Operation Nasr

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Operation Nasr, fought in early January

1981, was a major battle of the Iran–Iraq
War. It was the biggest tank battle of the
Iran–Iraq War.
 Operation Nasr
Part of Iran–Iraq War

Dezful

Dezful (Iran)

Date January 5–9, 1981

Location Dezful, southwest Iran

Result Decisive Iraqi victory

Iranian counter-attack fails.

Iraqis maintain the siege of
Shush, Dezful, Andimeshk as
well as continuing to siege the
nearby Air Force Base named
Vahdati—all were receiving
 artillery fire and were hit by Frog-
7 missiles

Belligerents
 Iraq  Iran

Commanders and leaders

Colonel Mahmoud Abolhassan

Shukr Shahin[1] Banisadr
Unknown local
commander

Strength

Three armored Three armored

brigades from the 9th brigades (M60s and
Armored division (T- Chieftain tanks, 16th
62s)[1] as well as T-62 and 92nd armored
tanks from the 10th divisions)
armored brigade 330 tanks in total[2]

Casualties and losses

45 tanks destroyed 214 tanks
50 APCs/IFVs destroyed/captured[4]
destroyed 100 APCs/IFVs
3 helicopters downed[3] destroyed/captured
15 rocket artillery Some self-propelled
pieces destroyed[3] artillery destroyed
44 killed (Iraqi claim) Several Ah-1J Cobras
[2] downed
Several fighter-
bombers downed
141–300 killed (Iranian
claim)
Heavy casualties (Iraqi
claim)
[1]

Three Iranian armored regiments

advanced towards Iraqi forces that had
invaded Iranian territory between the
cities of Ahvaz, Susangerd and Dezful.
The Iraqi forces were alerted to this
movement and feigned a withdrawal. The
Iraqis formed three armored brigades
into a three-sided box ambush. The
Iranians blundered into the ambush and
the two tank forces battled for four days
in a sea of mud. The Iranians withdrew,
leaving many destroyed and disabled
tanks stuck in the mud, or, because of
logistical misplanning, had run out of fuel
and ammunition. The condition of the
terrain prevented a clean break from the
battle and did not allow the Iraqi forces
to pursue what was left of the Iranians en
force.
Prelude
On September 22, 1980, Iraqi military
forces under the command of Saddam
Hussein invaded Iran. Iran, which had
been weakened drastically by revolution,
were caught off-guard. However, their air
force (itself weakened by sanctions and
purges) managed to hit numerous Iraqi
military and industrial targets, damaging
the Iraqi military and economy. Iraq's
invasion slowed drastically, and they
became bogged down fighting Iranian
paramilitary forces in urban actions such
as the First Battle of Khorramshahr. By
November, the Iraqi invasion force had
ground to a halt, and Iran's air force had
largely defeated its Iraqi counterpart.
Iraq's navy also suffered destruction
(Operation Morvarid). Nevertheless, Iran
lacked the strength to drive the Iraqis out
immediately. Being under American
sanctions, the Iranians could not get
spare parts for much of their military
equipment and had to use it sparingly.
While Iranian paramilitaries and
irregulars had slowed the Iraqi drive, it
took over three months for Iran to deploy
its military to the region.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the

regular army and air force had suffered
due to purges and lack of supplies and
spare parts from their former Western
allies, especially the US and UK, and was
no longer the fifth most powerful military
in the world. Meanwhile, a new force, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(Sepah-e-Pasdaran) gained prominence.
Meanwhile, the conflict between the
Pasdaran and the Army entered a new
phase after the war began in 1980. A
power struggle began within the new
government in Tehran between President
Abdulhassan Banisadr and the
opposition Islamic Republic Party (IRP),
led by Prime Minister Mohammad-Ali
Rajai. Banisadr began to support the
regular army, while IRP supported the
Pasdaran. This severely impeded military
operations, and caused a complete lack
of coordination. As a result, Iran was
virtually unable to launch any major
offensives other than the air offensive.
Both armies conducted their operations
separately and in a thoroughly
uncoordinated fashion, while the
Pasdaran carried out much of the
combat and getting much recognition. It
also led to an erosion of Banisadr's
revolutionary credentials, as he was
increasingly identified as defending and
being part of a perceived secular, shah-
era entity.

