FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v.

THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA

MANUFACTURING, INC.

CASE: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed.

A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as
the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.

FACTS:

 BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate
of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to
"ceramic tiles."
 Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
which was denied. So, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals
pursuant to SC Circular 1-91.
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of E.O. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

PETITIONER:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of
E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
this Court.

Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a
substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased
by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.

(NOTE: During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the
lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department. According to SC in its decision in the
herein case, the obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote.
In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that
all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
order or decision.)

PRIVATE RESPONDENT:

Whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been

between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already
been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial
agencies on the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS (BOI)?

RULING:

COURT OF APPEALS

1. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from
decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where
and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with
procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its
constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those
arising from procedural law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which

includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance
of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a
cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion.12

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should
be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to
appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders
of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply
transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals
and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an
incursion into the substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner
and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOI, WHICH BY STATUTE WAS PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED
TO BE FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT, SHOULD NOW BE BROUGHT TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS.