accordance with the law of New York.
In the absence of
Rule 77
01 SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
G.R. No. 76714 | June 2, 1994 | QUIASON, J.
TOPIC: Requisites for reprobate
DOCTRINE/S:
● With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an ‘original will’ or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time and accordingly
must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice to the known
heirs,legatees and devisees, and to the executor, if he is
not the petitioner.
● The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance
of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the
will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in
such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills
FACTS:
● Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a
successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The
Cunanans lived in the US with their children, Jocelyn,
Jacqueline, and Josephine.
● Each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event
that it is not known which one of the spouses died first,
the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his
wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that
gutted their home.
● Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for
the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the
County of Onondaga, New York. These two wills were
admitted to probate and letters testamentary were
issued in his favor.
● Petitioner Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn
P. Cunanan, filed with RTC Malolos a petition for the
reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate
proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be
appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the
deceased couple.
● However, notice to the heirs of Dr. Jose Cunanan was
not given.
● RTC denied reprobate of the two wills, ruling that
petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no
way of telling whether the wills were executed in
1
such evidence, the presumption is that the law of
succession of the foreign country is the same as the law
of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were
only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that
the wills were not signed on each and every page, a
requirement of the Philippine law.
● Petitioner then filed a motion to allow her to present
further evidence on the foreign law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the
reprobate of the two wills. YES
HELD:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of
the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the
Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are
as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the
foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that
the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted
all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws
upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party
(Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate
of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of
an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices,
the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the
first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or
personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he
is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and
place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of
the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to
be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent
Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to
submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and
sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies
of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
02 IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO
APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 169144., January 26, 2011 – Second Division, ABAD
TOPIC: Rule 77; Reprobate
DOCTRINE/S:
● reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent
court.
● In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as
binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
2
EMERGENCY RECIT: Ruperta executed a will in California, and
is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. She
died single and childless. Ruperta’s brother, Ernesto filed for
the probate of her will in Bulacan but was opposed by her
nephews Manuel and Benjamin claiming that the will should
first be probated in the place of execution, which is California.
The RTC and CA held that the probate was proper. Philippine
laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. It is
different from reprobate which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate
court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
FACTS:
1. On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a
Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.)
citizen, died single and childless. She left properties in
the Philippines and in the U.S.
2. In California, Ruperta executed her will and designated
her brother Sergio as executor.
3. On May 19, 2003, Ruperta’s brother, Ernesto filed with
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of
Ruperta’s will and his appointment as special
administrator.
4. However, nephews of Ruperta namely, Manuel and
Benjamin opposed stating that the will should be
probated first in the U.S. where she executed it.
5. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s
will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under duress and
without the testator’s full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also
not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
6. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria
Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the
Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition,
which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the
parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in
and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
7. RTC ruled: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator
at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of
Special Administration to Ernesto.
8. Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the CA which affirmed
the RTC ruling that held the probate was proper. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
does not require prior probate and allowance of the will
in the country of its execution, before it can be probated
in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is
different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
 probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by
different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the
decision, Manuel and Benjamin appealed to SC
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Ruperta’s will should be
probated first in California (place of execution) before being
probated in the Philippines – NO.
HELD: Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as
yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if
made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an
estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor,
devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of
the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.
findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction
over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically. If the
instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the
probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of
their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the will has been
proved and allowed by the proper court.
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing
more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance
of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the
meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator
of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the
due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at
the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities
required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the
trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly
authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will and the certified copies
of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
PETITION IS DENIED.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance
of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c)
the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and
probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first

probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure
for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated
and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before
a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’
stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a
will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the

3

Rule 78
03 Ventura vs Ventura
GR NO. L-263-6| April 27, 1988 | Paras
TOPIC: Rule 78, Order of preference
DOCTRINE/S:
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted to:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or
next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or
(b) to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
ISSUE/S:
As between the surviving spouse, legitimate children, and
illegitimate children, to whom should letter of
administration be issued?
HELD:
Sec. 6, rule 78 of the ROC provides that it should be issued to
the surviving spouse, the next of kin or both. In the case at
bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura (legitimate children) and Maria and Miguel
Ventura (illegitimate children).
It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in
the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of
administrator.'Among members of a class the strongest
ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of
interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be
preferred.'"

Testator, Gregorio Ventura, named and appointed as
executrix his illegitimate daughter, Maria Ventura. However,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, the legitimate children of
the deceased were preterited in the will. The lower court,
upon motion of the legitimate children, remived Maria as
executrix and it was found out that she has squandered the
funds of the estate, inefficient and incompetent. She also
failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of
presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected
to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, decided to remove
her as executrix.
Ruling on the issue as to who should be issued letter of
administration, the court relied on Sec. 6, rule 78 of the ROC
(the surviving spouse, next of kin or both). In the case at bar,
the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is
Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura (legitimate children) and Maria and Miguel
Ventura (illegitimate children).
FACTS:
Dispositive portion of the decision:
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme
Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio
Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided
in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed
administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana
Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
PETITION, DIMISSED.

1. On December 1953, Gregorio Ventura file a petition

for probate of his will, naming Maria, his illegitimate
child as executrix and excluding his legitimate
children (Mercedes and Gregoria).
2. The will was admitted to probate and upon the
death of Gregorio, Maria was appointed as executrix.
3. Maria submitted an inventory of the estate but the
same was opposed by the legitimate children on the
ground that the said inventory does not reflect the
true income of the estate.
4. Having found that Maria had squandered the funds
of the estate, the court removed her from her office
as executrix.

4

Rule 79
04 Pedro De Guzman v. Hon. Judge Angeles, Deputy
Sheriffs Flora and Santos, and Elaine G. De Guzman
G.R. No. 78590, June 20, 1988, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
TOPIC: Rule 79; Notice required
DOCTRINE/S:
Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an
interest in the estate of the deceased person, the proceeding
for the settlement of the estate is void and should be
annulled. The requirement as to notice is essential to the
validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Elaine De Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman,
her husband. She filed a motion for writ of possession over 5
vehicles which were allegedly the conjugal properties of the
de Guzmans but were in the possession of her father-in-law,
Pedro. This was granted and set for hearing on May 27 and
sheriff was ofdered to notify Pedro de Guzman. The next day,
Elaine filed her ex-parte motion to appoint herself as special
administratrix of the estate of Manolito which was GRANTED
by the lower court and hearing was set on June 5. Again,
court ordered all interest parties to be notified, however
Pedro was not notified. RTC appointed Elaine as special
administratrix and issued another order on June 8, 1987,
acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance filed by
Elaine for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Santos and Flora
together with some military men and/or policemen to assist
her in preserving the estate of Manolito. They tried to
enforce said order but were met with opposition. Issue is
whether probate court act/grant motions even before the
court has caused notice to be served upon all interested
parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The SC ruled in the negative. While the court had
jurisdiction upon filing of the petition for settlement of
estate, RTC did not have jurisdiction over the persons who
are interested in the settlement of the estate. Notice through
publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which
makes court orders, affecting other persons, subsequent to
the petition, void and subject to annulment. Here, no notice
as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it
acted on the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in
5
the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman. The petitioner as
creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
preservation of the estate as the private respondent who
happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman.
Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
Guzman, before the RTC
2. The petition alleges that:
a. on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in
Makati, Metro Manila; at the time of his death,
the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro
Manila; decedent left personal and real
properties as part of his estate the properties
were acquired after the marriage of the
petitioner to the decedent and therefore are
included in their conjugal partnership; the
estate of the decedent has a probable net value
which may be provisionally assessed at P4M
more or less;
b. the possible creditors of the estate, who have
accounts payable. and existing claims against
the firm — C. SANTOS Construction are listed
c. the compulsory heirs of the decedent are the
surviving spouse and their 2 minor children:
Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter
Brian de Guzman, 9 years old;
d. after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain
whether the decedent left a last will and
testament, none has been found and according
to the best knowledge information and belief of
the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died
intestate; and
e. the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of
the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to
the grant of letters of administration.
3. On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion
for writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under
the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal
properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present
in the possession of the private respondent's father-in-
law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion
stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent
must have the possession of said vehicles to preserve the
assets of her late husband.
4. RTC issued an order setting for hearing the motion on
May 27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify
petitioner Pedro de Guzman; the scheduled hearing was
postponed and rescheduled several times
5. In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private
respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
Manolito de Guzman." the aforesaid motion was set for
 hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same order, the RTC
directed that all parties in the case be notified. However,
no notice of the order was given to the petitioner.
6. On June 5, 1987, RTC appointed Elaine as special
administratrix and issued another order on June 8, 1987,
acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance filed
by Elaine for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Santos and
Flora together with some military men and/or policemen
to assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito, the
motion is granted and the Deputy Sheriffs Santos and
Flora are appointed for that purpose, provided that the
subject matter of the motion for writ of possession
pending before this Court shall not be affected.
7. Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce
the order. The petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs
tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they
were his personal properties; this resulted in a "near
shoot-out between members of the Makati Police, who
were to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM
soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs
and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of
Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile
situation which resulted in an agreement between the
parties that the bulldozer, sought to be taken, be
temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while
the parties seek clarification of the order."
a. the June 8, 1987 order was clarified to the effect
that the order "must be merely to take and
preserve assets admittedly belonging to the
estate, but not properties, the ownership of
which is claimed by third persons."
8. Pedro filed this petition to annul the lower court's orders
dated June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
a. For June 5 order, Pedro contends that RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction to appoint a special
administratrix because the petition for the
settlement of the estate of Manolito was not yet
set for hearing and published for 3 consecutive
weeks. The appointment of a special
administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion
for having been made without giving Pedro and
other parties an opportunity to oppose
b. For June 8 order, Pedro contends that the
immediate grant of the motion praying for the
court's assistance in the preservation of the
estate, "without notice to Pedro and its
immediate implementation on the very same
day, were intended solely to deprive Pedro of
his property without due process of law.
ISSUE/S: May a probate court act/grant motions for the
appointment of a special administrator, for the issuance of a
writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the
court has caused notice to be served upon all interested
6
parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court?
HELD: NO.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by
the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the
possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the
estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court. But RTC did
not have jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in
the settlement of the estate.
The jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for
the administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the
persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased person must be differentiated. The court may
also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties comprising
that estate must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a
petition for letters of administration is filed in the court
having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be
given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must
cause notice through publication of the petition after it
receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all
the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that
the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
(Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment on the
Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as
required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court has been
given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of
the deceased person, the proceeding for the settlement of
the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as
to notice is essential to the validity of the proceeding in that
no person may be deprived of his right to property without
due process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders
affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by
the probate court before it acted on the motions of the
private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and
to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of
Manolito de Guzman.
The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest
in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent
who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de
Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the
Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what
emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an
administrator was deferred at least until the most interested
parties were given notice of the proposed action. No
unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular
administrator is apparent from the records.
If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the
assets of an estate justify a court's immediately taking some
kind of temporary action even without the required notice,
no such emergency is shown in this case. The need for the
proper notice even for the appointment of a special
administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.
The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the
preservation of the estate was limited to properties not
claimed by third parties. If certain properties are already in
the possession of the applicant for special administratrix and
are not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry up
and take special action to preserve those properties. As it is,
the sheriffs took advantage of the questioned order to seize
by force, properties found in the residence of the petitioner
which he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the
estate of the deceased person.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
7
Rule 80
05 De Guzman v. Guadiz
G.R. No. L-48585, March 3, 1980, FERNANDEZ
Topic: Rule 80, Special Administrator: Why and when
needed.
Doctrine:
● When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded not as a representative of the agent of the
parties suggesting the appointment but as the
administrator in charge of the estate and, in fact, as
an officer of the court
● The principal object of the appointment of a
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.
● “The reason for the practice of appointing a special
administrator rests in the fact that estates of
decedents frequently become involved in protected
litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste
and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect
the debts and preserve the assets in the interim.
The occassion for such an appointment usually
arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of
a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed. No temporary
administration can be granted where there is an
executor in being capable of acting, however.
Facts:
● Feliciano de Guzman filed petition for probate of a
will alleged to have been executed by Catalina
Bajacan. In the will, petitioner was instituted as
Catalina's sole and universal heir and was also
named as the executor
● Respondents filed and opposition contending that all
properties of Catalina were now owned by them in
virtue of a Donation inter vivos executed by Arcadia
and Catalina Bajacan in their favor
● Petitioner filed a motion to be appointed as the
special administrator.
● That the property of the decedent consists of rice
land which would yield P50k worth of rice twice a
year so somebody must represent the estate
pending the probate of the will
● RTC: denied the motion for appointment of a special
administrator arguing that the properties are in the
custody of the oppositors who claim they own the
property so no need to appoint special administrator
 to take care of the properties where there is a
considerable delay
Issue: WON a special administrator should have been issued
to administer the properties allegedly of the estate when the
oppositors who claim ownership over the property are in
possession of the same?
Ruling:
● Yes. The probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned
by any cause including an appeal from the allowance
or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification,
the appointment of a special administrator lies in the
discretion of the Court. This discretion, however,
must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to
reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The basis for
appointing a special administrator under the Rules is
broad enough to include any cause or reason for the
delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is
being carried on in the same or in another court, or
where there is an appeal pending as to the
proceeding on the removal of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot
agree among themselves
● It appears that the estate the properties registered
under the Torrens system in the name of the
deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80)
hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed
that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of
palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is
an immediate need for a special administrator to
protect the interests of the estate as regards the
products.
● The respondent judge opined that there is no need
for the appointment of a special administrator in this
case because the respondents are already in
possession of the properties covered by the will. The
respondent judge has failed to distinguish between
the partisan possession of litigants from that of the
neutral possession of the special administrator
under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special
administrator is regarded, not as a representative of
the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment,
but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and
in fact, as an officer of the court
● The only way to test the validity of the alleged
donation in favor of the private respondents is to
appoint a special administrator who will have the
personality to file the corresponding action. In view
of all the foregoing, respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
motion for appointment of a special administrator.
● WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is
hereby granted
8
06 DE GUZMAN vs. ANGELES
GR NO., G.R. No. 78590, June 20, 1988, Gutierrez JR.
TOPIC: Special administrator;
why and when needed
DOCTRINE/S:
● A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the
probate court to care for and preserve his estate
until an executor or general administrator is
appointed.
● Since the position of special administrator is a very
sensitive one which requires trust and confidence, it
is essential that the suitability of the applicant be
ascertained in a hearing with due notice to all
oppositors who may object precisely to the
applicant's suitability to the trust.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Elaine filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as
Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."
Pedro de Guzman resisted when Deputy Sheriffs tried to take
the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his
personal properties. He filed a manifestation listing
properties which he claimed to be his own. Thereafter, the
instant petition was filed to annul RTC’s orders. Pedro De
Guzman contended that the RTC not having acquired
jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the
petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de
Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three
consecutive weeks
FACTS:
1. 05/05/1987: de Guzman filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de
Guzman
● Manolito de Guzman died in Makati at the
time of his death
● the decedent was a resident of Makati
● decedent left personal and real properties
as part of his estate
● the properties were acquired after the
marriage of the petitioner to the decedent
and therefore are included in their conjugal
partnership
 ● the estate of -the decedent has a probable
net value which may be provisionally
assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less
● the possible creditors of the estate, who
have accounts payable and existing claims
against the firm: SANTOS Construction are
listed in Annex "E;" (7) the compulsory heirs
of the decedent are the as the surviving
spouse and their two (2) minor children and
(9) the petitioner as the survey surviving
spouse of the decedent, is most qualified
and entitled to the grant of letters of
administration.
2. 05/22/1987: Elaine De Guzman filed a motion for
writ of possession over 5 vehicles registered under
the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be
conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which
are at present in the possession of Elaine’s father-in-
law Pedro de Guzman.
3. Elaine filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint
Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of
Manolito de Guzman."
4. RTC: granted the motion to be appointed as special
administratrix,
5. Pedro de Guzman resisted when Deputy Sheriffs
tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that
they were his personal properties. He filed a
manifestation listing properties which he claimed to
be his own.Thereafter, the instant petition was filed
to annul RTC’s orders.
6. The SC issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining RTC from enforcing the two questioned
orders. In another resolution, SC gave due course to
the petition.
7. Pedro De Guzman contends that the order is a
patent nullity
● the RTC not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the
petition for the settlement of the estate of
Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for
hearing and published for three consecutive
weeks
● The appointment of a special administratrix
constitutes an abuse of discretion for having
been made without giving petitioner and
other parties an opportunity to oppose said
appointment
ISSUE: Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special
administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in
a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
said deceased person even before the probate court causes
notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to
section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court?
HELD: NO
● Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
for the probate of a will and the administration of
9
the properties left by a deceased person, the
application must allege the residence of the
deceased and other indispensable facts or
circumstances and that the applicant is the executor
named in the will or is the person who had custody
of the will to be probated.
● In the instant case, there is no doubt that the
respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased
Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79
of the Revised Rules of Court.
● Jurisdiction of the probate court over the
proceedings for the administration of an estate and
its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested
in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
person must be differentiated. The court may also
have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties
comprising that estate must follow established rules.
● See Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
● The probate court must cause notice through
publication of the petition after it receives the same.
The purpose of this notice is to bring all the
interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so
that the judgment therein becomes binding on all
the world. Verily, notice through publication of the
petition for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of
which makes court orders affecting other persons,
subsequent to the petition void and subject to
annulment.
● In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section
3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused
to be given by the probate court before it acted on
the motions of the private respondent to be
appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of
possession of alleged properties of the deceased
person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion
for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de
Guzman.
● All interested persons including herein petitioner
who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the
Petition could have participated in the proceedings
especially so, because the respondent immediately
filed a motion to have herself appointed as
administratrix.
● A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the
probate court to care for and preserve his estate
until an executor or general administrator is
appointed."
 ● The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar
interest in the preservation of the estate as the
private respondent who happens to be the widow of
deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity
of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not
clear from the records exactly what emergency
would have ensued if the appointment of an
administrator was deferred at least until the most
interested parties were given notice of the proposed
action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of
a regular administrator is apparent from the records.
● Since the position of special administrator is a very
sensitive one which requires trust and confidence, it
is essential that the suitability of the applicant be
ascertained in a hearing with due notice to all
oppositors who may object precisely to the
applicant's suitability to the trust.
● If emergency situations threatening the dissipation
of the assets of an estate justify a court's
immediately taking some kind of temporary action
even without the required notice, no such
emergency is shown in this case. The need for the
proper notice even for the appointment of a special
administrator is apparent from the circumstances of
this case.
● The respondent Judge himself explains that the
order for the preservation of the estate was limited
to properties not claimed by third parties. If certain
properties are already in the possession of the
applicant for special administratrix and are not
claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry
up and take special action to preserve those
properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the
questioned order to seize by force, properties found
in the residence of the petitioner which he
vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the
estate of the deceased person.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
07 MANUNGAS vs LORETO
G.R. No. 193161 | AUGUST 22, 2011 | VELASCO
TOPIC: Special Administrator
DOCTRINE/S: As the law does not say who shall be appointed
as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee
must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection
of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be
sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Engracia Manungas was the wife of
Florentino Manungas. After the estate of Florentino was
distributed, Diosdado, an illegitimate child of Florentino, filed
a petition for issuance of letters of administration over the
estate of Engracia. This was first denied by the RTC, but upon
an MR, Diosdado was appointed as special administrator. The
Court ruled that the RTC acted with GADALEJ in appointing
10
Diosdado, explaining that While the trial court has the
discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the
estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided
by the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may,
therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular
administrator is appointed. (See doctrine too)
FACTS:
- Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino
Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they
adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12,
1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on May
29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive
mother.
- After a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Parreo, the niece of Engracia Manungas,
was appointed as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas, through Parreo,
then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros
Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. The MTC
ruled in favor of Engracia Manungas, and when this
reached the SC, it was affirmed by the Court because
the petition was filed out of time.
- Diosdado then instituted a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the Estate of
Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor
alleging that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia
Manungas.[10] The petition was opposed by
Margarita Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging
that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator
of the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a
Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia
Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a
debtor of the estate having been found liable to
Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a
Decision issued by the MTC.
- On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
appointing Parreo as the special administrator of the
Estate of Manungas. However, upon an MR by
Diosdado, the RTC changed its decision and
appointed Diosdado as the administrator. Upon
appeal to the CA, it ruled that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in revoking its earlier
appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas and appointing Diosdado
instead.
ISSUE/S: W/N the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint
when it appointed Diosdado as the special administrator. a person who is a debtor of the estate and otherwise
YES a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
- The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of - Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino
Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas
entitled or even qualified to become the special and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate
administrator of the Estate of Manungas. of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a estate and would have no interest in preserving its
special administrator lies within the discretion of the value. There is no reason to appoint him as its
court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. special administrator. The trial court acted with
Lacuata-Gabriel, it was stated that: grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as
special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment PETITION IS DENIED.
of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as
the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of
an executor or administrator under section 653 of
Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to
the selection or removal of special administrator. x x
x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be 08 DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR. vs.
not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 Nachura, J.
- While the trial court has the discretion to appoint
TOPIC: Special administrator; why and when needed
anyone as a special administrator of the estate, such
discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by
DOCTRINE/S:
the directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It
When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the
administration by any cause including an appeal from the
role of a special administrator is to preserve the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As
special administrator to take possession and charge of the
stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay
are decided and executors or administrators appointed.
Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such
special administrator shall take possession and
EMERGENCY RECIT: Renato and Erlinda (Leonardo’s siblings)
charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
sought their appointment as special joint administrators over
estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
the estate of their parents, Vicente and Maxima Ocampo,
executors or administrator afterwards appointed,
which they had been managing. RTC initially appointed
and for that purpose may commence and maintain
Dalisay (Leonardo’s surviving spouse) and Renato. Dalisay was
suits as administrator. He may sell only such
later substituted by Erlinda as she’s the nearest kin.
perishable and other property as the court orders
Petitioners (surviving spouse and children of Leonardo)
sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay
sought an inventory and accounting of the estate’s assets.
any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the
The respondents however sought an exemption from posting
court.
the bond and refused to render the inventory and accounting
until their motion is decided. Petitioners eventually sought
- Given this duty on the part of the special
the termination of the special administration due to delay
administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
and alleged misrepresentations committed by Renato and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in
Erlinda. Granted. Melinda (daughter) was then appointed as
preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
regular administratix. SC held that the RTC was justified in the
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such
appointment of joint special administrators pending
person would not expose the estate to losses that
determination of the persons to whom letters of
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the
administration may be issued to avoid further delay. Similarly,
court may use its discretion and depart from such
11
there was no GAD by the probate court in revoking the
appointment of respondents as joint special administrators,
the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice and
legal principle. It found that the appointees are no longer
entitled to its confidence. Melinda’s appointment was,
however, improper as there was no corresponding petition.
FACTS:
9. 2004: Five months after Leonardo Ocampo’s death, the
petitioners (surviving spouse and children) initiated a
petition for intestate proceedings entitled In Re: Intestate
Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and
Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo.
- Petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of
Leonardo and the Spouses Vicente and Maxima
Ocampo and for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the
two estates among the lawful heirs.
- Leonardo, Renato and Erlinda managed the estate of
their parents, Vicente and Maxima. Leonardo had
been receiving his share of 1/3 of the total income
generated from the properties of the estate. It was
alleged that Renato and Erlinda excluded petitioners
from management of the properties when Leonardo
died.
10. Renato and Erlinda (respondents) filed their opposition
and counter-petition contending that the petition was
defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two
estates in a single proceeding. Denied. RTC clarified that
the judicial settlement referred only to the properties of
Vicente and Maxima.
11. Dec 05: Respondents filed a Motion for Appointment of
Joint Special Administrators. So the two parties argued
as to who should be appointed as special joint
administrators.
- Respondents: They should be appointed and serve as
such w/o posting a bond.
- Petitioners: Resps’ appointment would cause further
injustice to them. Letters of Admin should be issued
to resps AND Dalisay (surviving spouse). They also
nominated Bian Rural Bank to serve as special admin
pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of
letters of administration.
12. June 06: RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special
joint admins of the estate of the spouses and required a
200k bond each. Respondents filed MR. Grounds:
- Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be admin
considering she failed to take care of Leonardo when
he was paralyzed;
- Prayer for Dalisay’s appointment was abandoned
upon their nomination of the bank;
- Respondents have priority in right being the next of
kin of Vicente whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-
in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by
right of representation from Leonardo.
13. Petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and
Accounting. Respondents contended they could not yet
12
be compelled to submit an inventor and render an
accounting of the assets as there was still a pending MR
concerning the appointment.
14. Feb 07: RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay and
substituted her with Erlinda as co-special administratix
on the ground that respondents were the nearest of kin
of the Spouses Ocampo.
15. Petitioners again filed a Motion for an Inventory and to
Render Account of the Estate.
16. Respondents filed a Motion for Exemption to file
Administrators bond due to difficulty in raising the
necessary amount. They alleged that, since petitioners
manifested in open court that they no longer object to
the appointment of respondents as special co-
administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the
heirs that the estate be spared from incurring
unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums.
17. Respondents filed a Comment to the Motion for
Inventory/Accounting, stating that it should be held in
abeyance pending resolution of their Motion for
Exemption. (aka they cannot yet submit an inventory and
render an account because they had not yet posted their
bonds)
18. June 07: Parties were directed to submit comments or
oppositions to the pending incidents/motions.
19. Oct 07: Petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke
the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial
Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.
- Special administration not necessary. The estate is
neither vast not complex. Properties are identified
and undisputed.
- Respondents resorted to special administration
merely to delay what was due to them (petitioners).
- There was a fraudulent sale by respondents of real
prop for 2.7m but was represented to petitioners to
be only for 1.5m.
- Respondents also claimed that petitioners owed the
estate for advances that covered Leonardo’s hospital
expenses. Asian Hospital however sent them a
demand letter for unpaid hospital bills.
20. Mar 08: RTC revoked and terminated Renato and
Erlinda’s appointment for their failure to comply with
its Order concerning the posting of the required bond
and to enter their duties as special admin (ie submission
of inventory). Melinda was appointed as regular
administratix subject to the posting of a 200k bond.
Judicial partition may proceed after she assumed her
duties and responsibilities as special admin.
21. Respondents filed a R65 pet for certiorari before CA.
Granted: RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents appointment as joint special administrators
without first ruling on their motion for exemption from
bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular
administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to
determine her competency to assume as such.
22. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S: Was there GAD in revoking the appointment of
respondents as special administrators? Was the designation
of Melinda as regular admin proper?
HELD: No.
1. RTC was justified in the appointment of joint special
administrators pending determination of the persons
to whom letters of administration may be issued.
- Special administrator: Officer of the court who is
subject to its supervision and control, expected to
work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a
view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement.
- Purpose of appointment: Preserve estate until it can
pass to the hands to the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.
- In this case, the appointment was justified
considering the disagreement caused undue delay in
the issuance of letters of administration.
2. The appointment or removal of special administrators,
being discretionary, is interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under R65.
- Being nearest of kin is not a mandatory requirement.
Probate court may appoint or remove special admins
based on grounds other than those enumerated in
the Rules (ie need to first pass issue of fitness, order
of preference) as long as the discretion is exercised
without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principles.
3. The administration bond is for the benefit of the
creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator,
whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed
in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him.
- Purpose: Safeguard properties of the decedent.
- The bond secures the performance of the duties and
obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to
administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to
perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within 1
year and at any other time when required by the
probate court; (4) to make an inventory within 3
months.
- Bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the
administration of the decedents estate requiring the
special administrator to (1) make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which come to his possession
or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received
by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver
the same to the person appointed as executor or
regular administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.
- Bond should not be considered as part of the
necessary expenses chargeable against the estate,
not being included among the acts constituting the
care, management, and settlement of the estate.
13
4. No GAD by the probate court in revoking the
appointment of respondents as joint special
administrators, the removal being grounded on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. The appointees are
no longer entitled to its confidence.
- Respondents failed to post their administrators bond
and failed to submit and inventory and accounting.
- Respondents had been in possession and
administration of the spouses’ estate since 2002 up
to the present. They also submitted a Statement of
Cash distribution covering a period until June 2006.
- Respondents had already been distributing the
incomes or fruits generated from the properties of
the decedents estate, yet they still failed to post
their respective administrators bonds despite
collection of the advances from their supposed
shares. This state of affairs continued even after a
considerable lapse of time from the appointment of
Renato as a special administrator of the estate and
when Erlinda substituted Dalisay.
- There was insincerity in the administration of the
estate. There was a 2007 demand letter sent by
Asian Hospital for expenses there were allegedly
already paid as advances from the estate. Further,
there was a fraudulent sale of property for 2.7m
where in respondents executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale claiming themselves to be the only
heirs of Maxima, thereby excluding Leonardo.
Dalisay, as Leonardo’s representative, was coaxed
into signing a Deed of Sale over the same property
but only for 1.5m. The interval between the two
Deeds might not have been distance considering the
similar CTC numbers of the parties in both contracts.
5. But there was GAD in the designation of Melinda as
regular administratix.
- Rule 78 provides for the determination of the regular
administrator while Rule 79 is on the matter of
contest for the issuance of letters of administration.
- There was no petition for letters of administration
with respect to Melinda because the prayer for her
appointment was embodied in the motion for the
termination of special administration.
- The capacity, competency, and legality of Melinda’s
appointment was not properly objected to by
respondents despite being the next of kin to the
decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the
RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the
above-mentioned Rules.
6. Melinda’s appointment is converted into one of special
administration pending proceedings for regular
administration considering her acts (posting bond and
filing inventory) manifested her intention to serve
willingly as administratix.
PETITION IS PARTIALLY GRANTED.
09 Corona v. CA
10 Liwanag v. Reyes
GR NO. L-19159, Sept. 29, 1964 , J. Regala
TOPIC: Regular Adminstrator v. Special Administrator
DOCTRINE/S:
· The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse
effects of the statute of limitations running against
them in cases where the appointment of a regular
administrator is delayed. So that if We are now to deny
the present action on this technical ground alone, and
the appointment of a regular administrator will be
delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.
EMERGENCY RECIT: An action for foreclosure is filed against
the special administrator of the estate. The special
administrator opposed and filed a motion to dismiss claiming
that the action cannot be filed against her. SC ruled in favor
of the mortgagee and ruled that mortgagee may proceed
against the special administratrix.
FACTS:
1. On 1960, The late Pio D. Liwanag executed in favor
of the Rotgan Financing Inc. a real estate mortgage.
o Before the mortgage agreement expired,
Pio Liwanag died.
2. As the total mortgage obligation was not paid,
mortgagee Rotegaan Financing instituted a
foreclosure case against the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag
and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate.
The action also prayed for the appointment of a
receiver.
3. Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that she cannot be sued as administratirx.
o Liwanag also contended that a writ of
issuance of writ of receivership cannot be
issued because property is already in
custodia legis.
4. CFI ruled to issue writ of receivership and ordered
that the MTD be set aside because of the possibility
that the estate may be able to pay the amounts
claimed by the plaintiff.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not an action for foreclosure of REM
may be filed against the special administratrix
HELD:
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a
creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of
these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his
14
claim in the testate or intestate proceeding and share in the
general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose
his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in
court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the
mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or
intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his
mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period
of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage,
he shall not be admitted as creditor of the estate, and shall
not share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second
remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the
administratrix of the property.
Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein
can be sued as special administratrix. The Rules of Court do
not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a
defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors
would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations
running against them in cases where the appointment of a
regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are now to
deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and
the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed,
the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted
will be defeated.
PETITION IS DENIED.
11 Zayco v. Hinlo
12 Tan vs. Gedorio
G.R no. 166520; March 14, 2008; Chico-Nazario
Topic: Rule 80
DOCTRINE/S:
The appointment of a special administrator is justified only
when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case
the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the
event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the
Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. The principal
object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is
to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private
respondents Rogelo Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who
were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for
the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as
special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner
Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of
the respondents can be appointed since they are not residing
in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same
competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de
facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin,
being the legitimate children, is preferred in the choice of
administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitimate
children). However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court
directive to account for the income of the estate, the court
granted Romualdo's appointment as special
administrator. WON court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 in the
selection of a special administrator? No, Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in
the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
FACTS:
1. Gerardo Tan (deceased) died without leaving a will.
2. Private respondents, claimed to be children of
Gerardo Tan and filed for a Petition of issuance of
letters of administration.
3. Pettitioners were claiming to be the legitimate heirs
of Gerardo Tan.
4. Private respondent moved for the appointment of
special administrator, asserting th need to take
possession and charge Gerardo’s estate until the
petition was resolved. They also prayed that their
attorney in fact Romualdo Lim be appointed as the
Special Administrator.
5. Petitioners Vilma Tan opposed and argued none of
the private respondents can be appointed because
they are not residing in the country.
6. Court-appointed commissioner issued directives to
Petitioner Vilma who was already acting as de facto
administratix but Vilma did not comply. A year have
passed but Vilma did not comply still.
7. RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order
appointing Romualdo as special administrator of
Gerardo’s Estate,
8. Petitioner filed MR claiming Petitioner Vilma should
be the one appointed as special administratix as she
was allegedly next of kin. However, RTC denied.
9. Petitioners instituted w/ CA a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition insisting on Petitioner Vilma’s right
to be appointed as Special Administrator. However,
CA denied petition. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari.
a. Court issued a Resolution denying the
Petition on the ground of late filing, failure
to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of
the Petition on the Court of Appeals and
proof of such service, failure to properly
verify the Petition, and failure to pay the
deposit for the Salary Adjustment for the
Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee.
10. Petitioners contend that they should be given
priority in the administration of the estate since they
15
are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo,
as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children
ISSUES: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court in their selection of a special
administrator.
HELD: NO. this Court has consistently ruled that the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as
provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator. The preference under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not
of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter
lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to
move for the appointment of a special administrator due to
the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply
with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It
would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still
appointed special administratix, when the necessity of
appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of
the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.
Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was
unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit
with the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide
an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardo’s
estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and
insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-
compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income,
petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that
effect, instead of continuing to disregard the court’s orders.
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular
administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court, and is not appealable.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of
preference, they should pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated
the appointment of a special administrator.
Petition is Denied.
Notes: (law used in this case – not Rule 80 but doctrine is
Rule 80, sec 1 not identified in this case)
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case

