G.R. No. 163767. March 10, 2014.* PENRO or CENRO.
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON,
respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (R.A. No. 1529); In Heirs of
Page | Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA
1 _______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
229172 (2009), the Supreme Court set the guidelines concerning land registration
proceedings brought under these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide
clarity to the application and scope of said provisions.—Section 14(1) deals with possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription as
a mode of acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172
(2009), the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration proceedings brought
under these provisions of the Property Registration Decree in order provide clarity to the
application and scope of said provisions.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 14(1), of the Property Registration Decree, the
respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945, or earlier.—Under Section 14(1), therefore, the
respondent had to prove that: (1) the land formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945,
or earlier. It is the applicant who carries the burden of proving that the two requisites
have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal of the application.
Same; Same; Same; In Menguito v. Republic, 348 SCRA 128 (2000), the Supreme Court
pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a certification on the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain.—Even had the
respondent’s effort to insert the certification been successful, the same would
nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito v. Republic, 348 SCRA 128 (2000), the
Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic engineer that included a
certification on the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land still formed part of the inalienable
public domain.
230
Same; Same; Same; Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must
be declared alienable and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).—Land of the public domain, to be the
subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by the
President or the Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA
477 (2008), we explicitly ruled: The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. This doctrine unavoidably means that
the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the
application for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the
original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Same; Same; Same; The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive
period in favor of the possessor.—The period of possession prior to the reclassification of
the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not considered in
reckoning the prescriptive period in favor of the possessor. As pointedly clarified also
in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009): Should public domain
lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or
duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative. The limitation
imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before
the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it
becomes
231patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code.
As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted
to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Manuel P. Punzalan for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the discharge of the burden of proof by the applicant in
proceedings for the registration of land under Section 14 (1) and (2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
The Republic appeals the adverse decision promulgated on January 30,
2004,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered
on August 10, 1981 by the erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan
(now the Regional Trial Court) in Registration Case No. 3446-M granting the
application of the respondent for the registration of her title covering a parcel
of land situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan.[2]
_______________
 [1] Rollo, pp. 29-36, penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (later Presiding Justice),
with Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice
Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased), concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 50-52.
232The respondent filed her application for land registration in the CFI in
Bulacan.[3] The jurisdictional requirements were met when the notice of initial
Page |
hearing was published in the Official Gazette for two successive weeks, [4] as
2 evidenced by a certification of publication.[5] The notice of initial hearing was
also posted by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building of Paombong, Bulacan as well as on the property
itself.[6] On June 2, 1977, at the initial hearing of the application, Fiscal Liberato
L. Reyes interposed an opposition in behalf of the Director of Lands and the
Bureau of Public Works. Upon motion by the respondent and without
objection from Fiscal Reyes, the CFI commissioned the Acting Deputy Clerk
of Court to receive evidence in the presence of Fiscal Reyes.[7]
The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland
with an area of 12,342 square meters known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong,
Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03-001603;[8] that the riceland had been
originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio since 1907; [9] that
on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale, [10] had sold the land to
Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria
Jacinto (mother of the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death
of Maria Jacinto in 1963, the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning
and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the
whole world, and in the concept of owner since then; that the land had been
declared in her name for taxation purposes; and that the taxes due
_______________
[3] Records, pp. 4-6.
[4] Folder of Exhibits, p. 1, Exhibit “A”.
[5] Id., at p. 2, Exhibit “B”.
[6] Rollo, p. 50.
[7] Id., at pp. 50-51.
[8] Folder of Exhibits, p. 5, “Exhibit “E”.
[9] Id., at pp. 7-8, Exhibit “G”.
[10] Id.
233thereon had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No.H-7100234.[11]
In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes,[12] the Director of Lands and the
Director of Forest Development averred that whatever legal and possessory
rights the respondent had acquired by reason of any Spanish government
grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure to occupy and possess
the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application;[13] and that the land applied for, being actually a portion of the
Labangan Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could
not be subject of appropriation or land registration. [14]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in behalf of the
Government an opposition to the application,[15] insisting that the land was
within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan, as indicated in BF Map
LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the unclassified region were
denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction,
control and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD); [16]and that
the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the application considering that: (1)
the land was beyond the commerce of man; (2) the payment of taxes vested no
title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer.[17]
Ruling of the CFI
On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision, [18]ordering the
registration of the land in favor of the respondent on
_______________
[11] Id., at p. 10, Exhibit “I”.
[12] Records, pp. 7-8.
[13] Rollo, pp. 31-32.
[14] Supra note 3, at p. 8.
[15] Rollo, pp. 47-49.
[16] Id., at p. 47.
[17] Id., at p. 48.
[18] Supra note 2.
234the ground that she had sufficiently established her open, public,
continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than
30 years, to wit:
Since it has been established that the applicants and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, public, continuous, and adverse possession of the said parcel of
land in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years, that it, since 1926 up to
the present time, applicant therefore is entitled to the registration thereof under the
provisions of Act No. 496, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws.
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of general default issued in this case, the Court
hereby orders the registration of this parcel of land Lot 2633, Cad 297. Case 5,
Paombong Cadastre[)] described in plan Ap-03-001603 (Exhibit D, page 7 of records)
and in the technical description (Exhibit F, page 5 of records) in favor of Rosario de
Guzman Vda de Joson, of legal age, Filipino, widow and resident of Malolos, Bulacan.
After the decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA, contending that the
trial court had erred in granting the application for registration despite the
land not being the subject of land registration due to its being part of the
unclassified region denominated as forest land of Paombong, Bulacan.[20]
235
 _______________
[19] Id., at p. 52.
[20] Rollo, pp. 32-38.
Judgment of the CA
Page | On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed
judgment,[21] affirming the decision of the trial court upon the following
3 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and
uncontroverted by the oppositor-appellant and they should serve as proof of the
paucity of the claim of the applicant-appellee over the subject property.
Upon the other hand, oppositor-appellant, in a lackluster fashion, advanced pro
forma theories and arguments in its Opposition which naturally failed to merit any
consideration from the court a quo and also from this Court. The indorsement from the
Bureau of Forest Development, San Fernando, Pampanga to the effect that the subject
area is within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan does not warrant any
evidentiary weight since the same had never been formally offered as evidence by the
oppositor-appellant. All the other allegations in the Opposition field (sic) by the
oppositor-appellant failed to persuade this Court as to the veracity thereof considering
that no evidence was ever presented to prove the said allegations.
Such being the case, this Court is not inclined to have the positive proofs of her
registrable rights over the subject property adduced by the applicant-appellee be
defeated by the bare and unsubstantiated allegations of the oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[22]
_______________
[21] Supra note 1.
[22] Id., at p. 36.
236
Hence, the Republic appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF PRIVATE ACQUISITION; and
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT, AS WELL AS THE COURT OF
APPEALS, ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.[23]
Ruling
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Section 14(1) and (2) of the Property Registration Decreestate:
Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
Section 14(1) deals with possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner while Section 14(2) involves prescription
_______________
[23] Rollo, p. 14.
237as a mode of acquiring ownership. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic,[24] the Court set the guidelines concerning land registration
proceedings brought under these provisions of the Property Registration
Decree in order provide clarity to the application and scope of said provisions.
The respondent sought to have the land registered in her name by alleging
that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful,
continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept
of owner since time immemorial. However, the Republic counters that the
land was public land; and that it could not be acquired by prescription. The
determination of the issue hinges on whether or not the land was public; if so,
whether the respondent satisfactorily proved that the land had already been
declared as alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and that she
and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, peaceful, continuous,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
In Republic vs. Tsai,[25] the Court summarizes the amendments that have
shaped the current phraseology of Section 14(1), to wit:
Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended several times.
The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment introduced by PD 1073.
In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July
26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided
for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
ap-
_______________
[24] G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
 [25] G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 423.
238plicantfor judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
Page | in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
4 possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years
or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977,
it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945
or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529. [26]
Under Section 14(1), therefore, the respondent had to prove that: (1) the
land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and (2) she, by herself or through her predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June
_______________
[26] Id., at pp. 432-433.
23912, 1945, or earlier.[27] It is the applicant who carries the burden of proving
that the two requisites have been met. Failure to do so warrants the dismissal
of the application.
The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by
virtue of her having been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. She
testified on how the land had been passed on to her from her predecessors-in-
interest; and tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale
evidencing the transfer of the property from Mamerto Dionisio to Romualda
Jacinto in 1926;[28] (2) Tax Declaration No. 4547 showing that she had declared
the property for taxation purposes in 1976;[29] and (3) Official Receipt No. H-
7100234 indicating that she had been paying taxes on the land since
1977.[30]The CFI found her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-
in-interest to have been open, public, continuous, and adverse in the concept
of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for more than 30 years,
entitling her to the registration under the provisions of Act No. 496, in relation
to Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and
other existing laws.[31] On its part, the CA ruled that the documentary and
testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and uncontroverted by the
Republic.[32]
Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not
discharge her burden to prove the classification of the land as demanded by
the first requisite. She did not present evidence of the land, albeit public,
having been declared alienable and disposable by the State. During trial,
_______________
[27] Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 619,
citing Mistica v. Republic, G.R. No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 408.
[28] Folder of exhibits, pp. 7-8, Exhibit “G”.
[29] Id., at p. 9, Exhibit “H”.
[30] Id., at p. 10, Exhibit “I”.
[31] Supra note 2, at p. 52.
[32] Supra note 1, at p. 36.
240she testified that the land was not within any military or naval reservation,
and Frisco Domingo, her other witness, corroborated her. Although the
Republic countered that the verification made by the Bureau of Forest
Development showed that the land was within the unclassified region of
Paombong, Bulacan as per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927, [33] such
showing was based on the 1stIndorsement dated July 22, 1977 issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development,[34] which the CA did not accord any
evidentiary weight to for failure of the Republic to formally offer it in
evidence. Still, Fiscal Reyes, in the opposition he filed in behalf of the
Government, argued that the land was a portion of the Labangan Channel
operated by the Pampanga River Control System, and could not be the subject
of appropriation or land registration. Thus, the respondent as the applicant
remained burdened with proving her compliance with the first requisite.
Belatedly realizing her failure to prove the alienable and disposable
classification of the land, the petitioner attached as Annex A to her appellee’s
brief[35] the certification dated March 8, 2000 issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources–Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),[36] viz.:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the parcel of land described on lot 2633 located at San
Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan as shown in the sketch plan surveyed by Geodetic Engineer
Carlos G. Reyes falls within the Alienable or Disposable Land Project No. 19 of
Paombong, Bulacan per Land Classification Map No. 2934 certified on October 15, 1980.
[33] Rollo, p. 11.
[34] Id., at p. 38.
[35] CA Rollo, pp. 49-58.
[36] Rollo, p. 58.
 241However, in its resolution of July 31, 2000, [37] the CA denied her motion
to admit the appellee’s brief, and expunged the appellee’s brief from the
records. Seeing another opportunity to make the certification a part of the
records, she attached it as Annex A of her comment here. [38] Yet, that attempt
to insert would not do her any good because only evidence that was offered at
Page | the trial could be considered by the Court.
5 Even had the respondent’s effort to insert the certification been successful,
the same would nonetheless be vain and ineffectual. In Menguito v.
Republic,[39] the Court pronounced that a survey conducted by a geodetic
engineer that included a certification on the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the land still formed part of the inalienable public domain, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: “This survey
plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map
No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,” appearing on Exhibit
“E” (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
“All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x.” (Emphasis supplied.)
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
_______________
[37] CA Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[38] Rollo, pp. 55-57.
[39] G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128.
242reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, “occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.” To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in
Exhibit “E” indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such
notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable.[40]
We reiterate the standing doctrine that land of the public domain, to be the
subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable and disposable either by
the President or the Secretary of the DENR. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,[41] we explicitly ruled:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be es-
_______________
[40] Id., at pp. 139-140.
[41] G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.
243tablished to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.[42]
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by the
CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for registration,
because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of
the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. As the
Court said in Republic v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation:[43]
The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that
the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of
the government. We held in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO
certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land
sought to be registered. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as
alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.
Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of
its application. Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.[44]
_______________
[42] Id., at p. 489.
[43] G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158.
[44] Id., at pp. 170-171.
244
Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have
sufficed, the respondent’s application would still be denied considering that
the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable came only after the
filing of the application in court in 1976. The certification itself indicated that
the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.
 The consequence of this is fittingly discussed in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, to wit:
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land
Page | was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the
better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
6 authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, which
involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land
that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office
in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were “found to be
within the alienable and disposable (sic)
245Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map
2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980.” This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of
private respondents’ application. Further, the certification
enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth
noting also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating
that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of
Lands and Forestry to contest the application of
appellees on the ground that the property still
forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....”
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did
not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the
first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private
respondents were able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even
before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.”
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and
246180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application
for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable
or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the
land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to
belittle.[45](citations omitted)
On the other hand, under Section 14(2), ownership of private lands acquired
through prescription may be registered in the owner’s name. Did the
respondent then acquire the land through prescription considering that her
possession and occupation of the land by her and her predecessors-in-interest
could be traced back to as early as in 1926, and that the nature of their
possession and occupation was that of a bona fide claim of ownership for over
30 years?
Clearly, the respondent did not. Again, Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic is enlightening, to wit:
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the
commerce of man. Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability
of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable
be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
_______________
[45] Supra note 24, at pp. 195-196.
247within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
 of the patrimonial property of the State.” It is this provision that controls how public purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420(2) makes clear that those property Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
“which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some framework of
public service or for the development of the national wealth” are public dominion _______________
[46] Id., at pp. 202-204.
Page | property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified [47] Id., at pp. 205-206.
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
7 “intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” 249prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. [48]
national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains In other words, the period of possession prior to the reclassification of the
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of land, no matter how long, was irrelevant because prescription did not operate
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
against the State before then.
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 30, 2004; DISMISSES the
or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. application for land registration of respondent Rosario de Guzman Vda. De
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Joson respecting Lot 2633, Cad-297 with a total area of 12,342 square meters,
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of more or less, situated in San Isidro, Paombong, Bulacan; and DIRECTS the
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona respondent to pay the costs of suit.
fide possessors or occupants SO ORDERED.
248claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although Judgment reversed and set aside.
declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply
the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The
remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress
can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.[46]
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain is not considered in reckoning the
prescriptive period in favor of the possessor. As pointedly clarified also
in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic:[47]

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such
in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the
period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial
be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in
the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
 G.R. No. 164408. March 24, 2014.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.ZURBARAN REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree [P.D.]
No. 1529); Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an
Page | application for registration of land based on possession and occupation of a land of the public
domain.—Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for
8 P.D. No. 1529 requires that the land had already been converted to patrimonial
registration of land based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain,
thus: Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
Same; Same; Same; Under Section 14(1), it is not necessary that the land must have been
declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply requires
the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.—An application for registration under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 must establish the following requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and
disposable property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant and
its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. The Court has clarified in Malabanan that under Section 14(1), it is not
necessary that the land must have been declared alienable and
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
602disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply requires the
property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation
would absurdly limit the application of the provision “to the point of virtual inutility.”
Same; Same; Same; Registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to
private ownership at that time.—Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private
ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been
declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for
registration.
Same; Same; Same; An application under Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 is based on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as
provided by the Civil Code.—An application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided
by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil Code. For acquisitive prescription to set
in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied must already be classified or
declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession
would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public
dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial
property of the State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription. Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of
property of the State at the onset of the period of possession required by the law on
prescription.
603
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of an application for registration based on Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.—An application for registration based on Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the following requisites, to wit: (a) the
land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b)
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for at
least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of
good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as
patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year
period of possession.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Perpetou G. Paner for respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 must show not only that
the land has previously been declared alienable and disposable, but also that
the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the
30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law
on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule — as
clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.Republic[1] — in reviewing the decision
promulgated on June 10, 2004,[2] whereby the Court of Appeals
_______________
[1] G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
[2] Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos (retired/deceased),
with Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (later Presiding Justice, and a Member of the Court, since
retired)
604(CA) granted the petitioner’s application for registration of land.
Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development
Corporation filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an
application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter parcel of
 land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,
denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-
D, Cabuyao Cadastre,[3] alleging that it had purchased the land on March 9,
1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos, married to Jose Abalos, for P300,000.00; that
the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-in-
Page | interest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or
9 encumbrance of any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person
or entity having any interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the
applicant; and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the land in the
concept of an owner.
Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing
cloth plan as approved by the Land Management Division of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (2) blue print copies of the
tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the
application, arguing that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had not
been in open, continuous,
_______________
and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (a Member of this Court), concurring.
[3] Id., at pp. 33-35.
605exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax declaration presented did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the
land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was
not subject to private appropriation.[4]
The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna;
and the Land Management Sector and Forest Management Bureau, Manila, to
submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land was
covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved
isolated survey, and whether it was within a forest zone. [5]
In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and
the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial
court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated that the land had been
“verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land
Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as
such pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-1627 dated September 28, 1981
per BFD Map LC-3004.” Attached to the memorandum was the inspection
report declaring that “the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3)
buildings for employees’ residence;” that the land was acquired through sale
before the filing of the application; that the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in “continuous, open and peaceful occupation” of the land,
and that “no forestry interest is adversely affected.”[6]
CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales
reported that: (1) the land was covered by a sur-
_______________
[4] Id., at pp. 37-38.
[5] Id., at p. 41.
[6] Id.
606vey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration
Authority on May 25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it
consisted of 22,773 square meters and was located in Barangay Banlic,
Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable
area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for nonpayment
of taxes, and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal
cases; (5) it was not within a previously patented property as certified to by
the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there was no public land
application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons as per verification
from the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification
at the Office of the Municipal Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared
for the first time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of
Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered
by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent; (3) the real
property taxes had been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for
public or quasi-public purposes per information from the District Engineer.
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the
respondent was in the actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3)
the land did not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbank/bed
protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area devoted to general use
or devoted to public service.[7]
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the
Land Management Bureau stating that it had no record of any kind of public
land applications/land patents covering the parcel of land subject of the
application.[8]
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer,
who testified that the respondent had pur-
_______________
[7] Id., at pp. 41-42.
[8] Id.
607chased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for
P300,000.00; that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name
 of Abalos under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax
Declaration had been issued in the name of the respondent, who had
meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and
introducing improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real
property taxes thereon since its acquisition; that the respondent’s possession
Page | had been continuous, open and public; and that the land was free from any
10 lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the land. [9]
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because
it was a portion of Lot No. 8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao
Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had acquired it from the Hemedez
family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and the
remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the
respondent.[10]
The respondent’s final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he
was a retired land overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was
familiar with the land which was part of a bigger parcel of land owned by the
Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his assistance, and one
Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding
had originally been sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold
until it ceased to be agricultural land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to
Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer; that as the overseer, he fenced
and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing
purposes; that in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the
remaining portion to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for
the new owners; that Abalos then sold her portion to
_______________
[9] Id., at pp. 42-43.
[10] Id., at p. 43.
608the respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of
the land, and he then ceased to be the overseer; that the possession by the
Hemedez family and its successors-in-interest was open, continuous, public
and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any person who
claimed ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as
overseers.[11]
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly,
granted the application for registration, viz.:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant,
this Court hereby orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described
as Lot 8017-A of subdivision plan Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of
subdivision plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao,
Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the name of the
applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M. Viola St.,
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the
decision shall become final, let an order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in
favor of said applicant.
SO ORDERED.[12]
_______________
[11] Id., at pp. 43-44.
[12] Id., at p. 44.
609
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and
its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land within the required length
of time could not be determined because there was no evidence as to when the
land had been declared alienable and disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and
concluded that the reports made by the concerned government agencies and
the testimonies of those familiar with the land in question had buttressed the
court a quo’s conclusion that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
even prior to 1960.[13]
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the
following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT
AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD OF
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.[14]
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when
the land covered by the application for registration became alienable and
disposable;[15] that such detail was crucial because the possession of the
respondent
_______________
[13] Id., at p. 31.
[14] Id., at p. 13.
[15] Id., at p. 16.
610and its predecessors-in-interest,for the purpose of determining whether it
acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when
 the land was declared alienable and disposable; and that prior to the
declaration of the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, it was
not susceptible to private ownership, and any possession or occupation at such
time could not be counted as part of the period of possession required under
the law on prescription.[16]
Page |
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property
11 was declared alienable and disposable and whether it complied with the 30-
year required period of possession should not be entertained anymore by the
Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court and were
being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on
this Court. At any rate, the respondent insists that it had been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for the
prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had
been declared for taxation purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-
interest, and that such possession had the effect of converting the land into
private property and vesting ownership upon the respondent. [17]
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondent’s
application for registration; that it was only able to ascertain the errors
committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its decision; and that the
burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must
prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains
that the Court had the authority to review and reverse the factual findings of
the lower courts when
_______________
[16] Id., at pp. 20-21.
[17] Id., at pp. 57-61.
611the conclusion reached was not supported by the evidence on record, as in
this case.[18]
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application
for registration of land based on possession and occupation of a land of the
public domain, thus:
Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must
establish the following requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and
disposable property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership; and (c) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court has
clarified in Malabanan[19] that under Section 14(1), it is not necessary that the
land must
_______________
[18] Id., at pp. 84-87.
[19] Supra note 1.
612have been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier,
because the law simply requires the property sought to be registered to be
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation would absurdly limit
the application of the provision “to the point of virtual inutility.”
The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a
registration proceeding filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to Malabanan:
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section
14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public
Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by
the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.[20]
In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based
on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land
was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to show
that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time
prior to the filing of the application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is
based on acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on
prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil
_______________
[20] Id., at p. 206.
613Code.[21] For acquisitive
prescription to set in, therefore, the land being
possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared as patrimonial
 property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right
in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public
dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to
patrimonial property of the State, possession of it prior to such conversion will
not be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription.[22] Thus,
Page | registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the land had
12 already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the
period of possession required by the law on prescription.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529
must, therefore, establish the following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an
alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b)
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30
years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been
converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the
beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondent’s case, we must ascertain under
what provision its application for registration was filed. If the application was
filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the particular
date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would be
unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been
classified as such at the time the application was filed would be enough. If the
application was filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination
of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not the
_______________
[21] See Article 1113 of the Civil Code.
[22] Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 1 at pp. 205-206.
614declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it
susceptible to private ownership by acquisitive
prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus
…Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil
Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by
connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man
are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that “[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part
of the patrimonial property of the State.” It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to
acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
“which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth” are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
“intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.”
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that
615the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.[23]
The respondent’s application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in the
concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation
commenced and the duration of such possession. At any rate, the evidence
presented by the respondent and its averments in the other pleadings reveal
that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in
its application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12,
1945, or earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish such fact.
With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of the
application had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State.
In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth?
The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the
Court for the same reason that it objects to the determination of whether it
established when the land was declared alienable and disposable, that is, the
issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But the objection
would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne
out by the Republic’s allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect
“that the land is a portion of the public domain not subject to prescription.” In
any case, the interest of justice dictates the consideration and
_______________
[23] Id., at pp. 202-203.
616resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised.
The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up
 by a party on appeal refers only to independent, not concomitant, matters to
support or oppose the cause of action.[24]
Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an
area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the
State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the development of the
Page | national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny the
13 respondent’s application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June
10, 2004; and DISMISSESthe respondent’s application for original
registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D,
of the Cabuyao Cadastre.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
 G.R. No. 159810. October 9, 2006. *
ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM, represented by RAMON J.
QUISUMBING and RANDY GLEAVE LAWYER, as Judicial Administrators,
petitioners, vs.ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS and PATRICK C.
PARSONS, G-P AND COMPANY and MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
Page | INC., respondents.
14 Remedial Law; Appeals; The rule that the Court will not set aside the factual
determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during
trial admits of several exceptions.—The respondents’ formulation of the grounds for the
dismissal of the instant petition is a statement of the general rule. A resolution of the
petition would doubtless entail a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against
which the appealed decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside the
province of the Court and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. For, the rule of long standing is that the Court will not set aside the factual
determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of evidence
adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Among these
are when the factual conclusions of the CA are manifestly erroneous; are contrary to
those of the trial court; when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of
facts or overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly
considered, would justify a different
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
68
68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
conclusion. Decidedly, this case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule
on the finality of factual findings or conclusions of the CA.
Same; Evidence; Presumptions; A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed
and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of overthrowing by substantial and
credible evidence the presumption.—A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists
may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not
introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facieproof of the fact
presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of overthrowing
by substantial and credible evidence the presumption. Under the law on evidence, it is
presumed that “there was sufficient consideration for a contract.”
Civil Law; Trust; Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable
ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of
certain powers by the latter; Trust relations may be express or implied.—Trust is the legal
relationship between one having an equitable ownership in property and another
person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former
entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by
the latter. Trust relations between parties may be express, as when the trust is created
by the intention of the trustor. An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts
of the parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an intention to create a
trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its constitution, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied trust comes into existence by
operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter
of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any
such intention.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Torres for petitioners.
69
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 69
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
Manuel O. Chan Law Offices for Manila Golf & Country Club, Incorporated.
Blanco Law Firm and Feria, Feria, Lao, Tantoco co-counsels for
respondents Estate of Charles Parsons, Patrick Parsons and G-P & Co.
GARCIA, J.:
Because legal and situational ambiguities often lead to disagreements even
between or amongst the most agreeable of persons, it behooves all concerned
to put their financial affairs and proprietary interests in order before they
depart for the great beyond. Leaving legal loose ends hanging or allowing
clouds to remain on property titles when one can do something about them
before the proverbial thief in the night suddenly comes calling only opens the
door to bruising legal fights and similar distracting inconveniences. So it was
here.
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Estate
of Edward Miller Grimm, represented by its judicial administrators, assails
and seeks to set aside the Decision dated September 8, 2003 of the Court of
1
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, reversing an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No. 92-2452.
At the core of the controversy is a stock certificate of the Manila Golf &
Country Club, Inc. (“MGCC” or the “Club”, for short) covered
by Membership Certificate (MC) No. 1088 for 100 units, the playing rights
over which the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), the court-
appointed receiver, had, in the meantime, leased out. The Club issued MC No.
1088 to replace MC No. 590. Asserting clashing ownership claims over MC
No.1088, albeit recorded in the name
_______________
1Per Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, (ret.) concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios
Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam; Annex “A,” Petition, Rollo, pp. 7 et seq.
 70 involving MC No. 1088. Thus spurned, the Estate of Grimm filed on August
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 31, 1992 before the RTC of Makati City, a suit for recovery of MC No. 1088 with
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and damages against the Estate of Parsons, Patrick Parsons and MGCC. In its
Patrick C. Parsons complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2452 and eventually raffled to
9

Page | of Charles Parsons (“Parsons,” hereinafter) are petitioner Estate of Edward
15 Miller Grimm and respondent G-P and Company (“G-P & Co.,” hereinafter).
Parsons and Edward Miller Grimm (Grimm), together with Conrado Y.
Simon (Simon), formed in 1952 a partnership for the stated purpose of
engaging in the import/export and real estate business. Per SEC Certificate
#3305, the partnership was registered under the name G-P and Company.
2
Before September 1964, Parsons and Grimm each owned proprietary
membership share in MGCC, as evidenced by MC No. 374 for 100 units in the
3
name of Parsons, and MC No. 590, also for 100 units, in the name of Grimm.
Per records, the Club issued MC No. 590 to Grimm on May 25, 1960.
After Grimm’s demise on November 27, 1977, Parsons and Simon
continued with the partnership under the same name, G-P and Company, as
reflected in Articles of Partnership dated December 14, 1977. The articles of5
the partnership would later undergo another amendment to admit Parsons’
son, Patrick, in the partnership. After Parsons died on May 12, 1988,
6
Amended Articles of Partnership of G-P and Company was executed
on September 23, 1988 by and
_______________
Original Records, p. 2086.
2
Sec. 6 of the Club’s By-Laws (Exh. “U”) provides: Membership in the Club shall consist of
3
Branch 135 of the court, the Estate of Grimm, represented by its judicial
administrator, Ramon J. Quisumbing, alleged, among other things, the
following:
1. “1.That on September 7, 1964, Grimm transferred MC No. 590 in trust
to Parsons; on the same day, MGCC cancelled MC No. 590 and
issued MC No. 1088 in the name of Parsons;
2. 2.That in separate letters dated February 28, 1968 addressed to MGCC,
both Grimm and Parsons stated that the transfer of MC No. 590 was
4
temporary. Enclosed in that Parsons’ letter was MC No. 1088 which
he was turning over for safekeeping to the Club, thru E.C. Von
Kauffmann and Romeo Alhambra, then MGCC honorary secretary
and assistant manager, respectively;
3. 3.That on June 9, 1978, or after Mr. Kauffman’s death and Mr.
Alhambra’s resignation, MGCC turned over the possession of MC
No. 1088 to Parsons;
4. 4.That in 1977, Grimm died; after a protracted proceedings, his estate
was finally settled in 1988, the year Parsons also died;
5. 5.That Patrick and Jose Parsons had, when reminded of the trust
arrangement between their late father and Grimm, denied the

only the Proprietary Members. A Proprietary Member is one owning one (1) full [MC] and who
has been elected …. A full [MC] shall consist of one hundred (100) units. No [MC] will be issued _______________
for more than one hundred (100) units, but may be issued for less.
Subject to approval of the Board …., full Proprietary [MCs] may also be acquired by 7Id., at p. 2110.
Companies …. A Company Proprietary [MC] may only … be utilized by a bona fide official of the 8Exh. “C,” Id., at p. 2232.
Company …. 9Annex “B,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 114 et seq.
Per the Club’s index card #144; Exh. “7-I,” Original Records, p. 2571.
4 72
Id., at p. 2102.
5
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Id., at p. 2106.
6

