LOPEZ VS DE LOS REYES
It follows,
G.R. NO. L-34361, NOVEMBER 5, 1930
TOPIC: WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?
FACTS
On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez
attacked and assaulted, without any justification, the
Jose D. Dimayuga, who was a member of the House
of Representatives, while said Dimayuga was going
to the hall of the House of Representative to attend
to the sessions which were then about to begin, as a
result, Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions
on that day and those of the two days next
following, by reason of the threats which Mr.
Candido Lopez made against Dimayuga. A warrant of
arrest was issued against Lopez for contempt by the
Speaker of the House of Representative.
Thus, this is an application for the writ of
habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from
restraint of his liberty, by a ranking officer of the
Constabulary, under a warrant of arrest issued by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
pursuant to resolutions of the House finding the
petitioner guilty of contempt.
ISSUE
Whether the Philippine House of Representatives
has power to order the commitment of persons
guilty of contempt against it
DECISION
The Philippine Legislature has practically the
same powers in the Philippine Islands, within the
sphere in which it may operate, as the Congress of
the United States. There is as much necessity for the
House in a territorial legislature to possess the
power to punish for contempt as there is for the
Houses in the Congress of the United States and the
Houses in the State Legislatures to possess this
power. Accordingly, we rule that a limited power to
punish persons not members for contempt resides in
the House of Representatives of the Philippine
Legislature.
However, the United States Supreme Court
has twice definitely held that the power is limited to
imprisonment during the session of the legislative
body affected by the contempt. The language of the
higher court in the case first cited was: "And
although the legislative power continues perpetual,
the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of
its adjournment or periodical dissolution.
that imprisonment must terminate with the
adjournment."
Dissenting and concurring opinions
The people of the Philippine Islands have
never adopted a constitution, and no constitutional
convention had ever been held here. The primary
power to adopt a constitution is vested in the people
and not in the legislature. The Constitution of the
United States was the final result of a constitutional
convention composed of delegates from the
different states by whom it was prepared and then
submitted to the different states for adoption. All of
the state constitutions are the results of
constitutional conventions.
Definitions of Constitution
State vs. County Treasurer
A constitution is not the beginning of a country, nor
the origin of appropriate rights. It is not the fountain
of law, nor the incipient state of government. It
grants no rights to the people, but it is the creature
of their power, the instrument of their convenience.
Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of
the rights and powers they possessed before the
constitution was made, it is but the framework of
political government, and necessarily based on the
preexisting rights, habits, and modes of thought.
Judge Story
A constitution is defined to be a fundamental law or
basis of government. It is established by the people,
in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their
own happiness, and permanently to secure their
rights, property, independence, and common
welfare.
Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance
A constitution is the form of government, delineated
by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain
first principles of fundamental laws are established.
The constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme
law of the land. It is paramount to the legislature,
and can be revoked or altered only by the authority
that made it.
Eakin vs. Raub
A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation
by which the people establish the structure and
mechanism of their government, and in which they
prescribe fundamental rules to regulate the motions
of the several parts.
Lynn vs. Polk
A constitution is the written charter enacted and
adopted by the people of a state through a
combination of representatives, or in any way the
people may choose to act, by which a government
for them is obtained and established, and by which
the people give organic and corporate form to that
ideal thing, a state, for all time to come, or during
the life of the state.
Livermore vs. Waite The term "constitution" implies
an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,
and, while it contains provision for revision, it
indicates the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature.
Ruling Case Law, vol. 6 p. 16, says: A constitution is
a system of fundamental laws or principles for the
government of a nation, society, corporation or
other aggregation of individuals, and it may be either
written or unwritten.
The United States decisions lay down the
rule that where the Legislature, acting and sitting
under a constitution, has the inherent power to
punish for contempt, that a conviction for that
offense is not a bar to a prosecution in the court for
the crime of assault and battery, which in the instant
case would correspond to article 587 of the Penal
Code. Be that as it may, none of those decisions are
in point. First, for the simple reason that the
Legislature of the Philippine Islands is not sitting or
acting under a constitution, but is a creature of an
Act of Congress of the United States, which has no
power to adopt or even amend the Constitution of
the United States or any State of the United States,
much less to adopt a constitution for the Philippine
Islands. Second, that the people of the Philippine
Islands have never adopted or held a constitutional
convention. Third, none of those decisions are
founded upon Act No. 1755 or any similar provision.
