PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC. V.
FRENA
FACTS:
Defendant Frena operated a subscription bulletin
board service (BBS) that distributed pornographic
images. Once logged on a subscriber could browse
through different BBS directories to find images, and
subscribers could also download high-quality copies
of the images. Over 100 of the images that were
available on the BBS were copies of photos taken
from plaintiff's magazines. Frena claimed that the
photos had been uploaded to the system without his
knowledge, and claimed to have removed the
infringing photographs as soon as he learned that
they were copyrighted.
Playboy's trademarks were obliterated on some
photographs transmitted by Frena and Playboy's
"Playboy" and "Playmate" marks appeared on other
photographs transmitted by Frena.
RULING:
The court found Frena liable for direct copyright
infringement, even though he did not upload the
copyrighted image onto the bulletin board and was
unaware of the material being on the bulletin board
until after served with the summons in the case.[1]
Despite Frena’s purported lack of knowledge
regarding the copyright infringements occurring on
his BBS, the court held that Frena had directly
infringed Playboy’s copyrights in image taken from
the magazine.
——————————————————————
GAMMA AUDIO & VIDEO, INC. V. EAN-CHEA
FACTS:
Television Broadcast Ltd. or TVB is a producer of
Chinese language television programs and
videotapes including the two programs at bar, Jade
Fox and Hunters Prey, which were originally
broadcasted by TVB in Hong Kong. Through a series
of four recorded licensing agreements, Gamma
Audio and Video Inc. obtained three exclusive rights
with respect to TVB’s programs; (1) the right to dub
TVB’s videotapes into Cambodian, (2) to duplicate
the dubbed versions, and (3) to distribute them by
rental in thirty-seven states including
Massachusetts. However, no one registered the
copyrights in the derivative works created by
Gamma.
Meanwhile, Ean-Chea owns and operates two video
rental stores in Lowell, Massachusetts and became
the authorized distributor of the Cambodian versions
of TVB’s programs for Gamma’s predecessor.
Gamma commenced an action in the US District
Court against Ean-Chea with six causes of action
alleging violations of Copyrights Act and the Lanham
Act, with four state law claims: unfair competition,
conversion, tortious interference with advantageous
business relations, and a constructive trust. Gamma
alleged that Ean-Chea was behind a massive
pirating scheme, and requested million of dollars in
relief.
ISSUE:
Whether there is copyright infringement on the part
of the respondent for distributing Cambodian dubbed
videotapes of Jade Fox or not
HELD:
Yes. The judgment was entered in favor of Gamma
and held respondent Ean-Chea guilty for unlawfully
distributing two videotapes containing four episodes
of the Cambodian dubbed program, Jade Fox, a
popular Chinese soap opera. However, the court
reiterated that the program’s four episodes
constitute only one work for purposes of computing
statutory damages.
It is worthy of noting that there are two sets of
copyrights at issue here, the underlying work which
is the original Chinese language Jade Fox program
created by TVB, and the derivative work created by
Gamma which is the Cambodian dubbed version of
said program. It is undisputed that the copyrights in
Gamma’s derivative works are unregistered but this
fact do not affect the infringement of copyright in the
underlying work committed by Ean-Chea.
A derivative work is work based upon one or more
pre-existing works, such as translation, musical
arrangements, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represents an original work of
authorship, is a “derivative work”. 17 U.S.C. Sec 101
——————————————————————
GEOFFREY T. WILLIAMS V. MICHAEL
CRICHTON
FACTS: Williams created and published four original
copyrighted works of fiction for children:  (1)
Dinosaur World, published in 1985 (“Book I”);  (2)
Lost in Dinosaur World, published in 1987 (“Book
II”);  (3) Explorers in Dinosaur World, published in
1988 (“Book III”);  and (4) Saber Tooth:  A Dinosaur
World Adventure, published in 1988 (“Book IV”)
(together, “Dinosaur World books”). The books were
copyrighted by Williams. Each of the four books is
an adventure story for children that takes place in
“Dinosaur World,” described in Williams's brief as
“an imaginary present day man-made animal park
for dinosaurs and other pre-historic animals where
ordinary people․ can, in presumed safety, visit, tour
and observe the creatures in a natural but hi-tech
controlled habitat.” The focus of this case is on the
similarities between books II and III and the Jurassic
Park works.
