Republic of the Philippines respondents under R.A. No.
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which
denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen Denise.5 On
January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her
in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,10 contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to
Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation
thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on the
ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as
alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration14 contending that the
doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice
and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential
condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the
coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW
OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section
47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be
suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her
to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for
complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section
3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a
former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of
respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since
their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-
inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC,
thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is
silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple
violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering
the lack of similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define
the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as
the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined
therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for
the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under
Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing
Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said
special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be
supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators,
and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another,
thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals
or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus: SO ORDERED.

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally

or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety
of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by
the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the
legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius"
finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of
statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be
applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of
circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary
matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in
the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is thus premature for petitioner to
argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether
respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A.
No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005
and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-
54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition
against respondents is concerned.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former
boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service
(SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former
girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and
pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and
humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up
with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope
with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal
and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her
cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-
8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure
(Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of
the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he
took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send
sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture
and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada,
Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but
the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to
lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in
another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that
the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face
was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was
fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales
explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the
Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003
and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended,
Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at
that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort
as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers
approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the
police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and,
pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why
the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims
that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures
of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the
woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A.
Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she
was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully
dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during
her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human
nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty
of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January
31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message
the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological
distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation
of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented
in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he
has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had
a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during
the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the
course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals
in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended
woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites
Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He
romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a
dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore,
exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a
continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from
October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual
trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking
place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at
times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all.
Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a
form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very
dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing
only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her
getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or
psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such
that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not
impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7).
It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except
Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits
2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did
not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the
memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would
have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was
no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to
see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her
testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low
regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case.
Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like
Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in
such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture
with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without
any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is
that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the
police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to
prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial
conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that
the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon
him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was
that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and
he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the
same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was
most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the
sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for
the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she
sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the
supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.)
9262.2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-formacomplaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial
support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live
Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine
Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father;
that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a
harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and
that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a
protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to
compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its
April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her
child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with
this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for
temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.
The Court’s Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include
the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became
apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she
nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously
denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on
her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. 7 The child’s remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. 8 If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support
and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. 10
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an
action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on
the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue
remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether
they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina
failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the
real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is
just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative father’s legitimate family.12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the
preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-
07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140604 March 6, 2002
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer Rico Jacutin of
Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of
Sexual Harassment, thusly:
"That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the accused, a
public officer, being then the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade
26 but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975, committing the offense in
relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his position, did there and then,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit, request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet
Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in
Nursing who was seeking employment in the office of the accused, namely: by
demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose her body and allow her private parts to
be mashed and stimulated by the accused, which sexual favor was made as a condition
for the employment of Ms. Yee in the Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus
constituting sexual harassment."1
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence, trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her
father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment.
Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City
Health Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he
might be able to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and
they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in
December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be
considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine o’clock in the morning, she and her father went
back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family
planning project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job.
Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether
or not she already had a boyfriend, she said "no." Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father
were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father, taking the
cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his
theory on the various aspects of virginity. He "hypothetically" asked whether she would tell her
family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the
job where she would be the subject of a "research" program. She was requested to be back after
lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to
seek divine guidance as she felt so "confused." When she got to the office, petitioner made
several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for
her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking.
She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include "hugging" her but petitioner
assured her that he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner
told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car
together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner stopped. She got in.
Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his
bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so
in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins,
and she said "no." Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm
it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her
knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair.
Surprised, she exclaimed "hala ka!" and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched
her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm
touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. She
hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast.
Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself,
telling him angrily that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about
what had just happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her
decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the money he gave her
but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her for accepting the money and
instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04 December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to
return the money to petitioner but she was not able to see him until about one o’clock in the
afternoon. She tried to give back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she attempted to
slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her mother. Noticing that Juliet
was suffering from some psychological problem, the family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for
counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21
December 1995, and that Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so
stupid as to allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliet’s frustration was due
to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28 November 1995 he had
a couple of people who went to see him in his office, among them, Juliet and her father, Pat.
Justin Yee, who was a boyhood friend. When it was their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee
introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner
replied that there was no vacancy in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the
power to appoint city personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident
happened, he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City Mayor. On
04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return the P300.00, he did not report
to the office for he was scheduled to leave for Davao at 2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket.
He asserted that the complaint for sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against
him by Vivian Yu, Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political
harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05 November 1999,
penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr. Rico Jacutin, guilty of the
crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No. 7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO JACUTIN Y
SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished under R.A. No.
7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act, properly known as the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended
party in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral
damages; Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages
and to pay the cost of suit."2
In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
"I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the
inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
"II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law and
presumption of innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to
sustain his conviction."3
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:
"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee,
manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor,
or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in
a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires
any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment,
re-employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee."
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held when
complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to gain
employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a boyhood friend, but
finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her about accepting a job in a family
planning research project. It all started from there; the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
"x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination would be
a part of a research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her private parts
(bolts) would be seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in the research, she
would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the accused with utmost
reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo the physical
examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview and told the
complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day,
December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, but did not
proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as she dropped by a nearby church to
ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a loss on how to resolve her present
predicament. At 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she went back to the office of the accused.
And once inside, accused called up a certain Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy,
but he was told that she would only accept a registered nurse. Complainant was about to
leave the office of the accused when the latter prevailed upon her to stay because he
would call one more hospital. In her presence, a call was made. But again accused told
her that there was no vacancy. As all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed,
accused renewed the offer to the complainant to be a part of the research in the Family
Planning Program where there would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused
motioned his two (2) secretaries to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the
complainant, accused asked her if she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she
would not agree because the research included hugging. He then assured her that he
was just kidding and that a pre-schooler and high schooler have already been subjected
to such examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to
the research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and
would gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a ‘tomboy’, she
answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he would first play
bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical examination). On the
understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the clinic where the research
will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But accused instructed her to
proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it was not good for people to see
them riding in a car together. She walked from the office of the accused and proceeded to
Borja St. as instructed. And after a while, a white car arrived. The door was opened to her
and she was instructed by the accused to come inside. Inside the car, he called her
attention why she was in a pensive mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated
side by side, the accused held her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her
that he would go home for a while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he
came back inside the car and asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she
was not able to do so because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car,
 accused directed her to raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on
her legs. Thinking that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to
raise it higher, but she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She
did lower her pants, exposing half of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward
down to her knees and grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she
had lost control of the situation, she raised her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she
exclaimed, ‘hala ka!’ because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held
her abdomen, saying, ‘you are like my daughter, ‘Day’! (Visayan word of endearment),’
and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the traditional way of making
the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling embarrassed
and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she raised her shirt
up to her breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively lower her shirt and
embraced her bar while silently asking God what was happening to her and asking the
courage to resist accused’s physical advances. After a short while, she asked him if there
could be a right place for physical examination where there would be many doctors. He
just exclaimed, ‘so you like that there are many doctors!’ Then he asked her if she has
tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss her, she answered that she has lots of
decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them treated. Finally, she informed him that
she would not continue with the research. The accused retorted that complainant was
entertaining malice and reminded her of what she earlier agreed; that she would not tell
anybody about what happened. He then promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she
could take the examination. She was about to open the door of the car when he suddenly
grabbed her thigh, but this time, complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag."4
While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to
reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in
the municipal health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to
have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s
employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person
of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary
between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y
Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse
behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner, i.e., that he was at
a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
"There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence
adduced by the defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards
Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.
"First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna
Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. ‘3-A’ and ‘3-B’) were signed by Teresita
Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting, Exh. ‘5’, was signed by Myrna Maagad and not
by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. ‘3-A’ and ‘3-B’ certify that the officially
designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita Rozabal.
"Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how was
she able to personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8, 1998,
when in fact, she admitted during her testimony that she retired from the government
service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be the custodian of
the logbook when she testified.
"And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, ‘Others Present,’ the attendance of
those who attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who wrote
and signed their names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their names
were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr. Jacutin. However,
Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to attending individuals
inside the conference room."5
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal,6 no cogent
reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The assessment on the credibility
of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique position of being able to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand,
an opportunity that is denied the appellate court.7
Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary damages by the
Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral damages are not intended to enrich
a complainant but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help
obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must
not appear to be the result of passion or undue prejudice,8 and it must always reasonably
approximate the extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should
be recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological counseling expert,
has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed and suffering from post trauma
stress following her unpleasant experience with petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in
favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially
deleterious actions.9
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799,
finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and
punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him
with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayan’s award of
moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the
offended party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively,
moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory --
the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the
proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful
aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she
shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
"psychological paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that
she was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid
emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and
her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody
on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under
detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the
accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5,
RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none
of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one
BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding
from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on
the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels
producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of
the epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March
3, 1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this
wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc
City. Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a
time, Ben's younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl
Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass
Ben's house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out
that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while
Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiaorunner to
place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben
replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and
was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor
living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going
to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle
to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going
to Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each
one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he
was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as
Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find
out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not
have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a
window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying
on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the
back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother
of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben,
identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas'
rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the
dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the
nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparadora metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a
wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of
one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at
one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel,
Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for
two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination
of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against
appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital
[bone].'
"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November
15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone
gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for
Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found
Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's
request for her to sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a
fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing
their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and,
with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from
watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the
bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly
flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her
by the neck, and told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however,
'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
 "Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had
three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors
in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of
parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other
suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at
fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'.
But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would
become violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben
and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident
in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left
hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early
morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from
Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as
the marriage went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada
Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3)
misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his
left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and
also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995
when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's
hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2)
bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went
across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during
that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and
runners so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he
heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of
the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill
you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.' Basobas thought they were
joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday
and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle
by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back
after she would leave him 'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they
had been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had
known the couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was
a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin
her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents,
but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted
upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her
every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that
on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was
shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with
each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come
voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995.
He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and
saw 'the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able
to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work
as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please
note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his
niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was
always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use
the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben
was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben
was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and
he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means
'let's go and look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife
and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness
pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia
also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only
that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in
the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to
look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places,
but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with
her in the Genosa house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got
to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was
already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering
walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them
quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo
Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to
sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home
drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening
when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked
the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife
through the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9,
1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries
were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution
admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-
three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of
Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and
the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether
she is capable of committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in
the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear
from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they might
have forgiven with each other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five
(5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was
crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in
the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that
Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995;
that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a
field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was
leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she
did not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was
wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled'
by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she
had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all
the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte
at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of
all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of
cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board
exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence
and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He
was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal
area of the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination,
Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged
her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5
and 6 August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and
further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under
date of 24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry
of appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January
2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without
counsels' to the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the
only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the
death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman
syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to
this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were
done at her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with
her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National
Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a
Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the
U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is
a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic
Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is
actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and
nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with
Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as
an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she
looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are
lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity,
to psychiatric disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of
psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also
sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they
usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they
usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence,
they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.'
Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from
'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low
opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a
very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling,
drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do
anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of
modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave
her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself
which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the
house, or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
'physical violence on both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses
also happen, but these are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and]
day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is
long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the
victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it
was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her
feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss,
such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person.
And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced
in the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider
filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy
that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He
was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private
practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained
his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six
(26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas.
He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City
Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international
congresses. He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000', which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook
published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in
1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on
the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish
medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had
already encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in
1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has
seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of
therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he
became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita
Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes
confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of
the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of
violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma
as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of
nothing but the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness,
such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer,
he normally 'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his
own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he
shows his strong façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or
the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic)
because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she
killed her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the
trauma.' He said 'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the
trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in
time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At
the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore
x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial
court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with
a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1)
the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening
of the case for the lower court to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric
opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter
to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional
evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on
domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented
to and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the
records of the case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were
legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from
impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer
and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered
husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of
her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance
of treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to
the ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight
and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the
case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision,
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his
evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and
the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial
judge's conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he
failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and
at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case
with dispatch should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly
hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find
his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,16 this Court held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case
of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however,
oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is
not objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased
spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no
objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a
judicial admission of her marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission
was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely
attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether
by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing
her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of
his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which
of said acts actually caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused
the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk,
gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant
had not raised the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may
have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As
will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence
ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence,
his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children.
As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which
witnesses and evidence are necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the
trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses.
Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila
and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save
the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these
circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her
to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. 21 Well-settled is
the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person)
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While
new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form
of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the
justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her
to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of
intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an
abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation,
she is defined as a battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant
male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the
relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of
violence,"27 which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss
of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the
violence "spirals out of control" and leads to an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature
can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The
battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she Q How many times did this happen?
may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may
be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from A Several times already.
her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may
show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously
cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
caring man" is the real person whom she loves.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very to him and he said 'sorry'.
slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation
that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by
your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his A Yes, sir.
nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence
and forgiveness," each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither Q Who are these doctors?
one may really feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.31
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
History of Abuse
in the Present Case xxx xxx xxx

