Battle of Kamdesh

The Battle of Kamdesh took place during

the War in Afghanistan (2001–present).
It occurred on October 3, 2009, when a
force of 300 Taliban assaulted the
American Combat Outpost ("COP")
Keating near the town of Kamdesh of
Nuristan province in eastern Afghanistan.
The attack was the bloodiest battle for
US forces since the Battle of Wanat in
July 2008, which occurred 20 miles
(32 km) away from Kamdesh. The attack
on COP Keating resulted in 8 Americans
killed and 27 wounded whilst the Taliban
suffered an estimated 150 killed.
 Battle of Kamdesh

Part of the war in Afghanistan (2001–present)

A Chinook helicopter lands at Combat Outpost

Keating, Afghanistan, in March 2007

Date October 3, 2009

Location Kamdesh, Nuristan Province,

Afghanistan

35.4231°N 71.3289°E

Result
Indecisive

Tactical Coalition victory[1]

Strategic Taliban victory[2]
Belligerents
  United States Taliban insurgents

 Afghanistan
 Latvia
Commanders and leaders
Curtis Scaparrotti
Dost Muhammed[4]
COL Randy George (4-
Sirajuddin Haqqani[5]
4ID [TF Mountain
Ghulan Faroq[6]
Warrior])
LTC Robert Brown (3- Abdul-Rahman
61 CAV [TF Destroyer]) Mustaghni
CPT Stoney Portis (B
Trp, 3-61 CAV)
CPT Agris Liepiņš
(Latvian Army
commander)[3]

Strength

60 (US)[1] 300[1]
2 (Latvia)
Casualties and losses

8 killed, 27 wounded 150 killed (U.S. claim)[1]

(US);[1] 4 killed (ANA)

Kamdesh

Location of Kamdesh in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan

As a result of the battle, COP Keating

was partially overrun and nearly
completely
destroyed.[1][7]:531–41Observation Post
("OP") Fritsche was attacked
simultaneously, limiting available support
from that position.[8] The Coalition forces
withdrew from the base shortly after the
battle. A deliberate withdrawal had been
planned some time before the battle
began, and the closing was part of a
wider effort by the top commander in
Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal,
to cede remote outposts and consolidate
troops in more populated areas to better
protect Afghan civilians.[9] The
Americans "declared the outpost closed
and departed—so quickly that they did
not carry out all of their stored
ammunition. The outpost's depot was
promptly looted by the insurgents and
bombed by American planes in an effort
to destroy the lethal munitions left
behind."[2]

After an investigation, four officers in the

chain of command were disciplined for
their failure to adequately support the
base. Eight aviators were awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross for helping
defend the base. Staff Sergeant Clinton
Romesha and Staff Sergeant Ty Carter
were awarded the Medal of Honor for
their actions during the battle.

Background
Kamdesh base origins
Allied commanders believed the
Kamdesh area to be key to denying anti-
coalition militia the required access to
supply lines crossing into and out of
nearby Pakistan. This strategy depended
upon extending government control by
building and maintaining provincial
reconstruction team bases. The Allies
hoped that extending these bases into
Nuristan, one of the most remote and
isolated eastern provinces in
Afghanistan, they could demonstrate to
the entire Afghan population the
government's credibility and power.
These bases were a key element of the
American counterinsurgency strategy.
Colonel John W. Nicholson Jr.,
Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade
Combat Team of the 10th Mountain
Division, had observed that Kamdesh
was located at a point where three of the
valley systems from the Pakistan border
in the north converged. Nicholson and
officers of his command believed that
much of the flow of weapons and troops
from Pakistan could be stopped at
Kamdesh. Gul Mohammed Khan, the
government administrator for Kamdesh
District, lived at the intersection of the
Landay-Sin and Darreh Ye Kushtoz rivers.
These valley and road intersections
combined with the political leadership in
the area inspired the positioning of the
Nuristan PRT.[7]: 28, 41, 90–8, 123

The Nuristan provincial reconstruction

team base was strongly recommended
by Nuristani Province Governor Tamim
Nuristani. On July 20, 2006, 2:00 a. m. all
of Cherokee Company and one platoon
from Able Troop, 3-71 Cavalry Squadron
dropped in two Chinooks on Landing
Zone Warheit, a cornfield on a ridge near
Kamesh, under command of Lieutenant
Colonel Howard to garrison the area. The
camp was constructed by 3-71 Cavalry,
10th Mountain Division (Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition) in
the summer of 2006 and was manned by
their ABLE Troop element until June
2007.[7]: 28, 41, 90–8, 123

