TOPIC: SEARCH AND SEIZURE therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
erate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
RULE 126, Rules of Court
Search and Seizure
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before
the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall
be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made
in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of
facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed
by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day
time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in
the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a)
The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11
of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized
be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of
the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return,
the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action
has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)
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 STONEHILL v. DIOKNO
GR. No. L-19550 – June 19, 1967
Chief Justice Concepcion
Petitioners: Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck
Respondents: Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose
Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, et
al.
“Upon application of the officers of the government named above – hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors – several judges – hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges – issued, on
different dates,, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or corporations of which they
were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals… and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit loss statements…”
FACTS:
 The petitioners in this case alleged that the search warrants were null and void
as contravening both the Constitution and the Rules of Court for the ff. reasons:
o (1) did not describe with particularity the things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases filed
against them; (4) searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law
o Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the respondents and their agents from using the effects
seized or any copies thereof in the deportation cases against them and
that the contested search warrants be declared null and void –
commanding that thins and cash moneys seized under the warrants in
question be returned
 The respondents herein alleged that: (1) the warrants were valid; (2) defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by the petitioners’ consent; and (3) effects
seized are admissible in evidence regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures
 The documents and other things seized may be split into (2) major groups,
namely: those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and those found and seized in the residences of petitioners.
 March 22, 1962: this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
in the petition, but by June 29, 1962 the writ was partially lifted or dissolved
insofar as the evidence seized from the offices of the corporations of the
petitioners
o With regard to the things seized from the offices: The Court stated
that the petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof – for
the simple reason that corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of the petitioners, regardless
of the amount of stock each one of the petitioners own in their
respective businesses  the legality of a seizure may only be contested
by the party whose rights have been impaired “PURELY
PERSONAL”
o With regard to the things seized in the residences: Respondents
were restrained from using them in evidence against the petitioners
ISSUES & HELD:
1. W/N the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under
the authority thereof, are valid – NO
o The Constitution states that: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
o Note that the mandate stresses that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause and that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized  None of these requirements were complied with
in the contested warrants
o The applications merely stated that the natural and juridical person
named had committed “a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code.” 
In other words, so specific offense alleged
o The Court stated that it would be legal heresy to convict anybody of
“a violation of Central Bank Laws…” as alleged in the applications
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
 It would also place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers
o Because of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, the Court deemed it fit
to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former ROC by providing that
“A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense.”  The Court then amended it again and added that “No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.”
o The Court stated that the warrants authorized the search for and
seizure of records pertaining to ALL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal  thus
2
 openly contravening the explicit demands of the Bill of Rights – that
things to be sized be particularly described, to eliminate “general
warrants”
2. If the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners – NO
o Although the respondents relied on the ruling in Moncado v.
People’s Court, they stated that even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the papers and things
seized were admissible in evidence  The Court stated that the ruling
in Moncado should be abandoned.
 Judge Learned Hand once said:
“In earlier times, the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.”
 Over 30 years ago, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:
“The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.”
On the right to privacy, the Fourth Amendment and
the exclusionary rule: “The purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to “deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it”
o The Court stated that if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of
a given crime, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law  If no
probable cause, then no justification for the issuance of the warrant
 The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of the crime  but, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish probable
cause
 With regard to the the things seized from their offices, the petitioners herein
alleged that some of the things taken were personal belongings and should not
be included  the Court stated that this would in effect be a readjustment of
said petitions which may contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by the petitioners
o Court stated that they do not deem it necessary to express opinion
thereon, as it would be best to leave th matter open for determination
in appropriate cases in the future
RULE:
“We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution
of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the
same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.”
Concurring and Dissenting – J. Castro
 Agrees with C.J. Concepcion that the search warrants were in violate of Article
III of the Constitution, that the searches and seizures were illegal, the non-
exclusionary rule in Moncado be abandoned, the search warrants served at the
three residences of the petitioners be declared illegal
 J. Castro agrees with the last part of the ponente’s decision wherein it was stated
that he was reluctant in declaring the search warrants served at the places other
than the residences be declared null and void
o J. Castro stated that this case is imbued with so much environmental
and political developments that the Court should not shy away from
laying down the law not only for the case but as well as for future cases
and future generations
BURGOS, SR. v. CHIEF OF STAFF
GR No. 64261 – December 26, 1984
Justice Panganiban
Topic: Search and Seizure
Petitioners: Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano, J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc.
Respondents: The Chief Of Staff, Armed Forces Of The Philippines, The Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, The Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, The
Judge Advocate General, et al.
FACTS:
 December 7, 1982: Two (2) search warrants (Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b]) were
issued by Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño (Exec. Judge of then CFI Rizal), under which
the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C &
3
 D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched,
and office and printing machines, equipment, and other articles used in the
printing, publication, and distribution of the said newspapers were seized.
 Petitioners pray for Writ of preliminary and mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that the respondents be enjoined
from using the seized articles as evidence against Burgos, Jr (Petitioner) in a
separate criminal case
o This was already ruled as moot and academic, as the SolGen already
manifested that they won’t use them as evidence until final resolution
of the legality of the seizure of the items.
 Respondents presented several arguments for the dismissal of the petition
o Petitioners did not seek quashal of the search warrants in the
lower court: SC here said that due to the seriousness and urgency of
the constitutional issues raised and the public interest generated by the
search of the We Forum office, they will still take cognizance of the
petition.
o Petition is barred by laches: Petitioners explained that they were
exhausting other remedies first [e.g. sending a letter to Pres. Marcos]
before filing the petition with the SC. SC ruled that petitioners cannot
be punished for an error in judgment.
o Burgos, Jr. used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents: SC ruled that the fact he used them as evidence does not
in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants.
ISSUES + RATIO [These are the issues actually raised by the petitioners]:
1. Petitioners argue that respondent judge failed to conduct examination
under oath of the applicant and witnesses for the search warrant
 Moot and academic already, since petitioners themselves [LOL] conceded
that an examination had indeed been conducted [Shunga-shunga lang]
2. Petitioners argue that both search warrants contain only one address to
search [No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, QC], yet two places were searched by
the police
 The defect was obviously a typographical error. It would be absurd if the
judge would issue two search warrants for the one place. The fact is that
the application indicated both addresses. In the determination of
whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.”
3. Petitioners argue that although the search warrants were directed against
Burgos, Jr., articles belonging to the other petitioners were also seized
1Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property: [a] Property subject of the offense; [b] Property stolen
or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and [c] Property used or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense.
[They were relying on Section 2, Rule 126, ROC1, which lists down the personal
properties that may be seized]
 The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned
by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. In fact, under
subsection [b], one of the properties that may be seized is stolen property,
which means the items to be seized are not owned by the subject of the
warrant.
4. Petitioners argue that real properties were seized, which is not allowed
 In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, where NCC415[5] was invoked, it was ruled
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant. Petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the
land/building the items were seized, there for items cannot be considered
as real properties.