Williams claims that the Appellees' novel and movie
Jurassic Park (together, the “Jurassic Park works”)
infringe upon children's stories that he authored and
copyrighted. Williams filed an action for copyright
infringement and for an accounting of profits.
ISSUE: WON Williams’ claim of copyright
infringement should prosper.
RULING: Williams's works and the Appellees' works
were not substantially similar.
To establish copyright infringement, “two elements
must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright,
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work
that are original.” The parties do not dispute that
Williams obtained valid copyrights in the Dinosaur
World books. Therefore, in order to prevail,
Williams must show that the Appellees copied the
Dinosaur World books. In the absence of direct
evidence, copying is proven by showing “(a) that the
defendant had access to the copyrighted work and
(b) the substantial similarity of protectible material in
the two works.”
Appellees have conceded that they had access to
Williams's books. This case thus turns upon the
second part of the test:  whether, in the eyes of the
average lay observer, the Jurassic Park works are
substantially similar to the protectible expression in
the Dinosaur World books. Having reviewed both
parties' works in detail, we find that nearly all the
similarities between the works arise from
noncopyrightable elements.
Consideration of the total concept and feel of a work,
rather than specific inquiry into plot and character
development, is especially appropriate in an
infringement action involving children's works,
because children's works are often less complex
than those aimed at an adult audience.
Here, the total concept and feel of the two works
differ substantially. The Jurassic Park works are
high-tech horror stories with villainous characters
and gruesome bloodshed. Books II and III of the
Dinosaur World series, by contrast, are adventure
stories and, although suspenseful in places, have
happy endings. The threats and danger in Books
II and III do not arise because of the evils of humans;
rather, the threats exist because of the wild nature of
dinosaurs and are intended to educate children
about the behavior of these now-extinct creatures.
The total concept and feel of the Jurassic Park works
are of a world out of control, while Williams's
Dinosaur World is well under control.
——————————————————————
MAI SYSTEMS V. PEAK COMPUTER INC.
FACTS: MAI Systems Corp. manufactured
computers and designed software to run those
computers. MAI software includes operating system
software, which is necessary to run any other
program on the computer.
Peak Computer, Inc. is a computer maintenance
company organized in 1990. It maintained computer
systems for MAI by performing routine maintenance
and emergency repairs. When providing
maintenance or making emergency repairs, Peak
booted the MAI Systems computer, causing the MAI
operating system to be loaded from the hard disk
into RAM. MAI also alleged that Peak ran MAI's
diagnostic software during Peak's service calls.
MAI filed a suit against Peak. MAI contended that
Peak's use of the MAI operating system constituted
copyright infringement. MAI argued that the license
agreement which permitted an end user to make a
copy of the program for their own use did not extend
to Peak because Peak was not the licensee and
therefore had no rights under the license agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Peak was liable for copyright
infringement.
RULING: YES. MAI software licenses allow MAI
customers to use the software for their own internal
information processing. This allowed use
necessarily includes the loading of the software into
the computer's random access memory ("RAM") by
a MAI customer. However, MAI software licenses do
not allow for the use or copying of MAI software by
third parties such as Peak. Therefore, any "copying"
done by Peak is "beyond the scope" of the license.
The Copyright Act defines "copies" as: material
objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
A "copying", for purposes of copyright law, occurs
when a computer program is transferred from a
permanent storage device to a computer's RAM.
The loading of copyrighted computer software from
a storage medium (hard disk, floppy disk, or read
only memory) into the memory of a central
processing unit ("CPU") causes a copy to be made.
In the absence of ownership of the copyright or
express permission by license, such acts constitute
copyright infringement.
Peak Computer Inc. services and maintains MAI
customers’ computers which includes emergency
repairs. Peak technicians run the operating system
of the computer to view the systems error logs
thereby enabling the technicians to diagnose the
problem. This constitutes copying of the software
program - which is a violation of the MIA’s copyright.
