1. REP. vs. , MARELYN TANEDO MANALO (Peralta, J.): 4.
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation
of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice
of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of
the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately
from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall
not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et
al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view
of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this
case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was
dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision
was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26
now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is
to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although
the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that
is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many
Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands
even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws
and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining
a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the
Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by
the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the
ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that
was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of
a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal
property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay,
et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue
of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of
the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the
framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We
put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are
found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should
be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 39 Law have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render
it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort
should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15
of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination
and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification
is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right
to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale
rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to
take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems
and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are
alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment
because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or
her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37
and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the
RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as
well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically
grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice
of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos
to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying
foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what
he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome
by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care
of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was
conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is
whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just
because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure
lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed
marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an
alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.
The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way
they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or
not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the
only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily
to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now
that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding
Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of
the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the
filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an
extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have
force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens,
whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to
re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17 th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these
bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading -
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree
of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even
if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of
legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
 c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest
of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes
that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any
ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. 79 It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to
point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic
abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of
2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of
every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered
as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has
to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have
become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven
and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human
potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel
the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before
a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu
the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
2. MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON
vs. BENJAMIN L. SINGSON (DEL CASTILLO)
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set
aside the November 12, 2010 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch
260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed
a Petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines6 (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were
married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said
marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the
expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,"7 and a compulsive
gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that
respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's
abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her;
and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled
to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility,8 a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending
psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on
respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from
Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in
his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in
order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good
career in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate fmancial
situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it
would be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are]
etiologically related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from
the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational
and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can
be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore
diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations.9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood;10that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as
the youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were, however,
transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years old; and
that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already
betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders,
but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement
to govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or
debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the
instant case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or
assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children
are living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do
not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the
standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing
more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that
contrary to petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in
business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his
alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the
psychiatrist to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder;
that petitioner's allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered emotional
devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous; and that assuming that
he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are
not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin
to hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable
psychiatric disorders that were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the
land where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their
conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank
accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares
of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets
because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused
him to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his confinement
and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional
medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal assets it
stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose),
and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of
the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit
dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008;
Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical
Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a
notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November
1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses
paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes
Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on the ground that the totality of
evidence presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply
with the essential martial obligations x x x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and
respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29,
2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was
waiving the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the
Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The
RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby
rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a.
CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong
City or any other marriage between them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the
respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to
cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of
Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and
Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National
Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that
respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical
antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly
showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations; that respondent's inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to
71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising from a
pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering
from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has been shown that
this personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest
only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his
relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the performance
of his obligations as a husband and as a father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of
the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It
reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from
"Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical
antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal25 which was given due
course by the RTC in its order26 dated February 28, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage between
Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case,
was not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing
at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in
obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner
failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave
psychological disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the
RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality
disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the
latter was truly capable of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job,
had provided money for the family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the
land on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and
their children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that
respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner
admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married; that
petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was
courting her; that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the
hospital during all four instances when she gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to
be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has
been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA
in its Resolution of January 6, 2014.29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30
Petitioner's Arguments
In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and
Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court,
including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love,
respect, and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies
of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological
incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations;
that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved
and built had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the
rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as
shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological
incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was
already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the
Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s
sister, and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor
overthrown by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to
respondent’s flawed relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder
that existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders
are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this
case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling
problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that
personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should
be affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by
petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly
that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor
of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the
same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties."37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As
amended by Executive Order 227)
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting
and construing the quoted Article, to wit:
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the
time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings
between the trial court and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the records, and
we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability to
perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that
respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations
as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the
land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee
and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was
working at a certain point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical
Summary and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence,
respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where
petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior
to their courtship and their marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized
summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to
around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover
the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for
their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that
electric bills came from this money. "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." 45 "[I]t is not
family home was built, thus - enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological,
not physical, illness."46
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A: No. Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel
Q: He does not [own] any real property? truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his
A: No. marital obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which
has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470, [Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.
xxxx Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?
[COURT to the witness, petitioner] A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in]
Q: Who owned this property? 2006, [S]ir.
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson. Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?
Q: Where is this property located? A: Yes, [S]ir.
A: It is located in United Paranaque. Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
Q: Where in United Paranaque? A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari. [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.
Q: Are you staying in that property? xxxx
A: We are staying in that property. Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?
xxxx A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on
[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner] the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it? and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out
A: It was donated to the children. from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would] immediately take them out
xxxx again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.
[COURT to the witness, petitioner] xxxx
Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner? Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam
A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor. witness?
Q: Who owns it now? A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that
A: The children because it was donated [to them].43 [respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when
he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's
time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?
any instance when respondent failed to live with them. A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.
COURT: Go ahead.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his
likewise brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children.44 personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied
with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing amounts of money in
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at
order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.
the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and xxxx
is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is [Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request
[from] this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you
concluded that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?
A: Yes,[S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?
A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to
perform his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who
is supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir.47
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly
negative traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of
[incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and
appellate court,49 we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective
postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of
the psychological incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises
for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his
marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as
already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x.52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically
identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was
younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist
who conducted the tests.54 And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that,
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly
betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having
personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in
court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of
psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that
marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State."55
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could
be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties'
marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding
petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct
was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges
which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all
adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of
respondent's alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's
psychological incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that
the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been
there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth."56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and
trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and
that the same antedated their marriage.57 If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the
CA's finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they got married and
that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.58
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that
respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality
disorders are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial
notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.59
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie."60 This is the situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
3. PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO (Perez)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25
March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the
same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in
Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco
H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A.
Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime
in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her
children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name
of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself
to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually
filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General,
NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of
Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of
Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War
issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as
requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place
in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he
already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to
substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage
on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he
contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
 3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith
so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence,
her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s
counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the
validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without
proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the
original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove
the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the
witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves
the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial
court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol,
that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said
as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court
observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945
to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of
verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol. 27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof
of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children.
Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina
Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to
the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well
in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact
can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to
show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the
Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the
instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It
is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-
existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution,
besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents. x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It
generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of
such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which
is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established
by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage." x x x x
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina],
the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of
her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the
eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS (Mendoza)
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as
one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
x x x x SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned
to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that
when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it
and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits,
have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the
present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention
of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they
have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to
deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that
a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent
or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into
as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention
to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be
brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
5. LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO,
PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO,
joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO,
GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE
and EDUARDO SALDE vs. MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO
PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO,
TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO (Makalintal)
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita
died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her
deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino,
Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also
deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely:
Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and
Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A.
Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio
Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,"
whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and
808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about
the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the
second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs
alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute
the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido,
who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved
among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the
following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio
Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased;
great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido;
Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511,
509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that
each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but
because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to
Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino
Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido
Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age,
single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age,
single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40
to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of
age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but
because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of
age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa
Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to
Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A.
Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio
Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age,
married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and
alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and
11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of
the children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring
Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined
accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10"
for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim
and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring
that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the
legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that
Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding
that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in
toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he
instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the
brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina
Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three
were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two
were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the
first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by
petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the
face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner
Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that
Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon
us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in
1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he
was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut
the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome
only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs.
Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of
human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of
marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the
appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido
on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during
the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and
placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506,
511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the
contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by
the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there
is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
(t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late
Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said
Properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots
were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish
through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong
acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question
involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the
factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769
issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be
disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the
registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the
law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal
(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil.
922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in
whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It
appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership
had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the
same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12
of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of
sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in
the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence
and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court.
Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced
before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an
appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between
an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the
purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners.
6. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO,vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY (Romero)
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by
respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits
gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the
office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the
mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person.
The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge
of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other
for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family
Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were
considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been
sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's
answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states
that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado,
Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September
1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left
the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for
almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of
Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under
the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge
to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "
The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
 Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in
the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the
case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there
being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month
suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and
therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any will be dealt with more severely.
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized
to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court
Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of
civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law
they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to expect them to know and
7. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO (Panganiban)
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked
and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or
annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2 The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3 The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5 The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or
tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner
was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice
of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino)
on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of
the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22,
1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
8. ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.
vs.NORMA BAYADOG (Ynares-Santiago)
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed
the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null
and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage
after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void
their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family
Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated
the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the
State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a
basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the
State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy
and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be
resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity
— that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil
Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence
of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage
subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted
for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage
at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of
the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by
analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance
be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind
of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared
by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of
a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
9. HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs.JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan
(Davide)
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior
existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge
Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia
Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-
Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children
were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew
was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he
(Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of
P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in
the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
two separate affidavits5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively;
and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five
years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. 6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s
and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less
authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not
severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application
to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with
the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is
increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 179474 FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, JOSE A. DAYOT (CHICO-NAZARIO)
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between
Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose
and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them
had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According
to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder
in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage
contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.
Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put
him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover"
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets
and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he
is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa]
as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only
reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This
is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would
have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose
Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court
if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article
8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.
x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of the
Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87
(4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said
party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment
of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his
marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and
Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect
the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on
the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in
the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third
party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the
union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license,
it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that
the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate
Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of
uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE
TO FELISA.
II RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for
bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa
surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that
a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing
officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties
incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the
parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further
fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)
Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the
point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, 33 (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the
age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages
and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central issues
in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably construed.39 They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. 41 For the
exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years
of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.
The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes
of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986
when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case
the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are
supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither
did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of
a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation
of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior
license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we
must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage
not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the
marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the
essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which
is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of
nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage
was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void
ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity
that is unbroken.58