71 Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and

VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 71 Patrick C. Parsons
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons 1. existence of a trust over the Club share and refused to return the same;
and
among Parsons’ heirs, namely, Patrick, Michael, Peter and Jose, all surnamed
2. 6.That MGCC had refused, despite demands, to cancel MC No. 1088
Parsons, albeit the amendment appeared to have been registered with the SEC
and issue a new certificate in the name of the Estate of Grimm.”
only on March 18, 1993. 7

The herein legal dispute started when brothers Patrick and Jose, both
surnamed Parsons, responding to a letter from the Estate of Grimm, rejected
8

the existence of a trust arrangement between their father and Grimm

 Attached to the complaint were the demand letters and other communications
which, to the Estate of Grimm, document the Grimm-Parsons trust
arrangement.
In his Answer with counterclaim, Patrick Parsons averred that his father
10
was, with respect to MC No. 1088, a mere trustee of the true owner thereof, G-
Page | P & Co., and alleged, by way of affirmative defense, that the claim set forth in
16 the complaint is unenforceable, barred inter alia by the dead man’s statute,
prescription or had been waived or abandoned.
Herein respondent G-P & Co., echoing Patrick Parsons’ allegation
respecting the ownership of MC No. 1088, moved to intervene and to implead
Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC), as transfer agent of MGCC, as defendant-
in-intervention. Attached to its motion was its COMPLAINT In
Intervention therein alleging (a) that on September 1, 1964, Parsons executed
11
a Letter of Trust, infra, in which he acknowledged the beneficial ownership of
G-P & Co. over MC No. 374 and MC No.1088; (b) that Parsons, as required by
the partnership, endorsed both certificates in blank; and (c) that G-P & Co.
carried said certificates amongst its assets in its books of accounts and financial
statements and paid the monthly dues of both certificates to the Club when its
membership privileges were not temporarily assigned to others. In the same
complaint-in-intervention, G-P & Co. cited certain tax incidents as reasons
why the transfer of MC No. 374 and MC No. 1088 from Parsons to the
intervenor-partnership cannot as yet be accomplished.
_______________
Annex “D,” Petition; Id., at pp. 142 et seq.
10
Id., at pp. 128 et seq.
11
73
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 73
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
After the usual reply and answer to counterclaims had been filed, the Estate
of Grimm filed an amended complaint to include Randy Gleave Lawyer, the
other judicial co-administrator, as representative of the Estate. On April 28,
1993, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
After a lengthy trial, the trial court rendered its May 29, 2000
judgment finding for the Estate of Grimm, as plaintiff a quo, disposing as
12
follows:
1. “1.Ordering defendants ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS and PATRICK C.
PARSONS:
1. 1.1to turn over [MC] No. 1088 to plaintiff ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER
GRIMM;
2. 1.2jointly and severally to pay damages to plaintiff ESTATE …in the amount
of P400,000.00 per annum from September 8, 1989 to November 12, 1998, with
legal interest thereon from the date of this Decision until fully paid;
3. 1.3Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff ESTATE … attorney’s fees in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 and the costs;
1. 2.Ordering defendant [MGCC] and defendant-in-intervention [FEBTC] to
cancel [MC] No. 1088 and to issue a new Membership Certificate in lieu
thereof in the name of plaintiff ESTATE ….
2. 3.Ordering Receiver RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION to
turn over to plaintiff ESTATE … all income derived from the lease of the
playing rights of [MC] No. 1088, less Receiver’s fees and charges.
3. 4.Ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendants … [Parsons];
and
4. 5.Ordering the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention and the
supplemental counterclaim of intervenor G-P AND COMPANY.
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.)
_______________
Penned by Judge Francisco B. Ibay; Annex “R,” Petition; Id., at pp. 797 et seq.
12
74
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
In gist, the trial court predicated its ruling on the postulate that the temporary
transfer of Grimm’s original share in MGCC—covered by MC No. 590 whence
MC No. 1088 descended—to Parsons, created a trust relationship between the
two.
Therefrom, only herein respondents G-P & Co., Patrick Parsons and the
Parsons Estate appealed to the CA, albeit MGCC would, in its brief, reiterate
its readiness to issue the corresponding replacement certificate to whosoever
is finally adjudged owner of MC No. 1088.
On September 8, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, the appellate court
rendered its herein assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
13
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the lower court dated May 29, 2000 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one rendered:
1. 1.Dismissing the complaint filed by … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm for lack
of merit;
2. 2.Ordering … Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc., and defendant-in-
intervention Far East Bank & Trust Company, as transfer agent, to
 immediately effect the reconveyance of [MC] No. 1088 to Intervenor-
appellant G-P and Company;
3. 3.Ordering Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, as receiver, to
immediately turn over to intervenor-appellant G-P and Company all income
derived from the lease of the playing rights of said Membership Certificate,
Page | less receiver’s fees;
4. 4.Ordering [the] … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants the
17 amount of P800,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
5. 5.Ordering … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.)
_______________
Supra note 1.
13
75
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 75
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
Hence, this petition for review on the lone submission that the CA erred in
finding that respondent G-P & Co. is the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088.
In their comment to the petition, the respondents urge the outright
dismissal thereof on the ground that it raises only purely factual and
evidentiary issues which are beyond the office of an appeal by certiorari. As
argued further, the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties.
It should be made clear right off that respondent Patrick Parsons, in his
individual capacity, and the Estate of Parsons (collectively, the Parsons) are
not claiming beneficial ownership over MC No. 1088. The same goes for
respondent MGCC which went to state on record that “[T]he ownership of
[MC] No. 1088 (previously No. 590) does not belong to the Club and it does
not stand to gain … from the determination of its real owner.” 14
We GRANT the petition.
The respondents’ formulation of the grounds for the dismissal of the
instant petition is a statement of the general rule. A resolution of the petition
would doubtless entail a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against
which the appealed decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside
the province of the Court and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. For, the rule of long standing is that the Court will not set
aside the factual determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the
evaluation of evidence adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of
several exceptions. Among these are when the factual conclusions of the CA
are manifestly erroneous; are contrary to those of the trial court; when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly
_______________
MGCCI’s Comment on Petitioner’s Petition for Review, Rollo, pp. 252 et seq.
14
76
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
considered, would justify a different conclusion. Decidedly, this case falls
15
within the recognized exceptions to the rule on the finality of factual findings
or conclusions of the CA.
The principal issue tendered in this case turns on who between petitioner
Estate of Grimm and respondent G.P. & Co. beneficially owns MC No. 1088.
Corollary thereto - owing to the presentation by respondents of a LETTER OF
TRUST that Parsons allegedly executed in favor of G-P and Company with
respect to MC No. 1088 - is the question of whether or not the transfer of MC
No. 590 effected on September 7, 1964 by Grimm in favor of Parsons resulted,
as the petitioner would have it, in the formation of a trust relation between the
two. Thus formed, the trust relationship would preclude the trustee from
disposing of the trust property, save when repudiation of the trust had
effectively supervened.
The trial court found the September 7, 1964 Grimm- to-Parsons certificate
transfer to be only temporary and without valuable consideration to
accommodate a third person and thus adjudged Grimm to be the real owner
of MC No. 590, as later replaced by MC No. 1088. According to the trial court,
such transfer created a trust, with Parsons, as trustee, and Grimm, as the
beneficial owner of the share thus transferred, adding that Parsons, as mere
trustee, is without right to transfer the replacement certificate to G-P & Co.
On the other hand, the CA, while eschewing the alternative affirmative
defenses interposed below by respondents, nonetheless ruled for respondent
G—P & Co. Citing Article 1448 of the Civil Code, the appellate court held that
16
respondent G—P
_______________
Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, Jan. 14, 2005, 448 SCRA 220, citing cases. Reyes
15
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110207, July 11, 1996, 258 SCRA 651.
Art. 1448. There is implied trust when property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one
16
party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the
property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. x x x.
77
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 77
 Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
& Co. pertains the beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088, an implied trust in its
favor having been created when MC No. 590 and MC No. 374 were acquired
Page | for and placed in the names of Grimm and Parsons, respectively, albeit the
18 partnership paid for the price therefor. To the appellate court, the fact that
these certificates were carried, as of December 31, 1974, November 27, 1977
and December 31, 1978 in the books of G-P & Co. as investment assets only
17
proves one thing: the company paid the acquisition costs for the membership
certificates. If Grimm was the real owner of said share, he should have,
according to the appellate court, objected to its inclusion in the partnership
assets during his lifetime. Completing its ratiocination, the CA wrote:
“x x x. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another
especially between the partners and the company, does not lose that character simply
because of what appears in a legal document. The transfer therefore of Grimm’s [MC]
No. 590 on September 7, 1964 in favor of Charles Parsons resulted merely in the change
of the person of trustee but not of the beneficial owner, the G-P and Company.”
The CA’s ruling does not commend itself for acceptance. As it were, the
assailed decision started on the wrong foot and thus had to limp all along to
arrive at a strained and erroneous conclusion. We shall explain.
A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact
presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of over-
throwing by substantial and credible evidence the presump-
_______________
Exh. “13” and submarkings; Original Records, pp. 2610-12.
17
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
tion. Under the law on evidence, it is presumed that “there was sufficient
18
consideration for a contract.” 19
Inasmuch as Grimm’s name appeared on MC No. 590 as registered owner
thereof, he is deemed to have paid sufficient consideration for it. The onus of
proving otherwise would fall on respondents G-P & Co. and/or the Parsons.
Without so much of an explanation, however, the CA minimized the value of
MC No. 590 as arguably the best evidence of ownership. Corollarily, the
appellate court devalued the rule on legal presumption and faulted petitioner
Estate of Grimm for not presenting evidence to prove that Grimm paid for his
original acquisition of MC No. 590. Wrote the CA:
“Contrary to the findings of the lower court, [petitioner] failed to establish [its] right
over the said shares. x x x Not a single evidence of proof of payment for the said shares
was ever presented by the [petitioner] to establish ownership.” (Words in bracket
added.) 20
Ironically, while the CA held it against the petitioner for failing to adduce
proof of payment by Grimm for his MC No. 590, it nonetheless proceeded to
declare respondent G-P & Co. to be the beneficial owner of said certificate even
if it, too, had not presented proof for such payment. Respondent G-P & Co., in
its complaint-in-intervention (should have been answer-in-intervention), did
not allege paying for MC No. 590. Surely, payment cannot be validly deduced,
as the CA did, from the bare fact of such membership certificate being listed
in the books of respondent G-P & Co. as partnership investment assets. For
one, the self-serving book entries in question are, as correctly dismissed by the
trial court, not evidentiary of ownership. Else, anyone can lay a claim, or
worse, acquire ownership over a share of stock by the simple expedience of
_______________
Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 582; Angeles v.
18
Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363.
Rule 131, Sec. 3[r], Rules of Court.
19
CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 16.
20
79
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 79
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
listing, without more, the same in the partnership or corporate books. The
sheer absurdity of the notion need no belaboring.
For another, what appears or what respondent company uniformly
entered as investments are: “Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. 2 shares.” No
reference was made whatsoever in the books or financial statements about MC
No. 590, (MC. No. 1088) and MC. No. 374. In the absence of the number
reference or other similar identifying details, the CA’s categorical conclusion
that one of the “2 shares” referred to is MC No. 1088 is at best speculative. This
observation becomes all the more valid given that Michael Parsons had in his
name two (2) Club share certificates. Exhibit “X-4,” a September 21, 1964 letter
from Parsons to Mr. Kaufmann made specific reference to Michael’s shares:
“Under the circumstance, please disregard … the previous letter which Michael wrote
in connection with the shares in his name ….
In the case of the two shares in the name of Michael, please leave the two in his
name . . . .
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain my shares in my name and
continue playing under such shares; Michael will retain two shares … assigning one to
Mr. Stoner; and Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida.” 21
 And for a significant third, respondent G-P & Co. is not the same G-P & Co. Id., at p. 2094.
23

Id., at pp. 2103 et seq.

that Parsons, Grimm and Simon organized in 1952, the former being an entity
24

Comment to Petition for Review, p. 51; Id., at p. 140.

25

that came into existence only on September 23, 1988. It is thus well-nigh
impossible for respondent company to have participated in a transaction that
occurred years before it acquired juridical personality. In the concrete, it is not
Page | physically possible for respondent G-P & Co. to have paid the price for the
19 purchase of Grimm’s MC No. 590, the same having been acquired in 1960 or
some 28 years
_______________
Original Records, p. 2427.
21
81
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 81
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable ownership in
property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the
equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain
duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. Trust relations between
26

80
parties may be express, as when the trust is created by the intention of the
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED trustor. An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the parties,
27

Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust;
Patrick C. Parsons the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its constitution, it being
before the respondent company was established by the execution of the sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied trust comes into existence
28

Articles of Partnership on September 23, 1988. The trial court depicted the by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust
incongruity of the situation in the following fashion: as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and
“Intervenor [respondent G-P & Co.] is not the same partnership originally formed by even contrary to any such intention. 29

Grimm, Parsons and Simon. When Grimm died on November 27, 1977, the original
partnership was dissolved. The death of a partner causes dissolution of a partnership
[Article 1829, Civil Code]. A new partnership was formed with Parsons and Simon as
partners. Besides this new partnership formed after the death of Grimm, there were
five (5) others formed [Exhibit “DD,” “EE,” “FF,” “GG,” “HH” and “II”] carrying the
name, G-P and Company.” (Words in bracket in the original)
22
Judging from their documented acts immediately before and subsequent
to the actual transfer on September 7, 1964 of MC No. 590, Parsons, as
transferee, and Grimm, as transferor, indubitably contemplated a trust
arrangement. Consider:
There can be no quibbling, owing to the letter exchanges between the Club,

in particular its Honorary Secretary E. C. Von Kauffman, and Parsons, that the
Independent of the cited Article 1829 of the Civil Code on the matter of
reason Grimm transferred his MC No. 590 to Parsons was because of the
partnership dissolution, however, it bears to state that Parsons and Simon
latter’s wish to accommodate one Daikichi Yoshida. Earlier, Parsons
executed on December 13, 1977 a joint affidavit wherein they declared the
23

recommended to Club management the approval of Mr. Yoshida’s

dissolution of the original 3-man G-P & Co., owing to the death of Grimm. The
“Application For Waiting List Eligible To [Club] Proprietary Membership.” In a
registration on December 14, 1977 of a new Articles of Partnership of G-P &
30

letter of August 10, 1964 to the

Co. followed the execution by Parsons and Simon of said affidavit.
31

24

_______________
It may be, as respondents rationalize, that the succeeding G-P & Co.
partnerships merely continued with the business started by the original G-P & Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1991 ed.,
26

Co. This element of continuity, assuming to be true, does not, however,

25 p. 669, citing 54 Am Jur. 21.
detract from the fact that the partnerships of the same name formed after Art. 1441, Civil Code; Vda. De Esconde v. Courts of Appeals, G.R. No. 103635, February 1,
27

1966, 253 SCRA 66.

Grimm’s demise are entities altogether different and with personalities Art. 1444, Civil Code.
28

distinct from the original partnership. Valdez vs. Olarga, G.R. No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71.
29

This brings us to the next issue of whether or not the transfer to Parsons of Exh. “X-2”/ “24-a.”
30

MC No. 590, as replaced by MC No. 1088, partook of the nature of a trust Exh. "X-1"/"24." Original Records, p. 2643.
31

82
transaction.
_______________ 82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
RTC Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 2975.
Patrick C. Parsons
22
 MGCC’s Board of Directors, Parsons endorsed the application of Yoshida as
Club member. While the Club’s response does not appear in its files, it is quite
apparent that Parsons addressed a letter to Kauffman requesting that Yoshida
be taken in as a Company assignee. In his reply-letter of August 29, 1964,
32
Kauffman explained why he cannot, under Club rules, favorably act on
Page | Parsons’ specific request, but suggested a viable solution, as follows:
20 Reference to your letter dated August 25th there is a hitch … of assigning the playing
rights to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida, as a company assignee.
xxx xxx xxx
The only solution that I see is that you transfer Pete Grimm’s 100 units to your name
and leave the other 100 units in your name, then you may assign the playing rights of one of
the certificates for 100 units to Mr. Yoshida. Mr. Yoshida was approved by the Board but
not as a Company assignee. (Emphasis added.)
Parsons’ response to Kauffman’s August 29, 1964 letter partly reads as follows:
Thank you for your letter of the 29th …. Under the circumstances, please disregard the
previous letter which I wrote with reference to Pete Grimm’s and my shares ….
xxx xxx xxx
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain in my name and continue playing
under such shares …. And Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to Mr. Daikichi
Yoshida.
The conclusion easily deductible from the foregoing exchanges is that, given
existing Club restrictions, the simplest way to accommodate and qualify
Yoshida for Club membership was for Grimm to transfer his 100-unit share to
Parsons who will then assign the playing rights of that share to Yo-
_______________
Exh. “X-3”/ “25.”
32
83
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 83
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
shida. The RTC aptly described the relevant factual situation, viz.:
33
“With these exchanges between Parsons and Kauffman …, it is apparent that since the
shares held by Parsons and Grimm are individual shares and not company shares, their
shares may not be assigned …. The proposal of Parsons that “Pete Grimm will assign
his playing rights to … Yoshida” was rejected by Kauffman in his letter dated
September 5, 1964 [Exhibit X-5/27] that “Pete Grimm’s assignment to him (Yoshida) cannot
be made as the rules are that only members who holds (sic) 200 units may assign 100 units to
an individual.” A letter of the same date … [Exhibit X-6/28] was sent by Kauffman to
Mr. Yoshida informing him of his election to the Club apologizing for the delay ….
Kauffman wrote further “ … Mr. Charles Parsons has made arrangement for to play
(sic) as assignee of extra membership which he now holds.”
The election of Yoshida as assignee of a proprietary member and the resignation of
Grimm were approved by the Club’s Board… on August 27, 1964. Kauffman and
Parsons were still discussing the ways … Mr Yoshida can be accommodated … as of
September 5, 1964, but the resignation of Grimm and election of Yoshida was already
approved … more than a week before.” (Words in bracket in the original; Italics
34
added.)
Even on the above factual perspective alone, it is not difficult to characterize,
as did the trial court, the certificate transfer from Grimm to Parsons, as
temporary, there being no evidence whatsoever that the transfer was for value.
Such transfer was doubtless meant only to accommodate Yoshida whose stay
in the country was obviously temporary. As it were, Yoshida’s application for 35
Club membership juxtaposed
_______________
33Sec. 31 of the Club’s 1968 By-Laws provides: “A member may own more than one (1) full
Membership Certificate …. The owner of more than one (1) full Membership Certificate shall be
entitled to transfer such certificate, permanently or temporarily, to any person who has been duly
elected to membership ….
34RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 801-802.
35Supra note 30.
84
84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
with the August 10, 1964 endorsement-letter of Parsons, yielded the 36
information that he (Yoshida) is the manager of the Manila Liaison Office of
Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha desiring to acquire Company membership in the
name of his employer Mitsubishi to enable future representatives to avail
themselves of Club facilities. Since Club membership did not seem possible at
the time, Yoshida had to come in as an assignee of a proprietary member.
Other compelling evidence attest to the temporary nature of the transfer in
question. The trial court cited two in its Decision. Wrote that court:
Even a witness for the (respondents) intervenor and the Parsons, Celso Jamias, Chief
Accountant of G-P and Company, confirmed that the transfer of the share to Parsons
was temporary. In a letter [Exhibit “7-GG”] dated 10 August 1991 addressed to Atty.
Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda, counsel for G-P and Company, Jamais wrote:
“. . . please be informed that the accommodation for Mr. Yoshida to have playing rights has not bearing on
the ownership of the share. The share of …Grimm (EMG) was transferred to Mr. Charles Parsons (CP) to
accommodate Mr. Yoshida due to Manila Golf club requirements.
Atty. Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda …echoed the view of Jamias, in a letter [Exhibit “Y”]
dated 30 August 1991 addressed to … (the) then General Manager of the Club: She
wrote:
“Also, we would like to clarify …. That the accommodation of Mr. Yoshida to enjoy the playing rights has
no bearing to the ownership of the shares. The share of Edward Grimm was transferred to Charles Parsons
to accommodate D. Yoshida due to club requirements.” 37
Any lingering doubt, however, as to the temporary nature of the Grimm-to-
Parsons transfer should, in our view, be put to rest by what MGCC records-
file contained and the testi-
 _______________ “Since the transfer of Grimm’s share to Parsons was temporary, a trust was created
with Parsons as the trustee, and Grimm, the beneficial owner of the share. The duties
Supra note 31.
36
of trustees have been said, in general terms, to be: “to protect and preserve the trust
----Pages 6-7; Rollo, pp. 802-803.
37
property, and to see to it that it is employed solely for the benefit of the cestui que trust.”
85 x x x Parsons as a mere trustee, it is not within his rights to transfer the share to G-P
Page | VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 85 and Company (sic).
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and The Court has, to be sure, considered the Letter of Trust dated September 1,
41

21
Patrick C. Parsons 1964 largely because, in respondents’ own words, it “provides the answer to the
mony of its former records custodian, Romeo Alhambra. In his affidavit of question of who the real owner of MC #1088 is.” In the Letter he purportedly
42

May 12, 1989, Alhambra stated that “[A]ccording to Club records, the transfer
38
of [MC] # 580 was only temporary, and that Mr. Grimm was and, according
to club records, is in fact the owner of [MC] # 1088” and that after the transfer,
“Mr. Charles Parsons endorsed the share certificate and turned it over to …
Kauffmann … for safekeeping.” Forming parts of the same records were letters
both dated February 28, 1968—the day the share certificate transfer was
effected—separately submitted by Grimm and Parsons, to inform MGCC of
the temporary nature of the transfer. In his letter, Grimm stated that MC No.
1088 “is still my property and I wish it recorded as such in the Club’s
file.” Parsons’ letter was just as simple as it was revealing, thus:
39 40
“Reference to the transfer of [MC] #590 in the name of Mr. E.M. Grimm to my name,
for which I now have the new Certification No. 1088 …, please be advised that this
transfer was made on a temporary basis and that said new certificate is still the
property of Mr. E.M. Grimm and I enclose the certificate duly endorsed by me for
safekeeping.”
At bottom then, documented events immediately before and after the
February 28, 1968 share certificate conveyance in question veritably confirm
the trust arrangement Parsons had or intended to have with Grimm and vice
versa, vis-á-vis MC No. 1088. If, as herein respondent G-P & Co. posits at every
turn, Parsons was its trustee, then the latter’s act of endorsing MC No. 1088 in
blank and then delivering the same to the Club for safekeeping instead of
signed, Parsons declared holding MC No. 374 and MC No. 1088 as “NOMINEE
IN TRUST for and in behalf of G-P AND COMPANY … or its nominee.” This piece
of document is not, however, a winning card for the respondents. The trial
court mentioned two compelling reasons why not, both reasons bearing on the
due execution and genuineness of the document. Wrote the court:
This “LETTER OF TRUST” was purportedly signed by Parsons on September 1,
1964. But the transfer of [MC] No. 590 was recorded (and MC No. 1088 issued) only
on September 7, 1964 in the Club’s Proprietary Membership Card No. 144 [Exhibit
“8”]. With the testimony of Celso B. Jamias, a long time employee of G-P and Company,
the doubt as to the genuineness of the signature of Parsons on the “LETTER OF
TRUST” was brought to light. Jamias was cross-examined on the signatures of Parsons
on several documents including the signature of the LETTER OF TRUST”:
Q: How about the signature appearing on Exhibit “CC-1” …?
A: This is Charles Parsons, sir.
Q: You are familiar with the signature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I’m showing you Exhibit “I” which is a letter of trust dated
September 1, 1964, comparing those signatures
_______________
Exh. “7-mm.”
41

directly to the G-P & Co. was without sense. Comment to Petition for Review, p. 41; Rollo, p. 130.
42

87
The trial court correctly described the relationship that was formed
between Grimm and Parsons, and the consequence of such relationship, as VOL. 504, 87
follows: OCTOBER 9,
_______________ 2006
Exh. “J,” Original Records, pp. 2244-2245.
38
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Exh. “L,” Id., at p. 2247.
39 Patrick C. Parsons
Exh. “M,” Id., at p. 2248.
which you identified above the printed name C.
40