Planning
With declining support, President
Banisadr convinced Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran (who had
the final say in all state matters) to allow
him to take personal command of the
regular army. After Banisadr took
personal command and arrived at the
front, he began planning a major
offensive against the Iraqis, codenamed
"Operation Nasr" (Victory). The attack
was to be carried out entirely by the
regular army, and if successful would
boost Banisadr's standing in the still
chaotic Iranian political landscape, in
addition to trumping the Pasdaran and
their supporters.
The operation was planned to be an
armored offensive in Khuzestan province
(the main province that Iraq attacked). It
was designed to relieve the city of
Abadan, which was under what would be
a nearly year-long siege. It would be
preceded by diversionary attacks at Qasr-
e-Shirin and Mehran near the central part
of the border with Iraq. The main attack
would be carried out by three armored
brigades of the 16th Qazvin armored
division and the 55th paratrooper brigade
of the regular army. The armored thrust
would cross the Karkheh River drive from
the northeast part of the province past
the cities of Susangerd and Ahvaz, down
the west bank of the Karun River. At the
same time, forces inside Abadan would
break out of their positions, and link up
with the armored column arriving from
the north. The plan depended on total
surprise being achieved. Iran's armored
forces assembled for the attack were
larger than their opponents (consisting of
an armored brigade), and on paper the
plan appeared to be practicable.

Despite his title as president, Banisadr

was not a military leader. While the flaws
of this plan were not apparent to him,
they would create serious problems
during his campaign. Firstly, Iran's army
having suffered disastrously during the
revolution from purges and sanctions
was simply unable to carry out proper
combined arms operations. Many senior
generals and entire swathes of the officer
cadre from the shah's era had been lost
to purges (either executed, imprisoned,
or fled abroad), and the remaining ones
were not as well trained, and/or all too
happy to embark on an operation to
restore their credibility to the eyes of the
regime. Iran's armored forces were not
skilled in carrying out armored
maneuvers even prior to the revolution,
and those problems were amplified after
the revolution.

To make matters worse, much of the

regular army infantry forces had been
disbanded after the revolution, and there
was little time to recall them. Thus the
bulk of the tank's infantry support should
have been the Pasdaran. But since
Banisadr was excluding them from this
operation, Iran's tanks would have less
vital infantry support. Without the
Pasdaran supporting as infantry, the
Iranians were to use their 55th
paratrooper brigade from the regular
army as infantry support. Even worse, the
Iranians did not have sufficient
helicopters, artillery, and ammunition to
support their advance. The Iranians
would use 300 tanks (M-60 Patton and
Chieftain), but didn't have the 3:1
superiority necessary to guarantee a
breakthrough (and possibly lacked even
a 2:1 superiority). Iran also lacked proper
reconnaissance. While Banisadr had tried
to alleviate some of the problems, and
somewhat restored the Iranian army's
command structure, it was simply not
ready to carry out a major offensive.

The attack had been planned for an

unsuitable location, which complicated
the matter even further. The terrain
around Susangerd was muddy and prone
to seasonal flooding and rain turned the
ground into a quagmire, the area was in
many ways unsuitable for proper
armored maneuver. The Iranians would
have to attack slowly in a straight column
on surface roads, with the infantry
support at the tail end of the column.
That meant the tanks would be moving
forward unprotected, and with their
flanks exposed. Worse, this movement
would be easily detected by Iraqi
helicopters. The distance the Iranian
forces had to penetrate was also
extremely lengthy, and it was easy for the
Iraqis to counterattack and reinforce their
troops, running counter to Iran's plan of
achieving surprise.

Thus, the stage was set for Operation

Nasr.

Diversionary attacks
Iran launched three diversionary attacks
prior to Operation Nasr. The first one
began on January 4–6, near Qasr-e-Shirin
in central part of the border with Iraq. A
brigade of regular Iranian mountain
troops attacked Iraqi forces that were in
a defensive position, blocking the main
highway between Tehran and Baghdad.
In a pattern which would become all too
familiar later during the war, the Iranians
infiltrated through the Iraqi positions, and
even captured some enemy units. But the
battle broke down into a fight for each hill
and mountain peak, and the Iraqis rushed
reinforcements. While Iran gained 8
kilometers, they did not achieve any
significant tactical advantage.
The second attack involved other Iranian
mountain troops infiltrating towards
occupied Mehran in a failed effort to
liberate the town. The end result was
similar to the previous battle.

The third attack was more serious. It

involved an Iranian mechanized division
attacking Iraqi forces west of the Karun
River in the vicinity of Ahvaz. The goal of
the battle was to drive the Iraqis out of
artillery range of the city. The terrain was
more suitable for vehicles, and the road
network was good. They achieved
surprise, and drove the Iraqis back
several miles, however the Iraqis
remained within artillery range of the city
and the Iranians took moderate to heavy
losses.