——————————————————————
FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS AUTHORS
& PUBLISHERS, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE HOME
CABLE HOLDINGS, INC.,
FACTS: Sometime from 1997-1998, Philippine
Home Cable Holdings, Inc. (Home Cable), a
domestic corporation engaged primarily in the
business of installing, operating and maintaining a
Community Antennae Television System (CATV), or
otherwise more commonly known as "Cable TV,"
was carrying a couple of karaoke channels which
played Filipino and English songs.
Noticing that the songs being played in the
said karaoke channels were being used without prior
authorization from their copyright owners, the
plaintiff-appellee Filipino Society of Composers
Authors and Publishers (FILSCAP), a non-stock and
non-profit association of Filipino composers, authors
and publishers, which includes amongst its
members several noted Filipino composers/authors
such as Jim Paredes, Jose Mari Chan and George
Canseco, just to name a few, wrote a series of letters
advising Home Cable to procure a music license, but
this remained unheeded.
As a result, on February 16, 1998, FILSCAP
filed a Complaint against Home Cable for copyright
infringement before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. In the said complaint, FILSCAP
essentially alleged that Home Cable infringed the
copyright of certain musical works that were in its
repertoire when the latter used the same without the
former's authority or consent.
RTC ruled in favor of FILSCAP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding
that the defendant-appellant cable TV company was
liable for copyright infringement when certain
music/songs belonging to the plaintiff-appellee's
repertoire were shown/played in the former's
karaoke channels?
HELD: NO.In the present case, these rights are
granted by Republic Act No. 8293, specifically,
Section 177 thereof which provides the copy or
economic rights (copyright and economic right are
used interchangeably in the statute) consisting of the
exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent the
following acts:
177.1 Reproduction of the work or substantial
portion of the work;
177.2 Dramatization, translation, adaptation,
abridgment, arrangement or other transformation of
the work;
177.3 The first public distribution of the original and
each copy of the work by sale or other forms of
transfer of ownership;
177.4 Rental of the original or a copy of an
audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work
embodied in a sound recording, a computer
program, a compilation of data and other materials
or a musical work in graphic form, irrespective of the
ownership of the original or the copy which is the
subject of the rental;
177.5 Public display of the original or a copy of the
work;
177.6 Public performance of the work; and
177.7 Other communication to the public of the work.
The execution, therefore, of any one or more
of these exclusive rights conferred by RA 8293 on a
copyright owner, without his consent, constitutes
copyright infringement. In essence, copyright
infringement, is a trespass on a private domain
owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright,
and, therefore, protected by law, consisting in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to
do is conferred by statute on the owner of the
copyright (Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. CA, 329 Phil.
875 [1996]). With the invasion of his property rights,
a copyright owner is naturally entitled to seek
redress, enforce and hold accountable the defrauder
or usurper of said economic rights.
While it is true that CATV operators, such as
the defendant- appellant, generally merely receive
programs and retransmit them by private channels
to additional viewers, the act of retransmitting or
importing these programs to a new and different
market, to the mind of the Court, constitutes public
performance of the copyrighted work by other means
of communication falling under Section 177.7 of RA
8293. This is because a CATV operator that erects
an antenna to pick up telecasts from Area A, B and
C, then transmits them by cable to Area D for a fee
is essentially reproducing the copyrighted work and
distributing the same to a wider audience. Thus, this
reproduction of copyrighted work without any
authorization from the owner of the copyright
constitutes infringement.
——————————————————————
FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS,
AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, INC. (FILSCAP) v.
BENJAMIN TAN
FILSCAP:
- Is the owner of certain musical compositions
among which are the songs entitled: "Dahil SaIyo",
"Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin," "Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao
Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You."
- Filed a complaint with the lower court for
infringement of copyright against defendant-
appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-
appellee's restaurant of said songs copyrighted in
the name of the former.
