Case Digest

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was
filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently,
it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands
has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest
cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of
the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i)
the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and
to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to

the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent
part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's

is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but
to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of
time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits
of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers"
of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated
on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all
natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other
hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the
fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152
(Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a)
to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the
truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true,
may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante
vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
...
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and

is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American
Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it
as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby
set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders
or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 1. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years.
The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and
course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing
and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and
the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for
future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is
no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest,
with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular
claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil,
chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit
mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has
identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine
Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear
to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in
the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section
16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present
form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are
too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
— a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that
the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be
a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 1. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and
professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments —
must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in
the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence
of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public
respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the
forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the
Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, vs CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF

MANILA BAY
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective
offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our
internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and
their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it
deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and
commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but
now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila
Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint
alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This
environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must
be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and
to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section,
Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the
Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most
probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe
level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not
exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of
other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through
the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as
part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated
waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of
wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof,
to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes
but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution
of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the
marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic
animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of
sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this
Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the
said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not
cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial
act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision
of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks
outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON

BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE
WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC

POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL

ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or
are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the
part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies
and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’
duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise
of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion,
for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they
are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature
and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the
Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-
called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate
with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in
Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the
scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec.
42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a
proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to
exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has
the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for
want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand,
designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution,
the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution,
determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent
information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to
prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of
RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein.
As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area.
Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board
every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan
with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should
more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing
laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over
all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro
Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for
the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It
can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall
monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct,
operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage,
waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH,
is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In
relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and
surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are
judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is
charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in
marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under
Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution
for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under
EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood
control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development
objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control,
drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For
the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services.
The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the
removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros
(drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and
Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules
and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for
the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner,
into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or

deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on
the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be
washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of
pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was
signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to
perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume
and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine
pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were
authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its
purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs
and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine
territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It
is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined
in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs,
and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,
the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable
laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source
of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the
DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate
guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment
and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly
urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on
Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of
the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand,
it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels,
with an emphasis on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline
processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic
instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic
national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this
management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection,
water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management
program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of
RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26

hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have
been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency
cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same,
the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be
reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real
since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the
DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and
(h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged

or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result
from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of
said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the
occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal,
and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that
there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other
hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila
Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the
operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the
Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations"
embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the
phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the
chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary
to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the
cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup
operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier
discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific
duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them.
Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275
on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident.
In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at
once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 &
20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such
magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the
polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be
caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in
water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand,
specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer
to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the
waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can
validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila
Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters
has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or
clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step
in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152,
covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-
term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise,
any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay
water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275,
and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-
agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to
perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of
its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing
mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in
view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or
indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the
court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures
which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks,
and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the
major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the
major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list.
And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained
resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught.
The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of
rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing
and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zonelonger than what is
necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along
or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they
may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs,
have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a
reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut
down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights
of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste
in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that
lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an
understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains
of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established
as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be
taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5)
years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which
ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly
complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping
of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open
burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila
Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized
transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550
which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment
including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual
products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or
harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-
made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need
to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them
by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former
splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks
ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take
responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation
and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities
cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims:
(1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that
the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political
rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men
and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to
keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a
betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-

government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective
areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the
Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments
and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial
wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and
the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore
the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries
and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA
8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila
Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila
Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and
other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the
principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country
more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its
territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of
sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27
of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The
DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and
like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine
archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective
to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
U.S. Supreme Court

Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909

Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this
Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is
proper to bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a
judgment of the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of
land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles,
one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No.
496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically
it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide
how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and
how far it will recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat.
691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for
failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine
Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many
years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply
with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land
in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled
to the continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.

