical equipment shall be respected and
protected in the same way as mobile medical units.
Should such transports or vehicles fall into the hands of the adverse Party, they shall be
subject to the laws of war, on condition that the Party to the conflict who captures them shall in
all cases ensure the care of the wounded and sick they contain.
The civilian personnel and all means of transport obtained by requisition shall be subject
to the general rules of international law.
Art. 36. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded
and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but
shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically
agreed upon between the belligerents concerned.
They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem prescribed in Article 38,
together with their national colours on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be
provided with any other markings or means of identification that may be agreed upon between
the belligerents upon the outbreak or during the course of hostilities.
Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.
Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus
imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.
In the event of an involuntary landing in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, the
wounded and sick, as well as the crew of the aircraft shall be prisoners of war. The medical
personnel shall be treated according to Article 24 and the Articles following.
Chapter VII. The Distinctive Emblem

Art. 38. As a compliment to Switzerland, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white
ground, formed by reversing the Federal colours, is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign
of the Medical Service of armed forces.
Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as emblem, in place of the red
cross, the red crescent or the red lion and sun on a white ground, those emblems are also
recognized by the terms of the present Convention.
Art. 40. The personnel designated in Article 24 and in Articles 26 and 27 shall wear, affixed to
the left arm, a water-resistant armlet bearing the distinctive emblem, issued and stamped by the
military authority.
Such personnel, in addition to wearing the identity disc mentioned in Article 16, shall
also carry a special identity card bearing the distinctive emblem. This card shall be water-
resistant and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket. It shall be worded in the national
language, shall mention at least the surname and first names, the date of birth, the rank and the
service number of the bearer, and shall state in what capacity he is entitled to the protection of
the present Convention. The card shall bear the photograph of the owner and also either his
signature or his finger-prints or both. It shall be embossed with the stamp of the military
authority.
The identity card shall be uniform throughout the same armed forces and, as far as
possible, of a similar type in the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties. The Parties to the
conflict may be guided by the model which is annexed, by way of example, to the present
Convention. They shall inform each other, at the outbreak of hostilities, of the model they are
using. Identity cards should be made out, if possible, at least in duplicate, one copy being kept
by the home country.
In no circumstances may the said personnel be deprived of their insignia or identity
cards nor of the right to wear the armlet. In case of loss, they shall be entitled to receive
duplicates of the cards and to have the insignia replaced.
Chapter VIII. Execution of the Convention

Art. 46. Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equipment protected by the
Convention are prohibited.
Art. 47. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to
disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective
countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if
possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire
population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.
Chapter IX. Repression of Abuses and Infractions

DUTY TO LEGISLATE
Art. 49. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out
a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined
in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those
following, of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August
1949.
Art. 50. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of
the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Art. 53. The use by individuals, societies, firms or companies either public or private, other than
those entitled thereto under the present Convention, of the emblem or the designation " Red
Cross " or " Geneva Cross " or any sign or designation constituting an imitation thereof,
whatever the object of such use, and irrespective of the date of its adoption, shall be
prohibited at all times.
By reason of the tribute paid to Switzerland by the adoption of the reversed Federal
colours, and of the confusion which may arise between the arms of Switzerland and the
distinctive emblem of the Convention, the use by private individuals, societies or firms, of the
arms of the Swiss Confederation, or of marks constituting an imitation thereof, whether as
trademarks or commercial marks, or as parts of such marks, or for a purpose contrary to
commercial honesty, or in circumstances capable of wounding Swiss national sentiment, shall
be prohibited at all times.
Nevertheless, such High Contracting Parties as were not party to the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929, may grant to prior users of the emblems, designations, signs or
marks designated in the first paragraph, a time limit not to exceed three years from the coming
into force of the present Convention to discontinue such use provided that the said use shall not
be such as would appear, in time of war, to confer the protection of the Convention.
The prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of the present Article shall also apply,
without effect on any rights acquired through prior use, to the emblems and marks mentioned in
the second paragraph of Article 38.
The Second Convention
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
minimum, the following
provisions:

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
torture;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and cared for.
conflict.
Art 4. In case of hostilities between land and naval forces of Parties to the conflict, the
provisions of the present Convention shall apply only to forces on board ship.
Forces put ashore shall immediately become subject to the provisions of the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field of August 12, 1949.
Art 5. Neutral Powers shall apply by analogy the provisions of the present Convention to the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and to members of the medical personnel and to chaplains of
the armed forces of the Parties to the conflict received or interned in their territory, as well as to
dead persons found.
Art 7. Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, as well as members of the medical personnel
and chaplains, may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to
them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing
Article, if such there be.
Chapter II. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked

Art 12. Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who
are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all
circumstances, it being understood that the term "shipwreck" means shipwreck from any cause
and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft.
Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties to the conflict in
whose power they may be, without any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality,
religion, political opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts upon their lives, or violence
to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or
exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not wilfully be left
without medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or
infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be
administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
Art 13. The present Convention shall apply to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea
belonging to the following categories:
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany.
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously
OBLIGATIONS OF THE RESCUED

Art 14. All warships of a belligerent Party shall have the right to demand that the wounded, sick
or shipwrecked on board military hospital ships, and hospital ships belonging to relief societies
or to private individuals, as well as merchant vessels, yachts and other craft shall be
surrendered, whatever their nationality, provided that the wounded and sick are in a fit state to
be moved and that the warship can provide adequate facilities for necessary medical treatment.
Art 15. If wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons are taken on board a neutral warship or
a neutral military aircraft, it shall be ensured, where so required by international law, that
they can take no further part in operations of war.
Art 16. Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked of a
belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of
international law concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them. The captor may decide,
according to circumstances, whether it is expedient to hold them, or to convey them to a port in
the captor's own country, to a neutral port or even to a port in enemy territory. In the last case,
prisoners of war thus returned to their home country may not serve for the duration of
the war.
Art 17. Wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons who are landed in neutral ports with the consent
of the local authorities, shall, failing arrangements to the contrary between the neutral and the
belligerent Powers, be so guarded by the neutral Power, where so required by international law,
that the said persons cannot again take part in operations of war.
The costs of hospital accommodation and internment shall be borne by the Power on
whom the wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons depend.

Art 18. After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible
measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against
pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent
their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties to the conflict shall conclude local
arrangements for the removal of the wounded and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled
area and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way to that
area.
DUTY TO NOTIFY
Art 19. The Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible, in respect of each
shipwrecked, wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse Party falling into their hands, any
particulars which may assist in his identification. These records should if possible include:
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number;
(c) surname;
(d) first name or names;
(e) date of birth;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc;
(g) date and place of capture or death;
(h) particulars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of death.
As soon as possible the above-mentioned information shall be forwarded to the information
bureau described in Article 122 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August 12, 1949, which shall transmit this information to the Power on which these
persons depend through the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central Prisoners
of War Agency.
Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the same bureau,
certificates of death or duly authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and
forward through the same bureau one half of the double identity disc, or the identity disc itself if
it is a single disc, last wills or other documents of importance to the next of kin, money and in
general all articles of an intrinsic or sentimental value, which are found on the dead. These
articles, together with unidentified articles, shall be sent in sealed packets, accompanied by
statements giving all particulars necessary for the identification of the deceased owners, as well
as by a complete list of the contents of the parcel.
Art 20. Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial at sea of the dead, carried out individually
as far as circumstances permit, is preceded by a careful examination, if possible by a medical
examination, of the bodies, with a view to confirming death, establishing identity and enabling a
report to be made. Where a double identity disc is used, one half of the disc should remain on
the body.
If dead persons are landed, the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August
12, 1949 shall be applicable.
Art 21. The Parties to the conflict may appeal to the charity of commanders of neutral merchant
vessels, yachts or other craft, to take on board and care for wounded, sick or shipwrecked
persons, and to collect the dead.
Vessels of any kind responding to this appeal, and those having of their own accord
collected wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons, shall enjoy special protection and facilities to
carry out such assistance.
They may, in no case, be captured on account of any such transport; but, in the absence
of any promise to the contrary, they shall remain liable to capture for any violations of neutrality
they may have committed.

Chapter III. Hospital Ships

Art 22. Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships built or equipped by the Powers specially and
solely with a view to assisting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to
transporting them, may in no circumstances be attacked or captured, but shall at all times be
respected and protected, on condition that their names and descriptions have been notified to
the Parties to the conflict ten days before those ships are employed.
The characteristics which must appear in the notification shall include registered gross
tonnage, the length from stem to stern and the number of masts and funnels.
Art 23. Establishments ashore entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August
12, 1949 shall be protected from bombardment or attack from the sea.
Art 24. Hospital ships utilized by National Red Cross Societies, by officially recognized relief
societies or by private persons shall have the same protection as military hospital ships and
shall be exempt from capture, if the Party to the conflict on which they depend has given them
an official commission and in so far as the provisions of Article 22 concerning notification have
been complied with.
These ships must be provided with certificates from the responsible authorities, stating
that the vessels have been under their control while fitting out and on departure.
Art 28. Should fighting occur on board a warship, the sick-bays shall be respected and spared
as far as possible. Sick-bays and their equipment shall remain subject to the laws of warfare,
but may not be diverted from their purpose so long as they are required for the wounded and
sick. Nevertheless, the commander into whose power they have fallen may, after ensuring the
proper care of the wounded and sick who are accommodated therein, apply them to other
purposes in case of urgent military necessity.
Art 29. Any hospital ship in a port which falls into the hands of the enemy shall be
authorized to leave the said port.
Art 30. The vessels described in Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27 shall afford relief and assistance to
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked without distinction of nationality.
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to use these vessels for any military
purpose.
Such vessels shall in no wise hamper the movements of the combatants.
During and after an engagement, they will act at their own risk.
Art 33. Merchant vessels which have been transformed into hospital ships cannot be put to any
other use throughout the duration of hostilities.
Art 35. The following conditions shall not be considered as depriving hospital ships or sick-bays
of vessels of the protection due to them:
(1) The fact that the crews of ships or sick-bays are armed for the maintenance of order, for
their own defence or that of the sick and wounded.
(2) The presence on board of apparatus exclusively intended to facilitate navigation or
communication.
(3) The discovery on board hospital ships or in sick-bays of portable arms and ammunition
taken from the wounded, sick and shipwrecked and not yet handed to the proper service.
(4) The fact that the humanitarian activities of hospital ships and sick-bays of vessels or of the
crews extend to the care of wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians.
(5) The transport of equipment and of personnel intended exclusively for medical duties, over
and above the normal requirements.
Chapter IV. Personnel

Art 36. The religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews shall be
respected and protected; they may not be captured during the time they are in the service of
the hospital ship, whether or not there are wounded and sick on board.
Chapter V. Medical Transports (very similar to medical land transports)

Art 38. Ships chartered for that purpose shall be authorized to transport equipment exclusively
intended for the treatment of wounded and sick members of armed forces or for the prevention
of disease, provided that the particulars regarding their voyage have been notified to the
adverse Power and approved by the latter. The adverse Power shall preserve the right to board
the carrier ships, but not to capture them or seize the equipment carried.
By agreement amongst the Parties to the conflict, neutral observers may be placed on
board such ships to verify the equipment carried. For this purpose, free access to the equipment
shall be given.
Chapter VI. The Distinctive Emblem (same pa rin)

Art 41. Under the direction of the competent military authority, the emblem of the red cross on a
white ground shall be displayed on the flags, armlets and on all equipment employed in the
Medical Service.
Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as emblem, in place of the red cross,
the red crescent or the red lion and sun on a white ground, these emblems are also recognized
by the terms of the present Convention.
Chapter VIII. Repression of Abuses and Infractions (same)
Art 50. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and
in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to
another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out
a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined
in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those
following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949.
Art 51. Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of
the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The Third Convention

Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
provisions:
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this
end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
torture;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
conflict.
DEFINITION OF POW
Art 4. A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to
one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:[
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority
civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
have received authorization, from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the
occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even
though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it
occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the
armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to
comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have
been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers
are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15,
30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to
the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the
Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these
persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power
as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties
normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided
for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
Art 5. The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time
they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and
having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article
4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their
status has been determined by a competent tribunal.
Art 7. Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights
secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the
foregoing Article, if such there be.
Part II. General Protection of Prisoners of War

Art 12. Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or
military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may
exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a
party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and
ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred
under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the
Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any
important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being
notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request
the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.
Art 13. Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission
by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war
in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention.
In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of
violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
Art 14. Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their
honour.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit
by treatment as favourable as that granted to men.
Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of
their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own
territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as the captivity requires.
Art 15. The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their
maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.
Part III. Captivity

Section 1. Beginning of Captivity
Art 17. Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number,
or failing this, equivalent information.
If he wilfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the
privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are
liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first
names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of
birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the
owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add
concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5
x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of
war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who
refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.

Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state
their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be
established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they
understand.
Art 18. All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and
military documents, shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal
helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used
for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and
articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power
shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or
sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by
order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a
special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank
and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or
which are changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of
the prisoner's account as provided in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for
reasons of security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of
money impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining
Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the
custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at
the end of their captivity.
Art 19. Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps
situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.
Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks
by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a
danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation
from a fighting zone.
Section II. Internment of Prisoners of War

Chapter I. General Observations
Art 21. The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them
the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the
said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the
present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be
held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only
during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is
allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken
particularly in cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state of health. No
prisoner of war shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party
of the laws and regulations allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or
promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in conformity with
the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their personal honour scrupulously to fulfil,
both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured
them, the engagements of their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they
depend is bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible with the
parole or promise given.
Art 22. Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every
guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the
interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them,
shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds
according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be
separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at
the time of their capture, except with their consent.
Chapter II. Quarters, Food and Clothing of Prisoners of War

Art 25. Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the
forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make
allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their
health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as
regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and
blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be
entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between
dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated,
separate dormitories shall be provided for them.
Art 26. The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep
prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional
deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations
as are necessary for the labour on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall
be permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their
meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given
the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.
Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
Art 27. Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient
quantities by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region
where the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining
Power should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining
Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the
nature of the work demands.
Chapter III. Hygene and Medical Attention

Art 29. The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure
the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to
the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in
which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for
them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished
prisoners of war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for
washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted
them for that purpose.
Art 30. Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the
attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set
aside for cases of contagious or mental disease.
Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special
treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian
medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the
near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in
particular to the blind, and for their. rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power
on which they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical
authorities for examination. The detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every
prisoner who has undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating the nature of his illness
or injury, and the duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be
forwarded to the Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance
of prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and
spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
Chapter VI. Discipline

Art 39. Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate authority of a responsible
commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such
officer shall have in his possession a copy of the present Convention; he shall ensure
that its provisions are known to the camp staff and the guard and shall be responsible,
under the direction of his government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute and show to all officers of the
Detaining Power the external marks of respect provided for by the regulations applying in their
own forces.
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only officers of a higher rank of the Detaining
Power; they must, however, salute the camp commander regardless of his rank.
Art 42. The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against those who are escaping
or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded
by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
Section III. Labour of Prisoners of War

Art 49. The Detaining Power may utilize the labour of prisoners of war who are physically fit,
taking into account their age, sex, rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to
maintaining them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall only be required to do
supervisory work. Those not so required may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as
possible, be found for them.

If officers or persons of equivalent status ask for suitable work, it shall be found for them, so far
as possible, but they may in no circumstances be compelled to work.
Art 50. Besides work connected with camp administration, installation or maintenance, prisoners
of war may be compelled to do only such work as is included in the following classes:
(a) agriculture;
(b) industries connected with the production or the extraction of raw materials, and
manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical
industries; public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose;
(c) transport and handling of stores which are not military in character or purpose;
(d) commercial business, and arts and crafts;
(e) domestic service;
(f) public utility services having no military character or purpose.
Should the above provisions be infringed, prisoners of war shall be allowed to exercise their
right of complaint, in conformity with Article 78.
Art 52. Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed on labour which is
of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labour which would be looked upon as
humiliating for a member of the Detaining Power's own forces.
The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labour.
Section V. Relations of Prisoners of War With the Exterior

Art 69. Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power, the Detaining Power shall inform
them and the Powers on which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the measures
taken to carry out the provisions of the present Section. They shall likewise inform the parties
concerned of any subsequent modifications of such measures.
Art 70. Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is
a transit camp, likewise in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or to another camp, every
prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the
Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card
similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of
his capture, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible and may not be delayed in any manner.
Art 71. Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the
Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each
prisoner of war, the said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly,
exclusive of the capture cards provided for in Article 70, and conforming as closely as possible
to the models annexed to the present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed only if the
Protecting Power is satisfied that it would be in the interests of the prisoners of war concerned
to do so owing to difficulties of translation caused by the Detaining Power's inability to find
sufficient qualified linguists to carry out the necessary censorship. If limitations must be placed
on the correspondence addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the Power
on which the prisoners depend, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and
cards must be conveyed by the most rapid method at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they
may not be delayed or retained for
disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period, or who are unable to
receive news from their next of kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as
those who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be permitted to send telegrams, the
fees being charged against the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or paid in
the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war shall be written in their native
language. The Parties to the conflict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely sealed and labelled so as clearly
to indicate their contents, and must be addressed to offices of destination.
Section VI. Relations Between Prisoners of War and the Authorities

Chapter I. Complaints of Prisoners of War Respecting the Conditions of Captivity
Art 78 Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose
power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the representatives of the
Protecting Powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary,
direct, in order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make
regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the
correspondence quota referred to in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even if
they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the
needs of the prisoners of war to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
Chapter II. Prisoner of War Representatives

Art 79. IIn all places where there are prisoners of war, except in those where there are officers,
the prisoners shall freely elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies,
prisoners' representatives entrusted with representing them before the military authorities, the
Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization
which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent status or in mixed camps, the senior
officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners' representative. In
camps for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more advisers chosen by the officers; in mixed
camps, his assistants shall be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers and
shall be elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be stationed in labour camps for
prisoners of war, for the purpose of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the
prisoners of war are responsible. These officers may be elected as prisoners' representatives
under the first paragraph of this Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners'
representatives shall be chosen from among those prisoners of war who are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has
the right to commence his duties. Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of
war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the Protecting Power of the reason for
such refusal.
In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the same nationality, language and
customs as the prisoners of war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed in
different sections of a camp, according to their nationality, language or customs, shall have for
each section their own prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs.
Chapter III. Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions

I. General Provisions
Art 82. A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the
armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking
judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of
war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments
contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a
prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed
by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary
punishments only.
Art 85. Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present
Convention.
II. Disciplinary Sanctions

Art 89. The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of war are the following:
(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances of pay and working pay which the
prisoner of war would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a
period of not more than thirty days.
(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the
present Convention.
(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
(4) Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health
of prisoners of war.
Art 91. The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have succeeded when:
(1) he has joined the armed forces of the Power on which he depends, or those of an allied
Power;
(2) he has left the territory under the control of the Detaining Power, or of an ally of the said
Power;
(3) he has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which he depends, or of an allied Power,
in the territorial waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being under the control of the
last named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the sense of this Article and who
are recaptured, shall not be liable to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
Art 92. A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured before having made good
his escape in the sense of Article 91 shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in
respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over without delay to the competent
military authority.
Art 93. Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an
aggravating circumstance if the prisoner of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in
respect of an offence committed during his escape or attempt to escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences committed by prisoners of
war with the sole intention of facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence
against life or limb, such as offences against public property, theft without intention of self-
enrichment, the drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian clothing, shall
occasion disciplinary punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt to escape shall be liable on
this count to disciplinary punishment only.
III. Juridicial Proceedings

Art 99. No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law
of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner of war in order to induce
him to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had an opportunity to present his
defence and the assistance of a qualified advocate or counsel.
Art 100. Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed as soon as possible of
the offences which are punishable by the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining
Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without the
concurrence of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of
the court has, in accordance with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the
fact that since the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, he is not bound to it by any
duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent of his
own will.
Art 101. If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war, the sentence shall not be
executed before the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date when the
Protecting Power receives, at an indicated address, the detailed communication provided for in
Article 107.
Art 102. A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced
by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have
been observed.
Art 105. The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance by one of his prisoner comrades, to
defence by a qualified advocate or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and, if
he deems necessary, to the services of a competent interpreter. He shall be advised of these
rights by the Detaining Power in due time before the trial.
Failing a choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting Power shall find him an advocate
or counsel, and shall have at least one week at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining
Power shall deliver to the said Power, on request, a list of persons qualified to present the
defence. Failing a choice of an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting
Power, the Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate or counsel to conduct the
defence.
The advocate or counsel conducting the defence on behalf of the prisoner of war shall
have at his disposal a period of two weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the
necessary facilities to prepare the defence of the accused. He may, in particular, freely visit the
accused and interview him in private. He may also confer with any witnesses for the defence,
including prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit of these facilities until the term of appeal or
petition has expired.
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner of war is to be arraigned, as
well as the documents which are generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws in
force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power, shall be communicated to the accused
prisoner of war in a language which he understands, and in good time before the opening of the
trial. The same communication in the same circumstances shall be made to the advocate or
counsel conducting the defence on behalf of the prisoner of war.
The representatives of the Protecting Power shall be entitled to attend the trial of the
case, unless, exceptionally, this is held in camera in the interest of State security. In such a
case the Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power accordingly.

Art 106. Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as the members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, the right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced
upon him, with a view to the quashing or revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial.
He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he
may do so.
Part IV. Termination of Captivity

Section I. Direct Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral Countries
Art 109. Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are
bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and
seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in
accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article.
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavour, with the
cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in
neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph
of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct
repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have
undergone a long period of captivity.
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph
of this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities.
Art 110. The following shall be repatriated direct:

(1) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical fitness seems to have been gravely
diminished.
(2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion, are not likely to recover within one
year, whose condition requires treatment and whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely diminished.
(3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose mental or physical fitness seems to have
been gravely and permanently diminished.
The following may be accommodated in a neutral country:
(1) Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected within one year of the date of the
wound or the beginning of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might increase the
prospects of a more certain and speedy recovery.
(2) Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health, according to medical opinion, is seriously
threatened by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in a neutral country might remove
such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a neutral country must fulfil in
order to permit their repatriation shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement
between the Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war who have been accommodated in
a neutral country, and who belong to the following categories, should be repatriated:
(1) Those whose state of health has deteriorated so as to fulfil the condition laid down for direct
repatriation;
(2) Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even after treatment, considerably
impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties to the conflict concerned, to
determine the cases of disablement or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation
in a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with the principles laid down in
the Model Agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of
wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations concerning Mixed Medical
Commissions annexed to the present Convention.
Section II. Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at the Close of Hostilities

Art 118. Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any agreement concluded between
the Parties to the conflict with a view to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such
agreement, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and execute without delay a plan
of repatriation in conformity with the principle laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all cases be equitably apportioned between
the Detaining Power and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportionment shall be
carried out on the following basis:
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which the prisoners of war depend shall
bear the costs of repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining Power shall bear the costs of transport
of prisoners of war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its port of embarkation nearest to
the territory of the Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The Parties concerned shall
agree between themselves as to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs of the
repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the
repatriation of the prisoners of war.
Section III. Death of Prisoners of War

Art 120. Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy the conditions of validity
required by the legislation of their country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining
Power of its requirements in this respect. At the request of the prisoner of war and, in all cases,
after death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy
shall be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates, in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a
responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122.
The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third
paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and
place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination
of the body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where
necessary, establishing identity.
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity
are honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged,
and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any
time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be
interred in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable
circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative
reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his
express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given
in the death certificate of the deceased.
In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded
with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and
particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to
the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves
and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the
territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes,
which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in
accordance with the wishes of the home country.
PART V. Information Bureaux and Relief Societies for Prisoners of War

Art 123. A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral
country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to
the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through
official or private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible
to the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend. It shall
receive from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the
services of the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may
require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian
activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief societies provided for
in Article 125.
The Fourth Convention
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12
August 1949.
Art. 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Art. 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
provisions:
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
torture;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
conflict.
WHO ARE THE PARTIES PROTECTED

Art. 4. Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a
Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a
neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-
belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are
nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons
within the meaning of the present Convention.
Art. 8. Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the

rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred
to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Part II. General Protection of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War

Art. 13. The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict,
without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political
opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.
Art. 15. Any Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a neutral State or some
humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish, in the regions where
fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war the
following persons, without
distinction:
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants;
(b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones,
perform no work of a military character.
When the Parties concerned have agreed upon the geographical position,
administration, food supply and supervision of the proposed neutralized zone, a written
agreement shall be concluded and signed by the representatives of the Parties to the conflict.
The agreement shall fix the beginning and the duration of the neutralization of the zone.
Art. 18. Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and
maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be
respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.
States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all civilian hospitals with certificates
showing that they are civilian hospitals and that the buildings which they occupy are not used for
any purpose which would deprive these hospitals of protection in accordance with Article 19.
Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem provided for in Article 38 of
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, but only if so authorized by the State.
The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as military considerations permit, take the
necessary steps to make the distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible to
the enemy land, air and naval forces in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile action.
In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close to military objectives,
it is recommended that such hospitals be situated as far as possible from such objectives.
Art. 19. The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they
are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.
Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming, in all
appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such warning has remained unheeded.
The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are nursed in these
hospitals, or the presence of small arms and ammunition taken from such combatants and not
yet been handed to the proper service, shall not be considered to be acts harmful to the enemy.
Art.24. The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that children
under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a result of the war, are
not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, the exercise of their religion and their
education are facilitated in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be
entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of such children in a neutral
country for the duration of the conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power, if any, and
under due safeguards for the observance of the principles stated in the first paragraph.
They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve to be
identified by the wearing of identity discs, or by some other means.
Part III. Status and Treatment of Protected Persons

Section I. Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the conflict and to
occupied territories
Art. 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their
honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and
customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against
all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all
protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in
whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or
political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in
regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.