5. Petitioners contend that the documents presented for the application
[statement by Col. Abadilla (applicant), joint affidavit of Gutierrez and
Tango (Members of the Metrocom; Conducted a surveillance of the
premises)] could not have provided sufficient probable cause2 for the
issuance of the warrants.
 Court agrees with the petitioner. The application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
 Applicants made generalizations such as that the petitioner “is in
possession … of printing equipment … which were used … as
means of committing the offense of subversion…”
 Should have indicated what subversive materials were published
or being intended to publish!
 In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause . . . after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,” the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge of
facts upon which the issuance may be justified
 Therefore when the applicant stated that the evidences were
gathered “by our unit,” it cannot be a basis for probable cause
 Lastly, the court said that General Warrants were issued, where the
warrants state vague items such as “All printing equipment, paraphernalia, …
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper
and any and all documents/communications … related to the 'WE FORUM'
newspaper.” Items in the search warrant should be specific, as held in
Standford v. State of Texas.
2 Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched.
4
 6. The seizures cannot be justified as part of sequestration under Section 8
of PD8853
 The President himself denied a request filed by government prosecutors
for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendaña
 Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation
of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the
equipment and materials it uses
RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-
82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void
and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return
of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
PEOPLE v. MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 –January 18, 1991
J. Bidin
Topic: Search and Seizure
Petitioner: People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Respondents: Andre Marti, accused-appellant
Summary: This is a criminal case discussing the validity of a search made by a private
individual and the admissibility of evidence from said search.
FACTS:
 August 14, 1987: The appellant, accompanied by his common-law wife,
attempted to send four gift-wrapped packages to Zurich, Switzerland through a
shipping company called Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
 Anita Reyes (proprietress) asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect
the packages.
o The appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained
books, cigars, and gloves
and were gifts to his friend in Zurich.
o In view of appellant’s representation, Anita no longer inspected the
packages.
o The four packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box (1'
x 2'), secured with styro-foam and sealed with masking tape, thus
making the box ready for shipment.
3“the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive
activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities”
 Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor, and husband of Anita), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection before delivery to the Bureau of Customs and/or Posts.
o When he opened appellant’s box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.
o He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
inside.
o He opened one of the bundles, and pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves.
o He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams
of its contents.
 Job Reyes prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane.
o Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in
his office.
 In the presence of the NBI, Job Reyes brought out the box which contained
appellant’s packages, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took
out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.
o The cellophane wrappers contained dried marijuana leaves.
o The package which allegedly contained books actually had bricks or
cake-like dried marijuana leaves.
o The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars likewise had
dried marijuana leaves.
 The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents, acknowledging custody.
 August 27, 1987: appellant was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves.
o On the same day, the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried
leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination.
o It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops.
 An Information was filed against Marti for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act (RA 6425).
 After trial, RTC Manila convicted Marti for said charge.
ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N the evidence was illegally searched and seized thus, inadmissible as
evidence – NO
 First argument: The evidence had been obtained in violation of appellant’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
5
 communication and should therefore be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 24
and 35, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution).
 SC: An act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant’s
constitutional rights, may not be invoked against the State.
o In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
o A private person discovered the evidence. The Constitution, especially
the Bill of Rights, provides protection of private persons against the
State.
 Villanueva v. Querubin: This constitutional right (against
unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his papers,
and other possessions.
 Walker v. State: The search and seizure clauses are restraints
upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals.
 Second argument: The NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the
evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
 SC: Argument is untenable!
o Records clearly show that it was Mr. Job Reyes who made
search/inspection of the packages.
 Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on his part as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau
of Posts
o The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search done by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure proscribe by the Constitution.
 Merely to observe and look at what is in plain sight is not a
search.
 Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
o The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
 If the search is made at the initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private purposes and
4Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual is involved.
 The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.
 Third argument: It doesn’t matter whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals, since the 1987 Constitution expressly declares
as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure.
 SC: The argument is untenable.
o The modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution did not deviate
as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search
and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and
did not shift to anyone else.
o Alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be
invoked against the State
by an individual unjustly violated by the exercise of sovereign authority.
o To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation
of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation
of the constitution.
2. W/N the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that
his rights under custodial investigation were not observed – NO
 The law enforcers testified that accused/ appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights.
 It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to
the contrary.
 It is also clear from the records that appellant refused to give any written
statement while under
3. W/N the lower court erred in not giving credence to the explanation of the
appellant on how the four parcels came into his possession - NO
 Appellant’s disclaimer: He was not the owner of the packages but rather a certain
Michael, a German national, whom he met in a pub along Ermita, Manila.
5Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
6
 o In the course of their 30-minute conversation, Michael requested him
to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country
the next day.
 SC: Disclaimer is incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It
can easily be fabricated.
 An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have
pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00
for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents.
 A person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that
as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the accused.
o The accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such
undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a
complete stranger on his mere say-so.
 Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
 Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more
weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
RULING: Conviction AFFIRMED.
Commissioner Bernas’ sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights:
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill
of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder.
PEOPLE v. ARUTA
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998
Romero, J.
Pet: The People of the Philippines
Res: Rosa Menguin Aruta
Topic: Search and Seizure
6Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
FACTS:
 Rosa Aruta was arrested and charged with violating Sec 4 (Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs), Art II of RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. She pleaded not guilty upon her arraignment.
 Testimonies
o P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Olongapo City Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
OIC & P/Lt. Jose Domingo
o 12/13/88: Abello tipped off by Benjie (informant) that an Aling Rosa
would be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of Marijuana on
12/14. He then assembled a team of 5 men.
o 12/14/88: The team deployed themselves in West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo
City.
 6:30pm: Aling Rosa got off of a Victory Liner Bus (Body # 474,
BGO printed on front & back bumpers) in front of the PNB Bldg
where one team was waiting. Informant pointed her out -> team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents.
When asked about the contents of her bag, Aling Rosa handed it
to Abello. Bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed
in a plastic bag marked Cash Katutak.
 Upon examination, by the PC/INP Crime Laboratory at Camp
Olivas Pampanga, seized specimen was confirmed to be
Marijuana.
 Defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence, alleging illegality of the search and seizure of
the items, thus violating Aling Rosa’s right against unreasonable search and seizure;
the defense also alleged the inadmissibility of said evidence
o Denied. TC did not rule on illegality of search and seizure & inadmissibility
in evidence. TC continued to hear the case.
 Aling Rosa’s Testimony: Prior to arrest, she just watched ‘Balweg’ @ Choice Theater.
She was about to cross the street when an old woman asked her for help in carrying
a shoulder bag. Abello & Domingo then arrested her in the middle of the road &
asked her to go with them to the NARCOM office. She averred that she wasn’t
shown a search warrant by the 2 officers.
 Olongapo City RTC: convicted Aling Rosa of transporting 8.5kg of marijuana from
Baguio to Olongapo, violating Sec 4 Art II, RA 6425.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. W/N the NARCOM agents should’ve applied for and used a search warrant
– YES.