The area had not been occupied by any

conventional US forces prior to 3-71
Cavalry's takeover, although Special
Operations forces operated in the area
on a very limited basis. The camp was
originally constructed to be a PRT (i.e.,
Provincial Reconstruction Team), called
PRT Kamdesh, but due to extremely high
levels of fighting in the area it remained a
fire base instead of a PRT. In December
2006 it was renamed Camp Keating after
the death of ABLE Troop 3-71 Cavalry
10th Mountain Division's Executive
Officer Benjamin Keating, who died
November 26, 2006 while conducting
combat operations south of the camp. 3-
71 Cavalry conducted many successful
combat missions in the area surrounding
the camp and repelled various attacks on
the base.[7]: 28, 41, 90–8, 123

Adverse terrain affects

operations

The Kamdesh village and most of

Nuristan is located in the Hindu Kush.
This is a lofty mountain range
characterized by steep slopes of
enormous granite boulders separated by
fast moving rivers in deep narrow valleys.
The temperate climate of the area
provides hot summers, a monsoon
season in the summer, and cold winters
of ice and snow extending down into the
valleys. The combination of volatile
weather and rugged mountains make any
kind of travel and life in general difficult
and challenging. American military
operations in Kamdesh were affected as
soon as units began gathering for
deployment in the area. Operation Deep
Strike began on May 5, 2006. This was a
re-deployment from the Cowkay and
Korangal Valleys to Kamdesh. The pick
up zone for Able Troop 2nd Platoon was
called PZ Reds, located on the side of an
8,000-foot mountain. It was nicknamed
"Heart Attack Ridge" due to its steep
slope and obstacles hazardous to low
flying aircraft.[7]: 80–3, 94–5, 116–20

While attempting the pickup, a Chinook

transport helicopter crashed in the
darkness at 10:09 PM when the rear rotor
hit a tree, and the helicopter slid down
the slope and over a cliff, exploding in
flames and killing all the crew and
passengers. There was an element of
ABLE Troop 3-71 CAV 2nd Platoon still
left on the PZ after the crash that worked
relentlessly to recover the bodies of their
10 comrades and destroy sensitive
equipment left among the
wreckage.[7]: 80–3, 94–5, 116–20
After marching into the proposed site for
the Kamdesh provincial outpost, Captain
Michael and Cherokee Company's
second platoon were confronted by a
large boulder in the middle of the site
that made use of a helicopter landing
area in the PRT site impossible. The rock
could not be blown apart without raining
fragments into the town of Urmul across
the Landay-Sin river. The landing zone
was therefore placed on the other side of
the river on a rocky peninsula jutting into
the river near Urmul. This separation of
the landing zone, and the fact that PRT
was surrounded by mountains on three
sides make the site unappealing because
of the difficulty of mounting an effective
military defense.[7]: 123–8, 136–8, 181–91, 407

On August 8, 2006, 19 days after the first

American landing, the PRT was attacked
for the first time. Captain Frank Brooks,
commanding at LZ Warheit, was
dismayed to discover the PRT could not
be quickly supported by LZ Warheit.
From the PRTs position, that resembled
the bottom of a funnel, it could not be
seen or supported with indirect fire due
to the multi-level and complicated local
terrain. The tall mountains made a joke
of two dimensional maps, and rendered
pre-determined landmarks useless.
Eventually supporting aircraft scattered
the attackers, but if the weather had been
a problem, air support would not have
provided the decisive
results.[7]: 123–8, 136–8, 181–91, 407

From August 8 to November 25 of 2006

strenuous efforts were made to supply
and expand the PRT by supply convoys
using the Landay-Sin valley road from
Naray FOB. Afghan contractors were
unable to keep the narrow mountain road
in safe condition, and convoys were
subject to constant ambush from the
surrounding mountains that lined the
entire valley to
Naray.[7]: 123–8, 136–8, 181–91, 407
It was against regulations for officers to
drive a convoy vehicle, but First
Lieutenant Ben Keating took the wheel
while returning an armored supply truck
to the Naray FOB. He wanted to avoid
risking the lives of his men while
traveling on an unstable road subject to
ambush with an overweight vehicle.
During the highly risky convoy, the road
collapsed under the weight of Keating's
vehicle. He was thrown from the truck
and it rolled over him and sank into the
Landay-Sin river. His death had a
traumatic effect on the morale of 3-71
Cav. The Allies stopped using the
Kamdesh-Naray road as a
result.[7]: 123–8, 136–8, 181–91, 407
Combined with difficult conditions for air
supply, and a continuing loss of support
from the local population, supply to what
was renamed Camp Keating on
November 26, 2006 was steadily
strangled. As it became obvious that
COP Keating was too isolated,
indefensible, and rapidly becoming
impossible to supply, plans were made to
close it beginning in December
2008.[7]: 123–8, 136–8, 181–91, 407

