ALICIA REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. RAMILLO, JR.

, and
RICHARD UPTON, respondent.

139 SCRA 139, October 8, 1985

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera

Facts:

Petitioner, Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen, married Richard Upton, an American Citizen,
in Hong Kong in 1972. They established their residence in the Philippines and had two children.
However, on 1982 the couple were divorced in Nevada. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada to
Theodore Van Dorn.

On June 9, 1983, Richard Upton, herein respondent, filed a suit against the petitioner in the RTC
in Pasay City, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila (the Galleon Shop) is a conjugal
property of the parties and is asking the RTC to order petitioner to render an accounting of that
business and declare the right of the respondent to manage the conjugal property. The petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein the respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property.” The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue(s):

1. Whether or not the Philippines recognizes foreign divorce between an alien and a Filipino?
2. Whether or not Upton still has conjugal right over petitioner’s property in the Philippines?

Ruling:

1. Yes, Philippines Laws recognizes foreign divorce between a Filipino and an alien. Supreme
Court held that it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released respondent from the marriage to herein petitioner.
Thus pursuant to respondent’s national law, he is no longer the husband of petitioner. To maintain,
as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109 of the Civil code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to abide by the essential marital obligations to respondent
when he is not entitled to return the same. She should not be discriminated against her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.

2. No, he does not have right over petitioner’s property. The Supreme Court ruled that since
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner therefore he would have no standing to exercise
control over conjugal assets.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner vs. HON. CORORA IBAY-SOMERA,
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondent.

174 SCRA 653; G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

Ponente: Regalado, J.

Facts:

Petitioner, Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to herein private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Republic of Germany. The marriage
begot a daughter. After their child was born marital discord set in which followed a separation
between them. In January 15, 1986, Geiling secured a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, on June 27, 1986, private
respondent filed a complaint for adultery against petitioner and a certain William Chia. Same
complaint was filed against a certain James Chua.

Pilapil filed a motion to defer her arraignment and to suspend both criminal proceeding thereon.
Likewise petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition anchored on the ground
that the Court is without jurisdiction “to try and decide the character of the case” being that the
respondent is a foreigner and does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent has a legal standing to file a criminal complaint of adultery against
petitioner?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that since Erich was no longer the husband of Pilapil after having
obtained a divorce decree, he no longer had the legal standing to sue for adultery. Under Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as other crimes against chastity can
be prosecuted only upon the complaint of the offended spouse.
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs., HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

109 Phil 628
Ponente: Conception, J.

Facts:

Petitioner, Soledad Cagigas, a teacher in Sibonga Provincial High School, had a relationship with
respondent, Francisco Hermosisima who was ten (10) years younger than her. Intimacy developed
between the petitioner and respondent which resulted to the pregnancy of Cagigas. Upon informing
the respondent that she was with child, he promised to marry her. However respondent failed to
make good of his promise. Soledad gave birth to a daughter named Chris Hermosisima.

Petitioner filed a complaint of breach of promise against respondent and asked for financial support
from the latter. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the
respondent to pay not only alimony but also damages for breach of promise to marry. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court however it increased the amount of the
damages to be paid by the respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under Philippine laws, for breach of promise to
marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under Philippine laws, generally, the breach of promise to marry is
not actionable. The higher court ruled that the indication that there is seduction therein
contemplated by law and is a crime punished as such in Article 337 and 338 is not in attendant to
this case, being that the petitioner is ten years older than the respondent.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with the elimination of the award
for damages.