 People v Ramos: law enforcers may only conduct searches only on strength of a
search warrant
 A3, S2 6of the Constitution:
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
7
 o not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures (SS) – only those
that are unreasonable
o SS are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest
o Fundamental protection accorded by SS clause in the consti: the magistrate
who has the power to issue/refuse warrants.
 Stonehill v Diokno: articles from unreasonable SS are INADMISSIBLE as evidence
o Later included in A3, S3(2) 7of the Consti. The state cannot intrude
indiscriminately into a person’s personal effects, etc.
 “The right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.”
o Statutes, rules, situations that allow exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant must be STRICTLY construed and their applications LIMITED
to those specified/allowed. (cases specifically allowed by law are listed in
the notes 😊)
o These exceptions do not allow law enforcement officers to step on
constitutional/fundamental rights of people against unreasonable SS.
 PROBABLE CAUSE (essential requisite) must be satisfied before a warrantless SS
can be lawfully conducted, otherwise, articles seized could not be admitted as
evidence.
o Probable cause requisites
 reasonable ground of suspicion/belief that a crim has been/about
to be committed
 supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
 a cautious/prudent man will believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense if presented with these facts
o in determining probable cause, an average man:
 weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to rules of
evidence – he relies on common sense.
o For a search warrant to be issued, there should be substantial evidence that
items are
 seizable by virtue of being connected to the criminal activity
 actually to be found in the place to be searched.
o Information can be a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless SS
(examples & how they contrast to instant case in dicta)
 SS of Aruta’s belongings doesn’t fall under the exceptions to a valid
warrantless SS.
o Aruta’s arrest does not qualify as a valid warrantless arrest under Sec 5, Rule
113 ROC8
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
7 Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
 She was merely crossing the street & wasn’t acting in a manner
that would’ve caused suspicion -> she wouldn’t have been
arrested if she hadn’t been pointed out by the informant. Court
deems this as a clear violation of Aruta’s right against
unreasonable SS.
 Since arrest was illegal, subsequent search also ILLEGAL -
> evidence inadmissible pursuant to Art3,S3(2), Consti.
 “seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree” (fav
metaphor ng ponente)
o Not a seizure of evidence in plain view
 Marijuana not immediately apparent -> they had to open bag to
confirm
o Not a search of a moving vehicle
 She was apprehended after alighting the bus. She was accosted in
the middle of the street.
 No cause for her to be stopped and frisked, and she didn’t even
attempt to flee when the NARCOM agents introduced themselves
(as opposed to what happened in Ppl v Solayao & Posadas v CA)
o SS not under exigent and emergency circumstances
 As opposed to Ppl v De Gracia where there was general chaos &
disorder.
o Aling Rosa handing her bag over -> not consent/voluntary
submission/implied acquiescence
 SolGen cited Ppl v Malasugui to argue that when Aling Rosa
handed her bag, she effectively agreed to the SS, therefore making
it valid.
 SC: No. Malasugui inapplicable because there was initial
probable cause for Malasugui’s warrantless arrest, thus
making subsequent SS lawful.
 SC: Case similar to People v Encinada, where Encinada’s ‘consent’
“could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.” #SilenceDoesntReallyMeanYes
 What constitutes a waiver (Ppl v Barros):
 The right exists
 person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right
 person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
Court does not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights
8 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
8
  Ppl v Omaweng: Actual example of case where the accused had
an intention to relinquish his right.
o SolGen: Police officers could only secure a search warrant if Aruta’s name was
known, vehicle identified, and date of her arrival certain
o SC: Untenable. Art 4, Sec 3, Consti9
 Purpose of rule: to limit the things to be seized
o Had the NARCOM agents applied for one, they could have easily
secured one.
 Person to be searched particularized (Aling Rosa)
 Thing to be seized specified (mj)
 Time sufficiently ascertained (12/14/88 – afternoon)
 Vehicle (Victory Liner Bus)
 Agents purposely positioned themselves near the
spot where these buses normally unload passengers
 Not specifying vehicle -> not a hindrance. Other
details wouldve sufficed. (“police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and
the person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible”)
2. W/N Aruta waived objections to illegality of warrantless search &
admissibility of evidence by virtue of entering a plea during arraignment and
participating in the trial – NO.
 Waiver would apply only to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest, and
her active participation shows her submission to court’s jurisdiction -> these would
not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidence into
objects of proof.
 Records show that Aruta filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed
the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
 People v Barros: “We consider that appellants objection to the admission of
such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be
reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence
to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y
MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs
9[N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
DICTA:
 Information as a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless SS (however, the
following cases do not apply to the case at bar lol)
o People v Tangliben – officers were acting on info to conduct surveillance
at the Victory Liner Terminal. A man (later identified as Tangliben) was
carrying a bag and acting suspiciously - these actuations led the officers to
suspect him - so they later confronted him -> turns out he had marijuana
in his bag. Officers had no prior info of Tangliben’s activities before that
night.
 In Aruta, officers had prior info on Aruta’s alleged activities.
There is also no indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
o People v Malmstedt: NARCOM received reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana, and that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had drugs on his person. Agents weren’t able to secure warrants bc
there was no reasonable time to get them and the suspect’s identity couldn’t
be readily ascertained.
 In Aruta, officers had time to obtain warrant, Aruta’s identity
already ascertained, and Aruta wasn’t acting suspiciously. Also,
Malmstedt was aboard a moving vehicle (incl in the exceptions)
while Aruta was just about to cross the street.
o People v Bagista: NARCOM agents were again acting on previously
received information so they had probable cause to stop & search vehicles
coming from the North. They ahd probable cause to search Bagista’s
belongings because she fit the description the informant gave.
 The case differs from Aruta because Bagista was in a moving
vehicle and the police officers were in a checkpoint.
o Manalili v CA: Again, NARCOM agents acting on previously received info;
conducting surveillance in Kalookan Cemetery. They saw a person who
appeared to be high (had reddish eyes, was walking in a swaying manner)
and was trying to avoid the policemen. Policemen had probable cause ->
Manalili was suspicious + prior info that area was haven for drug addicts
NOTES:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
9
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;[9]
6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]
VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
GR No. 83988 // September 29, 1989 // En Banc
Padilla, J.
Topic : Search and Seizure
Petitioner : Ricardo C. Valmonte
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Rights (ULAP)
Respondent : Gen. Renato De Villa
National Capital Region District Command
FACTS:
 SUMMARY: Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order seeking the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, or elsewhere as unconstitutional and seeking
the dismantling and banning of the same, and enjoining the respondents to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints. Petition
DISMISSED.