Benjamin Tan:
- Countered that the complaint states no cause of
action. While not denying the playing of said
copyrighted compositions in his establishment,
appellee maintains that the mere singing and playing
of songs and popular tunes even if they are
copyrighted do not constitute an infringement under
the provisions of Section 3 of the Copyright Law.
ISSUE: whether or not the playing and signing of
musical compositions which have been copyrighted
under the provisions of the Copyright Law (Act 3134)
inside the establishment of the defendant-appellee
constitute a public performance for profit within the
meaning and contemplation of the Copyright Law of
the Philippines; and assuming that there were
indeed public performances for profit, whether or not
appellee can be held liable therefor.
HELD: NO
It has been held that "The playing of music in dine
and dance establishment which was paid for by the
public in purchases of food and drink constituted
"performance for profit" within a Copyright Law."
Thus, it has been explained that while it is possible
in such establishments for the patrons to purchase
their food and drinks and at the same time dance to
the music of the orchestra, the music is furnished
and used by the orchestra for the purpose of
inducing the public to patronize the establishment
and pay for the entertainment in the purchase of food
and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of
business for profit, and it is public; andt he music is
performed for profit.
Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have
infringed upon the Copyright Law. Appellee's
allegation that the composers of the contested
musical compositions waived their right in favor of
the general public when they allowed their
intellectual creations to become property of the
public domain before applying for the corresponding
copyrights for the same is correct.
The Supreme Court has ruled that "Paragraph 33 of
Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3(as
amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled
'Rules of Practice in the Philippines Patent Office
relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims'
promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides
among other things that an intellectual creation
should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its
publication, if made in Manila, or within the (60) days
if made elsewhere, failure of which renders such
creation public property." Indeed, if the general
public has made use of the object sought to be
copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright
application the law deems the object to have been
donated to the public domain and the same can no
longer be copyrighted. Under the circumstances, it is
clear that the musical compositions in question had
long become public property, and are therefore
beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
——————————————————————
PACITA HABANA, ALICIA CINCO AND JOVITA
FERNANDO VS. FELICIDAD ROBLES AND
GOODWILL TRADING, CO. INC.
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioners are authors and
copyright owners of a published work entitled
College English for Today. Respondents on the
other hand are the author/publisher and
distributor/seller of another published work entitled
Developing English Proficiency.
Petitioners by chance came upon the book of
respondent Robles and were surprised to see that
the book was strikingly similar to the contents,
scheme of presentation, illustrations and illustrative
examples in their own book.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for
infringement and/or unfair competition with
damages. It was alleged that Robles without
authority or consent of petitioners and
misrepresentations of respondent Robles that the
book was her original work and concept which
adversely affect and substantially diminished the
sale of petitioners’ book and caused them actual
damages by way of unrealized income.
Respondent filed her answer and denied the
allegations of plagiarism and copying; she further
stressed that DEP is the product of her independent
researches, studies and experiences, and was not a
copy of any existing valid copyrighted book and that
the similarities may be due to the authors’ exercise
of the “right to fair use of copyrighted materials, as
guides.”
Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents. CA
affirmed the decision ruling that similarity of the
allegedly infringed work to the author's or
proprietor's copyrighted work does not of itself
establish copyright infringement, especially if the
similarity results from the fact that both works deal
with the same subject or have the same common
source, as in this case.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT, DESPITE THE
APPARENT TEXTUAL, THEMATIC AND
SEQUENTIAL SIMILARITY BETWEEN DEP
AND CET, RESPONDENTS COMMITTED
NO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT;
2. AS TO WHAT EXTENT CAN COPYING BE
INJURIOUS TO THE AUTHOR OF THE
BOOK BEING COPIED?
RULING:
1. There is copyright infringement. A perusal
of the records yields several pages of the book
DEP that are similar if not identical with the text
of CET.
Respondents act of lifting from the book of
petitioners’ substantial portions of discussions and
examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same
in her book is an infringement of petitioners’
copyrights.
There is substantial reproduction of a book
when if so much is taken that the value of the original
work is substantially diminished, there is an
infringement of copyright and to an injurious extent,
and the work is appropriated.