Art. 28. The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or
areas immune from military operations.
Art. 31. No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in
particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.
Art. 34. The taking of hostages is prohibited.
Section II. Aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict

Art. 35. All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a
conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of
the State. The applications of such persons to leave shall be decided in accordance with
regularly established procedures and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those
persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey
and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects and articles of personal use.
If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to
have refusal reconsidered, as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board
designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.
Upon request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security
prevent it, or the persons concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any
request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the
names of all persons who have been denied permission to leave.
Art. 38. With the exception of special measures authorized by the present Convention, in
particularly by Article 27 and 41 thereof, the situation of protected persons shall continue to be
regulated, in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in time of peace. In any case, the
following rights shall be granted to them:
(1) they shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them.
(2) they shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and hospital
treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
(3) they shall be allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from
ministers of their faith.
(4) if they reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be authorized
to move from that area to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
(5) children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years
shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State
concerned.
Art. 40. Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the
Party to the conflict in whose territory they are.
If protected persons are of enemy nationality, they may only be compelled to do work
which is normally necessary to ensure the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transport and health of
human beings and which is not directly related to the conduct of military operations.
In the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, protected persons compelled to work
shall have the benefit of the same working conditions and of the same safeguards as national
workers in particular as regards wages, hours of labour, clothing and equipment, previous
training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases.
If the above provisions are infringed, protected persons shall be allowed to
exercise their right of complaint in accordance with Article 30.
Art. 42. The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered
only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.
If any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting Power, voluntarily
demands internment, and if his situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned by the
Power in whose hands he may be.
Art. 44. In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining
Power shall not treat as enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an
enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government.
Section III. Occupied territories

Art. 47. Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in
any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said
territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories
and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the
occupied territory.
, in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are prohibited.
Art. 64. The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they
constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.
Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective
administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in
respect of all offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the
present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the
security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.
Art. 68. Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the
Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of
the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the
property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, shall be
liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or
imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed. Furthermore, internment or
imprisonment shall, for such offences, be the only measure adopted for depriving protected
persons of liberty. The courts provided for under Article 66 of the present Convention may at
their discretion convert a sentence of imprisonment to one of internment for the same period.
The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in accordance with Articles
64 and 65 may impose the death penalty against a protected person only in cases where the
person is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military
installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have caused the
death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death
under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began.
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the
attention of the court has been particularly called to the fact that since the accused is not a
national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was
under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.
Art. 70. Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying
Power for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a
temporary interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war.

Nationals of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought
refuge in the territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or
deported from the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of
hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which,
according to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.
Art. 75. In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for
pardon or reprieve.
No death sentence shall be carried out before the expiration of a period of a least six
months from the date of receipt by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment
confirming such death sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve.
The six months period of suspension of the death sentence herein prescribed may be
reduced in individual cases in circumstances of grave emergency involving an organized threat
to the security of the Occupying Power or its forces, provided always that the Protecting Power
is notified of such reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make
representations to the competent occupying authorities in respect of such death sentences.
Art. 76. Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country,
and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein. They shall, if possible, be
separated from other detainees and shall enjoy conditions of food and hygiene which will be
sufficient to keep them in good health, and which will be at least equal to those obtaining in
prisons in the occupied country.
They shall receive the medical attention required by their state of health.
They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assistance which they may require.
Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision
of women.
Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due to minors.
Protected persons who are detained shall have the right to be visited by delegates of the
Protecting Power and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 143.
Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one relief parcel monthly.
Section IV. Regulations for the treatment of internees

Chapter I. General provisions
Art. 80. Internees shall retain their full civil capacity and shall exercise such attendant rights
as may be compatible with their status.
Art. 81. Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall be bound to provide free of
charge for their maintenance, and to grant them also the medical attention required by their
state of health.
No deduction from the allowances, salaries or credits due to the internees shall be made
for the repayment of these costs.
The Detaining Power shall provide for the support of those dependent on the internees,
if such dependents are without adequate means of support or are unable to earn a living.
Chapter II. Places of Internment

Art. 83. The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed
to the dangers of war.
The Detaining Power shall give the enemy Powers, through the intermediary of the
Protecting Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of places of
internment.
Whenever military considerations permit, internment camps shall be indicated by the
letters IC, placed so as to be clearly visible in the daytime from the air. The Powers concerned
may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. No place other than an internment
camp shall be marked as such.
Art.84. Internees shall be accommodated and administered separately from prisoners of

war and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason.
Chapter III. Food and Clothing

Art. 89. Daily food rations for internees shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep
internees in a good state of health and prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies.
Account shall also be taken of the customary diet of the internees.
Internees shall also be given the means by which they can prepare for themselves any
additional food in their possession.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees. The use of tobacco shall be
permitted.
Internees who work shall receive additional rations in proportion to the kind of labour
which they perform.
Expectant and nursing mothers and children under fifteen years of age, shall be given
additional food, in proportion to their physiological needs.
Art. 90. When taken into custody, internees shall be given all facilities to provide themselves
with the necessary clothing, footwear and change of underwear, and later on, to procure further
supplies if required. Should any internees not have sufficient clothing, account being taken of
the climate, and be unable to procure any, it shall be provided free of charge to them by the
Detaining Power.
The clothing supplied by the Detaining Power to internees and the outward markings
placed on their own clothes shall not be ignominious nor expose them to ridicule.
Workers shall receive suitable working outfits, including protective clothing, whenever
the nature of their work so requires.
Chapter IV. Hygiene and Medical Attention

Art. 91. Every place of internment shall have an adequate infirmary, under the direction of a
qualified doctor, where internees may have the attention they require, as well as an appropriate
diet. Isolation wards shall be set aside for cases of contagious or mental diseases.
Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition
requires special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any
institution where adequate treatment can be given and shall receive care not inferior to that
provided for the general population.
Internees shall, for preference, have the attention of medical personnel of their own
nationality.
Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities
for examination. The medical authorities of the Detaining Power shall, upon request, issue to
every internee who has undergone treatment an official certificate showing the nature of his
illness or injury, and the duration and nature of the treatment given. A duplicate of this certificate
shall be forwarded to the Central Agency provided for in Article 140.
Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of
internees in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances and spectacles,
shall be free of charge to the internee.
Chapter VII. Administration and Discipline

Art. 99. Every place of internment shall be put under the authority of a responsible officer,
chosen from the regular military forces or the regular civil administration of the Detaining Power.
The officer in charge of the place of internment must have in his possession a copy of the
present Convention in the official language, or one of the official languages, of his country and
shall be responsible for its application. The staff in control of internees shall be instructed in the
provisions of the present Convention and of the administrative measures adopted to ensure its
application.
The text of the present Convention and the texts of special agreements concluded under
the said Convention shall be posted inside the place of internment, in a language which the
internees understand, or shall be in the possession of the Internee Committee.
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind shall be communicated to the
internees and posted inside the places of internment, in a language which they understand.
Every order and command addressed to internees individually must, likewise, be given
in a language which they understand.
Art. 100. The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be consistent with
humanitarian principles, and shall in no circumstances include regulations imposing on
internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical or moral
victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs or markings on the body, is
prohibited.
In particular, prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drill, military drill and
manoeuvres, or the reduction of food rations, are prohibited.
Art. 102. In every place of internment, the internees shall freely elect by secret ballot every
six months, the members of a Committee empowered to represent them before the
Detaining and the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any
other organization which may assist them. The members of the Committee shall be eligible for
re-election.
Internees so elected shall enter upon their duties after their election has been approved
by the detaining authorities. The reasons for any refusals or dismissals shall be communicated
to the Protecting Powers concerned.
Chaper VIII. Relations with the Exterior

Art. 106. As soon as he is interned, or at the latest not more than one week after his arrival in a
place of internment, and likewise in cases of sickness or transfer to another place of internment
or to a hospital, every internee shall be enabled to send direct to his family, on the one hand,
and to the Central Agency provided for by Article 140, on the other, an internment card similar, if
possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his
detention, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible and may not be delayed in any way.
Art. 107. Internees shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining
Power deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each internee, the
said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly; these shall be drawn up
so as to conform as closely as possible to the models annexed to the present Convention. If
limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed to internees, they may be ordered
only by the Power to which such internees owe allegiance, possibly at the request of the
Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed with reasonable despatch; they may
not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.
Internees who have been a long time without news, or who find it impossible to receive
news from their relatives, or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those
who are at a considerable distance from their homes, shall be allowed to send telegrams, the
charges being paid by them in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this
provision in cases which are recognized to be urgent.
As a rule, internees' mail shall be written in their own language. The Parties to the
conflict may authorize correspondence in other languages.
Art. 113. The Detaining Powers shall provide all reasonable execution facilities for the
transmission, through the Protecting Power or the Central Agency provided for in Article 140, or
as otherwise required, of wills, powers of attorney, letters of authority, or any other documents
intended for internees or despatched by them.
In all cases the Detaining Powers shall facilitate the execution and authentication in due
legal form of such documents on behalf of internees, in particular by allowing them to consult a
lawyer.
Art. 114. The Detaining Power shall afford internees all facilities to enable them to manage
their property, provided this is not incompatible with the conditions of internment and the law
which is applicable. For this purpose, the said Power may give them permission to leave the
place of internment in urgent cases and if circumstances allow.
Art.116. Every internee shall be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, at
regular intervals and as frequently as possible.
As far as is possible, internees shall be permitted to visit their homes in urgent cases,
particularly in cases of death or serious illness of relatives.
Chapter IX. Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions
Art. 117. Subject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws in force in the territory in
which they are detained will continue to apply to internees who commit offences during
internment.
If general laws, regulations or orders declare acts committed by internees to be
punishable, whereas the same acts are not punishable when committed by persons who are not
internees, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
No internee may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same count.
Art. 119. The disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following:
(1) a fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the wages which the internee would otherwise
receive under the provisions of Article 95 during a period of not more than thirty days.
(2) discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the
present Convention
(3) fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, in connection with the maintenance of the
place of internment.
(4) confinement.
In no case shall disciplinary penalties be inhuman, brutal or dangerous for the
health of internees. Account shall be taken of the internee's age, sex and state of health.
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed a maximum of thirty consecutive
days, even if the internee is answerable for several breaches of discipline when his case is dealt
with, whether such breaches are connected or not.
Art. 120. Internees who are recaptured after having escaped or when attempting to escape,
shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated
offence.
Article 118, paragraph 3, notwithstanding, internees punished as a result of escape or
attempt to escape, may be subjected to special surveillance, on condition that such surveillance
does not affect the state of their health, that it is exercised in a place of internment and that it
does not entail the abolition of any of the safeguards granted by the present Convention.
Internees who aid and abet an escape or attempt to escape, shall be liable on this count
to disciplinary punishment only.
Art. 121. Escape, or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed
an aggravating circumstance in cases where an internee is prosecuted for offences
committed during his escape.
The Parties to the conflict shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise leniency
in deciding whether punishment inflicted for an offence shall be of a disciplinary or judicial
nature, especially in respect of acts committed in connection with an escape, whether
successful or not.
Chapter XI. Deaths