may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

RULE 80
Special Administrator
Section 1. Appointment of special administrator. — When
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay
are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

Section 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. —

Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of
the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
and preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence
and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of
the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Section 3. When powers of special administrator

cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. — When letters
testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate
of the deceased, the powers of the special administrator shall
cease, and he shall forthwith deliver to the executor or
administrator the goods, chattels, money, and estate of the
deceased in his hands. The executor or administrator may
prosecute to final judgment suits commenced by such special
administrator.

16

Rule 82
13 Reynaldo Mendiola v. CA, Redentor Mendiola,
Florentina Mendiola, Ernestina Mendiola, Edgardo
Mendiola, Manuel Mendiola, Enrico Mendiola, Ricardo
Mendiola, Marilou Mendiola
G.R. No. 92999 | October 11, 1990 | Grino-Aquino, J.
TOPIC: Removal of administrator/executor
DOCTRINE: If an executor or administrator neglects to render
his account and settle the estate according to law, or to
perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may
permit him to resign.
ER: Petitioner was appointed by the RTC as executor of his
father’s estate. But he was removed by the RTC (and later on
CA) because his siblings/respondents opposed it. Petitioner
now goes to the SC arguing that there was not basis for the
removal. But SC said there was. Petitioner did not pay the
estate tax and even involved respondents in a case filed by
Villarica Pawnshop. Basis used was Sec. 2 of Rule 82.
FACTS:
● This is a contest between 2 brothers for
appointment as executor of their father's estate.
Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling on the RTC’s orders
in the SpecPro case, removing him as executor of the
estate of his father, the late Carlos Mendiola, and
appointing his brother, Redentor Mendiola, in his
stead.
● The petitioner and respondents are the surviving
heirs of the late Carlos Mendiola who died on
December 28, 1984. Florentina Mendiola is the
surviving spouse while the petitioner and all the
respondents are the children of the deceased.
● A petition for probate of a will was filed by petitioner
on March 30, 1987 in the RTC entitled 'Probate of
the Will and Testament of Deceased Carlos
Mendiola' Sp. Proc. No. 10027 which was set for
hearing on Aug. 18, 1987.
● RTC – Allowed the will and issuing letters
testamentary in favor of the petitioner who was
declared executor of the estate of the deceased in
the will. After the petitioner took his oath on Oct. 14,
1987 letters testamentary was issued in favor of the
petitioner on Oct. 20, 1987.
● On April 28, 1989, the respondents filed a motion for
the removal of the executor and another motion on
May 2, 1989 for the appointment of Redentor
Mendiola of executor.
● On May 22, 1989, the RTC Judge granted the motion
and ordered the removal of the petitioner as
executor and revoked the letters testamentary. Also,
it ordered the appointment of Redentor Mendiola as
executor.
● A MR was filed by petitioner which was opposed by
respondents. RTC denies petitioner’s MR.
17
● Petitioner now argues that the CA erred in not
annulling the probate court's order removing him as
executor for:
a. No evidence had been adduced by the
respondents in support of their motion for his
removal; and
b. That he was not given his day in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be removed as
executor.
HELD: YES.
● Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings
in the RTC, that petitioner failed to pay the estate
tax. Petitioner's own counsel, Atty. Gregorio Ejercito,
admitted in a Manifestation that his client indeed
has no proof or receipt of payment of the estate tax.
Annexes "C" and "L" were presented as proof.
Petitioner also failed to render an accounting of the
estate and settle the same according to law.
● Furthermore, he involved the heirs in a transaction
with Villarica Pawnshop which, because of
petitioner's failure to honor his part of the bargain,
resulted in the filing of a civil suit by Villarica against
the heirs. The case is still pending in the RTC of Pasig.
● The removal of the petitioner is in accordance with
the provisions of Sec. 2, Rule 82 of the ROC:
If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty
expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to
resign.
● The determination of a person's suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court
is clearly in error. (Abad vs. CTA, 18 SCRA 371) The
removal of an administrator under Sec. 2 of Rule 82
lies within the discretion of the court appointing
him.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned
decision dated February 12, 1990 and the order dated April
25, 1990 of the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition for
review is denied for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
14 Gabriel v. CA
GR NO. 101512, DATE: August 7, 1992, PONENTE: Regalado
TOPIC: Removal of Administrator/Executor
DOCTRINE/S:
● It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that
the preference given to the surviving spouse or next
of kin may be disregarded by the court where said
persons neglect to apply for letters of administration
for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death.
However, it is our considered opinion that such
failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from
the administration of the estate of her husband.
There must be a very strong case to justify the
exclusion of the widow from the administration. In
the case at bar, there is no compelling reason
sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's
estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is
not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause
despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the
30-day period be likewise waived under the
permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which
merely provides that said letters, as an alternative,
"may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors."
● The determination of a person's suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising
the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court
is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right
and corresponding interest in the execution of their
trust as would entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule
82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing
the probate court to remove an administrator. While
it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it
must, however, have some fact legally before it in
order to justify such removal. There must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of
the rules or the orders of the court which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of
the administrator. In the instant case, a mere
importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased,
there being no factual and substantial bases
therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the
removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state
that the removal of an administrator does not lie on
the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may
also exercise its discretion in appointing an
administrator where those who are entitled to
letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.
18
EMERGENCY RECIT: .
PR filed a petition for letters of administrator. Such was
published but no one opposed. PR was appointed
administrator. Later on, the petitioners filed an opposition
saying that they were not informed and that the letters of
administration issued to PR be revoked. The probate court
denied the opposition. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari of the petitioners. Hence, a petition for review on
certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that the wife
should be preferred as administrator based on the
preference. If the wife is incompetent, it should be the next
of kin. PR argued that petitioners never applied for
appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months
from the death of Domingo Gabriel. The SC ruled that the
wife can be co-administrator and that the PR is not
disqualified.
FACTS:
● 9 months after Domingo Gabriel died, private
respondent (PR) filed with the RTC, a petition for
letters of administration alleging that he is the son of
the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in
business, and is fully capable of administering the
estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.
● PR mentioned 8 of herein petitioners as the other
next of kin and heirs of the decedent.
● The court below issued an order setting the hearing
of the petition. The court directed the publication of
the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks.
● There were no opposition despite such publication
of the notice of hearing.
● PR was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
● Probate Court Order: appointed PR as administrator
of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel
on a bond of P30,000.00.
● A notice to creditors for the filing of claims against
the estate of the decedent was published in the
"Metropolitan News.
● Petitioners (Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and
Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel), filed their
"Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the
letters of administration issued to PR and the
issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased,
or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
Petitioners.
● Petitioners filed an "Opposition to the petition and
Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging that
o (1) they were not duly informed by personal
notice of the petition for administration;
o (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter, should be preferred
over private respondent;
o (3) private respondent has a conflicting
and/or adverse interest against the estate
 because he might prefer the claims of his
mother; and
o (4) most of the properties of the decedent
have already been relinquished by way of
transfer of ownership to petitioners and
should not be included in the value of the
estate sought to be administered by private
respondent.
● Probate court Order: denied the opposition
(1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to
prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the
deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the
person who was appointed administrator is
unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform
the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable
under these circumstances. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise
denied.
● Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals
● CA Ruling: dismissed that petition for certiorari.
● Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
● Petitioner’s arguments: Under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is
first in the order of preference for the appointment
of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel
is the widow and legal surviving spouse of the
deceased Domingo Gabriel and should be preferred
over PR who is one of the illegitimate children of the
decedent by claimant Aida Valencia. Secondly, they
claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent,
the next of kin must be appointed. As between a
legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is
preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the
legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private
respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is
contended that the non-observance or violation per
se of the order of preference already constitutes a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.LLphil
● PR’s arguments: the court did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in not following the order of
preference because the same is not absolute and the
choice of who to appoint rests in the sound
discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact
that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the
lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death
of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the
probate court to have considered them for
appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several
properties of the deceased have already been
relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would
have no interest in applying for letters of
administration. Lastly, private respondent submits
that it has not been shown that he is incompetent
19
nor is he disqualified from being appointed or
serving as administrator.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not Felicitas Jose-Gabriel can no longer be
appointed as co-administrator.
(2) Whether or not PR’s appointment as administrator
should be nullified.
HELD:
(1) Felicitas Jose-Gabriel can still be appointed.
Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-
Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason
of her failure to apply for letters of administration within
thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required
under the rules.llcd
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the
preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may
be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to
apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after
the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion
that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from
the administration of the estate of her husband. There must
be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow
from the administration.
In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to
disqualify Felicitas Jose- Gabriel from appointment as
administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the
order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded
for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day
period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in
paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said
letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors."
(2) No.
On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the
appointment of private respondent as administrator. The
determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the power of appointment and said
judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the
said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right
and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as
would entitle them to protection from removal without just
cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and
specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an
administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must,
however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify
such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission
on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it
deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by
some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and
substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for
the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the
removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion
in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled
to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator
and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose
Gabriel as co- administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-
4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.
15 Nelita Moreno VDA. De Bacaling v. Hector Laguda
GR. No. L-26694;December 18, 1973 I Esguerra, J.
TOPIC: Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation and
Removal of Executors or Administrators (RULE 82)
DOCTRINE/S: Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
De Bacaling’s lawful acts before the revocation of her letters
of administration or before her removal shall have the same
validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is
elementary that the effect of revocation of letters
testamentary or of administration is to terminate the
authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the
executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the
revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar
protection will be extended to rights acquired under a
previous grant of administration.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Laguda owned a residential lot and with
his consent Sps. De Bacaling was able to construct a
residential house on a portion of the said lot on the premise,
that they will pay a monthly rental of 80.00php. Sps. De
Bacaling was unabale to pay the rental fees from July 1959-
September 1961 prompting Laguda to file an ejectment suit.
Dr. Bacaling the husband of Nelita De Bacaling died making
the latter as the judicial administratix of the estate of her late
husband. Laguda entered into a compromise agreement with
De Bacaling which was approved by the CFI. De Bacaling was
discharged as the judicial administratix when the obligations
stipulated in the settlement became due and demandable. De
Bacaling filed an opposition to the execution of the
compromise agreement alleging that she was no longer the
judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr.
Ramon Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds
when the stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement
became due and payable, hence, the special order of
demolition could not be enforced. The SC ruled that De
Bacaling’s lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of
administration or before her removal shall have the same
validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is
elementary that the effect of revocation of letters
testamentary or of administration is to terminate the
authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the
executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the
revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar
20
protection will be extended to rights acquired under a
previous grant of administration.
FACTS:
● Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a residential
land situated at La Paz, Iloilo City. Nelita De Bacaling and
her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, with the
acquiescence of Laguda, constructed a residential house
on a portion of said lot fronting Huevana Street, paying a
monthly rental of P80.00. Unable to pay the lease rental
from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling P2,160.00,
an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by
Laguda against De Bacaling in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr.
Bacaling.
● De Bacaling filed certiorari proceedings but was
dismissed for lack of merit. With this setback, De
Bacaling, filed with the CFI of Iloilo a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No.
6162) but the same was dismissed. Unsuccessful in her
motion for reconsideration, she went to the CA by way
of certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was
dismissed.
● Suffering from these series of legal reverses, De Bacaling
entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964,
with Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823 which was
approved by the CFI of Iloilo and a writ of execution was
issued. Said agreement inter alia provides that:
1. De Bacaling agreed to vacate the premises and remove
the residential house therefrom before December 31,
1966;
2. For the use and occupation of the said premises from
June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said De Bacaling
will pay Laguda a monthly rent of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos
per month;
3. Upon failure of De Bacaling to comply with any
provision of the amicable settlement within fifty (50)
days the Laguda shall be entitled to "immediate
execution to restore Laguda in possession of the
premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents
from June 1, 1964 until said premises are vacated" by De
Bacaling;
4. De Bacaling "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39,
Rules of Court, to bar enforcement of the execution of
the judgment in the case at anytime within one year
from December 31, 1969".
● De Bacaling moved for reconsideration to quash the writ
of execution, but before the Court could resolve the
motion, De Bacaling, served notice of her intention to
take the case to the Court of Appeals. Laguda filed an
opposition, alleging that as judicial administratrix, she
was legally authorized to enter into the amicable
settlement which was the basis of the decision dated July
30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo sought to be executed
 and, therefore, her act was binding upon the present
judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who
replaced petitioner upon her discharge as such on
November 28, 1964.
● Denying the De Bacaling’s MR and to quash writ of
execution, the City Court however, held in abeyance the
enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo stamped
its imprimatur considering the pendency of Special
Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the properties
involved therein are in custodia legis. Thereafter, on
October 25, 1965, Laguda moved the CFI of Iloilo in
Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of the City
Court's order of execution which was granted despite De
Bacaling’s opposition.
● On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City
issued an alias writ of execution upon representations of
Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon De
Bacaling and Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as
judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Dr.
Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings No. 1469.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the acts of De Bacaling as judicial
administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and
binding upon her successor.- Yes
HELD: Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, De
Bacaling’s lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of
administration or before her removal shall have the same
validity as if there was no such revocation or removal. It is
elementary that the effect of revocation of letters
testamentary or of administration is to terminate the
authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of the
executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the
revocation of the letters, will be protected, and a similar
protection will be extended to rights acquired under a
previous grant of administration.
PETITION IS DENIED