In determining the question of infringement,
the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted
work is an important consideration. To constitute
infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or
even a large portion of the work shall have been
copied. If so much is taken that the value of the
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the
original author are substantially and to an injurious
extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in
point of law to constitute piracy.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be
essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore
its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private
domain owned and occupied by the owner of the
copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and
infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the
doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to
do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the
copyright.
2. In cases of infringement, copying alone is
not what is prohibited. The copying must produce an
"injurious effect". Here, the injury consists in that
respondent Robles lifted from petitioners' book
materials that were the result of the latter's research
work and compilation and misrepresented them as
her own. She circulated the book DEP for
commercial use did not acknowledged petitioners as
her source.
Hence, there is a clear case of appropriation of
copyrighted work for her benefit that respondent
Robles committed. Petitioners' work as authors is
the product of their long and assiduous research and
for another to represent it as her own is injury
enough. In copyrighting books the purpose is to give
protection to the intellectual product of an author.
This is precisely what the law on copyright protected,
under Section 184.1 (b). Quotations from a
published work if they are compatible with fair use
and only to the extent justified by the purpose,
including quotations from newspaper articles and
periodicals in the form of press summaries are
allowed provided that the source and the name of
the author, if appearing on the work, are mentioned.
In the case at bar, the least that respondent Robles
could have done was to acknowledge petitioners
Habana et. al. as the source of the portions of DEP.
The final product of an author's toil is her book. To
allow another to copy the book without appropriate
acknowledgment is injury enough.
——————————————————————
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF
PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
FACTS: The case is to seek reconsideration of the
decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that
dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of
cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice
Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision
he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled
Vinuya v. Romulo.
On July 19, 2010, Attys. Harry Roque and
Rommel Bagares, counsels for petitioners Vinuya, et
al., filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
raising, among others, the plagiarism allegedly
committed by Justice del Castillo for using the works
of three foreign legal authors in his ponencia. They
alleged that the use was without proper attribution
and that Justice del Castillo twisted the foreign
authors’ works to support the Decision. They
considered it "highly improper for x x x the Court x x
x to wholly lift, without proper attribution, from at
least three sources – an article published in 2009 in
the Yale Law Journal of International Law, a book
published by the Cambridge University Press in
2005, and an article published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law – and to make
it appear that these sources support the assailed
Judgment’s arguments for dismissing their petition,
when in truth, the plagiarized sources even make a
strong case for the Petition’s claims.
ISSUE: Whether or not Justice Mariano Del
Castillo is guilty of plagiarism.
HELD: No. Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute,
has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize,
says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own"
the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies
malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary, the world’s
leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in
its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate
and knowing presentation of another person's
original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own."
The presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s
own must be deliberate or premeditated—a taking
with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the
world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism
errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Decisions of courts are not written to earn
merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of work
or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the
government for the public good. Judges issue
decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving
people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy
justice or juridical beings which have rights and
obligations in law that need to be protected. The
interest of society in written decisions is not that they
are originally crafted but that they are fair and correct
in the context of the particular disputes involved.
Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object
of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of
whatever level of courts, including the Supreme
Court, not to use original or unique language when
reinstating the laws involved in the cases they
decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are
written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare
decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are
applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine,
Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb
settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all
future cases, where facts are substantially the same;
regardless of whether the parties or property are the
same."
——————————————————————
RAPPLER, INC. vs. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA
FACTS: On 21 September 2015, Andres D,
Bautista called for a meeting with various media
outlets to discuss the "Pilipinas 2016 Debates,"
for presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
which the COMELEC was organizing. Respondent
showed a presentation explaining the framework
of the debates, in which there will be three
presidential debates and one vice presidential
debate. Respondent proposed that petitioner and
Google, Inc. be in charge of online and social
media engagement.
Thereafter, petitioner sent a proposed draft
for broadcast pool guidelines to COMELEC and
the KBP, KBP informed petitioner that the
proposal will be discussed in the next meeting.
KBP informed petitioner that the proposal will be
discussed in the next meeting.