ISAGANI CRUZ vs SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,
and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3
Id. at 23-25.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws."
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6
Id. at 27-28.
7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard
Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense
and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the
labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by
the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land
but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and
do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control
and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and
is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the

IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA

may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into
the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e.,
more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set
the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at
such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by
them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper
deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands
became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took
charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military
and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by
the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880.
The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as
well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the
last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of
the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands.
In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial
treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had
lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment,
asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the
State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws
which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies."10 The
question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as
against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in
the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a
specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862,
it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the
Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of
1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the
court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not
belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted
lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory
part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities
named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or
showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention
of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the
land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by
the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the
decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's
principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the
parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated,
without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied"
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the
earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the
proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public
land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government
from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from
the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed
rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of
the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law
was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation
of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law
and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the
transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth
period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496,
or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a
verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who
patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that
the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly
facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country.28There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to
secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National
Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated
therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State
ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the
IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,

subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if
the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the
ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect
their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their
own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of
seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and
the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon,
Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern
Mindanao; and Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President
Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The
NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to
₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that
of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories,
sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may
have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or

homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied,
possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have
been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of
110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao,
Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag
of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva
Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan
or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental
Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato
of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and
Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of
Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros
Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the
Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon,
Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of
Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of
Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of
Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and
Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South
Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of
South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and
Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000
to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the
Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common
cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago.
Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented
these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-
colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially
homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary
factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common
ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored
similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had
languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media
of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They
fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be
part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality
of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they
called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul
spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to
consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that
was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object
of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically
a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was
different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his
subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all
the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme
commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were
preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.54 The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the
necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel
at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of
Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance,
divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and
adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by
the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of
different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The
chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an
extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual,
therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a
member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept
of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without
sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was
what regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise
free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and
elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits.
But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by
Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction:
Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato
toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in
common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The
Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the
acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where
most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations.
They were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos
living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first
tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos
together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying
solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord
them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would
be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the
church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards
attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make
the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately
adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands
not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-
Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of
public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and
law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or
colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights
to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First
were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations.
Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards
and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were
regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from
Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not
pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were
peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian
community.78 Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and
vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,

addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now
living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization,
the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity
and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian
Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and
more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act
No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the
Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized
Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT
was modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen
anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials
about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging
issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian
Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of
all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the
American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II,
a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands
and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the
Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from
their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national
government in the name of national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities"
were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition
and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration
into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve
their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration
policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands
Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the
national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979,
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National
Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon
Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was
authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-
Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan
natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other
projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their
land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created
the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains,
the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They
are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system
of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the
rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial
threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture.
The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying
the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional
concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more
accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the
secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses
his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only
belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods
and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality
who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary
laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest
products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture
and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common
right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in
common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions
individual ownership.The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system
of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and
dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined
under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is
strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs
due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be
offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be
sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept
of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin,
our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral
lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of
four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and
Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the
comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional
consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the
Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their
Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were
pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the
massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they
became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our
system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land
long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they
ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their
dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment
in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political,
economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to
this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending
on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based
on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence
passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in
the case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling
has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410,
P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These
laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and
the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator
Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented
the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard
shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic
when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the
ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral
land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme
power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that
persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual
inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in
favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor
by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain
that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws
that remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is
a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill
shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that
they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in
the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v.
Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment
of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples
and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in
Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging
to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized
by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but
not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied
or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and
includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains
except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed
but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These
lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden
farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the
IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in
identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role
in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51
and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section
53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding
by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to
ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of
Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public
lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by
virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never
to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariñofirmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares
of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the
property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him
to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a
U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including
Cariño, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land.
Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of
Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The
Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the
case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian
doctrine and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June
25, 1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the
other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never
formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were
held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that,
as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How
far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the
new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due
process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong
mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose
of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter
1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose
that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own
is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards
to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that
the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the
profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed
to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought
to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or
memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to
"never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish
decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to
recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine
declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that
titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines
into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is
true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all
titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in
their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey
to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of
such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land
under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the
strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This
title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a
Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the
opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property,
through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in
Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government
of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not
have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was
entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question
good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of
the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government
seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of
Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine
Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made
after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the
origin and development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the
term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said
case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined
by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American
Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American
regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native
Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio
Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some
Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for
habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a
permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing
civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they
roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist
in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on
these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of
a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive
order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the
"aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on
the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the
sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action,
although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their
aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their
boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have
held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest
definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in
1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of
two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs
being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to
the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed
out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition,
said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war,
to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between
them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of
the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire
Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or
Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of
the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by
purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the
discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from
the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title
unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession
has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the
universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without
having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia
enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or
permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor.
The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for
the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into
their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the
protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of
the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that
of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but
guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil
from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which
excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the
coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with
treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the
Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original
inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the
Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the
Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate
dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as
occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands
occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of
occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government
continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which
it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply
constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based
upon aboriginal possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the
federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on
actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by
Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to
another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and
occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in
the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being
held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to
designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land
which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of
Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the
Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of
indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second,
indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be
drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between
native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether
jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S.
recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed
to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not
specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of
aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans'
ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly
entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between
its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on
the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically
recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and
the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariñowas cited by the succeeding
cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a
different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must
be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act
are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right
to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind
of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however,
was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the
applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and
members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is
Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land
which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is
private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration
purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the
Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their
individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of
this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title
to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a
slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval
of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in
the concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims
are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of
registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified
as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements
of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals
specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to
disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on
which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act,
allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and
lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA
itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per
cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless
a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the
date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and
Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a)
agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any
of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes
will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is
the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and
lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified
period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent)
of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not
been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether
disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding
paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public
Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural
land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years
(judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous
possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession
has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights
of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427,
428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the
Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over
things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned.
And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it
produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or
even destroy the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by
any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral
domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is
not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is
owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides
that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally
held.209 These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights
under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the
property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much
less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years
subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the
right to disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be
dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but
extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the
reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot
be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are
communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to
the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject
to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under
customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a
source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in
cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable
provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies
to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil
law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT
is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land,
being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall,
and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation
to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right
to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or
used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that
will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for
any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment
upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural

catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights
by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration
or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which
covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred
places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any
time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to
resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to
safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations;
and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains,
Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the
same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to
secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains
Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision
in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is
declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control
and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements
with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in
the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly
undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private
sector through co-production,224joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through
Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the
large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with
foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to
"mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do
not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral
domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section
7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the
traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not
cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, floraand fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies
with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7
(a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands.
These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to
use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests
over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section
7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership
over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural
resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the
ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and
these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership
over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the
law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants
the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources
in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by
the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for
the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future
generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
"negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the
right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration
which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and
conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization
or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure
that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and
that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to
national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate
small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale
utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal
fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance
and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these
resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by
their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed
Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written
agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own
decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may
exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under
the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural

resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The
terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within
the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for
subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual
labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate
in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for
a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition
that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or
exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there
is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential
rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said
doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the
light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural
resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources
by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of
the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of
said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement
with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs
under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the
State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and
exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the
agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not
mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options
and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in
the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the
natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour
always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give
due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie,
have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance
with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural

resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation
shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained.
Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend
any project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained.
Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie
within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57
of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources.
First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples
controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN
Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the
attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the
possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's
Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-
82 and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights
and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments'
inability to deal with the situation.241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy
on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now
seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an
influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a
State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and
development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international
category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on
the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law
made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to
removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of
these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government
through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is
through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the
evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the
Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this
Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and
affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum
resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction,
which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross
violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to
compel public respondents to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon
Strait Oil Exploration Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are
the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around
the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-
Osorio) as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly
empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an
unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock,
non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region
VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their
personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department
of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-
Regional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board;
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan
with a Philippine branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of
JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez
(Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their capacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and
then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively.6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical
Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.7
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.8
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel
sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to determine the area's
underwater composition.9
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was
to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988,10 JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact
Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other
Purposes."11
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait)
issued Resolution No. 2007-001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE)
commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil
and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an
exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.16
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two
separate original petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents
be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike17 its name as a respondent on the ground that it is not the
Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the branch office application of
JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly identified. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere
logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil and gas exploration activities in the Philippines.
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS's motion on the ground that it was
premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that SOS admitted that "it is in law
a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other exploration activities in Tañon Strait under the
instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They argued that it would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX
had not yet been joined in the case; and that it was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its
name from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it in its
motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
also asked the Court to implead JAPEX Philippines as a corespondent or as a substitute for its parent
company, JAPEX.19
On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to Strike with
Motion to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No. 180771.
On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation21 that they were not objecting to SOS's
Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all this time, did not file any comment at
all.
Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given ample chance
and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the Court's process servicing unit
to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due
course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. The February 7, 2012 Resolution22 reads as follows: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales,
Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527 (Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center,
et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). - The Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-
SEND the resolution dated September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this
resolution:
c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Atty. Aristeo
20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
O. Cariño
Counsel for
Respondent 146 Valero Street
Supply
Oilfield
Salcedo Village, Makati City
Services, Inc.
JAPEX
Philippines 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Ltd.
146 Valero Street
JAPEX
Philippines 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Ltd.
c/o Atty. Maria
146 Valero Street
Farah Z.G.
Nicolas-
Suchianco
Atty. Maria
Suite 2404 Discovery Centre
Farah Z.G.
Nicolas-
25 ADB Avenue
Suchianco
Resident Agent
Ortigas Center, Pasig City
of JAPEX
Philippines Ltd.
This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on February 23, 2012.
On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of special appearance, filed a Motion to
Admit23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX PH requested to be clarified as to whether or not it
should deem the February 7, 2012 Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not
been impleaded. It also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities in the Tañon Strait