● On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was

issued upon motion of Laguda and over De Bacaling’s
opposition, subject, however, to the approval of the CFI
of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. Upon the denial
of De Bacaling’s MR, Laguda, filed a manifestation
praying for the confirmation of the Order to demolish the
house under custodia legis.

● De Bacaling interposed an opposition alleging:

1. That she was no longer in control of the estate
funds when the stipulated obligations in the
amicable settlement became due and payable;
2. That the residential house to be demolished is
worth P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to
reimbursement as a builder in good faith, in addition
to reasonable expenses they may incur in
transferring the same to another place; and
3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children
was not notified of the motion for the issuance of an
order of demolition;

● Laguda disputed De Bacaling's claim and supported the

legality of the court's ruling. The probate court in Special
Proceedings No. 1469 approved the order of demolition
of the house in controversy.

● Impugning the said Order as violative of the provisions of

Sec. 14, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, and of the
constitutional mandate on due process, De Bacaling
moved to reconsider the same but the motion was
denied

21

Rule 83
16 - Munsayac De Villa v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 148597 | October 24, 2003 | J. Panganiban
TOPIC: Rule 83 - Question of ownership, how treated
DOCTRINE:
A probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the
rights of third parties are not impaired.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Judge Reyes, acting as the presiding judge in the special
proceeding case, issued an order commanding the bank
manager of the China Bank to freeze the safety deposit box of
petitioners (children of the late spouses Munsayac) and to
deposit certain amounts in custodia legis. SC ruled that Judge
Reyes has no any right to hold the properties that were the
subject of his order in the special proceedings because the
parties involved already executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition which settled their respective shares and claims as
heirs of deceased spouses Munsayac. As such, any and all
incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be
deemed to have been terminated.
FACTS:
● Petitioners DE VILLA, SUNGA and ROY, three of the five
children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA
MUNSAYAC filed for a petition for letters of
administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of
the intestate estate of their parents.
● DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other
children namely MUNSAYAC, JR. and VISPERAS, who
nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late
Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate.
● MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator
pursuant to respondent Judge’s Order thus, replacing
Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the
said intestate estate.
● Subsequently, Petitioners filed for a Request to Inhibit
Respondent Judge. Barely a week after such request and
before respondent Judge could act on it, DE VILLA filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
questioning respondent Judge’s Order in
directing/ordering him (DE VILLA) to produce certain
bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the
order of arrest for failure to produce the said bank
certificates/documents.
● Pending the resolution, Petitioner DE VILLA filed an
administrative case before the Supreme Court, which
prayed for respondent Judge’s suspension and his
permanent removal from office on grounds of grave
misconduct and serious inefficiency.
● Acting on the Omnibus Motion which was filed by the
administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge
22
issued the Order to surrender, under pain of contempt,
(a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the
names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made
with UCPB, and which amount was not disclosed by the
petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the
surrender of all the pieces of jewelry given by the late
VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze
order’ with the China Banking Corporation.
● For their failure to comply with the Order the petitioners
were arrested and were likewise ORDERED to surrender
in custodia legis amount of P15M and P3M plus the legal
interest.
● A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
filed before the CA. CA nullified the arrest order
only. Hence this petition, arguing that the inhibition
is still needed as the issue on withdrawal/release of
the money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of
the freeze order on certain jewelry is pending.
ISSUE: Whether properties in custodia legis must be released.
YES
HELD: The Court ordered the TC to lift the freeze order and
cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis.
The inhibition of the respondent judge became moot and
academic.
It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special
Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition executed by all the parties was the "final, complete
and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims
as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and
Vicenta Munsayac." As such, any and all incidents relating to
the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been
terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank
manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze
the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain
amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in
the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No.
704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it
follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to
hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the
special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return
of any property previously deposited with the court should be
effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide
whether the amounts and the property deposited should be
released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in
relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This
ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal
acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction.
However, the determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction.
Such determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in
character and subject to the final decision in a separate action
that may be instituted by the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an
advance made or allegedly made by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court that has
jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heirs.
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated
this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court
may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do
so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one
of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are
not impaired. These principles, however, have no more
application in this case, since the main proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple
have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every
litigation must come to an end.
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership
of the properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the
lower court during the progress of the special proceedings.
Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those
properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of
the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The
former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition
representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of
their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is
simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any
property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct
Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending
and to order the release of any property deposited in
custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for
this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation.
23
17 Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA
17 HEIRS OF MIGUEL FRANCO, namely: MODESTA, LEONIDES
ROMULA, EMMA, JOHNNY, RAMON, BERNARDO, PACITA, all
surnamed FRANCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
HEIRS OF FAUSTINA CABADING, represented by VICTORIA
CABADING, respondents.
G.R. No. 123924. December 11, 2003– Second Division,
TINGA
TOPIC: Rule83; Question of Ownership, how treated
DOCTRINE/S:
● While the intestate court does not have the
authority to rule with finality on questions of
ownership over the property of the decedent, it is
not precluded from making a provisional
determination over such questions for purposes
relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as
ruling whether or not to include properties in the
inventory of the estate.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Quintin Franco died intestate and left a
70.6 hectare land. Miguel, his brother, filed a petition to be
the estate’s administrator but was opposed by their sister
Faustina for being unfit. The property, however, was declared
to be owned solely by Quintin, but Miguel alleges that he
owns half of the property. Miguel alleged that he received it
from Quintin by virtue of a General Power of Administration
executed by Quintin. The other heirs filed a petition to cancel
the TCT of Miguel alleging it was obtained by fraud. However,
the CA reversed on the ground that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership. The SC issued a
resolution affirming the decision of the CA. When Faustina
died, her heirs filed a petition to cancel Miguel’s TCT but it
was dismissed. The CA reversed and issued that the TCT was
acquired through fraud. Hence, the issue in the SC whether or
not questions of ownership should be resolved in the
intestate proceeding. The SC held that while the
intestate court does not have the authority to rule with
finality on questions of ownership over the property of the
decedent, it is not precluded from making a provisional
determination over such questions for purposes relevant to
the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to
include properties in the inventory of the estate.
FACTS:
23. Quintin Franco died intestate on 8 December 1967, and
his brother Miguel filed for Petition for Letters of
Administration in the Intestate Court of Zamboanga del
Norte to be appointed as administrator. He owns a 70.6
hectare land.
24. Quintin’s sister, Faustina opposed on the ground that
Miguel was unfit to be administrator.
25. On 27 August 1973, the intestate court issued
an Order declaring inter alia that, based on the evidence,
Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject
property. This finding was subsequently used by the
intestate court as one of the grounds for granting the
motion to remove Miguel as special administrator, per
the Order dated 1 September 1973. In the latter Order,
the intestate court said that since Miguel was claiming
ownership over half of the subject property, his
conflicting interest rendered him incapable of rendering
a true and faithful account of the estate.
26. Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that
he is the owner of half of the property and was already
transferred to him by Quintin. It was discovered that
Miguel filed for the cancellation of the OCT by virtue of
the document General Power of Administration executed
by Quintin. It was granted and the court issued two
transfer certificate of titles to Miguel and Quintin.
27. The other heirs filed for the cancellation of the TCT, and
it was granted on the ground that the acquisition of title
is fraudulent.
28. However, the CA reversed on the ground that the lower
court has no jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership.
The SC in a resolution, affirmed the CA.
Heirs of Faustina filed in the RTC cancellation of the TCT
of Miguel but it was dismissed. The CA reversed the decision
and stated that it was acquired through fraud, surreptitious
conduct and bad faith. As basis, it recited the following
circumstances:
1. In his petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, Miguel admitted that the subject property in
its entirety belonged to his brother, Quintin, with his inclusion
of the entire property in the list of properties left behind by
Quintin, without asserting ownership over it or any part
thereof;
2. The intestate court had declared that Quintin was the
absolute owner of the subject property and dismissed, for
lack of sufficient evidence, the claim of Miguel to half of the
property;
3. OCT No. P-436, covering the entire subject property,
was registered as early as 9 July 1954 but it was only on 13
February 1973 that Miguel Franco obtained the TCT covering
half of the property in his name. His silence for 19 years had
militated against his claim of ownership and may well be
indicative of laches on his part;
4. The subject property was solely declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Quintin;
5. The General Power of Administration, on which
Miguel anchored his claim of ownership, had simply
documented a delegated power to administer property and
could not be a source of ownership;
6. The cancellation of the OCT was without factual basis.
Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act which was the
24
apparent basis of the Order contemplated only summary
proceedings for non-controversial erasures, alterations or
amendment of entries in a certificate of title and therefore
could not be invoked if there is no unanimity among the
parties, or if one of them had posed an adverse claim or
serious objection which would render the case controversial.
29. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. While
asserting that the transfer and registration of one-half of
the subject property in the name of Miguel was not done
through fraud or in bad faith, they point out that at no
time did the respondents question the execution or
genuineness of the General Power of Administration
which purportedly admits of the existence of a trust
relation between Quintin and Miguel. They also claim
that the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the
recognition which Quintin had accorded to the rights and
interest of Miguel.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not questions of ownership should be
discussed in the intestate proceeding -
HELD: The intestate court in its Order dated 27 August
1973 declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the
property and accordingly denied Miguels claim of ownership
over half the subject property. The Order was apparently
issued for the purpose of determining which properties
should be included for the inventory of the estate of Miguel.
While the intestate court does not have the authority to rule
with finality on questions of ownership over the property of
the decedent, it is not precluded from making a provisional
determination over such questions for purposes relevant to
the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to
include properties in the inventory of the estate. And yet, at
no time did Miguel file a motion for the reconsideration of
the 27 August 1973 Order of the intestate court which denied
Miguels claim of ownership. It was the 1 September 1973
Order of the intestate court, by virtue of which Miguel was
removed as special administrator, that he contested. While
the 27 August 1973 Order is a provisional determination of
ownership over the subject property, yet conformably to
ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to
dispute such an order which rejects his claim of ownership.
Miguels inaction unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable
weight that should be accorded the statement as a
declaration against interest and a judicial admission.
PETITION IS DENIED.
18 De Leon vs CA
GR NO. 128781| August 6, 2002 | Austria-Martinez
TOPIC: Rule 83, Question of ownership, how treated
DOCTRINE/S:
● A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally since the probate court’s limited
jurisdiction, and the principle that questions of title
or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion
from the inventory of the property, can only be
settled in a separate action.
● All that a court could do as regards properties in
dispute is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory of properties
to be administered by the administrator. If there is a
dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing
parties and the administrator have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
EMERGENCY RECIT: In this case, the oppositor argues that
certain properties must be collated to the estate of the
deceased. The RTC, based on the Amended Motion for
Collation, issued an order including several properties in the
estate. Said order was treated as an order of collation, rather
than a mere order to include in the estate certain properties.
The same was affirmed by the CA and petitioner’s petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was denied on the basis
of her failure to appeal the final order (collation)
SC held that the order in a mere interlocutory order since any
decision made by the probate court on the question of title is
merely provisional.
FACTS:
1. Pending settlement proceedings for the estate of the
deceased Rafael Nicolas, Ramon Nicolas filed a Motion
for Collation, claiming that real properties were given to
his children by gratuitous title by the deceased during his
lifetime.
2. Petitioner, who was appointed as the administratrix,
opposed the motion based on the following grounds:
a. subject properties were sold to her and her
deceased brother and they were already titled
in their names;
b. titles may not be collaterally attacked in a
motion for collation.
3. The RTC denied the motion ruling that it is within the
jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled
properties should be collated, citing Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court.
4. On November 11, 1994, RTC ordered four properties be
collated to the estate (4009 sqm property, two lots
covered by TCT-3689 and TCT-33658, property covered
by TCT-36987/TCT-40333/TCT10907, and a 310 sqm. Lot
25
given to Antonio Nicolas. The RTC further ordered the
removal the petitioner as administratrix on the ground of
conflict of interest.
5. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO before
the CA.
6. The CA upheld the lower court's order of collation
(inclusion) of subject properties to the estate. CA held
that the November 11, 1994 Order of collation have
become final due to petitioner’s failure to appeal from
the order of collation.
ISSUE/S:
W/N a probate court can pass upon questions of title?
W/N the RTC’s order was an order for the collation of
properties or a mere order to include the properties in the
inventory of the properties of the estate?
HELD:
Probate, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can
only rule on the question of title provisionally
Citing the case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that, "The patent reason is the probate court’s limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
action. All that the said court (probate court) could do as
regards said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the
administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.”
The Supreme Court held that the questioned order is not a
final order but merely an interlocutory order to include or
exclude the subject properties in the inventory of the
decedent's estate.
The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals 26 that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a
final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not
settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the
prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether
a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which
may be instituted by the parties.
PETITION, PARTLY MERITORIOUS
19 SPRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and
WILLIE SANTERO v. CFI
G.R. No. L-61700, September 14, 1987, J. Paras
Topic: Rule 83; Provisional Support
Doctrine: While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the
widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased,
the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her
children without distinction.
Since the CC, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouses
and to the children the right to receive support during
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot
be impaired by Rule 83 Sec 3 of the ROC which is a procedural
rule.
Be it noted however that with respect to “spouse”, the same
must be the legitimate spouse.
PETITION IS DISMISSED.

Facts:
1. Princesita, Frederico and Willy (PETITIONERS) are
children of Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa.
2. Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguela (RESPONDENTS)
are children of Pablog with Anselma.
3. Both sets of children are illegitimate children of Pablo.
4. Pablo who died on Nov 30, 1973, was the only legitimate
son of Pascual Santero and Pamuti Vda. De Santero.
5. Respondents filed a Motion for Allowance to include
Juanita, Estelita and Pedriro as children of Pablo and
Anselma, and praying that an order be granted directing
the administrator to deliver the sum of P6K to each of
the 7 children of Pablo.
6. CFI granted the motion but oppositors asked for a
reconsideration.
7. CFI then amended its order, directing Anselma to submit
her explanation as to the additional 3 children included in
the motion.
8. Anselma explained that the 3 children were then of age
but still has the right to receive allowance as advance
payment of their share in the inheritance of Pablo, while
the other 4 were minor and represented by her.
9. Petitioners filed their Motion to Admit Supplemental
Petition opposing the inclusion of the 3 more heirs.
10. CFI ordered the administrator to get back the allowance
of the 3 addional recipients or children of Anselma.
11. Hence this petition, arguing that respondents are not
entitled to any allowance since they are not minors and
are gainfully employed.

Issue: Whether or not the additional 3 children should be

given allowance despite not being minors
Held: YES.

Ratio:
The fact the respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or
married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the
determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.

While the ROC limit allowances to the widow and minor or

incapacitated children of the deceased, the NCC gives the
surviving spouses and his/her children without distinction.
Hence, respondents are entitled to allowances as advances
from their shares in the inheritance from their father.