86
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Parsons there are, two signatures, the signatures
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and you identified earlier and the one appearing on the
Patrick C. Parsons letter of trust are similar in the sense that the “s” of
 Parsons is elevated and it slopes down, is that
correct?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Based on how I see, this doesn’t seem to be the
Page | signature of Parsons, it looks like but it is not, sir.
22 [TSN, May 4, 1999, pp. 5-6]. (Words in parenthesis
added.)
And lest it be overlooked, Parsons had previously acknowledged Grimm to be
the owner of MC No. 1088, after his earlier repeated declarations that the
transfer of the replaced MC No. 580 was temporary. Parsons was thus in
contextually in estoppel to deny, thru the Letter of Trust aforementioned,
hypothetically assuming its authenticity, Grimm’s ownership of the
replacement certificate.
Summing up, the Court finds the evidence adduced and admitted by the
trial court more than adequately supporting a conclusion that MC No. 1088
was issued to and held by Parsons as the trustee thereof of Grimm or his estate.
The fact that respondent G-P & Co. may have paid, starting 1992, as evidence
discloses, the membership fees due on MC No. 1088 does not make Grimm
less of a beneficial owner. Such payment, needless to stress, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.
Parenthetically, the CA is observed to have said that in the settlement of
the estate of Parsons, MC No. 1088 was not included in the list of stocks owned
by him. And from this inconsequential event, the appellate court would
conclude that the estate administrator recognized Parsons to be a mere trustee
of such certificate. While the decision does quite say so, the implication is that
Parsons was the trustee of G-P & Co.
We cannot agree with this non sequitur approach which, at bottom, clearly
tends to lower the evidentiary bar for respondents. Needless to stress, it is not
for the CA and all courts for
88
88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
that matter to compensate for a burden of proof not discharged or a quantum of
evidence not met.
The Court cannot, for two reasons, also lend cogency to the CA’s
observation that the heirs of Grimm may have had waived, abandoned or
denounced their rights to the trust property when, for P100,000.00, they
executed a Deed of Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Partnership
Interests. Firstly, the deed, as a quitclaim instrument, did not mention any
43
share certificate at all, which is only logical since MC No. 1088 was not a
partnership asset in the first place. Secondly, the intention to waive a known
right must be clear and unequivocal. In this case, the intent to renounce
beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088 cannot reasonably be drawn from the
tenor of the quitclaim document. For perspective, what the heirs of Grimm
stated in the Deed of Acknowledgment is that the amount of P100,000.00 they
received “represents the total liquidation and complete settlement … of the
entire partnership interests pertaining to the late Edward Miller Grimm as
partner in G-P AND COMPANY.” If, to borrow from Thompson v. Court of
Appeals, we apply the standard norm on how a waiver must be formulated,
44
then clearly the general terms of the aforementioned deed merely indicate a
clearance from general accountability, not specifically an abandonment of
ownership of the disputed share. For:
“x x x. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must, in the first place,
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. x x x A waiver may
not be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. If we apply the standard
rule that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general
terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general ac-
_______________
Exh. “3-F,” Original Records, pp. 2552 et seq.
43
G.R. No. 116631, October 28, 1998, 298 SCRA 280.
44
89
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 2006 89
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
countability, not specifically a waiver of Amcham’s beneficial ownership of the
disputed shares.” 45
In all, the facts and circumstances attendant militate against the CA’s finding
pointing to G-P & Co. as the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088. What the
evidence adduced instead proved beyond cavil is that Grimm or his estate is
such owner. We therefore reverse.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Civil Case No. 92-2452 is REINSTATED.
Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Coronaand Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside. That of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City reinstated.
 [No. 3636. August 29, 1907.]
FREDERICK GARFIELD WAITE, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JAMES J.
PETERSON ET AL., defendants and appellants.
1. 1.WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY; SALE OR TRANSFER; ACTION
Page | BY THE TRANSFEREE.—When the property of one person is unlawfully
23 taken by another, the former has a right of action against the latter for the
recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or retention, and he
is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. This is also a right which may
be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee
can maintain either action against the wrongdoer.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHERIFF.—When, however, the
owner seeks to make the sheriff responsible for such wrongful act he must,
in order to preserve his right against the sheriff, comply with the provisions
of section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
1. 3.LEVY UPON PROPERTY; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CREDITOR.—If a
sheriff levies upon property at the instance of a creditor and is indemnified
by the latter, the creditor is thenceforward liable for the acts of the sheriff
with respect to the property.
450
450 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for appellants.
Frederick Garfield Waite, in his own-behalf.
WILLARD, J.:
The appellant (Kwong We Shing) has not caused the proof in this case to be
brought here. The only question therefore is whether the facts admitted in the
pleadings and those found by the court below in its decision sustain the
judgment appealed from. That court found among other things as follows:
"From the evidence presented at the trial, the court finds that on December
8, 1905, one Henry Manheim delivered to L. K. Tiao Eng a diamond ring on
consignment for 800 pesos, to be returned, if not sold, in sixty days; that on the
22d day of January, 1906, while the ring was in the possession of L. K. Tiao
Eng, the defendant, as sheriff of Manila, levied upon the said ring; that on the
23d day of January, 1906, the aforementioned Henry Manheim, for value
received, assigned all his right to and interest in said ring to the said plaintiff
herein; that on the 25th day of January, 1906, the plaintiff made demand upon
the sheriff of Manila, who had made the levy, as before said, for the said ring,
and alleged the value thereof to be 800 pesos; that the sheriff was indemnified
by the judgment creditor, in whose favor the levy had been made, as provided
by law, and retained possession of the ring and sold the same at public sale;
that the said Henry Manheim has never been paid for the said ring, in
accordance with the terms of the contract hereinbefore mentioned or any part
thereof; that at the time of the levy by the sheriff upon the said ring, as before
stated, the said Henry Manheim was the owner of and entitled to possession
of the said ring; that while the ring was in the possession of the sheriff the said
Henry Manheim transferred his ownership and right to possession of said ring
to plaintiff herein and
451
VOL. 8, AUGUST 29, 1907 451
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al.
that the plaintiff thereupon became the owner and entitled to possession of
said ring."
Judgment was rendered against both of the defendants for the return of
the ring, and, if that could not be had, for the sum of 725 pesos, with interest,
and costs.
I. The appellant claims that by the terms of section 451 of the Code of Civil
Procedure this action can not be maintained by the plaintiff because he was
not the owner of the ring at the time the levy was made. In other words, as we
understand it, his claim is that no action for the value of the property taken
can be maintained except by the person who was the owner thereof at the time
it was seized by the sheriff. We do not think that this contention can be
sustained. Said section 451 is as follows:
"Claims by third persons to property levied on.—Property levied on can be
claimed by a third person as his property, by a written claim, verified by the
oath of such claimant, setting out his title thereto, his right to possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such title, and served upon the governor, or his
deputy, or officer making the levy. The officer in such case is not bound to
keep the property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the writ
of execution runs, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim by an
obligation, signed by the plaintiff, with good and sufficient .surety, and no
claim to such property shall be valid against the officer, or shall be received or
be notice of any rights against him, unless made as herein provided; but
nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his
claim to the property by any proper action."
The vice in the argument of the appellant consists in the fact that be
assumes that section 451 is the only law which gives the plaintiff a right of
action against the sheriff, and that if be is not included within that section, he
 can not maintain any action. This is manifestly erroneous. So far from being
the origin of any rights on the part of the owner of property wrongfully taken
by the sheriff, it is rather a limitation upon his rights previously 'existing. If
property of a person is taken by the sheriff upon an
452
Page | 452 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
24 Waite vs. Peterson Et Al.
execution against another person, the sheriff is liable therefor in the absence of
statute, as any private person would be. When one's property is wrongfully
taken by another, the former has a right of action against the person who
interfered with his property, either for the recovery of the property itself or for
damages for its taking, and he has his choice of these remedies. If section 451
did not exist, by the general principles of the law the sheriff would always be
responsible for wrongfully taking the property of another For the purpose of
limiting the responsibility of the sheriff in such cases, and to provide that some
notice should be given to him of the claims of third persons. this section
requires such third persons to make such claims in writing, so that the sheriff,
after the notice is given to him, can decide for himself whether he will proceed
with the levy or abandon the property.
The right of action given by the general principles of law to the person
whose property has wrongfully been taken from him, either to recover
damages or the possession of the property, is a right which can be transferred
by him, and his transferee can maintain either one of these actions against the
wrongdoer. On this first claim of the appellant, then, the only question is
whether this section 451 has taken away from the assignee of the owner his
right to maintain an action to recover the value of the property.
An examination of the section will show that there is no distinct statement
therein, that the claim can only be made by a person who was the owner of the
property at the time the levy was made. As the section is written, we do not
think that it should be so construed. Such a construction would, in case of the
involuntary transfer of rights, deprive the transferee of actions which might
be absolutely necessary to him for the protection of his interests. If we so
construed the section, we should have to hold that if the owner of the property
died the day after the levy his executor or administrator would have no right
to make a claim against the sheriff for the return of the property and would be
deprived of an action against the sheriff for the recovery of damages for such
wrongful
453
VOL. 8, AUGUST 29, 1907 453
Waite vs. Peterson Et Al.
taking, The same rule would have to be made if an order in bankruptcy was
passed against the owner of the property the day after the levy. We do not
think that the section requires any such construction.
II. It is further claimed by the appellant that in no event should judgment
have been entered against him—that is to say, against Kwong We Shing. It will
be noticed that the court found that the sheriff was indemnified by the
judgment creditor. This statement is sufficient to make the judgment creditor
liable for the acts of the sheriff. In the case of Lovejoy vs. Murray (3 Wall. U.
S., 1) the court said, at page 9:
"The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants,
proceeded upon the supposition that the sheriff would without it go no further
in that direction, but would give up the property to the claimant, the present
plaintiff, and make his peace on the best terms be could. By the present statute
of lowa he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in attachment refused to
assume the hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no such statute, he
had a right to deliver the property to the claimant, and risk a suit by the
plaintiff in attachment rather than a contest with a rightful claimant of the
goods.
"The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be held
equivalent to a personal interference in the course of the proceeding, by-
directing or requesting the sheriff to hold the goods as if they were the
property of the defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the
direction and control of the sheriff's future action, so far as it might constitute
a trespass, and they became to that extent the principals, and he their agent in
the transaction. This made them responsible for the continuance of the
wrongful possession and for the sale and conversion of the goods; in other
words, for all the real damages which plaintiff sustained."
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant, Kwong We Shing. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Tracey, JJ.,concur.
Judgment affirmed.
 G.R. No. 161758. June 8, 2007. *
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its
SCHOOL’S DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, petitioner, vs. CELSO OÑATE,
respondent.
State Immunity; An unincorporated government agency, such as the Department of
Page | Education, Culture and Sports can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy
25 to a Deed of Donation over a disputed property.—We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued
without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed
by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily
gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily
bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable
to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and
relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.
Same; Parties; In a situation involving a contract between a government department and
a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting
from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into
such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its
name.—The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise
resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated
government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to
be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of
the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it
best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this
case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive
at the same ruling. The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-
defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the
involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a
contract between a government department and a third
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
201
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 201
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit
resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such
department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and
authority to sue and be sued in its name.
Laches; Elements; Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial
remedies.—Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due diligence—could
or should have been done earlier. Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to
any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of
one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases
the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
Same; Evidence; Laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be
proved positively—laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.—In Felix Gochan
and Sons Realty Corporation, 409 SCRA 306 (2003), we held that “[t]hough laches applies
even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in
nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not
be resolved in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).” In the same vein, we
explained in Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 98 (1997), that there is “no absolute
rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.”
Same; Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of
it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and standing
on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property.—Respondent testified
that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old. He asserted
that he took possession of said lot in the
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to
him the disputed lot as his father’s share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oñate
and Gregoria Los Baños (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he
testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a
portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common
experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail
to discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and standing on the
lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Edgardo R. Raneses for respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
A little neglect may lead to great prejudice.
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse
1
and set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659, which affirmed the November 3, 1997 Decision of 3
the Legaspi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, declaring as null and
void the December 21, 1998 Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality
4
 of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner, and directing the latter to return to
respondent Celso Oñate
_______________
Rollo, pp. 13-48.
Page | 1
2Id., at pp. 50-60. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño and
26 concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon (Chairperson) and Jose C. Mendoza.
3Id., at pp. 61-82.
4Records, pp. 6-7.
203
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga
North Central Elementary School.
The Facts
Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed
lot) with an area of around 27,907 square meters registered under the Torrens
System of land registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563.
Claro Oñate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all
surnamed Oñate. Respondent Celso Oñate is the grandson of Claro Oñate,
being the son of Francisco Oñate.
In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a
portion of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Daraga North
Central Elementary School. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the area while
petitioner Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS; now
Department of Education [DepEd]) developed and built various school
buildings and facilities on the disputed lot.
Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT
No. 2563 which was granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due
notice, publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-18971 was
issued in the name of spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños.
On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and
Cession was executed by respondent and his three (3) sisters, namely: Melba
O. Napil, Cielo O. Lardizabal, and Maria Visia O. Maldo, who waived their
successional rights in favor of respondent Celso Oñate. Asserting that the
disputed lot was inherited by his father, Francisco Oñate, from the latter’s
father, Claro Oñate, by virtue of a prior partition among the three (3) sons of
Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los
_______________
5 Issued on October 16, 1992.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
Baños, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of
extrajudicial settlement.
Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondent’s father, Francisco Oñate,
truly acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oñate’s
three (3) children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724
for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael Oñate
before the Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX. In said case, respondent Celso Oñate,
203
6
the defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court.
Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5)
lots, all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of
Mariano M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued
Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square meters)
under TCT No. T-83946; (2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters) under TCT
7
No. T-84049; (3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under TCT No. T-
8
83948; (4) Lot No. 6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT No. T-83949; and
9 10
(5) Lot No. 6849-E (608 square meters) under TCT No. T-83950. 11
On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to
petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the
elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072
square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner DECS that it purchase Lot
No. 6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and
also requested for reasonable rent-
_______________
6 Records, pp. 164-171. See the August 14, 1995 Decision entitled Heirs of Rafael Oñate,
represented by Diego Oñate v. Spouses Celso Oñate and Allem Vellez .
5
7 Id., at pp. 178-179.
8 Id., at pp. 180-181.
9 Id., at pp. 182-183.
10 Id., at pp. 184-185.
11 Id., at pp. 186-187.
205
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 205
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
als from 1960. The records show that then DECS Director IV Jovencio Revil
12
subsequently referred the matter to the DECS Division Superintendent
Rizalina D. Saquido for investigation. 13
On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to
Engr. Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Albay Engineering District about the
 on-going construction projects in the school. Engr. Roces then informed
14
respondent’s counsel that petitioner DECS is the owner of the school site
having acquired the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by
the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner. 15
Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint for 16
Page | Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession
27 of Lot No. 6849 located at Barrio Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay before the
Legaspi City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against petitioner DECS,
Division of Albay, represented by the Division Superintendent of Schools,
Mrs. Rizalina D. Saquido; and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, represented
by the Municipal Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante.
In its April 28, 1993 Answer, the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through
17
Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondent’s ownership of the disputed lot
as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Claro
Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied
said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when the
Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it
could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Moreover,
_______________
Id., at pp. 190-191.
12
Id., at p. 192.
13
Id., at p. 193.
14
Id., at p. 194.
15
Id., at pp. 1-4.
16
Id., at pp. 24-27.
17
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant
municipality in the Municipal Assessor’s Office under Tax Declaration No.
31954 from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes.
Further, defendant Municipality contended that respondent was guilty of
laches and was estopped from assailing ownership over the disputed lot.
Similarly, petitioner’s April 29, 1993 Answer reiterated in essence the
18
defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and further contended
that respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over the
disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21, 1988
in its favor; and that respondent’s claim was vague as it was derived from a
void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession disposing of the
disputed lot which was already sold to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in
1940. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over Lot
6849 when the lower court granted respondent’s petition for reconstitution
without notifying petitioner.
During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and
testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the
disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of the
said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the elementary school
occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in 1992 that
he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay. Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating a portion of
19
disputed Lot 6849, testified that respondent indeed owned said lot and the
share of the crops cultivated were paid to respondent. 20
_______________
Id., at pp. 29-31.
18
TSN, November 3, 1993 and July 12, 1994.
19
TSN, February 14, 1994 and August 3, 1995.
20
207
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 207
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that respondent’s suit was against the State
21
which was prohibited without the latter’s consent. Respondent countered with
his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, the trial court denied
22
the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by
entering into a contract. 23
Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented
the TCTs covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax
Declaration No. 04-006-00681 issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992
24
Certification from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Daraga,
25
Albay attesting to respondent’s payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980
to 1990.
After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their
documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the
late Claro Oñate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954, which
26
cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of Daraga
with the annotation of Ex OfficioDeputy Assessor Natalio Grageda attesting to
the purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69, August
1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality;
Tax Declaration No. 8926 in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax
27
Declaration No. 31954; and the sub-
_______________
 Records, pp. 97-100.
21
1. tion Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools Division as null and void;
Id., at pp. 106-111.
22
2. 2.Declaring the plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos. 6849-A, 6849-
Id., at pp. 112-117, March 11, 1994 Order of the RTC.
23
C, 6849-D and 6849-E which are registered in his name;
Id., at p. 189.
24
3. 3.Commanding the defendants to return the possession of the portion of the
Id., at p. 195.
25

Id., at p. 101.
26
land occupied by the school site to the herein plaintiff Celso Oñate;
Page | Id., at p. 102.
27
4. 4.Ordering the plaintiff for reason of equity, to pay the defendant
208 Municipality of Daraga, Albay the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00)
28 Pesos pursuant to Article 479 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines;
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
5. 5.The defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports being a builder
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate in good faith, the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
sequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184, 332, and 04-006-00068.
28 29 30
Philippines shall be observed by the parties; and
The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra, the Principal of
31 6. 6.Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. No attorney’s fees is
Daraga North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipality’s hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiff’s counsel.
donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot
amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Toribia Milleza, a retired 32 SO ORDERED.” 33

government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since
1955, who testified on the Municipality’s continuous and adverse possession
of the disputed lot since 1940.
As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and
Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael Oñate in Legaspi City RTC,
Branch IX against Spouses Celso Oñate and Allem Vellez, involving the same
disputed lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay were
about to file a complaint for intervention in said case, but it was overtaken by
the resolution of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial court dismissing
the complaint.
The Ruling of the RTC
On November 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent Celso Oñate. The dispositive portion declared, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants:
The trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject Lot 6849 was originally
registered under the Torrens System in the name of Spouses Claro Oñate and
Gregoria Los Baños as evidenced by OCT No. RO-18971. The right of
respondent Celso Oñate over the disputed lot had not been proven otherwise
or overturned in Civil Case No. 8724, and this was bolstered by the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession, where respondent’s sister
waived their successional rights in his favor. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor
of respondent’s title. Besides, it further ruled that defendants could not assail
the registered title of respondent in a collateral proceeding.
While the Municipality of Daraga, Albay anchored its prior ownership
over the disputed lot by virtue of a sale in 1940 and mentioned TCT No. 4812
supposedly issued in its name,
_______________
Supra note 3, at pp. 81-82.
33

210
1. 1.Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Albay in favor of the defendant Department of Educa
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
_______________ it however failed to submit any deed of conveyance in its favor, as well as a
copy of the alleged TCT No. 4812. Hence, the trial court held that its claim over
28 Id., at p. 103. disputed Lot 6849 was based solely on adverse prescription which could not
29 Id., at p. 104.
30 Id., at p. 105. prevail over respondent’s registered title.
31 TSN, February 22, 1996.
The trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs,
32 TSN, September 30, 1996.

209
petitioner had no right to occupy Lot 6849-A, and the Deed of Donation
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner must be
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 209
nullified. Finally, the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
 Daraga, Albay for the cost of landfill and ordered that Article 448 of the New 34 the evidence submitted before Us their failure to present the two
Civil Code be followed by the parties as petitioner was a builder in good faith. documents.” The appellate court concluded that given these facts, no title in
40

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals the name of the Municipality ever existed and thus it could not have validly
Aggrieved, petitioner DECS and Municipality of Daraga, Albay filed their donated the subject property to petitioner.
respective Notices of Appeal assailing the trial court’s Decision before the CA.
35

Page | However, on June 17, 1998, the appellate court declared the appeals of both _______________
29 petitioners abandoned and dismissed for their failure to pay the required
Id., at pp. 18-19.
37

docket fees within the reglementary period. Peti- 36

Id., at p. 21.
38

Id., at p. 28.
39

_______________ Id., at p. 59.

40

212
34 Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good 212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in Articles 456 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter Anent the issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca, the CA affirmed the
41

cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or doctrine enunciated in said case that “to uphold the State’s immunity from
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
suit would subvert the ends of justice.” In fine, the appellate court pointed out
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. the inconvenience and impossibility of restoring possession of Lot 6849-A to
35 Records, pp. 296 & 298. respondent considering the substantial improvements built on said lot by the
36 CA Rollo, p. 17. government which amounted to almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief
211
available was for the government to pay just compensation in favor of
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 211 respondent computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time of
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate the government’s taking of the land.
tioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said June 17, 1998
37
Through its assailed Decision, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal for
42

Resolution and its appeal was subsequently reinstated. The Municipality of

38
Daraga, Albay, however, totally lost its appeal due to inaction, and the
appellate court correspondingly issued a Partial Entry of Judgment on July 9,
1998. 39
Moreover, the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect
in the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, and in the issuance of OCT
No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563, even if no notice
was sent to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondent’s claim of
ownership over Lot 6849-A occupied by the school is conclusive for being
soundly predicated on TCT No. T-83946 which cancelled the reconstituted
OCT No. RO-18971. Furthermore, it reiterated the trial court’s holding that
petitioner is precluded from attacking collaterally respondent’s title over the
disputed lot in this proceeding.
The CA emphasized that petitioner’s failure to present TCT No. 4812—
allegedly issued in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940 in
lieu of OCT No. 2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the original
owner, Claro Oñate, in favor of the Municipality—was fatal to the defense. It
reasoned that “all the more had their claim of ownership become doubtful
when defendants-appellants [sic] failed to explain from their pleadings and
lack of merit and affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. It reasoned that
laches does not apply, its application rests on the sound discretion of the court,
and where the court believes that its application would result in manifest
wrong or injustice, it is constrained not to be guided strictly by said doctrine.
Besides, it opined that laches could not defeat the rights of a registered owner.
The Issues
Hence, we have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY LACHES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT ON
RESPONDENT’S RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL
 _______________
41 G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360.
42 Supra note 2.
213
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 213
Page |
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
30 CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE
SUED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATE’S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE
SUED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. 43
Petitioner basically raises two issues—the application of laches and the non-
suability of the State.
The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case
No. 8715 without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether petitioner
DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines.
We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result
of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its
consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily
bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State
vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle
of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the
State. 44
The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is
likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an
unincorporated government agency,
_______________
43Rollo, pp. 25-26.
44See United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. Nos. 76607, 79470, 80018 & 80258, February 26,
1990, 182 SCRA 644; and Department of Agrarian Reform v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 104269, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 693.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be
impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our
resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at
this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally
resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give
due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-
defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its
approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a
situation involving a contract between a government department and a third
party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a
suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to
such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full
responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.
Main Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches
Petitioner strongly asserts that the Municipality of Daraga, Albay had
continuous, open, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner over the
disputed lot since 1940 until December 21, 1988 or for about 48 years.
Significantly, it maintains that Tax Declaration No. 31954 covering the
disputed lot in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay contains an
annotation certifying that said lot was “under voucher No. 69, August, 1940
accounts. The corresponding Transfer Title No. 4812 has been issued by the
Register of Deeds Office of Albay on August 3, 1940.” 45
When petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on
December 21, 1988, it possessed the subject lot also in the concept of an owner
and continued to introduce improvements on the lot. Consequently, when
respondent
_______________
Records, p. 213.
45
215
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 215
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
instituted the instant case in 1993, petitioner and its predecessor-in-interest
Municipality of Daraga, Albay had possessed the subject lot for a combined
period of about fifty two (52) years.
Petitioner strongly avers that Claro Oñate, the original owner of subject lot,
sold it to the Municipality. At the very least it asserts that said Claro Oñate
allowed the Municipality to enter, possess, and enjoy the lot without protest.
In fact, Claro Oñate neither protested nor questioned the cancellation of his
Tax Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and its substitution by
 Tax Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the Municipality on account of his
sale of the lot to the latter. In the same vein, when Claro Oñate and his spouse
died, their children Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco who succeeded them also
did not take any steps to question the ownership and possession by the
Municipality of the disputed lot until they died on June 8, 1990, June 12, 1991,
Page | and October 22, 1957, respectively.
31 Petitioner maintains that significantly, respondent and his siblings—
succeeding their father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his death on
October 22, 1957—also did not take any action to recover the questioned lot
from 1957 until 1993 when the instant suit was commenced. Petitioner avers
that if they were really the owners of said lot, they would not have waited 52
long years to institute the suit assuming they have a cause of action against the
Municipality or petitioner. Thus, petitioner submits that the equitable
principle of laches has indubitably set in to bar respondent’s action to recover
possession of, and title to, the disputed lot.
Laches and its elements
Indeed, it is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the effect
of delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant’s title, but only with plaintiff’s long inaction or
inexcus-
216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
able neglect to bar the latter’s action as it would be inequitable and unjust to
the defendant.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due
diligence—could or should have been done earlier. Verily, laches serves to
46
deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant
claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the
defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. 47
In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, we held that “[t]hough laches
applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved
positively.Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by
mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to
dismiss (emphases supplied).” In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v.
48
Court of Appeals that there is “no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of
_______________
46Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017, December 8, 2003, 417
SCRA 277, 286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594,
605; and Westmont Bank v. Ong, G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.
47Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409
SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
Id.
48
217
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 217
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.” 49
Issue of laches not barred by adverse judgmentagainst Daraga, Albay
It is unfortunate that defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay lost its appeal
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 before the CA for its failure to pay the required
docket fees within the reglementary period. As a result, a Partial Entry of
Judgment was made on July 9, 1998 and consequently, the dispositions in the
November 3, 1997 Decision, rendered by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch I in
favor of respondent Celso Oñate, became final and executory as against
defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
As an off-shoot, with respect to the Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of
Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was annulled——respondent Oñate was
declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots and entitled to possession
but was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal Government and
the costs of suit. By reason of the finality of the Decision against the
Municipality of Daraga, Tax Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068, 332, 22184, 31954,
and 8926 are all cancelled and annulled (if not yet cancelled).
What are the effects of the final judgment against Municipality of Daraga
on its co-defendant, petitioner DECS?
Generally, it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision
affects its defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the declaration
of nullity of the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and hence can be
considered as a final resolution of the issue. Likewise, it does not challenge the
ownership of Oñate of the disputed lots, but merely relied on the defense of
laches. The final directive for Municipality of Daraga to return possession of
the land has no significance
_______________
 G.R. No. 103959, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 98, 112.
49
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q: Now, how many buildings were first constructed in
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate [sic] this property?
on DECS’ appeal since precisely, it is DECS’ position that it should retain A: In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was
Page | possession of the land. From these considerations, the final RTC November 3, constructed five (5) Marcos Type buildings during
32 1997 Decision against the Municipality of Daraga has no substantial and the Marcos time. 52

material effect upon the DECS’ appeal. The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up
The only remaining issue left is whether laches can inure to the benefit of to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on,
petitioner DECS considering the fact that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot
public education when the elementary school was built in 1940 under the No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993
supervision and control of DECS up to 1993 when Civil Case No. 8715 was when respondent Oñate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter up to the
filed by respondent Oñate. present.
We rule in the affirmative. Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A
Laches has set in was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This
A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first fact was not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.
element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was
was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took
6849-A containing 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, any action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested
Mrs. Toribia Milleza, a retired government employee and resident of
50
the Municipality’s adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner
Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus: had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible evidence, it is incumbent
Q: How long have you been residing in this place, Bagumbayan, upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected
their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first
Daraga, Albay?
Seva type school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot,
A: Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present. 51
now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest
xxxx indeed undertook activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot
Q: Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was by the Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately,
constructed in this property? respondent failed to substantiate such defense of ownership and possession of
A: Seva type, building. the lot and even skirted this issue.
Q: At present how many buildings were constructed in this _______________
property?
A: Plenty of school buildings. Id., at p. 5.
52

220
_______________ 220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
Supra note 32.
Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he
50

Id., at p. 4.
51

219 was 23 years old. He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same
53

VOL. 524, 219 year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him
the disputed lot as his father’s share of the inheritance from the late Claro
JUNE 8,
Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños (his grandparents). However, it is interesting
2007 to note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary
 school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions
are irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property
and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing
elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the
owner starts possessing a property.
Page | Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of
33 such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that
of his predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro Oñate and his uncles, Antonio
and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondent’s right
over the lot originated from his predecessorsin-interest, then he cannot have
better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher
than its source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any explanation why his
predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipality’s
occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years
afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay
in protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner
DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a
portion of Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built
additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more
than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga
_______________
Supra note 19.
53
221
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 221
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot
to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it. After more than forty-
54
eight (48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by
petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent
would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such long occupation
coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality.
Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that
clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner,
in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even considering the
cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the
deleterious effect on the school children and affected school teachers and
personnel if Lot No. 6849-A would be returned to respondent.
Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant
case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving
approbation to the trial and appellate courts’ ruling that the application of the
principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for
the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for 52 years.
Also, the inaction of respondent Oñate and his predecessors-in-interest for
over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a
stale demand.
Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by petitioner
We, however, make the clear distinction that laches applies in favor of
petitioner only as regards Lot 6849-A which is
_______________
Supra note 31.
54
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
actually possessed and occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-
B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E. These portions were never occupied by the
Municipality and petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta testified that
his father, Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of Lot 6849 way back
in the 1940s and that he took over the tenancy in 1960 when his father stopped
tilling the land. Besides, if the Municipality indeed owned Lot 6849 by virtue
of a purchase, it is likewise guilty of laches in not protecting or contesting the
cultivation by Oñates’ agricultural tenants of said portions of Lot 6849.
Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of Lot 6849 valid
Petitioner contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563—covering subject
lot in 1991 or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lot—does not in any
way affect the latter’s preferential and superior right over the disputed lot. In
the same vein, it maintains that it is inconsequential that petitioner and the
Municipality failed to present as evidence the deed of conveyance in favor of
the Municipality, as well as TCT No. 4812 as a registered land owner may lose
the right to recover possession of a registered property by reason of laches.
Petitioner concludes that the long delayed reconstitution of OCT No. 2563 by
respondent was a mere afterthought and intended to camouflage his and his
predecessor’s unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that
they have no valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849.
We disagree.
It must be noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and is thus
binding to the whole world. While it is true that laches has set in so far as it
pertains to the portion of Lot 6849, specifically Lot 6849-A where the
 Municipality and petitioner DECS had constructed the existing school, such
does not hold true for the totality of Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed, the
reconstitution proceeding being one in rem,
223
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 223
Page |
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
34 the consequent issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed
OCT No. 2563 is valid.
Anent the issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the
courts a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified about
the reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify
and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in rem.
More so, while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax
Declaration No. 31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under
Municipal Voucher No. 69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was never
disputed nor controverted by respondent, should have been given evidentiary
weight by the trial and appellate courts as the presumptions of regularity and
validity of such official act have not been overcome, such documents cannot
defeat the registered title of respondent.
Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and
a certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former
holds as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax declarations in land
cases per se do not constitute ownership without other substantial pieces of
evidence.
The records do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent
explanation why the Deed of Conveyance in favor of the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay and TCT No. 4812 were not presented. With clear and
affirmative defenses set up by petitioner and Municipality of Daraga, Albay,
it is incumbent for them to present these documents. Therefore, the
unmistakable inference is that there was indeed no sale and conveyance by
Claro Oñate of Lot 6849 in favor of the Municipality. Consequently, the TCTs
cancelling OCT No. RO-18971 covering Lot Nos. 6849-A, 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-
D, and 6849-E were likewise validly issued.
Thus, notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of Lot 6849,
respondent Oñate cannot now take possession over Lot
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
No. 6849-A for reason of laches. In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel,
we reiterated the principle we have consistently applied in laches:
“The law provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered
55
owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless, while it is
true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner
may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches.” 56
Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable
remedy of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.
A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of
equity, a modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent
Oñate and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay is in order. It would be grossly
iniquitous for respondent Oñate to pay PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession and
usufruct of Lot No. 6849-A.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997
Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. 1)Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division of Albay to have the rights
of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square
meters under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result
of laches on the part of respondent Celso Oñate
_______________
55Act No. 496, Sec. 46 (The Land Registration Act), now P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
56G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518; citing Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs of
Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, G.R. No. 132677, October 20, 2000, 344 SCRA 95, 106-107.
225
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 225
Department of Education, Division of Albay vs. Oñate
1. and his predecessors-in-interest. Respondent Celso Oñate, his heirs, assigns,
and successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or
encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied
by petitioner DECS. However, the rights of possession and usufruct will be
restored to respondent the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the
said lot. The Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate the
aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No. T-83946-
A in the name of respondent Celso Oñate. Item No. 2 of the November 3,
1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified accordingly;
2. 2)Declaring Celso Oñate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the
following lots:
 1. a.Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under TCT No. T-83948 of
the Registry of Deeds of Albay;
2. b.Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of
the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and
3. c.Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the
Page | Registry of Deeds of Albay.
35
1. 3)Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an
area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No. T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds
of Albay;
2. 4)Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said
department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to
respondent Celso Oñate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and
3. 5)Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City
RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oñate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos
(PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay.