They are all based upon the inherent power of a
legislature under a constitution. Fourth, to permit
the exercise of that alleged inherent power of the
Philippine Legislature under an Act of Congress
would subject the offender to three different
penalties. One by the Legislature itself, one under
Act No. 1755, and the third under article 587 of the
Penal Code, and all for an act committed outside of
the legislative halls, and while the Legislature was
not sitting in actual session.
BELTRAN | INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
NITAFAN V CIR
NO. L-78780 | JULY 23, 1987
Petitioner: David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo and
Maximo A. Savellan, Jr.
Respondents: Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
The Financial Officer, Supreme Court of the
Philippines
Doctrine:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution.
Facts:
- The Chief Justice has previously issued a
directive to the Fiscal Management and
Budget Office to continue the deduction of
withholding taxes from salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and other
members of the judiciary. This was affirmed
by the Supreme Court en banc on 4
December 1987.
- The petitioners (David G. Nitafan,
Wenceslao M. Polo and Maximo A Savellan,
Jr.) are duly appointed and qualified judges
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, all with
stations in Manila.
- The petitioners seek to prohibit and/or
perpetually enjoin the respondents
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court),
 from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries
- They submit that "any tax withheld from
their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution mandating that during
their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased," even as it is anathema
to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue/s:W/N the members of the Judiciary are exempt
from income tax
Provision/s: Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987
Constitution
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).
Held/Ruling/Ratio:
NO
- The debates, interpellations and opinions
expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is
but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that
the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.
- The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption
of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
- The ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution
thereof, and so violates the Constitution", in
Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia
vs. David must be declared discarded. The
framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear
and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the
1987 Constitution that they have adopted
- Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to
the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of
maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income
taxation equitably.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is
hereby dismissed.
BETOYA | INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
FILOTEO JR V. SANDIGANBAYAN
263 SCRA 222 | OCTOBER 16, 1996
PETITIONER: JOSE D. FILOTEO
RESPONDENT: SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
Doctrine
Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive
effect for being favorable to him as an accused,
cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,"
what is being construed here is a constitutional
provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights
which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights
is a declaration and enumeration of the individual
rights and privileges which the Constitution is
designed to protect against violations by the
government, or by individuals or groups of
individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the
individual and a limitation upon the power of the
state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and
properly are those imposing punishment for an
offense committed against the state which the
executive of the state has the power to pardon. In
other words, a penal law denotes punishment
imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or
offense against its law
Facts
 On May 3, 1982 in Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
incident of high-way robbery was commited
when a Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau
of Postal was stopped along MacArthur
Highway and robbed by means of violence,
threat, and intimidation taking away 1)
Postal Delivery Truck, 2) Social Security
System Medicare Checks and Vouchers, 3)
Social Security System Pension Checks and
Vouchers, 4) Treasury Warrants, 5) Several
Mail Matters from abroad; in the total
amount of P253,728.29 more or less,
belonging to US Government Pensionados,
SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare
Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from
Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and
Olongapo City
 Accused for the incident were petitioner
Jose Filoteo, a police investigator of the
Western Police District in Metro Manila,
and Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt.
Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed
Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo
Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo
Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel
Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo
Escalada, but only Filoteo filed the current
petition.
 Various testimonies and affidavits were
filed by the accused and the witnesses of
the crime regarding the happenings at the
moment in time when the crime occurred,
but what is of importance is the event upon
capture of these respondents and the
events confessions made on May 30, 1982.
 Filoteo was informed about his right to have
a counsel, but he rejected this. Despite
having a lawyer as a father-in-law, he
proceeded with the pre-trials and extra-
judicial confessions without a lawyer. He
stated in his extra-judicial confession that
he was guilty of preparing the vehicles their
team used in the robbery, and that he left
the share of his sum of checks to his kumare
whom he instructed not to open the bag.
 Filoteo then asserts, during the trial period,
that his extra-judicial statements were
obtained through torture, duress,
maltreatment, and intimidation, and
therefore should be inadmissible as
evidence in the court.
 This capture of Filoteo happened prior to
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution,
and therefore although he has been told
about his rights to have a counsel, he was
not told of his right to remain silent and the
officers then were not compelled to assign
him a counsel to waive such right to deny a
counsel (since your right of a counsel can
only be denied in signing a waiver with a
counsel).