26
20 Hilario Ruiz vs. CA
G.R. No. 118671, Jan. 29, 1996, PUNO
Topic: Rule 83, Provisional Support
Doctrine:
● In settlement of estate proceedings, the
distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before
payment of said obligations only if the distributees
or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or
when provision is made to meet those obligations.
● Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the decedent’s estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and
children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity
Facts:
● Petitioner Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond, his adopted
daughter, PR Maria Montes, and his 3
granddaughters, all children of Edmond. The testator
bequeathed cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond executor. When H. Ruiz died, the
cash was distributed among Edmond and PRs
according to the will. One of the properties of the
estate – a house and lot at Valle Verde IV, which the
testator bequeathed to the granddaughters, - was
leased out by Edmond to third persons. The court
ordered Edmond to deposit the rental payments
totalling P540K as one-year lease of the property. In
compliance, Edmond turned over cash but only
P348,583.
● Eventually, the court approved Edmond’s motion for
the release of P50K to pay the real estate taxes of
the estate. Edmond filed another Motion for Release
of Funds. Montes opposed. She prayed for the
release of the rent payments to the granddaughters
and for the distribution of the Valle Verde property
and the Blue Ridge apartments in accordance with
the will. The court granted Montes' motion. The
court, however, delayed the release of the titles.
● Edmond was ordered to submit an accounting of the
expenses for administration including provisions for
the support of the granddaughters. Petitioner
appealed to the CA. CA sustained the court's order.
ISSUE: WON the probate court, after admitting the will to
probate but before payment of the estate's debts and
obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from
the funds of the estate for the support of the grandchildren;
(2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to
27
grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will. (NO).
HELD:
● 1) Sec 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court is controlling.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the
widow and the minor or incapacitated children of
the deceased the right to receive allowances for
support during the settlement of estate proceedings.
He contends that the granddaughters do not qualify
for an allowance because they are not incapacitated
and are no longer minors but of legal age, married
and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision
expressly states "children" of the deceased which
excludes the latter's grandchildren. It is settled that
allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83
should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188
(now Art 133 of the Family Code) of the Civil Code,
the substantive law in force at the time of the
testator's death, provides that during the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their
age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled
to provisional support from the funds of the estate.
The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty
to support, especially the right to education, subsist
even beyond the age of majority. Be that as it may,
grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the estate. The law clearly limits
the allowance to "widow and children" and does not
extend it to the grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity. It was error for the CA to
sustain the probate court's order granting an
allowance to the grandchildren of the testator
pending settlement of his estate.
● 2) The lower courts also erred when they ordered
the release of the titles of the properties to PRs. An
order releasing titles to properties of the estate
amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the conditions under R
109 Sec 2 in relation to R 90
● AFFIRMED

Rule 84
21 CARO vs. CA
G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982, GUERRERO, J.
TOPIC: What constitutes as
administration
DOCTRINE/S:
The administrator has the right to the possession of the real
and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the
payment of the expenses of administration, and the
administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery
or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2,
Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not
include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share
sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of
another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption
only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was
perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased
co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir
of the deceased co-owner.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
One of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of
absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said
parcels of land in favor of Luz Caro for the sum of P10,000.00.
Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and
Alfredo Benito, a subdivision title was issued to Luz Caro.
Basilia, thus, filed the present case as an independent one
and in the trial sought to prove that as a joint administrator of
the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been notified of the
sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article
1623 of the New Civil Code. RTC dismissed the complaint
stating that Basilia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right
of legal redemption.
FACTS:
1. Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito
were the original co-owners of two parcels of land.
Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving
wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito,
were subsequently appointed as joint administrators
of Mario's estate.
2. 08/26/1959: Benjamin Benito executed a deed of
absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over
said parcels of land in favor of Luz Caro for the sum
of P10,000.00. Subsequently, with the consent of
Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito, a subdivision
title was issued to Luz Caro.
3. 05/1966: Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito learned that
the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin
Benito the aforesaid one-third undivided share in
each of the two parcels of land. She sent to Caro a
written offer to redeem the said one-third undivided
share.
4. Basilia sought to intervene in a civil case for
annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of
28
the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving
the same parcels of land, but did not succeed as the
principal case was dismissed on a technicality, that
is, for failure to prosecute and the proposed
intervenor failed to pay the docketing fees.
5. Basilia, thus, filed the present case as an
independent one and in the trial sought to prove
that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario
Benito, she had not been notified of the sale as
required by Article 1620 in connection with Article
1623 of the New Civil Code.
6. RTC: Dismissed the complaint
● Basilia, as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Mario Benito, does not have the
power to exercise the right of legal
redemption
● Benjamin Benito substantially complied
with his obligation of furnishing written
notice of the sale of his one-third undivided
portion to possible redemptioners.
7. CA:
● The affidavit of notice executed of Benjamin
Benito declaring that written notices of the
sale as required by law were duly sent to
Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, the
latter in his capacity as administrator of the
estate of Mario Benito, as well as the sworn
statement of Saturnino Benito's widow
confirming that her husband received the
written notice of the sale referred to in
Benjamin Benito's affidavit of notice would
not satisfy that there was clear notice in
writing of the specific term of the intended
sale.
● Saturnino was only a co-administrator and
hence, his unilateral act could not bind the
principal because there was no less than a
renunciation of a right pertaining to the
heirs, under Article 1818, NCC, apart from
the fact that the right of redemption is not
within their administration.
ISSUE: W/N Basilia, as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right
of legal redemption?
HELD: YES
● As early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609
and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito, Luz
Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito,
represented by administrators Saturnino Benito, as
trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario
Benito, agreed to subdivide the property. An
agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and
consequently binding upon the parties.
● A petition for subdivision was then filed for the
purpose. A subdivision plan was made and by
common agreement was ceded to Caro. Thereafter,
 the co-owners took actual and exclusive possession
of the specific portions respectively assigned to
them.
● A subdivision title has been issued in the name
petitioner on the lot ceded to her. Upon the
expiration of the term of one year from the date of
the entry of the subdivision title, the Certificate of
Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496).
Since the title of petitioner is now indefeasible,
private respondent cannot, by means of the present
action, directly attack the validity thereof.
● Even on the assumption that there still is co-
ownership here and that therefore, the right of legal
redemption exists, private respondent as
administratrix, has no personality to exercise said
right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of
Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-
administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's
consent to the sale of the one-third portion to
petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario
Benito on the ground that the right of redemption
was not within the powers of administration, in the
same manner, private respondent as co-
administrator has no power exercise the right of
redemption — the very power which the Court of
Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of
administration.
● While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the
administrator has the right to the possession of the
real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as
needed for the payment of the expenses of
administration, and the administrator may bring and
defend action for the recovery or protection of the
property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88),
such right of possession and administration do not
include the right of legal redemption of the
undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-
owners after the death of another, because in such
case, the right of legal redemption only came into
existence when the sale to the stranger was
perfected and formed no part of the estate of the
deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be
transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner.
● Private respondent cannot be considered to have
brought this action in her behalf and in behalf of the
heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional
allegations of the complaint specifically stated that
she brought the action in her capacity as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario
Benito.
PETITION GRANTED.
29
22 MANANQUIL vs VILLEGAS
A.M. No. 2430 | August 30, 1990 | CORTES
TOPIC: ADMINISTRATION
DOCTRINE/S:
● Administrators are not required under the law and
prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from
the probate court in order to validly lease real
properties of the estate.
● By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the
persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited
from leasing, either in person or through the
mediation of another, the properties or things
mentioned in that article, which applies “to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession”
EMERGENCY RECIT: Villegas, as administrator of the estate of
Leong, leased certain properties of the estate to the HIJOS DE
JOSE VILLEGAS partnership in which he is a member. This act
was subject of a disbarment case. The Court ruled that the act
of leasing is valid even without prior approval of the court.
However, the Court found Villegas guilty for committing acts
of gross misconduct when he participated in the renewals of
the lease agreements, which runs counter to Art. 1646 and
Art. 1491 of the NCC.
FACTS:
- In a verified complaint for disbarment dated July 5, 1982,
Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent Atty.
Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross misconduct or
malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record
of one Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as administrator
of the Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna in Special
Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental.
- In the pleadings submitted before the Court and the
Office of the Solicitor General, complainant alleges that
over a period of 20 years, respondent allowed lease
contracts to be executed between his client Felix Leong
and a partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
respondent is one of the partners. Moreover,
complainant charges that these contracts were made
without the approval of the probate court and in
violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code.
- The Solicitor General submitted his report dated
February 21, 1990, finding that respondent committed a
breach in the performance of his duties as counsel of
administrator Felix Leong when he allowed the renewal
of contracts of lease for properties involved in the testate
 proceedings to be undertaken in favor of HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS without notifying and securing the approval of
the probate court. However, the Solicitor General opined
that there was no sufficient evidence to warrant a finding
that respondent had allowed the properties to be leased
in favor of his family partnership at a very low rental or in
violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code.
- The below-mentioned circumstances have been made
the basis of the charges against respondent.
That, a lease contract dated August 13, 1963 was
executed between Felix Leong and the "Heirs of Jose
Villegas" represented by respondent's brother-in-law
Marcelo Pastrano involving, among others, sugar lands;
That, on April 20, 1965, the formal partnership of HIJOS
DE JOSE VILLEGAS was formed amongst the heirs of Jose
Villegas, of which respondent was a member; That, on
October 18, 1965, another lease contract was executed
between Felix Leong and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS, containing basically the same terms and
conditions as the first contract, with Marcelo Pastrano
signing once again as representative of the lessee;
That, on March 14, 1968, after the demise of Marcelo
Pastrano, respondent was appointed manager of HIJOS
DE JOSE VILLEGAS by the majority of partners; That,
renewals of the lease contract were executed between
Felix Leong and HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS on January 13,
1975 and on December 4, 1978, with respondent signing
therein as representative of the lessee;
ISSUE/S:
(1) W/N there is sufficient basis to find Villegas guilty
for misconduct when he failed to secure the first
the approval of the court in leasing certain
properties of the estate. NO
(2) W/N Villegas may be subject of disciplinary action
for having participated actively in the renewal of
the lease contracts. YES
HELD:
(1) Under the above circumstances, the Court finds
absolutely no merit to complainant's charge, and the
Solicitor General's finding, that respondent
committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the
approval of the court in Special Proceedings No. 460
to the various lease contracts executed between
Felix Leong and respondent's family partnership.
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court, a judicial executor or administrator has the
right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and the expenses of administration. He may,
therefore, exercise acts of administration without
special authority from the court having jurisdiction
of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled
30
that an administrator has the power to enter into
lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
even without prior judicial authority and approval.
Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not
required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence
to seek prior authority from the probate court in
order to validly lease real properties of the estate,
respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be
taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of
the various lease contracts involved herein and to
secure its judicial approval thereto.
(2) Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to hold
respondent subject to disciplinary sanction for
having, as counsel of record for the administrator in
Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the
execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals of the lease
agreement involving properties of the estate in favor
of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which
respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed
managing partner.
By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons
referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited from
leasing, either in person or through the mediation of
another, the properties or things mentioned in that
article, to wit:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property or rights in litigation or levied
upon on execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed
lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and
the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and
respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter,
the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered
by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by
a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which
he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a
stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which,
in effect, circumvents that which is directly
prohibited by law.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C.
Villegas committed acts of gross misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
for four (4) months effective from the date of his receipt of
this Resolution, with a warning that future misconduct on
respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let
copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance, and spread in
the personal record of Atty. Villegas.

31
23 ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented
by JOSE S. MATUTE, Judicial Co-Administrator in Sp.
Proc. No. 25876, Court of First Instance of
Manila, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES,
Presiding Judge of Branch III, Court of First Instance of
Davao, Davao City; SOUTHWEST AGRICULTURAL
MARKETING CORPORATION also known as (SAMCO);
CARLOS V. MATUTE, as another Administrator of the
Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, Sp. Proc. No. 25876
CFI, Manila; and MATIAS S. MATUTE, as former Co-
Administrator of the Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave,
Sp. Proc. No. 25876, CFI, Manila
G.R. No. L-29407 July 29, 1983 Relova J.
TOPIC: What constitutes administration
DOCTRINE/S: (not exactly under R84)
● No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator;
● The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased
person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate court.
EMERGENCY RECIT: The administrators entered into an
Amicable Settlement with SAMCO for the payment of the
estate’s obligations without prior approval by the probate
court. SC said it was wrong. See doctrine.
FACTS:
30. Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO)
initiated a collection suit against respondents Carlos
Matute and Matias Matute in their capacities as co-
administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave
before CFI Davao.
31. CFI Manila issued an order directing the administrators to
secure the probate court’s approval before entering into
any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate,
including a parcel of land in Davao.
32. Respondents and SAMCO entered into an Amicable
Settlement whereby the Davao property was conveyed
to the latter as payment of its claim. In the said
settlement, the respondents acknowledged that the
estate is indebted to SAMCO and that the estate does
not have enough funds with which to settle the
obligation. The settlement was submitted to CFI Davao
but not to the probate court (CFI Manila).
33. CFI Davao approved the Amicable Settlement despite
lack of approval by the probate court and opposition by
other parties.
34. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. SAMCO and
respondent judge argue that the Amicable Settlement
need not be approved by the probate court, the same
having been entered into in another independent action
and in another court of co-equal rank. Article 2032 of the
32
Civil Code applies only to extrajudicial compromise
entered into by the administrators of the estate. In the
alternative, lack of approval of the probate court of the
Amicable Settlement does not render it null and void, but
at most voidable, which must be the subject matter of a
direct proceeding in the proper Court of First Instance.
ISSUE/S: Can an administrator bind the property of the estate
to an amicable settlement without the probate court’s
approval?
HELD: No.
7. Sec. 1 R87 provides that "no action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; ..."
8. SAMCO’s claim, being one arising from contract, may be
pursued only by filing the same in the administration
proceedings in CFI Manila for the settlement of the
estate of Olave. The claim must be filed within the
period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed
"barred forever."
9. The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents
of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate
of deceased persons.
- That way, the executor or administrator will be able
to examine each claim and determine whether it is
a proper one which should be allowed.
10. The primary object of the provisions requiring
presentation is to apprise the administrator and the
probate court of the existence of the claim so that a
proper and timely arrangement may be made for its
payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course
of the administration.
- Inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire
estate is burdened with the payment of all of his
debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or
priority. All of them share pro-rata in the liquidation
of the estate.
11. It is clear that SAMCO’s main purpose in filing the civil
case was to secure a money judgment against the estate
which ended in the conveyance of more than 29hc of
land without prior authority of the probate court which
has exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Olave.
12. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. Where the estate of a
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter
into any transaction involving it without prior approval
of the probate court.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
Rule 85
24 Pascual v. CA