Counterinsurgency effort in
Nuristan

The population of Nuristan is ethnically

distinct from the rest of Afghanistan, and
divided into four major groups, the Kom,
Kata, Kushtoz, and Kalasha. These
subgroups were in turn divided into
different clans and sects of the Islamic
religion, depending on lineages and the
interpretations of individual religious
leaders. These groups could clash
violently over water rights, pasture, and
religious beliefs. Five different languages
and various dialects are spoken by these
groups, making translators from other
areas of Afghanistan useless. The
Soviets had to contend with a rebel group
known as the Dawlet of eastern Nuristan.
They were professing a Salafi version of
Islam, and hostile to any political rivals.
The Nuristanis had resisted Islam as late
as the year 1895 and before that had
been considered a nation of infidels with
a long tradition of violently resisting
outsiders, their beliefs, and their
invasions. Resistance in Nuristan
revolved around a specific group of
Islamic fighters known as Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin or HIG. During the Soviet
occupation HIG received more support
from the CIA than any other Mujahideen
resistance group. When it came to
infiltration from Pakistan, and setting up
ambushes, HIG was regarded as the
most skillful. In 2006 HIG was actively
resisting the Afghan government. When
Captain Aaron Swain of Cherokee Co.
had sounded out Afghan Border Police
Commander Ahmed Shah about setting
up near Kamdesh, he was told that HIG
insurgents tried to blow up Shah's jeep
on his last trip there and it was a bad
place.[7]: 33–4, 50–1, 92, 98

American occupation troops in Nuristan

would find themselves directly in
opposition to the HIG forces prepared by
the CIA to resist the Soviets. Colonel Pat
Donahue, the former commander of the
3rd BCT, had believed that Nuristani
population was essentially neutral,
hostile to any outside groups, and so
isolated that resources allocated to the
region would be wasted. These
resources were limited by the fact that
only 5,000 American troops were
available to occupy a rugged area the
size of Virginia that had very little in the
way of Infrastructure. A new counter-
insurgency strategy seemed to offer a
way around these problems. Known as
COIN and refined by General Petraeus,
Commander of US forces in Afghanistan,
the Army and Marine Counter-insurgency
Field Manual FM 3-24 would convert the
population of Nuristan to American goals
in the region. Unlike Donahue, Nicholson
was a supporter of COIN in addition to
seeing Kamdesh as a decisive control
point in the region. The basic approach
to victory by the PRT would involve three
steps: 1. Separate the enemy from the
people. 2. Link the people to their
government. 3. Transform Afghanistan
by economic development and the
creation of a national infrastructure.
Nicholson hoped the PRT would seed a
process that would be developed by the
local Nuristanis rather than completely
imposed from the outside. Lieutenant
Keating, first commander of the
Kamdesh PRT, was determined to make
COIN a success in the region.[7]:95, 26–8

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Howard,

Squadron Commander, saw COIN as a
process of providing three services in the
Kamdesh region. Providing clean water
by installing gravity fed pipelines in all
the local villages, repairing the
hydroelectric plants in Urmul and
Kamdesh, and setting up new plants in
Mirdesh and Gawardesh. New roads
would be the final stage, built and
maintained by local contractors, this
would improve the local economy while
providing improved communications with
the central government and the rest of
the nation. 1.33 million dollars was
budgeted for these projects. This had the
potential of providing a significant boost
to the local economy, which in the past
saw little in the way of civic
improvements. Keating saw these
programs as having mixed results.
Villagers and clans who were left out of
these projects were resentful, and quick
to turn to those who would exploit the
resulting divisions. Haji Yunus, a village
elder of Gawardesh and contractor for an
electric plant was kidnapped and
murdered. A note was attached to his
body which said: "Don't work with
coalition forces. This will happen to you."
The note was signed "Mullah Omar".
Omar was the top Taliban leader in
Afghanistan, but U.S. Intelligence stated
HIG had done the killing, giving Omar
"credit" in order in instill more fear due to
Omar's greater reputation. The constant
ambushes and fire fights along the road
to Naray did little to relieve Keating's
doubts. "The little bastards keep
shooting at us every day.", represented
Keating's assessment of the progress of
COIN in Kamdesh.[7]:129–30 134–5, 156

