William LeMessurier was understandably proud of his structural design of the 1977

Citicorp building in downtown Manhattan. He had resolved a perplexing problem in a

very innovative way. A church had property rights to a corner of the block on which the
59-story building was to be constructed. LeMessurier proposed constructing the building
over the church, with four supporting columns located at the center of each side of the
building rather than in the four corners. The first floor began the equivalent of nine
stories above ground, thus allowing ample space for the church. LeMessurier used a
diagonal bracing design that transferred weight to the columns, and he added a tuned
mass damper with a 400-ton concrete block floating on oil bearings to reduce wind sway.
In June 1978, LeMessurier received a call from a student at a nearby university who said
his professor claimed the Citicorp building’s supporting columns should be on the
corners instead of midway between them. LeMessurier replied that the professor did not
understand the design problem, adding that the innovative design made it even more
resistant to quartering, or diagonal, winds. However, since the New York City building
codes required calculating the effects of only 90-degree winds, no one actually worked
out calculations for quartering winds. Then he decided that it would be instructive for his
own students to wrestle with the design problem.

This may have been prompted by not only the student’s call but also a discovery
LeMessurier had made just 1 month earlier. While consulting on a building project in
Pittsburgh, he called his home office to find out what it would cost to weld the joints of
diagonal girders similar to those in the Citicorp building. To his surprise, he learned that
the original specification for full-penetration welds was not followed. Instead, the joints
were bolted. However, since this still more than adequately satisfied the New York
building code requirements, LeMessurier was not concerned.

However, as he began to work on calculations for his class, LeMessurier recalled his
Pittsburgh discovery. He wondered what difference bolted joints might make to the
building’s ability to withstand quartering winds. To his dismay, LeMessurier determined
that a 40 percent stress increase in some areas of the structure would result in a 160
percent increase in stress on some of the building’s joints. This meant that the building
was vulnerable to total collapse if certain areas were subjected to a ‘‘16-year storm’’ (i.e.,
the sort of storm that could strike Manhattan once every 16 years). Meanwhile, hurricane
season was not far away. LeMessurier realized that reporting what he had learned could
place both his engineering reputation and the financial status of his firm at substantial
risk. Nevertheless, he acted quickly and decisively. He drew up a plan for correcting the
problem, estimated the cost and time needed for rectifying it, and immediately informed
Citicorp owners of what he had learned. Citicorp’s response was equally decisive.

LeMessurier’s proposed course of action was accepted and corrective steps were
immediately undertaken. As the repairs neared completion in early September, a
hurricane was reported moving up the coast in the direction of New York. Fortunately, it
moved harmlessly out over the Atlantic Ocean, but not without first causing considerable
anxiety among those working on the building, as well as those responsible for
implementing plans to evacuate the area should matters take a turn for the worse.
Problems faced:

 Nine-story stilts suspend the building over St. Peter’s church. But rather than
putting the stilts in the corners, they had to be located at the midpoint of each side
to avoid the church.
 Having stilts in the middle of each side made the building less stable, so
LeMessurier designed a chevron bracing structure rows of eight-story V’s that
served as the building’s skeleton.
 The chevron bracing structure made the building exceptionally light for a
skyscraper, so it would sway in the wind. LeMessurier added a tuned mass
damper, a 400-ton device that keeps the building stable.
 Escalating cost
 Design flaws
 Scheduling overruns

RELATION OF THE CASE TO THE ME CODES OF ETHICS

This case is related to chapter 7 of mechanical engineering code of ethics. The

concern for safety is a common one for engineers. How should engineers deal with issues
of safety and risk, especially when they involve possible liability for harm? In the Twin
Towers case, the risk was increased by the earlier weakening of building codes and the
use of new structural designs that were untested, even though the building codes required
such testing. This illustrates an important fact: Engineering necessarily involves risk, and
innovation usually increases the risks. One cannot avoid risk simply by remaining with
tried and true designs, but in- novation creates technologies in which the risks are not
fully understood, thereby increasing the chance of failure. Without innovation, there is no
progress. A bridge or building is constructed with new materials or with a new design.
New machines are created and new compounds synthesized, always without full
knowledge of their long-term effects on humans or the environment. Even new hazards
can be found in products, processes, and chemicals that were once thought to be safe.
Thus, risk is inherent in engineering.

The relationship of safety to risk is an inverse one. Because of the laws of engineering
science and statistics, the more we accept risk in an engineering project, the less safe it
will become. If there were absolutely no risk in a project, then that project would be
absolutely safe. So safety and risk are intimately connected. Concern for safety pervades
engineering practice. One of the most common concepts in engineer- ing practice is the
notion of ‘‘factors of safety.’’ If the largest load a walkway will have to carry at any one
time is 1,000 pounds, for example, then a prudent engineer might design the walkway
geometry to carry 3,000 pounds. The walkway dimensions for normal usage would then
be designed with a factor of safety of three on geometry.
Alternative solutions

1. Tuned mass damper

2. Chevron bracing structure rows of eight-story v. served as skeleton of the building

3. Welding and bolting all the connections

Quantitative analysis 1 2 3

Criteria:

Production output 5 4 3

Efficient materials 5 4 3

cost 3 4 5

Qualitative analysis

timeliness 3 4 5

Quality 5 4 3

efficiency 5 4 4

total 25 24 23

5-EXCELLENT

4-ABOVE AVERAGE

3-AVERAGE

2-BELOW AVERAGE

1-POOR

The best alternative is the tuned mass damper, a 400-ton device that will keep the
building stable
Recommendations for remedial actions with analysis

 The action that had to be taken was to immediately inform the citi group
corporation board of directors with the flaw in the design about the flaw in the
design and how dangerous it can be if no action takes place. Also, a solution for
the problem needs to be found as soon as possible so that the major effects in the
design can be retrieved otherwise a lot of people would be killed if a series of
strong enough winds hit the building. That is exactly what William lemessurier
has done. He stated that he had three options in mind whether to keep silent or
commit suicide or inform Citicorp and start working in solving the issue. He
chose the third option and saved many lives by taking this action which
considered to be a very brave action and will forever be remembered

 On August 3, 1978, LeMessurier and four associates met with Robertson and two
Citicorp employees that were charged with overseeing the repair work.
LeMessurier explained his proposed design, which included welding two inch
thick by six feet long gusset plates to more than 200 bolted connections. Citicorp
approved the proposed design provided that the necessary materials and labor
could be secured immediately. After some coaxing, Robertson was able to
persuade Karl Koch Erecting to undertake the work, even though they were
initially hesitant to do so because of commitments on other projects. Fortunately,
Koch had the material on hand and agreed to start work once LeMessurier’s office
issued drawings.

 In addition to pushing the work forward as quickly as possible, LeMessurier and

Robertson took several other critical steps to address the obvious safety concerns.
First, they arranged to have the manufacturer of the tuned mass damper provide
24-hour service to insure no technical problems would cause an interruption in
service. Second, they placed strain gauges on several structural members so that
the team could monitor the stresses imposed on the members. Finally, weather
experts and forecasters were retained to provide weather and wind predictions
four times each day.
UNIVERSITY OF PERPETUAL HELP SYSTEM-DALTA

Alabang-Zapote Road: Pamplona tres, Las Pinas City

Case no. 6

CITICORP

IGNACIO, Mon Feil V.

BSME-4

Mechanical Engineering Laws, Contracts and Ethics

October 19, 2016

Engr. Manuel P. Romero