226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Navarro vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.
The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Moralesand Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment affirmed with modifications.
 G.R. No. 147076. June 17, 2004. * Anabella S. Altuna for petitioner.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM,
petitioner, vs. ACT THEATER, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; Definition of a Right; The exercise of rights is not without
limitations; Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to
Page | be exercised.—A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a
36 constitution, statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage,
constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. Concededly,
the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers
including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the
right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one’s rights: Art.
19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Same; Same; Same; When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms set
in Article 19 of the Civil Code, resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which actor can be held accountable.—When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice
and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off
the respondent’s water service connection.
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
419
VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004 419
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater,
Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.—There is,
thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a
quo and the appellate court that the petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the
Civil Code.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled
to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
party.—The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorney’s
fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect
his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eulogio E. Gatdula for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
1
No. 58581, which affirmed the civil aspect of the Decision dated May 5, 1997
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the petitioner
MWSS to pay the respondent Act Theater, Inc. damages and attorney’s fees.
The present case stemmed from the consolidated cases of Criminal Case
No. Q-89-2412 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Tabian, et al., for
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401, as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 876, and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitled Act Theater, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Waterworks
_______________
1Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate Justices Fermin A.
Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole concurring.
2Penned by Judge Normandie B. Pizarro.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
and Sewerage System. The two cases were jointly tried in the court a quo as they
arose from the same factual circumstances, to wit:
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater, Inc.,
namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto
Ruales, were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for
allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 876. The respondent’s employees were subsequently criminally
charged (Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo. On account of
the incident, the respondent’s water service connection was cut off.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with damages
(Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the
court a quo that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously,
in cutting off the respondent’s water service connection without prior notice.
Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondent’s
patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected. The
respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.
 After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412
Page | “WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
37 reasonable doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. 3 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] CORRECTLY
In Civil Case No. Q-88-768
...
1. 1.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory damages in the
amount of P25,000.00; and to return the sum of P200,000.00 deposited by the plaintiff
for the restoration of its water services after its disconnection on September 23, 1988;
2. 2.Defendant’s counterclaim for undercollection of P530,759.96 is dismissed for lack of
merit;
3. 3.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay costs of suit;
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 35.
421
VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004 421
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
1. 4.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
2. 5.Making the mandatory injunction earlier issued to plaintiff Act Theater, Inc.
permanent.
SO ORDERED.”
4
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision to
the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According to the
CA, the court a quocorrectly found that the petitioner’s act of cutting off the
respondent’s water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary,
injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of damages under
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
I Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] VALIDLY
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN RESOLVING
THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY
UPHELD THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES;
III
APPLIED THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE WITHOUT
CONSIDERING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME
CODE. 5
Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the fact that, in quoting the decretal
portion of the court a quo’s decision, the CA erroneously typed P500,000 as the
attorney’s fees awarded in favor of the respondent when the same should only
be P5,000. In any case, according to the petitioner, whether the amount is
P500,000 or P5,000, the award of attorney’s fees is improper considering that
there was no discussion or statement in the body of the assailed
_______________
4Id., at p. 37.
5Id., at pp. 13-14.
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
decision justifying such award. The petitioner insists that in cutting off the
respondent’s water service connection, the petitioner merely exercised its
proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its
act of disconnecting the water supply of the respondent without prior notice,
reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive
6
of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. 7
supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the
exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. 8
 Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one’s The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted.
rights: Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. party. 12

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in

Page | damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held _______________
38 accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the
9

respondent what is due Rollo, p. 26.

10

Id., at p. 27.
11

Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 378 SCRA 82 (2002).
12

_______________
424

6BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Ed., p. 1324. 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
7Rellosa v. Pellosis, 362 SCRA 486 (2001). People vs. Ibarrientos
Paguio v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc., 393 SCRA 379(2002).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
8

9Rellosa v. Pellosis, supra.

423 dated January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is AFFIRMED in toto.
VOL. 432, JUNE 17, 2004 423 SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinezand Tinga, JJ., concur.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed in toto.
to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water
service connection. As correctly found by the appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior
to the disconnection of the latter’s water services, this was done only a few hours before
the actual disconnection. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter,
Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was
treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. Act’s water
services were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees.
Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the
water services. As a consequence thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide
water for a number of days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with
MWSS the sum of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services. 10

There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion
of the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioner’s act was arbitrary,
injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages
under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as attorney’s fees in that portion of the
assailed decision which quoted the falloof the court a quo’s decision was
obviously a typographical error. As attorney’s fees, the court a quo awarded
the amount of P5,000 only. It was this amount, as well as actual and
compensatory damages of P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000
deposited by the respondent for the restoration of its water supply, that the
CA affirmed, as it expressly stated in its dispositive portion that “finding no
cogent reason to reverse the appealed Decision which is in conformity with
the law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.” 11
 G.R. No. 135219. January 17, 2002. *
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and ERNESTO AUSTRIA and LORETO Q. QUINTANA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Foreclosures; Possession; The obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
Page |
ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is
39 claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.—Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex-partewrit of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who
is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was
inversely applied in a more recent case, where we ruled that a writ of possession may
be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in
possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances of this case
may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances are undeniably
similar—a party in possession of the foreclosed property is asserting a right adverse to
the debtor/mortgagor and is
______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
23
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 23
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-partewrit of possession
was applied for.
Same; Same; Same; One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another
must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.—Notably, the Civil Code
protects the actual possessor of a property, to wit: Art. 433. Actual possession under
claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted
provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must
bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The term “judicial
process” could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which
the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and
adjudicated.
Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section
7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process”.—An ex-parte petition for
issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking,
a “judicial process” as contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a
foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.”
Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-
litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act
3135.—It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought within the ambit
of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with
the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
Same; Same; Same; The actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just
title in his favor.—Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above,
requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to be brought even by the true owner.
After all, the actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in
his favor, which must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
24
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Carao, Noblejas & Associates for petitioner PNB.
Luz & Advincula for private respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
a reversal of the Court of Appeals’ resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 48660 dated
August 25, 1998, which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 60 in LRC Case No. M-2635.
Sometime during the late 70’s, the spouses Godofredo and Wilma Monsod
obtained a loan in the amount of P120,000.00 from petitioner Philippine
National Bank (PNB). To secure their loan, the Monsods mortgaged to PNB a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. S-84843, located within the Monte Villa de
Monsod Subdivision in Parañaque, Rizal.
Due to Monsods’ failure to pay their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale of the subject real property, PNB
was declared the highest bidder. On December 21, 1981, a certificate of sale
was issued in favor of PNB, and was registered on July 11, 1984. 1
Upon expiration of the redemption period on July 12, 1985, ownership of
the property was consolidated in PNB. Thereafter, TCT No. S-84843 was
cancelled and TCT No. 99480 was issued in PNB’s name. 2
On June 23, 1992, PNB filed an “Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession” with Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as LRC Case No. M-2635. Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3135,
as amended, the trial court conducted an ex parte hearing. PNB’s
 representative testified that the foreclosed property is occupied by one Ernesto 8Id., at 119.
Id., at 129.
Austria. According
9

26

______________ 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Page | 1Rollo, pp. 12-13. On January 31, 1994, the trial court denied the Austrias’ second motion and
2Ibid., at 34.
40 25
granted PNB’s “Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order.” The trial court
ruled that the Austrias can no longer be permitted to intervene in the case
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 25
during said stage of the proceedings and that the remedy of the Austrias was
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals to file an ordinary civil action to assert their claim of ownership over the
to PNB, Mr. Austria was invited by the bank to a conference to discuss the property. 10

ownership of the foreclosed lot, however, he did not honor the bank’s In the meantime, the first alias writ of possession lapsed. PNB thus filed an
invitation. 3
“Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Possession,” and on 11

On August 28, 1992, the trial court granted PNB’s petition and a writ of November 29, 1994, a second alias writ was issued. 12

possession was issued on October 26, 1992. 4

Unfazed, the Austrias filed an Omnibus Motion on January 25, 1995,
On December 11, 1992, respondents Ernesto and Loreto Quintana Austria seeking a recall of the second alias writ and a reconsideration of the trial
filed a “Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the Enforcement of court’s order denying their motion to intervene. Meanwhile, the second alias
13

the Writ of Possession.” The Austrias alleged that they are the actual occupants writ had likewise expired.
of the subject lot, which they purportedly bought from the Monsods as early PNB filed a “Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Third Alias Writ of
as 1974. They claimed that the foreclosed property was enclosed within a Possession,” which the trial court granted anew in an order dated October 10,
concrete fence and formed part of their family compound. PNB allegedly 1995. 14

knew of this fact even before it granted the loan to the Monsods, because the However, on December 12, 1995, the Austrias again filed a motion to set
bank’s credit investigators were advised of the same when they inspected the aside the trial court’s order dated October 10, 1995 and to recall the third alias
property in the summer of 1976. Consequently, the Austrias maintained that writ. 15

the issuance of the possessory writ ex parte was improper, since it will deprive
them of their property without due process. 5
Due to the Austrias’ refusal to vacate the premises, the sheriff failed to
Consequent to the filing of this fourth motion, the sheriff again failed to
implement the third alias writ, which also lapsed. Thus, on February 15, 1996,
PNB filed another “Motion for Issuance of a Fourth Alias Writ,” which was
16

enforce the challenged writ. granted on March 26, 1996.

On July 27, 1993, on motion of PNB, the trial court issued an alias writ of The trial court, after hearing the Austrias’ fourth motion, issued an order
possession. Again, the writ was not implemented. 6
on October 4, 1996, denying the same, on the ground that the issuance of a
On September 17, 1993, the sheriff sought to enforce the first alias writ of possessory writ for a property sold at public auction pursuant to an extra-
possession for the second time. The Austrias filed a “Second Motion for judicial foreclosure proceeding was a
Intervention” seeking to restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession
issued on October 26, 1992. PNB then filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
7
______________
Issuance of Break Open Order” and, subsequently, an Opposition to the
8

Austrias’ Second Motion for Intervention. 9 Id., at 158-160.

10

Id., at 171.
11

Id., at 180-183.
12
______________
Id., at 185-187.
13

Id., at 224.
14

3 RTC Records, pp. 26-27. Id., at 232.

15

4 Ibid., at 76. Id., at 244.

16

5 Id., at 59-63. 27
6 Id., at 100 & 103.
7 Id., at 104-108. VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 27
 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
ministerial duty on its part. The Austrias failed to establish any legal ground
for recalling the writs, even as they claimed a superior right to the subject
property. 17
On February 19, 1997, the fourth alias writ was issued by the trial court.
Page |
The writ was partially implemented with the posting of PNB security guards
41 within the premises of the foreclosed lot.
18
On April 17, 1997, the Austrias, for the fifth time, filed a motion to stop the
enforcement of the fourth alias writ and to set aside all prior writs issued by
the trial court. 19
In the meantime, the Austrias filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, an action for cancellation of PNB’s title to the property, docketed
as Civil Case No. 97-0184. 20
On October 28, 1997, the trial court denied the Austrias’ fifth motion but
ruled that: “any writ of possession that may be issued in this case, is declared
unenforceable against the MOVANTS ERNESTO AUSTRIA and the HEIRS
OF LORETO AUSTRIA, until the Court declares otherwise.” 21
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 20,
1998. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed by
22
PNB before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, stating:
There is no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge in issuing his assailed Order which the Court finds to be in accord with law, the
pertinent rules and jurisprudence cited therein.
Hence, PNB filed the instant petition, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR BY SIMPLY
ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WRIT
______________
17 Id., at 310-312.
18 Id., at 319, 322, 324 & 338.
19 Id., at 327.
20 Id., at 369-370.
21 Id., at 417.
22 Id., at 455.
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
OF POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST RESPONDENT AUSTRIA.
SAID FINDINGS ARE UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS IN:
1. A)SUPPORTING THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER. THE RULINGS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE
NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST
RESPONDENTS. RESPONDENTS WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD BUT NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THEIR
CLAIM;
2. B)NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE FACT THAT PNB HAS
THE LEGAL RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY AS ITS REGISTERED
OWNER;
3. C)LOSING SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT BELATEDLY
ISSUED THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER DIRECTING THAT THE WRIT
OF POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST THE
RESPONDENTS. THE TRIAL COURT HAD EARLIER ISSUED FOUR (4)
POSSESSORY WRITS ALL OF WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS AUSTRIA & QUINTANA. 23
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ex-parte writ of
possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, can be enforced
against a third person who is in actual possession of the foreclosed property
and who is not in privity with the debtor/mortgagor. 24
Petitioner PNB maintains that the trial court’s order was based on the
unproven allegation that respondents had purchased the property from the
Monsods before the latter mortgaged it to PNB. According to petitioner PNB,
respondents did not adduce any proof to support their claim of ownership,
even as they were repeatedly given the opportunity to do so during the
hearings on the numerous motions filed by respondents themselves.
______________
Ibid., at 20.
23
Id., at 130.
24
29
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 29
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Petitioner PNB also submits that since it is the registered owner of the
property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. The bank
insists that it could rely on the title of the registered land which does not have
any annotation of respondents’ supposed rights.
 Petitioner PNB likewise avers that the trial court could not now belatedly
refuse to enforce the writ of possession against respondents. The trial court
had already issued a total of four possessory writs directing the ouster of all
occupants of the lot, including respondents herein.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the trial court correctly held
Page | that the writ of possession can only be implemented against the
42 debtor/mortgagor and his successors-in-interest. Since respondents acquired
their rights as owners of the property by virtue of a sale made to them by the
Monsods prior to the bank’s mortgage lien, respondents can not be
dispossessed therefrom without due notice and hearing, through the simple
expedient of an ex-parte possessory writ.
We agree with respondents. Under applicable laws and jurisprudence,
they can not be ejected from the property by means of an ex-parte writ of
possession.
The operative provision under Act No. 3135, as amended, is Section 6,
25
which states:
Sec. 6. Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special
power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any person
having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which
the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from
and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (Italics ours)
______________
An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to
25
Real Estate Mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118.
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
Despite the evolutionary development of our procedural laws throughout the
years, the pertinent rule in the Code of Civil Procedure remains practically
26
unchanged. Particularly, Rule 39, Section 33, second paragraph, which relates
to the right of possession of a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale:
Sec. 33. x x x
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment
obligor to the property at the time of levy. The possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Italics ours)
Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of
27
a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there
is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse
to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely applied in
a more recent case, where we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in
28
an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in
possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances
of this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing
circumstances are undeniably similar—a party in possession of the foreclosed
property is asserting a right adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger
to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was
applied for.
______________
See IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, 19 SCRA 181, 184 (1967), where the
26
Court explained that Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections
25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-
31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
27162 SCRA 358, 363 (1988), citing IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera,
supra; Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico, 63 Phil. 746 (1936).
28Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 70, 77 (1997), citing Gatchalian v.
Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 (1977).
31
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 31
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
It should be stressed that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not
without support in substantive law. Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual
possessor of a property, to wit:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption
of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property.
Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a
property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for
its physical recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act
No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated above.
Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement
of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an
ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.” 29
It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial
 foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any
property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a
petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made. 30
Page | As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty,
43 who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, will have no
opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature. It stands
to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the
strength of a mere ex-
authority to direct issuance of the writs against respondents assured that its
earlier orders would never attain finality in the first place.
In the same vein, respondents are not obliged to prove their ownership of
the foreclosed lot in the ex-parteproceedings conducted below. The trial court
has no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is entitled to
ownership and possession of the foreclosed lot.
______________
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his
31

favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show
or prove it.
______________ 33
VOL. 374, JANUARY 17, 2002 33
Section 3 (a), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
29

See Supena v. De la Rosa, 267 SCRA 1, 10 (1997), citing Section 4, Act No. 3135, as amended.
30 Mateo vs. Diaz
32 Likewise, registration of the lot in petitioner PNB’s name does not
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof. As discussed earlier,
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals petitioner PNB must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery of
parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary the property and cannot simply invoke its title in an ex-parte proceeding to
ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process. justify the ouster of respondents.
Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above, WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the resolution of the
requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to be brought even by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48660 is AFFIRMED.
true owner. After all, the actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal SO ORDERED.
presumption of just title in his favor, which must be overcome by the party
31
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
claiming otherwise. Petition denied, resolution affirmed.
In the case at bar, petitioner PNB admitted that as early as 1990, it was
aware that the subject lot was occupied by the Austrias. Yet, instead of
bringing an action in court for the ejectment of respondents, it chose to simply
file an ex-parte petition for a writ of possession pursuant to its alleged right as
purchaser in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot sanction this
procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against an unwitting third party
possessor, who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be
tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial
intervention.
Consequently, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No.
3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondents from the lot
subject of this instant case. The trial court was without authority to grant
the ex-parte writ, since petitioner PNB’s right of possession under said Act
could be rightfully recognized only against the Monsods and the latter’s
successors-in-interest, but not against respondents who assert a right adverse
to the Monsods. Hence, the trial court cannot be precluded from correcting
itself by refusing to enforce the writs it had previously issued. Its lack of
 G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000. *
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON,
and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
Page | Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised Forestry Code makes
44 mere possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying legal documents
unlawful and pun-
_______________
26Art. 64(1), Revised Penal Code; People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 224 [1998].
*SECOND DIVISION.
56
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
ishable with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310
of the Revised Penal Code.—This provision makes mere possession of timber or other
forest products without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable
with the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with
forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing
authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented.
These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima
facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the
trial court, the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the
public prosecutor.
Same; Same; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; It would be absurd to
require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before a seizure could be effected where the
vehicle owner and his driver immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.—
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained. Petitioners did
not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner
of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda,
drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody
of the DENR. Then again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and
impounded for the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the
seizure to the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of
replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension
for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected under the
circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there was a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting illegally cut timber was in accordance
with law, the seized vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they could not be
subject to an action for replevin.—Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code
and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were
validly deemed in custodia
57
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 57
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it is property lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise.
Same; Same; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject
of a replevin suit.—Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot
be the subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated
further: “. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs
to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax
assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from the presiding judge to
the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their execution of the law otherwise, as in this
case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings could easily be undermined by the
simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .”
Same; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public officer for his official
acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable—
thus, a suit against officers who represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot
prosper without the States consent.—Well established is the doctrine that the State may
not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts
is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies
only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without
willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners
are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners
were performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within
the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a
suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot
prosper without the State’s consent.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;Exhaustion must be raised
at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim, by a
58
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed waived.—
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the Solicitor
General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time
possible, even before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim,
 by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal
could be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Page | The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
45 Fiel Marmita for petitioners.
Plaridel Bohol for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision dated May 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1 3Rollo, p. 23.
G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May
27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had
denied petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for a
Writ of replevin. 2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 22-27.
CA Records, p. 43.
2
59
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 59
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
1. “1.Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and
twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at P8,544.75,
being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose Vargas.
2. 2.Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two
hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegally-
sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .” 3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENR-PENR
(Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan. Seizure receipts were issued but
4
the drivers refused to accept the receipts. Felipe Calub, Provincial 5
Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in
Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree
705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. 6
_______________
4Id. at 23.
5Id. at 74.
6Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License.—
Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing
forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code . . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found. (Emphasis supplied.)
60
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer
Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon
and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor. 7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Rarangay
Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,
and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section 68
[78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code. 8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao and
 all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code. For it
appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and ordered
that cut timber be loaded on it. 9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
Page | recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an application
46 for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of Catbalogan. The trial
court granted the application for replevin and issued the corresponding writ
in an Order dated April 24, 1992. Petition-
10
_______________
7Rollo, p. 70.
8Id. at 23, 78.
9Id. at 75, 85.
CA Records, p. 43.
10
61
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 61
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
ers filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application
for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products seized
are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said property
being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the Supreme Court. In
12
a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court referred said petition to
respondent appellate court for appropriate disposition. 13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of
merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the
authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No.
277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis.According
to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR or
his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and disposition of
illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for that purpose is
not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws, regulations, or
policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR Administrative
Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the appellate court said.
For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition
of conveyances used in the commission of offenses penalized
_______________
Supra, note 4.
11
Id. at 18-19.
12
Id. at 21.
13
62
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277. 14
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners
failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the
DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary.
Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid down by
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been issued
prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit. Therefore,
in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate court, the
subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in peti-tioners’ claim
that private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted illegally
or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the
State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or
withholding the possession of the property of another. 16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based
on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contra-
_______________
Id. at 26-A.
14
Id. at 25-27.
15
Id. at 27.
16
63
 VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 63
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
dicted by its own findings. Their petition was found without merit.
17 18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19
Page |
1. (1)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE SEIZURE
47
OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO.
705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID
CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
2. (2)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE TO
BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY
E.O. NO. 277; AND
3. (3)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A
SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
1. (1)Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
2. (2)Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded
vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without
License.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest
products from any forestland, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other
_______________
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 6.
forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code . . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the
timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well
as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with the
penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded
with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit
evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest products was
duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus
there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said violation
were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised Forestry
Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They read as
follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation.—In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water
or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions.—A forest officer or employee of the
Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Philippine
National Police shall arrest even
65
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 65
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of
the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements

64 Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:

Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.—All conveyances used in the
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED transport of any forest product obtained or gathered illegally whether or not covered
Calub vs. Court of Appeals with transport documents, found spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A
[78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of
in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
 Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance.—The Secretary or his duly authorized
representative such as the forest officers and/or natural resources officers, or
deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize said conveyances subject to
policies and guidelines pertinent thereto. Deputized military personnel and officials of
other agencies apprehending illegal logs and other forest products and their
Page | conveyances shall notify the nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest
products and conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the
48 apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be deposited with
the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be, for safekeeping wherever
it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to possession
of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and their load
was allowed under Sections 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
66
66 SUPREME OURT EPORTS NNOTATED
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly took
the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again, when one
of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the second time,
the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the DENR Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because private
respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin. The
seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their apprehension for a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be absurd to require a
confiscation order or notice and hearing before said seizure could be effected
under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure
was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin. For it
is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20
In Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited in
favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such property
was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on seizing the
property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The appropriate action
should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the situation by way of
partial Sheriff’s Return, and wait for the judge’s instructions on the proper
procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
“. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to retrieve
their chattel earlier taken for violation
_______________
20 Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614, 621 (1991).
67
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 67
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
of the Tariff and Customs Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of
the court, from the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture proceedings
could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of replevin . . .” 21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the two
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a
22
suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
23
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the
24
acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by
them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the
25
Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing
their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits
of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a
suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State.
It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
_______________
21Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 259,
citing Pacis v. Hon. Averia, 18 SCRA 907(1966).
22ONST., Art. XVI, sec. 3.
23De Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 2nd ed., 1994, pp. 228-229.
24Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233, 241 (1960).
25Sanders v. Veridiano II, 162 SCRA 88, 96 (1988).
68
 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Calub vs. Court of Appeals Petition granted, judgment set aside.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion of
Page | administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
49 raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. If not invoked 26

at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed waived and the
court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 27

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

_______________

26 Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.

SECTION 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting
a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

1. (a)That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
2. (b)That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
3. (c)That venue is improperly laid;
4. (d)That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
5. (e)That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
6. (f)That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
7. (g)That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
8. (h)That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished;
9. (i)That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute
of frauds; and
10. (j)That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

Soto v. Jareno, 144 SCRA 116, 119 (1986). See also Section 1(j), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court.
27

69
VOL. 331, APRIL 27, 2000 69
Calub vs. Court of Appeals
29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in
the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the
subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody
of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be
provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action, against
any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the Revised
Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 169596. March 28, 2007. *
shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., their
434
petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PEDRO BALUBAL, respondents.
Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re- Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
Page | examination of the evidence presented by the parties; Exceptions.—While it is settled that this National Construction Company
50 Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
evidence presented by the parties, a number of exceptions have imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of
cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought
_______________ not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of
*SECOND DIVISION
433
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 433 technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine Actions; Replevin; Words and Phrases; In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must
National Construction Company convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object
nevertheless been recognized by the Court. These exceptions are enumerated sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same; The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or
in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79 (2004): It is a
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or detained upon the
settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is
person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the
not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
action.”—On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 587 (1991),
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the
discusses the term replevin as follows: The term replevin is popularly understood as
findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court
“the return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully
had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are
taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or the common-law action in which
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin”; and
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
“a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
that the term, “to replevy” means “to redeliver goods which have been distrained to
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin.” The term
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x (Italics
therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recov-
in original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted) As will be discussed below,
435
number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case.
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In the exercise of the Court’s equity VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 435
jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
its merits.—Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner National Construction Company
to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ery of personalty, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by
regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained
constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)
however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
merits. As held in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, 477 SCRA 801 (2005): It
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and
is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases
 that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same.
Same; Searches and Seizures; The seizures and impounding of a vehicle involved in an
accident, on a policeman’s request, is unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by
the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.—In upholding the dismissal of
Page | petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals held that while “there is no law
authorizing the impounding of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police
51 authorities, x x x neither is there a law making the impounding of vehicles involved in
accidents illegal.” It added that “the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no
clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.” The appellate court is mistaken. The
Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section 2, Article III
provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Italics supplied) The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request,
were unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Custodia Legis; Words and Phrases; The rule that property held as evidence
in a criminal case cannot be replevied applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is,
seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted
exceptions; “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the
official custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only
when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the
law, and not otherwise.—That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was
criminally charged for reckless
436
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus could possibly be
held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. As explained in Bagalihog v.
Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991): It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal
case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held,
that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or
its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia
legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v. Odejar, 108 Phil. 560 (1960), “A thing is in custodia
legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only when property
is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations
omitted) Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the
foregoing discussion, thus in order.
Same; Same; Same; Where the police authorities have turned over the vehicle to a third
person, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and the latter.—As for petitioner’s
claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass upon the same without
impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure
and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the
bus to respondents for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them
and respondents.
Same; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action.—Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable
parties is not, of course, fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties
not being a ground for its dismissal. Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468 [2004] elucidates:
However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s
failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.
437
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 437
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Glenna Jean R. Organ and Fatima L. Caluya for respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 1
September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 61144.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public
transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling north
and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and crashed into
the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company
(PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way
patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal), then head
of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon tollway. The 2
bus was
3
_______________
 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with the concurrence of Associate Justices
1 Plate No.—TB-DVN-19
Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso; CA Rollo, pp. 147-158.
TSN, January 16, 1997, pp. 3-7; TSN, June 14, 1996, pp. 7-8.
2 4TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6.
Description:
3 5TSN, December 8, 1994, pp. 5-6; Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
Make—Fuso (replaced with Nissan Engine)
Type—Bus
Page | Motor Number—072020 (replaced with Motor No. 05184)
Serial/Chassis Number—BM 115LL-20359
52 Certificate of Registration No.—0200047-1
Official Receipt No.—316890066
Bus Body No.—719
438
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for it to conduct its own
investigation of the incident. Because of lack of adequate space, the bus was,
on request of traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the
PNCC patrol to its compound where it was stored. 4
Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the
bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s undertaking
to repair the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal instead demanded the
sum of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value, representing respondent
PNCC’s estimate of the cost of reconstruction of the damaged radio room. By
petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage amounted to P10,000.00 only.
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property
(replevin) with damages against respondents PNCC and Balubal with the
6
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, praying as follows:
xxxx
1. 2.after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered—
1. a)adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject personal
property and awarding the material possession of said property to plaintiff
as the sole and absolute owner thereof;
2. b)ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the following:
1. (1)the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of the date of the
filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the sum of P7,500.00 daily
until subject passenger bus shall have been delivered to and in actual
material possession of plaintiff;
2. (2)the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
_______________
(CA Rollo, pp. 148-149; Folder of Exhibits, pp. 1-2)
6Records, pp. 1-8.
439
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 439
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
1. (3)the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and
2. (4)the cost of suit.
7
In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin,
petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for the court’s final judgment.
In respondents’ Answer to the complaint, they claimed that they merely
8
towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order
from the police authorities; that respondent Balubal did not release the bus to
petitioner in the absence of an order from the police authorities; that petitioner,
in claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of registration and official
receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof; and that the bus subject of
the complaint was not the same bus involved in the December 13, 1990
accident.
5
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of P40,326.54
in actual damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P130,000.00 in
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. On respondents’ Counterclaim, it ordered petitioner to pay
respondent PNCC the amount of P40,320.00 representing actual damages to
the radio room
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that the storage of
9
the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit, hence,
custody or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its
safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s agent, hence, absent
any instruction from him, respondent PNCC may not release the bus.
_______________
7Id., at p. 5.
8Id., at pp. 15-19.
9CA Rollo, pp. 147-158.
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been brought
against the police authorities instead of respondents.
Page | Hence, the present petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
53
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition, the Court
resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by respondents in their
Comment. 10
Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact and
suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to include “such material
portions of the record as would support the petition” as required under
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, hence, it should be dismissed outright.
11
_______________
10 Rollo, pp. 42-47.
11 Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition.—The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended
for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as
the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either
as petitioner or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution subject thereof was received when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and
when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and
the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of
court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record
as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the
last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42.
441
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 441
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the petition raises questions of law
foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an
action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal
distraint.
In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does
not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the
parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the
Court. These exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd.
v. Court of Appeals: 12
“It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However,
the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, ifproperly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x” (Italics
in original; italics supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies
in the present case.
_______________
G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86.
12
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner to
comply with any of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany
the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal. 13
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may
be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban
Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan: 14
“It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that
cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of
cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought
not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of the rules that would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
x x x x” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that, in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the merits.
 On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals discusses the term
15 Records, p. 16.
18

TSN, November 8, 1996, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 6-8.
replevin as follows:
19

444
“The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a person
of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
Page | _______________ National Construction Company
54 It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
13

G.R. No. 167136, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 801, 809.
14 law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or
G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991, 197 SCRA 587, 597-598.
15 otherwise placed under custodia legis.
443 In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 443 held that while “there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine involved in an accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is there a law
National Construction Company making the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal.” It added
taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and return that “the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or
the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or the common-law action in which rule on the matter.” The appellate court is mistaken.
20

goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin”; and
to replevy, means to recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of
goods or chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as
“a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have
been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the
sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein described and
transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff
to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states
that the term, “to replevy” means “to re-deliver goods which have been distrained to
the original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin.” The term
therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus,
Section 2, Article III provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” (Italics
supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were
unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution. 21

property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo to justify22

action.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)

the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities is
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a trial
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
court judge. This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such an
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
16

order:
wrongfully detains the same. 17

Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being admitted by _______________

respondents, consideration of whether respondents have been wrongfully
18

detaining it is in order. CA Rollo, p. 156.