After the death of Keating, and renaming

COP Keating after him, a "Night Letter"
appeared on the door of the Upper
Kamdesh mosque on April 29 of 2007.
Part of the letter stated: "At the present
time for those who work and obey the
American devils by taking contracts for
building schools, road, and power plants:
also those who work as police, district
administrators, and commanders as well
as sold-out mullahs who deny Allah's
orders and holy war and deny the holy
Quran: We are telling you that we are
continuing our holy war in Allah's will…
Soon we will start our operations." This
letter was written in Pashto and signed
"Mujahideen". The following day
insurgents kidnapped and murdered
Fazal Ahad, an elder from the village of
Badmuk who was attempting to end the
Kom/Kata tribal disagreements by
arranging a meeting in Kamdesh. In
response to this, the local Afghan
officials sent more government troops
into the area to increase security. These
troops were ambushed on the
Naray/Kamdesh road and shot up badly
enough to prevent their arrival in
Kamdesh.[7]:215–30
The closeness of the action, and
coordinated fire from both sides of the
valley indicated that the attackers in this
ambush were different than the groups
that were using sporadic, long range,
harassing fire in the past. The latest
acronym for attackers used by the
Americans was AAF, for anti-Afghan
fighters. These AAF were more
professional and probably represented
groups from areas outside of Nuristan.
They would be Pashtuns, who hated the
Tajiks and Hazara tribes that made up
the ANA, or Afghan National Army. The
AAF would disguise themselves in ANA
uniforms and set up fake checkpoints to
extract taxes and tolls from local
contractors, and allied themselves with
smugglers transporting illegal timber and
gems across the border into Pakistan.
Urdu and Pashtun HIG warriors bringing
in arms and ammunition from Pakistan
would cross the border in the other
direction. Their fake government
check[10] points and "taxes" would
finance and complete the economic
cycle and serve to finance AAF
operations. On the whole the AAF was a
broader based and more formidable
force in 2007 than before the American
invasion, and represented a significant
escalation.[7]:228, 249, 469
At the end of May, 2007, Bulldog Troop,
1-91 Cavalry Squadron, 173rd Airborne
Brigade Combat Team, arrived at COP
Keating. They were commanded by
Captain Tom Bostick, the next leader to
inherit the responsibilities associated
with the Kamdesh area of operations.
The first of these would be "Operation
Mountain II", and effort to extend a series
of observation posts west to control the
villages between COP Keating and the
Afghan village of Saret Koheh. Extending
control further along the Landay-Sin river
would hopefully provide a counter to the
expansion of AAF organization and
activity in the summer of 2007. The AAF
responded to this advance with a well-
organized and coordinated ambush on
July 26, 2007 in the river valley at Saret
Koheh. The AAF forces involved fit the
pattern of the improved AAF, in that they
were uniformed and equipped as Afghan
Army and police forces, with the latest
weapons and radios issued to
government Afghan forces, along with
black knit ski masks to conceal their
identities. They made sustained attacks
over a two-day period, drawing American
support forces and widespread air forces
into the battle. Despite air and artillery
support the American forces suffered
significant losses from the enemy fire
that rained down on them from both
sides of the valley. Captain Thomas G.
Bostick was killed by a rocket propelled
grenade, along with Staff Sergeant
William "Ryan" Fritsche who was killed by
rifle fire. Seven other Americans and one
ANA soldier were
wounded.[7]:229, 256, 263–80[11]