Art. 129. The wills of internees shall be received for safe-keeping by the responsible authorities;
and if the event of the death of an internee his will shall be transmitted without delay to a person
whom he has previously designated.
Deaths of internees shall be certified in every case by a doctor, and a death certificate
shall be made out, showing the causes of death and the conditions under which it
occurred.
An official record of the death, duly registered, shall be drawn up in accordance with the
procedure relating thereto in force in the territory where the place of internment is situated, and
a duly certified copy of such record shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power as
well as to the Central Agency referred to in Article 140.
Art. 130. The detaining authorities shall ensure that internees who die while interned are
honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged and
that their graves are respected, properly maintained, and marked in such a way that they can
always be recognized.
Deceased internees shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable
circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative
reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his
expressed wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons
given in the death certificate of the deceased. The ashes shall be retained for safe-keeping by
the detaining authorities and shall be transferred as soon as possible to the next of kin on their
request.
As soon as circumstances permit, and not later than the close of hostilities, the Detaining
Power shall forward lists of graves of deceased internees to the Powers on whom deceased
internees depended, through the Information Bureaux provided for in Article 136. Such lists shall
include all particulars necessary for the identification of the deceased internees, as well as the
exact location of their graves.
Art. 131. Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or suspected to have been caused
by a sentry, another internee or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is
unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. The
evidence of any witnesses shall be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be
prepared and forwarded to the said Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take
all necessary steps to ensure the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
Chapter XIII. Release, Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral Countries
Art. 132. Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the
reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.
The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour during the course of hostilities, to
conclude agreements for the release, the repatriation, the return to places of residence or the
accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of internees, in particular children,
pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees
who have been detained for a long time.
Art. 133. Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.
Internees in the territory of a Party to the conflict against whom penal proceedings are
pending for offences not exclusively subject to disciplinary penalties, may be detained until the
close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require, until the completion of the penalty. The
same shall apply to internees who have been previously sentenced to a punishment depriving
them of liberty.
By agreement between the Detaining Power and the Powers concerned, committees may be
set up after the close of hostilities, or of the occupation of territories, to search for dispersed
internees.
Art. 134. The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the close of hostilities or
occupation, to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to
facilitate their repatriation.
Section V. Information Bureaux and Central Agency

Art. 136. Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to
the conflict shall establish an official Information Bureau responsible for receiving and
transmitting information in respect of the protected persons who are in its power.
Each of the Parties to the conflict shall, within the shortest possible period, give its Bureau
information of any measure taken by it concerning any protected persons who are kept in
custody for more than two weeks, who are subjected to assigned residence or who are interned.
It shall, furthermore, require its various departments concerned with such matters to provide the
aforesaid Bureau promptly with information concerning all changes pertaining to these protected
persons, as, for example, transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admittances to hospitals,
births and deaths.
Art. 137. Each national Bureau shall immediately forward information concerning protected
persons by the most rapid means to the Powers in whose territory they resided, through the
intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise through the Central Agency provided for in
Article 140. The Bureaux shall also reply to all enquiries which may be received regarding
protected persons.
Information Bureaux shall transmit information concerning a protected person unless its
transmission might be detrimental to the person concerned or to his or her relatives. Even in
such a case, the information may not be withheld from the Central Agency which, upon being
notified of the circumstances, will take the necessary precautions indicated in Article 140.
All communications in writing made by any Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a

seal.
Art. 138. The information received by the national Bureau and transmitted by it shall be of such
a character as to make it possible to identify the protected person exactly and to advise his next
of kin quickly. The information in respect of each person shall include at least his surname, first
names, place and date of birth, nationality last residence and distinguishing characteristics, the
first name of the father and the maiden name of the mother, the date, place and nature of the
action taken with regard to the individual, the address at which correspondence may be sent to
him and the name and address of the person to be informed.
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of internees who are seriously ill or seriously
wounded shall be supplied regularly and if possible every week.
Art. 139. Each national Information Bureau shall, furthermore, be responsible for collecting all
personal valuables left by protected persons mentioned in Article 136, in particular those who
have been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died; it shall forward the said
valuables to those concerned, either direct, or, if necessary, through the Central Agency. Such
articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by
statements giving clear and full identity particulars of the person to whom the articles belonged,
and by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Detailed records shall be maintained of the
receipt and despatch of all such valuables.
Art. 140. A Central Information Agency for protected persons, in particular for internees, shall be
created in a neutral country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems
necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency, which may
be the same as that provided for in Article 123 of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all information of the type set forth in Article 136
which it may obtain through official or private channels and to transmit it as rapidly as possible
to the countries of origin or of residence of the persons concerned, except in cases where such
transmissions might be detrimental to the persons whom the said information concerns, or to
their relatives. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all reasonable facilities for effecting
such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of
the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities
of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the relief Societies described in Article
142.
Art. 141. The national Information Bureaux and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free
postage for all mail, likewise the exemptions provided for in Article 110, and further, so far as
possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.
The First Protocol32
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
PART 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Preamble:
 earnest wish to see peace prevail among peoples
 every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of any State
Scope (Article 1)
 In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public
conscience.
 apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.
32 For the three Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, thanks to dave romero.
 apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
 Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the
 armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination
Definitions (Article 2)
 Rules of international law applicable in armed conflict" means the rules applicable in armed
conflict set forth in international agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are Parties and
the generally recognized principles and rules of international law which are applicable to
armed conflict
 Protecting Power" means a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has been
designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to
carry out the functions assigned to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and this
Protocol
 "Substitute" means an organization acting in place of a Protecting Power
Protecting Power (Article 5)

 duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that conflict to secure the supervision
and implementation of the Conventions and of this Protocol by the application of the system of
Protecting Powers
 Protecting Powers shall have the duty of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the
conflict
 each Party to the conflict shall without delay designate a Protecting Power
 If a Protecting Power has not been designated, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
without prejudice to the right of any other impartial humanitarian organization to do likewise,
shall offer its good offices to the Parties to the conflict with a view to the designation without
delay of a Protecting Power to which the Parties to the conflict consent
PART 2: WOUNDED, SICK, SHIPWRECKED

Definitions (Article 8)
 “Wounded" and "sick" mean persons, whether military or civilian, who, because of trauma,
disease or other physical or mental disorder or disability, are in need of medical assistance or
care and who refrain from any act of hostility. These terms also cover maternity cases, new-
born babies and other persons who may be in need of immediate medical assistance or care,
such as the infirm or expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility
 "Shipwrecked" means persons, whether military or civilian, who are in peril at sea or in other
waters as a result of misfortune affecting them or the vessel or aircraft carrying them and who
refrain from any act of hostility.
 "Medical personnel" means those persons assigned, by a Party to the conflict, exclusively to
the medical purposes enumerated under e) or to the administration of medical units or to the
operation or administration of medical transports.
 "Religious personnel" means military or civilian persons, such as chaplains, who are
exclusively engaged in the work of their ministry and attached to the armed forces of a Party
to the conflict, to medical units or medical transports of a Party to the conflict, to medical units
or medical transports or to civil defense organizations of a Party to the conflict.
 "Medical units" means establishments and other units, whether military or civilian, organized
for medical purposes, namely the search for, collection, transportation, diagnosis or treatment
- including first-aid treatment - of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, or for the prevention of
disease.
 "Medical transportation" means the conveyance by land, water or air of the wounded, sick,
shipwrecked, medical personnel, religious personnel, medical equipment or medical supplies
 "Medical transports" means any means of transportation, whether military or civilian,
permanent or temporary, assigned exclusively to medical transportation and under the control
of a competent authority of a Party to the conflict
 "Medical vehicles" means any medical transports by land
 "Medical ships and craft" means any medical transports by water
 "Medical aircraft" means any medical transports by air
 "Distinctive emblem" means the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion
and sun on a white ground when used for the protection of medical units and transports, or
medical and religious personnel, equipment or supplies
Scope (Article 9)
 shall apply to all those affected by a situation referred to in Article 1, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief political or other opinion,
national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria.
Protection of Persons (Article 11)

 All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to whichever Party they belong, shall be respected
and protected
 The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are in the power of the adverse
Party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty shall not be endangered
by any unjustified act or omission
 prohibited to carry out on such persons, even with their consent: physical mutilations, medical
or scientific experiments, removal of tissue or organs for transplantation
 Exceptions to the prohibition: only in the case of donations of blood for transfusion or of skin
for grafting, provided that they are given voluntarily and without any coercion or inducement,
and then only for therapeutic purposes
Protection of Medical Units

 Medical units shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack
(Article 12)
 Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt to shield military objectives
from attack (Article 12)
 protection to which civilian medical units are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to
commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy (Article 13)
 not be considered as acts harmful to the enemy: that the personnel of the unit are equipped
with light individual weapons for their own defence or for that of the wounded and sick in their
charge, that the unit is guarded by a picket or by sentries or by an escort, that small arms and
ammunition taken from the wounded and sick, and not yet handed to the proper service, are
found in the units, that members of the armed forces or other combatants are in the unit for
medical reasons (Article 13)
Protection of civilian medical and religious personnel (Article 15)

 Civilian medical personnel shall be respected and protected
 The Occupying Power shall afford civilian medical personnel in occupied territories every
assistance to enable them to perform, to the best of their ability, their humanitarian functions
 Civilian religious personnel shall be respected and protected
Role of the civilian population and of aid societies (Article 17)

 The civilian population shall respect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, even if they belong
to the adverse Party, and shall commit no act of violence against them

Identification (Article 18)
 civilian medical personnel and civilian religious personnel should be recognizable by the
distinctive emblem and an identity card certifying their status
 a Party to the conflict may authorize the use of distinctive signals to identify medical units and
transports
Medical Transportation
 Medical vehicles shall be respected and protected in the same way as mobile medical units
(Article 21)
 Medical ships and craft, whether at sea or in other waters, be respected and protected in the
same way as mobile medical units (Article 23)
 Any warship on the surface able immediately to enforce its command may order them to stop,
order them off, or make them take a certain course, and they shall obey every such command.
Such ships and craft may not in any other way be diverted from their medical mission so long
as they are needed for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked on board (Article 23)
 A clear refusal to obey a command given in accordance with paragraph 2 shall be an act
harmful to the enemy (Article 23)
 Medical aircraft shall be respected and protected (Article 24)
 In and over land areas physically controlled by friendly forces, or in and over sea areas not
physically controlled by an adverse Party, the respect and protection of medical aircraft of a
Party to the conflict is not dependent on any agreement with an adverse Party (Article 25)
 A medical aircraft which flies over an area physically controlled by an adverse Party without,
or in deviation from the terms of, an agreement, either through navigational error or because
of an emergency affecting the safety of the flight, shall make every effort to identify itself and
to inform the adverse Party of the circumstances. As soon as such medical aircraft has been
recognized by the adverse Party, that Party shall make all reasonable efforts to give the order
to land or to alight on water, or to take other measures to safeguard its own interests, and, in
either case, to allow the aircraft time for compliance, before resorting to an attack against the
aircraft. (Article 27)
 Medical aircraft shall not be used to collect or transmit intelligence data and shall not carry any
equipment intended for such purpose (Article 28)
 Medical aircraft shall not carry any armament except small arms and ammunition taken from
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked on board and not yet handed to the proper service, and
such light individual weapons as may be necessary to enable the medical personnel on board
to defend themselves and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked in their charge. (Article 28)
 Medical aircraft flying over areas which are physically controlled by an adverse Party, or over
areas the physical control of which is not clearly established, may be ordered to land or to
alight on water, as appropriate, to permit inspection in accordance with the following
paragraphs. Medical aircraft shall obey any such order. (Article 30)
 Should a medical aircraft, in the absence of an agreement or in deviation from the terms of an
agreement, fly over the territory of a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict, either
through navigational error or because of an emergency affecting the safety of the flight, it shall
make every effort to give notice of the flight and to identify itself. That State shall make all
reasonable efforts to give the order to land or to alight on water to allow the aircraft time for
compliance, before resorting to an attack against the aircraft. (Article 31)
Missing Persons (Article 33)

 As soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, each
Party to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been reported missing by an
adverse Party
Dead Persons (Article 34)

 The remains of persons who have died for reasons related to occupation or in detention
resulting from occupation or hostilities and those or persons not nationals of the country in
which they have died as a result of hostilities shall be respected, and the gravesites of all such
persons shall be respected, maintained and marked.
 In the absence of any agreement and if the home country of such deceased is not willing to
arrange at its expense for the maintenance of such gravesites, the High Contracting Party in
whose territory the gravesites are situated may offer to facilitate the return of the remains of
the deceased to the home country. Where such an offer has not been accepted the High
Contracting Party may, after the expiry of five years from the date of the offer and upon due
notice to the home country, adopt the arrangements laid down in its own laws relating to
cemeteries and graves.
Part 3: Methods and Means of Warfare, Combatants and POW
Methods and Means of Warfare

 prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (Article 35)
 prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment (Article 35)
 prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the
confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray
that confidence, shall constitute perfidy (Article 37)
 Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an
adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law
applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are
examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.
(Article 37)
 prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or
red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals (Article 38)
 prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized
by that Organization (Article 38)
 prohibited to make use in an armed conflict of the flags or military emblems, insignia or
uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict (Article 39)
 prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse
Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military
operations (Article 39)
 No person parachuting from an aircraft in distress shall be made the object of attack during his
descent (Article 42)
 person who has parachuted from an aircraft in distress shall be given an opportunity to
surrender before being made the object of attack, unless it is apparent that he is engaging in a
hostile act (Article 42)
Armed Forces (Article 43)

 armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units
which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its subordinates
 Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and
chaplains) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
hostilities.
Combatants and POW

 Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war. (Article
44)
 combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Article 44)
 A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to distinguish himself
from noncombatants shall forfeit his right to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless,
be given protections equivalent in all respects to those accorded to prisoners of war (Article
44)
 A person who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be
presumed to be a prisoner of war and should any doubt arise as to whether any such person
is entitled to the status of prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status until such time
as his status has been determined by a competent tribunal. (Article 45)
 any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an
adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of
war and may be treated as a spy (Article 46)
 member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in
territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be
considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed
forces (Article 46)
 A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war (Article 47)
Part 4: Civilian Population

 the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct
their operations only against military objectives (Article 48)
 In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian
(Article 50)
 Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. (Article 52)
 Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited (Article 54)
 In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. (Article 57)
 Persons who, before the beginning of hostilities, were considered as stateless persons or
refugees under the relevant international instruments accepted by the Parties concerned or
under the national legislation of the State of refuge or State of residence shall be protected
persons (Article 73)
 The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall facilitate in every possible
way the reunion of families dispersed as a result of armed conflicts and shall encourage in
particular the work of the humanitarian organizations engaged in this task in accordance with
the provisions of the Conventions and of this Protocol and in conformity with their respective
security regulations. (Article 74)
Protection of Civilian Population (Article 51)

 The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers
arising from military operations.
 The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.
 Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.
 The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations.
Protection of Civilian Objects

 Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
(Article 52)
 it is prohibited:to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works
of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples; to use
such objects in support of the military effort; to make such objects the object of reprisals.
(Article 53)
 prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs,
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse
Party (Article 54)
 prohibitions above shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an
adverse Party: as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or if not as
sustenance, then in direct support of military action (Article 54)
Protection of the Natural Environment (Article 55)

 Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage
 Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.
Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces (Article 56)

 Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and
consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
 In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the
conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles
placed on the same axis
Zones under Special Protection

 It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-
defended localities (Article 59)
 The appropriate authorities of a Party to the conflict may declare as a non-defended locality
any inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for
occupation by an adverse Party. Such a locality shall fulfill the following conditions: all
combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment must have been
evacuated; no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments; no
acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and no activities in
support of military operations shall be undertaken. (Article 59)
 It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to extend their military operations to zones on
which they have conferred by agreement the status of demilitarized zone, if such extension is
contrary to the terms of this agreement. A demilitarized zone is a zone which fulfils the
following conditions: all combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
equipment, must have been evacuated; no hostile use shall be made of fixed military
installations or establishments; no acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities or by
the population; and any activity linked to the military effort must have ceased.
(Article 60)
Civil Defense

 "Civil defence" means the performance of humanitarian tasks intended to protect the civilian
population against the dangers, and to help it to recover from the immediate effects, of
hostilities or disasters and also to provide the conditions necessary for its survival (Article 61)
 Civilian civil defence organizations and their personnel shall be respected and protected
(Article 62)
 Occupying Power may disarm civil defence personnel for reasons of security. (Article 62)
 . The protection to which civilian civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings,
shelters and matériel are entitled shall not cease unless they commit or are used to commit,
outside their proper tasks, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only
after a warning has been given setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit, and
after such warning has remained unheeded. (Article 65)
 It shall also not be considered as an act harmful to the enemy that civilian civil defence
personnel bear light individual weapons for the purpose of maintaining order or for self-
defence (Article 65)
 Each Party to the conflict shall endeavour to ensure that its civil defence organizations, their
personnel, buildings and matériel are identifiable while they are exclusively devoted to the
performance of civil defence tasks. (Article 66)
 The international distinctive sign of civil defence is an equilateral blue triangle on an orange
ground when used for the protection of civil defence organizations, their personnel, buildings
and matériel and for civilian shelters. (Article 66)
Relief Actions
 If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than
occupied territory, is not adequately provided with supplies, relief actions which are
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall
be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers
of such relief shall not be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts.
In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as
children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth
Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special
protection. (Article 70)
 Each Party in receipt of relief consignments shall, to the fullest extent practicable, assist the
relief personnel in carrying out their relief mission. Only in case of imperative military necessity
may the activities of the relief personnel be limited or their movements temporarily restricted.
(Article 71)
Penal Prosecutions (Article 75)

 No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a
penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an
impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of
regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars
of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all
necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal
responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to
which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be
imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed;
if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;

(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of
which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced
under the same law and judicial procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced
publicly; and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of
the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
Protection of Women
 Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be
held in quarters separated from men's quarters. They shall be under the immediate
supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they
shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units.
(Article 75)
 Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape,
forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault. (Article 76)
 Pregnant women and mothers having dependent infants who are arrested, detained or
interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, shall have their cases considered with the
utmost priority. (Article 76)
 To the maximum extent feasible, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to avoid the
pronouncement of the death penalty on pregnant women or mothers having dependent
infants, for an offence related to the armed conflict. The death penalty for such offences shall
not be executed on such women. (Article 76)
Protection of Children
 Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they
shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen
years the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.
(Article 77)
 If arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict, children shall be
held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except where families are
accommodated as family units (Article 77)
 The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be executed on
persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was
committed (Article 77)
 No Party to the conflict shall arrange for the evacuation of children, other than its own
nationals, to a foreign country except for a temporary evacuation where compelling reasons of
the health or medical treatment of the children or, except in occupied territory, their safety, so
require. Where the parents or legal guardians can be found, their written consent to such
evacuation is required. If these persons cannot be found, the written consent to such
evacuation of the persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for the care of the
children is required. Any such evacuation shall be supervised by the Protecting Power in
agreement with the Parties concerned, namely, the Party arranging for the evacuation, the
Party receiving the children and any Parties whose nationals are being evacuated. In each
case, all Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible precautions to avoid endangering the
evacuation. (Article 78)

Protection of Journalists (Article 79)

 Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of armed conflict shall be
considered as civilians
 They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of this Protocol. This card,
which shall be issued by the government of the State of which the Journalist is a national or in
whose territory he resides or in which the news medium employing him is located, shall attest
to his status as a journalist.
Grave Breaches (Article 85)

 the following acts shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed
willfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or serious
injury to body or health:
(a) making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;
(b) launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii);
(c) launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii);
(d) making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
(e) making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;
(f) the perfidious use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and
sun or of other protective signs recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol
 the following shall be regarded as grave breaches of this Protocol, when committed willfully
and in violation of the Conventions or the Protocol:
(a) the transfer by the occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory
it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied
territory within or outside this territory,
 (b) unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;
(c) practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon
personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;
(d) making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which
constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been
given by special arrangement, for example, within the framework of a competent international
organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof, where
there is no evidence of the violation by the adverse Party of Article 53, subparagraph (b), and
when such historic monuments, works of art and places of worship are not located in the
immediate proximity of military objectives;
(e) depriving a person protected by the Conventions or referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article of the rights of fair and regular trial.
 grave breaches of these instruments shall be regarded as war crimes
International Fact-Finding Commission (Article 90)

 a) An International Fact-Finding Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission")
consisting of 15 members of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality shall be
established;
(b) When not less than 20 High Contracting Parties have agreed to accept the competence of
the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2, the depositary shall then, and at intervals of five
years thereafter, convene a meeting of representatives of those High Contracting Parties for
the purpose of electing the members of the Commission. At the meeting, the representatives
shall elect the members of the Commission by secret ballot from a list of persons to which
each of those High Contracting Parties may nominate one person;

(c) The members of the Commission shall serve in their personal capacity and shall hold office
until the election of new members at the ensuing meeting;
(d) At the election, the High Contracting Parties shall ensure that the persons to be elected to
the Commission individually possess the qualifications required and that, in the Commission
as a whole, equitable geographical representation is assured;
(e) In the case of a casual vacancy, the Commission itself shall fill the vacancy, having due
regard to the provisions of the preceding subparagraphs;
(f) The depositary shall make available to the Commission the necessary administrative
facilities for the performance of its functions.
 The Commission shall be competent to:
(i) inquire into any facts alleged to be a grave breach as defined in the Conventions and this
Protocol or other serious violation of the Conventions or of this Protocol;
(ii) facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of an attitude of respect for the
Conventions and this Protocol;
(d) In other situations, the Commission shall institute an inquiry at the request of a Party to the
conflict only with the consent of the other Party or Parties concerned;
(e) Subject to the foregoing provisions or this paragraph, the provisions of Article 52 of the
First Convention, Article 53 of the Second Convention, Article 132 or the Third Convention
and Article 149 of the Fourth Convention shall continue to apply to any alleged violation of the
Conventions and shall extend to any alleged violation of this Protocol.
Responsibility (Article 91)

 A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall,
if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
Denunciation (Article 99)

 In case a High Contracting Party should denounce this Protocol, the denunciation shall only
take effect one year after receipt of the instrument of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry
of that year the denouncing Party is engaged in one of the situations referred to in Article I, the
denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict or occupation and not,
in any case, before operations connected with the final release, repatriation or re-
establishment of the persons protected by the Convention or this Protocol have been
terminated.
 The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the depositary, which shall transmit it to all the
High Contracting Parties.
The Second Protocol
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.
The rules observed in international armed conflicts are also applicable in non-international
armed conflicts.
The Third Protocol
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005
Distinctive Emblems (Article 2)

 This Protocol recognizes an additional distinctive emblem in addition to, and for the same
purposes as, the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions. The distinctive emblems
shall enjoy equal status.
 This additional distinctive emblem, composed of a red frame in the shape of a square on edge
on a white ground, shall conform to the illustration in the Annex to this Protocol. This
distinctive emblem is referred to in this Protocol as the "third Protocol emblem".
Indicative use of the third Protocol emblem (Article 3)

 National Societies of those High Contracting Parties which decide to use the third Protocol
emblem may, in using the emblem in conformity with relevant national legislation, choose to
incorporate within it, for indicative purposes:
a) a distinctive emblem recognized by the Geneva Conventions or a combination of these
emblems; or
b) another emblem which has been in effective use by a High Contracting Party and was the
subject of a communication to the other High Contracting Parties and the International
Committee of the Red Cross through the depositary prior to the adoption of this Protocol.
Who may use the 3rd protocol emblem

 National societies of high contracting parties (Article 3)
 International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, and their duly authorized personnel (Article 4)
 medical services and religious personnel participating in operations under the auspices of the
United Nations (Article 5)
Prevention and Repression of Misuse (Article 6)

 The provisions of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, the 1977 Additional
Protocols, governing prevention and repression of misuse of the distinctive emblems shall
apply equally to the third Protocol emblem. In particular, the High Contracting Parties shall
take measures necessary for the prevention and repression, at all times, of any misuse of the
distinctive emblems mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 and their designations, including the
perfidious use and the use of any sign or designation constituting an imitation thereof.
Notwithstanding the paragraph above, High Contracting Parties may permit prior users of the
third Protocol emblem, or of any sign constituting an imitation thereof, to continue such use,
provided that the said use shall not be such as would appear, in time of armed conflict, to confer
the protection of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, the 1977 Additional Protocols,
and provided that the rights to such use were acquired before the adoption of this Protocol.
4. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Crash Course In Basic Foreign Investment Law 33
A. EXPROPRIATION LAW
As one of the most dynamic fields of international commercial law today, foreign
investment law has undergone a rapid evolution in state practice within the recent past. There
are many centers of controversy within the larger field of foreign investment law, but arguably
the most contentious issue remains that of expropriation. The context of international
expropriation rules is: the home state (where the investment is located) expropriates the rights
of ownership of the investor state (who introduced the investment and to whom such investment
belongs) who, as an alien, may rely on international law for the standard of treatment that
should be accorded to it. We must remember that expropriation, although recognized as one of
33 Thanks to ceejay balisacan for this portion
the inherent attributes of sovereignty, assumes an international and therefore more complex
dimension when exercised against foreign property because (1) the investor state, being a
subject of a foreign state, cannot be deemed to have been completely subsumed under the
authority and sovereignty of the home state by virtue merely of their contractual relations (2) the
relationship of home and investor states are clearly defined under an investment contract which,
according to its verbiage, may or may not make reference to international law in cases of
conflict, in the former case the ideally absolute exercise of the home state’s sovereignty
becomes limited to a certain extent by the standards of international law. In navigating through
the turbulent waters of expropriation rules, one may be guided by the following principles which,
to date, may be said to govern foreign investment law:
1. The norm remains to be the harmonization of all sources of legal obligations. One party
to an investment contract cannot therefore renege on the duties it voluntarily assumed
on the pretext of complying with a duty or exercising a right if the source of such duty or
right comes into conflict with the obligations laid down in the investment contract and/ or
customary law. The home state is therefore not allowed to unilaterally revoke investment
agreements on the basis of its absolute sovereignty over its natural resources, because
such exercise of sovereignty must as much as possible be consonant with the duty to
comply with obligations validly entered into.
2. If harmonization is not possible, the norm remains to be the expropriability of every