33

Rule 86
25 Villanueva v. PNB
GR NO. L-18403, Sept. 30, 1961 , J. Paredes
TOPIC: How claims presented
DOCTRINE/S:
· Notice of claim must be filed within the period as
stated by the notice to creditors. (See held as there is no
direct legal basis or doctrine stated by the case. The
Court directly ruled on the factual circumstances of the
case)
FACTS:
1. On 1949, wife of Pascual Villanueva, Mauriera G. De
Villanueva, filed a petition for issuance of letter of
administration. Later on, with other heirs opposing,
Atty. Teodulo was suggested and was declared to be
the administrator.
2. The notice to creditors and notice of the
appointment of Atty. Teodulo was published thru a
newspaper of general circulation.
o “"Letters of administration having been
issued in the above entitled case in favor
of Teodulo R. Ricaforte for the settlement
of the intestate of Pascual Villanueva,
deceased; Notice is hereby given to all
persons having claims for money against
the decedent, the said Pascual Villanueva,
arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, for funeral expenses and
expenses of last sickness of the deceased,
and judgment for money against him,
requiring them to file their claims with the
clerk of court within six but not beyond
twelve months after date of the first
publication of this notice, serving copies of
such claims upon the administrator, the
said Teodulo R. Ricaforte."
3. On July 20, 1953, PNB filed in the administration
proceedings a Creditor’s Claim. The creditor’s claim
indicated the total amount of the principal and the
running interest for the period of 1939-1953. The
claim indicated a total amount of 1,347.45.
4.
5. On Oct. 12, 1954, the PNB filed a motion for
admission of claim, stating-
"1. That the Philippine National Bank filed its claim
dated July 20, 1953;
2. That the last action taken on the claim was an
order of this Honorable Court issued on March 20,
1954, transferring the hearing of the claim until the
34
next calendar of the court, without objection of the
administrator;
3. That the administrator has not answered the claim
nor denied the same.
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that an order
he issued admitting and approving the claim and
ordering the administrator to pay the Bank the
amount of the claim."
6. The administrator, on November 5, 1954, opposed
the claim, alleging that he had no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the allegations therein. As special defenses, he
interposed—
o "That the same indebtedness; if it
existed, has already been paid" That the
cause of action for the recovery of the
aforesaid amount of P1,347.4o is barred
by the statute of limitations, for more than
ten (10) years have elapsed since the
cause of action accrued up to the present
time;
o That the said claim is barred forever or;
the ground that the to creditors having
been published in the MORNING TIMES of
City, a newspaper of general circulation in
the province, on November 10, 23 and 30,
1950, * * * the Philippine National failed
to file its claim within the time limited in
the notice.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not PNB is barred from setting up the
claim
HELD:
The important issue presented is whether or not
the claim in question is already barred. Admittedly, the claim
was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of
the lower court, within which to present claims against the
estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on November
16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1053 or about 1
year and 8 months late. This notwithstanding, appellant
contends that it did not know of such administration
proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in
Butuan City, Agusan.
It is to be noted that the petition for Letters of
Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly
published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning
Times, respectively, which was a full compliance with the
requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of
knowledge of the proceedings on the part of appellant and
its employees had been belied by imcontested and eloquent
evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by
the administrator of the estate in said Bank (Agusan
Agency).
The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, in
spite of which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July
20, 1953. It is quite true that the Courts can extend the
period within which to present claims against the estate, even
after the period limited has elapsed; but such extension
should only be granted under special circumstances. The
lower court did not find any justifiable reason to give the
extension and for one thing, there was no period to extend,
since the same had lapsed.
PETITION IS DENIED.
26 Sheker v. Estate of Alice Sheker
27 Intestate Estate of Encarnacion Elchico Vda. De
Fernando, deceased. Et. Al vs Pampanga Bus Company,
Inc.
GR NO. L-18936, May 23, 1967, Sanchez
TOPIC: Rule 86
DOCTRINE/S:
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state
the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall
not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months
after the date of the first publication of the notice. However,
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a tune not exceeding one (1) month.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
● Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., lodged its complaint
in the CFI of Manila against defendants Valentine
Fernando and Encarnacion Elchico Vda.
● Fernando to collect P105,000.00 upon a contractual
obligation. Later, Encarnacion died but the
Pambusco in the foregoing civil case had already
presented its evidence and submitted its case.
● Intestate proceedings were filed. Notice to estate’s
creditors was given for them to file their claims
within six months from the first publication of the
notice.
● The CFI of Manila rendered judgment ordering the
defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P93,000.00. Defendants appealed but the CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
● When the judgment in the civil case reached finality,
Pambusco moved in the intestate proceedings that
the heirs and/or the present joint administratrices,
35
be ordered to pay 46,500, the share of the deceased
in the judgment debt.
● The administratrces opposed on the ground that the
claim is time barred.
ISSUE:
Was the Pambusco’s claim properly admitted by the
probate court?
HELD:
At the time of the death of defendant Encarnacion
Elchico Vda. de Fernando, plaintiff Pambusco had already
closed its evidence and submitted its case. Her administrator
substituted. By this substitution, the estate had notice of the
claim. The estate was thus represented. The administrator did
not complain of the substitution. At no time did the estate of
the deceased impugn the authority of the regular courts to
determine the civil case. Much less did it seek abatement of
the civil suit. On the contrary, its administrator took active
steps to protect the interests of the estate. He joined issue
with plaintiff. He filed an amended answer. He
counterclaimed. He went to trial. Defeated in the Court of
First Instance, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. He even
elevated that civil case to this Court. Now that the judgment
has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said
judgment — reached after a full dress trial on the merits —
will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to
have Pambusco's claim re- litigated in the estate proceedings.
For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is
generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's
representative. And, waiver is to be determined from the
administrator's "acts and conduct." Certainly, the
administrator's failure to plead the statute of nonclaims, his
active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the
civil suit, amount to such waiver.
It matters not that Pambusco's said claim was filed
with the probate court without the six-month period from
March 25, 1955, set forth in the notice to creditors. For,
Section 2, Rule 86, permits acceptance of such belated
claims. Says Section 2:
SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In
the notice provided in the preceding section, the
court shall state the time for the filing of claims
against the estate, which shall not be more than
twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the
date of the first publication of the notice. However,
at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed
to file his claim within the time previously limited,
the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as
are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a
tune not exceeding one (1) month.
Here, the claim was filed in the probate court on February 25,
1959, while the defendants in the civil case were still
perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show
that the administrator objected thereto upon the ground that
it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are
persuaded to say, is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of
the claim. And, the order of final distribution is still to be
given.
Besides, the order of the lower court of March 18, 1961
allowing payment of appellee's claim "impliedly granted said
appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim."
The probate court's discretion has not been abused. It should
not be disturbed.
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the order of the
lower court of March 13, 1961 and May 24, 1961, under
review. Costs against appellants. So ordered.
Decision affirmed.
28 Heirs of Ramon Pizarro, Sr. v. Hon. Francisco
Consolacion, CFI Davao, and Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An
G.R. No. L-51278 | May 9, 1988 | Gancayco, J.
TOPIC: How claims presented/prosecuted
DOCTRINE: The filing of such claims should be for a period of
6 months, starting from the 6th month after the date of the
first publication of the notice down to the 12th month, as per
Sec. 2 of Rule 86.
ER: Respondent Luis Tan filed for the issuance of LOA. But this
was opposed by the petitioners. So, the CFI of Davao set the
hearing at a certain date and published its order and
respondent’s petition in the Mindanao Times in March 30,
1978. Issue came about when the petitioners filed their 2
claims against the estate in March 5, 1979, and March 29,
1979. Respondent and the CFI of Davao said that the
petitioners’ claims were filed out of time since they should
have been filed within 6 months from date of 1st publication.
But SC said that this is wrong. Sec. 2 of Rule 86 says that the
period for filing of claims should start only from the 6th
month, after the date of 1st publication, up to 12th month.
Thus, SC said petitioners’ claims were timely filed. Purpose is
to ensure speedy settlement. But to follow the CFI’s ruling
would violate Sec. 2 of Rule 86.
FACTS:
● Petitioners are the oppositors in a SpecPro case in
the CFI of Davao for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by respondent
herein, Luis Tan alias Chen Yeh-An.
● The records disclose that on Aug. 12, 1977, Luis Tan
filed a verified petition with the CFI for the issuance
of letters of administration (LOA) in favor of a certain
Alfonso Atilano. It alleged that:
a. Respondent is the only surviving son of the
deceased Dominga Garcia who died intestate
sometime in 1930 in Canton, China;
b. The latter left a parcel of land in C.M. Recto
Avenue, Davao City;
c. Said lot is in the possession of the heirs of
Ramon Pizarro, 2 petitioners herein;
d. On Oct. 4, 1977, petitioners filed an opposition
to the said petition claiming that they are the
36
heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died intestate on
June 16, 1974; and
e. The deceased was the vendee of 1/2 of such lot
by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate
and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicenta
Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966.
● Petitioners prayed that LOA of Dominga Garcia’s
estate be issued in favor of anyone of them.
● CFI – Ordered setting the petition for hearing. Said
order and the petition were duly published in the
Mindanao Times. The City of Davao was likewise
served with a copy of said petition.
● But after respondent had begun presentation of
evidence, the parties entered into a compromise
whereby petitioners agreed to withdraw their
opposition to the appointment of respondent’s
recommendee and for the intestate proceedings to
proceed in due course. Said agreement was
approved.
● On March 27, 1978, after the judicial administrator
had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the
late Dominga Garcia was approved, CFI ordered the
requiring the filing of creditors’ claim against the said
estate within 6 months from the date of the first
publication. Copy of said order was received by
petitioners through counsel on March 28, 1979.
● Meanwhile, on Jan. 23, 1979, respondent and the
City of Davao filed a joint motion asking the CFI to
take notice of their agreement which provides for an
agreement to file a joint motion to proceed with the
determination of the heirs of the deceased Dominga
Garcia which shall be determinative of their
respective claims against the estate.
● On Feb. 19, 1979, petitioners opposed said joint
motion because it is without procedural basis. On
Feb. 28, 1979, respondent filed a motion to drop and
exclude the petitioners on the ground that they do
not even claim to be the heirs of the deceased
Dominga Garcia and that the extrajudicial deed of
partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly
executed in Hongkong in favor of the petitioners’
deceased father is spurious and simulated.
● On March 5, 1979, petitioners, again, opposed. They
also filed a claim against the estate of the deceased
Garcia in the amount of P350k representing services
allegedly rendered by their deceased father in favor
of Vicenta Tan.
● On March 8, 1979, respondent replied to petitioners’
opposition and filed a motion to strike out or dismiss
the claim on the ground that it is spurious and
barred for having been filed beyond the 6 month
period set in the notice for the filing of creditors’
claim.
● On March 29, 1979, petitioners filed another claim
against the estate for P200k allegedly advanced by
their deceased father for the payment of realty and
income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to
 which claim private respondent filed an opposition ● Since the notice issued and the period set was not in
on the ground that it is barred for having been filed accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 86, what should then
beyond the 6 month period and that it was merely apply is the period as provided for by the rules which
intended to delay the proceedings. is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months
● CFI - Dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the from the date of first publication of notice.
ground that they are barred for having been filed out ● The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao
of time. Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus, the 2 claims of
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ claim were filed out of petitioners against the estate which were filed on
time. March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively
HELD: NO. were filed on time.
● Petitioners - The CFI’s order, which directed that the ● The other issue raised in the petition is the CFI’s
filing of claims against the estate of the late Dominga authority to determine whether the appeal involves
Garcia be filed within 6 months after the first a question of law or both questions of law and facts.
publication of the notice, is null and void in that it is SC ruled that the CFI was within its competence and
violative of Sec. 2, Rule 86. jurisdiction to determine whether the appeal of
● Petitioners - Such provision mandates that the filing petitioners was based on pure questions of law or
of such claims should be for a period of 6 months involves both law and facts. The provision cited by
starting from the 6th month after the date of the petitioners (Section 3, Rule 50) applies only when
first publication of the notice down to the 12th the appeal is already brought to the CA at which
month. To require filing of claims within the 6th time it may, instead of dismissing the appeal, upon
month from publication of notice will shorten the determination that it involves a pure question of
period in violation of the mandatory provisions of law, order that the case be certified to the SC.
Sec. 2, Rule 86. ● It must be noted that in the notice of appeal, it is not
CFI’s point even required that the appellant indicate the court
1st publication ----------> 6th month ----------> 12th month to which’ its appeal is being interposed. The
File claim here requirement is merely directory and failure to
Petitioners’ point comply with it or error in the court indicated is not
1st publication ----------> 6th month ----------> 12th month fatal to the appeal.
F
ile claim WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
here orders of the respondent court of June 1, 1979 and
● SC – Agreed with petitioners. The range of the period July 17, 1979 are reversed and set aside in so far as
specified in the rule is intended to give the probate the claims filed by petitioners were found to be
court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of barred, the same having been timely filed, without
claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
set the period provided it is not less than 6 months
nor more than 12 months from the date of the first
publication of the notice. Such period once fixed by
the court is mandatory.
● The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within
which claims against an estate must be presented, is
to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased person and the early delivery of the
property to the person entitled to the same.
● SC cites Sikat v. Vda. de Villanueva - The speedy
settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid is the
ruling spirit of our probate law.
● However, in this case, the CFI set the period for the
filing of the claims within 6 months from the date of
the first publication of the notice. It was obviously
short of the minimum limit of 6 months provided for
by the law. Petitioner correctly observed that the
trial court thereby shortened the period set by the
law.
37
29 Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-
Asahi Glass Corporation
GR NO. 147561, DATE: June 22, 2006, PONENTE:
TOPIC: Claims allowed
DOCTRINE/S:
● As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or
the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except
when the transmission is prevented by the law, the
stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are
identified with the persons themselves are
extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of
money claims arising from a contract against the
estate of a deceased debtor.
EMERGENCY RECIT: .
Respondent entered in to a contract with Santos, proprietor
of JDS for the construction of roadways and drainage. It is to
be completed within a period f 240 days. A performance bond
was executed by JDS together with Stronghold to guarantee
the satisfactory performance of the construction. However,
the construction of JDS was slow and which resulted in the
fear that the construction would not be finished within 240
days. Respondent extrajudicially rescinded the contract and
hired another contractor to finish the work. Respondent sent
letters to Petitioner stronghold for the claim of the
performance bond but it went unheeded. Hence, a complaint
was filed to both JDS and Stronghold. However, Santos, the
proprietor of JDS died during the pendency of the case.
Stronghold argued that the Respondent's money claims
against petitioner and JDS have been extinguished by the
death of Santos, Jr. RTC Ruling: ruled in favor of petitioner
stronghold. CA Ruling: Ruled in favor Respondent Republic
Asahi. SC: sustained CA ruling. Only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are
extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased
debtor.
FACTS:
1. Rrespondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation
(Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with Santos,
Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction (JDS), for the
construction of roadways and a drainage system in
Republic-Asahi's compound in Pasig City.
2. Respondent was to pay JDS P5,300,000.00 to be
completed within a period of 240 days beginning
May 8, 1989. In order 'to guarantee the faithful and
satisfactory performance of its undertakings' JDS,
shall post a performance bond of P795,000.00.
3. JDS executed, jointly and severally with Petitioner
Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) a Performance
Bond
4. Respondent paid to JDS P795,000.00 downpayment.
38
5. "Several times prior to November of 1989,
Respondent's engineers called the attention of JDS
to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the
construction, which resulted in the fear that the
construction will not be finished within the
stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders
went unheeded by JDS.
6. Dissatisfied with the progress of the work
undertaken by JDS, Respondent extrajudicially
rescinded the contract pursuant to Article XIII of said
contract, and wrote a letter to JDS informing the
latter of such rescission.
7. Such rescission, according to Article XV of the
contract shall not be construed as a waiver of
Respondent's right to recover damages from JDS and
the latter's sureties
8. Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner SICI filing its
claim under the bond for not less than P795,000.00.
Respondent again sent another letter reiterating its
demand for payment under the aforementioned
bond. Both letters allegedly went unheeded.
9. Respondent then filed a complaint against JDS and
SICI. It sought from JDS payment of P3,256,874.00
representing the additional expenses incurred by
Respondent for the completion of the project using
another contractor, and from JDS and SICI, jointly
and severally, payment of P750,000.00 as damages
in accordance with the performance bond;
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
and attorney's fees in the amount of at least
P100,000.00.
10. However, Santos, Jr. died the previous year (1990),
and JDS Construction was no longer at its address
and its whereabouts were unknown.
11. Petitioner SICI filed its answer, alleging that the
Respondent's money claims against petitioner and
JDS have been extinguished by the death of Santos,
Jr.
12. RTC Ruling: dismissed the complaint of respondent
against JDS and SICI, on the ground that the claim
against JDS did not survive the death of its sole
proprietor, Santos, Jr.
13. CA Ruling: The CA ruled that SICI's obligation under
the surety agreement was not extinguished by the
death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-
Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
14. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S: whether petitioner's liability under the performance
bond was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos,
the principal.
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond
principal, extinguished his liability under the surety bond.
Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any
liability under the bond.
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the
debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are
transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is
prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the
nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or
are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished
by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the
prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against
the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are
not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the
obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not
then acting as a probate court.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or
obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent
were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by
provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the
extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he
or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the
performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot
use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its
performance bond.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
30 Melencio Gabriel represented by surviving spouse,
Flordeliza V. Gabriel v. Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and
Ernesto Pagaygay
GR. No. 146989; February 7, 2007 I Azcuna, J.
TOPIC: Claims against estate (RULE 86)
DOCTRINE/S:
● When the action is for recovery of money arising from
contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment in the court in which the
action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment
obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims
against the estate of a deceased person.
● All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that
they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that
the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Repondents filed a comlaint for illegal
dismissal against Gabriel. NLRC ruled that the respondents
were illegally dismissed hence Gabriel must pay for the
monetary claim. However, before the decision of NLRC
became final, Gabriel died and when the family of Gabriel
received the decision they filed for the dismissal of the case
due to the death of Gabriel. SC ruled that when the action is
for recovery of money arising from contract, express or
implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
All claims for money against the decedent arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, and judgment for money against the
decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be
set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants.
FACTS:
● Sps. Gabriel was the owner- operator of a public
transport business, “Gabriel Jeepney” They had a pool of
drivers which included Bilon, Brazil, and Pagaygay under
a boundary system of 400.00php/day.
● Nelson, Brazil and Pagaygay filed a separate complaint
for illegal dismissal against Sps. Gabriel which was
consolidated. They alleged that they were regular drivers
of Gabriel Jeepney, driving 5 days/ week with an average
of daily earnings of 400.00php. That they were forced to
pay additional 55.00php/ day for police protection,
washing deposit and garage fees. Later on, Gabriel told
them not to drive anymore and when they went to the
garage they were not given any unit to drive. That the
boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered
regular employees of the jeepney operators. Being such,
they are entitled to security of tenure. Petitioner,
however, dismissed them without factual and legal basis,
and without due process.
● LA: ruled in favor of the respondents and ruled that the
respondents were illegally dismissed. Gabriel must pay
the following:
Bilon Brazil Pagaygay
Backwag Backwag Backwages
es ₱ es ₱ ₱ 294,800
284,800 294,800 Separation
Separati Separatio Pay 26,400
on n Total: 321,2
Pay 26,4 Pay 96,80 00
00 0
Total: ₱ Total:
321,200 391,600
Total: ₱ 1,034,000
● Melencio Gabriel passed away. Counsel for petitioner
filed an entry of appearance with motion to dismiss the
case for the reason that petitioner passed away. They
appealed to the NLRC contending that the LA erred in not
dismissing the case, despite notice of the death of
Gabriel before final judgment.
● NLRC: reversed the decision and dismissed the case for
lack of EE-ER and the death of Melencio Gabriel on April
39
 4, 1997 ipso facto negates recovery of the money claim
against the successors-in-interest.
● CA: Reversed. Section 3, Rule III of the NLRC Manual on
Execution of Judgment, which provides:
SECTION 3. Execution in Case of Death of Party. – Where
a party dies after the finality of the decision/entry of
judgment of order, execution thereon may issue or one
already issued may be enforced in the following cases:
a) x x x ;
b) In case of death of the losing party, against his
successor-in-interest, executor or administrator;
c) In case of death of the losing party after execution
is actually levied upon any of his property, the same
may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the
sheriff making the sale shall account to his
successor-in-interest, executor or administrator for
any surplus in his hands.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the claims survived despite the
death of Melencio Gabriel?- Yes
HELD: With regard to respondents’ monetary claim, the same
shall be governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court which provides:1awphi1.net
SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. – When the
action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final
judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead
be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
(21a)
In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred ; exceptions. – All claims for money against the
decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, ... and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against
the claimants….
Thus, in accordance with the above Rules, the money claims
of respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner
Melencio Gabriel.
PETITION IS DENIED
31 - Alfredo Hilado et al vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 164108. May 8, 2009 | J. TINGA
TOPIC: Rule 86 - Claims allowed
DOCTRINE:
40
While there is no general right on the part of a creditor or
any person interested in the estate to intervene, they
may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from
the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to
protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can
protected.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioners are the creditors of the estate of deceased
Roberto Benedictor. They filed with the Manila RTC a
Motion praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent Julita, administratrix of
Benedicto’s estate, opposed the motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her deceased husband. RTC denied the
motion on the ground that petitioner are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the ROC particularly
Rule 19 to intervene in the intestate proceedings which
was affirmed by CA. SC affirmed the decision rendered
by RTC and CA, and ruled that petitioners which were
qualified as persons interested in the intestate estate of
Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights as provided for such interested persons in the
Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
under the Rules on Special Proceedings.
FACTS:
l A well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto
died intestate in May 2000. He was survived
by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix), and his only
daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.
l At the time of his death, there were two pending
civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners.
l Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. RTC issued an
order appointing Julita as administrator of the
estate of her deceased husband, and issuing
letters of administration in her favor.
l In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory,
Julita included as among the liabilities, the
above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City
courts.RTC required Julita to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal
report pertaining to the estate.
l Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,
praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings.
l RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the
 contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.
l Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
dismissing the petition and declaring that the
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. CA also cited the fact
that the claims of petitioners against the
decedent were in fact contingent or expectant,
as these were still pending litigation in separate
proceedings before other courts.
l Hence, the present petition. Petitioners cited in
support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions
of the Rules on Special Proceedings
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings
of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. - NO.
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court x
x x"
While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not
literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the
intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held
that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant."
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within
the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule
72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall
be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings." Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend
to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under
Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims. Even if it were declared that petitioners have no
right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they
had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is
not one of those reliefs.
Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to
participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. It appears that the claims against
Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
41
Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the
notice to creditors required under Rule 86.
These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death
of the decedent and may be commenced against the
administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the
records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully
impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other
civil case was already pending review before this Court
at the time of Benedicto's death.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the
intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire
to protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate left subject of administration
and distribution; and the court is justified in taking
cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable
fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence
in the determination and distribution of the estate.
Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly
provides that "action to recover real or personal property
from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator."
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending
action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is
rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would
have already been distributed, or diminished to the
extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
While there is no general right to intervene on the part of
the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain
prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules by which
such interests can be protected.
Petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate
proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. Running account would allow
them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their
interests be compromised, such as the right, under
Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.
The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested
persons" entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. Allowing creditors, contingent or
otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
upon them.We do not doubt that there are reliefs
available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have
explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the
qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the
intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to
such notices and rights as provided for such interested
persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of
Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
32 Echaus v. Blanco
32 ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and
as Administratrix of the Estate of Luis Puentevella, assisted
by her husband, RENE ECHAUS, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON
BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Charles
Newton Hodges, AVELINA A. MAGNO, as Administratrix of
the Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989– First Division,
MIDIALDEA
TOPIC: Rule86; Claims Allowed
DOCTRINE/S:
● the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is
not exclusive; that money claims against the estate
may be allowed any time before an order of
distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court
for cause and upon such terms as are equitable
EMERGENCY RECIT: Angelina Puentavella Echaus, as
administratrix of her father’s estate, filed a claim against the
estate of CN Hodges and was awarded by the court. She
opted to file a motion in the estate proceeding but was
opposed by the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges. Judge Blanco ruled holding in abeyance the
resolution to pay the judgment credit until the resolution of
the petition for relief of judgment. The issue is whether or not
claim against the estate of CN Hodges was filed within the
time allowed by the Rules. – Yes because the period
prescribed in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that
money claims against the estate may be allowed any time
before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of
the court for cause and upon such terms as are equitable. In
this case, there was no order of distribution yet regardless if
42
the motion was filed more than four years from the
publication of the notice then.
FACTS:
1. Angelina Puentavella Echaus, as administratrix of her
father’s intestate estate, filed a complaint against Charles
Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an accounting
of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the
recovery of her share in the profits and remaining assets
of their business and the payment of expenses and moral
and exemplary damages
2. Trial commenced even after the death of CN Hodges, and
the trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), as administrator
of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party
defendant. No objection to the order was interposed by
PCIB.
3. A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N.
Hodges was instituted before the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, the date of which does not appear in the
records, and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1672. A
notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a
newspaper of general circulation in its issues of March
13, 20 and 27, 1963
4. Trial ccourt ruled in favor of Angelina and awarded
P851,472.83 with legal interest thereon from date of
judgment until paid
5. A writ of execution was issued but was not enforced
because plaintiff opted to file a motion in the Special
Proceeding (estate proceedings of CN Hodges) for the
payment of the judgment.
6. Avelina Magno, the administratrix of Linnie Jane, wife of
CN Hodges, opposed the motion. She filed a petition for
relief of judgment and motion to intervene. On June 6,
1967, the heirs of C. N. Hodges filed a motion to
intervene in the same civil case
7. On July 20, 1967, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco,
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City,
Branch V, taking cognizance of Special Proceedings No.
1672, ordered holding in abeyance the resolution of the
motion of Angelina Echaus for payment of the judgment
rendered in her favor, until after the resolution of the
"Petition for Relief from Judgment" filed by
Administratrix Magno before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6628.
8. the petition for relief from judgment was denied because
Magno was not a party to the case. The twin motions to
intervene filed by the heirs of C. N. Hodges and Avelina
Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges were likewise denied on the ground that
pleadings in intervention are allowed only before or
during the trial and not when a final and executory
judgment had already been rendered
9. In a motion, Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the resolution
of her previous motion to direct payment of the
judgment credit which was held in abeyance, stating that
the petition for relief from judgment filed in Civil Case
 No. 6628 was dismissed by the trial court which dismissal
has become final and executory in view of the failure of
Avelina Magno to file a record on appeal on time.
10. Judge Blanco reiterated his position that the judgment
credit cannot be resolved yet and holding in abeyance
the resolution.
11. Petitioner Angelina filed a petition for Mandamus
believing that the judgment is final and executory and
the execution thereof becomes a matter of right under
Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The duty to
order the execution of a final and executory judgment is
ministerial and the failure of respondent judge to issue
such order is a proper case for mandamus.
12. However, private respondents contend that the
judgment was null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. Money claims against a defendant
who dies without a judgment having been rendered in
the RTC shall be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in
the estate proceedings, which was not followed by the
civil case and even if valid, the claim presented in the
estate proceedings is already barred by the statute of
non-claims.
It must be noted that civil case which is a money claim, was
Instituted during the lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its
pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the
RTC hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death,
he was substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate.
Being a money claim, said civil case should have been
dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the
intestate estate of C. N. Hodges in accordance with
Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive.-
When the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the claim against the estate of CN
Hodges was filed within the time allowed by the Rules. – Yes.
HELD: The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim
after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors,
provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The
rule provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However,
at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on
application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within
the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown
and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be
filed within a time not exceeding one (1) month. (Rule 86)
43
It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule
86]) that the period prescribed in the notice to creditors is
not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be
allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered,
at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such terms
as are equitable (Quisumbing v. Guison, 76 Phil. 730;
Edmands v. Phil. Trust Co., G.R. No. L-2670, September 29,
1950, 48 O.G. 139; Paulin v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-11267, March
20.1958: Afan v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-14715, April 28,
1960). At the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of
the judgement credit was filed, no order of distribution was
issued yet. Also, it is worthy to cite herein a situation, similar
to the case at bar which was considered by this court as a
good excuse for the late filing of a claim against the decedent:
Here the claim filed in the probate court on
February 25,1959, while the defendants in the civil
case were still perfecting their appeal therein. The
record does not show that the administrator
objected thereto upon the ground that it was filed
out of time. The pendency of that case, we are
persuaded, to say is a good excuse for tardiness in
the filing of the claim. (In pari materia: De Rama v.
Palileo, L-18935, Feb. 26, 1965). An the order of the
final distribution is still to be given. (Ignacio v.
Pambusco)
Nevertheless, while We hold that the judgment credit should
be admitted as a claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, the
question of whether an order to direct payment thereof is
compellable by mandamus is doubtful. At the time the
second motion for payment was filed by petitioner,
respondent judge's hands were "tied" by an existing writ of
preliminary injunction restraining him from hearing the estate
proceedings of both Linnie Jane and CN Hodges. Even if
petitioners' judgment credit allowed as a claim against the
estate, immediate payment thereof by the administrator of
the estate, is not a matter of right. A judgment against the
executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course
of administrator, the amount ascertained to be due, and it
shall not create a lien upon the property of the estate, or give
the judgment creditor any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule
86, Revised Rules). The time for paying debts (and legacies) is
to be fixed by the probate court having jurisdiction over the
estate of the deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of
any showing that respondent judge who is taking cognizance
of the estate proceedings had already allowed the
administrator to dispose of the estate and to pay the debts
and legacies of the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not
issue to compel him to order payment of petitioner's claim.
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that
the (plaintiffs) should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required (Province of
Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 80 SCRA 376).
PETITION IS DENIED.

44
33 Melizza vs Melizza
GR NO. L-1849 | October 25, 1949 | Ozeta
TOPIC: Rule 83, Question of ownership, how treated
DOCTRINE/S:
"By money claims, is meant any claim for 'money, debt, or
interest thereon, However, not all money claims may be
presented, but only those which are proper against the
decedent, that is, claims upon a liability contracted by the
decedent before his death. Accordingly, claims arising after
his death cannot thus be presented, except funeral
expenses."
EMERGENCY RECIT: (case is just 2 pages)
FACTS:
1. In his lifetime Melizza contracted the services of Gabin to
administer certain haciendas belonging to Melizza for a
period of thirty years at a compensation of 350 cavans of
palay per agricultural year, with the stipulation that
Gabin cannot be dismissed from the service without just
and legal cause during the time she cared to serve within
the said period of thirty years, and in case of dismissal
she shall have the right to be indemnified for the rest of
the period at the rate of 150 cavans of palay for each
agricultural year.
2. After Melizza’s death his executrix took from Gabin the
administration of said haciendas.
3. Gabin filed a claim against the estate for the payment of
150 cavans of palay per agricultural year for twenty-nine
years to which the heirs opposed on the ground that
such is not a money claim.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the claim of Gabin can be considered as a money
claim?
HELD: No.
That the claim is not allowable, first, because it arose after
the death of the decedent and, second, because it is not a
claim for money falling within the contemplation of the rules
(Rule 86 but during the time of the case, Rule 87)
PETITION, DENIED.
45
34 TESTAMENTARIA DE DON AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE
v. PATERNO R. CANLAS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-12709, Feb. 28, 1962, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Topic: Claims allowed
Doctrine: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security may
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by
ordinary action in court making the executor or administrator
a party defendant, and need not file his claim before the
probate court to share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate. Under the same theory, an action to
recover real or personal property from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested
person against the executor or administrator independently
of the testate or intestate proceedings.
Facts:
1. Amadeo Matute Olave died on April 4, 1855.
Testamentary proceedings were instituted before the
CFI.
2. During the lifetime of Matute, he was a party defendant
in a civil case wherein Atty. Paterno Canlas was his
counsel. They entered into an agreement that the
attorney’s fees will amount to 20% of the market value
of the property in litigation payable upon termination
of the case.
3. On August 4, 1953, Atty. Canlas filed in Civil Case No. L-
14208 of the CFI of Manila a motion praying that his
claim for attorney's fees for the services he has rendered
to defendant Matute be established as a charging lien,
which was later supplemented by another motion,
wherein he recited the services he had rendered and the
amount of fees he was entitled to.
4. This was granted by the court, stating that Atty. Canlas'
claim for attorney's fees is thereby established "on the
P100,000.00 balance of the deposit still with the Clerk of
Court of this Court and on all the other properties, real
and personal, involved in this case." (charging lien) The
court also ordered the lien to be annotated on the titles
of all the real properties involved in the case.
5. Around a month after the death of Matute, Atty. Canlas
filed an urgent for the amount of P85,000 that was
deposited with the clerk of court be ordered delivered to
him in full settlement of his services as he had already
filed the brief in the case then pending before the SC.
6. The administrator of the estate opposed, claiming that
the court had no jurisdiction because the motion
involving a money claim must be submitted to the
probate court.
7. In the meantime, the CFI which had jurisdiction over the
civil case, granted Atty. Canlas authority to withdraw
partial payments from said deposit. Then on April 30,
1957, it issued an order holding that it had authority to
entertain Canlas' claim for attorney's fees.
8. To nullify this order, the administrator of the estate has
interposed the present petition for certiorari alleging
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Issue: Having Amadeo Matute Olave died before the
attorney's fees he agreed to pay to his counsel Paterno R.
Canlas had been fully paid and after the claim of the latter for
attorney's fees had been established as a charging lien in the
ordinary civil case, which court shall entertain the payment of
the balance of said claim? - The court in the ordinary case
has jurisdiction.
Held:
It is clear that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased
secured by mortgage or other collateral security may
foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by
ordinary action in court making the executor or administrator
a party defendant, and need not file his claim before the
probate court to share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate. Under the same theory, an action to
recover real or personal property from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, may be prosecuted by the interested
person against the executor or administrator independently
of the testate or intestate proceedings. And it cannot be
gainsaid that a charging lien established on the property in
litigation to secure the payment of the attorney's fees of
Atty. Canlas partakes of the nature of a collateral security or
of a lien on real or personal property within the meaning of
the provisions of our rules.
The reason behind the rule which exempts money claims
covered by a mortgage or other collateral security or lien
from the jurisdiction of probate courts appears well-stated in
the American authorities as follows: According to the weight
of authority, a creditor whose claim is secured by mortgage,
pledge, or any specific lien need not present his claim for
allowance in order to preserve his right to subject the
property covered by the lien to the satisfaction of his claim,
for the reason that such claims cannot in any just sense be
considered claims against the estate, but the right to subject
specific property to the claim arises from the contract of the
debtor whereby be has during life set aside certain property
for its payment, and such property does not, except in so far
as its value may exceed the debt, belong to the estate, and
the instrument being of record or the property being in the
possession of the creditor is notice to all the world of the
contract.
Our conclusion is also supported by the principle that a
probate court, being of limited jurisdiction, has no authority
to enforce a lien unless conferred by a statute. The statutory
jurisdiction of a probate court is exclusive (34 C.J.S. 721), and
since the lien referred to in Section 1, Rule 88 is not among
those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 87, it is reasonable to
assume that all money claims secured with a lien are outside
the jurisdiction of the probate court.
46
Petition is DISMISSED.
35 First National City Bank v Tan
GR L-14234, Feb. 28, 1962,
Topic: Rule 86, Claims allowed
Doctrine:
● A deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and
must be filed with the probate court where the
settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor
is pending, within the period of time fixed for the
filing of claims
Facts:
● On July 2, 1947 the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered judgment on an action to foreclose a real
estate mortgage which ordered Silvio Cheng Tan
alias Silvio Cheng Pan amongst them to pay, jointly
and severally, The First National City Bank of New
York the sum of P142,000.56, and providing that in
case of default of payment within the period of time
therein given, the properties mortgaged by said
defendants be sold at Public auction to satisfy the
judgment.
● A deficiency judgment was rendered on March 25,
1950 for P98,256.13. Despite sale of two parcels of
land in Bulacan, there remained unsatisfied the sum
of P38,090.06.
● Petitioner instituted the present action on June 26,
1957 against Silvio Cheng Tan in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to revive the judgment for the
reason that the five-year period for the enforcement
of the deficiency judgment by mere motion had
elapsed without the same having been satisfied
● Cheng Tan died and was substituted by his legal
representative, Serafin Cheng, who argued that a
motion to dismiss the action arguing that the
plaintiff should file its claim in the intestate estate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said
deceased. The petition was granted.
Issue: Should the petitioner file its claim in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased Tan?
Ruling:
● Yes. It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil
action remaining unsatisfied after 5 years from its
date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere
right of action but this does not argue against the
proposition that it should be filed with the probate
court for corresponding action. To the contrary,
reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere
right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory
note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be
 submitted as a claim to the probate court where the
settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is
pending.
● WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed
36 VERA vs. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979, DE CASTRO, J.
TOPIC: Claims allowed
DOCTRINE/S:
Section 5, Rule 86 shows that it makes no mention of claims
for monetary obligation of the decedent created by law, such
as taxes which is entirely of different character from the
claims expressly enumerated therein
EMERGENCY RECIT: Short facts
FACTS:
1. A motion for allowance of claim and for payment of
taxes dated May 28, 1969 was filed in the "Intestate
Estate of Luis D. Tongoy” proceeding. The claim
represents the indebtedness to the Government of
the late Luis D. Tongoy for deficiency income taxes in
the total sum of P3,254.80 to which motion was
attached Proof of Claim
2. The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the
ground that the claim was barred under Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Finding the opposition
well-founded, Judge Fernandez dismissed the
motion for allowance of claim filed by the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statute of non-claims Section 5,
Rule 86 of the New Rule of Court, bars claim of the
government for unpaid taxes, still within the period of
limitation prescribed in Section 331 and 332 of the National
Internal Revenue Code?
HELD: NO
● Section 5, Rule 86 shows that it makes no mention of
claims for monetary obligation of the decedent
created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of
different character from the claims expressly
enumerated therein, such as: "all claims for money
against the decedent arising from contract, express
or implied, whether the same be due, not due or
contingent, all claim for funeral expenses and
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and
judgment for money against the decedent."
● Under the familiar rule of statutory construction
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing
not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate, everything else
must necessarily, and by implication be excluded
from its operation and effect.
47
● Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ilagan
Electric & Ice Plant, et al., G.R. No. L-23081,
December 30, 1969: the assessment, collection and
recovery of taxes, as well as the matter of
prescription thereof are governed by the provisions
of the National Internal revenue Code, particularly
Sections 331 and 332 thereof, and not by other
provisions of law. Even without being specifically
mentioned, the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court may reasonably be presumed to
have been also in the mind of the Court as not
affecting the aforecited Section of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
● Pineda vs. CFI of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803: taxes
assessed against the estate of a deceased person ...
need not be submitted to the committee on claims
in the ordinary course of administration. In the
exercise of its control over the administrator, the
court may direct the payment of such taxes upon
motion showing that the taxes have been assessed
against the estate." The abolition of the Committee
on Claims does not alter the basic ruling laid down
giving exception to the claim for taxes from being
filed as the other claims mentioned in the Rule
should be filed before the Court. Claims for taxes
may be collected even after the distribution of the
decedent's estate among his heirs who shall be liable
therefor in proportion of their share in the
inheritance.
● The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims
for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of
exception from the application of the statute of non-
claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of
the Government and their prompt and certain
availability are imperious need.
● To safeguard such interest, neglect or omission of
government officials entrusted with the collection of
taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as
private persons may be made to suffer individually
on account of his own negligence, the presumption
being that they take good care of their personal
affairs. This should not hold true to government
officials with respect to matters not of their own
personal concern. This is the philosophy behind the
government's exception, as a general rule, from the
operation of the principle of estoppel. As already
shown, taxes may be collected even after the
distribution of the estate of the decedent among his
heirs.
● Payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the
Government of the Philippines from the time the
assessment was made by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties,
etc. By virtue of such lien, this court held that the
property of the estate already in the hands of an heir
or transferee may be subject to the payment of the
 tax due the estate. A fortiori before the inheritance
has passed to the heirs, the unpaid taxes due the
decedent may be collected, even without its having
been presented under Section 2 of Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It may truly be said that until the
property of the estate of the decedent has vested in
the heirs, the decedent, represented by his estate,
continues as if he were still alive, subject to the
payment of such taxes as would be collectible from
the estate even after his death.
● Even assuming arguendo that claims for taxes have
to be filed within the time prescribed in Section 2,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, the claim in question
may be filed even after the expiration of the time
originally fixed therein.
● In the instant case, petitioners filed an application
which, though filed after the expiration of the time
previously limited but before an order of the
distribution is entered, should have been granted by
the respondent court, in the absence of any valid
ground, as none was shown, justifying denial of the
motion, specially considering that it was for
allowance Of claim for taxes due from the estate,
which in effect represents a claim of the people at
large, the only reason given for the denial that the
claim was filed out of the previously limited period,
sustaining thereby private respondents' contention,
erroneously as has been demonstrated.
PETITION GRANTED.
37 PEOPLE vs BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007 | September 2, 1994 | ROMERO
TOPIC: Claims against the estate
DOCTRINE/S:
● Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
FACTS:
- Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital.
- Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file
its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged. In his
comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that
48
the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil
liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of
People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still
be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction
by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
ISSUE/S: What claims may be made against the estate or the
executor/administrator?
HELD:
- Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of
what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments
for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict
do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action
ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and
(2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before
the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality
of his conviction.
- Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of,
he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously
charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.
- If the same act or omission complained of also arises
from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an
injury to person or property (real or personal), the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages
for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may
be commenced against him.
- This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where
we held that, in recovering damages for injury to persons
thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of
 the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86
because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from
contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims,
we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations
other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
- Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of
also arises from contract, the separate civil action must
be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
PETITION IS DISMISSED.
38 METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170498, Jan 9 2013, Brion, J.
TOPIC: Claims allowed
DOCTRINE/S:
Liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should
be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided
in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
EMERGENCY RECIT: SHCI sued AMC concerning its advance
payments made in Metrobank crossed checks (payable to
AMC) for purchases that were not delivered. The checks were
delivered to Chua, AMC’s General Manager. A third-party
complaint was filed against Metrobank. Metrobank wanted to
file a fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate for
reimbursement. SC says Metrobank should instead file its
claim before the special proceedings for the settlement of
Chua’s estate because it’s claim is characterized as solutio
indebiti or a quasi-contract— Chua had the obligation to
return the checks. Further, it’s claim is contingent on whether
or not it would be made liable to AMC.
FACTS:
13. Sherwood Holdings Corporation Inc (SHCI) it made
advance payments to Absolute Management Corporation
(AMC) for purchases of plywood and plyboards. The
crossed checks amounting to 12m were given to Chua,
AMC’s General Manager, in 1998.
14. Chua died in 1999 and a special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was commenced before RTC
Pasay.
15. SHCI made demands on AMC for undelivered items
worth 8m. The transactions could not be found in AMC’s
records.
16. AMC conducted an investigation and discovered that in
1998, Chua received 18 Metrobank checks wroth 31m
from SHCI. The crossed checks were all payable to AMC.
17. 2000: SHCI filed a complaint for a sum of money against
AMC before RTC QC.
49
18. AMC filed a 3rd party complaint against Metrobank.
19. RTC granted Metrobank’s Motion for Bill of Particulars.
AMC failed to submit it. Metrobank filed a motion to
strike our 3rd party complaint.
20. Metrobank filed a MTD against AMC on the ground that
it engaged in forum shopping on the ground that AMC’s
claim against it is the same claim it raised against Chua’s
estate in the special proceedings before RTC Pasay.
Denied.
21. RTC QC opted to defer consideration of Metrobank’s
motion to strike out 3rd party complaint and instead
granted AMC’s motion for leave to serve written
interrogatories on the Metrobank. Metrobank filed its
answer to the written interrogatories while AMC was
against directed to submit its bill of particulars.
- Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in
question to the account of Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and
managed. The deposit was allegedly done with the
knowledge and consent of AMC.
- Chua submitted documents showing his position and
interest in AMC. AMC also admitted that it allowed
Chua to manage AMC with a “relatively free hand”.
Metrobank claims this was gross negligence on the
part of AMC.
- Metrobank claims AMC is estopped considering AMC
had knowledge of the arrangements with Chua for
several years but did not object to it.
22. Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit 4th party
complaint against Chua’s estate which should reimburse
the bank in case it would be held liable.
23. RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. The RTC categorized
Metrobank’s allegation in the fourth-party complaint as a
"cobro de lo indebido"– a kind of quasi-contract that
mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid.
Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied
contracts that must be included in the claims required to
be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased’s
estate.
24. Metrobank filed a R65 petition for certiorari before CA.
CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling that the 4th party complaint
should have been filed in the special proceedings.
- The relief sought by Metrobank was based on a
quasi-contract and was a money claim categorized as
an implied contract (solution indebiti).
- Based on the statutory construction principle of lex
specialis derogat generali, Sec 5, Rule 86 is a special
provision that should prevail over the general
provisions of Sec 11 Rule 6. The latter applies to
money claims in ordinary actions while a money
claim against a person already deceased falls under
the settlement of his estate that is governed by the
rules on special proceedings. If at all, rules for
ordinary actions only apply suppletorily to special
proceedings.
25. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Metrobank asserts that it should be allowed to file a
 fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate in the
proceedings before the RTC; its fourth-party complaint
was filed merely to enforce its right to be reimbursed by
Chua’s estate in case Metrobank is held liable to AMC.
ISSUE/S: Should Metrobank’s fourth party complaint be
allowed?
HELD: No.
1. Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be
filed under Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
- Maclan vs. Garcia: A claim for necessary expenses
spent as previous possessor of the subject land is a
kind of quasi-contract. The term "implied contracts"
originated from the common law where obligations
derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both
considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term
quasi-contract is included in the concept "implied
contracts" as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly,
liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-
contracts should be filed as claims in the settlement
of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
2. Metrobank’s 4th party complaint is based on quasi-
contract.
- Article 2154 embodies the concept "solutio indebiti"
which arises when something is delivered through
mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It
obligates the latter to return what has been received
through mistake. It has two requisites: (1) that
something has been unduly delivered through
mistake; and (2) that something was received when
there was no right to demand it.
- The instant case fulfills the requisites of solutio
indebiti.
- First, Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake
when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber
and Hardware’s account; because of Chua’s control
over AMC’s operations, Metrobank assumed that the
checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account.
- Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to
demand and receive the checks that were deposited
to its account; despite Chua’s control over AMC and
Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two entities are
distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly
payable to one cannot be deposited in the account
of the other.
- So, there is an obligation on the part of Ayala
Lumber and Hardware, through Chua, to return the
checks to Metrobank.
- The abovementioned description of the claim as
solutio indebiti, however, is not an adjudication of
liability. The appropriate trial court should still
determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim
against Chua’s estate.
50
- A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party
complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be
adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or
may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably
marks the complaint as a contingent one that must
be included in the claims falling under the terms of
Section 5, Rule 86 .
3. Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 prevail over
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.
- CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of lex
specialis derogat general was correct.
- The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 should
prevail over the general provisions of Section 11,
Rule 6. The settlement of the estate of deceased
persons (where claims against the deceased should
be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special
proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 ofthe Rules of
Court, merely apply suppletorily.
Other procedural issues:
● AMC argues that Metrobank’s failure to append relevant
AMC pleadings submitted to the RTC and to the CA
violated Sec 4 R45 and is a sufficient ground to dismiss
the petition.
● The requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose
violation would automatically lead to the petition’s
dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to
be totally rigid.
● Procedural rules should be liberally construed to
promote their objective and to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding.
● An examination of Metrobank’s petition shows that it
contains AMC’s opposition to its motion to admit fourth-
party complaint among its annexes. The rest of the
pleadings have been subsequently submitted as
attachments in Metrobank’s Reply. A reading of these
pleadings shows that their arguments are the same as
those stated in the orders of the lower courts. Even if
Metrobank’s petition did not contain some of AMC’s
pleadings, the Court still had the benefit of a clear
narration of facts and arguments according to both
parties’ perspectives.
PETITION IS DENIED.
39 Evangelista v. La provedra
40 Briones v. Henson-Cruz
G.R. No. 159130; August 22, 2008
Doctrine/s:
1. Section 8. Claim of executor or administrator against
an estate. - If the executor or administrator has a claim
 against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof in writing, to the court, and the court shall
appoint a special administrator, who shall, in the
adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be
subject to the same liability as the general administrator
or executor in the settlement of other claims. The court
may order the executor or administrator to pay the
special administrator necessary funds to defend such
action.
2. Section 13. Judgment appealable. The judgment of
the court approving or disapproving a claim, shall be filed
with the record of the administration proceedings with
notice to both parties, and is appealable as in ordinary
cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator
shall be that he pay, in due course of administration, the
amount ascertained to be due, and it shall not create any
lien upon the property of the estate, or give to the
judgment creditor any priority of payment.
Facts:
1. Ruby J. Henson filed a petition for the allowance
of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson.
2. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased's
daughters opposed Ruby's petition. She alleged
that Ruby understated the value of their late
mother's estate and acted with "unconscionable
bad faith" in the management thereof. Lilia
prayed that her mother's holographic will be
disallowed and that she be appointed as the
Intestate Administratrix.
3. Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment
of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate
of her late mother, praying that the Prudential
Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be
appointed as Interim Special Administrator. The
trial court granted the motion but designated
Jose V. Ferro (Senior Vice-President and Trust
Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines
National Bank) as the Special Administrator.
Ferro, however, declined the appointment.
4. The trial court then designated petitioner Atty.
George S. Briones as Special Administrator of
the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the
appointment, took his oath of office, and started
the administration of the estate. The significant
highlights of his administration are listed below:
7. On February 21, 2002, the respondents
filed an audit request with the trial court.
Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting
that the audit be done by an independent
auditor at the expense of the estate.
8. In an Order dated March 12, 2002, the
trial court granted the request for audit and
appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo
& Co. to conduct the audit.
51
5. On April 29, 2002, respondents filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus which was raffled
to the CA's Ninth Division. The petition assailed
the Order dated March 12, 2002 which
appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as
auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002
which reiterated the appointment.
6. Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari in CA,
the heirs of Luz Henzon filed a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC assailing the Order insofar as it
directed the payment of Atty. Briones'
commission. They subsequently filed their
record on appeal.
7. The trial court, however, denied the appeal and
disapproved the record on appeal on the ground
of forum shopping. Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
8. On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a
Petition for Mandamus with the appellate
court. They claimed that the trial court
unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial
duty to approve their seasonably-perfected
appeal. They refuted the trial court's finding of
forum shopping by declaring that the issues in
their appeal and in their petition for certiorari
are not identical, although both stemmed from
the same Order of April 3, 2002. The appeal
involved the payment of the special
administrator's commission, while the petition
for certiorari assailed the appointment of an
accounting firm to conduct an external audit.
9. Court of Appeals granted the respondents'
petition for Mandamus.
10. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court
had neither the power nor the authority to deny
the appeal on the ground of forum shopping.
11. Atty. Briones moved for the reconsideration of
this decision. The appellate court denied his
motion. Thereupon, he seasonably filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
ground that the CA refused to resolve the issue
of forum shopping.
12. In the interim, on August 5, 2003, the Court of
Appeals (Ninth Division) granted the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on the
appointment of the auditing firm.
Issue/s:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the
respondents' petition for mandamus on the ground of
forum shopping? NO
Held:
Issue 1:
 1. The designation of the accounting firm of Alba, special administrator's commission - is the court's definite
Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit of the administration and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a
of Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of Luz J. Henson, higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the court's
at the expense of the estate. ruling.