The Battle of Saret Koheh made good on

the threats of the "Night Letter" posted in
Kamdesh beginning the campaign
season of 2007. It also confronted
Lieutenant Colonel Kolenda commanding
American forces in the area in Naray,
with the fact that COIN operations in
Nuristan were facing a crisis. AAF
operations in the area were expanding,
involving a greater proportion of the local
population, and were being supported by
Taliban organizations in Pakistan.
American forces were strung out in a
thinly held and poorly supplied picket line
from Naray to Kamdesh along the
Landay-Sin River. The American forces
were too outnumbered to survive in
sustained combat with the local
population. Something had to be done to
put the Americans and the Afghans of
Nuristan on the same side. The first
effort in a new COIN campaign was
made by First Lieutenant Dave Roller. He
decided that the appearance of American
soldiers in their "battle rattle" war gear
gave the impression of soulless killing
machines. Encased in armor, helmets,
and weapons, Americans appeared to be
looking for a fight. As a contrast Dave
attended his next meeting with the
Kamdesh village leaders dressed in a T-
shirt and shorts. When he spoke to them
he discussed their common values as
leaders of families and communities
working toward a better future for their
children. Mawlawi Abdul Rahman of
Kamdesh was a local elder much
impressed with this new approach. He
began building a consensus of village
elders in support of the Afghan
government. Through the rest of the
summer and fall of 2008, Captain Joey
Hutto, the new commander of COP
Keating, and his troops expanded this
initiative. Hutto had worked for years on
COIN campaigns in Central America, and
put his skills to good use in
Nuristan.[7]:298–304

The Hundred Man Shura

By October 2007 the elders and mullahs

of the Kamdesh area had been inspired
by Rahman to gather at Kamdesh for a
mass meeting, or shura to plan the future
of Nuristan. This series of meetings over
two days involved more than 800
representatives of the people of Nuristan,
and had the goal of bringing order and
economic development to the region.
The village leaders elected a
representative council of 100 members
to form a shura that would produce a
regional security plan and obtain an
agreement with the American military
and the Afghan Karzai government. This
agreement would recognize the authority
of the Hundred Man Shura, and provide
funds for economic development.
Formalized as "The Commitment of
Mutual Support" the agreement also
provided the Shura would provide local
security in return for an end to uninvited
American military searches of local
towns and mosques. From November
through January 2008 members of the
Shura traveled the villages of the
Kamdesh area, informing the residents of
the support agreement and stating that
the era of holy war was over, and that
local government would bring peace and
prosperity. This agreement did bring
down the level of combat in the Kamdesh
area. In the year that followed the
agreement, ANA and American deaths
dropped from thirty to three.[7]:312–14, 371

The shura began to falter by October

2008. The initiating ISAF forces of 1-91
Cavalry had returned home, replaced by
6th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry
Division. On October 28, the commander
of COP Keating, Captain Robert J.
Yllescas, was severely wounded in a
targeted assassination attempt with a
remotely detonated IED less than 400
meters from the outpost—he later died
from his wounds. The assassin was later
found in Urmul and appeared to have the
assistance of one of the Afghan day
laborers at Camp Keating and the
acquiescence of Urmul's elders.
Yllescas's charismatic relations with the
Shura had supported the transition from
1-91 Cavalry to 6th Squadron, and the
Shura's influence and collaboration with
ISAF forces declined from this
point.[7]:363–383[12]

Final operations
COP Keating became increasingly
isolated in the summer of 2009. Ground
resupply became almost impossible due
to the area's limited roads and the threat
of insurgent attacks. Furthermore, Camp
Keating's location, surrounded by
mountains on three sides, exposed
helicopters and the outpost's garrison to
insurgent fire. Towards the end, resupply
flights were limited to moonless nights
when near total darkness offered some
protection to helicopter crews and their
craft.[7]:327–328 The nearest attack
helicopters were located in Jalalabad, a
thirty-minute flight away.[2]
OP Fritsche was established to provide
overwatch for COP Keating and was
manned by a mix of US and Afghan
national forces.[8] US Army soldiers at
both outposts had been ordered to
prepare to evacuate the outposts and
had informed local Afghan leaders of
their intention to do so.[9]

Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron "Destroyers",

61st Cavalry Regiment manned COP
Keating.[8] In addition, Afghan national
forces manned checkpoints and
roadblocks at various locations around
the area.[13] At the time, Afghan national
forces were supervised and trained by
members of the Latvian Operational
Mentor Liaison Teams.[14]

The Allies planned to close COP Keating

by August 2009, but the move was
delayed because of other military
operations in a nearby district[15]
Because Keating was scheduled for
closure in the near future, coalition
leaders had decided not to make more
than minimal efforts to improve
fortifications at the base.[16]

Coalition forces received three human-

source intelligence reports sometime
before the battle indicating that
insurgents were planning an attack on
the outposts. Because the reports had
not been verified by other intelligence
sources, such as electronic intelligence,
the reports were discounted.[17]