property. Although investment contracts must be complied with in good faith, all states
recognize the validity of the exercise of a home state of its prerogative to expropriate.
The home state can therefore take foreign property, and there are no established
absolute exceptions to this rule (meaning there are no cases wherein the home state
can be said to be absolutely barred or precluded from expropriating). The only difference
lies in the legal consequence of every act of taking, which would depend on whether the
taking was lawful or not, or whether the parties expressly provided in the investment
contract for the processes to be complied with during such expropriatory acts.
3. For every act of expropriation, the norm remains to be the compensability of every act of
taking. If the home state takes, it is bound to pay. This is the prevailing rule in current
state practice and opinion juris. The home state may exercise its prerogative to
expropriate, but it cannot do so without compensating the investor state or at least
reinstating the status quo ante (meaning the considerations paid for and benefits
received under the contract would be restored to the respective parties). The duty to pay
compensation may take various forms. It may be (1) a necessary legal consequence of
the expropriatory act, as provided expressly in the investment contract (2) a necessary
legal consequence of the expropriatory act, in accordance with customary law (3) an
alternative form of extinguishment of a legal obligation (instead of performing the
obligations under the contract, the home state chooses to reinstate the status quo ante
by giving back, as compensation, the consideration for the contract plus other incidental
adjustments), or (4) in the form of punitive damages, where the taking was adjudged to
be unlawful, in which case the contract may be enforced or, if performance is already
impossible, the home state may be required to pay compensation in an amount that
would approximate the value of the property taken and the damage caused by the
unlawful taking. The fact that compensation must be paid is generally accepted as a
norm; the only point of contention is the QUANTUM of such compensation. How much
should be paid is often a subject of debate and there is as yet no fixed rule in
determining the value of compensation that must be paid. In practice, however, what the
home state pays the investor would usually be a matter of negotiation and conditioned
upon the financial circumstances of the home state. There are some cases where the
norm of compensability is believed to be inapplicable, although such exemptions are
found in the writings of publicists and no authoritative decision has yet been rendered
recognizing these exemptions as such. The examples are the taxing power of the
state34, regulatory takings35, and police powers36.
4. In any case, the norm remains to be enforceability of every international legal obligation,
regardless of the source. The investment contract may be primarily the law between the
parties. However, by virtue of the fact that investment agreements are often concluded
between states or between private entities pursuant to a trade agreement concluded by
their respective states, international legal obligations would inevitably come into play. As
such, from the time the investor state introduces the foreign property into the home
state’s territory, both would have to be guided by the obligations which both are bound to
under international law. As a consequence, the home state cannot be permitted to
undertake an expropriation in such manner as to be violative of other international legal
obligations like (1) the duty to observe pacta sunt servanda under customary law 37 (2)
the duty to accord foreign investors with the international minimum standard of treatment
under customary law38 (3) the duty to expropriate for a public purpose, on a non-
discriminatory basis, and with payment of just compensation under customary law 39, or
(4) the duty to observe elementary rules of contractual relations as embodied in general
principles of law relating to contracts40.
In dealing with the issue of expropriation, one must be guided by basic UN texts touching on
expropriation:
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or

reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In
such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance
with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law. (ARTICLE 4)
34 In the process of taxation, the investor state may constructively be deprived of a portion of its property through profits; but
since the power of taxation is recognized as plenary in nature, any incidental taking that would result cannot be compensable.
35
In enacting legislations designed to protect the interests of its citizens, the home state may impose certain regulatory measures
which, when applied, would have the effect of depriving the investor of a portion of its property. An example of such regulatory
measures is the imposition of technical requirements upon a particular industry to comply with environmental standards. Even if
such a measure would effect a deprivation of ownership rights, it is not compensable because regulatory measures are not
supposed to take property; they merely impose standards by which such property may be utilized.
36 Police power measures are distinguished form expropriatory acts in that the former assumes a more immediate dimension; in
such cases, the taking of property is done to avert or stop a clear and present danger to the public, something which the home
state has a duty to prevent. There is therefore a difference between expropriating a factory because the government wants to
nationalize the manufacturing industry and abating the operations of the factory because of its harmful emissions. In the latter
case, since the taking was done to stop an existing danger and to punish the offending factory owner, no compensation is due.
Notice that in both police power and expropriation, a public purpose is being served, but the exercise of police power was done
not to pursue a public policy but to exercise a governmental duty to abate nuisances.
37 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the Vienna Convention is
recognized as a codification of international customary norms regarding treaty compliance.

38 Such minimum standard is nothing more than the “reasonable” treatment recognized by all nations viewed from the perspective
of an objective third party observer. The minimum standard is embodied in most investment treaties in force today, and was
enunciated by the General Claims Commission constituted by the US and Mexico in the Neer Claim.
39 These three requirements can be found in almost all investment treaties in force and can therefore be argued as constituting
internationally recognized norms relating to the validity of expropriatory acts.

40 These general principles of law recognized by all civilized nations pertain to such commonly-held notions as good faith, non-
unilateral abrogation without reinstatement of the status quo ante, and unjust enrichment. These principles are found in all
established legal systems and are, in some instances, codified categorically as articulating general principles of law, like in the
case of the “Principles of International Commercial Contracts” codified by the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law.
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign
States shall be observed in good faith; States and international organizations
shall strictly and conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations
over their natural wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter and the
principles set forth in the present resolution. (ARTICLE 8)
---United Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1962
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which

case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question
of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the
domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on
the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle
of free choice of means. (ARTICLE 2, Par. 2, Subpar. C)
---Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50
As Harris notes, the “Charter” has not attained the status of custom because developed states
have effectively mounted a resistance to the clause which does not require a “public purpose”
precondition to expropriation. The same is true with the Declaration on the Establishment of the
New International Economic Order, another UN GA Resolution backed by developing countries,
which was overridden, according to Walde, by the historical inclination towards market
liberalism. The formula of developing states, according to him, was simply incompatible with the
tendency towards promotion of foreign investment, the latter requiring adequate and stable
protections as an inducement to risk-averse foreign investors. The following survey of case law
on expropriation represents the views taken by international tribunals in interpreting the different
operative terms of the aforequoted texts:
Texaco v. Libya
“An ‘internationalized’ contract with a stabilization clause precludes the exercise of the
expropriatory prerogatives of the home state”
In 1973 and 1974, Libya decided to nationalize the properties and assets of two American
companies which were granted concession contracts to exploit and extract oil. The contention
centers on two clauses in the concession contract: (1) the “stabilization clause” which provides
that “the contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be altered except by
mutual consent of the parties” and (2) the “governing law” clause which provides that “ the
concession shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles of the law of
Libya common to the principles of international law and in the absence of such common
principles then by and in accordance with the general principles of law, including such of those
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals”. Further, under the concession
contract, any disputes arising from the interpretation of the terms of the agreement (including
alleged breaches of the stabilization clause) shall be submitted to international arbitration.