 National Capital Region Districtt Command was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 on January 20, 1987 with the mission of conducting security
operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintain peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region  checkpoints were installed in
various parts of Valenzuela
 PETITIONERS: Residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and
of their safety  placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of
the military manning the checkpoints; no benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order.
o July 9, 1988 – Benjamin Parpon, supply officer of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
was gunned down for not submitting himself to the checkpoint and
speeding off.
o Atty. Valmonte also alleges his vehicle has been subjected to searches
at the checkpoints
o Blanket authority is given to make searches and seizures without court
orders, contrary to the Constitution.
ISSUE + HOLDING: W/N the Petitioners’ allegations have merit – NO
 Petitioners’ concerns regarding safety and apprehensions at being harassed are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as illegal  no concrete proof
has been presented to show that the military has committed specific violations
of petitioners’ right against unlawful search and seizure.
 ULAP v Integrated National Police: individual pettioners who do not allege that
any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real
parties in interest
 Valmonte’s general allegations are not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation against unlawful search and seizure.
“True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at
the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.”
RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ANIAG, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 104961. October 7, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.
Topic: Search and Seizure
Petitioners: Congressman Francisco B. Aniag, Jr. (1st District of Bulacan)
Respondents: COMELEC and DOJ Special Task Force
Summary:
A warrantless extensive search of a vehicle during a gun ban was conducted. The court
held that the search was in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
FACTS:
 Dec. 11, 1991 - COMELEC issued on Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred
to as the “Gun Ban,” promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying
and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the
election period
 Dec. 26, 1991 - COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gun-running, using and
transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints
10
  Jan. 10 1992 – Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives,
wrote petitioner to return of the two (2) firearms3 issued to him by the House
of Representatives
 Jan. 13, 1992 - petitioner instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the
firearms from petitioner’s house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
o 5pm - PNP headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters
away from its entrance.
o About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost searched
the car the car driven by Arellano and found the firearms neatly packed
in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano
was then apprehended and detained.
 the police referred Arellano’s case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
inquest.
o The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with
an election offense.
o Jan. 15, 1992 - the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after
finding the latter’s sworn explanation meritorious. (Napag-utusan lang)
 Jan. 28, 1992 – Upon invitation of the prosecutor, petitioner appeared at the
preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano’s statement. He explained further
that Arellano was complying with the gun ban when apprehended by returning
the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner’s driver, not a security
officer nor a bodyguard
 March 6, 1992 - the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution
recommending the dismissal of the case against Arellano and the “unofficial
charge” against petitioner.
 April 6, 1992 - COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing
of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q),
of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to
Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Secs. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec.
52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881
 April 23, 1992 – petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petition to SC
Arguments by the petitioner:
 Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327.
o that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and
other acts mentioned in the resolution are not disqualifications under
the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., any person who has either been
declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude;
o that the resolution created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may
be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the criminal charge
is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and (c)
where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the
requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or
holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e., proof
beyond reasonable doubt
 Regarding the search of the vehicle
o violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution because
there was no warrant and Arellano was not informed of his
fundamental rights.
o The firearms were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a
bag kept in the trunk of the car not within the immediate reach of
Arellano
o Violative of due process - he was neither impleaded as party
respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet.
 that he did not violate Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or
engaging the services of security personnel or bodyguards since Arellano is a
civilian employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives.
Arguments by respondent:
 Solicitor General could not take the position of COMELEC and prayed instead
to be excused from filing the required comment. (Balakajan)
 COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q),
in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that “the principals,
accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be
criminally liable for election offenses.” (since it was petitioner who ordered
Arellano to take the firearms)
 that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City
Prosecutor to explain the circumstances regarding Arellano’s possession of the
 firearms.
 COMELEC claims that violation of the “Gun Ban” is mala prohibita, hence,
the intention of the offender is immaterial
ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N he should be disqualified from the election – MOOT MOOT
o he lost the election
2. W/N he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to
the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms
issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless
search of his car – NO
11
o As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority.
 we declared that a warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor
its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search
o An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the
officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or
that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched
o We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by
police officers on the basis of prior confidential information which
were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters
o The search conducted by the policemen is in violation of Sec. 2, Art.
III, of the Constitution.
 There was no evidence to show that the policemen were
impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading
them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
the description furnished by their informant were engaged in
gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that
could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen.
 Firearms obtained cannot be used in any proceeding.
o Assuming that Arellano’s acquiescence is an implied waiver of his
right
o Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of
checkpoints, but stressed that “guidelines shall be made to
ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights
results from the implementation of this authority,” and that
“the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be
determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms
Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution
No. 2323.
o There was no warning to the citizens about the existence of
checkpoints and its purpose
o The motorists did not have any choice but to submit to the
PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit
innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause
for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an
extensive search of his vehicle.
o In the case, 14 armed policemen conducted the operation,
driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of
petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the
courage to protest against the extensive search conducted in
the vehicle.
 “consent” given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of
the constitutional guaranty.
3. W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated – YES
o The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he
subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner
that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of
due process which requires that the procedure established by law
should be obeyed
o Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary
investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter’s explanation.
Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent
in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only
intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself
o petitioner’s filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary
investigation for himself.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted
by the Philippine National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms
seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against
petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being
violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
RUDY CABALLES vs. CA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AC No. 6593 – January 15, 2002
Justice Puno
Topic: Good Moral Character
Petitioner: RUDY CABALLES
Respondent: CA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 Two police officers in Pagsanjan, Laguna flagged down a suspicious looking
passenger jeep driven by Caballes which was unusually covered with kakawati
leaves. Caballes allegedly failed to answer when asked of the contents of the jeep.
12
  The police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by the National
Power Corp. The police asked Caballes where the wires came from and he said
that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 km away. Caballes was
brought to the police station. Picutres of him and the vehicle with the wires were
captured. Caballes was jailed for 7 days.
 Caballes offered an alibi that he was merely requested to transport the wires by
Resty Fernandez. He was promised 1K to do the job. 5 masked men loaded the
wires and when he crossed the bridge the police officers intercepted him. He
told them of his story but the police officers did not believe him.
 Caballes was charged with the crime of theft. He pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
 RTC found him guilty of the crime of theft sentencing him to 2 yrs, 4 mths, and
1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 yrs of Prision Mayor, as
maximum with award for damages. CA affirmed the judgment but removed the
award for damages.
 Caballes contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who
were on routine patrol, merely on suspicion that it might contain smuggled
goods, does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search
and seizure.
 He did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. As
such, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search
and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
ISSUE + HELD: W/N the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible
against Caballes – NO
Const, Sec 3, Art III provides for the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unsreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of such right is barred by the exclusionary rule found in Const, Sec
3 (2), Art III.
Search of a Moving Vehicle: The constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions including the search
of moving vehicles. This is so because it is not practicable to secure a warrant as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought. This is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws provided that the search was made at borders or checkpoints near the
boundary lines of the State.
 In order to conduct a warrantless search, probable cause must exist. The required
probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is resolved according
to the facts of each case.
 Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. A search is permissible in this instance but will be limited to the
following:
 where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds;
 simply looks into a vehicle;
 flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
 where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
 where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and
 where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
 None of the foregoing circumstances is present here. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes’ vehicle. They had to
reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they
were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
 A warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either
the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The fact that the vehicle looked
suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati
leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a search
without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received
any confidential report or tipped information that Caballes was carrying stolen cable
wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.
Plain View Doctrine: Object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. The warrantless seizure was invalid under this doctrince since the cable wires were
not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The
police had to ask Caballes what was loaded in his vehicle.
Consented Search: In order to validate an otherwise illegal search, the consent must be
voluntary (unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given without duress or coercion). It
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Caballes did not utter his consent to the search in a voluntary manner. At
most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no
“consent” at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
 In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the evidence is
lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired.
The police approached Caballes and “told him I will look at the contents of his
13
 vehicle and he answered in the positive”. This only amounts to the police
informing/imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The
“consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent
within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. Neither can Caballes’ passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused
Rudy Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
TOPIC: PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
GAANAN v. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
J. Gutierrez, JR.
Topic: Bill of Rights > Privacy of Communication
Petitioner: Edgardo Gaanan
Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court, People of the Philippines
FACTS:
 October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against
Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. Laconico asked Gaanan to
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. Laconico then requested Gaanan
to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension
so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Gaanan
helped Laconico in deciding whether to accept the proposal or not. After
agreeing with the conditions, Complainant called up again and instructed
Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of
Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that the complainant should be
the one who will receive the cash. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Gaanan executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since Gaanan listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of
such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall
not be covered by this prohibition.
 November 22, 1982: RTC found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1of Anti-Wiretapping Act. They were sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs. Gaanan appealed with IAC.
 August 16, 1984: IAC affirmed RTC because the communication between the
complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature, and that the petitioner
overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner
to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is
covered in the term ‘device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200. Thus, this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE + HOLDING: W/n an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in
Section 1 of the Anti-Wiretapping Act – NO.
 Petitioner: telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they
belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by
law. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the
Act.
 Respondent: An extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part
or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and
distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone
receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or
removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be
plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication
corning from the other party or end.
14
  Court: When the law pertains to tap, it refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the
use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Socorro Ramirez filed a civil case for damages in the RTC of Quezon
City against Ester Garcia. Petitioner claimed that Garcia allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” which was offensive to the
petitioner’s dignity and personality – contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy
o Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event:

 The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend Afternoon M'am.
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha
would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone, and that their Ester S. Garcia (ESG) —Ano ba ang ni Dr. Tamayo
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
conversation. An extension telephone is very common and that a caller can paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening. In the case of gagawin ko sa 'yo. CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
Rathbun v. US, it was held that:
 “a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon. ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may
than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic) makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has
been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.” CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing
 The Court further stated that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor ganoon — ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-
of the accused. Thus, in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin
construed as not including an extension telephone. [Rationale for this rule, as ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
explained in People v. Purisima: “the object is to establish a certain rule by hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi mga magulang ko.
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik
limited. The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts."] sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi. ka umalis ka doon.
 The Court also examined the intent of the lawmakers where it showed that they
were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako
listening to a telephone conversation.
ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to ng mga taga Union.
10:00 p.m.
RULING: Petition granted. IAC decision annulled and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala
RAMIREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
Justice Kapunan
mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
G.R. No. 93833 – September 28, 1995
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi na loob.
Petitioner: Socorro D. Ramirez
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
Respondents: Honorable Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
15
 CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana
ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong
binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung
paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your
own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka
"ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply
alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam
noon.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
nilapastangan mo ako. o In addition, a perusal of the Senate Congressional Records supports the conclusion
that in enacting RA 4200, the lawmakers intended to make illegal the unauthorized
CHUCHI — Paano kita recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
nilapastanganan? themselves OR by third persons
 Exchanges between the Senators:
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi Senator Padilla: “Even if the record should be used not in the
na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or
na. Magsumbong ka.3 special proceedings?”
Senator Tañada: “That is right. This is a COMPLETE BAN ON
TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATIONS TAKEN WITHOUT
AUTHORIZATION OF ALL THE PARTIES.”

 Because of the filing of Ramirez of the case against Garcia, Garcia filed a
criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200 “An Act
to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Relations Violations of Private
Communication, and Other Purposes.”
o Ramirez filed a motion to Quash which the trial court granted. The
RTC agreed with Ramirez that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense under RA 4200 because the violation punished by said act
refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participation to the communication
o From this decision, Garcia filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the CA
 The Court of Appeals declared the trial court’s order null and
void holding that – the allegations SUFFICIENTLY
CONSTITUTE an offense punishable under RA 4200
 Ramirez then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which
the CA denied, hence the instant petition
ISSUE & HELD: W/N the acts by Ramirez of recording her conversation with Garcia
constitutes a violation of Section 1 of RA 4200 – YES
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
o Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would only be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd, or would lead to
an injustice.  the provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person,
Senator Tañada: “I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to
record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it
against him. It is not fair.”
Senator Tañada: “That is why when we take statements of persons, we
say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used
against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in
spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own
interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are going to
take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing
that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is
unfair.”
Senator Diokno: “Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section
1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech,
he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public,
but the recording is done secretly.”
Senator Tañada: “Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by
the bill. It is the communication between one person and another
person — not between a speaker and a public.”
o The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 RA
4200
o The petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity

16
  The word “communicate” means “to share to or to impart,” or signifies the
“process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols  these definitions are broad enough
to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange on February 22, 1988 between the petitioner and respondent
Ruling:
“WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves
us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.”
TOPIC: RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Ople v. Torres
GR No. 127685 – July 23, 1998
Justice Puno
Topic: Privacy
Petitioners: Blas F. Ople
Respondents: Ruben D. Torres, Alexander Aguirre, Hector Villanueva, Cielito Habito,
Robert Barbers, Carmencita Reodica, Cesar Sarino, Renato Valencia, Tomas P. Africa,
Head of The National Computer Center and Chairman Of The Commission On Audit
FACTS:
 The case is about the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 (Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System) that was promulgated by
Pres. Fidel V. Ramos, which establishes a National Computerized Identification
Reference System [NCIRS] (a decentralized Identification Reference System among
key basic services and social security providers). This will require a computerized
system to efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security,
and reduce fraudulent transactions.
o Added to this, the AO also mandates the creation of an Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee [IACC]10, which will draw the implementing
guidelines and oversee the system’s implementation.
 The AO was published in newspapers, and in January 24, 1997, the petitioners
filed the instant petition, where the SC issued a TRO enjoining its
implementation.
o Petitioners contentions: (1) The NCIRS requires a legislative act, not
a mere AO, as this would result to usurpation of legislative power; (2)
10Chaired by the Executive Secretary. Other Members: Head, Presidential Management Staff;
Secretary, NEDA; Secretary, DILG; Secretary, DOH; Administrator, GSIS; Administrator, SSS;
Administrator, NSO; Managing Director, National Computer Center.