Main Attack

Iraqi T-62

The main attack began on 5 January. The

attack began with a short artillery
bombardment. The Iranian forces, using
pontoon bridges, crossed the Karkheh
River. The Iranians used 300 tanks. Due
to the muddy terrain, they were confined
to the paved road. Because of that, the
Iranians assembled their forces in a long
row of columns. The first three columns
consisted of armored brigades, and the
final column was the infantry support.
The infantry was thus behind the tanks,
and the entire flank of this long row of
column was completely exposed.

The Iranian forces began to move down

the paved road which ran between
Susangerd and Dezful. They moved very
slowly, and each column moved
separately. Unknown to the Iranians, their
plans had already begun to go awry when
Iraqi observation aircraft spotted the
column moving south towards Abadan.
Thus their plans for surprise had been
foiled. The Iraqis immediately began
planning their action. The Iraqis moved
their 10th Armored Brigade, and
positioned them on the Iranian line of
advance on the road. The Iraqis dug their
tanks into a hull-down position, meaning
they were dug into the mud and used as
static pieces. While the Iraqis often
lacked the skill to maneuver, and
regularly put their tanks in dug-in
positions gaining the advantage of a
smaller/lower silhouette, in this instance
it would prove to be successful, because
the extremely muddy conditions would
hamper armored maneuver. The Iraqi
tanks (Soviet T-62) were dug into
positions both in front of and on the side
of the Iranian line of advance. The Iraqis
were also supported by attack
helicopters such as Mi-8s, BO-105s,
Alouette IIIs, and Sa-341/342 Gazelles.
Thus the Iraqi trap was set.

On 6 January, the next day, Iranian forces

came into contact with the Iraqi armor.
Iran's shortage of reconnaissance proved
to be disastrous as they failed to see the
approaching trap. The Iraqis began firing
at the Iranian tanks from the front and
both sides. The Iranians tried to drive
through the Iraqi forces in an armored
spearhead, but took heavy losses. They
then tried to maneuver. But that involved
driving their tanks off the paved road,
and into the mud. Iranian tanks then got
stuck in the mud. The first Iranian
brigade was decimated, and many tanks
were destroyed or abandoned in the
mud. Nevertheless, the Iranians refused
to abort the attack, and their next brigade
moved into action.

The second Iranian brigade advanced,

and the results were similar. Iranian
helicopters (AH-1J SeaCobras) also
joined the battle, destroyed several dug-
in Iraqi tanks, but their efforts were not
enough to alleviate the pressure on the
Iranian ground force and the Iranian
armor kept taking heavy losses. The
Iraqis also had anti-aircraft weapons, and
several Iranian helicopters were shot
down. To make matters worse, Iraqi
mechanized infantry with anti-tank
weapons joined in, turning the battle into
a slaughter for the Iranians. Fighting took
place at close range and was brutal. Just
when things were going badly, Iraqi
aircraft also bombed the pontoon bridge
across the Kharkeh River, trapping the
Iranian tanks and preventing their retreat.
Iran's infantry was also stuck on the
opposite bank (they hadn't moved into
action yet) and separated from joining
the battle. Iranian helicopters attempted
to fight back, but they were attacked by
Iraqi fighter jets, which destroyed or
damaged several helicopters.

By 8 January, the entire Iranian attack

was in chaos. Many tanks from the first
two brigades had been lost, either
destroyed, or stuck in the mud and
abandoned. The third Iranian brigade
attempted to continue the attack, but
could make little headway. Instead,
Operation Nasr was aborted, and the
Iranians moved to retreat. The infantry
force (which never had a chance to join
the battle) instead moved into a
defensive position to prevent an Iraqi
counterattack. Iranian engineers at the
last second managed to rebuild the
pontoon bridges over the Karkheh river,
and the third Iranian tank brigade
managed to break away from the combat
and retreat from the Iraqi forces and
move back across the Karkheh River.

Meanwhile, during the débâcle at Dezful,

Iranian infantry forces at besieged
Abadan attempted their breakout, in
order to link up with the armored column.
Even if the 16th and 92nd armored
divisions had not been defeated in battle,
it was unlikely that they would have been
able to reach them. The Iranian infantry
took heavy losses and were forced to
retreat back to Abadan.
Aftermath
The Iraqis had easily defeated the
Iranians. While the Iranians had been a
powerful force prior to the revolution, the
damage inflicted by the revolution had
made it possible for the Iraqis to gain a
victory like this. Nevertheless, a
centralized and inflexible Iraqi command
and lack of foresight resulted in a failure
to capitalize on their victory, which saved
the Iranians from a total rout. The Iraqis
primarily dug in their tanks into the
ground to act as static artillery, and while
that worked at the fighting around Dezful
and Susangerd, it meant that they were
unable to follow up their victory and
destroy the Iranians. Instead, they
remained dug in as the Iranians
withdrew. A minor Iraqi counterattack
with helicopters and some armor was
beaten back by Iranian forces near the
town of Shush which lay just behind the
Karkheh river on the line of advance to
Dezful.

