In Re: Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988)

Facts:

Judge Rodolfo Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte

Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No.
856 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Farinas.
Among the functions of the Committee are: (1) receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found to have committed
abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action; (2) recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed
prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge may accept the designation.

Ruling:

No. It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform

administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation
and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or
such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that
membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,
which discharges an administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a
relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of
government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure.
As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of
Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when
such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.
Angara v. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 139

Facts:

In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner, Jose Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes. The petitioner took his oath of office thereafter.

The National Assembly passed a Resolution, confirming proclamation of Angara.

Ynsua filed before the respondent Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against
the election of petitioner, and praying that said respondent be declared elected member,
or that the election of said position be nullified. Meanwhile, on December 9, 1935, the
National Assembly, in a resolution, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by them.

Angara then filed a petition praying for the dismissal of Ynsua’s protest. He
alleged that Resolution no. 8 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its members should be presented. But said Motion to Dismiss was denied by
the Electoral Commission. Hence the present petition filed by petitioner seeking to
restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the
protest made by Ynsua against the election of said petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy.
Ruling:

Yes. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December
3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other
hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power
of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935,
then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533

Facts:

The private respondent was P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) for the accidental death of her husband, Vitaliano
Saco, in Japan who was an employee of Eastern Shipping Lines. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction
over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
POEA does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his
widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but
a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission.
The Supreme Court upheld the POEA decision and ruled that Vitaliano Saco was
within the definition of an overseas employee as provided by the 1985 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employment.
Meanwhile, the award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for
burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2,
which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard
contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of
Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
 The petitioner questioned the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contended that no authority had
been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Issue:

Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is
clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of
the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are
known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the
Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.

Casibang v. Aquino 92 SCRA 642

FACTS:

Respondent Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of

Rosales, Pangasinan. Petitioner Casubang, his only rival, filed a protest November 24,
1971 against the respondent, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2)
terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive
campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

The respondent Yu filed his answer and counter-protest which he withdrew after
waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes.

During the proceedings, the incumbent President of the Republic of the declared
for Martial Law and passed and approved the 1973 Constitution to supplant the 1935
Constitution. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the
ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a political complexion above and beyond the power
of judicial review.

RULING:

No. In the case at bar, it is held that the electoral protest case herein involved
has remained a justiciable controversy, wherein no political question exists nor is there
any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way
collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution.
The only issue in the electoral protest case is who between and was the duly elected
mayor. Moreover, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its
resolution by the Court, remains the same before and after the ratification and effectivity
of the New Constitution. Thus, the respondent court is immediately directed to proceed
with the trial and determination of the election protest.
Belgica etal. v. Ochoa etal., November 13, 2019

Facts:

On July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation is alleging that the

government has defrauded ₱10 Billion pesos through a syndicate using funds from the
pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
Six whistle-blowers declared that JLN Corporation of Janet Lim Napoles had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using more than 20 dummy
NGOs. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.
After the investigation, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging 5 lawmakers for Plunder, and three 3 other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of 3 implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged
that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project
off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power,
checks and balances, accountability, political dynasties, and local autonomy.

Ruling:

Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which

govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This
violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 PDAF article as well as all other provisions of
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

Sanidad v. Comelec 73 SCRA 333

Facts:

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers.

On September 22, 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the
previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The
President also issued PD 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The
Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos.
991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power
to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has
no legal basis.

Issue:

Whether the president have authority to propose amendments to the

Constitution.

Ruling:

In abnormal transition times, presidential exercise of legislative powers is a valid

act. The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent
assembly is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional
authority of the president to perform such act is in question. The president has the
authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally
concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the
referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the
questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the
proclamation of martial law.

Daza v. Singson 180 SCRA 496

Facts:
 The House of representative proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the
Commission on Appointments among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. On the basis of
this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the herein petitioner,
Raul A. Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. Consequently, the chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
herein petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.

In connection therewith, petitioner came to Supreme Court to challenge his

removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary
injunction, Supreme Court issued a Temporary restraining Order that same day to
prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointments.

Petitioner contended that he cannot be removed from the Commission on

Appointments because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not duly registered political party
and has not yet attained political stability.

Issue:

Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Held:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue
involved is not discretionary act of the House of the Representatives that may be
reviewed because it is political in nature. What is involved is the case is the legality, not
wisdom, of the act of the chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.

Even if the questions were political in nature, it would still come within its power
of review under the expanded jurisdiction by the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of lack of
jurisdiction had been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The Court preferred not to intervene on the matter beyond their jurisdiction which
is the wisdom of the act complained, leaving it to be settled by the House of the
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved.
But as to their authority, the petition was dismissed and the TRO was lifted. The Court
holds that the respondent had been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is titled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section
18 of the Constitution.

Abakada Guro Partylist v. Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, August 14, 2008

Facts:

This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005). RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation and capability and collection of the BIR and BOC. The law intends
to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

The petitioners invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters. The rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve
the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Petitioners also
claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee
on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of
the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the
creation of the congressional oversight committee.
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations
of the law is declared unconstitutional and therefore null and void.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its
alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law
may be considered moot and academic.