Appropriation of funds by the president is usurpation of Congress’
power to appropriate public funds; (3) The implementation of AO308
violates the Bill of Rights
o Respondent’s arguments: (1) Not a justiciable case; (2) AO308 was
issued within the executive and administrative powers of the President;
(3) AO308 protects an individual’s interest in privacy
ISSUES + RATIO:
1. Procedural issues on standing and justiciability
 On Standing: Petitioner Ople, as Senator, has standing as part of the
legislative branch, since one of the issues raised is that of the usurpation
of legislative powers. He also has standing as taxpayer and member of the
GSIS, since he also impugns the legality of the misalignment of public
funds.
 On Justiciability: Although no IRR for AO308 was promulgated yet,
Petitioner assails AO308 as invalid per se. Moreover, the respondents
themselves already started the implementation of AO308 without waiting
for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent SSS cause the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacturing of the National
Identification (ID) card. Added to this, Executive Secretary Torres publicly
announced that the GSIS and SSS have completed the guidelines for the
National ID System. All signals show that there is no need to wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality.
2. W/N AO308 is not a mere Administrative Order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue [YES, it is a law that needs to be
passed by the legislature]
 Petitioner is contending that AO308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, therefore it warrants a legislation and its
promulgation is a violation of separation of powers [Executive vs.
Legislative].
 As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties.
 Administrative power is concerned with applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
This then authorizes the president to issue administrative orders,
rules, and regulations.
 An Administrative Order (AO) is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operations. It must
17
 be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
 The defense of the respondents that AO308 implements the legislative
policy of the RAC of 1987 cannot hold water, as the Code is a general law
that documents the major structural, functional, and procedural principles
of governance [7 Books].
 AO308 cannot be simplistically argued to be an implementation
of the RAC, as it establishes for the first time a NCIRS, which
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies
(e.g. National Security, Extent of privacy, Choice of policies etc.)
 The argument that it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords
no protection, and creates office is equally untenable. Under
AO308, citizens will be “forced” to avail of the contemplated ID
card for them to transact business with government agencies,
therefore it is evident that duty is imposed.
3. W/N AO308 violates the right to privacy [YES]
 The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” In the Morfe vs. Mutuc
ruling, the court adopted a US ruling (Griswold vs. Connecticut), which said
that the right to privacy is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
 Added to this, it is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) 11 of the
Bill of Rights. Other facets of the right to privacy are also found
in other sections of the Bill of Rights (Sections 1, 2, 6, 8, 17).
 Moreover, “Zones of Privacy” are likewise recognized in our
laws, such as in the Civil Code12, the Revised Penal Code13, and
Special Penal laws such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Intellectual Property Code, and the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act.
 Since the right to privacy is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is the burden
of the government to show that AO308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
 Purpose of the AO: (1) To provide people with facility to
conveniently transact business with basic government services;
and (2) To reduce or eradicate fraudulent transactions
 Court here said that what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, and the overbreadth of AO308, which if implemented
will put the right to privacy in clear danger.
11 Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law
12 Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons
 Section 4 of AO308 provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a
common reference among agencies through the use of “Biometrics
Technology” and “Computer Application Designs”
 Court dwelled on what “biometrics technology” is. Basically, it’s
the use of a unique physiological characteristic to identify a person
(e.g. fingerprint, retinal scan, facial recognition, etc.) It further talks
about something that is called as “biocrypt.” It is basically a data
bank where the biometric data of people will be stored. This is
also in charge of all data’s encryption and decryption. [Cute ng Court
nagpapaka-techie in 1998]
 However, the AO does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be
used, and whether encoding of data is limited to biological
information alone for identification purposes.
 There is also the risk for misuse of data to be gathered under AO308. The
data stored every time people use their PRN will contribute to the building
of a formidable information base of all transactions. The existence of
which may invite misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some to
resist.
 It should be noted that there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. An intruder, without fear of sanction and
penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the data stored within the system. Thus, the court
holds that AO308 falls short of assuring that the gathered
information will only be processed for uneqivocally
specified purposes.
 The lack of proper safeguards may violate the right to privacy
(e.g. Liberty of Abode and Travel through tracking of movements;
“fishing expeditions” through the data; Right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, etc.)
4. W/N the effects of AO308 are only speculative for now [NO]: “The Court
will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it
would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger their rights but would
rather wait for the fire that could consume them.”
5. W/N an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
the National ID and the use of biometrics technology [NO]: The use of
biometrics and computer technology in AO308 does not assure the individual
of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of
reasonably expected privacy decreases. Basically, the court here is saying that
technology is dynamic, therefore it cannot be assumed that people do know the
extent by which privacy is affected over time.
13RPC makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial
secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
18
 6. W/N AO308 passes the Rational Relationship Test [NO]
 SolGen argues that the streamlining of government processes, eradication
of fraud, and generation of population data for development planning
justify incursions into the right to privacy.
 Court dismisses this argument. In the case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, RA3019’s
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) constitutionality was upheld even
with its provision of the submission of the SALN, and supposed private
matter. Unlike AO308, RA3019 is a law and it is sufficiently detailed,
meaning the law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized.
 In the instant case, although AO308 may have been impelled by a worthy
purpose, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn.
7. Final notes of the Supreme Court
 They mention that the Court is not per se against the use of computers
to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our
bureaucracy. Used wisely, data stored could help good administration by
making accurate information for those who have to frame policy and make
key decisions.
 Court also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
merely requires that the law be narrowly focused, and a compelling interest
justify such intrusions.
 The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in
a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources — governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
Ken Note: As an MIS major, I call relative constitutionality. The ponencia was penned
in 1998 (21 years ago), and tech already advanced way way forward. Security of data
(though still very prone to hacking and misuse) can be done a lot easier with new
techniques. In terms of the biometrics, it now really depends on the provider [Hardware,
Software] and how they are stored, pero majority naman is encrypted na. Fun Fact: Your
data sa phone (Touch ID, Face ID) is actually stored in numbers, not actual “pictures” of
your fingerprint or face, tapos jinajumble yung numbers para mahirap mahack (Basics of
encryption). Lastly, we now have the Data Privacy Act, which indicates specific people
with specific purposes. These people can be held criminally liable whenever a breach in
the data they’re “guarding” happens. So ayun, if ever this is implemented today, I say it’s
a go kasi naniniwala talaga ako na data is the way, rufa mae. Jk.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. v. CAPULONG
G.R. No. L-82380 – April 29, 1988
J. Feliciano
Topic: Right to Privacy
Petitioners: Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. and McElroy & McElroy Film Productions
Respondents: Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong (Presiding Judge of Makati RTC) and Juan
Ponce Enrile
Enrile seeks to enjoin the petitioners from producing "The Four Day Revolution," a
docu-drama of the February 1986 revolution, for public showing, on the ground that it
would violate his right to privacy.