According to sole arbitrator Dupuy, the stabilization, governing law, and arbitration clauses of
the concession contract are sufficient evidence that the contract has been “internationalized”,
meaning subjected to the standards of international law and taken out of the ambit of domestic
law. The validity of the actuations of both parties, therefore, has to be measured against
international standards, and not based on its compatibility with Libyan law. Internationalization
of contracts results in the protection of investors against the risks of contractual modification or
abrogation resulting from changes in municipal laws or other governmental measures.
Specifically, Dupuy states that “the recognition by international law of the right to nationalize is
not sufficient ground to empower the state to disregard its commitments, because the same law
also recognizes the power of a state to commit itself internationally, especially by accepting the
inclusion of stabilization clauses in a contract entered into with a foreign private party…Thus, in
respect of the international law of contracts, a nationalization cannot prevail over an
internationalized contract, containing stabilization clauses…” Therefore, if a state bound itself to
a contract which is international in character and burdened with stabilization clauses, such state
is deemed to have waived its prerogative to expropriate contrary to the terms of such contract.
Since, in this case, the expropriation was deemed to have been contrary to the stabilization
clause of an internationalized contract, the expropriatory act is set aside and Dupuy awarded a
remedy of restitutio in integrum – meaning Libya was compelled to perform its obligations under
the concession contract, i.e., to allow Texaco to extract oil.
BP v. Libya
“The home state may expropriate if it wants to; when it does, even under wrongful
circumstances, the investor state cannot compel the home state to continue performing the
latter’s obligations, but may only claim compensation by way of damages”
BP Exploration Company (BP) had a contractual agreement with the Government of Libya
(Libya), which allowed BP to operate in Libya for the extraction, processing and export of
petroleum. The area in which BP was allowed to operate was called Concession 65; it has an
area of over 8,000 sq. kms. in the heart of the Sarir desert. On November 29 and 30 of 1971,
the Government of Iran occupied 3 Islands in the Gulf (Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser
Tumb). These Islands were still under British protection, though the treaty which provided such
protection would last only until Nov. 30 1971. The British, however, did not react to the
occupation, and were blamed to be the cause of the loss of the Islands. In December 7 of 1971
Libya passed the BP Nationalization Law, which nationalized the operations of BP in
Concession 65, restoring to the State ownership of all properties, rights, assets and shares in
the operations conducted in the said area, and then transferring these to a new company, the
Arabian Gulf Exploration Company. The law was passed in reaction to Britain’s failure to act on
the Iranian occupation of its three protectorate islands in the Gulf. The nationalization law
provided that the State should pay compensation to BP, which was to be determined by a
committee established by the Minister of Petroleum. The decision of such a committee was to
be final, to admit no appeal, and to be communicated to the Petroleum Minister, who will then
inform BP about it within 30 days of issuance. However, no action on compensation was taken
until February 13, 1972. A three man committee was formed but it was only in September of that
year that BP received communication from the committee, asking its remarks and viewpoints on
the matter of compensation. As a result of the Nationalization Law (which was rapidly
implemented) BP’s operations in Concession 65 were brought to a complete halt and its staff
were immediately excluded from the premises and facilities. The Arabian Gulf Exploration
Company had taken over Concession 65.
The Concession contract in this case contains the same governing law clause as that in the
case of Texaco above – that Libyan law would be applicable only to the extent that it coincides
with international law. The arbitrator first disposed of the issue of (1) whether or not the alleged
injured party to a concession agreement has the right to deem the contract as valid and
enforceable even after the alleged wrongful expropriation and (2) whether or not the injured
party may claim reparations in the form of specific performance/ restitutio in integrum. The
arbitrator stated that under international law, the wrongful breach of a contract would entitle the
injured party to terminate the contract at its option. Until and unless such injured party elects to
do so, the contract should be deemed as valid and binding and it can compel the other party to
continue performing its obligations under it. However, such situation, according to the arbitrator,
does not find application in a case where the other (expropriating) party is a sovereign state.
The right to deem the contract as continuing to be binding and the consequent right to demand
restitutio in integrum is therefore not available to BP under international law. This
pronouncement is important because it recognizes the almost plenary power of the home state
to expropriate – that the home state cannot be precluded under international law to expropriate
when it wishes to.
Finding no concurrence between Libyan and international law regarding the declarations sought
to be obtained by BP, the arbitrator then turns to international law. Under international law, the
arbitrator declared, the same conclusions as above were inevitable – no support for the claim
that the injured party may deem the contract as continuing to be valid and that restitutio in
integrum is proper. The all-important portion of the decision which applies to all expropriation
cases involving a sovereign state is: “when by exercise of sovereign power a State committed a
fundamental breach of a concession agreement by repudiating it through a nationalization of the
enterprise and its assets in a manner which implies finality, the concessionaire is not entitled to
call for specific performance by the Government of the agreement and reinstatement of his
contractual rights, but his sole remedy is an action for damages”. The conclusion is therefore
unequivocal – the home state may expropriate when it desires to, and even if such expropriation
is done in breach of the contract, the home state can still not be entitled to reinstate the
operability of the contract; at the most, it can only be compelled to pay damages.
In this case, damages were awarded by the arbitrator. However, it is important to note that the
circumstances under which the expropriation took place in this case constitutes one of the first
instances where an arbitral court classified state actions as (1) in breach of obligations (2)
discriminatory and (3) confiscatory. The wrongfulness of the expropriatory act is important to
establish because this would determine the quantum of compensation that would be awarded to
the injured party. The oft-quoted portion of the decision is: “The BP Nationalization Law, and
actions taken thereunder, by Libya, constitute a fundamental breach of the BP Concession as
they amount to a total repudiation of the agreement and obligations of Libya under such
agreement. The bases for this ruling are rules of applicable systems of law too elementary and
voluminous to require or permit citation. Further, Libya’s taking of BP’s property, rights and
interests clearly violate Public International Law as it was made for purely extraneous political
reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory (as other concessions have not been touched). It
was also confiscatory as no offer of compensation was made in two years”.
Chorzow Factory Case
“The home state may expropriate, but when it does unlawfully, it would have to pay a large price
– either to continue being bound to the obligations under the contract, or be liable for damages,
or both”
For facts of the case, please refer to earlier reference under “Sources of International Law”.
However, for purposes of this section, it is important to recall that the expropriation undertaken
by Poland against German interests in this case was made in violation of a treaty, and therefore
classified as wrongful under international law. This case is often quoted in expropriation cases
because it provides for the quantum of compensation required to be paid in cases of wrongful
takings by the home state. The oft-quoted portion of the decision is now known as the “Chorzow
Standard” in international law. It is often invoked by investor states to justify their claims of
compensation, because it is sufficiently vague as to evade exact quantification but sufficiently
liberal and inclined towards investors’ interests as to be adequately justificatory of claims of full
compensation (“full” meaning nearly everything – the value of the property, forgone profits,
future profits, incidental expenses, committed profits, and damages). Note, however, that the
Chorzow Standard does contemplate restitutio in integrum as a remedy for unlawful
expropriations, contrary to subsequent arbitral decisions precluding the propriety of any such
remedial award, as in the BP case. The continuing validity of this assertion is still a matter of
debate, and of course, although investor states do settle in time to mere payment of
compensation, it never hurts to have the Chorzow Standard as the starting point of every
negotiation as far as the investor state is concerned. The Chorzow Standard provides:
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems
to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals -
is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. (1) Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; (2) Award of damages for loss sustained which
would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles
which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to
international law”.
Liamco v. Libya
(1) “Sovereign immunity is waived if the home state consents to litigate arbitral claims anywhere
in the world”
(2) “Acts of state cannot be passed upon in judgment by any foreign tribunal.”
(3) “Contractual rights are not property, and repudiation of contractual obligations is not a taking,
within the meaning of expropriation law”
(4) “Compensability, once satisfied, renders a taking lawful under international law; the
unsatisfactory quantum of such compensation on the part of the investor would not render the
taking unlawful”
In 1973 and 1974 Libya nationalized both LIAMCO's rights under the concessions and certain of
its oil drilling equipment. Following unsuccessful negotiations regarding compensation, LIAMCO
rejected the terms of the nationalization and initiated proceedings under the arbitration clause.
Libya, maintaining that the nationalization superseded the concessions altogether, refused to
participate in the Geneva proceedings. LIAMCO, after obtaining a favorable ruling, brings action
to the District Court of the District of Columbia to confirm and enforce such ruling. In bringing the
suit, LIAMCO invokes the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to American Law on “Actions
Against Foreign States”, arguing that Libya is not immune under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA). LIAMCO further contends that the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention) requires the confirmation of the award.
Libya does not challenge the validity of the underlying award. Instead it mounts a two pronged
defense arguing first that the Court is without jurisdiction, and second, that even should the
Court find jurisdiction, it should refrain from enforcing the award under the Convention because
of the act of state doctrine. This case was brought before an American Court not because that is
where it will be litigated but because LIAMCO wanted the arbitral decision rendered in Geneva
to be confirmed in the United States.
The District Court of the District of Columbia made several pronouncements relevant under
international law. First, it held that the arbitration clause of the concession contract between
LIAMCO and Libya is sufficient to bring disputes arising under it within the ambit of international
law. As such, as far as American law is concerned, it has acquired jurisdiction over Libya
notwithstanding its supposedly immune status as a state because of the arbitration clause
(which provides that “arbitration should take place either where the parties agreed, or where the
arbitrators might agree”) that contemplates arbitration anywhere in the world, including the
United States.
Second, this case is relevant in expropriation law because it recognizes that measures falling
within the “act of state” doctrine41 cannot be questioned by another foreign state. It does not
mean that the court before which a case is brought can be deprived of jurisdiction properly
acquired, as in this case. It only means that in litigating a claim, all the parties to the dispute,
including the court, would take it as a given that an act of state is valid and legitimate. In short,
all other points of issue may be litigated except whether or not the home state is justified in
expropriating.
Under American law, particularly the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 42,
acts of state may be passed upon if such would amount to a confiscatory taking violative of
international law and the President of the United States does not exercise his prerogative, by
reason of foreign policy, to preclude American courts from doing so. Under this consideration,
the District Court dismissed LIAMCO’s claim as being not justiciable, and made two
pronouncements relevant to expropriation law: the “taking” requirement of the Hickenlooper
amendment was not satisfied because (1) contractual rights are not “property”, and the
repudiation of contractual obligations not a “taking”, within the meaning of the law; and the
“violative of international law” requisite was also not satisfied because (2) a taking is not
rendered violative of international law simply because the investor is not satisfied with the
amount of compensation the home state is prepared to pay; as long as there exists a
mechanism for compensation within the law of the home state, the taking is lawful.
Starett Housing Case
(1) “Expropriation does not need a law to be deemed as such; any act that would result in the
deprivation of ownership rights and therefore effect an indirect or virtual taking would be
classified as expropriation nonetheless”
(2) “Expropriation does not need the physical taking of property to be deemed as such; any
deprivation of ownership rights closely related to the physical property would be classified as
expropriation nonetheless”
In 1974, Starett, operating through Shah Goli, an Iranian subsidiary company, entered into an
agreement with an Iranian development bank to buy land in Iran and build houses upon it. The
project was proceeding on schedule when their harassment during the 1979 revolution caused
the withdrawal of the American and other foreign personnel working on it. This, coupled with
general revolutionary disruption and government intervention (making Shah Goli forgo
contractual payments and freezing Shah Goli’s bank accounts), caused the project to fall behind
schedule and Shah Goli to be in financial difficulties. In January 1980, Iran placed Shah Goli
under control of a temporary manager. Starett files a suit for compensation, alleging that the
acts of the Iranian government is an expropriation of its property rights under the contract.
The Starett Housing case is a landmark case in foreign investment law because it recognized
the concept of an “indirect expropriation”. In current usage, the concept has been used
interchangeably with terms such as “virtual expropriation”, “effective expropriation”, or “act
tantamount or equivalent to expropriation”. In this case, the tribunal recognized that, technically
41 The doctrine provides that “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and th e
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory.”
42 The Hickenlooper Amendment provides that unless the President, for foreign policy reasons, suggests otherwise, courts must
not decline on the ground of the act of state doctrine to decide the merits of a claim of title or other right to property . . .based
upon (or traced though) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law.
speaking, no expropriation took place because, unlike in the Texaco, BP, or LIAMCO cases, no
law was passed by Iran expropriating the assets of Starett. However the tribunal made a
pronouncement that “it is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can
interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that
they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport to
have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original
owner.” In this case such manner of interference was committed by the Iranian government
when it undertook acts leading to the bankruptcy and placement under receivership of Shah
Goli, Starett’s co-venturer. Upon doing so, Iran effectively has taken the property rights of
Starett in the housing project and deprived it of its reasonable expectations as an investor.
Secondly, the Starett case is also significant because, in departure from the LIAMCO view,
contractual rights are deemed to be property for purposes of expropriation law. The doctrine of
the case is that “measures of expropriation or taking, primarily aimed at physical property, have
been deemed to comprise also rights of a contractual nature closely related to the physical
property”. The contractual rights referred to by the Tribunal includes such intangible assets as
management rights, legitimate investment-backed expectations in the completion of the venture,
and right to proceeds. The Tribunal, in sum, laid down the doctrine that expropriation may be
direct or indirect, and that it may be undertaken through a literal taking of a physical asset, or
through a deprivation of ownership rights closely related to a physical property.
Kuwait v. Aminoil
“A home state may not be precluded from expropriating; if any, the limitations to the exercise of
expropriatory prerogative must be confined only to a limited period covering serious
undertakings, and such limitations must be expressly provided for in the contract”
Aminoil is an American company which was granted an oil concession by Kuwait. However,
Kuwait, by Decree, terminated the agreement before its expiry and transferred the concession
assets to itself. Aminoil question the legality of the termination under the “stabilization clauses of
the contract,” particularly Art 17 and Art 11(B). The provisions prohibit a nationalization of the oil
venture. Art 17 states that “no alteration shall be made in the terms of this Agreement…except
in the event of the Shaikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of
both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions.” Art 11(B) states that “save as
aforesaid this Agreement shall not be terminated before the expiration of the period
specified…except by surrender as provided in Article 12 or if the Company shall be in default
under the arbitration provisions of Article 18.” Kuwait, in defense of its actions, invokes the
principle of sovereignty over natural resources which, according to it, is an imperative rule of jus
cogens. This principle prohibits States from giving guarantees against the exercise of the public
authority over natural resources.
In contrast with Dupuy’s arbitral decision in the Texaco case, the arbitral court in Aminoil
expressly reiterates that there is no rule in international law absolutely precluding a home state
from expropriating. The only limitations (and not absolute exceptions) to this rule are three-fold:
States may pledge not to nationalize but only if: [a] it is for a serious undertaking; [b] it is
expressly stipulated for; [c] it covers a limited period. In short, a home state may validly waive its
expropriatory prerogative only for a limited time (the prohibition against taking cannot be
perpetual), only upon serious undertakings (other investments of a smaller scale may be
expropriated more expeditiously), and in any case any such limitations must be embodied in the
contract. The expropriatory power of the state is the general rule, and therefore any limitations
to its exercise cannot be implied. In considering the legal consequences of an expropriatory act,
consideration must be given to whether the investor has been adequately protected by express
provisions of the contract relating to compensation. The compensability of an expropriatory act
strongly militates against the presumption that the home state can take property without
necessary legal consequences in the exercise of its sovereignty. The Tribunal also interpreted
Arts 17 and 11(B) as not absolutely forbidding nationalization because it impliedly requires that
nationalization shall not have a confiscatory character. Lastly, the Tribunal gave due credit to
the fact that the act of Kuwait was in pursuance of a legitimate state policy. It considered that
the undertaking (the extraction of oil) was at first, directed to narrow patrimonial ends, that is, as
a financial venture entered into by the Kuwaiti government for its governmental purposes. Later,
it became an essential instrument in the economic and social progress of the State, as
evidenced by the progressive development of Kuwaiti law with a view to taking an active role in
the development of its own resources within its territory. As such, the expropriation in this case
was not found to be unlawful, and the Tribunal merely awarded compensation to Aminoil.
Amoco International Finance v. Iran
(1) “Expropriation may be done for a public purpose, and not merely for public utility”
(2) “Compensability is the norm; the process or quantum of compensation is not. An
expropriation is therefore deemed lawful as long as provision for compensation exists, although
it may be unsatisfactory to the investor, subject to the submission of any dispute to arbitration”
(3) “Takings may be done in successive stages; the fact that the entire economic branch to
which an enterprise belongs was not expropriated is not necessarily a badge of discriminatory
intent”
(4) “A home state is not bound by obligations contracted by private entities within its territories.
For any such obligation to arise, a clear duty on the part of the home state must be embodied in
the contract”
Amoco is a Swiss company and a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil, and American
company. Amoco entered into a joint venture with NPC, an Iranian company controlled by the
Iranian government, to form Khemco, an Iranian company jointly owned and managed by
Amoco and NPC. The venture sought to process and sell Iranian natural gas, each contracting
party having 50% shares in the profits to be realized. In 1980, the Khemco Agreement, which
was by its terms valid for 35 years, was declared null and void by the Iranian government
following the 1979 Iranian revolution and the implementation of Iranian legislation (the Single
Article Act of 1980) that was intended to complete the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry.
Amoco filed a suit for compensation for the taking of its interests in Khemco.
The first doctrine of foreign investment law that was pronounced in Amoco is that the ground for
expropriation which was formerly limited to public utility (as expressed in the Chorzow case) has
been expanded to the more general term public purpose. It is therefore not needed for the
expropriating home state to prove that it wanted to exercise ownership over the property taken
for the use of the public. It is enough that the taking be done in pursuance of some public
purpose43.
Secondly, the case reiterated the doctrine in LIAMCO that a taking satisfies international
standards of lawfulness when it provides for a mechanism for the payment of compensation.
Under the Single Article Act, a special commission will be constituted to determine the amount
of compensation due to the foreign investor, any disagreement over the quantum of which may
be submitted for arbitration. Amoco did not avail of this remedy, and so it cannot be said that the
expropriation was unlawful per se because it did not grant compensation in such manner and
within such time as to satisfy the investor. What would make an act of taking unlawful under
international law would be the absence of any provision for compensation.
Thirdly, the Amoco case is also instructive with regard to the issue of discriminatory takings. In
the BP case, the Tribunal actually found that there was a discriminatory expropriation because it
43 By this standard, the home state may transfer ownership of the property for the use of a private entity, or even let the property
lie idle or destroy it – in any case there would be an expropriation.
was undertaken only against BP and not against other similar ventures of other nationalities.
The Tribunal in the Amoco case did not rule that an expropriation is per se unlawful because it
is directed only against a particular entity within a larger industry. The Tribunal in this case
recognized that the act of expropriation which is the prerogative of the home state may be
undertaken in such manner as to be determined by the home state in pursuance of its policies.
The non-expropriation of an entire branch of economic activity is not in itself discrimination,
absent any evidence of patent bad faith or discriminatory designs. Said the Tribunal: “Reasons
specific to the non-expropriated enterprise, or to the expropriated one, or to both, may justify
such a difference of treatment. Furthermore, as observed by the arbitral tribunal in AMINOIL, a
coherent policy of nationalization can reasonably be operated gradually in successive stages”.
Lastly, the important doctrine laid down in this case is that stabilization clauses must be clear in
demanding from the home state obligations which the investor state can enforce against it.
Absent such unequivocal stipulation in the contract, the home state cannot be deemed to have
been a party to the contract and cannot therefore be held liable under its terms. In this case, no
clear obligation was imposed by the concession contract on the Iran government. There was no
showing that the contract contained a “stabilization clause” that would have obligated the Iranian
government to insulate the contract from any change in domestic law that would affect the
contract’s operation. As such, the Iranian government cannot be said to have expropriated
Amoco’s property in breach of its obligations because no obligation exists on its part. In
conclusion, the Tribunal ordered Iran’s compensation of Amoco as a necessary legal
consequence of the taking, and such expropriation was classified as a lawful one under
international law, thereby negating the propriety of any award of damages.
Phillips v. Iran
(1) “Expropriation is any act which would deprive the investor of his ownership rights
permanently”
(2) “Focus should be on the effect of the expropriatory act on the investor, and not on the
intention of the home state”
(3) “The reckoning point of expropriation is that point at which the deprivation of ownership
rights becomes irreversible”
Phillips entered into a Joint Structure Agreement with Iranian Government to exploit oil. Imam
Khomeini sparks a revolution in Autumn of 1978 and it succeeds in toppling over the past
regime in February 1979. The revolutionary government decides to withdraw all oil contracts
with foreign companies under the guise of Nationalization/Anti-western sentiment. The company
then sued for recovery of compensation form the Iranian government.
The Phillips case is significant in that it reiterated the doctrine on indirect expropriation
established in the Starett case. This case, however, further qualified the concept of indirect
expropriation by pronouncing that (1) expropriation need not be of contractual rights closely
related to a physical property; it is merely required that the taking amount to a deprivation of
ownership rights (2) expropriation must be done with finality and not merely ephemeral (3) the
focus must be on the effect and impact of the expropriatory act on the investor and not on the
intention of the home state or the manner in which the expropriation is undertaken – this heavy
focus on the effect of expropriatory acts on the investor more than the government interest
pursued will later be known as the “sole effect doctrine” in foreign investment law. Said the
tribunal: “While assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically and
immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the government, thus
requiring compensation under international law, such a conclusion is warranted whenever
events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it
appears that this deprivation is not merely ephemeral. The intent of the government is less