 Filoteo asserts that the 1987 Constitution
should be applied to him retroactively.
Issues
 W/N 1987 Constitution should be
retroactively applied to petitioner
 W/N the extrajudicial confession which lays
out in detail his complicity in the crime
should be admissible in court despite the
absence of counsel
Provisions
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation; or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as
 well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices and
their families."
Held
 By parity of reasoning, the specific provision
of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a
waiver by an accused of his right to counsel
during custodial investigation must be made
with the assistance of counsel may not be
applied retroactively or in cases where the
extrajudicial confession was made prior to
the effectivity of said Constitution.
Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel
during custodial investigation without the
benefit of counsel during the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution should, by such
argumentation, be admissible. Although a
number of cases held that extrajudicial
confessions made while the 1973
Constitution was in force and effect, should
have been made with the assistance of
counsel, the definitive ruling was
enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this
Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued
the guidelines to be observed by law
enforcers during custodial investigation.
The Court specifically ruled that "the right
to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel”.
 Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner
may not claim the benefits of the Morales
ruling because he executed his extrajudicial
confession and his waiver to the right to
counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April
26, 1983.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of
robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and
penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay
his proportionate share of the costs of the action.
All other parts of the disposition are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
VHALERIE S. BULURAN | WHO INTERPRETS THE
CONSTITUTION
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L-45081 | JULY 15, 1936
Petitioner: Jose A. Angara
Respondent: the Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor
Doctrine:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
Facts:
- Candidates for the position of member of
the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas for elections of
Sept. 17, 1935 are Jose Angara, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor
- Jose Angara won by majority of votes and
took oath of office
- On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution (No. 8)
confirming the election of Angara to the
body.
- Pedro Ysnua filed a motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on Dec 8
- Dec 9, Electoral commission adopted a
resolution in which it fixed a date for the
last day of the filing of protest.
- Dec 20, Angara filed a motion to dismiss the
protest alleging that Resolution 8
o of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise
of its constitutional prerogative
o (b) that the aforesaid resolution
has for its object, and is the
 accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period
o (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period
- Ysnua filed an answer to the motion of
dismissal, alleging that there is no
constitutional provision barring a
presentation of protest in which angara
replied.
- Electoral commission promulgated a
resolution on Jan, 23, 1936 denying the
motion to dismiss the protest Angara, filed
for issuance of the writ prayed for.
- February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General
appeared and filed an answer in behalf of
the respondent Electoral Commission
- Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed
an answer in his own behalf contending
that the Electoral Commission had the sole
power of regulating proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts
--Whether the said Electoral Commission acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
Provisions:
Art. II
(Current Art. 8 sec. 1 and 2 of 1987 Constitution)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary
when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.
Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
SEC. 4.: The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
Sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.,
states that the electoral Commission, as a
constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person.
Held:
Yes
 The judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
 The Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform,
closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the governments as stated
in Sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
 The Electoral Commission is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly as stated in Section 4
of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
 That such transfer of power from the
legislature to the Electoral Commission was
full, clear and complete.
 The framers of our constitution adopted the
American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect
by the judicial department.
 Upon principle, reason and authority, the
supreme court has jurisdiction over the
 Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission.
 The National Assembly of the election, does
not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to
prescribe the time within which protests
against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
--No, the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed
by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any
manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
Disposition:
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
VIN CHING LANGUAGE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
TUASON V. LAND OF TENURE ADMINISTRATION
GR NO. L67766 FEBRUARY 18, 1970
PETITIONER: J.M. TUASON & CO.
RESPONDENT: THE LAND TENURE
ADMINISTRATION, SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND
AUDITOR GENERAL
Doctrine: Language of the Constitution
Facts: In this special civil action for prohibition to
nullify a legislative act directing the expropriation of
the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, the Court is called
upon to inquire further into how far the power of
Congress under the Constitution to authorize upon
payment of just compensation.
RA 2126 authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2
others.
On August 3, 1959, RA 2616 took effect without
executive approval. It is stated that the expropriation
of the Tatalon Estate is hereby authorized.
The lands involved constitute a portion of the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision totaling to 109 hectares,
registered in the name of petitioner.