way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of Time25 to file its
Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012 Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had
until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum. JAPEX PH then asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly
to give this Court some time to consider its Motion for Clarification.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit its Motion for
Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification, held:
cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, this Court
considers JAPEX Philippines. Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s
allegation that it is a completely distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company,
Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the purpose of
carrying out the latter's business transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no
separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of a resident
agent of a foreign corporation:chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. — The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require
as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign
corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of
attorney designating some person who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and
other legal processes may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and
consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the
duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation shall
likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange Commission an agreement or stipulation,
executed by the proper authorities of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its being granted by
the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any time
said corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in
the Philippines on whom any summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or
proceeding arising out of any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such
service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers of the corporation
at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such
summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such copy
by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by
the Commission for such service shall be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service is
made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately notify in
writing the Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive summons or legal
processes that may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These
cases have been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch
office and resident agent, had been receiving the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by
Registry Return Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension of time to file its
memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within which to comply with the
submission.27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this Court for an
additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012. It justified its request by
claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued past its requested deadline for filing, which
was on April 21, 2012.28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file its Memorandum
and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda,29 and public respondents had earlier filed a
Manifestation30 that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31, 2008 as their memorandum, this
Court submitted the case for decision. chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners
Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the
fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the
average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch
an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the "payao"
also known as the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32 observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic
survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public
consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC,
were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards'
allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or discussions with the fisherfolk and other
stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic surveys and
drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig
was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE.33 It also
agrees in the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an
ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with the
procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries
Code, and their implementing rules and regulations.34 It further claims that despite several requests for
copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Taflon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait
Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987
Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing
laws and regulations; that public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners
copies of all documents relating to SC-46; and that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to
injunctive relief. They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and
academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21,
2008.36
ISSUES
The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards in G.R. No.
180771: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLAT[IVE] OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION FOR OIL
AND NATURAL GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF THE TANON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE COMMITMENTS
TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

(ECC) IN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE WILDLIFE AND
ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER.37
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our consideration: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS DOE

AND JAPEX SHOULD BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORATION CONTEMPLATED UNDER SERVICE
CONTRACT NO. 46 IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY PASSED
EXPRESSLY FOR THE PURPOSE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TANON STRAIT
PROTECTED SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION GRANTED TO
PETITIONERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

(ECC) FOR SUCH AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TANON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE
CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE MATTER.
V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO FURNISH

PETITIONERS WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TANON STRAIT OIL
EXPLORATION PROJECT.38
In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by the petitioners
may be condensed into two primary issues:
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards, petitioners in G.R.
No. 180771; and
II. Main Issue: Legality of Sendee Contract No. 46.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the '"moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts have decided cases otherwise moot and
academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and
4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these consolidated
petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both petitioners allege that SC-
46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the
public's interest, and the respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition. chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ib rary
Procedural Issues
Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal standing to file this
action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful performance of international and municipal
environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have
the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international
instruments that the Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident
Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among
the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the
Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark
in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be either natural or juridical
persons, viz.:chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the
counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may
refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were
all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn.45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the
ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public
respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-interest for their failure to show how they
stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.46
Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any proof that
former President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts
remain to be her own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' petition was
not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal standing in actions
before courts of law is not new in the field of animal rights and environmental law. Petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B.
Morton,49wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the conventional thought on legal standing,
opined: c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal
rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name
of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury
is the subject of public outrage, x x x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful
for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary
and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of
trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life.
The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water
ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who
enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is
part of it. Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which
are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate
objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our
own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest,
even if filed by a representative, viz.: chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff may refer to the claiming party, the
counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may
refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third
(fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a

representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting
in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical
persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate
objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show
that he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While
developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas's
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification of
procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,51 which allow for
a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws: chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in
a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective
provisions.52 (Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, commented: chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.)
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission55 held that: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take
away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing,
do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had
already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, we
allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn "based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned."56Furthermore, we said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not
even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated
by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and
not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition. chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of Malacañang Palace,
Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be the incumbent President of the
Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her
express declaration and undertaking under the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners'
habitat, among others. She is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time
in seeking her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may hereafter
arise by reason of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego principle in political
law.58cralawlawl ibra ry
This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be
obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be
obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the
jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party's
name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a
denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in
their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President
as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is
contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit.
Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case. chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis

Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that
SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under
paragraph 4 of the same provision.61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos62 laid down the guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which is that there must exist a general
law for oil exploration before a service contract may be entered into by the Government. The petitioners
posit that the service contract in La Bugal is presumed to have complied with the requisites of (a) legislative
enactment of a general law after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as Republic Act No. 7942, or
the Philippine Mining Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b) presidential notification. The
petitioners thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining contracts under Republic Act No.
7942, does not apply in this case.63 The petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have been repealed
by the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the
environment.64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural
resources,65 and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical
Assistance Agreements.66
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46 does not violate
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does not fall under the coverage of
paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs.
They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are
not applicable to SC-46 as the contract does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise
impinge on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources.67
Ruling of the Court

On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which reads as follows: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases ours.)
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987
Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution
did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the
1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime, to wit:cha nro blesvi rtua llawlib rary
Summation of the ConCom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations,
as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term service contracts in
referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the
abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the
general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to
Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned by such citizens — the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign
investments in the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be considered adequate and
reasonable. But some of them, having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban service contracts altogether;
for them, the provision would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's natural resources, which
they felt should be reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the entire body. They sounded
off their individual opinions, openly enunciated their philosophies, and supported or attacked the provisions
with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony — including paragraph 4 allowing
service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to the general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2
of the same article — was resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service Contracts with Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the
other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation
and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies
(DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.68 c ralawlaw li brary
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the
safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the
safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69 cra lawlawlib rary
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the
Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972.
This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous
petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the
maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise repealed, to wit: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed,
or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done expressly by
Congress. For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local Government Code of
1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific provision in Presidential Decree No.
87, viz.:
chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby
repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and
issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3)
and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential
Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464,
477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been expressly
repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied
repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that when laws are in conflict with one another, every
effort must be exerted to reconcile them. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining
Corporation,72 we said: chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference
of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to
have known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and
give effect to all laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a construction that it
is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should be preferred.73 This Court,
in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections74 expounding on this point, pronounced: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason,
a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent, x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the ground that there is
no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts
involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law
upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be
discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed
only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a general law,
the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be
notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code provides: chan rob lesvi rt uallawlib ra ry
ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law between the
parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit
and govern the relations between the parties, x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into
any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed
only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional
requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently
notified of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are also that of then
President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres,77 we explained the concept of
the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise:
cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation
omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much bigger role. As we have explained
in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize
the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will
only render a contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not
just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will nullify the contract.
Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service
Insurance System,79 held: chanro blesvi rt uallaw libra ry
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. (Emphasis ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be the signatory of
service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the exploration, development, and utilization
of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This power cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any participation in SC-46.
Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her
disapproval, must fail as the requirement that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is
embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving
the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount interest to the
present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law
are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments
and agencies by ensuring that the President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the
DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under said statute, as shown in the
following provision:
c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. - Every contract herein authorized shall, subject to
the approval of the President, be executed by the Petroleum Board created in this Act, after due public
notice pre-qualification and public bidding or concluded through negotiations. In case bids are requested or
if requested no bid is submitted or the bids submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being
disadvantageous to the Government, the contract may be concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum operations, any of the following
alternative procedures may be resorted to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior approval of the President
[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the
aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or
subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the
government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved of such
contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar. chanRoblesvirtual Lawli bra ry
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No. 9147 or the Wildlife
Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine exploration and exploitation of oil and gas
deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of
information-gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. The said petitioners
further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998,
which protects the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal waters, with the exception
being limited only to research and survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, the
gathering of information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved program, and the exploitation and
utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a general law passed by Congress expressly for that
purpose. Since there is neither a DENR-approved program nor a general law passed by Congress, the
seismic surveys and oil drilling operations were all done illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46
infringes on its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters as it is denied free access within
the prohibited zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of the 1987 Constitutional provisions
on subsistence fisherfolk and social justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the provisions in
Presidential Decree No. 87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters, should be deemed to have
been rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No. 7160, which
reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution.83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14 of the NIPAS
Act is a more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been repealed by the more general
prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver that Section 14, under which SC-46 falls,
should instead be regarded as an exemption to Section 27.84
Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a violation of Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the section prohibits is the exploration of minerals,
which as defined in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, exclude energy materials such as coal, petroleum,
natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas
exploration, Section 27 does not apply.85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant exclusive fishing rights
to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of municipal waters. Moreover, they allege
that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project area, contrary to the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents
also contest the attribution of the declining fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is
unfounded. They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data, the
reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court