important than the effects of the measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of
control or interference is less important than the reality of their impact.”
Also, the Phillips case is significant when it comes to determining the reckoning point at which
the operative act of expropriation is deemed to have taken place. This is essential in the
computation of compensation, especially with regard to forgone profits and damages. According
to the tribunal: “where the taking is through a chain of events, the taking will not necessarily be
found to have occurred at the time of either the first or the last such event, but rather when the
interference has deprived the Claimant of fundamental rights of ownership and such deprivation
is "not merely ephemeral," or when it becomes an "irreversible deprivation”. The “irreversibility
point” refers to that point where the exercise of ownership rights of the investor has already
been rendered absolutely impossible by the acts of the home state.
B. FREE TRADE 44
The study of foreign investment law would not be complete without delving into one of
the most progressive fields of international commerce – free trade. The underlying basis for the
widespread promotion of liberal market paradigms in the international economy is the
proposition that trade, as a rule, is always beneficial, and the more unhampered and equal the
trade is, the greater the economic benefits to be reaped and, ultimately, the greater the level of
development that all states can achieve. Rising from the ashes of World War II, the nations of
the world came to the agreement that accelerating the recovery of devastated states would
entail the promotion of an international mechanism that would facilitate the flow of international
capital from those who have it to those who need it most. The Bretton Woods regime
established from such agreement became the precursor of modern-day international free trade,
again with the underlying assumption that trade is essentially beneficial, and that international
trade would be more facilitative of development if it were to be undertaken under a regime of
progressively decreasing tariffs and strictly enforced mechanisms to safeguard against unfair
trade practices. From the Bretton Woods agreement arose discussion groups the members of
which agree to conduct international trade under mutually favourable terms using a “most
favored nation” framework. From this discussion groups came the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. Ultimately, the World Trade Organization was born, as the manifestation of the
states’ desire to conduct multilateral trade with a view to establishing an economic order where
tariffs are progressively decreased and unfair trade practices are offset by economic
enforcement measures.
The Philippines is arguably the only jurisdiction among all the states signatories to the
WTO treaty wherein the legality of the treaty itself has been pronounced by the highest court of
the land. In the case of Tanada v. Angara, the Supreme Court has had occasion to declare that
(1) the Filipino-First policy purportedly enshrined in the Constitution is just a hortatory provision
which cannot be legally enforced as a matter of right without any supporting legislation (2) the
Philippines does not adhere to an isolationist economic policy and is in fact accommodative of
international trade arrangements that are anchored on the policy of equality and reciprocity (3)
the WTO Agreeement constitutes a treaty obligation which the Philippines is bound to perform
under the principle of pacta sunt servanda; as such, since the pacta sunt servanda doctrine is
part of international law, it is binding on the Philippines by virtue of the Constitution’s
Incorporation Clause (4) the international free trade regime embodied in the WTO Agreement
represents the best possible economic option for the Philippines, considering the prevailing
international economic context. This last pronouncement of the Court was uncalled for at the
very least, it being a statement of policy which the Court has no competence to make. In
44This portion is based on notes from Sir Harry’s discussion in class and the article “The Philippines and the WTO: Survey of
Current Practices with Emphasis on Anti-Dumping, Countervailing Duties, and Safeguard Measures” by Sir Harry published in
the Asian Journal of WTO and Health Law and Policy (Vol. 1, 2006).
deciding the case the way it did, therefore, the Supreme Court not only solidified the argument
that the WTO Agreement is a valid treaty obligation, but also made the unsolicited
pronouncement of the trade regime’s wisdom and propriety.
The implementation of the WTO Agreement in the country, however, is not without issue.
As expected, many contentious controversies have confronted the country primarily in the field
of protecting against unfair trade measures of other states. We must remember that the WTO
established not only a policy of progressive lowering of tariffs, it also put in place certain
measures of economic enforcement to ensure that trade between nations are as equal as
possible. These economic enforcement measures are anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures, and safeguard measures:
(1) anti-dumping measures – there is dumping when the export price of a commodity is
less than its normal value in the exporting state. Anti-dumping measures seek to
equalize trade in such manner as for the commodity to actually reflect its value from the
standards of the exporting state. Such measures must be undertaken only after it was
proven that (1) a dumping exists (2) there was an actual injury to a domestic industry (3)
there is a causal link between the dumping and the injury. In addition, the measures
must be initiated by 25% of an industry affected.
(2) countervailing measures – a subsidy is a financial contribution by a government

where there is either a direct fund transfer, a revenue which otherwise due is forgone, or
when a government provides goods and services. In such cases, countervailing
measures may be employed by the importing state to make the product reflect its actual
value taking into consideration the subsidy that its manufacturers have received. Such
measures may be undertaken only if it was proven that (1) a dumping exists (2) there
was an actual injury to a domestic industry (3) there is a causal link between the
dumping and the injury.
(3) safeguard measures – safeguard measures are employed when there is a showing
of a dramatic increase in the imports of a particular commodity. Dumping or unfair
subsidy need not be proved to justify resort to these measures, it being enough that
surge in imports is proven alongside a serious injury or threat of injury that the former
has caused or will cause, and that the product in question is a “like product”, in absolute
or relative terms, to the product domestically manufactured.
How exactly the arbitration panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO (which were
established to rule on disputes between states arising from the interpretation of the Agreement’s
provisions) dealt with cases and disputes arising from the adoption of such economic
enforcement measures is also a fertile topic. Here, relevant decisions and the essential portions
of their rulings interpretative of the Agreement’s provisions will be considered:
1. Cold Rolled Coil Sheets from Taiwan – the injury proven was not causally linked to the
dumping measure but a result of such extraneous factors as the Asian Financial Crisis,
debt servicing, and inefficient and uncompetitive technology.
2. Portland Cement Case – the Tariff Commission of the Philippines is independent and
its factual findings are given great weight by the Court.
3. Desiccated Coconut Case (Philippines v. Brazil) – the application for remedies must
follow the process set out in the treaty; in this case, the case should have been brought
before the GATT and not the WTO because the measures were imposed under GATT.

4. Shrimps Case (US); Tuna Case (US); Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
Case (US) – the US must impose trade restrictions that are in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption and must impose them against not
only imported but locally harvested products.
It is also relevant that one of the recognized valid grounds for the imposition of trade
restrictions are the so-called Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) which allows an
importing state to impose trade measures to protect human, animal or plant life or health in
the territory of member states either from (1) entry , establishment, or spread of pests or
diseases (2) risks arising from additives, contaminant toxin, or disease-causing organism,
(3) from a risk arising from a disease or pest carried by an animal or plant, (4) to prevent or
limit other damages in the territory of member states arising from the introduction,
establishment or spread of pests. The imposition of these measures, however, are subject
to the showing of sufficient scientific basis and the undertaking of risk assessment
measures. Any challenge to the validity of SPS measures must be anchored on the
proposition of an available alternative to the measure being challenged that would (1)
provide the same or a higher protection than that given by the challenged measure and (2)
be less restrictive of trade.
5. Beef Hormones Case (US v. EU) – risk assessment is a prerequisite in the imposition
of SPS measures
6. Bananas Case (US v. EU) – quantitative trade preferences are violations of the most
favored nation provision of the WTO Agreement. The same tariff dues must be imposed
on similar products, regardless of the origin.

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Public international law

PROF. HARRY ROQUE

* Bok * Ceejay * Tif * Gem * Tin *

~ Lora ~ PJ ~ Carol ~ Jerome ~ Ben ~ Cathe ~ Easter ~ Mike ~ Marco ~

How is international law defined in the light of developments in international legal

2. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Art. 38, ICJ Statute:

Article 53, 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties

A number of writers have distinguished formal sources from material sources of

1 Thanks to Bok, PJ, and Lora for this part.

What are the elements of international custom?

Repetition of practice or actions of states is necessary. A customary norm of international

According to Judge Hudson: “elements which must be present before a principle of

a. concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of situation falling

How is opinion juris understood?

Are judicial decisions and teaching of publicists sources of international law?

What is a jus cogens norm?

In general, how do norms of international law come into being?

Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949)

Yamashita v. Styer (1945)

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

RP is bound to comply with established rules in treating war criminals. Impelled by

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Recognition that a rule is fundamental or a jus cogens establishes CIL. A further

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Widespread & representative participation in the convention including specially affected

Southwest Africa Case (2nd Phase, 1966)

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Asylum Case – Haya Dela Torre (Columbia/Peru, 1950)

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Certificate of arrival not essential, declarations or intention to become a Fil. citizen is

Nuclear Test Cases (1974)

Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the

Legality Of The Use Of A State Of Nuclear Weapons (1996)

Necessity & proportionality. The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article 51 is

Rules on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of nuclear weapons as such. International

"In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements,

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Preah Vihear Temple Case (1962)

Corfu Channel Case (1949)

Chorzow Factory Case (Germany V. Poland) (1928)

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Texaco V. Libya (1978)

Resolutions in order to be binding must be accepted by the members escpecially those

Passage Case (Portugal V. India)

ART. 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:

ART 34, ICJ Statute:

3. ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Reparations For Injuries Suffered In The Service Of The Un (1949)

UN’s international personality as evidenced by UN Charter, practice and conventions. The

Mavrommatis Case (1924)

Disputes, defined. A dispute is defined as a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict

Certain Expenses Of The UN (1962)

Article II par 2 empowers the General Assembly, by means of recommendations to States or

If state sovereignty is said to be “absolute”, how is it related to the independence of

How is state sovereignty defined in international law?

Island Of Palmas Case

Territorial sovereignty, defined. It appears to follow that sovereignty in relation to a portion of

Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence, in

Territorial sovereignty belongs always to one, or in exceptional circumstances to several,

Uplaw 2009b *** Always will b

Acquisition of title. Titles of acquisition of TS in present-day international law are either