The first part of the Order (the auditor's appointment) was From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special
the subject of the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and Administrator's commission is no less a claim against the
mandamus that the respondents filed before the appellate estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8,
court. Whether this part is interlocutory or one that fully Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for
settles the case on the merits can be answered by the test "Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate." Under
that this Court laid down in Mirada v. Court of Appeals: "The Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a
test to ascertain whether or not an order is interlocutory or claim against the estate "is appealable as in ordinary cases."
final is - Does it leave something to be done in the trial court Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is extent of the Special Administrator's commission -
interlocutory; if it does not it is final." effectively, a claim by the special administrator against the
The terms of the trial court's order with respect to estate - is the lower court's last word on the matter and one
the appointment or "designation" of the accounting that is appealable.
firm is clear: "to immediately conduct an audit of the
administration by Atty. George S. Briones of the Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the
estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of petition and, accordingly, AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
which shall be charged against the estate." Appeals dated February 11, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844.
Given that the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Costs against the petitioner.
Briones' Final Report in the administration of the
estate of the decedent, its preparatory character is
obvious; it is a prelude to the court's final settlement
and distribution of the properties of the decedent to
the heirs. In the context of what the court's order
41 Paredes v. moya
accomplishes, the court's designation of an auditor
does not have the effect of ruling on the pending 42 Manalasan v. Castaneda
estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of
finally determining the extent of the net estate of
the deceased and distributing it to the heirs) or on
the merits of any independently determinable
aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for
purposes of confirming the accuracy of the Special
Administrator's Final Report, particularly of the
reported charges against the estate. In other words,
the designation of the auditor did not resolve Special
Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently
determinable issue therein, and left much to be
done on the merits of the case. Thus, the April 3,
2002 Order of the RTC is interlocutory in so far as it
designated an accounting firm to audit the
petitioner's special administration of the estate

2. The payment of the petitioner's commission as

the estate's Special Administrator

In contrast with the interlocutory character of the auditor's

appointment, the second part is limited to the Special
Administrator's commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the
value of the estate. To quote from the Order: the court
hereby. . . 2. Suspends the approval of the report of the
special administrator except the payment of his commission,
which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate."
Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that this
pronouncement on an independently determinable issue - the
52
43 Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa v.
The Judge of the CFI of Mindoro, The Provincial Sheriff
of Mindoro, and Juan Luna
G.R. No. L-2360 | Dec. 29, 1949 | Moran, C.J.
TOPIC: Procedure on claims
DOCTRINE: The correct procedure for the collection of
attorney's fees is for the counsel to request the administrator
to make payment and file an action against him in his
personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail
to pay.
ER: Petitioner was appointed administrator of the estate of
Santiago Rementeria, his partner in the p’ship Aldamiz y
Rementeria. Respondent Luna was petitioner’s lawyer as the
former represented the latter in the probate proceedings.
When petitioner rendered his accounts for 1944-1946 and
submitted a project of partition, CFI approved the accounts
but rejected the partition. Along with it was the CFI’s ruling,
ordering petitioner to pay respondent Luna P28k as lawyer’s
fees. When petitioner could not pay the whole amount, as he
only paid P5k, the balance was paid by way of a public sale of
2 parcels of land which was owned by the p’ship, not by the
decedent’s estate. This gave rise to the issue on whether CFI
correctly ordered petitioner to pay the lawyer’s fees and
ordered the execution on the 2 parcels of land. SC said that
CFI erred because the correct procedure for the collection of
attorney's fees is for the counsel to request the administrator
to make payment and file an action against him in his
personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail
to pay. Also, the 2 lots publicly sold did not even belong to
the estate, but to the p’ship.
FACTS:
● The decedent Santiago Rementeria y understanding with the interested parties;
Aldamizcogeascoa was a Spaniard and member of
the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria."
The other members were the Aldamiz brothers,
Gavino and Jose.
● Santiago Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and
probate proceedings were instituted in the same
year in the CFI of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz,
represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna.
● Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator, and,
as such, was represented by respondent up to Jan.
21, 1947, when the order complained for was issued.
● In that order, it said that "said attorney is the one
who instituted this testate proceeding 10 years ago
and has from its incipiency to the present stage of
the proceedings actively intervened in the same.”
● On Jan. 15, 1947, after 10 years from the date of his
appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator,
through Juan Luna, submitted his accounts for 1944-
1946 and also a project of partition with a view to
closing the proceedings.
● CFI - Approved the accounts but refused to approve
the project of partition unless all debts including
attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of
partition, it was expressly stated that attorney's fees,
53
debts and incidental expenses would be
proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the
closure of the testate proceedings, but the court
refused to sanction this clause of the project.
● Because of this, Attorney Luna, at that moment,
submitted evidence of his services and professional
standing so that the court might fix the amount of
his compensation and the administrator may make
payment thereof. Atty. Luna’s failure to file a written
claim and to notify the interested parties thereof
was not due to bad faith or fraudulent purpose but
to an honest belief on the part of the respondent
attorney that such requirements were not necessary
under the circumstance.
● In this connection, SC had to state, in justice to
Attorney Luna, that:
a. During the 10 years he served as attorney for
the administrator and during the 25 years as
legal consultants to Santiago Rementeria,
Gavino Aldamiz and Jose Aldamiz individually
and as commercial partnership, Luna never took
the trouble of charging them for his professional
services, thus showing disinterested and
extreme liberality on his part due to friendship
and other personal considerations toward his
clients;
b. Also, even after 10 years of active work in the
testate proceedings, when he wanted to close
the same and it was then time for him to
demand payment for his services, he showed no
interest in demanding preferring to leave the
matter to the future negotiation or
c. And when the amount of his fees was fixed by
the court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a
substantial reduction, Luna answered that it was
not he who had fixed the amount but the court,
and advised his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he
would offer no objection to any reduction in
amount and to any extension of the time for
paying what might be granted by the court;
d. And again, when Gavino Aldamiz paid him P5k
on account, Luna told him that he would be
satisfied with any additional amount that Gavino
might later desire to pay him. Only subsequent
occurrences which proved distasteful to the
parties, led them to take steps which culminated
in the filing of the instant civil action.
● At the time respondent's evidence was submitted to
the court, the interested parties who were residing
in the PH were Gavino Aldamiz and Jose Aldamiz.
The others were then residing in Spain. No written
claim had ever been filed for respondent's fees, and
the interested parties had not been notified thereof
nor of the hearing, not even Gavino Aldamiz who did
 not know when he was called to testify that he
would testify in connection with respondent's fees.
● The Court, after considering the whole evidence
presented, issued its order of Jan. 21, 1947,
awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of
his professional services, an aggregate sum of P28k:
a. For the institution, preparation of the pleadings
in the voluminous probate case, allowance of
the will, project of partition and the final closing
of this proceeding, — P15k;
b. For the registration of a parcel of land of
seventy-eight hectares in favor of the testate, —
P5k;
c. For 3 naturalization cases at the rate of P1k
each, — P3k; and
d. For services rendered in the deduction of
inheritance tax from P28k to P433.40 — P5k.
● The Court ordered payment within 30 days.
Petitioner Gavino Aldamiz received copy of this
order on February 21,1948. But out of the total
amount, petitioner was only able to pay P5k, and
upon his failure to pay the balance after several
demands, respondent, on April 17, 1948, filed an ex-
parte motion for execution which was granted by
the respondent Court on April 19,1948.
● Pursuant to the order of execution, 2 parcels of land
(357 ha.) were sold at a public auction on July 20,
1948 for P20k in favor of respondent, despite its
assessed value at P182,360. However, such lots did
not belong to the testate estate of Santiago
Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, but to the
commercial partnership. This sale was made after
preliminary injunction had been issued by this court
in the instant case.
● Petitioner then filed for certiorari as administrator to
set aside the order of the CFI issued in the said
testate estate proceedings, fixing the amount of fees
for respondent Juan L. Luna, as attorney for said
administrator.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI was correct in awarding
respondent atty. Luna his professional fees
HELD: NO.
● The CFI’s order issued on Jan. 21,1948 fixing the
amount attorney's fees is null and void. The correct
procedure for the collection of attorney's fees is for
the counsel to request the administrator to make
payment and file an action against him in his
personal capacity and not as an administrator should
he fail to pay (Palileo vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 47106).
● If the judgment is rendered against the administrator
and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his
account to the court. (Uy Tioco vs. Imperial, 53 Phil.,
802)
● The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an
action, file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceeding asking that the court, after notice to all
persons interested, allow his claim and direct the
54
administrator to pay it as an expense of
administration. (Escueta vs. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405)
● Here, no written petition for the payment of
attorney's fees has ever been filed by the
respondent attorney Luna and the interested parties
had not been previously notified thereof nor of the
hearing held by the court.
● Consequently, the CFI’s order issued on Jan. 21,
1947, and all subsequent orders implementing it, are
null and void, as having been issued an excess of
jurisdiction.
● The order of execution issued on April 19,1948 is
also null and void, not only because it was intended
to implement the order of Jan. 21, 1947, but because
a writ of execution is not the proper procedure
allowed by the ROC for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration:
a. Proper procedure – Court is to order the sale of
personal estate or the sale of mortgaged of real
property of the deceased and all debts or
expenses of administration should be paid out
of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage;
b. The order for the sale or mortgage should be
issued upon motion of the administrator and
with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees
and devisees residing in the PH, as per Rule 89,
Sec. 3, and Rule 90, Sec. 2. And when sale or
mortgage of real estate is to be made, the
regulations contained in Rule 90, Sec. 7, should
be complied with;
c. Execution may issue only where the devisees,
legatees or heirs have entered into possession
of their respective portions in the estate prior to
settlement and payment of the debts and
expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and
expenses to be paid. In which case "the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities, and order
how much and in what manner each person
shall contribute, and may issue execution if
circumstances require". But this is not the
instant case.
● Respondent - Petitioner is guilty of laches.
● SC - Agrees at first because petitioner technically
failed to appeal within the time provided by the
Rules and the instant petition for certiorari was filed
1 year, 4 months and 14 days after petitioner had
received a copy of said order:
a. In addition, SC has held, in Prifeta vs. David, that
orders issued without previous notice to parties
will be cured if said parties fail to appeal within
time provided by the rules and their appeal is
lost due to their own negligence.
● SC – But it ruled that petitioner did not lose his
appeal through his own negligence. In fact, when he
 received the notice of the CFI’s order fixing for naturalization filed in behalf of Gavino Aldamiz
respondent's fees in the amount of P28k, he and Jose Aldamiz and the application for registration
immediately wrote Luna a letter asking for a of a parcel of land of 78 ha. filed not in favor of the
substantial reduction and extension of time to pay: testate estate but of the partnership "Aldamiz y
a. Luna answered advising petitioner to file his MR Rementeria.” These services evidently could not be
within 30 days, but he received his lawyer's charged against the estate of Santiago Rementeria.
letter after said period had expired. And For all the foregoing, the order of the respondent court of
petitioner had no other attorney to advice him January 21,1947, and all the subsequent orders implementing
except respondent who was his adversary on it, particularly the order of execution issued by the court on
the matter now in dispute; April 19, 1948, and the sale made by the sheriff on July
b. After receiving said letter, he again sought 20,1948, in favor of respondent attorney, are null and void
equitable compromise with respondent attorney and are hereby set aside, with costs against respondents. It is
and later paid him P5k, and respondent then so ordered.
told him that he would be satisfied with
whatever additional amount petitioner might
desire to pay him;
c. And petitioner would perhaps have taken no
action were it not because without previous
notice to him, Luna asked authority from the CFI
to sell 2 parcels of land (Totaling 11 ha.) for the
payment of said professional fees and later on
the motion for execution for the same purpose.
Both motions were, however, abandoned;
d. But a 2nd motion for execution was filed by
respondent without petitioner's knowledge,
which was granted by the Court on April 19,
1948. Respondent Sheriff levied on the 2 parcels
of land belonging to the partnership "Aldamiz y
Rementeria" (Totaling 357 ha.);
e. 2 MRs were filed by petitioner, 1st on June
16,1948, 2nd on June 28, 1948, asking that the
order of Jan. 21, 1947, and the order of
execution of April 19,1948 be set aside, but both
motions were denied and the last order of
denial is dated July 1,1948. The petition in the
instant case was filed on July 17, 1948;
f. Lastly, there are interested parties who have
never been notified of the order complained of,
and as to them, said order has not become final
and executory.
● SC - Rules that, under the circumstances, particularly
the fiduciary relation between petitioner and
respondent attorney, the former is not guilty of
laches.
● Respondents - The case for petitioner is one of pure
technicality, premised upon a supposed failure of
Luna to follow a supposed procedure. The P28k fixed
and allowed by the CFI as professional fees is not
unconscionable because the entire estate was worth
P315,112 and now it is worth about half a million
pesos because of many improvements existing
thereon.
● SC - It appears, however, that due to lack of notice
upon the interested parties, CFI erred. For instance,
the CFI awarded fees for services rendered not to
the estate but to the other persons, such as the
supposed services in connection with the petitions
55

Rule 87
44 Melgar v Buenviaje
GR NO. 55750 , DATE: Nov. 8, 1989 , PONENTE: Paras
TOPIC: Actions that survive
DOCTRINE/S:
● Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
actions that are abated by death are: (1) All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due or contingent; (2) All claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent; and (3) Judgments for money against the
decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]).
● As restated in a much later case, in case of
unreasonable delay in the appointment of an
executor or administrator of the estate or in case
where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, the court may adopt the
alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to
be substituted for the deceased
EMERGENCY RECIT:
There was a collision of vehicles in the National Highway of
Albay. Fabian Prades and Felicidad Bella died as a result of the
collision. The heirs of Paredes filed a complaint for damages
against the children of the deceased Bella. Bella was the
owner and operator of one of the passenger buses involved in
the collision. The defendants in the complaint (petitioners
herein) moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action against them.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss. SC: Thus, while petitioners
may have correctly moved for the dismissal of the case and
private respondents have forthwith corrected the deficiency
by filing an amended complaint, even before the lower court
could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
denial of their motion to dismiss, the action under Section 17
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which allows the suit against
the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor
or administrator of his estate, would still be futile, for the
same reason that there appears to be no steps taken towards
the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad Balla, nor
has an executor or administrator of the estate been
appointed. Under the circumstances the absence of an estate
proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the
place of the deceased (Javier v. Araneta, 90 Phil. 292 [1951]).
As restated in a much later case, in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of
the estate or in case where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, the court may adopt the alternative
of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the
deceased.
FACTS:
● A vehicular accident happened along the National
Highway Albay whereby a passenger bus, owned and
56
operated by the late Felicidad Balla and driven by
Domingo Casin, swerved to the left lane and came
into head-on-collision with a Ford Fiera, owned by
Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio,
coming from the opposite direction. It then swerved
further to the left this time colliding head-on- with
a passenger bus, FUSO , owned by Benjamin Flores
and driven by Fabian Prades.
● As a result of the accident, Felicidad Balla, owner
and operator of the passenger bus, and mother of
herein petitioners together with Domingo Casin,
driver of the bus, died on the spot. Ruben Lim
Relucio, driver of the service jeep and Fabian Prades,
driver of the other passenger bus died in the same
accident.
● Spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades, private
respondents herein as the only surviving forced heirs
of the deceased Fabian Prades, filed a complaint in
the CFI of Camarines Sur against the children of
deceased Felicidad Balla, petitioners herein for
damages.
● Defendant’s arguments: The defendants in the
complaint (petitioners herein) moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action against them
● RTC Ruling: denied the motion to dismiss.
● MR was likewise denied
● Hence, the present petition for certiorari
ISSUE/S: whether or not the Court of First Instance has the
power to entertain a suit for damages arising from the death
of a person, filed against the estate of another deceased
person as represented by the heirs.
HELD:
Yes. “the petition is hereby dismissed and petitioners are
ordered substituted for the deceased Felicidad Balla.”
● Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
actions that are abated by death are: (1) All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due or contingent; (2) All claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent; and (3) Judgments for money against the
decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 [1962]). It is
evident that the case at bar is not among those
enumerated. Otherwise stated, actions for damages
caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant
survive the death of the latter.
● The action can therefore be properly brought under
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, against an
executor or administrator. The rule provides:
"Section 1. Actions which may and which may
not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the executor or
 administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from
the state, or to enforce a lien thereon, end
actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him."
● Thus, while petitioners may have correctly
moved for the dismissal of the case and private
respondents have forthwith corrected the
deficiency by filing an amended complaint,
even before the lower court could act on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
denial of their motion to dismiss, the action
under Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, which allows the suit against the legal
representative of the deceased, that is, the
executor or administrator of his estate, would
still be futile, for the same reason that there
appears to be no steps taken towards the
settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad
Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of
the estate been appointed. From the statement
made by the petitioners that "many persons die
without leaving any asset at all", which
insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is
reasonable to believe that the petitioners will
not take any step to expedite the early
settlement of the estate, judicially or
extrajudicially if only to defeat the damage suit
against the estate. (Note however the deceased
Balla apparently left the bus). Under the
circumstances the absence of an estate
proceeding may be avoided by requiring the
heirs to take the place of the deceased (Javier
v. Araneta, 90 Phil. 292 [1951]).
● As restated in a much later case, in case of unreasonable
delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator of
the estate or in case where the heirs resort to an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased (Lawas v. Court of Appeals, 146
SCRA 173 [1986]).LexLib
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby dismissed and
petitioners are ordered substituted for the deceased Felicidad
Balla.
57
45 Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation, First
Farmers Holding v. Leonardo De Castro
GR. No. 164108; May 8, 2009 I Tinga, J.
TOPIC: Actions by and against Executors and Administrators
(RULE 87)
DOCTRINE/S: The fact that petitioners interests remain
inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to
participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle
petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be
furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the
claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would
mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to
anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent
claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding
principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will
be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every
court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while
providing a viable means by which the interests of the
creditors in the estate are preserved.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Roberto Benedicto was a defendant in a
two- pending civil cases. Upon the death of Roberto, Julita
was appointed as the administratix. The petitioners, who are
also the petitioners in 2 pending civil cases, filed a motion or
manifestation before the probate court to intervene and be
furnished with all of the copies and proceedings of the
intestate case. The SC ruled that the petitioners are not
allowed to intervene. Had the claims of petitioners against
Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be
issued by the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort,
as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-
delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These actions,
being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87.
The fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents
submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such
pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be.
Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the
service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing
a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would
unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and
would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and
orderly disposition of cases.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will
be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every
court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while
providing a viable means by which the interests of the
creditors in the estate are preserved.
FACTS:
● The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto
died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his
wife, Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At
the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases
against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil
Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the RTC
of Bacolod City, with Hilado as one of the plaintiffs
therein. The second civil case No. 11178, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, with Lopez Sugar
Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as
one of the plaintiffs therein.
● Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the ROC. Said
petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the
decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities. The Manila
RTC issued an order appointing Benedicto as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and
issuing letters of administration in her favor.
● Benedicto submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate
of her deceased husband. In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, Benedicto included as among
the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending
claims. The amounts of liability corresponding to the two
58
cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137
and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.
● Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that
they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders
pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Benedicto
opposed, disputing the personality of petitioners to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus
motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by Benedicto of the required inventory of the
decedents estate. Petitioners also filed other pleadings or
motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part
of Benedicto in her administration of the estate, and
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far
as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
● RTC: denied the manifestation/motion on the ground
that petitioners are not interested parties. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was
filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter
being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with
the Bacolod RTC.
● CA: dismissed the petition.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioners has the right to
intervene to the intestate proceedings.- No, intervention is
not available to creditor with a contigent, not actual claim.
HELD: Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been
based on contract, whether express or implied, then they
should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the
aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the
issuance of such notice. However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall
within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to
creditors required under Rule 86. These actions, being as they
are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87.
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be
inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless.
We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows
not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons
interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect
their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict
against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the
time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished
to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do
not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate,
the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to
intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed
to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief
sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and
there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we
assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate
proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the
administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the
utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly
alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings,The court has no authority to decide whether the properties, real or
including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running
account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or
fraudulently conveyed.
The fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the
intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents
submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with
service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such
pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be.
Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the
service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing
a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would
unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and
would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and
orderly disposition of cases.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the
records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being
preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will
be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the
records, rather than entitling them to the service of every
court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their
individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate
court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while
providing a viable means by which the interests of the
creditors in the estate are preserved.
PETITION IS DENIED.
46 - Betty T. Chua et al vs. Absolute Management
Corporation and Court of Appeals
GR 144881| October 16, 2003 | J. CARPIO
TOPIC: Rule 87 - Right to compel 3rd persons to examination
and right to cover property
DOCTRINE:
personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If
after such examination there is good reason to believe that
the person examined is keeping properties belonging to the
estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action
in court to recover the same. Inclusion of certain shares of
stock by the administrator in the inventory does not
automatically deprive the assignees of their shares. They have
a right to be heard on the question of ownership, when that
property is properly presented to the court.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Absolute Management Corp. filed a claim against the
intestate estate of deceased Jose Chua and later on, noticed
that the deceased’s shares of stocks with Ayala Corp were not
included in the inventory assets. Thus, it prompted them to
file a motion questioning Betty Chua (surviving spouse of the
deceased and administratix of the intestate estate) why she
did not report these shares of stocks in the inventory. In her
defense, she averred that these shares had already been
assigned and transferred to other parties prior to the death of
her husband. Absolute Corp., still not convinced, filed a
motion for the examination of the transferees. The SC ruled
in favor Absolute Corp. and ordered the examination of the
transferees.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Jennifer T. Chua-Locsin, Benison T. Chua,
and Baldwin T. Chua fled a petition for letters of
administration with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. Betty T Chua was appointed as administratrix of
the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose
L.Chua.
● Respondent Absolute Management Corporation
(Absolute), one of the creditors of the deceased,
filed a claim against the estate in the amount of
P63M. Respondent Absolute however, noticed that
the deceased's shares of stocks with Ayala Sales
59
 Corporation and Ayala Construction Supply, Inc. the estate, then the administrator should file an
were not included in the inventory of assets. As a ordinary action in court to recover the same.
consequence, it filed a motion to require Betty T. Inclusion of certain shares of stock by the
Chua to explain why she did not report these shares administrator in the inventory does not
of stocks in the inventory. In her reply, Betty T. Chua automatically deprive the assignees of their shares.
alleged that these shares had already been assigned They have a right to be heard on the question of
and transferred to other parties prior to the death of ownership, when that property is properly presented
her husband, Jose L. Chua. Suspecting that the to the court.
documents attached to Betty T. Chua's reply were 2. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
spurious and simulated, respondent Absolute filed a Court of Appeals and denied the petition. According
motion for the examination of the supposed to the Court, there is no reason why the trial court
transferees. The trial court denied the motion. should disallow the examination of the alleged
● On petition for certiorari and mandamus with the transferees of the shares of stocks. The proceedings
Court of Appeals, Absolute claimed that the trial under Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court is only
court committed grave abuse of discretion in for purposes of eliciting information or securing
denying its motion and in failing to act on its claim. evidence from persons suspected of concealing or
Absolute alleged that the trial court deprived it of conveying some of the decedent's properties to the
the right to show that the documents presented by prejudice of creditors. Petitioners' admission that
petitioners were fictitious to the prejudice of the persons are the decedent's assignees does not
Absolute. The appellate court set aside the trial automatically negate concealment of the decedent's
court's order. It pointed out that the presentation of assets on their part. The assignment might be
the deeds of assignment executed by the decedent simulated so as to place the shares beyond the reach
in petitioners' favor does not automatically negate of creditors. In case the shares are eventually
the existence of concealment. The appellate court included in the estate, this inventory is merely
stated that it is a common occurrence in estate provisional and is not determinative of the issue of
proceedings for heirs to execute simulated deeds of ownership because a separate action is necessary for
transfer which conceal and place properties of the determination of ownership and recovery of
decedent beyond the reach of creditors. Hence, the possession.
present petition.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The
ISSUE: WON the RTC should give due course to the motion Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57421
to examine. - YES dated 9 May 2000 as well as the Resolution dated 5
September 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration is
HELD: AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Section 6 of Rule 87 seeks to secure evidence from persons suspected
of having possession or knowledge of the properties left by a
deceased person, or of having concealed, embezzled or
conveyed any of the properties of the deceased. The court
which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased
person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings
has supervision and control over these properties. The trial
court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory of
the administrator lists all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to include in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court also has the
inherent power to determine what properties, rights and
credits of the deceased the administrator should include or
exclude in the inventory. An heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased may call the court’s attention that
certain properties, rights or credits are left out from the
inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear
the observations of such party.
1. However, The court has no authority to decide
whether the properties, real or personal, belong to
the estate or to the persons examined. If after such
examination there is good reason to believe that the
person examined is keeping properties belonging to
60