Battle

Kamdesh District in the Nuristan Province in

Afghanistan

About 3:00 am on October 3, insurgents

ordered all Kamdesh villagers to leave
the area. At 6:00 am, the fighters opened
fire from all sides of the outpost with
mortars and rocket-propelled grenades,[2]
immediately putting the Americans'
mortar pit out of action.[1] Observation
Post Fritsche was attacked
simultaneously, limiting available support
from that position.[8] Coalition forces
responded with small arms fire, mortars,
and by the afternoon, helicopters, heavy
artillery, and airstrikes.[4]

The attackers overran Keating's

perimeter defenses about 48 minutes
into the battle. Breaches occurred at a
latrine area close to the perimeter wire;
also the main entrance where civilian
Afghan Security Guards were
overwhelmed; and from the eastern side
—where Afghan National Army soldiers
were stationed. Despite the efforts of
two Latvian military advisors, who tried
to convince the Afghan National Army
forces not to flee,[18] the Afghan
defenders quickly broke and ran. U.S.
soldiers reported that none of the Afghan
soldiers held their ground. During and
after the battle, some of the Afghan
soldiers stole items, including digital
cameras and protein drinks, belonging to
American soldiers at the base.[19]

Once inside, the attackers set fire to the

base, burning down most of the
barracks. Within the first hour, the
American and Latvian defenders had
collapsed to a tight internal perimeter,
centered on the two buildings that were
not burning. Regrouping there, they
pushed out teams to retake much of the
outpost. They expanded the perimeter all
the way back to the entry control point
and to the buildings on the western edge
of the outpost, which became their final
fighting position. U.S. air support
directed by Sgt. Armando Avalos and Sgt.
Jayson Souter, including attack
helicopters, A-10s, a B-1 bomber, and F-
15 fighters, destroyed the local mosque,
where much of the insurgents' heaviest
fire originated. Once OP Fritsche soldiers
gained control of their mortar pit, Sgt.
Avalos began directing indirect support
to help the defense of COP Keating.[1][2]
Two USAF F-15E fighter bombers circled
overhead, led by Captain Mike Polidor
and his wingman, 1st Lt. Justin Pavoni,
for almost eight hours, helping
coordinate airstrikes by 19 other
aircraft.[20]

The insurgents began to retreat later in

the day. Quick reaction forces (QRF) from
1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment did
not reach the outpost until 7:00 pm that
day, while insurgents remained in parts
of the outpost as late as 5:10 pm. Relief
had been slowed in reaching COP
Keating due to a lack of available aircraft
and density of terrain. Members of 10th
Mountain Division's 1-32 Infantry
Regiment were air lifted to the nearest
helicopter landing zone on OP Fritsche
and arrived at approximately 1400 hrs, as
recalled by a soldier on scene. After
assisting with securing the OP from
potential follow on attacks, members of
the Quick Reaction Force descended
from the mountain's peak to COP Keating
on foot. While in route the Platoon
encountered a planned ambush on the
side of the mountain resulting in three
confirmed enemy KIA at approximately
1800 hrs. After dispensing with the
enemy, QRF continued their descent and
entered the outpost at approximately
1900 hrs. At such time the platoon
cleared the remaining areas of the
outpost which members of 3-61 had not
yet retaken. Within moments of entry,
members of the QRF discovered and
confirmed the death of Sgt. Joshua
Hardt, who until this time had been MIA.
Follow-up attacks attempted by Taliban
forces were subsequently thwarted by
U.S. aircraft.[1]

Aftermath
Eight U.S. soldiers were killed and 27
wounded; eight Afghan soldiers were
wounded, along with two Afghan private
security guards.[1] The U.S. military
estimated that 150 Taliban militants
were also killed as a result of repulsing
the assault. The U.S. soldiers killed in the
battle were: Justin T. Gallegos (Tucson,
Arizona), Christopher Griffin (Kincheloe,
Michigan), Kevin C. Thomson (Reno,
Nevada), Michael P. Scusa (Villas, New
Jersey), Vernon W. Martin (Savannah,
Georgia), Stephan L. Mace (Lovettsville,
Virginia), Joshua J. Kirk (South Portland,
Maine), and Joshua M. Hardt (Applegate,
California).[16]

The outpost was evacuated two days

later, and bombed on October 6 by a B-1
bomber to prevent insurgents from
looting the munitions abandoned in the
hasty withdrawal.[8][2] American forces
had already planned to pull out of the
area as part of a plan to move forces to
more densely populated areas, so
closure of the base was imminent when
the attack occurred.[21] The attack
accelerated those plans, with the troops'
departure taking place so quickly after
the battle that some munitions were
abandoned. "The outpost's depot was
promptly looted by the insurgents and
bombed by American planes in an effort
to destroy the lethal munitions left
behind."[2][22][23]