FACTS:
 Hal McElroy (owner of Ayer Productions) envisioned the filming, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and International release, of a mini-series
about the 1986 EDSA revolution entitled “The Four Day Revolution.”
o The proposed motion picture was endorsed by MTRCB and other
government agencies, and approved by General Fidel V. Ramos.
 It was also suggested that they consult with Senator Juan Ponce Enrile.
However, Enrile replied that he did not want any references to his name, private
life, and family in the film.
o Petitioners acceded to this demand and Enrile’s name was deleted from
the movie script.
 Petitioners proceeded to film.
 Feb. 23, 1988: Enrile applied for a Temporary Restraining Order and sought to
enjoin petitioners from producing the film.
o He alleged that petitioners’ production of the miniseries without his
consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his
right of privacy.
o McElroy contended that the mini-series film would not involve the
private life of Enrile nor that of his family and that a preliminary
injunction would amount to a prior restraint on their right of free
expression.
o Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
 RTC ordered the petitioners to cease and desist from producing and filming, from
making any reference whatsoever to Enrile or his family, and from creating any
fictitious character in that is based on, or bears remote, substantial or marked
resemblance or similarity to Enrile.
ISSUE + HELD: W/N the production and filming by petitioner of “The Four Day
Revolution” violates Enrile’s right of privacy – NO
19
 Freedom of speech and of expression
o The freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film
and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television.
o This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies.
o Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture
films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not
a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression.
Right of privacy
o The right of privacy or “the right to be let alone," like the right
of free expression, is not an absolute right.
o A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy is permissible where
that person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters
of a public character.
o The right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest.
 The interest sought to be protected by the right of
privacy is the right to be free from “unwarranted publicity,
from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and
activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate
public concern.
 Whether the “balancing of interests test”14 or the “clear and present danger
test”15 be applied to the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different
conclusion must be reached.
o Neither of the respondents knew what the completed film would
precisely look like.
o There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any
violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully
assert.
 The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-
bloody change of government that took place at EDSA in February 1986,
and subsequent train of events.
o Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and concern.
o Indeed, it is of international interest (as petitioners’ argue).
o It relates to a highly critical stage in our country’s history and as
such, must be regarded as having passed into the public domain
14The courts should balance the public interest served by legislation on one hand and the freedom
of speech (or any other constitutional right) on the other. The courts will then decide where the
greater weight should be placed.
and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media.
o The subject matter does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to
the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
 “The Four Day Revolution” is not principally about, nor
is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile; but it is
compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role
played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the
constituent events of the change of government in
February 1986.
 A public figure is a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of
living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate
interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public
personage.’ He is, in other words. a celebrity.
o Those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public.
o Includes anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention
is.
o Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their
right of privacy.
Reasons:
 They had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could
not complain when they received it.
 Their personalities and their affairs had already become
public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private
business.
 The press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform
the public about those who have become legitimate matters
of public interest.
 Private respondent is a “public figure” precisely because of his participation
as a principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in
February 1986.
 Because he had major participation, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent
would be grossly unhistorical.
 The right of privacy of a “public figure” is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen.
 Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. He continues to be a “public figure.”
15That words are used in such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.
20
 o After a successful political campaign during which his participation in
the EDSA Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press,
radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the
Philippines.
 To the extent that “The Four Day Revolution” limits itself in portraying the
participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events
which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA
Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent’s privacy cannot be regarded
as unreasonable and actionable.
RULING: Petitions GRANTED. Order SET ASIDE.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (DDB)
G.R. No. 157870 | November 3, 2008
Velasco, J
Topic: Right to Privacy
GR 157870: SJS v DDB and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
GR 158633: Atty Manuel J. Laserna Jr. v DDB and PDEA
GR 161658: Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. v Commission on Elections
FACTS:
 The 3 petitions are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 36, RA 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) (pls check notes). It requires drug testing of:
o Candidates for public office whether appointed/elected in natl/local govt
(mandatory)
o Students of secondary & tertiary schools (random)
o officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas (random)
o persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and
1 day (mandatory)
 Pimentel’s Case:
o 12/23/03: COMELEC issued Resoln No. 6486 (check notes pls), or the
rules & regulations of the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office for the 05/10/04 national & local elections.
o Pimentel, as senator & candidate for reelection in the 051004 elections,
sought to:
 nullify Sec 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Reso 6486 for
imposing an additional qualification for senatorial candidates (that
they must first be certified as drug free) when the Sec 3, Art VI
(notes) of the Consti only prescribes a max of 5 qualifications.
 He asserts that there is no provision authorizing
Congress/COMELEC to expand requirements of
candidates for senator.
 enjoin COMELEC from implementing Res 6486
 SJS Case:
o SJS, a political party sought to prohibit PDEA and DDB from enforcing
Sec 36 (c,d,f,g), RA 9165 for being constitutionally infirm.
 Undue delegation of legislative power in giving unbridled
discretion to schools and employers to determine manner of
random drug testing.
 Equal Protection Clause violated because law can be used to
harass a student or to deem an employee as undesirable.
 Persons right against unreasonable searches also breached.
 Laserna’s Case:
o Laserna, as citizen and taxpayer sought for Sec 36 (c,d,f,g), RA 9165 to be
struck down.
 Infringes on right to privacy, right against unreasonable search
and seizure, and right against self-incrimination
 Contrary to due process & equal protection clauses
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. W/N Petitioners have locus standi – YES.
 DDB and PDEA: SJS & Laserna failed to allege incident amounting to violation of
rights they mentioned in their petitions
 SC: Pimentel has standing because he’s a sitting senator and a reelectionist
o Re SJS & Laserna: transcendental importance and paramount public
interest.
2. W/N contested provisions in RA 9165 and COMELEC Reso 6486 impose
addtl qualifications for candidates and should therefore be deemed
unconstitutional – YES.
 Sec 36(g) of RA 9165 should be declared unconstitutional because it violates the
norm of the consti, and effectively enlarges it. Congress can’t validly amend/modify
these consti qualifications.
o Government v Springer (1927): the powers of the departments are confined
w/in 4 walls of the consti/charter, and each dept can only exercise powers
as necessarily implied from the given powers. Basically Consti is the
insurmountable wall that the legislative cannot leap over.
o legislative power is limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations.
 COMELEC can’t impose the additional qualifications for senatorial candidates
either.
o Basically makes being drug-free a condition sine qua non for candidates.
o “The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.”
o Although Reso 6486 only covered the 2004 elections, it was still discussed
to obviate repetition.
21
3. W/N random drug testing for secondary & tertiary level students is
constitutional – YES.
 W/in prerog of educational institutions to require compliance w/ reasonable school
rules, regulations, and policies as a condition for admission.
o Right to enroll not absolute -> subject to fair, reasonable, equitable
requirements.