Petitioner communicated with respondent
its concerns regarding certain provisions of the
MOA particularly regarding online streaming and
the imposition of a maximum limit of two minutes
of debate excerpts for news reporting.
Respondent assured petitioner that its concerns
will be addressed afterwards, but it has to sign
the MOA because time was of the essence. The
petitioner along with other mdeia outlet executed a
signed MOA.
Petitioner alleged that it made several
communications with respondent and the
COMELEC Commissioners regarding its concerns
on some of the MOA provisions, but petitioner
received no response. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to
live stream the debates.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's demand to exercise the
right to live stream the debates is a contractual
right of petitioner under the MOA. Under Part VI
(C), paragraph 19 of the MOA, the Lead
Networks are expressly mandated to "allow the
debates they have produced to be shown or
streamed on other websites," but "subject to
copyright conditions or separate negotiations with
the Lead Networks." The use of the word "or"
means that compliance with the "copyright
conditions" is sufficient for petitioner to exercise
its right to live stream the debates in its website.
The "copyright conditions" refer to the limitations
on copyright as provided under Section 184.1 (c)
of the Intellectual Property Code (IPC), thus:
SEC. 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184. l
Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the
following acts shall not constitute infringement of
copyright:
(c) The reproduction or communication to the
public by mass media of articles on current
political, social, economic, scientific or religious
topic, lectures, addresses and other works of the
same nature, which are delivered in public if
such use is for information purposes and has not
been expressly reserved; Provided, That the
source is clearly indicated; (Sec. 11, P.D. No.
49) (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Under this provision, the debates fall under
"addresses and other works of the same nature."
Thus, the copyright conditions for the debates
are: (1) the reproduction or communication to the
public by mass media of the debates is for
information purposes; (2) the debates have not
been expressly reserved by the Lead Networks
(copyright holders); and (3) the source is clearly
indicated.
——————————————————————
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, vs.
PHILIPPINE MULTI-MEDIA SYSTEM, INC.,
CESAR G. REYES, FRANCIS CHUA (ANG BIAO),
MANUEL F. ABELLADA, RAUL B. DE MESA, AND
ALOYSIUS M. COLAYCO
FACTS: PMSI was granted a legislative franchise
under Republic Act No. 86305 on May 7, 1998
and was given a Provisional Authority by the
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
on February 1, 2000 to install, operate and
maintain a nationwide DTH satellite service.
When it commenced operations, it offered as
part of its program line-up ABS-CBN Channels 2
and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC Channel 5, GMA
Channel 7, RPN Channel 9, and IBC Channel
13, together with other paid premium program
channels.
However, on April 25, 2001, ABS-CBN
demanded for PMSI to cease and desist from
rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. On April 27,
2001, PMSI replied that the rebroadcasting was
in accordance with the authority granted it by
NTC and its obligation under NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 4-08-88, Section 6.2 of which
requires all cable television system operators
operating in a community within Grade “A” or
“B” contours to carry the television signals of the
authorized television broadcast stations.
On May 13, 2002, ABS-CBN filed with
the IPO a complaint for “Violation of Laws
Involving Property Rights, with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” which was
docketed as IPV No. 10-2002-0004. It alleged
that PMSI’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of
Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting
rights and copyright.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s broadcasting
rights and copyright are infringed.
HELD: NO. The Director-General of the IPO
correctly found that PMSI is not engaged in
rebroadcasting and thus cannot be considered to
have infringed ABS-CBN’s broadcasting rights
and copyright, thus:
“That the Appellant’s [herein respondent PMSI]
subscribers are able to view Appellee’s [herein
petitioner ABS-CBN] programs (Channels 2 and
23) at the same time that the latter is
broadcasting the same is undisputed. The
question however is, would the Appellant in doing
so be considered engaged in broadcasting.
Section 202.7 of the IP Code states that
broadcasting means “the transmission by wireless
means for the public reception of sounds or of
images or of representations thereof; such
transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’
where the means for decrypting are provided to
the public by the broadcasting organization or
with its consent.”