On October 5 and 6, Coalition troops

conducted operations in the area in an
attempt to locate and destroy the Taliban
forces responsible for the attack on the
outposts. Another 10 Afghan soldiers
and 4 Taliban were killed during these
operations.[24]

Investigation

Following the battle, the U.S. Central

Command conducted an investigation on
what had occurred, led by US Army
General Guy Swan. The report, released
to the public in June 2011, concluded
"inadequate measures taken by the chain
of command" facilitated the attack, but
praised the troops fighting at the base for
repulsing the attack "with conspicuous
gallantry, courage and bravery."[15] Four
U.S. Army officers—a captain, a major, a
lieutenant colonel, and a colonel—who
oversaw COP Keating were admonished
or reprimanded for command failures.[25]
In the report released to the public, the
U.S. Army concealed the names of the
four disciplined officers.[16]

Decorations
27 Soldiers were awarded the Purple
Heart for wounds sustained in combat.
37 Soldiers were awarded the Army
Commendation Medal with "V" device for
valor.[26] 3 Soldiers were awarded the
Bronze Star Medal, and 18 others the
Bronze Star Medal with "V" device for
valor. 9 Soldiers were awarded the Silver
Star for valor.[27] Staff Sgt. Justin
Gallegos' Silver Star was later upgraded
to a Distinguished Service Cross.[28]

The flight crews of three United States

Army AH-64D Apache helicopters were
later decorated for actions during the
battle. Captain Matthew Kaplan, CW3
Ross Lewallen, CW3 Randy Huff, CW2
Gary Wingert, CW2 Chad Bardwell, and
CW2 Chris Wright were awarded the
Distinguished Flying Cross for
conducting close combat attacks on the
Taliban during the battle.[29] Capt.
Michael Polidor, pilot of one of the F-15E
aircraft coordinating close air support,
was also awarded the Distinguished
Flying Cross.[30]

Medals of Honor

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Clinton L. Romesha patrols near

Combat Outpost Keating in Kamdesh, Nuristan
province, Afghanistan, 27 July 2009.

On 11 February 2013, President Barack

Obama awarded the Medal of Honor to
Staff Sergeant Clinton Romesha, a
survivor of the battle. He became the
fourth surviving soldier from the Iraq and
Afghanistan conflicts to be awarded the
Medal of Honor due to courageous
actions during the battle.[31]

Staff Sergeant Ty Carter, who had been a

Marine before joining the U.S. Army, was
awarded the Medal of Honor for his
courage. He was awarded the medal on
26 August 2013.[32]