20

Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was Vide Bagalihog v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 96356, June 27, 1991, 198 SCRA 614.
21

towed by respondents on the request of Lopera. 19

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 79.
22

445
_______________ VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 445
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
Distilleria Washington, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 622; 263 SCRA 303 (1996).
National Construction Company
16

Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006, 490
17

SCRA 368.
 “In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of
the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its
impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper courts and not
directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative case. x x x
xxxx
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from
Page |
us through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the
55 established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able
to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a property petition,
including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that
issue in this case.” (Italics supplied)
23
This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a “clear-cut policy” refers
to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges of issuing orders for
the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents. It has no application to the
instant case which involves the seizure and distraint implemented by
respondents upon a verbal order by Lopera without the benefit or color of
legality afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged
for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus
could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this case. As 24
explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez: 25
“It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the
rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with
the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property
subject of litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin
v. Odejar, “A thing is in custodia legis
26
_______________
Supra at pp. 87-88.
23
Folder of Exhibits, p. 43.
24
Supra at p. 621.
25
108 Phil. 560 (1960).
26
446
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only when property
is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law, and
not otherwise.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the
foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass
upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer
responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police
authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to respondents for
safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and
27
respondents.
Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal
to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a ground
for its dismissal. Domingo v. Scheer elucidates:
28 29
_______________
27 Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the
obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the
principal purpose of the contract, there is not deposit but some other contract.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
28
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.—Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may
be severed and proceeded with separately.
G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 468, 483-484.
29
447
VOL. 519, MARCH 28, 2007 447
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Philippine
National Construction Company
“However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff’s
failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial court motu
proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties—Lopera and any
other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc., for
recovery of possession of personal property is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is DIRECTED to REINSTATE
petitioner’s complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested to pursue its
claim for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing pronouncement
of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Assailed decision reversed and set aside.

Page |
56
 G.R. No. 187944. March 12, 2014.*
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR.
and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, respondents.
Civil Law; Possession; The registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession.—“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
Page | possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever
57 is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the
proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy
the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Jurisdictional Facts That Must
Be Alleged and Sufficiently Established in a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer.—In a
complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged
and
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
678sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s
right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the
last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.
Same; Accion Publiciana; Accion Reivindicatoria; When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.—This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect
the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint
must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romeo J. Balili for petitioner.
Steve R. Siclot for respondents.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for
Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-
Delantar (Marilou) (respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 3,6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case
No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832,
respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of
Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer
instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated
as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated
in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The
subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the
following manner among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and
Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9
_______________
3 Id., at p. 40.
4 Id., at pp. 65-95.
5 With Presiding Judge Estela Alma A. Singco.
6 With Presiding Judge Gil R. Acosta.
7 Entitled “Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Marilou Emboy-Delantare and
Veronica P. Garcia.”
8 A 957-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-5922.
9 Rollo, pp. 30-31.
680

REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2rendered
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-19.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, with Associate Justices Francisco P.
Acosta and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; id., at pp. 21-28.
679 A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in
on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied
 the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share
in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades
after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own
parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who
Page | are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No.
58 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to comply
insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty.
Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004,
requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that Carmencita
had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the for-
_______________
10 Sometimes referred to in the records as “Veronida.”
11 Rollo, p. 22.
12 Id.
681mer’s relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand.
Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered
possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of
a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004,
they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the
partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective
portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the
respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant
petition. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno,
Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who
allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their
successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject
lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same. 16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on
September 25, 2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject lot
and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon.
They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.17
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety
the MTCC ruling.18
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a
Petition for Review19 filed before the CA.
_______________
13 Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-30548.
14 Rollo, p. 22.
15 Vicente’s spouse.
16 Rollo, p. 23.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 65-95.
682The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot
in the concept of owners for several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand,
was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the property despite the notice
of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the
respondents’ institution on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the
partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that “even if
one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same
for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of ejectment.”21 The
respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated in Amagan v. Marayag22 that
the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies
the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The
foregoing is especially true in the case at bar where the issue of possession is
so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question
of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of
possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004,
which was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs
of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the respondents
instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita,
who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s,
was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a
fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among the vendors, but she,
too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed
was only registered the following year after its supposed execution.
_______________
20 320 Phil. 146; 250 SCRA 108 (1995).
21 Id., at p. 156; p. 117; Rollo, p. 76.
22 383 Phil. 486; 326 SCRA 581 (2000).
683
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold
the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same. Hence,
there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the respondents’
possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered
evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home. A
duly notarized document captioned as an “Agreement,” 23 dated February 23,
1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their
hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente
 obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as a
collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must
have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from
the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over the subject
lot to convey to Carmencita.
Page |
The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause
59 of action. The certification to file an action was issued by the officials
of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother, who
had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita
based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on
April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the respondents after that
date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally defective, as
the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period
within which the suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs,
they argued that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of
the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in
which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be rendered
useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for
_______________
23 Rollo, p. 121.
684unlawful detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house
demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing
the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint
for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court
against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with damages and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained
in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical pos-
685session of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy,
or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto.
In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful
by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of
rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into
the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of
unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the
last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was
neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of
ownership which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize
[the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It
did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon.
It was also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred
that their relatives previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that
after [Carmencita] purchased it[,] she, as its new owner, demanded [for the
respondents] to vacate the
686land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their ancestors have
been occupying the land for several decades already. There was no averment as to how
or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’] possession of the
land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied,
between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the
other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful
detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took possession of the land
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible
entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the respondents’]
possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s]
predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession
thereof. Take note that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the
shoes of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause
of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present from the start of the possession which he later seek[s] to
recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
 dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the
owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of
possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in
an accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court
Page | in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
60 For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested
from another who had been in possession thereof for more
687than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although
admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments
of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of
prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that
regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (Citations omitted
24
and underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she
alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not applicable to
the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute, which is
properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has
no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more relevance in the
case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each other’s relatives and
the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by
the complainant is not necessary.27 Instead, what is required is a better right of
possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because
the defendants assert ownership over the disputed property.
_______________
24 Id., at pp. 24-27.
25 Id., at pp. 29-38.
26 453 Phil. 404; 405 SCRA 466 (2003).
27 Id., at p. 410; p. 470.
688
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied
Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I 29 Citing Punio v. Judge Go, 357 Phil. 1, 6; 296 SCRA 1, 6 (1998), and Silverio v. Court of Appeals,
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently
alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition
of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s
ejectment suit.
Carmencita’s Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the
subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners
thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were occupying
the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they
vacate the property. The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand
turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding the possession of the
subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose recourse was to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a
collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action
for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of ownership of
a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the
_______________
28 Citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree.
689two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different
reliefs.29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its possession.
In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation of a property not
by its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance, and
the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand,
failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be proper. 32
The Respondents’ Arguments
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate.
There was practically no specific averment as to when and how possession by
tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a
general claim that the respondents possessed “the property by mere
tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would voluntarily vacate the premises
and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the owners.’”34 In Spouses Valdez,
Jr. v. CA,35the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the
MTCC of jurisdiction over the action.
_______________
454 Phil. 750, 758; 407 SCRA 240, 246 (2003).
30 424 Phil. 544; 373 SCRA 513 (2002).
31 348 Phil. 813; 285 SCRA 34 (1998).
 32 Id., at p. 825; p. 35; Rollo, p. 140. within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and
33 Rollo, pp. 55-64. from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the
34 Id., at p. 59. right to physical possession.
35 523 Phil. 39; 489 SCRA 369 (2006).
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
690In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
Page |
possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar. possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
61 Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title, the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out
which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one
partition of Lot No. 1907-A. of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other
hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper
Our Disquisition regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. (Citations omitted)
39

_______________
The instant petition lacks merit. 39 Id., at pp. 45-46; pp. 376-377.
Carmencita had not amply alleged 692
and proven that all the requisites In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts
for unlawful detainer are present must be alleged and sufficiently established:
in the case at bar. (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;
“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
prosper.”37 the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
actions available to recover possession of real property, viz.: Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it.41 Carmencita was
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 144-151. likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted
37 Corpuz v. Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 350, 361, citing Carbonilla v. Abiera, G.R. the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came
No. 177637, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
38 Supra note 35.
about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal
conclusion, sansfactual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial
691 occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats,
owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. 43 It is worth
or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in
_______________
implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
40 Supra note 37, at p. 363; see also Delos Reyes v. Odones, G.R. No. 178096, March 23, 2011, 646
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which SCRA 328, 334-335.
party has prior de factopossession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the 41 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of 42 Id.
the right to possess. 43 Please see Petition, id., at pp. 12-13; Reply, id., at pp. 138-139.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought
 693the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been
occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party
Page | clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
62 without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general
the respondents’ petition for
fication of the partition of Lot
1907-A can abate Carmencita’s
for unlawful detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. “The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the
Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.”
_______________
44 Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 323, 341, citing Serdoncillo v. Spouses
Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, 95; 297 SCRA 448, 459 (1998).
694
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending
civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court
declared:
“x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover
the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is
more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of
physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For
the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership
or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be
filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in
order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as
a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately
set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other
party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises
involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.”
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the
demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning,
considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note
that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of
forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a
demolition of their
695house, a matter that is likely to create the “confusion, disturbance, inconveniences
and expenses” mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to
go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners
from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is
claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well
rule,
as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein
nulli- the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust
No. and probably irreparable.
suit We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an
expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on “mere tolerance.” Without in
any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious
under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case. (Citations 45
omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision
dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-
G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
“ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful
detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by
mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x,
petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written,
asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street,
San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession but
ownership as well that is involved in this case.[”]
_______________
45 Supra note 22, at pp. 495-499; p. 594.
696
“TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed
an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of
this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.[”]
“THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will
include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.[”]
 “To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of
petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which
it stands.” (Citation omitted)
46

Page | We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the

63 instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the
proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot by
mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise the
defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case
No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A,
in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties.
Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the respondents’ house,
which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to
demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the
instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. As
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 498-499; pp. 592-593.

697discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere

tolerance of the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover,
circumstances exist which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings.
Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for
the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk
of having their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the
subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
 G.R. No. 167554. February 26, 2008.*
ROMEO ASIS, OSCAR ASIS and EDUARDO ASIS,
petitioners, vs. CONSUELO ASIS VDA. DE GUEVARRA, respondent.
Ejectments; Jurisdictions; Ownerships; The Chua Peng Hian v. Court of Appeals (133
SCRA 572 [1984]) doctrine should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Page | Civil Procedure, which is categorical—the issue of ownership raised as a defense will
64
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
581not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can rule on
the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to possess the disputed
property.—Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua
Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it was
applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an action for specific performance
[with the then Court of First Instance], and it was the defendant there who raised the
issue that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, implying that the case was
really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this context that this Court held that the
Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not only because the issues raised
do not only involve the possession of the land, but also the rights of the parties to the
building constructed thereon. This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore
was taken out of context by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that
the MeTC had no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng
Hian doctrine enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule
70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical. The issue of ownership
raised as a defense will not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as
the court can rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to
possess the disputed property. “When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Relation to Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Issues
of Ownership in Ejectment Proceedings.—To ensure that the above policy would be
maintained, Refugia also laid down the following guidelines to be observed in relation
to the exercise of jurisdiction over issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings: 1. The
primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is
merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only
for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal
provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is
dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership. 2. It must sufficiently
appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and
primarily582seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations
of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery
of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the
averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such
claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property. 3. The
inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the relationship of
lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment case, unless it is
sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change in or termination of
that relationship between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. 4. The
rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the
security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some other way,
then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership. 5.
Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real
owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership
and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In
the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other
contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded
merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
583
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cesar T. Verano for petitioners.
Celso O. Escobido for respondent.
PUNO, C.J.:
In an action for unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan trial
court has jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the
restoration of possession; even if there is a need to resolve the ownership of
the disputed property to determine who has prior possession. As long as the
issue of ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for the purpose of determining
the issue of possession, then the court can make a declaration who among the
contending parties is the real owner of the property. Any such pronouncement
is to be regarded merely as provisional, and will not bar nor prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the disputed property. 1
The Case
 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated November 26, 2004 issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 76187, and
the Resolution dated March 18, 2005 which denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Page | The facts of the case are simple, and substantially culled from the CA’s
65 account.2
_______________
1 See Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982; 258 SCRA 347 (1996).
2 CA Decision dated November 26, 2004, CA-G.R. SP No. 76187. See Rollo, pp. 40-43.
584Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. de Guevarra, claiming to be the owner
of the apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th Street, Fabie
Subdivision, Paco, Manila, filed separate ejectment cases with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) against her brothers Romeo, Oscar
and Eduardo, all surnamed Asis, the petitioners herein.3 In her complaint,
respondent admits that the land on which the apartment units were built are
owned in common by her and her siblings, including petitioners,4 but alleges
that she alone owns the apartment units, having paid for the construction of
the same, and that the name of petitioners had only been included in the title
of the property at the instance and benevolence of respondent.5 She then
alleges that petitioners, as lessees of the apartment units, had been paying her
for several years monthly rentals of P500.00, P1,000.00 and P2,000.00
respectively, for their occupation of the apartment units.6 All of a sudden, and
she states that for no justifiable reason, petitioners stopped paying
rent.7 Despite repeated demands, they failed and refused to pay.8 When the
matter could not be settled by the Barangay Lupon,9 a “Certification to File
Action” was issued. The cases against petitioners were then consolidated, as
they involved common issues and questions of fact and law.
In their respective Answers, petitioners claim that they are co-owners not
only of the lot but also of the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance, because
it was their parents—the original owners of the land—who had constructed
the apartment units by way of loan and mortgage of the land with the
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 52-67. She filed three ejectment cases, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 161644-CV,
161645-CV and 161646-CV.
4 Id., at pp. 52, 57 and 62.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 In compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
585Philippine National Bank in 1964.10 They each claimed that they have never
paid any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to
respondent.11 Petitioner Eduardo added that any money he may have given to
respondent was in the form of abuloy (alms), since respondent was their eldest
sister, and a widow without children.12 In their petition with this Court, they
admit to having previously paid the exact amounts specified by respondent
monthly, but averred that these were not rentals but contributions for the
upkeep and maintenance of the premises.13
The records show that petitioners’ claim of co-ownership over the
apartment units is solely based on the principle of accession. They argue that
since they can establish possession of the apartment units during the lifetime
of their parents—who were then owners of the parcel of land and the
buildings/improvements situated thereon,14 then their inheritance as
compulsory heirs must necessarily include ownership not only of the land but
also of the improvements.
The MeTC ruled for respondent, finding sufficient basis for the valid
ejectment of petitioners thus:
_______________
10 Rollo, p. 68. The record also shows that petitioner Romeo Asis alleged in his answer that
respondent was no longer a co-owner or heir of the lot or the apartment as of February 14, 1988,
when their parents during their lifetime sold the lot in question for P5,000.00 to their five siblings
(Oscar, Cesar, Linda, Alfred and Ramon), and then on the same date, siblings Romeo, Helen and
respondent herself sold their 1/5 share to their brothers Ruben and Eduardo for P5,000.00,
through a Deed of Sale. Id., at pp. 68-69. A review of the attached deed of sale revealed, however,
that the sale involved the excess share of the siblings, so as to effect a 1/5 ownership of each of
the siblings over the lot. Id., at p. 123.
11 Id., at pp. 67, 72, and 79.
12 Id., at p. 79.
13 Id., at p. 13.
14 Id., at p. 21.
586
“On the issue of whether or not [respondent] could validly eject the [petitioners] from
the apartment [units], the Court find[s] basis to sustain the [respondent].
[Petitioners] claim that they, together with the [respondent] are co-owners not only of
the lot but also of the apartment [units]. They posit this claim by their mere argument
that the accessory follows the principal. But this issue should not be resolved by a
blinded adherence to such legal principle when evidence shows otherwise.
[Respondent] never denied that the lot upon which the apartment [units were] erected
is owned in common by her and her siblings. She claims ownership only on the
apartment [units]. She support[s] this with the records of her real property loan with
the [Social Security Systems] and the Tax Declaration which are solely in her name.
 [Petitioners] have nothing to refute the authenticity of the said documents other than
their naked claim and stubborn insistence of co-ownership.
[Petitioners] could not also convince this Court that what they were paying to the
[respondent] were not rents but contribution to the upkeep and maintenance of the
premises as well as aid to the [respondent] who is their elder sister. On the face of this
Page | gratuitous allegation[s], [respondent] has presented several receipts to establish that
defendants were paying rental but stopped doing so[,] prompting her to file the instant
66 case for ejectment. [Petitioners] submitted no evidence to disprove their authenticity. 15
The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent, as follows:
Civil Case No. 161644-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Romeo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him
to vacate Apartment No. 1497 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Romeo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from July 1998 up
to February, 2000 and the amount of P500.00 a month from March, 2000 and every
month
_______________
15 Id., at p. 100.
587thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as reasonable compensation for the
use and occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161645-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Oscar Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him to
vacate Apartment No. 1495 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Oscar Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of TWENTY
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P22,000.00) representing his rental arrearages from May,
1998 up to February 2000 and the amount of P1,000.00 a month from March, 2000 and
every month thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161646-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Eduardo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights under him
to vacate Apartment No. 1499 located at 7th Street, Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Eduardo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of THIRTY
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P38,000.00) representing his rental arrearage from
August, 1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of P2,000.00 a month from March,
2000 and every month thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Ordering all [petitioners] to pay [respondent], jointly and severally the sum of
P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit.
[Petitioners’] counterclaim[s] are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)17 reversed the Consolidated
Decision of the MeTC on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over
the case since it involved not only possession of the lot but of the rights of the
parties on the
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 100-101.
17 Branch 17, Manila.
588building constructed thereon. Relying heavily on the case of Chua Peng Hian
v. CA,18 the RTC ruled:
“On hindsight, and yes, what escaped the attention of the [MeTC] was the averments
of the initiatory pleading, the [petitioners’] formal reaction thereto, and papers
subsequent to the preliminary conference of November 16, 1999, with respect to the
controversy as to the matter of exclusive dominion over the apartment units vis-à-
vis the acknowledged co-ownership of the lot. Indeed, there was no unanimity of
thought as to ownership of the lot and building thereon which thus constrained this
Court to equate thecasus belli at hand to the scenario portrayed by Mr. Justice Aquino
in [Chua Peng Hian vs. Court of Appeals] (133 SCRA 572, 575 [1984]; cited [in] 1
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 8th Revised Edition, 2002, at page 801) which may
well apply herein, thusly.
We hold that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case. Where the issues
raised before the inferior court do not only involve possession of the lot but also
the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon, the Court of First
Instance and not the municipal or city court has jurisdiction over the case. (citations
and emphasis omitted)
Even then, and mindful of the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the appellate court can hardly render a categorical disposition based
on the entire record in accordance with Section 7 thereof, relative to the nagging query
as to the rights of the parties over the building, inasmuch as the proviso under Section
8 of the same Rule was conditional upon ‘. . . reception of evidence on which the
judgment of the lower court was based. . .’ peculiar to a ‘. . . a trial on the merits by the
lower court. . .’, which circumstances are anathema to a civil suit envisioned by the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.” (citations omitted) 19
The RTC ruling was likewise reversed and set aside by the CA, 20 and the
decision of the MeTC was reinstated. The CA
_______________
18 218 Phil. 544; 133 SCRA 572 (1984).
19 Rollo, pp. 106-107.
20 In the petition for review filed by respondent, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76187. See CA
Decision dated November 26, 2004, id., at pp. 40-43.
589ruled that the Chua Peng Hian case relied upon by the RTC was not
applicable to the case at bar, since the action there was for specific performance
of the stipulations in a lease contract which was filed with the RTC, whereas
the present case is for eviction of tenants through an unlawful detainer action.
The CA thus explained:
“x x x However, it must be stressed that the Chua Peng Hian case involves the recovery
of possession of a leased lot where the lessee bound himself to transfer to the lessor the
building which he erected thereon. It was an action for specific performance. On the
 other hand, in the case at bar, [respondent] sought the eviction of her tenants from her
apartment units in an action for unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court further
explained in the case of Chua Peng Hian that, “the action was for specific performance
of the stipulations of a lease contract. It was not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was
within the [exclusive original jurisdiction] of the Court of First Instance.” Evidently,
Page | the ruling in that case is not applicable to the case at bar.”
21
Further, the CA sustained the jurisdiction of the MeTC to rule on the issue
67
of ownership for the purpose of determining who had the right of possession,
based on the explicit grant in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus:
Furthermore, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.—When the defendant raises
the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.”
We should emphasize that the only issue involved in ejectment proceedings is
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. Moreover, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides that in ejectment proceedings where the question of
possession cannot be resolved
_______________
21 Id., at p. 45.
590without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts have the power to
resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of possession.
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Aznar Brothers Realty vs. Court of
Appeals, 327 SCRA 359, where the Supreme Court held that, “In an action for
ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de facto. However, when the
issue of possession cannot be decided without resolving the issue, the court
may receive evidence upon the question of title to property but solely for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.”
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the [MeTC] has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case. Even if [petitioners] raised the
issue of ownership, the [MeTC] can still determine the validity of their claim
on which they justify their right to possess. “The MeTC acts correctly if it
receives evidence on ownership where the question of possession could not be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership” Paz vs. Reyes, 327 SCRA
605. It is now a well-settled rule that inferior courts are not divested of
jurisdiction over ejectment cases just because the defendants assert ownership
over the litigated property (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 714).”22
Petitioners now come before this Court arguing that a grave reversible
error was committed by the CA in overturning the decision of the RTC, on the
grounds that (a) Chua Peng Hian23 applies to the instant case because the
complaint filed by respondent at the MeTC did not make out an action of
ejectment; and (b) petitioners could not be ejected because they are co-owners
of the apartment units.
The petition must fail.
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking
the Chua Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred
when it was applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an action
for specific performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it was the
defendant there who raised the issue that the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction, implying that the case was
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 45-46.
23 Supra note 18.
591really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this context that this Court held
that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not only because
the issues raised do not only involve the possession of the land, but also the
rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon.
This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore was taken out of
context by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng Hian doctrine
enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of Section 16, Rule 70 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is categorical. The issue of ownership
raised as a defense will not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case, as the court can rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine
who has right to possess the disputed property. “When the defendant raises the
defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only
to determine the issue of possession.”24
Moreover, petitioners’ objections to the MeTC jurisdiction all rest on the
supposed “exception” to the jurisdiction over ejectment cases, anchored on the
proposition that “when the issue of ownership is so necessarily involved with
the issue of physical possession that it cannot be determined without resolving
the issue of ownership, the court loses its jurisdiction.”25
Unfortunately for petitioners, the cases cited in support of this
“exception” were all decided prior to Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129. And
this “exception” to the MeTC jurisdiction was removed, and the rule modified
by B.P. Blg. 129, which provides that in ejectment proceedings where the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, all inferior courts have the power to
 _______________
24 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Sec. 16.
25 Rollo, p. 107.
592resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of possession
Page | (Sec. 33 [2], changing the rule in Sec. 3 [c], R.A. No. 5967, which was then
applicable to City Courts).26 Even more so after the promulgation of the 1997
68
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, with its clear grant of power under
Section 16, Rule 70. It is for this reason that petitioners are unable to cite
jurisprudence to support their cause after the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129.
Did the passage of these amendments mean that courts having jurisdiction
over ejectment cases can never be ousted of such jurisdiction? This was
explained in Sps.Refugia v. CA,27 where this Court, speaking through J.
Regalado, held:
“x x x [I]t is clear that prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the jurisdiction
of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of ownership in order to
determine only the nature and extent of possession, by reason of which such
jurisdiction was lost the moment it became apparent that the issue of possession was
intricately interwoven with that of ownership. The law, as revised, now provides
instead that when the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was extended to
include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise
involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket authority to
adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the
inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issue
concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the issue
of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper
application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or where the
principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief
prayed for make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.”
_______________
26 Florenz D. Regalado, I Remedial Law Compendium 782-783 (8th revised ed. 2002).
27 Supra note 1, at p. 1002; pp. 362-363.
593To ensure that the above policy would be maintained, Refugia also
laid
down the following guidelines to be observed in relation to the exercise of
jurisdiction over issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be
resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, as
earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior
court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue
of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the
plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently,
where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish
a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of
possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a
mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership
is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one
for title to real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the
relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the ejectment case,
unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a subsequent change in or
termination of that relationship between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is that a
party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the
owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and
whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some other way,
then the594inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue of ownership.
5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who
the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of
ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real
owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other
contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded
merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.”28
From the foregoing, it is clear that unless petitioners are able to show that
the real purpose of the action for ejectment is to recover title to the property,
or otherwise show that the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
resolved, then the municipal or metropolitan trial court retains jurisdiction.
This the petitioners failed to prove.
Finally, a careful evaluation of the records of this case also convinces us
that the findings of the MeTC are in order, insofar as to the validity of the grant
of eviction. Again, we stress that the decision of the MeTC finding respondent
as the owner of the apartment units is merely to determine the right of
 possession. It will not bar any of the parties from filing a suit with the proper
court to determine conclusively the title to the disputed property.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Consolidated Decision dated March 7, 2000, renrendered by the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Page | SO ORDERED.
69
 G.R. No. 194880. June 20, 2012.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, both represented by the PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, petitioners, vs. SUNVAR REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Page | Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338, the Court clarified
70 the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition
for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
321
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 321
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45.—In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338 (2010), the Court clarified
the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition
for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law.”
Same; Summary Procedure; Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari
petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.—Under the Rules on Summary Procedure,
a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in
a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain enough, and
its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed outright
respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading.
Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for
the dismissal of the certiorari Petition. Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss
the certiorari Petition, but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Unlawful Detainer; Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any
land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by virtue
of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation—bring
an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession, for
restitution of possession with damages and costs.—Under the Rules of Court, lessors against
whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to
hold possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one
year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against
the person
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with damages
and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor shall commence only
after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that demand is served upon the
person found on the premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days
in the case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.
Same; Elements of a Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer.—Hence, a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following
elements: 1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon
the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession. 3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment. 4. Within one year from the making of
the last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
Complaint for ejectment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Br. 134.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners.
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for unlawful detainer
filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation
(NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong Tamo
Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and covered by four Transfer
323
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 323
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition is
one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an area of
approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject property). Eighty
percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by petitioner Republic, while
the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to petitioner NPC. 2 Petitioners are
being represented in this case by the Privatization Management Office (PMO),
which is the agency tasked with the administration and disposal of
government assets.3Meanwhile, respondent Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the subject property by virtue of sublease
agreements, which had in the meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26 December
1977,4 petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the
Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years
 beginning 01 January 1978 and ending on 31 December 2002.5 Under the Contract of
Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any
portion of the four parcels of land.6
_______________
1 TCT Nos. 458364, 458365, 458366 and 458367.
2 Petitioner Republic owns approximately 17,574 square meters of the subject property, while
Page | petitioner NPC owns 5,350 square meters. (NPC Resolution No. 2009-13 dated 09 March
71 2009; Rollo,
p. 73)
3 Executive Order No. 323 dated 06 December 2000, Art. III, Sec. 2.
4 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 3-4, para. 4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.
5 Contract of Lease between petitioners Republic and NPC with TRCFI; Rollo, pp. 492-502.
6 “The LESSEE [TRCFI] shall have the right, upon notice to the LESSORS [petitioners
Republic and NPC], to sublease the whole or part of the leased land.” (Contract of Lease, Sec. VI,
p. 6; Rollo, p. 497)
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject
property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements (the sublease
agreements).7 Although these agreements commenced on different dates, all of them
contained common provisions on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to
expire on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s main lease contract with
petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:8
“The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years and
[variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another twenty-five (25)
years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.” 9 15 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 26 April 2002 to the Office of the President, the
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar agreed
“to return or surrender the subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the
termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any renewal or extension
thereof.”10
_______________
7 The entire subject property was subleased by TRCFI to respondent Sunvar in five
agreements: (a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980 (Rollo, pp. 503-519); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement
dated 28 February 1982 (Rollo, pp. 523-536); (c) 1983 Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible exact date
(Rollo, pp. 537-545); (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983 (Rollo, pp. 546-554); and (e)
the remaining portions were also subleased by Sunvar, according to petitioners (Complaint dated
26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 9; Rollo, p. 80)
8 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 10; Rollo, p. 80.
9 (a) Agreement dated 18 August 1980, p. 9; Rollo, p. 511 (22 years and 5 months from 31 July
1980); (b) Sub-Lease Agreement dated 28 February 1982, p. 3; Rollo, p. 526 (20 years and 10 months
from 28 February 1982); (c) 1983 Sub-Lease Agreement with illegible exact date, p. 2; Rollo, p. 538
(19 years and 9 months from March 1983); and (d) Sub Lease Agreement dated 28 August 1983, p.
2; Rollo, p. 547 (19 years and 3 months from September 1984).
10 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 6, para. 11; Rollo, p. 80.
325
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 325
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful
improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces
therein.11It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the subject property as
parking areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was dissolved. In its
stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation (PDAF) was created,
assuming the functions previously performed by TRCFI.13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main lease contract
and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI.
Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option to renew the sublease over the
subject property and proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period of another
25 years.14 On even date, it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters expressed the
same desire to renew the lease over the subject property under the new rental rate and
renewal period.15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of the lease
had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive a response.16 It further
ex-
_______________
11 Among these commercial buildings are what are known today as Premier Cinema, Mile
Long Arcade, Makati Creekside Building, The Gallery Building and Sunvar Plaza. (Complaint
dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; Rollo, pp. 80-81)
12 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, pp. 6-7, para. 12; Rollo,
pp. 80-81.
13 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 13; Rollo, p. 81.
14 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 26 April 2002 to PDAF; Rollo, pp. 714-715.
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and petitioner NPC; Rollo, pp. 712-713.
16 PDAF’s letter dated 10 May 2002; Rollo, p. 716.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
plained that the proposal of respondent for the renewal of the sublease could
not yet be acted upon, and neither could the proposed rental payments be
accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested
PDAF to apprise the former of any specific actions undertaken with respect to
the said lease arrangement over the subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to expire,
petitioner NPC—through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and General
Counsel—notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the contract of lease.19 In
turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew
the lease con-
_______________
 17 “We wish to inform you that as of this date, our office has not received any response from
the NG [petitioner Republic] nor the NPC. Consequently, since the renewal of our Sublease
Contract is dependent on our Foundation’s own renewal of our Contract of Lease with the NG
and the NPC, we cannot yet act on your letter or give favorable consideration on your desire to
renew our Sublease Contract, notwithstanding the provisions thereof.
“In view hereof, we likewise cannot accept any proposed rental payments from your office
Page | for the renewal term until such time that we already have an indication of the terms and conditions
of any renewal acceptable to the NG and the NPC and, hence, our decision to return the check
72 you sent to us.” (PDAF’s letter dated 10 May 2002; Rollo, p. 716)
18 Respondent Sunvar’s Letter dated 27 May 2002; Rollo,
p. 717.
19 “We wish to inform you that in its last meeting on May 29, 2002, the NPC Board of
Directors decided not to renew the contract of lease which is set to expire on December 31,
2002 …” (NPC Letter dated 03 June 2010 [Rollo, p. 555]; see also Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p.
7, para. 14 [Rollo, p. 81])
20 PDAF’s Letter dated 14 June 2002; Rollo, p. 718.
327
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 327
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
tract.21 The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the
corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the
purpose of selling them to raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed
respondent Sunvar of petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and
quoted the Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease
agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from
PDAF all the rights over the subject property and the three other parcels of land.
Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred the subject property to the PMO for
disposition. Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised respondent Sunvar
to completely vacate the subject property within thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly
received the Notice from the OSG
_______________
21 “You are hereby given by this Office notice that subject lease should no longer be
renewed/extended.
The Lease should end by January 2003, so that Notice of Non Renewal/ Non Extension should
be given to Lessor not less than 6 months from said date given PDAF is now in the process of
dissolution.” (Memorandum dated 13 June 2002; Rollo, p. 556)
22 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 7, para. 15; Rollo, p. 81.
23 PDAF Letter dated 25 June 2002; Rollo, p. 557.
24 “As you very well know, this property is owned by the National Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the National Power Corporation, both of which has not extended
or renewed, either expressly or impliedly, any lease [contract] involving the same in favor of any
party, private or public. This being the case, your sublease agreement with the Philippine
Development Alternative Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002 could not
possibly have been renewed or extended. We hereby advise you to completely vacate said
property within THIRTY (30) DAYS from
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
through registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property. 26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent OSG a final
notice to vacate within 15 days.27 When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again
refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to determine
the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners’ lost income—a loss arising
from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property after the expiration of the
main lease contract and sublease agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach,
the PMO determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was P10,364,000
per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of P630,123,700 from
01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
_______________
receipt of this letter.” (OSG Letter dated 22 February 2008; Rollo,
p. 558)
25 Registry Receipt No. 2826; Rollo, p. 559.
26 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 9, para. 20; Rollo, p. 83.
27 “This is in reiteration of our first letter dated February 22, 2008 demanding that you vacate
the property covered by your sublease agreements with the Philippine Development Alternative
Foundation (PDAF) which expired on December 31, 2002, or more specifically, the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. (458365) S-77242 located between De la Rosa and Arnaiz streets and parallel
to Amorsolo street in Legaspi Village, Makati City.”
“Once again, we demand that you completely vacate said property within FIFTEEN (15) days
from receipt of this letter, or we will be constrained to file the necessary legal action against you
before the proper court.” (OSG Final Notice to Vacate dated 26 January 2009; Rollo, p. 560)
28 Inspection and Appraisal Report dated 02 April 2009; Rollo, pp. 563-566.
29 “As per instruction, please see attached copy of Inspection and Appraisal Report dated
April 2, 2009 indicating a Fair Rental Value of Php 10,364,000 per month and an Income Loss of
329
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 329
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for unlawful
detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. Petitioners prayed
that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay damages
for the illegal use and lost income owing to them:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after
proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights under it, to vacate the subject
property and peacefully surrender the same, with the useful improvements therein, to
the plaintiffs or to their authorized representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to
pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS
(P630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use and occupation of the subject
property from January 1, 2003 to March 31, 2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION
 THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P10,364,000.00) per month
from April 1, 2008 until the subject property, together with its improvements, are
completely vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative.” 30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
Page | allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful
detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them. 31 In the alternative, it also
73 argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more prop-
_______________
Php 630,123,700, respectively.” (PMO letter dated 02 April 2009; Rollo, p. 562)
30 Complaint dated 26 May 2009, p. 11; Rollo, p. 85.
31 Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter) dated 07 August
2009; Rollo, pp. 90-102.
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
erly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not
the MeTC, considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the
subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and
directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’ Complaint. 32 The lower
court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration33 filed by
respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its Answer35 to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment,
respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to
assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the
jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly
prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright dismissal of the certiorari Petition of
respondent Sunvar.
_______________
32 MeTC Order dated 16 September 2009, docketed as Civil Case No. 98708; Rollo, pp. 116-
117.
33 Respondent Sunvar’s Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration (of the Order dated 16
September 2009); and (2) to Hold in Abeyance the Period to File an Answer dated 02 October
2009; Rollo, pp. 118-141.
34 MeTC Order dated 08 December 2009; Rollo, pp. 162-163.
35 Respondent Sunvar’s Verified Answer ad Cautelam dated 18 December 2009; Rollo, pp. 678-
711.
36 Thereafter, MeTC Judge Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag voluntarily inhibited himself, and
petitioners’ unlawful detainer suit was re-raffled to Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.
37 Petition for Certiorari dated 22 January 2010; Rollo, pp. 164-208.
38 Petitioners’ Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Court’s Order Issued in Open
Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18 February 2010; Rollo, pp. 255-272.
331
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 331
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was subsequently
denied by the RTC.41 Hence, the hearing on the certiorariPetition of respondent
proceeded, and the parties filed their respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the merits of
the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the MeTC to
dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of jurisdiction. 43 The RTC
reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an unlawful detainer case was
reckoned from the expiration of the main lease contract and the sublease agreements
on 31 December 2002. Petitioners should have then filed an accion publiciana with the
RTC in 2009, instead of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners. 44
_______________
39 “Thus, in view of the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in the present petition, the
Court resolves to relax the application of the rules and to proceed with the hearing on the
petitioners’ application for TRO/Injunction on March 12, 2010 at 2:00 in the afternoon.” (RTC
Order dated 08 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 273-275)
40 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated 16 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 276-295.
41 RTC Order dated 29 April 2010; Rollo, pp. 296-297.
42 Respondent Sunvar’s Memorandum dated 10 June 2010 (Rollo, pp. 805-843); Petitioners’
Memorandum dated 11 June 2010 (Rollo, pp. 844-868).
43 RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010; Rollo, pp. 62-72.
44 Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011; Rollo, pp. 25-61.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
I
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are procedural
issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of the assailed RTC
Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed themselves of a Rule 65 Petition
instead, since the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which
no appeal can be taken except by a certioraripetition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and holds that
the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly within the bounds
of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order of the RTC
dismissing an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party may file
a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are
raised or involved.47 This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
_______________
 45 Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1 (g).
46 “In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action as provided in Rule 65.” (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 1)
47 “Appeal by Certiorari—In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.” (Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2 [c]).
Page | 333
74 VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 333
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3)
by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated
to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.”49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter.50 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certiorari petition filed against the interlocutory
order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the present case is the correct
application of the Rules on Summary Pro-
_______________
48 G.R. No. 169067, 06 October 2010, 632 SCRA 338.
49 Id., at pp. 344-345.
50 Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, 27 July 2011, 654 SCRA 643,
citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA, 327 Phil. 810, 825-826; 258 SCRA 186, 199 (1996),
citing Arroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, 132 Phil. 9; 23 SCRA 525 (1968).
51 Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc, G.R. No. 143331, 05 October 2007, 535 SCRA 28.
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
cedure; or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
cognizance and granted the certioraripetition against the denial by the MeTC
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a question
of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been properly lodged
with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary
Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds that it was
erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition of respondent
Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibit this relief for
unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC
Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certioraripetition under Rule 65 against
an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited
pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough, and its further exposition is unnecessary
verbiage.53 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65
Petition, considering that it is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted
the RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of
the certiorariPetition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss
the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
_______________
52 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sec. 19 (g).
53 Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. No. 142676 & 146718, 06 June 2011, 650 SCRA 344.
54 Petitioners’ Comment (In Compliance with the Honorable Court’s Order Issued in Open
Court on February 12, 2010) dated 18 February 2010; Rollo, pp. 255-272.
55 RTC Order dated 08 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 273-275.
335
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 335
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of Appeals57 to
justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to “extraordinary circumstances” is
misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified
the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure—conditions that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case against Alberto Magdato,
an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a house over his property. When Magdato,
an illiterate farmer, received the Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10
days, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in
San Jose, Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of
Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the MCTC ruled that
it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and, hence, ordered his ejectment
from Bayog’s land. When his house was demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a
Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly
instituted tenant in the agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process.
Bayog, the landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment covering a
summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC, however, denied his Motion
to Dismiss and remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for relief from
judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice,
 _______________
56 327 Phil. 1019; 258 SCRA 378 (1996).
57 358 Phil. 214; 297 SCRA 574 (1998).
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Page | Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
75 since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury:
“We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil
Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in
light of the Jakihacaruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has
in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from
judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition,
of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial
Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules
38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no
petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate
of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case,
unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and
irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his part will
only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may
be allowed or treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular
appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of the MCTC of 20
September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged
therein and the justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without merit. xxx” (Emphasis supplied.)
58
_______________
58 327 Phil. 1019, 1040-1041; 258 SCRA 378, 397 (1996).
337
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 337
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted with a
procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that justified the resort to
a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the preliminary conference in the subject
ejectment suit was held in abeyance by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall
have been finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension
order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not
the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently
directed the MTCC to proceed with the hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was
upheld by the appellate court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court allowed the filing
of a petition for certiorariagainst an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering
that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous
suspension of a summary proceeding. Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
eloquently explained the procedural void in this wise:
“Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for “it does not
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the trial court on the merits of
the case.” It is axiomatic that an interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
Thus, it has been held that “the proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment on the meritsincorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing
the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would result in the
‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a counterproductive ping-pong to and from
the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of
its interlocutory rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.”338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory. But
neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which considers petitions
for certiorariprohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught “between Scylla
and Charybdis” in the procedural void observed by the Court of Appeals and the
RTC. Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it
with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, “the purpose of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)” Pursuant
to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other
pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of
cases. In this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC
order delayingthe ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief envisioned by the
Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary proceeding is
suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion
may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition
for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale
of the said Rules.” (Emphasis supplied.)
59
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances in these
two cases are not comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings therein are
inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As this Court explained in Bayog,
 the general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior
court from
_______________
59 358 Phil. 214, 223-225; 297 SCRA 574, 581-583 (1998).
339
Page | VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 339
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
76
cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent
Sunvar filed a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC.
Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally
not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the
agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the
general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been
deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary
judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of Appeals that
would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before the RTC. When
confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment
case, the expeditious and proper remedy for respondent should have been to proceed
with the summary hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to
a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory order in a summary ejectment
proceeding was not only prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity
on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy and available
remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary circumstances
that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions obtaining in Bayog and Go. The
Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of these two judicial precedents to
litigants in summary proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely
availed of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive determination of
an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the prohibition
against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected
parties questioning every order of the
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings
in forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful
Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present Petition—whether the
Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publicianalodged with the RTC. At the heart of the
controversy is the reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer
suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought within one
year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine whether it was
properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the one-year period should be
counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03 February 2009 of the Final Notice to
Vacate, then their Complaint was timely filed within the one-year period and
appropriately taken cognizance of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is
pegged from the expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then
petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be filed with the
RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for
unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by virtue
of any express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful
deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully
withholding possession, for restitution
341
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 341
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
of possession with damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action
of the lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written
notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and
the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days
in the case of buildings.61
In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones,62 the Court recently defined the nature and scope
of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
“Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one
who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature,
jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The
action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the
issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.
_______________
60 Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 1.
Page | 61 Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 2.
62 G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328, 334, citing Valdez, Jr. v. CA, 523 Phil. 39, 46; 489 SCRA
77 369, 376 (2006).
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment. 63
“On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words,
if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but
an accion publiciana.”64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for
an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess
the subject property from its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF.
However, with the expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent
lost possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued occupying
the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03 February 2009 that
petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to turn over the prop-
_______________
63 Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 92, 104, citing Cabrera
v. Getaruela, 586 SCRA 129, 136-137 (2009); see also Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, G.R. No. 183822, 18
January 2012 and Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 178096, 23 March 2011, 646 SCRA 328,
334-335, Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. v. Juane, G.R. Nos. 172447
& 179404, 18 September 2009, 600 SCRA 555, 562-563; Parsicha, v. Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc.,G.R.
No. 136409, 14 March 2008, 548 SCRA 273, 288; Fernando v. Spouses Lim, G.R. No. 176282, 22 August
2008, 563 SCRA 147, 159-160.
64 Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 157.
343
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 343
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
erty. What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer
suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the
one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an unlawful
detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease contract on 31 December
2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the reckoning period for
determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer. “Such one year
period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to
vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession
become unlawful.”66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date
of the last demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court, speaking through Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the one-year period to file the
_______________
65 “Hence, in the present petition, upon the expiration of the term of the sublease on
December 31, 2002, the private respondents (petitioners Republic and NPC) have one year to file
an unlawful detainer case. The complaint having been filed beyond the prescribed one year period
it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the lower court can
exercise jurisdiction as it is an accion publiciana.” (RTC Decision dated 01 December 2010, p.
10; Rollo, p. 71)
66 Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, 07 April 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 90,
citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 154; 250 SCRA 108, 116 (1995); Lopez v. David, Jr.,
G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 542; Varona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124148,
20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 577, 583-584.
67 Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 162; 287 SCRA 662 (1998), citing Sy Oh v. Garcia, 28
SCRA 735 (1969) and Calubayan v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160; 21 SCRA 146 (1967).
68 G.R. No. 141418, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 423.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
unlawful detainer Complaint—filed on 25 February 1997—from the latest
demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and not from the earlier demand letter
dated 03 July 1995:
“Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a 400-square meter
property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City whereon was constructed a
two-storey house and a three-door apartment identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to occupy
Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion publiciana because
their possession is not de facto, they having been authorized by the true and lawful
owners of the property; and that one year had elapsed from respondent’s demand
given on “July 3, 1995” when the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make out a case
for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that she is the registered
owner of the property and that petitioners, who are tenants by tolerance, refused to
vacate the premises despite the notice to vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing a
complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last demand, in this case
October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the
 premises. Thus, the filing of the complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the
one year reglementary period.” (Emphasis supplied.)
69
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired (01
January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject
property.
_______________
Page | 69 Id., at pp. 424-428.
78 345
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 345
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any
separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed
to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners—petitioners herein. Thus,
respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final
notice on 03 February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of
petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is
“necessarily bound by an implied promise” that it “will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.”70 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should
have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until
02 February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful
detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23
July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate on 22
February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period for filing an
unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to have waived their right of
action against respondent Sunvar and continued to tolerate its occupation of the subject
property. That they sent a final Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent
another opportunity to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere
tolerance. Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful
detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the nature
of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period
within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will
_______________
70 Spouses Beltran v. Nieves, G.R. No. 175561, 20 October 2010, 634 SCRA 242, 249,
citing Calubayan v. Pascual, 128 Phil. 160, 163; 21 SCRA 146, 148 (1967).
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
still be reckoned from the date of the original demand. 71 If the subsequent
demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the
one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the
first demand.72 However, respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings
below this question of fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the
OSG. It is now too late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009
Notice to Vacate was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to
Vacate. In any event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the
present Rule 45 Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the subject
property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002. The factual issue of
whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from the expiration of the sublease
to the present was never raised or sufficiently argued before this Court. Nevertheless,
it has not escaped the Court’s attention that almost a decade has passed without any
resolution of this controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject
property, contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of the case
to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the duty of the lower court
to speedily resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this case involves a
prime property of the government located in the country’s business district and the
various opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
_______________
71 Racaza v. Gozum, 523 Phil. 694; 490 SCRA 302, 315 (2006), citing Desbarats v. Laureano, 124
Phil. 704; 18 SCRA 116 (1966).
72 Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Torres, 374 Phil. 529; 316 SCRA 193 (1999), citing Pacis v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 102676, 03 February 1992, min. res., cited in Summary of 1992 Supreme Court
Rulings, Part III, by Atty. Daniel T. Martinez, p. 1847; Desbarats v. de Laureano, supra.
347
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 2012 347
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 14
February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and National Power Corporation, which
are represented here by the Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision
dated 01 December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary proceedings for the unlawful
detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
 G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002. *
TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SEVERO A. MALVAR and
TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.
Remedial Law; Ejectment; In forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building; Plaintiff must
Page |
prove and allege prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by
79 the defendant; Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.—Before
tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic legal principles. In
forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive
another of physical possession of land or building. Thus, the plaintiff must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by
the defendant. This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the
latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole question for resolution hinges on the
physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of
juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the
defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.
Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff
needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
Same; Same; The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land; After the lapse of the one-year period,
the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary
action to recover the right of possession or an accion reivindicatoria which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.—It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting
process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary
nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party
dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary
action to recover the right of
_______________
THIRD DIVISION.
*
shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult
decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or
applicable to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial
notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in
controversy. These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent,
as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice.
Same; Same; Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, exceptions.—Factual findings of trial courts,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court.
Indeed, the review of such findings is not a function that this Court normally
undertakes. However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run
contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant
facts which—if properly considered—will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there
is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence
of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record.
Same; Rule on Summary Procedure; A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings.—
Pursuant to Section 36 of B.P. 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is
a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however,
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings.
329
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 329
Bongato vs. Malvar
Same; Same; A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by
the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.—A court’s lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the
court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the