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A Of course my husband.
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me
and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to
A Yes, sir.
you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

xxx xxx xxx

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me
down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
[Court] /to the witness
 Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient.
What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32 A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner: Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
your clinic?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A Yes, sir.
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So,
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor? [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness
pain.
A I did.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
xxx xxx xxx
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero; Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and A Yes, sir.
contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
Q What did she tell you?
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Dr. Caing;
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora; and A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx Q Where?

ATTY. TABUCANON: A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the xxx xxx xxx
month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
A As per record, yes. examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.

Q What was the date? What is this all about?

A It was on November 6, 1995. A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I
think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? consultation for twenty-three (23) times.

A Yes, sir. Q For what?

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient A Tension headache.
pregnant?
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
A Yes, sir. hypertension?

Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or
less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family
history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the
moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy. A Probably.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, sir.
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension
which is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q For how many days?
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
A One day. accused?
 A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of
blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic
would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben. 35
Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at
the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On
one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the
couple "were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came
running into Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair,
scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but
they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk.
Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses
saw or heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful
night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards
her:
"ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately
asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I
was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while
waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that
time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again
beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had
fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of
Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy? who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his
challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me
A Eight (8) months. from watching television.

Q Was the baby subsequently born? Q What did he do with the bolo?

A Yes, sir. A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time? Q What else happened after he cut the wire?

A Marie Bianca. A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he
was already holding the bolo.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
Q How do you described this bolo?
A Yes, sir.
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What time?
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
A For chopping meat.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What was he yelling all about?
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do
if any? Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him. A I screamed for help and then he left.

Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know? Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just A Yes, sir.
worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble
for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off
the light when the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children
A I packed all his clothes. A Yes, sir.

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a
blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my
mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:

COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in xxx xxx xxx
her front neck)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Outside.
Q Where did he bring you?
Q In what part of the house?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at
me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'
A Dining.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
Q Where were the children during that time?
A Yes, sir.
A My children were already asleep.
Q What is there in the drawer?
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
A Yes, sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Is it a flexible blade?
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
 A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it
in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five
sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's
ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's
term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was
suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse,
to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was
the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in
a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in
cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She
also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was
carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when
it was happening day in and day out." 39
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the
facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were
fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were
fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think
that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the
battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not
during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her
husband.
 Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is
this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of
that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who
can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can
trust. That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The
Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the
atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was
also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often
joining his barkada in drinking sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly
to his wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed,
he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was
progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever
she suspected that her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve
years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and
mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite
of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and
more frequent and more severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering
on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of
the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a
woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect
the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and
make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-
called 'battered wife syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of
an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have
not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence,
has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner.
The psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered
woman immobilizes the latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel
trapped in the relationship with no means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found
that "the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater
danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x
[W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the
one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally
and even sexually abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave
an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked
the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their
children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in
suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent
family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a
result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe
domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her
loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and
severely abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power
to change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the
development of coping responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an
active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe
that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found
that "even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more
likely to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that
it was the cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to
this phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less
important than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women don't attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that
escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or
anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.55 Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.56 Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient
evidence that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence
that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quohow the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not
prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How
did Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try
to prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben
would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words,
she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel
helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to
separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of
the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings
inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which
were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to
present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -
- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would
establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case
of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of
self-defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense 60 -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in
order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual,
not merely imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect
of self-defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
 Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based
on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and
inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased
yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have
a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she
can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'" 65 Still, impending
danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's
use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.66Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-
defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part
of the victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying
circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her
favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a
criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by
the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious
pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the
prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder. 71 Expounding thereon,
he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of
the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged
commission of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim
and another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of
the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very
severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating
the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the
individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to
painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the
woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will
manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and
fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual
will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged,
it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this
six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6)
months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is
abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic
personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
 "Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x
x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her
of consciousness of her acts.There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held
that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1)
there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is
not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the accused might recover her normal equanimity.78
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck
towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months
pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and
violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child,
naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to
retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt
her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby
were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun,
then she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period
of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming
brutality [or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is
not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the
most vicious and the trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such
reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what
Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal
equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness
diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with
their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their
unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences,
or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body
of Ben had been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back
of his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution
failed to establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events
surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in
her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you? Q It is a flexible blade?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at A It's a cutter.
me that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
A Yes, sir.
Q How did he do it?
Q What is there in the drawer?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
A I was aware that it was a gun.
Q With the same blade?
COURT INTERPRETER
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
Q What happened?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and
blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his I ran to the other room.
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it
was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
Q What else happened?
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my
mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I
was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was
COURT INTERPRETER raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx (Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness
at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
ATTY. TABUCANON:
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?

Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
 A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I
got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of
the victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is
the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. 86 There is no
showing, though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To
the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order
to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have
been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one
(1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to
be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying
circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense. 90 Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is
next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium
period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as
minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for
and be released from detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor
simple to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court
agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the
normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence
applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to
take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of
the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court
has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina
Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing
of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated
by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites
of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed
upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody
upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other
lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence
against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of
abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former
husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman
has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to
prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care
providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests
for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions
and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man
eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair
when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that
he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned
his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and
whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear
that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his
father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never
bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been
undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's
job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He
even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour
and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her
that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-
Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast
to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a
monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation
together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24,
2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses,
ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner
(private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall
be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from
her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help
and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision
where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a
house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than
2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by
the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain
of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
 j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque,
the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally
resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did
not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked
that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning
the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after
the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture,
equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the
latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol
and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at
the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent.
This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and
her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in
the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another,
acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's
three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter
the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from
 the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for
their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support
in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00
and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by
J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini
St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets
or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served
a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person,
entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who
shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or
sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the
TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial
court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said
motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued
renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days
and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the
civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil
case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT
THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY
AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF
THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT
R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO
THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that
if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key
cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In
the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said
in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks
of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before
the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition
and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which
he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause
why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality
cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand,
is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51Finally, a third-party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his
opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim,
cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of
which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a
valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it
may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form
of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner
may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be
granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows
the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper,
and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary
manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such
statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution,
in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which
exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in
isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence
and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups
have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children
or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which
the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners
in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to
this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This
includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that
we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam
sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of
battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be
abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for
women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure
that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the
domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the
fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children
are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although
Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men,
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we
should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as
the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and
women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it
is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14,
15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart
to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update
that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but
not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment,
as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the
early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it
must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied
if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based
violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers,
providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions
and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining
more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is
a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of
a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote
the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under
the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that
one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the
rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more
importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike
down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20,
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against
women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze.
They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the
United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very
poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.
law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep.
Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of
total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases
out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year
2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90%
of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands
and live-in partners.73

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under
common. R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners. Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200
2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

1,04
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 832
2
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Rape
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to Rape
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the
 Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
Acts of
Lasciviousn 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625 On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
ess men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the
Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49 2,01 1,58 smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8 8 8 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in
Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than
the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their
spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much
Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63 less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman
Harassment
against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28 9,97 9,02
RA 9262 218 924 Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
9 7 9 5 4 1

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles
to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15 similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
Concubinag vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
e their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute
a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may
result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62 persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78

Abduction C. Gender bias and prejudices

/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29 From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then
United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence
Unjust Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155 Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
Vexation
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape
or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender
6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,1 12,9 and then of the legal system.79
Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 04 48
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor,
*2011 report covers only from January to August the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge
Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and
of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and
lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that
R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take
all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing
the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the
development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August
5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines
on October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality
with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of
men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and
its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity
by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein
the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined
in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the
use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are
so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their
son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court
to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days
(5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose
not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently
forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each
time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied
due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that
this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party,
or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal
effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort
him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal
and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to
suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on
Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies
that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the
person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A
Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted
upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence
and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into be, sustained.
practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in
his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist
SO ORDERED.
from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman
or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it
would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of