Notes
1. Norland, Rob (February 5, 2010).
"U.S. Military Faults Leaders in Attack
on Base" . The New York Times.
Archived from the original on
 February 8, 2010. Retrieved
February 6, 2010.
2. C. J. Chivers (July 25, 2010).
"Strategic Plans Spawned Bitter End
for a Lonely Outpost" . WikiLeaks –
via The New York Times.
3. Gazette
4. Tavernise, Sabrina; Sangar Rahimi
(October 4, 2009). "Eight U.S.
Soldiers Dead in Bold Attack in
Afghanistan" . The New York Times.
Archived from the original on
February 3, 2012. Retrieved
October 4, 2009. "...Taliban
commander named Dost
Muhammad, [...] described as the
 shadow commander for the Taliban
in Nuristan"
5. Faeiz, Rahim (Associated Press),
"Attack on Afghan outposts kills 8
soldiers Archived March 8, 2012, at
the Wayback Machine", Military
Times, October 5, 2009.
6. Gertz, Bill (October 16, 2009). "U.S.
ignored warnings before deadly
Afghan attack" . The Washington
Times. Retrieved February 6, 2010.
7. :Tapper, Jake (2012). The Outpost, An
Untold Story of American Valor.
Little, Brown and Company, Hachette
Book Group. ISBN 978-0-316-18539-
4.
 8. Roggio, Bill (February 6, 2010). "Army
releases report on battle at Combat
Outpost Keating battle" . The Long
War Journal. Archived from the
original on February 8, 2010.
Retrieved February 6, 2010.
9. Starr, Barbara; Adam Levine (October
6, 2009). "Afghan insurgents pushed
into U.S. base, official says" . CNN.
Archived from the original on
February 13, 2010. Retrieved
February 6, 2010.
10. Tapper pg 250
11. "Defense.gov News Release: DoD
Identifies Army Casualties" .
defense.gov. Archived from the
 original on July 14, 2015. Retrieved
May 23, 2015.
12. "Defense.gov News Release: DoD
Identifies Army Casualty" .
defense.gov. Archived from the
original on July 14, 2015. Retrieved
May 23, 2015.
13. Pitman, Todd (October 8, 2009).
"Insurgents breached U.S. outpost in
battle" . The Philadelphia Inquirer.
Associated Press. Archived from the
original on October 11, 2009.
Retrieved February 6, 2010.
14. The Gazette: Mom works to help
Carson soldiers honor battle bonds
 Archived January 23, 2010, at the
Wayback Machine, 2010–12–30.
15. Trofimov, Yaroslav (February 6,
2010). "Fault Found in Outpost's
Fall" . The Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved February 6, 2010.
16. Lardner, Richard (Associated Press),
"Command Failures", Stars and
Stripes, June 11, 2011, p. 1.
17. Gertz, Bill (October 29, 2009). "Inside
the Ring: DIA on Afghan intel" .
Washington Times. Archived from
the original on January 24, 2010.
Retrieved February 6, 2010.
18. Latvijas Televīzija: Videofilma
"Afganistāna. Skola karalaukā" ,
 2010–12–30.
19. Lardner, Richard, (Associated Press),
"Investigation: Afghan Troops Ran,
Hid During Deadly Battle", The
Virginian-Pilot, June 11, 2011.
20. Laster, Jill, "Pilot honored for
organizing airstrikes ", Military
Times, February 19, 2011, retrieved
February 23, 2011.
21. "COP Keating Investigation Findings
Released" . International Security
Assistance Force Afghanistan.
February 1, 2010. Archived from the
original on September 9, 2012.
Retrieved June 4, 2012.
22. "Taliban fighters display 'US
weapons' " . Al Jazeera. November
10, 2009. Archived from the original
on August 10, 2010. Retrieved
July 28, 2010.
23. "The Battle for COP Keating" .
American Legion's Burn Pit. October
7, 2009. Archived from the original
on July 10, 2010. Retrieved July 28,
2010.
24. Faiez, Rahim; Todd Pitman (October
6, 2009). "Afghan, US troops kill 40
militants in east" . CBS8. Associated
Press. Retrieved February 6, 2010.
25. Martinez, Luis (February 5, 2010).
"Camp Keating Officers Disciplined
 for Attack That Killed 8 U.S. Troops" .
ABC News. Archived from the
original on February 9, 2010.
Retrieved February 6, 2010.
26. Edwards, Jeff (March 23, 2016).
"Outnumbered and With Taliban
Overrunning the Base, Clinton
Romesha Was Awarded MoH at the
Battle of Kamdesh" . War History
Online. Retrieved March 30, 2018.
27. "The Battle for COP Keating" . The
American Legion. May 1, 2013.
Retrieved May 6, 2016.
28. "4th ID Soldier awarded
Distinguished Service Cross" .
 army.mil. December 17, 2018.
Retrieved December 17, 2018.
29. "Pilots receive Distinguished Flying
Cross for valor" . The Fort Campbell
Courier. Retrieved May 23, 2015.
30. "Airmen honored by college for
heroism in Afghanistan" . US Air
Force. Retrieved July 5, 2018.
31. "Army veteran Clinton Romesha
receives Medal of Honor for Afghan
fight" . Stars and Stripes. Retrieved
May 23, 2015.
32. "Obama awards Ty Carter Medal of
Honor for Afghan battle" . BBC
News. August 26, 2013.

References
Books

Tapper, Jake. The Outpost. New York:

Little, Brown and Company, 2012.
ISBN 978-0-316-18539-4
Romesha, Clinton. Red Platoon. New
York: Penguin Random House, 2016.
ISBN 978-0-525-95505-4

External links
The Taliban at COP Keating on
YouTube
COP Keating Report at
DefenseTech.org: After Action Report,
before and after photos, maps,
analysis
 Executive Summary - AR 15-6
Investigation re: Complex Attack on
COP Keating - 3 Oct 09 hosted at the
Long War Journal

Retrieved from
"https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Battle_of_Kamdesh&oldid=904953844"

Last edited 1 month ago by Fresco…

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