Rule 88
47 De Bautista v. De Guzman
48 Pastor vs CA
GR NO. L-56340 | June 24, 1983 | Plana
TOPIC: Rule 88, Libaility of heirs and distibutes
DOCTRINE/S: Prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased
is necessary before apportionment and distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees.
EMERGENCY RECIT: On August 20, 1980, while the
reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued
the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable
by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA
was not inofficious.
The Court held that the ordered payment of legacy would be
violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of
the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the
estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before
apportionment and distribution of the residue among the
heirs and legatees.
FACTS:
1. Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.) died in Cebu City on June
5, 1966. He was survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, their
two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.)
and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate
child Lewellyn Barlito QUEMADA.
2. QUEMADA filed with the CFI a petition for the probate
and allowance of an alleged holographic will left by
PASTOR, SR. The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of
30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by
ATLAS of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
3. The probate court appointed him special administrator of
the entire estate of PASTOR, SR. to which Pastor Jr. And
his sister Sofia opposed. QUEMADA as special
administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife
an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the
estate subject of the legacy which were in the names of
PASTOR, JR. and his wife, who claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
4. The probate court then issued an order allowing the
holographic will to probate.
5. For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE
COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking
for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties
subject of said legacy.
6. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the
ground that there is still a reconveyance suit pending
with another branch of CFI.
61
7. While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the
PROBATE COURT issued an Order of Execution and
Garnishment resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties from ATLAS and ruling that the legacy to
Quemada was not inofficious. The order being
"immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment and in
serving the same on ATLAS on the same day.
8. Pastor Jr. and Sofia filed MR but even before the MFR
could be resolved, PASTOR, JR. and his wife filed with the
CA a Petition for certiorari. The petition was denied on
the ground that its filing was premature because there
was still an MR pending before the PROBATE COURT.
The spouses moved for reconsideration.
9. While the MR was pending, the probate court issued an
order which the court claims to have resolved the
question of the instrinsic validity of the will and of the
ownership of the mining claims, rendering moot and
academic the suit for reconveyance.
ISSUE/S: W/N the court’s order for the payment of the
legacy of Quemada was proper? No
HELD:
The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule
requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e.,
the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of
all debts and expenses, before apportionment and
distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR,
SR. Payment therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would
collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue
Code requiring payment of estate tax before delivery to any
beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate.
The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having
been issued purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court which reads:
"Sec. 6.Court to fix contributive shares where devisees,
legatees, or heirs have been in possession. — Where
devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of
portions of the estate before the debts and expenses have
been settled and paid and have become liable to contribute
for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court
having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several
liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each
person shall contribute, and may issue execution as
circumstances require."
PETITION, GRANTED.

Rule 89
49 NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN
G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998, J. Panganiban
TOPIC: Rule 89, Sec. 7
DOCTRINE/S: Properties of the estate may be subject to a
valid sale without prior court approval if made by the seller in
the capacity of an heir and not as an administrator or
executor.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Opulencia entered into a contract to sell
a parcel of land which formed part of the estate of her father,
with Simundac and Olivan. The latter paid a downpayment
but, despite demands, Opulencia failed to comply with her
obligations. This prompted Simundac and Olivan to file a case
for specific performance and damages against Opulencia.
Opulencia argues that the contract to sell is not valid as it was
not approved by the probate court, citing Rule 89 of the ROC.
RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed, holding the contract to
sell valid as the contract was not covered by Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in her
capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her
under the will sought to be probated. SC affirmed the CA
ruling, holding that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the
Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an
executrix or administratrix of the estate. The lack of judicial
approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the
petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part
of her share in the estate of her late father. The sale made by
an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.
FACTS:
26. Simundac and Olivan filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Opulencia, alleging
that the latter executed in their favor a CONTRACT TO
SELL Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
27. Simundac and Olivan allegedly paid a downpayment of
P300k but Opulencia, despite demands, failed to comply
with her obligations.
28. Opulencia admitted the execution of the contract and
receipt of P300k and interposed the ff. defenses:
o that the property subject of the contract formed
part of the estate of Demetrio Carpena, her
father, of which a petition for probate was filed
with the RTC Laguna.
o That Simundac and Olivan knew of the
pendency of the probate proceeding at the time
the contract was executed;
o that the contract to sell was not approved by
the probate court;
62
o that realizing the nullity of the contract,
Opulencia had offered to return the
downpayment received from Simundac and
Olivan, but the latter refused to accept it;
o That Simundac and Olivan further failed to
provide funds for the tenant who demanded
P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on
the land;
o that Opulencia had chosen to rescind the
contract.
29. Simundac and Olivan submitted evidence: (1) Contract to
Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and
testament of Demetrio Carpena (defendants father) to
show that the property sold by defendant was one of
those devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts
signed by defendant for the downpayment in the total
amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand
letters sent to defendant
30. Opulencia, instead of submitting her evidence, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained
that the contract to sell was null and void for want of
approval by the probate court. She further argued that
the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which
was the probate of the will of defendants father
Demetrio Carpena.
31. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case,
holding that when the contract to sell was consummated,
no petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs
of the time and place of hearing, to show that the sale is
necessary and beneficial. A sale of properties of an estate
as beneficial to the interested parties must comply with
the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of
Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the
authority to sell, the sale itself, and the order approving
it, would be null and void ab initio. Also that where the
estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot
enter into any transaction involving it without prior
approval of the probate Court.
32. CA: reversed, declared the Contract to Sell valid, subject
to the outcome of the testate proceedings on Demetrio
Carpenas estate. as adverted to by appellants in their
brief, the contract to sell in question is not covered by
Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was made
by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that
was devised to her under the will sought to be probated.
33. Opulencia contends that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into
any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
Probate Court. She maintains that the Contract to Sell is
void because it was not approved by the probate court as
she was acting in her capacity as administratrix or
executrix, the estate being the landlord of said tenants.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03
February 1989 executed by Opulencia, Simundac and Olivan
without the requisite probate court approval is valid.
HELD: YES.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner
entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress,
not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and
seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the
reason for the sale to be difficulties in her living conditions
and consequent need of cash. These representations clearly
evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under
probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or
heirs from the moment of the decedents death. Petitioner,
therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval
does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the
petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a
part of her share in the estate of her late father.
The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is
contingent on the complete clearance of the court on the
Last Will Testament of her father. Consequently, although
the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner
and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of
ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents
is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the
termination and outcome of the testate proceedings.
Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners apprehension that
the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is
settled that the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise
stands in the way of such administration.
Petitioner is estopped from backing out of her
representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000
as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not
renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice
of the private respondents who have relied on them.
PETITION IS DENIED.
50 Acebedo v. Abesamis
G.R. No. 102380, January 18, 1993, CAMPOS JR.
Topic: Rule 89, Probate court to approve sale, also to nullify
unauthorized sale
Doctrine:
Facts:
63
● Herodotus Acebedo and 7 others were left an estate
consisting of real properties in Quezon City and
Caloocan City. Acebedo became the administrator
pending partition. In the meantime, the property is
owned in common by the heirs.
● The case pended for 16 years with the court. Miguel
Acebedo et al (respondents) then filed a Motion for
Approval of Sale for them to sell their shares from
the estate. The court approved the motion.
Respondents were able to find a buyer in the person
of Yu Hwa Ping who agreed to buy the properties for
P12 Million. He paid P6 million as earnest money.
● Acebedo assailed the approval of the sale claiming
that the the sale was done without his approval as
administrator and without the approval of the other
heirs, and that the price is quite low. The court
ordered Miguel et al to find a higher bidder within a
specified time frame which was later extended to 7
months but still no other buyer could provide better
terms.
● Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents
sell their share to the price already agreed upon with
Ping and that Acebedo can negotiate his price with
Ping. But Acebedo still filed a Supplemental
Opposition against the approval of the conditional
sale.
● The court affirmed the approval of the sale and
ordered Acebedo to sell his share at the same rate
that the other heirs sold their share to Ping
● The Petitioners now filed a supplemental opposition
to the new order but was denied for lack of merit
● Petitioners now appealed to the SC.
Issue: Is it within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as
a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior
court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the
remaining portion of said properties?
Ruling:
● Yes. An heir can sell his share without final
adjudication. An heir is a co-owner of the property
(estate) before adjudication.
● Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding,
should be made with the approval of the court, this
authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a
probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate
court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction
in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
● The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent’s
property, even if the same is under administration, is
based on the Civil Code provision stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and
from the moment of the death of the decedent, in
case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are
however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common
by such heirs.

64
51 HEIRS of ESCANLAR vs. CA
G.R. No. 119777, October 23, 1997 and G.R. No.
120690. October 23, 1997, ROMERO, J.
Topic: Right of heirs to dispose of right in estate
DOCTRINE/S:
It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of
any disposition of the decedents estate. However, reference
to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive
rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-
heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Gregorio Cari-ans heirs executed the Deed of Sale of Rights,
Interests and Participation in favor of Escanlar. Cari-ans
instituted this case for cancellation of sale against Escanlar for
failure to pay the balance of the purchase price. The said
transaction was nullified because it was not approved by the
probate court as required by the contested deed of sale of
rights, interests and participation and because the Cari-ans
were not fully paid. `
FACTS:
1. Spouses Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an
died without issue in 1924 and 1938,
respectively. Nombres heirs include his nephews and
grandnephews. Victoriana Cari-an was succeeded by
her late brothers son, Gregorio Cari-an.
2. After Gregorio died in 1971, his wife, Generosa
Martinez, and children, Rodolfo, Carmen, Leonardo
and Fredisminda, all surnamed Cari-an, were also
adjudged as heirs by representation to Victorianas
estate. Leonardo Cari-an passed away, leaving his
widow, Nelly Chua vda. de Cari-an and minor son
Leonell, as his heirs. Two parcels of land formed part
of the estate of Nombre and Cari-an. Gregorio Cari-
ans heirs executed the Deed of Sale of Rights,
Interests and Participation in favor of Escalar and
Holgado, the lessees of the lots. They stipulated that
the balance of the purchase price shall be paid on or
before May 1979 in a Deed of Agreement executed
by the parties on the same day.
3. Escanlar were unable to pay the Cari-an heirs
individual shares. However, said heirs received at
least 12 installments from petitioners after May
1979. Rodolfo Cari-an was fully paid by June 21,
1979. Generosa Martinez, Carmen Cari-an and
Fredisminda Cari-an were likewise fully compensated
for their individual shares, per receipts given in
evidence. The minor Leonells share was deposited
with the Regional Trial Court on September 7, 1987.
4. Being former lessees, Escanlar continued in
possession of the lots. They continued to pay rent
based on their lease contract. They moved to
intervene in the probate proceedings of Nombre and
Cari-an as the buyers of Cari-ans share.
65
5. RTC: Approved a motion filed by the heirs of Cari-an
and Nombre to sell their respective shares in the
estate. Cari-ans, in addition to some heirs of
Guillermo Nombre, sold their shares to the spouses
Ney Sarrosa Chua and Paquito Chua.
6. Cari-ans instituted this case for cancellation of sale
against Escanlar for failure to pay the balance of the
purchase price. (IN A DIFFERENT CASE)
7. Escanlar sold their rights and interests in the subject
parcels of land to Edwin Jayme and turned over
possession of both lots to the latter. The Jaymes in
turn, were included in the civil case as fourth-party
defendants.
8. RTC: The probate court approved the Chua sale
without prejudice to whatever rights, claims and
interests over any of those properties of the estate
which cannot be properly and legally ventilated and
resolved by the court in the same intestate
proceedings. The certificates of title over the lots
sold by the heirs of Nombre and Cari-an were later
issued in the name of Sps. Chua.
9. RTC: Allowed a third-party complaint against the
third-party defendants Chua where it was alleged
that the Cari-ans conspired with the Chuas when
they executed the second sale that the latter sale is
illegal and of no effect. The Chuas motion to file a
fourth-party complaint against the spouses Jayme
was also approved.
10. RTC (that took cognizance “Intestate Estate of
Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an”: All the
properties of the estate were disposed of or sold by
the declared heirs of both spouses, the case is
considered terminated and the intestate estate of
Guillermo Nombre and Victoriana Cari-an is closed.
11. PETITION FOR CANCELLATION: Said transaction was
nullified because it was not approved by the probate
court as required by the contested deed of sale of
rights, interests and participation and because the
Cari-ans were not fully paid. Consequently, the Deed
of Sale executed by the heirs of Nombre and Cari-an
in favor of Paquito and Ney Chua, which was
approved by the probate court, was upheld.
ISSUE: Can the heirs dispose their rights?
HELD: YES
● Under Art. 1318 of the Civil Code, the essential
requisites of a contract are: consent of the
contracting parties; object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract and cause of the
obligation which is established. Absent one of the
above, no contract can arise. Conversely, where all
are present, the result is a valid contract. However,
some parties introduce various kinds of restrictions
or modalities, the lack of which will not, however,
affect the validity of the contract.
● In the instant case, the Deed of Sale, complying as it
does with the essential requisites, is a valid
 one. However, it did not bear the stamp of approval the spouses Chua, in September 1982, that these
of the court. This notwithstanding, the contracts same heirs filed the case at bar for the cancellation
validity was not affected for in the words of the of the September 1978 conveyance. Worth
stipulation, . . . this Contract of Sale of rights, considering too is the fact that although the period
interests and participations shall become effective to pay the balance of the purchase price expired in
only upon the approval by the Honorable Court . . May 1979, the heirs continued to accept payments
. In other words, only the effectivity and not the until late 1979 and did not seek judicial relief until
validity of the contract is affected. late 1982 or three years later.
● Then, too, petitioners are correct in saying that the
need for approval by the probate court exists only PETITION GRANTED.
where specific properties of the estate are sold and
not when only ideal and indivisible shares of an heir
are disposed of.
● Dillena v. Court of Appeals: It is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale
of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication. It is
settled that court approval is necessary for the
validity of any disposition of the decedents
estate. However, reference to judicial approval
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the
heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship
and/or co-ownership among the heirs.
● It must be recalled that during the period of
indivision of a decedents estate, each heir, being a
co-owner, has full ownership of his part and may
therefore alienate it. But the effect of the alienation
with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
● It is clear that hereditary rights in an estate can be
validly sold without need of court approval and that
when private respondents Cari-an sold their rights,
interests and participation in Lot Nos. 1616 and
1617, they could legally sell the same without the
approval of the probate court.
● As a general rule, the pertinent contractual
stipulation (requiring court approval) should be
considered as the law between the
parties. However, the presence of two factors
militate against this conclusion. First, the evident
intention of the parties appears to be contrary to the
mandatory character of said stipulation. Whoever
crafted the document of conveyance, must have
been of the belief that the controversial stipulation
was a legal requirement for the validity of the
sale. But the contemporaneous and subsequent acts
of the parties reveal that the original objective of the
parties was to give effect to the deed of sale even
without court approval.
● Receipt and acceptance of the numerous
installments on the balance of the purchase price by
the Cari-ans and leaving petitioners in possession of
Lot Nos. 1616 and 1617 reveal their intention to
effect the mutual transmission of rights and
obligations. It was only after private respondents
Cari-an sold their shares in the subject lots again to
66
Rule 90
52 Fran, et. al. v. Hon. Salas, et. al.,
G.R. No. L-53546, June 25, 1992
TOPIC: RULE 90 - Motion for execution to deliver distributee’s
share v separate action
DOCTRINE/S:
● if the executor or administrator has possession of
the share to be delivered, the probate court would
have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding
to order him to transfer that possession to the
person entitled thereto. However, if no motion for
execution is filed within the reglementary period, a
separate action for the recovery of the shares would
be in order
EMERGENCY RECIT: .
FACTS:
- Remedios Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu
City with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left
properties located in Cebu and Leyte. She executed a last
will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her
collateral relatives (brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces)
all her properties. On 31 July 1972, the court appointed
petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
- Private respondents (the collateral relatives) did not file
any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will"
wherein they expressly manifested, with their "full
knowledge and consent that they have no objection of
the allowance of the will of the late Remedios Tiosejo,"
and that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters
testamentary in favor of petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran.”
- No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus
became uncontested. Upon a determination that the court
had duly acquired jurisdiction over the uncontested
petition for probate, Judge Cinco issued in open court an
order directing counsel for petitioner to present evidence
proving the authenticity and due execution of the will
before the Clerk of Court who was, accordingly, so
authorized to receive the same.
- The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court
immediately followed. The original of the will, marked as
Exhibit "F", and its English translation, marked as Exhibit
"F-Translation", were submitted to the Clerk of Court.
The court then rendered a decision admitting the will to
probate. Notice to creditors was issued, but despite the
expiration of the period therein fixed, no claim was
presented against the estate.
67
- A Project of Partition was then submitted by the executor
for the court's approval. No objection was made by
anyone. The Project of Partition was approved and the
proceedings were closed.
- On 1 October 1979 or SIX years after, private respondents
filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
probate judgment and the Order of partition. Along with
their supplemental petitions, they allege that, among
others: a) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court
was void per the ruling in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete; and b)
the probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case
since petitioner Fran failed to submit to the court the
original of the will, and was able only to attach the English
translation.
- Respondent Judge reopened the case and received
testimonies thereof. He then rendered an order finding
the will forged, thus null and void.
-
ISSUE/S: W/N the non-distribution of the estate is a ground
for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. NO
HELD:
- A seasonable motion for execution should have been
filed. In De Jesus vs. Daza, this Court ruled that if the
executor or administrator has possession of the
share to be delivered, the probate court would have
jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to
order him to transfer that possession to the person
entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion
for execution is filed within the reglementary period,
a separate action for the recovery of the shares
would be in order. As We see it, the attack of 10
September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy
to give asemblance of strength and substance to the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting
therein a probate court committing a series of fatal,
substantive and procedural blunders, which We find
to be imaginary, if not deliberately fabricated.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions
are GRANTED. The Order of respondent Judge of 2 June 1980
and all other orders issued by him in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, as
well as all other proceedings had therein in connection with
or in relation to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
53 Kilayko v. Tengco
54 Solivia v. CA

68