Section 202.7 of the IP Code, thus, provides two
instances wherein there is broadcasting, to wit:
1. The transmission by wireless means for the
public reception of sounds or of images or of
representations thereof; and
2. The transmission by satellite for the public
reception of sounds or of images or of
representations thereof where the means for
decrypting are provided to the public by the
broadcasting organization or with its consent.
It is under the second category that
Appellant’s DTH satellite television service must
be examined since it is satellite based. The
elements of such category are as follows:
1. There is transmission of sounds or images
or of representations thereof;
2. The transmission is through satellite;
3. The transmission is for public reception; and
4. The means for decrypting are provided to
the public by the broadcasting organization or
with its consent.
While the Rome Convention gives
broadcasting organizations the right to authorize
or prohibit the rebroadcasting of its broadcast,
however, this protection does not extend to cable
retransmission. — While the Rome Convention
gives broadcasting organizations the right to
authorize or prohibit the rebroadcasting of its
broadcast, however, this protection does not
extend to cable retransmission. The
retransmission of ABS-CBN’s signals by PMSI —
which functions essentially as a cable television—
does not therefore constitute rebroadcasting in
violation of the former’s intellectual property rights
under the IP Code. It must be emphasized that
the law on copyright is not absolute. The IP
Code provides that: Sec. 184. Limitations on
Copyright. — 184.1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Chapter V, the following acts shall
not constitute infringement of copyright: x x x x
(h) The use made of a work by or under the
direction or control of the Government, by the
National Library or by educational, scientific or
professional institutions where such use is in the
public interest and is compatible with fair use.
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SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA ET AL. v.
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., ET AL.
FACTS:
Respondents Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt
Disney Productions produce and hold the copyrights
on a substantial number of motion pictures and other
audiovisual works. Petitioner Sony manufactures
Betamax video tape recorders (VTR's) and markets
these devices through numerous retail
establishments. Upon surveys, it showed that the
primary use of the machine for most owners was
"time-shifting" -- the practice of recording a program
to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing
it. Time-shifting enables viewers to see programs
they otherwise would miss.
Respondents commenced an action alleging
petitioners were liable for the copyright infringement
allegedly committed by Betamax consumers
because of petitioners' marketing of the Betamax
VTR's. Respondents sought no relief against any
Betamax consumer and, instead, sought money
damages and an equitable accounting of profits from
petitioners, as well as an injunction against the
manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's.
The District Court denied respondents all the relief
they sought. The Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment, holding petitioners liable for contributory
infringement.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner should be liable for
contributory infringement.
RULING: NO
The respondents invoke the ruling, in Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers. The court ruled that the producer in
Kalem case did not merely provide the "means" to
accomplish an infringing activity; the producer
supplied the work itself. Sony, in the instant case,
does not supply with respondents' works; the
respondents do. Sony merely supplies a piece of
equipment capable of copying the programs that
may be televised.
Further, the sale of copying equipment does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. In the instant case, the machine’s
capability for extensive non-infringing use, such as
the taping of non-copyrighted works (news, religious,
educational broadcast, etc.) was proven. As it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses,
the court ruled that Sony is not liable for contributory
infringement.
The court also found that many important producers
find nothing objectionable from the practice of time-
shifting for private home use. The business of
supplying the equipment should not be stifled simply
because the equipment is used by individuals to
make unauthorized reproductions of respondents'
works. A finding of contributory infringement would
frustrate the interests of the broadcasters in reaching
their audience. In an action for contributory
infringement, the copyright holder may not prevail
unless the relief he seeks affects only his programs,
or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders
with interest in the outcome.
Moreover, an unlicensed use of the copyright is not
an infringement unless it conflicts with rights
conferred by the copyright statute. The legislative
endorsement of the doctrine of "fair use" identifies
various factors that enable a court to apply an
"equitable rule of reason" analysis to particular
claims of infringement.
1. The purpose and character of the use,
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
a non-profit character of an activity. The District
Court emphasized the fact that the material was
broadcast free to the public at large, the
noncommercial character of the use, and the private
character of the activity conducted entirely within the
home. The time-shifting also has the capability to
enlarge the total viewing audience of the programs
and Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that
substantial numbers of copyright holders who
license their works for broadcast on free television
would not object to having their broadcasts time-
shifted by private viewers.