On November 15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure
Administration was directed by the Executive
Secretary to institute the proceeding for the
expropriation.
On November 17, 1960, petitioner filed a special
action for prohibition with preliminary injunction
praying that the act be declared unconstitutional,
and a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents
from instituting such expropriation proceeding.
RTC rendered decision holding that RA 2616 is
unconstitutional and granted the writ of prohibition.
Issue: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal
protection. Eminent domain, in general, is an
inherent power of any government to adequately
respond to the demands of public need and interest.
The Constitution itself, supposedly the supreme law
on private property rights, declares it to be so, and
leaves it to Congress, not to the judiciary, to make
the choice of the lands to be taken to attain the
objective the constituent assembly aimed to achieve.
The use of the word “may” means that the National
Legislature will use the power sought to confer upon
it, and only when, the necessity for its exercise will
have arisen.
Provisions:
Art XIII, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the motion for the
reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970,
filed by petitioner-appellee, is denied.
CUARESMA | LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 83896 FEBRUARY 22, 1991
DOCTRINE:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is
the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in
the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain
the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
that purpose.
FACTS:
-These two (2) petitions were consolidated per
resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,
1987
-It is alleged that Section 13, Article VII prohibits
public respondents, as members of the Cabinet,
along with the other public officials enumerated in
the list attached to the petitions from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure.
-Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines
further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as
well as a temporary restraining order directing public
respondents therein to cease and desist from
holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual
or multiple positions other than those authorized by
the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any
salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of
privileges and the like appurtenant to their
questioned positions, and compelling public
respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and
all amounts or benefits that they may have received
from such positions.
-In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to
Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in
the Constitution.
- According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the
only exceptions against holding any other office or
employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.
-Petitioners further argue that the exception to the
prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the
Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that
said exceptions do not apply and cannot be
extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies
specifically to the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is
unconstitutional
PROVISION/S:
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions
of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies
or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary
or assistant secretary or other appointive official of
the Executive Department holds more positions than
what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions
other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the
members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2)8 provides:
Sec. 7. .....
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
RULING/RATIO:
YES
-The practice of designating members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government
agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations,
became prevalent during the time legislative powers
in this country were exercised by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
authority.
-There was a proliferation of newly-created agencies,
instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential
decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants
were designated to head or sit as members of the
board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments,
per diems, allowances and other perquisites of
office. Most of these instrumentalities have
remained up to the present time.
-This practice of holding multiple offices or positions
in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact,
the holding of multiple offices in government was
strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Pambansa.
-As keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
during the deliberations in these cases, one of the
strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution
during the campaign for its ratification was the
assurance given by its proponents that the
scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom
would be discontinued.
-The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
-It is quite notable that in all these provisions on
disqualifications to hold other office or employment,
the prohibition pertains to an office or employment
in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In
striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article
VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure." In the latter
provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being
qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The
prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both
public and private office or employment.
-Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay
down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
-Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in
question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the
Constitution, but who as an elective public official
under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely
ineligible "for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure."
-Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13,
Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific
provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-
President to become a member of the Cabinet,15
and to act as President without relinquishing the
Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave
been chosen or fails to qualify.
-The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.
-It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as
an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in
legal contemplation performing the primary function
of his principal office in defining policy in monetary
and banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is
designated, such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution.
-During their tenure in the questioned positions,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and
as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where
there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in
good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in
an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and
other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
grounds since it seems unjust that the public should
benefit by the services of an officer de facto and
then be freed from all liability to pay any one for
such services.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-
stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.
.PERFECTO v MEER
85 Phil 552 (1950)
LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
PETITIONER: GREGORIO PERFECTO
RESPONDENT: BIBIANO L. MEER
DOCTRINE: The imposition of income tax upon the
salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and violates
the Constitution.
FACTS:
 In April 1947 the Collector of Internal
Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary
as member of the Court during the year
1946.
 After paying the amount, he instituted an
action in Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal,
his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would
reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
 It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that
the members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts “shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law,
which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
PROVISION: Article VIII, Section 9 of 1935
Constitution
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax
upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution
RULING:
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary
of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof.
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting
words, and appears to be directed against all
diminution, whether for one purpose or another.