On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative of the 1987
Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other pertinent laws, to serve as a
guide for the Government when executing service contracts involving not only the Tañon Strait, but also
other similar areas. While the petitioners allege that SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including
international ones, their arguments focus primarily on the protected status of the Tañon Strait, thus this
Court will concentrate on those laws that pertain particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape.
The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the
West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For
this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 - Declaring the Tañon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros
Occidental and Negros Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as Tañon
Strait Protected Seascape. During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also constituted the Tañon
Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum and sustained use of the resources in
that area without threatening its marine life. He followed this with Executive Order No. 177,87 wherein he
included the mayor of Negros Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Tañon Strait Commission, to
represent the LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in 2002 by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No. 72.88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the
NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a
comprehensive system of integrated protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that
were incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial,
wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to maintain essential
ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of
resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.91 The
following categories of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the

Philippine Government is a signatory.92
Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to
their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected
against human exploitation.
The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the
category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national
significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for
public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas;93 thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity outside the scope of the
management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals
of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under Presidential Decree No.
1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared
environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative.96 Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper management of
environmentally critical areas,97 Proclamation No. 214698 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of
projects to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an area delineated as
environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of
proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which
is "any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment,"100 is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely
impacts of all its stages on the environment.101 An EIA is described in detail as follows:
chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves

evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project (including
cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction,
commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the
community's welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the
project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review Committee,
affected communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been
declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management
plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing an EIA to determine
the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an ECC103 and that
SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, due to the following reasons:
1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy resources; and
3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being done with the least damage to
surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are outside the scope of
the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an environmental impact assessment as
required by law before they are adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the
decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where
such activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as
will minimize any adverse effects and take preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent
shall be liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in Section 2 hereof,
protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be subjected to exploration only for
the purpose of gathering information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the
least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved
by the DENR, and the result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the
President for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found within
NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an
exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is allowed under Section 14
of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement to undergo an EIA
under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto,105 this Court explained why a statute should be construed as a
whole:chan rob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and
intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section
and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to the one section to be
construed. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of
etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some
particular definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these
definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached
to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject treated of and
the purpose or intention of the parties who executed the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed
the statute or constitution, x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with the
EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any
exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated in Section 2 of the NIPAS Act, to wit: chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on all components of
the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial
advancement amd recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural biological
and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain
human life and development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to
secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas within the
classification of national park as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common ecological values
that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural heritage; that effective
administration of this area is possible only through cooperation among national government, local
government and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must
be consistent with the principles of biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall
encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether
terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second
sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic
surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic
surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were dona in violation of Section
12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586, which provides: chan roble svirtuallawl ibra ry
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The President of the
Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection
Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally
critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally
critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President
or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the
President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations
or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and
responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the proper land or
water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient environmental quality
standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or protective measures against calamitous
factors such as earthquakes, floods, water erosion and others, and (d) perform such other functions as may
be directed by the President from time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will
not cure this violation. The following penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the
NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the ECC
requirement: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership found violating Section 4 of this
Decree, or the terms and conditions in the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, or of the
standards, rules and regulations issued by the National Environmental Protection Council pursuant to this
Decree shall be punished by the suspension or cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an
amount not to exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the
discretion of the National Environmental Protection Council. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIPAS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section 21: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations issued by the Department
pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the offenses in the
preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing damaged
or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years, or both, as
determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as
determined by the court, the offender shall be required to restore or compensate for the
restoration to the damages: Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of the offender from
the land and the forfeiture in favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or any species
collected or removed including all equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith,
and any construction or improvement made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an association
or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for the act of his employees and
laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent
with this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy
resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction
and petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While
Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for
petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress,
since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.106Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil
exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization
may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the other issues
raised in these consolidated petitions.cra lawred
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and
Presidential Decree No. 1586.

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Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

xxx xxx xxx

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

A cause of action is defined as:

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

FELICIANO, J., concurring

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

FELICIANO, J., concurring

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, vs CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

The CA Sustained the RTC

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON

[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL

The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

We agree with respondents.