328
MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED even if an answer has been belatedly filed.
Bongato vs. Malvar
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
well as possession. of Appeals.
Same; Evidence; Generally courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
same judge, exceptions.—As a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the
Jesus Chavez for petitioner.
evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending
Angeles & Associates and Felino M. Ganal for private respondents.
in the same court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily,
an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not
PANGANIBAN, J.:
 An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature. It
is designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that are
restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within which to
bring the suit is prescribed to complement its summary nature. Thus, after the
one-year period has lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail themselves of the
Page | summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but must litigate, in the
80 normal course, in the regional trial court in an ordinary action to recover
possession, or to recover both ownership and possession.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the December 16, 1998 Decision and the September 1, 1999
1
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 34204. The
2
decretal portion of the Decision reads:
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 14-18. Penned by Justice (later Presiding Justice) Jesus M. Elbinias (Division
chairman) and concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Marina L. Buzon (members).
2Rollo, p. 19-A.
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bongato vs. Malvar
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.”3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City
(Branch 4), which had disposed thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 penned by the Honorable Santos Rod.
Cedro and the Writ of Execution issued on the 24th day of August 1993 upon order of
the Honorable Rosarito F. Dabalos (Record, p. 42, Folio II) can now be served on the
defendant.” 4
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals
as follows:
“The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against
petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato unlawfully entered a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200 belonging to the said spouses and erected
thereon a house of light materials. The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time
to file an answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing. With a new counsel,
Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed an answer which the MTCC disregarded, the
same having been filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period. Later, with still
another counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney’s Office, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss which the MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
“Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land
in question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit. The decision
was affirmed by respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
“On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for
reconsideration ‘only insofar as to determine the location of the
_______________
3 CA Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 17.
4 RTC Decision, p. 7; CA Rollo, p. 15; penned by Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.
331
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 331
Bongato vs. Malvar
houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they are located
on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in the criminal case for
Anti-Squatting.’ In the same order, respondent Judge disallowed any extension and
warned that if the survey is not made, the court might consider the same abandoned
and the writ of execution would be issued.
“The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by private
respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still pending with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.
“On March 28, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March 29, 1994
deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move the deadline to April
15, 1994, as the engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda, could not conduct his survey
during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister and parish council member.
“On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was submitted
and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin for
disposal.” (Citations omitted)
5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different
from that involved in the anti-squatting case. It further ruled that the 6
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not
err in rejecting petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned
that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property merely
to determine possession—an action that did not oust the latter of its
jurisdiction. 7
Unsatisfied with the CA Decision, petitioner lodged this Petition. 8
_______________
5 Assailed Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
6 CA Decision, p. 3; id., p. 16.
7 Id., pp. 4 & 17.
 8The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 24, 2001, upon the Court’s receipt of
respondents’ Comment/Opposition to Motion for Restraining Order. Respondents’
Memorandum, submitted earlier on June 15, 2001, was signed by Attys. Manuel B. Beaniza, Jr.
and Aceray C. Pacheco. Petitioner’s Memorandum, filed on March 15, 2001, was signed by Atty.
She avers that in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting, Respondent
Severo Malvar alleged in his Sworn Statement that petitioner had illegally
entered his land “sometime in the first week of January 1987.” 11

Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney’s Office, Butuan City. On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the anti-squatting case
332 is different from the parcel of land involved here. 12

Page | 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic legal
81 principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
Bongato vs. Malvar stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building. Thus, the plaintiff
13

Issues must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s deprived thereof by the defendant. This requirement implies that the possession of the
14

consideration: disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole question for
15

resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the

I property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment
of ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking
16

“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not finding that cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of
17

the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed beyond the one-year ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de factoand undue
period from date of alleged entry; deprivation thereof. 18

Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented
in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or
II
before the same
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
_______________
the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.” 9

This Court’s Ruling sons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
The Petition is meritorious. costs.”
Annex “A”; Rollo, p. 153.
First Issue:
11

12Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 16; Rollo, p. 179.

MTCC Jurisdiction
Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint
for forcible entry was filed only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period
13Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 242, January 16, 1997.
14Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 691.
Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631.
15

16Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 220,
provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 10
March 4, 1996.
17Diu v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, January 19, 2000.
_______________ 18Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 274 SCRA 540, June 20, 1997.
334
9 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 145; original in upper case. 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
10 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, Bongato vs. Malvar
a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot
19

or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or refer to the record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record
implied or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other
20

time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable
or any person or per to the case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial
21

333 notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 333 controversy. These cases “may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly
22

Bongato vs. Malvar interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial notice. 23

 Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of such findings is not
a function that this Court normally undertakes. However, this Rule is not absolute; it
24
admits of exceptions, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual
Page | findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go
82 beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case,
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which—if properly considered—will justify a
different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record. 25
_______________
19Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 167, March 19,
1993; Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650, May 6, 1991.
20Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd edition, 1999, p. 26.
21Ibid.
22Figueras v. Serrano, 52 Phil. 28, September 3, 1928.
23Francisco, Basic Evidence, supra, citing 31 CJS 623-624, 1964.
24Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc,306 SCRA 762, May 5,
1999; Inland Trailways, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,255 SCRA 178, March 18, 1996.
25Halili v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465, March 12, 1998; Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
703, February 26, 1997; Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494, July 5, 1993; Lacanilao v. Court
of Appeals, 262
335
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 335
Bongato vs. Malvar
Respondents in the present Petition filed three cases against petitioner: (1)
Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D. No. 772 (filed on October 2, 1991),
26
in which petitioner was acquitted on the ground of good faith; (2) Civil Case
No. 5681 for forcible entry (filed on July 10, 1992) which was resolved by the
MTCC on October 26, 1992. (3) Criminal Case No. 5734 for Violation of P.D.
27
No. 1096 (filed on July 15, 1993), wherein petitioner was again acquitted.
28
We agree with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. RT-16200 and registered under the name of Severo Malvar, is different from
29
Lot 1 which is covered by TCT No. RT-15993 and registered under the name of Severo
30
Malvar also. However, we cannot ignore the Decision dated April 30, 1996 in Criminal
31
Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D. 772; or the Decision dated November 26, 1997 in
32
Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of P.D. 1096. The property involved in these two
criminal cases and in the instant case for forcible entry is one and the same—
petitioner’s house.
The allegation of petitioner that there is only one house involved in these three
cases has not been controverted by respondents. Neither was there evidence presented
to prove that, indeed, she had constructed one house on Lot 1 and another on Lot 10-A.
On the contrary, she correctly points out that the house involved in these three cases is
found on one and the same location. Verily, in
_______________
SCRA 486, September 26, 1996; Verendia v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 417, June 22, 1993.
26Penalizing Squatting and other similar acts, August 20, 1975.
27See MTCC Decision, pp. 1-4; Rollo, pp. 155-158, penned by Judge Santos Rod. Cedro.
Adopting a National Building Code of the Philippines Thereby Revising Republic Act
28
Numbered Sixty-Five Hundred Forty-One, February 19, 1977.
29Annex “1”; Rollo, p. 186.
30Annex “2”; ibid., p. 187.
31RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 4659, pp. 1-14; Rollo, pp. 52-65, penned by Judge Cipriano
B. Alvizo, Jr.
32RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, pp. 1-15; id., pp. 78-92, penned by Judge Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen.
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bongato vs. Malvar
his Sworn Statement submitted in Criminal Case No. 4659, Respondent
33
Severo Malvar stated that petitioner’s house was “located in front of the
Museum and just behind the City Hall.” On the other hand, in the
Complaint for forcible entry, the subject property was said to be “located
34
along Doongan Road and right in front of the Regional National Museum and
not far behind the City Hall of Butuan City.” Lastly, the Decision in Criminal 35
Case No. 5734 stated that the building inspector, Engineer Margarita Burias,
had “responded to a verbal complaint involving a structure built near the
Museum in Upper Doongan, Butuan City.”
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioner’s contention
that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.
First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by petitioner on Lot 10-A
covered by TCT No. 16200. This allegation is belied by the sketch plan dated June 16,
36
1994, submitted by Engineer Regino A. Lomarda, Jr. To recall, in an Order dated
37
March 4, 1994, the RTC had required petitioner to submit a relocation survey of Lot 10-
A to determine the location of the house and to ascertain if it was the same house
involved in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting. However, because of the Holy
Week, petitioner failed to submit the relocation survey within the period provided by
the RTC. In the said sketch plan that was offered in evidence as Exhibit “5” in the anti-
squatting case, Engineer Lomarda, Jr. certified that “the hut of Teresita Bongato is not
within Lot 10-A as shown in this plan as relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT
No. RT-1576 of Benjamin Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo
Malvar.”
Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioner’s house is
actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land previously covered by TCT No. RT-15993
and subject of the anti-squatting case. The RTC Judge in said case ruled:
 _______________ Bongato vs. Malvar
Petitioner’s Memorandum, Annex “A”; Rollo, p. 153.
33
ing your property consisting of 348 square meters. What did
Records, p. 1.
34
you do upon discovering that the accused already occupied a
RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, p. 2; Rollo, p. 79.
portion of your property without your knowledge?
35

Rollo, p. 116.
36

Page | Records, p. 129.

37
83 337
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 337
Bongato vs. Malvar
“The lot on which accused’s house is standing was formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983 in the name of Severo Malvar,
and superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-24589 dated December 3, 1991
in the name of Butuan Land Developers Group, Inc.” 38
Third, petitioner’s house had actually been in existence prior to February 1992,
the alleged date of illegal entry. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation
of P.D. 1096, the RTC Judge opined as follows:
“Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had constructed or for that
A I want to demolish her house. I told her that I am the owner of
the land and she is looking for the 1/4 hectare that was not
sold by her father to me.
“Q And upon being informed by Teresita Bongato that they were
looking for the 1/4 hectare lot which was not sold to you by
her father, what did you say to her?
A I told her to remove her house. Then after that, I was so busy
with the squatters along Satorre Street of the Malvar Village
that kept me so busy. It was only last year that we were able
to attend to this.” 41

matter was constructing the questioned house in February of 1992, since it was never It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the
stated that when the complaint was lodged with the City Engineer’s Office, that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such
house occupied by the accused was under construction or under renovation. The fact process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
42

that Engr. Burias even admitted that she had no knowledge of when the structure was forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
built implicitly indicates that the same was completely erected or constructed before However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is
Engr. Burias’ visit, or even for that matter, before the complaint was filed.”
39

counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-
43

That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and that she
had merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the Decision, which we
quote:
“Suffice it to state, however, that We are convinced, given the testimonial evidence
year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or
an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession. 44

offered that the house in question was not built by the accused, but by her father,
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible
Jacinto Bongato sometime in 1935; that accused merely lived in the house as a member
entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for
of Jacinto Bongato’s family until the death of her parents, whereupon, she continued to
ejectment on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land,
45

reside in the said house and now claims to be its owner.” 40

possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of

Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659 that he
petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than
had knowledge of petitioner’s house since January 1987. We quote from his
testimony: _______________
“Q Earlier, Judge Malvar, you told this Honorable Court that you
TSN, June 23, 1992, p. 18.
discovered sometime in January 1987, the accused was occupy 41

De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 728, April 18, 1997.