The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit
diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that
they regarded the independence of the judges as of
far greater importance than any revenue that could
come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the
salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation
of the Constitution.
DISPOSITION:
We vote for the reversal of the judgment
appealed from and the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
DE SILVA, PAULO
SARMIENTO V. MISON
G.R. NO. 79974 DECEMBER 17, 1987
PETITIONER: ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND
JUANITO G. ARCILLA
RESPONDENT: SALVADOR MISON
Doctrine: Intent of the framers of the constitution
and of the people adopting it must be given effect.—
The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give ef fect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the
constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will
thus construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive
or the legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what they say and
provide.
Facts:
• Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed by
former President Cory Aquino as Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs.
• Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members
of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and
professors of Constitutional Law, question the
appointment on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional by reason of it not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Respondents contend, and maintain the
constitutionality of the appointment.
• Commission on Appointments was allowed by the
Court to intervene
• There are four (4) groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint, specifically, these are:
1. The heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
3. Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank 4 whose
appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
• The first group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
• The second, third and fourth groups of officers are
the present bone of contention.
Issue:
• Whether or not the President can appoint Mison
without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments
Provision:
Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution:
• The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this
 Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
Ruling:
• Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau
are removed from the list of officers that needed
confirmation from the Commission On
Appointment.
• President Cory acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
• By following the accepted rule in constitutional
and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.
• it is evident that the position of Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs is not included in the scope
of the first group of appointments. The 1987
Constitution,deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in
intervention should be, as they are, hereby
DISMISSED. Without costs.
FORTUNO | SELF -EXECUTING PROVISIONS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
G.R. NO. 122156 | FEBRUARY 3, 1997
PETITIONER: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
RESPONDENT: GSIS
Doctrine:
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislation act is necessary
to enforce constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing, if the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executory, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
Facts:
● The controversy arose when respondent
Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization of the
Philippine Government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of Manila
Hotel Corporation.
● The winning bidder, or the eventual
“strategic partner”, will provide
management expertise or an international
marketing/ reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel.
● In close bidding held on September 18,1995
only two (2) bidders disputed: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, A Malaysian
firm, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.24 more
than the bid of the petitioner.
● Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhad
as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent
a manager’s cheque as bid security which
the GSIS refused to accept
 ● Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale
may be consummated with Renong
Bernard, petitioner filed a petition before
the court
Issue/s:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second paragraph, Article
XIII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision
Provision/s:
Sec.10, second paragraph, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be
evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in
accordance with law and in a just and humane
manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
undertaken without adequate consultation with
them and the communities where they are to be
relocated.
Ruling:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self - executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed in every statute and contract, A provision
which lays down general principle, such as those
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self - executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislation act is necessary
to enforce constitutional mandate, the presumption
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing, if the constitutional provisions are treated
as requiring legislation instead of self-executory, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase
the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary agreements and documents
to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances
and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
GACULA, KYLE Y.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
PETITIONER: OPOSA
RESPONDENT: THEN SEC OF DENR FACTORAN
Doctrine: Intergenerational responsibility gives
minors in this case a legal standing.
 Principal petitioners are minors represented
by their parents
 Impleaded as Plaintiffs PENI ( Phil Eco
Netwrok Inc) whose cause is protection of
natural resources
 Defendant is former DENR Sec Factoran Jr
 Taxpayers class suit citing Art 2 Sec 16 that
all taxpayers have a right to a balanced and
healthy ecology and entitled to enjoyment
of country’s virgin tropical forests
  Instant petition seeks to cancel all existing
Timber licenses in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving TLA
 Minor petitioners content that continued
granting of timber license is a impairment of
natural resource property and violated Art 2
Sec 16
 Defendant on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint had no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question
 The RTC judge sustained the motion to
dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by consti

ISSUE:

1. W/N Minors have legal standing?

2. W/N granting the petition would lead to
impairment of contracts?

HELD:

1. YES through the concept of

intergenerational responsibility. Every gen
has the responsibility to preserve ecology to
ensure the protection of the same right for
the next generations to come.
2. The Court held that the Timber License
Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates disposition of the forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the
non impairment clause cannot be invoked.
It can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case. The granting of license does
not create irrevocable rights. Moreover, the
constitutional guaranty of non impairment
of obligations of contract is limit by the
exercise by the police power of the State.