 Mandatory but still a random and suspicionless arrangement.
 Objective: to stamp out illegal drugs, protect well-being of the citizens, esp the youth,
from its effects.
o Legislative intent is not criminal prosecution – they may even be exempt
from criminal liability if they consent to undergoing rehab (expounded on
by Secs 54-55 of RA 9165) (iz in notes).
o US SC noted that school children are the most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Their recovery is at a
depressingly low rate.
 Re privacy of school children (Vernonia v Acton) 16
o schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students;
o minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject
to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
o schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-
being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty;
o schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
4. W/N random drug testing for officers and employees of public and private
offices is constitutional – YES.
 SJS and Lasernas failed to show how the mandatory, random, suspicionless drug
testing under Sec. 36 (c-d), RA 9165 violates right to privacy and is an
unlawful/unconsented search under Art III, Sec 1-2 of the Consti.
 Reasonableness of the drug testing requirement:
o Privacy:
 “…right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person
or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities.” BUT
personal privacy yields to certain paramount rights & to police
power
 Privacy in a regulated office environment is reduced by company’s
policies – degree of impingement upon this privacy has been
upheld.
16 School administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address frequent drug use of school
athletes by requiring random urinalysis drug testing. James Acton refused to undertake test so he
o Sec 36, RA 9165 and its IRR contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing humiliating situations for employees - nobody is singled
out before testing
 •employees shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations to reduce work place
risk -> narrowing ingredient in Ople.
o Testing will conducted in ways that will protect employee’s privacy and
dignity, and is accompanied by proper safeguards:
 2 methods: screening test & confirmatory test
 shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH)
 Access to results shall be on a need to know basis
 result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results
 RA 9165 does not oblige employers to report their employees to
prosecuting agencies
 The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough
to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises. Means and Method
are REASONABLE ergo, constitutional.
o Provisions also apply to gov’t employees & officials esp since they are
required to be accountable, and to serve the people w/ responsibility, and
efficiency.
 Re undue delegation of power contention of SJS – Sec 36 expressly provides drug
testing should be conducted and also enumerates who shall undergo testing.
o For students: in accordance to school rules in the student handbook and
w/ notice to parents
o For officers/employees: company’s work rules
o Sec 94 of RA 9165 also assigns DDB to issue, in consultation w/ DOH,
DILG, DepEd, DOLE and other agencies the necessary IRR, so the testing
schemes are still subject to said IRR.
5. W/N mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes is constitutional
– NO.
 No valid justification for this.
 Operative concepts in this testing is that it is random and suspicionless, which is not
the case for ppl charged w/ crimes
o they are not randomly picked, neither are they beyond suspicion because
when people suspected of crimes are charged, they are singled out and
impleaded against their will.
was denied participation to his school’s football program. Acton averred that the test violated the
4th Amendment, US Consti.
Btw, no PH cases, 1st to re schoolchildren so ang source nila US jurisprudence
22
 To impose the test on the accused is an attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution – contrary to RA 9165’s objectives. It violates their right to
privacy and they are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
COMELEC Resolution 6486:
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f)
and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
NOTES:
Sec 36, RA 9165
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall
be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test
which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used
and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test,
the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they
will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority
vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for
public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National
and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of
the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists
23
 of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x
xx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required.
Art 6, Sec 3, Consti
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election,
is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec 54-55, RA 9165
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement,
Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or any person who
violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through
his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such
application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which
shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment
and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt
from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the
following conditions:
xxxx
VIVARES v. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
GR No. 202666 // September 29, 2014 // Third Division
Velasco Jr, J.
Topic : Privacy
Petitioner : Rhonda Ave S. Vivares
Sps. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA
Respondent : St. Theresa’s College
Mylene Rheza T. Escudero
John Does
FACTS:
 SUMMARY: Petition for Review on Certiorari July 27, 2012 decision of RTC
Cebu Br 14 dismissing habeas data petition. Petition DENIED.
 Minors and then graduating high school students of St. Theresa’s College Nenita
Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, together with others, took digital
pictures of themselves only in their undergarments – they were changing into
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend. These were uploaded by
Angela Lindsay Tan on her Facebook profile.
 Respondent Mylene Rheza T. Escudero, a computer teacher of St. Theresa’s
College, learned of the photos and asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are – they were identified as Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada. Using school computers, Escudero’s students logged onto their
personal Facebook accounts and showed her the pictures which included
o Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar
o Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres
 Escudero referred the matter to Kristine Rose Tigol, Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action, who found the students to have violated material sections of
the student handbook:
o Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus
o Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts
o Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places
o Apparel that exposes the underwear
o Clothing that advocates unhealthy behavior; depicts obscenity,
contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and
o Posing and uploading pictures on the internet that entail ample body
exposure
 March 1, 2012 – students in the questioned pictures were summoned to the
office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe, school principal and ICM Directress where
they were castigated and verbally abused by school officials. SANCTION:
Bared from joining commencement exercises on March 30, 2012.
 March 23, 2012 – Dr. Armenia M. Tan filed a petition for injunction and
damages, enjoining the implementation of the sanction and allowing her
daughter to participate in the commencement exercises. March 25, 2012 –
24
 Rhonda Ave Vivares (mother of Julia) joins as intervenor in case. March 28,
2012, school files memorandum containing printed copies of the questioned
photographs, RTC Issues TRO to allow students to attend the commencement
exercises.
 Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data (SP Proc No 19251-CEB)
was filed, based on the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken
for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a
birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at
"Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to
have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily,
respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has
been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse,
after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights
by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children
were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted
by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay
of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus,
prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued; (b) respondents be ordered
to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been
illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
 RTC RULING: Dismissing petition for habeas data for lack of evidence
presented to prove existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, and that photos uploaded on Facebook lost their privacy in
some way for having failed to impose restrictions on them to regulate who may
view the photos.
ISSUE + HOLDING: W/N the lower court erred in denying Petition for Habeas Data
– NO
 The Writ of Habeas Data is available to those whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
o With the case at bar, given the nature of online social networks, and
the fine line of privacy online, the concept of informational privacy has
evolved. “[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no
longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking”.
o Facebook Privacy Tools: while social networking sites provide for
interaction and connections, different privacy tools have been
provided by Facebook to have a semblance of privacy online. A person
may other post (a) Public, (b)Friends of Friends, (c) Friends, (d)
Custom, (e) Only Me, designed to set up barriers to limit the visibility
of specific content online. In the current case, STC did not violate the
privacy of the students as while the photos were theoretically set to be
seen by friends only, by posting the content online, the expectation of
privacy lessens as it becomes accessible by others online. If, as the
petitioners assert, they wanted the photos private, to ensure this, they
must have set their privacy to Only Me.
 Users know the risk they expose themselves whenever they engage in cyberspace
activities. They should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves
they are willing to give up.
“It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the
vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves
take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing
to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.”
RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
25