42

Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143173, March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 691.
43

_______________ Gener v. De Leon, G.R. No. 130730, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 631; Serdoncillo v.
44

Benolirao, 297 SCRA 448, October 8, 1998; De Leon v. Court of Appeals (Special Second Division), 245
RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 4659, pp. 9-10; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
38
SCRA 166, June 19, 1995.
RTC Decision, Criminal Case No. 5734, p. 11; Rollo, p. 88.
39
Ibid.
45

Id., pp. 14 & 91.

40
339
338
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 339
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bongato vs. Malvar
 one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in
46 (a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for forcible
47
failure to comply with the preceding section;
xxx xxx x x x”
entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear
Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived
and decide it. 48

Page | Second by the parties or cured by their silence, acquies-

Issue:
84
Motion to Dismiss _______________
Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is allowed under Sec. 56 SEC. 36. Summary procedure in special cases.—In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
Trial Courts with at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches
19 (a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. We agree. 49

thereof to try exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to achieve “an traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental law, and such other cases requiring
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.” The speedy resolution of
50
summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt
unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and the Rule should equally apply
51
special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditious and
with full force to forcible entry cases, in which possession of the premises is already inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures
illegal from the start. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
52 may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6 was added that the periods of filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.”
to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu proprio,upon the failure 57 Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
Resolution of the Court En Banc Providing for the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special
of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period. However, as forcible
58
53

Cases Before Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
entry and detainer cases are summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social Courts as Amended. Effectivity, August 1, 1983.
order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be
54
59 Court En Banc Resolution dated October 15, 1991, “Providing for the Revised Rule on
allowed to override substantial justice. 55
Summary Procedure for Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.” Effectivity, November 15, 1991.
_______________ 341
VOL. 387, AUGUST 14, 2002 341
Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, September 23, 1992.
Bongato vs. Malvar
46

Ibid.
47

Gener v. De Leon, supra.

48 cence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court
60

Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 149.

49
over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the 61

Section 36, BP 129; Rule on Summary Procedure.

MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
50

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Generoso, 249 SCRA 477, October 25, 1995.
51

Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 274 SCRA 540, June 20, 1997.

52
jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held
Ibid.
53 in Bayog v. Natino: 62

Salvador v. Salamanca, 144 SCRA 276, September 24, 1986.

54
“The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not
Dakudao v. Consolacion, 122 SCRA 877, June 24, 1983.
55
provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from
340 the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO’s defense
Bongato vs. Malvar of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception
to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such
Pursuant to Section 36 of B.P. 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated
56 57

a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.”

the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion
58

to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
59
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of jurisdiction,
instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed on July 10,
63

jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable.
pleadings: Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioner’s Answer, in which 64

“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following pleadings, motions, or she averred that she had been “in constant occupation on said land in question since
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule: birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present, being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-
 Bongato, who inherited said property from her father Raymundo Eva with
considerable improvements thereon.” It should have heard and received the evidence
adduced by the parties for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it
possessed jurisdiction over the subject matter. And after such hearing, it could have
65

dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this way, the long,
66

Page |
_______________
85
60Duero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11; citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453, May 31, 1978.
61De Leon v. Court of Appeals (Special Second Division), supra.
62258 SCRA 378, July 5, 1996; per Davide, C.J.
63Ibid.
64Answer, p. 1; Records, p. 15.
65Bayog v. Natino, supra.
66Ibid.
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Pastrana
drawn out proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided. 67

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision ANNULLED

and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman) and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.
 G.R. No. 116192. November 16, 1995. *
reivindicatoria.—To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint
Actions; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; Ejectment; Jurisdiction of the court, as
must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
well as the nature of the action, is determined by the averments in the complaint.—The chief
Page | testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
86 ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in
nature of the action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. Accordingly,
the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
the issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the facts averred in the complaint reveals that the
cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same
action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a
for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.—If private respondent
boundary dispute, the same must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.—A careful reading
is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully
of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present
the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria,
involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the
and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer
issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square meters involved.
or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Forcible Entry” and “Unlawful
cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession
Detainer,”Distinguished.—Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct
of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This
actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is
is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or
deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession 110
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the Same; Same; Same; Same; In giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and
expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s possession.—We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and
cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires the parties
_________________ to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to invoke the decision of a court
of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership.
*SECOND DVISION.
109
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 109
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What determines the cause of action—whether De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for petitioner.
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer—is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land.—What David C. Paguio for private respondent.
determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the
entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year
therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
REGALADO, J.:
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand. The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 reversing the decision of the regional trial
1

entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying herein petitioner’s
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
 motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by
herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein
petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Trial Court of
Page | Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint alleges
87 these material facts:
xxx
1. 2.That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-
A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT
No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa,
________________
1Penned by Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, with Justices Eduardo G. Montenegro and Lourdes K.
Tayao-Jaguros concurring.
111
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 111
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
1. Bataan, containing an area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is
hereto attached as Annex “A” hereof and for taxation purposes, the same is
declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax declaration is
hereto attached as Annex “B” of this complaint;
2. 3.That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo
Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the defendant where a
house was constructed thereon;
3. 4.That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it
was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching
on her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the relocation sketch by said
surveyor is hereto attached as Annex “C” hereof;
4. 5.That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to
remove the old fence so that she could construct a new fence which will
cover the true area of her property, the defendant vehemently refused to let
the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff
remove(d) the said fence to construct a new one, she would take action
against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;
5. 6.For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing
the fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;
6. 7.That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of
Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa
turned futile, as evidenced by a certification to file action issued by the
Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy of the
certification to file action is hereto attached as Annex “D” hereof;
7. 8.Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she
is poor but nevertheless she consulted the undersigned counsel and a
demand letter was sent to the defendant for conference and/or settlement
but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence,
thus depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of
her lot (71 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for
several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex
“E” of this complaint;
8. 9.That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to
have the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of
the possession and she was forced to hire the services of counsel for which
she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until
the termination of this case before
112
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
this Honorable Court. 2
xxx
On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the
defendant therein an extension of five days within which to file her answer to
the complaint. This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that
3
Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of
motions for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other
papers. Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her “Answer with
4
Motion to Dismiss.” Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion reiterating her
5
contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion
was barred for the reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to
file an answer is a prohibited pleading. On February 4, 1993, the trial court,
6
finding merit in plaintiff’s ex parte motion, ordered that defendant’s answer be
stricken from the records for having been filed out of time. The case was then
7
submitted for decision.
On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, with the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, ordering the latter:
1. 1.To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing
the plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and (to) make the
necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein plaintiff containing
an area of 280 square meters, more or less;
2. 2.Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as
attorney’s fees. No pronouncement as to damages;
3. 3.To pay the cost(s) of this suit. (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)
8
 ______________ 114
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2Rollo, 55-57.
3Ibid., 58. Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
4Ibid., 59-60. On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP
5Ibid., 61-67. No. 32263 reversing the decision of the regional trial court and reinstating
13

Page | Ibid., 68.

that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition.
6

88 7Ibid., 69.
8Ibid., 70-71. The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had
113 jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 113 of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals averments in the complaint. Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only
14

Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the
same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2,
1993. 9
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5,
in Civil Case No. DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a
quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered judgment, stating
in part as follows:
A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries
led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide the instant appealed case based on (the) reason that the said case should be
one of question of ownership or accion rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible
entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed
lot as required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the
plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said
that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the
plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.
This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant
considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and
academic.” (Corrections in parentheses ours.)
10
be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in
the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein
private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor
of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must
be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the
disputed 71 square meters involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from
the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in
actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession. 15

Therein plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration having been denied in said

lower court’s order dated August 12, 1993, she elevated the case to the
11
________________
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on
13 Ibid., id., 130-139.
pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil action 14 Ganadin vs. Ramos, et al., L-23547, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 613; Del Castillo vs.
for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for proper Aguinaldo, et al., G.R. No. 57127, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 169; Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals,
determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. et al., G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.
129. 12
15 Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, et al., ante.
115
________________ VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 115
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
Ibid., 72.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the
9

10 Ibid., 98.
11 Ibid., 115. land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
12 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32263, 79. intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
 entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of
unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the
last demand. 16
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner’s
alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It
Page | does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and constructed the house
89 and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner’s possession
became legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the
fence. The complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by petitioner is
owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that said lot is enclosed
by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent
lot belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said
fence was already in existence on that lot at the time private respondent
bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey was made that it
was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former.
Consequently, there is here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner
and private respondent as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer.
Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed portion of said lot
was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner’s possession
of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that fact was never
alleged in the former’s basic complaint, and this argument was raised in her
later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue that
private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then
aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one
_______________
Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., L-22984, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1257.
16
116
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
to be recovered. 17
Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave
rise to the ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right
authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the Rules. If
a period of one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is
filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor is
deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.If a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number
of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession,
plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon a
plea of tolerance to prevent prescription from setting in—and summarily
throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we
bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is
but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 18
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such
a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court
19
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. 20
________________
Muñoz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA
17
216.
Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al., supra, citing Monteblanco vs. The Hinigaran Sugar
18
Plantation, Inc., et al., 63 Phil. 797 (1936).
36A C.J.S., Forcible Entry & Detainer, Sec. 39, p. 1002.
19
Ind—Boxley vs. Collins, 4 Blackf. 320; Me.—Treat vs. Brent, 51 Me. 478.
20
117
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 117
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. 21
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this
suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court
in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal
trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession of
 the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not
obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by
the rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry and
Page | unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact
90 has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. 22

On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to

pass upon the other issues raised in the petition at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is

_______________

Sarona, et al. vs. Villegas, et al.; Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.
21

Dizon vs. Concina, et al., L-23756, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 897; Manlapaz, et al. vs.
22

Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 39430, December 3, 1990, 191 SCRA 795.
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De Guzman
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is
REINSTATED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., On leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
 G.R. No. 169380. November 26, 2012.*
FIORELLO R. JOSE, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO
BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY
BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY
BORJA, BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO
Page | CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ,
91 RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS,
GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA,
EDUARDO EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING,
NARCING GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN
LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE
NOLASCO, REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO
PACATE, CONRADO PAMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, ROSARIO UBALDO, SERGIO VILLAR, JOHN
DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II,
Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases; Unlawful
detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be
filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied.—Unlawful detainer is a summary action for
the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of
the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on
account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the
contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.
Same; Same; Same; In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the
defendant’s subsequent refusal.—In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the
respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or
legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes illegal
only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the
defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the
defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written
by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of
possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date. 325
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 325
Jose vs. Alfuerto
Same; Same; Same; A case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must definitely
establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask
itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year
prescription period from the time of forcible entry.—As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v.
Villegas, et al., 22 SCRA 1257 (1968), we already ruled that a complaint which fails to
positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy
the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance
must definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case
for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to
be filed beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible
entry: A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start
of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge
to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in
the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.
If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of
years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to
the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Theory of the Case; Cause of Action; A party cannot
change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing
court.—It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause
of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses
not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the
issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to the adverse party, who had no
opportunity to present evidence in connection with the new theory; this would offend
the basic rules of due process and fair play.
 Sales; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; An action for forcible entry cannot be treated
as an accion publiciana; The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.—In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 611 (2007),
we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and
summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also applicable to an
Page | unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics: On the issue of
whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in
92 the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should
be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property,
while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real
property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical
possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the
better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is
filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied] The cause of action in ejectment is different
from that in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought
before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not
processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.
Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious
327
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 327
Jose vs. Alfuerto
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and
continuing his possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of
possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the
community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands
and seize the property by force and violence.—Because they only resolve issues of
possession de facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for
the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are
plenary actions. The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy
and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from
unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would take to
properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally
deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force
and violence. An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the
purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fiorello R. Jose for petitioner.
Luisito Lopez for respondents.
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision1 dated March
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court).
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of
Appeals’ decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 77, by dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s
complaint for ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado
Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo
Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro
Calagos, Alex Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana
Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera,
Rogelio Estrera, Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing,
Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon
Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding
Orcullo, Felicisimo Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos,
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe and
Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioner’s cause of
action was not for unlawful detainer but for recovery of possession. The
appellate court affirmed this decision in its resolution of August 22, 2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters,
located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in
1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract
of lease was neither notarized nor registered with the Parañaque City Registry of
Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 36-37.
3 Id., at pp. 180-181.
4 Id., at pp. 178-179.
329
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 329
Jose vs. Alfuerto
 That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period
upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any
occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to
evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses
that may be incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood
Page | however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all
damages that [may be] recovered from the occupants[.] (Underscore ours)
5
93 Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease
contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract,
the petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30
days and that they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the
property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the
petitioner filed an ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the
Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11344.7 In this complaint, no
mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then brought the
dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to File
Action
_______________
5 Id., at p. 56.
6 Id., at pp. 182-228.
7 Id., at p. 163.
8 CA Rollo, pp. 162-184, 209. The records do not state when the conciliation meeting occurred.
Nevertheless, the respondents did not dispute that the conciliation meeting took place during the
MeTC proceedings, nor appear to have raised this as a ground for dismissal in their Amended
Answer. However, in their Memorandum before the Court of Appeals, they stated that a
conciliation meeting between the proper parties did not take place; it is unclear whether they were
saying that no meeting between Chua Sing and the respondents took place or that no conciliation
meeting between the petitioner and the respondents occurred. The CA did not resolve this
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
on March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint,
incorporating the proceedings before the barangay before the summons and
copies of the complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that as
lessee of the subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully
occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot,
have defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law
whatsoever, much less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance
of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor. 12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents
failed to vacate the property without legal justification. He prayed that the
court order the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to pay him not less
than P41,000.00 a month from May 30, 1999 until they vacate the premises; and
(3) to pay him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. 13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in
possession of the land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that
the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to
possess the land. The respondents also pre-
_______________
issue, and no petition was filed before the Supreme Court by either party raising this issue,
even if the respondents again raise it in their Memorandum before the Court.
9 CA Rollo, pp. 162-184.
10 Motion to Admit Amended Complaint dated March 22, 2000. Records, volume I, p. 93.
11 Rollo, pp. 227-230.
12 Id., at p. 175.
13 Id., at p. 176.
331
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 331
Jose vs. Alfuerto
sented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R.
Dulfo in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the
case as the issue deals with ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They also
filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing of a baseless
and malicious suit.
After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were
submitted, the MeTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision15 of
January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land
and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance. It further noted that the
respondents could no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already
been settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the annulment/cancellation of
Chua Sing’s title before the RTC, Branch 260, of Parañaque City, which ruled that the
registered owner’s title was genuine and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not
divested of jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents’ assertion of
ownership of the property. On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to
vacate the premises and to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each pay
P500.00 per month from the date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises;
and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that no
legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by tolerance,
“where the possession of the defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the
complaint[,] there can be no tolerance.”16
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 232-239.
15 Id., at pp. 137-141.
16 Id., at p. 44.
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Jose vs. Alfuerto II
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision on
17
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE
October 8, 2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment was proper. The BASED ON RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS
petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file the ejectment complaint; the respondents COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE
occupied the land by mere tolerance and their possession became unlawful upon the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT.
Page | petitioner’s demand to vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the III
complaint for ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or within one year after the WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON
94 THE MERITS TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION
unlawful deprivation took place. It cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et
al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a case for unlawful detainer was OF JUSTICE. 24

_______________
appropriate.
21 Id., at p. 33.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It 22 CA Rollo, pp. 258-264.
ruled that the respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his 23 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful 24 Id., at p. 7.
possessor when another occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the 334
owner by reason of familiarity or neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that 334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the respondents unlawfully entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry
into the property) was not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful detainer.
Jose vs. Alfuerto
The respondents’ allegation that they had been in possession of the land before the
petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding. Having been in The Court’s Ruling
possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not be evicted
through an ejectment case. We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings Unlawful detainer is not the proper
where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession remedy for the present case.
of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
_______________ remedy.
17 Id., at pp. 126-136. Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
18 150 Phil. 166; 43 SCRA 136 (1972). property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
19 116 Phil. 1105; 6 SCRA 785 (1962).
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
20 Supra note 1.
333 expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract,
express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 333 legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
Jose vs. Alfuerto implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s possession became illegal
accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract of when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land. The expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the defendant
dispositive part of the decision reads: refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8, from the unlawful withholding of possession.25
2003 of the RTC, Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
and SET ASIDE and the amended complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED. 21
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful
denied in its resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not
before us the following issues: have jurisdiction over the case.26
_______________
I
25 Estate of Soledad Manantan v. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 81, 89-90.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 26 Id., at p. 90; Canlas v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 147, 156.
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL 335
DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND THEREFORE
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 335
DISMISSIBLE.
 Jose vs. Alfuerto
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in
support of his unlawful detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and registered
in [the] lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.
xxxx
Page | 6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his name.
95
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have defiantly erected
their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit
as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff referred the
matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants to vacate
the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes “C”
to “QQ[.]”
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to vacate the
premises without valid or legal justification. 27 (emphasis ours)
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of
the defendant was originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner
through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was
unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful
detainer case, the
_______________
27 Rollo, pp. 80-81.
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
defendant’s possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for
the defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal.
In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as
unlawful even before the formal demand letters were written by the
petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of
possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as
the alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents
occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint
nor any supporting evidence on record, however, shows when the respondents entered
the property or who had granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations
and evidence, the bare claim regarding “tolerance” cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s
definition and characterizes “tolerance” in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are “those which by
reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or
benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.” He adds that: “[t]hey
are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or
friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land,
tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well.” And, Tolentino continues,
even though “this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription.” Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: “There is tacit
consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By
virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license,
_______________
28 131 Phil. 365, 372; 22 SCRA 1257, 1264-1265 (1968).
337
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 337
Jose vs. Alfuerto
acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence
or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must
have been present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and
should be dismissed.29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a
complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the
claim that the defendant’s possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the
complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject property was unlawful from the
very beginning. The Court then ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when
a complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged
tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: “(1)
[defendant] immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by [the plaintiff]; and (2) [the respondent’s] allegedly illegal
occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.” The Court expressed its qualms
over these averments of fact as they did not contain anything substantiating the claim
that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of the property by the
defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, [plaintiff’s] theory that its cause
of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
_______________
29 Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, 457 Phil. 603, 610; 410 SCRA 484, 490 (2003); and Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 185; 362 SCRA 755, 767 (2001).
30 499 Phil. 64, 70; 460 SCRA 68, 72 (2005).
31 Supra note 29, at p. 611.
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
arguments advance the view that [defendant’s] occupation of the property was
unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that [plaintiff’s] supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.
 As the bare allegation of [plaintiff’s] tolerance of [defendant’s] occupation of the
premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the
beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for
forcible entry—an action that had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint
was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases
Page | is reckoned from the date of [defendant’s] actual entry into the land, which in this case
was on April 24, 1998. 32
96 Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack of
knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation
that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant
of permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of
tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence
was “totally wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged
tolerance came about.” It stated that:
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second.
If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of
years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe.
No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
_______________
36 Supra note 28, at pp. 371-372; p. 1264.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action. (italics supplied)
37

Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the
possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up respondents of possession over a property that they have held for at least eight years
to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding, simply because
possession only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the the petitioner used the word “tolerance” without sufficient allegations or evidence to
issuance of said title presupposes their having been in possession of the property at support it.
one time or another. 35
There was no change in the respon-
_______________ dents’ theory during the appeal that
32 Ibid.
33 Supra note 29, at p. 186; p. 767.
would amount to a deprivation of the
34 532 Phil. 714, 721; 501 SCRA 278, 286-287 (2006). petitioner’s right to due process.
35 Ibid. The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC
339 the fact that their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the respondents
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 339 allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s
predecessor is not the true owner of the property in question; (3) the petitioner’s lease
Jose vs. Alfuerto contract was not legally enforceable; (4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest;
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical possession of the property;
claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved. and (6) the respondents’ right of possession was based on the “Deed of Assignment of
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a Real Property” executed by Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely
complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative on appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes a change of theory, which is
of permission to occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal disallowed on appeal.38
for a case for unlawful detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
detainer alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the start of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses
unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal, change
prescription period from the time of forcible entry: _______________
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms 37 Id., at p. 373; p. 1265.
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start 38 Rollo, pp. 11-14.
of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful 341
detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 341
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge
to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in
Jose vs. Alfuerto
the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be unfair to
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in connection
 with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical possession of the property where
play.39 DEFENDANTS have already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not RODOLFO CHUA SING got his fake title to the property[.] (citation omitted)
42

applicable to the present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their
petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the essential requirements of an unlawful possession was based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf
Page | detainer case. In Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that: of the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they considered the
97 In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their transactions on the
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a property, and could not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the _______________
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are 41 Rollo, pp. 5, 95, 163.
summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the 42 CA Rollo, p. 147.
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or 343
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 343
when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
Jose vs. Alfuerto
reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required
respondents before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the
to properly allege and prove when the respondents entered the property and that it
was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other persons, who granted the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he belatedly states for the first time
respondents permission to enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the in his Memorandum44before this Court that his lessor had tolerated the respondents’
respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the case but the petitioner’s contradictory occupancy of the lot, without addressing the respondents’ allegation that they had
occupied the lot in 1970, before the petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property
statements
_______________ in 1991, and without providing any other details. His pleadings continued to insist on
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 535 Phil. 481, 489-490; 504 the existence of tolerance without providing the factual basis for this conclusion. Thus,
SCRA 484, 495 (2006); Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934-935; 406 SCRA we cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in anyway deprived the petitioner of
88, 96 (2003); and Olympia Housing, Inc. v. Panasiatic Travel Corporation, 443 Phil. 385, 399-400; 395 due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the case based on the issue of
SCRA 298, 309 (2003). tolerance.
40 358 Phil. 83, 95; 297 SCRA 448, 459 (1998). The Court cannot treat an eject-
342
ment case as an accion publiciana
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED or accion reivindicatoria.
Jose vs. Alfuerto The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an accion
in his amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.41 publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as requiring
Although the respondents did not use the word “tolerance” before the MeTC, they him to properly refile the case serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45
have always questioned the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance. In their Answer to The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an
Amended Complaint, the respondents negated the possibility of their possession of the ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These cases
property under the petitioner and his lessor’s tolerance when the respondents alleged are not interchangeable and their differences constitute far more than mere
to have occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired the property in 1991. technicalities.
They said as much in their Position Paper: In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed treated as an accion publiciana
property, as when he became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property described _______________
43 Rollo, pp. 3-17, 88-92, 173-177.
in TCT No. 52594, the property had already been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS
44 Id., at pp. 95-111.
since late 1970. Therefore, DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the 45 Id., at p. 16.
property from where they are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE 46 G.R. No. 153914, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 611, 620.
of a property with a dubious title. The main thing to be proven in the case at bar is prior 344
possession and that the same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and 344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or even
ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor herein Jose vs. Alfuerto
 and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also
applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant
characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion
publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First,
Page | forcible entry should be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the
real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of
98
the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the
physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation
is the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry
is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper
inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, notpossession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are not
processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of
ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47
Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are
summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions. 48 The purpose of
allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary
proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing
an
_______________
47 A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 833, 841-842;
298 SCRA 349, 356 (1998); and Spouses Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, 1004; 258 SCRA
347, 363 (1996).
48 Custodio v. Corrado, 479 Phil. 415, 427; 435 SCRA 500, 510 (2004).
345
VOL. 686, NOVEMBER 26, 2012 345
Jose vs. Alfuerto
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his
possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue
of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace
and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of
possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and
violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for
the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran
v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals51 describes in detail how
these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law
is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted
right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees
fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first acquired possession should
remain in possession pending [the] decision; and the parties cannot be permitted
meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is
the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security
and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the
owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a
court of competent jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading the property
and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting
an [action] to try the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to
simply file ejectment cases
_______________
49 Spouses Refugia v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, at p. 1007; p. 367.
50 37 Phil. 752, 761 (1918).
51 G.R. No. 130841, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 532, 540-541.
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jose vs. Alfuerto
instead of plenary actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings
cases which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because
these “summary” proceedings will have to tackle complicated issues requiring
extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious and would no longer
serve the purpose for which they were created. Indeed, we cannot see how the
resulting congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the
utter lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and preserving
property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.),** Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
 G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005. *
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.
Actions; Land Registration; Reconveyance and Reversion;Words and Phrases; The
essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been
Page | wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its right-ful owner or to one
with a better right.—The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC
99
prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor.
Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the subject
property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that “[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that the
decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.” Indeed, in
an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back
to the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine.—Reversion, on the other
hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the
action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; “Legal Standing” and “In-terest,” Explained; Every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one “who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.”—Under Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit.” Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest
in
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Caro vs. Sucaldito
the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Free Patents; A mere applicant for a free patent, hence not
the owner of the disputed property, cannot be considered as a party-in-interest with personality
to file an action for reconveyance.—A suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must
be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property
but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest
with personality to file an action for reconveyance. The Court, citing several of its
holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v. Cezar as follows: . . . Thus, in Lucas
v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed
by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and,
consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a
certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the
government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of
a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of
Alivio[104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant,
was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may bring the action for reversion.—This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail
v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., a case on all fours with the present
one, as follows: Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General
or the officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently,
Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would have the effect of
cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality from
Sumail. He does not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application
for a free patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part
of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that
lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if
597
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 597
Caro vs. Sucaldito
the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not
automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others
who may apply for the same.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rey G. Canindo for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503,
1
affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15529 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
 Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160 finality of this decision to file an appropriate public land application otherwise he shall
from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953.
2 lose his preferential right thereto.
The said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of SO ORDERED.” 5

Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares.

_______________
Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor
Page | Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512
4Id., at p. 432.
100 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a 5Records, p. 432.
Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
3 599
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 599
Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1, Caro vs. Sucaldito
Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City,
_______________
docketed as MNR Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in an
1Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes Order dated June 29, 1982, on the ground of failure to file an appeal
6

and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring. memorandum within the reglementary period therefor.
2Records, p. 301. On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed
3Id., at p. 302. an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued Free
7

598
Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito then filed
Caro vs. Sucaldito a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was
8

covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The granted in an Order dated May 7, 1984.
9

application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito
10

6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered a Decision canceling the said 4

for “Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership
application, thusly: and/or Possession with Damages” before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed
“This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of Calaya, Nueva an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and
11

Valencia, Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of Melchor Caro. had been in possession of the same “since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in
In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he
the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously.” He
acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought the
further alleged that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name
land from Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in 1953. On the other hand, protestant De la Cruz
testified that the land in controversy was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that the corresponding land taxes
that he thereafter occupied, possessed and improved the land by planting coconut had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had actually
trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in been divided into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito
question. had actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two
Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was actually sold to kilometers away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence
Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessor’s Lot No. 160. The description proving his ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of
and physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different and distinct from Lot No. Lands did not award it to him.
4512, the land in question. This could be clearly seen in the Certified True Copy of the
Sketch Plan from the Assessor’s Office of Assessor’s Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan _______________
marked as Exhibit “9” of the Respondent-Applicant. It has been established that
Assessor’s Lot No. 160 corresponds to Lot No. 4511 and not Lot No. 4512 claimed by 6 Id., at pp. 447-449.
the protestant. Moreover, Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified that what he 7 Id., at p. 452.
sold to Gregorio Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question. 8 Id., at pp. 458-460.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A. No. (VI- 9 Id., at pp. 461-463.
1)8548 of applicant-respondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is, cancelled. Protestant 10 Records, pp. 1-4.
Deogracias de la Cruz if qualified, is given one hundred twenty (120) days from the 11 Id., at pp. 16-20.
 600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Caro vs. Sucaldito
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject
lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right
Page |
whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a “trustee of a constructive trust,”
101 she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner. The complaint
contained the following prayer:
“WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. 1.Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the Bureau of Lands,
the free patent and the Original Certificate of Title No. F-27162 or in the
alternative;
2. 2.Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event she wrests
possession from plaintiff then, also the possession of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre, back to plaintiff;
3. 3.Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512 PLS-775 of
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the issuance of a free
patent or a torrens title in favor of plaintiff;
4. 4.Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P2,000.00 as expenses on litigation plus
exemplary damages in an amount at the discretion of this Court.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.”
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special affirmative
defense, the fact that she intervened in the proceedings on Caro’s application
for a free patent over Lot No. 4512 before the Bureau of Lands having bought
the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary to the allegations of the
petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one and the same lot, as per the
findings of the Bureau of Lands.
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective claims.
In a Decision dated December 7, 1993, the
13
_______________
Records, p. 20.
12
Id., at pp. 523-533.
13
601
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 601
Caro vs. Sucaldito
trial court ruled in favor of the respondent and dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff is dismissed. The
counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the filing of the complaint, is
likewise dismissed.
Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.” 14
Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, the trial court
15
ruled that Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the
free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the
Solicitor General. It held that “an applicant for a free patent who is not the
owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land,
for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through
administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act,” or Commonwealth
16
Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a
rival-applicant for a free patent over the same land was through
administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds
in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the
owner of the land in dispute. 17
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caro’s claims, the evidence
clearly showed that Lot No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters, was
not included in Assessor’s Lot No. 160, thus:
Assessor’s Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area of around 17
hectares, more or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we add Lot 4512 to Lot 4511
12
following the contention of
_______________
14 Id., at p. 533.
15 G.R. No. 61113, 21 February 1990, 182 SCRA 420.
16 CA Rollo, p. 32.
17 Id., at p. 34.
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Caro vs. Sucaldito
the plaintiff, then the area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the claim of
plaintiff that Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessor’s Lot 160.
The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot 989 which is
owned by Felix Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well taken, because the
identification of the lot as stated in the tax declaration is not binding and conclusive.
What is binding and conclusive is what is stated in the title of the land and its technical
description. In the technical description as found in the title of the defendant
[Sucaldito], it is clearly stated therein that the lot is Lot 4512 and is located at Brgy.
Calaya and not Brgy. Olacon, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras. 18
Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on the
following grounds:
 I The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal
personality to bring and institute the present action against the respondent,
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO considering that title issued on the basis of a patent is annullable on the ground
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION; of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period within which to file an action to
cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not
Page | II
apply where the registered owner, or the successor-in-interest, knew that the
102 property described in the title actually belongs to another, as in this
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAS
THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION STILL HE CANNOT RECOVER THE
_______________
LOT IN QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO. 4512;
21 Floralde v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 371 (2000); Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
III National Telecommunications Commission, 332 SCRA 819 (2000); and Ocampo v. Commission on
Elections, 325 SCRA 636. (Id., at p. 86).
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY 22 Ibid.
THE LAND IN QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY DAMAGES. 19 23 Rollo, pp. 55-56.
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision dated July 31, 2002. The
20
24 Id., at p. 26.
604
appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no
personality to file the action under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent. Citing Caro vs. Sucaldito
case. The petitioner cites Vital v. Anore, et al. to bolster his claim. The petitioner
25

_______________ also cites Director of Lands v. Abanilla where the Court stressed that any false
26

statement in the application, which is an essential condition of the patent or

CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.
title under Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, “shall ipso facto produce
18

Id., at p. 45.
19

Id., at pp. 80-87.