2. The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Respondents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting
would cause any likelihood of nonminimal harm to
the potential market for, or the value of, their
copyrighted works. The District Court restated, "Most
of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on speculation
about audience viewing patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which was called as `black art'
because of the significant level of imprecision
involved in the calculations.”
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SEGA ENTERPRISES V. ACCOLADE, INC.
FACTS: Sega Enterprises, Inc. manufactured video
game consoles and licensed the rights to third-party
video game developers to make games for their
consoles. Those licensees develop and sell
Genesis-compatible video games in competition
with Sega.
Accolade, Inc. wanted to sell their games for the
Sega console but did not want to pay Sega’s
licensing fees. In order to make its own games
compatible with Sega’s console, Accolade “reverse
engineered” Sega’s video game programs to
discover the requirements for compatibility with the
console. In order to do this, it first copied Sega’s
copyright code in its entirety and then disassembled
it to see how it worked.
Sega sued for copyright infringement for copying the
code on their computer chips. Accolade argued that
they had never actually copied any of the computer
code on Sega’s chips, they just copied the
specifications for how to write the software.
Accolade argued that they were protected by the fair
use provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Accolade’s decompilation of
Sega’s object code constitutes “fair use”.
RULING: YES. The disassembly of a copyrighted
object code is a fair use of the material if it is the only
way to access uncopyrighted elements of the code
and there is a legitimate reason for seeking to do so.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 lists four
factors to be considered in determining whether a
certain use is a fair one: (1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
market for the copyrighted work.
First, while Accolade ultimate intended to make
money-selling video games, the direct purpose in
copying Sega's code was simply to study the
functional requirements of the console's
compatibility. In addition, Accolade's work helped
the public because many companies started using
their information to make exciting, creative video
games.
Second, Sega’s video game programs must be
afforded a lower degree of protection than more
traditional literary works as they contain unprotected
aspects that cannot be examined without copying.
The Court noted that if someone could not look at
the code to see the uncopyrighted parts, then Sega
would have a de facto monopoly over those ideas
and functional concepts. That result defeats the
fundamental purpose of the Copyright Act — to
encourage the production of original works by
protecting the expressive elements of those works
while leaving the ideas, facts, and functional
concepts in the public domain for others to build on.
Third, the fact that Accolade disassembled entire
programs written by Sega should receive little
weight. There was no other way Accolade could
have learned about the functionality of the console
without copying as much as they did copy. While
they did copy the entire code, that did not mean
much because the final product (the video games)
did not contain any infringing material.
Fourth, Accolade’s copying may have affected the
market, but not significantly, as customers tend to
buy many video games, not just one. Accolade's
work did not stop people from buying Sega's video
games.
——————————————————————
METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS INC., ET
AL. VS. GROKSTER, LTD., ET AL.
Facts:
Grokster and other companies distributed free
software that allowed computer users to share
electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In
such networks, users can share digital files directly
between their computers, without the use of a central
server. Users employed the software primarily to
download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the
software companies knew about and encouraged.
The companies profited from advertising revenue,
since they streamed ads to the software users. A
group of movie studios and other copyright holders
sued and alleged that Grokster and the other
companies violated the Copyright Act by
intentionally distributing software to enable users to
infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled
for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution
companies were not liable for copyright violations
stemming from their software, which could have
been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issue: Were companies that distributed file-sharing
software, and encouraged and profited from direct
copyright infringement using such software, liable for
the infringement?
Ruling:
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
David Souter, the Court held that companies that
distributed software, and promoted that software to
infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts
of infringement. The Court argued that although the
Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable
for another's infringement, secondary liability
doctrines applied here. The software in this case
was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it
would have been immensely difficult to deal with
each individual infringer. The "only practical
alternative" was to go against the software
distributor for secondary liability. Here the software
companies were liable for encouraging and profiting
from direct infringement.
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