For the Iranian military, this major defeat

had serious implications. Iran had lost
214 tanks, at least 100 other armored
vehicles, some heavy artillery and a large
portion of the 16th and 92nd armored
divisions. Many armored vehicles had
been captured intact as they had been
abandoned or stuck in the mud, and were
put on display in Iraq (some were later
even sold to Jordan, while others
remained in storage until the 2003
invasion). The loss would have been
absolutely complete had the Iranians not
managed to re-assemble their pontoon
bridge. Prior to the revolution, Iran had
had 1,700 tanks (which dwindled to 1,000
usable ones after the revolution). With
their defeat at Dezful, approximately 17%
of that entire force was destroyed, a
major weakening of Iranian military
power. To make matters worse, with US-
led sanctions on Iran, those tanks could
not be replaced while the Iraqi ones
could easily be (since they weren't under
an embargo and had the support of the
west).

Despite their decisive victory, 45 Iraqi

tanks and 50 other armored vehicles
were destroyed. Since they fought from
static positions, they were easier targets.
Nevertheless, their losses could be
replaced, while the Iranians' could not.

The defeat at Dezful had major political

implications in Iran. President Banisadr
had been expecting that a major victory
would help increase his political standing
and help silence his ever-critical
opponents. Instead, exactly the opposite
happened. His approval rating dropped
drastically, and his opponents attacked
him even more fiercely. Worse, the army,
which he supported, was now discredited
even further. By June 1981, things had
gotten so bad for Banisadr that Iran's
Parliament led by the IRP and Prime
Minister Rajai impeached him. The
Ayatollah Khomeini, which had played the
role of a "neutral arbiter" and had through
the past year had sought to settle the
differences between Banisadr and his
opponents, finally gave up on him, and
approved his impeachment. Banisadr
fled the country in disguise with a
defecting air force pilot to avoid arrest.
Banisadr was replaced by an unofficial
junta, led by the now President Rajaii, the
new Prime Minister Javad Bahonar, and
the Speaker of Parliament Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani. Iran became a one-
party state led by the IRP for the duration
of the war.

The impeachment of Banisadr began a

several month period of near civil war
and terror in Iran. At least several
hundred government officials were killed
in assassinations and bombings (which
killed Rajai and Bahonar, and nearly
Rafsanjani). The Iranian regime
unleashed their own wave of terror,
torturing and executing over 3,000
members of the opposition, and purging
the regular army once again. They
eventually suppressed most of their
opponents (including dissident clerics).

By September, the political situation was

improving and with the government
under the control of the hard-liners of the
IRP, Iran's military effectiveness
drastically improved. The hardliners were
willing to benefit from the army, and with
no power struggle, Iran was able to fight
effectively again. Both as a result of
heavy equipment losses, and a decline in
confidence, the Iranian army with their
regular tactics were not seen as
important. Instead, the Pasdaran infantry
with their unconventional tactics became
even more prominent. Nevertheless, the
army and Pasdaran would be able to
display a unity that would help them drive
the Iraqis out of Iran, with the Pasdaran
launching infantry attacks, and the
regular army using their tanks and
artillery to support them.

References
1. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA541655
2. "Getty Images" . www.itnsource.com.
3. 11) ‫ ﻣﻮﺳﺴﻪ ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﯽ و اﻃﻼع رﺳﺎﻧﯽ‬,‫ﺗﺒﯿﺎن‬
December 2017). "Nasr offensive
operation (January 5th, 1981)" . ‫ﺳﺎﯾﺖ‬
‫ﻣﻮﺳﺴﻪ ﻓﺮﻫﻨﮕﯽ و اﻃﻼع رﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﺗﺒﯿﺎن‬
(tebyan.net).
 4. Pollack, Kenneth. "Arabs at War".
University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
Page 194.

Bibliography
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/
9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap05.pdf
https://books.google.com/books?
id=wYf3T4vjw3YC&pg=PA50
https://books.google.com/books/abou
t/Iran_at_War.html?id=dUHhTPdJ6yIC
http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0120
/012038.html/(page)/2
Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Operation_Nasr&oldid=908125602"

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