20
the cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted.”
603 In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the Bureau
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 603 of Lands itself would show that the petitioner is not the true and lawful owner
Caro vs. Sucaldito of the subject lot; as such, the argument that he has the legal personality to file
the action for annulment of patent based on constructive trust is untenable.
several cases, the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact made by
21

The respondent further contends that the CA did not err in upholding the
administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence must be
ruling of the RTC.
respected, particularly where the question demands the exercise of sound
The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply dated
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge and experience. 22

December 30, 2003.

Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that
appellate court denied in a Resolution dated February 7, 2003.
23

Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the
following grounds:
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THIS
ACTION;
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL INTERPOSED BY PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE
the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject
property.
The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for
the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering
that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the subject
property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance.In De Guzman v. Court
of Appeals, the Court held that “[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is
27

SOLICITOR GENERAL CAN FILE AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PATENT. 24
sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or
 erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko
one with a better right.” Indeed, in
28 v. Cezar as follows:
33

. . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the dismissal of
_______________ a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent
means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation
Page | 90 Phil. 855 (1952).
25
of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was
G.R. No. L-26324, 31 August 1983, 124 SCRA 358.
26
the government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal
103 442 Phil. 534; 394 SCRA 302 (2002).
27
of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs of
Id., at p. 543. (Citations omitted).
Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant,
28

605
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005
Caro vs. Sucaldito
an action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not
go back to the State. 29
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought
is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be 31
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one “who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.” Corollarily, legal
was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action for reconveyance. . . .
605 ...
Verily, the Court stressed that “. . . [i]f the suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action [Travel Wide v. CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991),
per Cruz, J. See also Suguister v. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final
judgment may be invalidated if the real parties-in-interest are not included. This was
underscored by the Court in Arcelona v. CA [280 SCRA 20, October 2, 1997], in which a
final judgment was nullified because indispensable parties were not impleaded.
30
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public
land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents
thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly
affected by the judgment in such suit. 34

standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in dismissing the petitioner’s
35

such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the imputation of fraud in securing a free patent and title over a parcel of land,
challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by declared that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s name. The Court further expounded:
36

interest in the question involved. 32

_______________
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be
dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed
G.R. No. 131277, 2 February 1999, 302 SCRA 559.
33

property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as Id., at pp. 569-570.
34

a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance. G.R. No. 81827, 28 March 1994, 231 SCRA 456.
35

Id., at p. 461.
36

_______________ 607
VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 607
Section 122 of the Land Registration Act; See also Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of
29
Caro vs. Sucaldito
Angeles, 439 Phil. 349; 390 SCRA 502 (2002).
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, supra.
30
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally
The provision reads in full:
31 issued by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 (1936)]. In such cases, the real
Sec. 2. Parties in interest.—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert
judgment in the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
32Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, 30 June 2004, 433 SCRA 324, citing Velarde v. Social
grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to
Justice Society, 428 SCRA 283 (2004). comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a
606 grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance. 37

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where the private
38

respondents therein were mere lessees of the property in question, the Court
Caro vs. Sucaldito
 ruled that as mere lessees, they had “no present substantial and personal WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
interest with respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed property.” merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and the
The Court went on to declare: Resolution dated February 7, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
. . . The only interest they have, in the event the petitioner’s title over the subject SO ORDERED.
property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the hope that they become Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,
Page | qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land. Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere concur.
104 expectancy. Even the private respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of
ownership to the State, they only have “pre-emptive rights” to buy the subject _______________
property; that their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the
government’s consideration of their application as buyers of the same. It is settled that 96 Phil. 946 (1955).
40

a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. 39

Abejaron v. Nabasa, 411 Phil. 552; 359 SCRA 47 (2001).
41

In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states— De Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 716.
42

Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public 609
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the VOL. 458, MAY 16, 2005 609
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now
Mayon Hotel & Restaurant vs. Adana
Republic] of the Philippines.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
_______________

Supra.
37

G.R. No. 121159, 16 December 2002, 394 SCRA 74.

38

Id., at pp. 79-80. (Citations omitted).

39

608
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Caro vs. Sucaldito
This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, et al., a case on all fours with the present one, as follows:
40

Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not
bring such action or any action which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent
and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that
the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there
is another reason for withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not claim the
land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free patent, he had
formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public domain; this,
aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land.
Consequently, even if the parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail
does not automatically become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant
like others who may apply for the same.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for
reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the
government. The petitioner has no personality to “recover” the property as
41

he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof. 42

 G.R. No. 170189. September 1, 2010.*
SPOUSES ELEGIO** CAÑEZO and DOLIA CAÑEZO,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES APOLINARIO and CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Accion Reivindicatoria; Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby
Page | plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.—The
105 present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with
Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil Code reads:
“In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” Accion
reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
_______________
** Additional member per Special Order No. 879 dated August 13, 2010.
* SECOND DIVISION.
** “Eligio” in some parts of the Records.
581
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 581
Cañezo vs. Bautista
Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
Same; Same; Same; In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the party who
prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity
of the same.—In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the
party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed,
but also the identity of the same. However, although the identity of the thing that a
party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right
of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any
part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and
extent of the portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Marcelino P. Arias for petitioners.
Jesus B. Roldan for respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 170189 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals (appellate
court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685. The appellate court granted the appeal filed
by the Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista (spouses Bautista) and
dismissed the complaint for the issuance of a writ of demolition with dam-
_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 50-54. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañezo vs. Bautista
ages filed by the Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (spouses Cañezo) without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum. In its
Decision3 on Civil Case No. MC-00-1069 dated 25 March 2002, Branch 213 of
the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (trial court) rendered judgment
in favor of the spouses Cañezo. The trial court also ordered the issuance of a
writ of demolition directing the removal of the structures built by the spouses
Bautista on the portion of the land belonging to the spouses Cañezo.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:
“Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (hereafter appellees) are the registered owner[s]
of a parcel of land with an area of One Hundred Eighty Six (186) square meters, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 32911.
Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (hereafter appellants) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of One Hundred Eighty One (181) square
meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 31727. Both parcels of land
are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to that of
appellees [sic].
Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot.
During the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by
the structures built by appellants without appellees’ knowledge and consent.
The three (3) surveys conducted confirmed the fact of encroachment. However,
despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the
structures encroaching appellees’ lot.
Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to no avail.
Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 39-41. Penned by Judge Amalia F. Dy.
583
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 583
Cañezo vs. Bautista
For failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the court,
appellants were declared in default. Appellees were allowed to present their
evidence ex parte before an appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered the
assailed decision in the terms earlier set forth.” 4
 The spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of
demolition with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order dated 15 August 2000,
the trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to answer
within the reglementary period. The Public Attorney’s Office, which
represented the spouses Bautista at the time, filed a Motion to Admit Answer
Page | dated 15 June 2000. The trial court denied the motion in its Decision.
106
The Trial Court’s Ruling
On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the
spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built
structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The spouses
Bautista also refused to remove the structures and respect the boundaries as
established by the various surveyors. A referral to the Barangay Lupon failed to
settle the controversy amicably. The trial court thus ruled that the spouses
Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that the spouses Cañezo are entitled to
an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. Let a writ of demolition be accordingly issued directing the
removal/demolition of the structures built by the defendants upon the portion of land
belonging [to] the plaintiffs at the former’s expense.
Further,
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 51-52.
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañezo vs. Bautista
1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and by
way of moral damages[; and]
2. [t]he defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s
fees.
SO ORDERED.” 5
The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal dated 29 April 2002 before the
appellate court.
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision which
reversed the 25 March 2002 Decision of the trial court. The appellate court
ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than a
year before the filing of the complaint, the spouses Cañezo should have filed
a suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of
demolition. A writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final
judgment or order, hence the spouses Cañezo’s complaint should be
dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed to specify the assessed value of the
encroached portion of their property. Because of this failure, the complaint
lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the appellate
court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for
recovery of possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith, the
market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the
appropriate indemnity.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
complaint filed by plaintiffs-appellees is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum.
_______________
5 Id., at p. 41.
585
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 585
Cañezo vs. Bautista
SO ORDERED.” 6
Issues
The spouses Cañezo enumerated the following grounds to support their
Petition:
I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the
petition of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the
Court a quo; [and]
II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that
the petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of
demolition.7
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of
Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or
an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the
Civil Code reads: “In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and
the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant’s claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership
and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional
 trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 14” indicated in the survey plan. Now, Mr. Witness,
you said that the defendants wanted you to recover that portion of your property encroached
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 8 on from the property adjacent to theirs. Please illustrate to us by referring to this survey plan
In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is what the defendants meant?
A The defendants want us to get the portion they had encroached on from “Lot 15” because,
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts, according to them, Lot 15 also encroached on their lot, sir.
that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 15” indicated in the plan. What happened next?
Page | the thing claimed, A We told them that this is not possible because Lot 15 is not adjacent to our property, sir.
Q What did the defendants do?
107 _______________ A The defendants still refused to remove their structure, sir.
Q So, what happened?
6 Id., at p. 54. A We filed a complaint against the defendants before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay
7 Id., at p. 11. Barangka, Ibaba, sir.
Q What happened in the Barangay?
8 See Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565.
A The Barangay council tried to settle the matter amicably between us. However, no settlement was
reached, sir.
586 Q While in the barangay, did you offer anything to the defendants in order to settle the case?
A Yes, sir.
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Q What was it?
Cañezo vs. Bautista A We offered that if the defendants will remove the structures, we are willing to shoulder half of the
expenses for the removal.
but also the identity of the same.9 However, although the identity of the thing Q What did the defendants say to this?
that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already A They refused our offer and insisted on their previous position that we get our portion from Lot
15, sir.588
proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for plaintiff
to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the Cañezo vs. Bautista
Q What did the Barangay do after failing to settle the case?
defendant within the plaintiff’s property.10 A The Barangay issued a Certification to File Action, sir.14
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the Given the efforts made by the spouses Cañezo to settle the present issue
encroached property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses Cañezo prior to the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the
were also able to present documentary and object evidence which consisted of spouses Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer. The
photographs,11 transfer certificates of title,12 and a relocation survey plan.13 Complaint was not the spouses Bautista’s first encounter with the present
The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Cañezo’s testimony on issue. Moreover, the spouses Bautista failed to file their Answer even after the
the reason for the spouses Bautista’s attitude regarding the encroached expiry of the motion of extension granted to them.15
property. The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautista’s The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
property encroached upon that of the spouses Cañezo by 0.97 centimeters, Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot
while the spouses Bautista’s property was encroached upon by 1.01 15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the
centimeters by another landowner. Elegio Cañezo testified thus: spouses Cañezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses
Q I am showing you a survey plan of lot 13. Can you please tell us what is this survey plan?
A That is the survey plan of the surveyor whom we hired sir. Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are entitled to the issuance
Q Can you please point to us where in this plan is your property indicated? of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in
A This is our property, sir.
_______________ accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.16
We affirm the awards made by the trial court in its Decision:
9 Salacup v. Rambac, 17 Phil. 22, 23 (1910).
10 Arturo M. Tolentino, 2 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 72 (1998). Citations omitted.
“x x x Considering the length of time when [the spouses Cañezo] were deprived of
11 Records, pp. 14-18.
12 Id., at pp. 9-10.
beneficial use on the subject portion of land owned by them, the [spouses Bautista] are
13 Id., at p. 11. likewise liable to pay P30,000.00 (Philippine Currency) in accordance with Article 451
587
of the Civil Code.
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 587 _______________
Cañezo vs. Bautista
Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 13” indicated in the survey plan. How about the 14 Id., at pp. 68-71.
property of the defendants? 15 Id., at p. 47.
A The defendants’ property is this, sir.
 16 Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder
or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
589
VOL. 629, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 589
Page | Cañezo vs. Bautista
108 With respect to the prayer for the award of P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as
moral damages, the court decides to give due course to it in view of the fact that the
[spouses Cañezo] satisfactorily proved the existence of the factual basis of the damages
and its causal relation to [the spouses Bautista’s] acts. There was bad faith on the part
of the [spouses Bautista] when they built the structures upon the land not belonging to
them. This wrongful act is the proximate cause which made the [spouses Cañezo] suffer
mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety. The [spouses Cañezo] positively
testified about these matters.
As regards the prayer for exemplary x x x damages, no sufficient evidence were
adduced which would warrant and justify this court to award the same. The prayer for
attorney’s fees however, is found meritorious hence, the same is hereby granted.” 17

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is SET
ASIDE and the dispositive portion of the Decision of Branch 213, Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City promulgated on 25 March 2002 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the encroaching
structures should be issued against and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario
and Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this judgment. Spouses
Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay Spouses
Elegio and Dolia Cañezo P30,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P30,000 as attorney’s fees. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount
awarded is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Nachura, Bersamin,*** Abad and Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
 No. L-23685. April 25, 1968.
CIRILA EMILIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EPIFANIO BADO (Alias Paño), ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Page |
Emilia vs. Bado
109
Injunction; Recovery of possession of real property; Injunction as a remedy.—
Injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or control of one party
and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established. Where
injunction was sought to recover possession of real property, the limited concept of
injunction may not be availed of while the rights between the parties are undetermined,
except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done which
can not be compensated in damages. To hold otherwise, would be to render practically
of no effect the various provisions of the code touching many if not most of the ordinary
actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions. If a complainant could secure
relief by injunction in every case where the defendant is doing or threatens or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of
plaintiff’s rights and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the
summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish
violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by
the ordinary remedies involving the difficult and oftimes fruitless labor of enforcing
judgment obtained therein by execution. (Citing Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273).
Same; Same; When not available; Reasons.—Where legal title is disputed and the
possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no injunction can issue to
dispossess him. Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is determined by
evidence, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo
so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.—There are recognized exceptions to the rule, as
where defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or where the action seeks to prevent a
purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s co-owners whose rights have
not been affected by the sale.
Actions; Recovery of possession of real property; Kinds of actions.—There are three
kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action
for forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten
days from the filing of the complaint under article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal
detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within
one year in the municipal court; (b) the accion publiciana, which is f or the recovery of
the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court
of First Instance; and (c) accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership,
which includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First
Instance.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance
185
VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968 185
Emilia, vs. Bado
of Lanao del Norte. Pineda, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel Deaño for plaintiff-appellant.
Irene D. Jurado for defendants-appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The relief prayed for but denied in an order of the court below, now the subject
of the present appeal, is that injunction issue to restrain defendants from
continuing with the construction of a house of light materials on a 48-square
meter area on the northern border of plaintiff’s land.
The suit started on December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as
amended, that on or about December 1,1962, defendants, confederating and
1
helping one another, entered plaintiff’s land and commenced the construction
of a house of light materials on the northern boundary of her Lot 1131 in Iligan
City bordering the bank of Salabao Creek, covered by her Torrens Title 0–267;
that the continuance of such act against the will of plaintiff would cause great
and irreparable damage and injury and injustice to her; and that there is no
other plan, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Whereupon, she prayed for preliminary and final injunction and damages.
Preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte.
Plaintiff’s said complaint was met by defendants’ motion to dismiss upon
the ground of lack of cause of action. They attached to their motion the sketch
of a private land surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his affidavit, both of which
were intended to convey the alleged fact that the new house being constructed
was inside defendant Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (covered by his Torrens Title 0–
275) being held by him. They averred, too, that the house did not encroach
upon the boundaries of plaintiff’s adjoining property (Lot 1131).
Obviously of the belief that procedural niceties should
_____________
1Civil Case 751, Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, entitled “Cirila Emilia, Plaintiff,
vs. Epifanio Bado alias Paño), Roque Marianas, Simplicio Marianas and Mario Marianas,
Primitivo Aranas, Eustiquio Sabihon, Alfredo Salim and Glicerio Bado, Defendants.”
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Emilia vs. Bado
not bar consideration of the equities of the case, the trial court, on the face of
2
the conflicting assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.
 On February 27, 1964, the trial court came out with an order sustaining the
motion to dismiss. The court gave credence to the testimony of surveyor
Flordelito Aragon (also a deputy public land surveyor) that the house under
construction was within Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (Torrens Title 0–275) and not
on plaintiff’s Lot 1131 (Torrens Title 0–267). The trial court took the position
Page | that to stop defendants from building a house within Glicerio Bado’s lot
110 “would be tantamount to depriving” the enjoyment of his lawful dominical
rights; that even on the assumption that defendant Glicerio Bado’s title to Lot
2894 was obtained through fraud, as plaintiff avers, nonetheless, said title
subsists until declared null and void by a competent court; and that these
circumstances would tie up the hands of the court from granting the relief
prayed for. Whereupon, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction
theretofore issued, and dismissed the complaint.
1. The procedural question presented asks of us a ruling as to whether
injunction is the proper remedy in the premises.
Whether defendant Glicerio Bado’s lot is registrable or not, because, as
plaintiff avers, that land registered in the name of defendant Glicerio Bado is
a creek—Salabao Creek—is beside the point here. Unless and until plaintiff
succeeds in annulling the decree of registration in defendant’s favor which she
has sought in the cadastral proceedings, that title subsists. It is to be presumed
3
that
______________
2 The procedural rule, it is to be recalled, is that where a motion to dismiss is grounded on
lack of cause of action, resolution of said motion should be determined on the basis only of the
facts alleged in the complaint, and on no others. 1 Mo-ran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963
ed., p. 429, citing Asejo vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil. 467.
3 See: Plaintiff’s petition for review and/or to cancel Glicerio Bado’s Certificate of Title No. 0–
275 filed on November 21, 1963 in Cadastral Case N-4 (LRC Cadastral Record N-267), Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and the answer thereto of defendant Glicerio Bado. Record on
Appeal, pp. 55–60, 82–84.
187
VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968 187
Emilia vs. Bado
the judicial proceedings leading to the issuance of the decree are valid.
The pivotal facts that the record discloses may thus be summarized this
way: Plaintiff claims that the house being built is on her land; defendants, on
the other hand, say that that house is on the land of Glicerio Bado. Both hold
Torrens titles. The lower court, prima facie at least, believes that there is factual
support for defendants’ averment.
The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicial
pronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the well-
ingrained precept that injunctions are not available to take property out of
possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose title
has not clearly been established. Instructive in this respect is the early 1909
decision in Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273, where injunction was sought to
recover possession of real property. Mr. Justice Carson there pithily summed
up the limited concept of injunction which may not be availed of “while the
4
rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases
where material and irreparable injury will be done’, which cannot be
compensated in damages.” To hold otherwise, Mr. Justice Carson continued
to say, “would be to render practically of no effect the various provisions of
the code (of civil procedure) touching many if not most of the ordinary actions,
and the enforcement of judgment in such actions; for it may well be supposed
that if a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where ‘the
defendant is- doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights’ and could
enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt
proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish violations of
injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by the
ordinary remedies, involving as they do the difficult and ofttimes fruitless
labor of enforcing judgments obtained there-
_______________
4At p. 278.
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Emilia vs. Bado
in by execution.” 5
Long divorced from doubt is the doctrine that where legal title is disputed
and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no
injunction can issue to dispossess him. Reason for this is that before the issue
6
of ownership is determined by evidence, justice and equity demand that the
parties be maintained in their status quoso that no advantage may be given to
one to the prejudice of the other.
7
Given the fact that there is the debatable question of where the house was
being erected, we say that adherence to the precept just enunciated is a
forbidding obstacle to the grant of injunction.
2. To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to the rule, as where
defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or where the action seeks to prevent a
8
purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s coowners whose
rights have not been affected by the sale. But these, generally upon hearing
9
and not upon ex parte application for injunction. 10
3. Upon well-entrenched jurisprudence, plaintiff’s prin-
 _____________
5 At p. 279.
6 Gordillo vs. Del Rosario, 39 Phil. 829, 835, citing Devesa vs. Arbes, supra; Golding vs.
Balatbat, infra; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 229. See also: Asombra vs. Dorado, 36 Phil. 883,
885; Tiongson vs. Martinez, 36 Phil. 948, 952; Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, 283; Santos vs. De
Page | Leon, 60 Phil. 573, 575.
111 7 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p, 68, citing Calo vs. Ortega, L-
4673 and L-4675, January 25, 1952.
8 Rustia vs. Franco, supra; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra; De Garcia vs. Santos, 79 Phil. 365, 369–
370; Barrameda vs. Gontang, L-24110, February 18, 1967.
9 Cabuhat vs. Ansay, 42 Phil. 170, 176.
10Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941, 946; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra,at p. 952; De Leon vs.
Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 203, 205. Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court, categorically provides that
“[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant unless it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice. x x x.”
189
VOL. 23, APRIL 25, 1968 189
Emilia, vs. Bado
cipal suit for injunction cannot, at bottom, prosper because there is an
adequate remedy in law open to her. It is elementary to the point of triteness
that the special remedy of injunction may not issue where there is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is in line with the principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa vs.
Arbes, supra, Palafox vs. Madamba,19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no uncertain
terms that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where “there exists the
ordinary remedy of action for property of possession, which may be either
plenary or summary, according to the method by which she may have been
deprived of her alleged possession.” A long line of cases has since then
stabilized the principle. 11
Under the present state of the law, there are three kinds of actions available
to recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action for forcible
entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten
days from the filing of the complaint under Article 539 of the Civil Code) or
illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is
brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the action publiciana,which
is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) acción de
reivindicación, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus
utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First Instance. 12
Plaintiff Cirila Emilia claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of
land, which she avers is covered by Torrens title in her name. Defendant
Glicerio Bado, on the
______________
11Evangelista vs. Pedreños, 27 Phil. 648, 650–651; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542, 550–
551; Asombra vs. Dorado, supra, at pp. 885–886; Golding vs. Balatbat, supra, at pp. 945–
947; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra,at pp. 951–953; Rustia vs. Franco, supra; Kabankalan Sugar Co.
vs. Rubin, 54 Phil. 645, 654; Piit vs. De Lara, 58 Phil. 765, 767; De Leon vs. Director of
Lands, supra, at p. 205; Santos vs. De Leon, supra, at pp. 574–575; Wagan vs. Sideco, 60 Phil. 685,
688; Coronado vs. Tan, 96 Phil. 129, 732.
12See: 3 Moran, op. cit., p. 272, citing cases.
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JRS Business Corporation vs. Montesa
other hand, also professes ownership over the same portion of land backed
up, too, by a Torrens title in his name. From these two directly opposing
positions, a legitimate issue of ownership emerges. This guides us to no other
conclusion than that plaintiff Cirila Emilia should have brought suit for
ownership (acción de reivindicación). Correctly did the trial judge dissolve the
preliminary injunction wrongfully issued and refuse the grant of a perpetual
injunction sought by her.
4. In a situation like the present, it was suggested in Devesa vs. Arbes,
supra, that it would not be improper if the record were to be returned to the
court of origin with instructions to further amend the complaint, such that the 13
question of ownership and possession (accion reivindicatoria) may bring about
a head-on contest between plaintiff and Glicerio Bado in the same injunction
case. As we make an appraisal of the record before us, however, we are
constrained to say that confusion may arise because of the so many pleadings
filed and court actuations taken before this decision. With the voluminous
record, difficulty may arise in pinpointing the exact issue between the parties.
Administration of justice could suffer thereby. And then, there is the
continued pendency of this case which has been started since nearly five years
ago. A final decision on the validity of Glicerio Bado’s title in the cadastral
proceeding could yet prevent further controversy between the parties.
Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to affirm the order of February
27, 1964, dismissing the complaint. With costs against plaintiff-appellant. So
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Order affirmed.
 G.R. No. 132424. May 4, 2006. *
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA
and FRANCISCA FABELLA, respondents.
Actions; Possession; Ejectment; Jurisdictions; Three Kinds of Actions Available to
Page | Recover Possession of Real Property; Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action,
112 namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico), the jurisdiction of these
two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court.—Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion
publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes
of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In
forcible entry,
_______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and
that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are
summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.
Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land,
in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer.The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has
lasted for more than one year.—Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right
of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words,
if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion
publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered—such tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer, not forcible entry.—To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that
the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
371
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 371
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas, 22 SCRA
1257 (1968): But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner,
still, distinction should be made. If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was
with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the
premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year
from the date of the demand to vacate. x x x x A close assessment of the law and the concept
of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action
as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer.—It is the
nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether
it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may
be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.—To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment
of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of
facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide
a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show
enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy
should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court.
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aventino B. Claveria for petitioners.
 Juan Moreno for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
Page | petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to
113 nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision and 30 January 1998 resolution
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the
judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the decision
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil
Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel
and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The
complaint alleges these material facts:
1. “2.That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot
denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk. 19 located at Carolina Executive Village,
Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina Realty,
Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of
which is hereto attached marked as Annex “A” and the xerox copy of the
Torrens Certificate of Title in her name marked as Annex “B”;
_______________
1Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna
and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.
373
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 373
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
1. 3.That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said
lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein
plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
2. 4.That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to
peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused
to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
3. 5.That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully;
4. 6.That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the
case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary
Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the
necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of
which is hereto attached marked as Annex “C”;
5. 7.That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the
defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the herein
plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of counsel
thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal
demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex “D”;
6. 8.That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious
anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x”
2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to
state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they
were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed
ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.
_______________
2Rollo, pp. 88-90.
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay
rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC. Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning the decision
of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case for
unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private
respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private
respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
 detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack 3Id., p. 91.
Id., pp. 152-155.
jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior
4

5Id., p. 146.
material possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus: 376
“An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation
Page | of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry, x x x and the complaint is Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
114 deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of The petition is not meritorious.
unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show that they had given the Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions
petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished. available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion
x x x publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria. 6

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible
before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is
7

375 deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,

VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 375 intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are 8

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.” 3
prior de factopossession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
dated 30 January 1998. 4
termination of the right to possess. 9

Hence, the instant petition. The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration: 5
the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must
10

be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case
1. A.WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
11

2. B.WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession
CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT has lasted for more than one
COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
_______________
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make 6Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572-573.
7Id.
out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents 8Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184; 362 SCRA 755, 766 (2001).
unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question, 9Id.
which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They 10Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy 11Id., p. 572.
377
available to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or
permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 377
implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner. Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
12

_______________ possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the
13

filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
 turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding. 14
Page | To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s
115 supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession
15
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:
16 17
“But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we
do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the
inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand
to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recov-
_______________
Id., p. 573.
12
Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
13
Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
14
Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September 2003, 410
15
SCRA 485, 490.
Id.
16
131 Phil. 365; 22 SCRA 1257 (1968).
17
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
ered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed,
to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation
of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in the inferior court—provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to
seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action
of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon
a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of
the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature
of the action.” (Italics supplied)
18
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause
of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal,
then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the
case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant,
it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide
a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must19
show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony. 20
_______________
Id., pp. 372-373; pp. 1264-1265.
18
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156; 250 SCRA 108, 116 (1995).
19
Id.
20
379
VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 379
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
21
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent
22
alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate
succession which was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners
as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not
petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled: 23
“Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under
TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was
by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they
had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to
vacate the property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful
detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This
is where petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with
the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after her
death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
 The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception VOL. 489, MAY 4, 2006 381
and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant
started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. x x x Clearly, defendant’s In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted
Page | or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
116
_______________ contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
Id.
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been
21

Supra note 8.
22

Id., pp. 184-186; pp. 766-767.

23
said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession
380 started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
26

the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of had no jurisdiction over the case. It is in this light that this Court finds that the
27

Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful jurisdiction over the complaint.
detainer not of forcible entry x x x.” WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz, petitioner’s
24
Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo,
complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare allegations that (1) Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an No pronouncement as to costs.
action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation SO ORDERED.
of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-
tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held: Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
x x x x
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of
fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation
of the premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause
of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that
respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they
counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed
act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that
is later sought to be recovered.” 25

_______________

Supra note 5.
24

Id., pp. 490-491.

25

381