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
11. ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA VS. FELIPE APELAN FELIX (BENGZON)
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of the
marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived together as
wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. In
the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill.
Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God,
named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1 visited and persuaded her to go to confession. They
fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the
penitent had been living with Felipe Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to
ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard
the confession of the bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the
Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in
articulo mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then
January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied, and in
January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to
an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana
de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe
Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable
judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed
the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal question-which
they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the events which took place in
January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the
marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and
30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a
respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . .
Notwithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in
question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis, because Matea
de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, however, that her
condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and according to his observation, she might
die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in
administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The
greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under
consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no
question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr.
Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the priest, as
required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court of
Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held such marriage
contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis was a fact", and the
only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of
marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register the said marriage in the Record of
Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the
only issue tendered in the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate
or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which
provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by
signature or mark by the contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for
annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being manifested by
the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" — which in this case actually
occurred.3 We think the signing of the marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute
simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited
making it an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we
believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite
another.
 Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who have
provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the registration or recording lived publicly in a state of concubinage6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to be valid.
of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not
essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license, The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs
certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or recording. (Sec. who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or sisters and of
27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.) nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct that a
license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform the Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the
marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the
conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to
secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such
statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do so expressly, even where such
marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the
purpose of these statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit
intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties
who live together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage. . . .
(Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also
Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)

And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)

In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such
marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41) implies his
obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it would not be fair to visit
upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, which
apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of Manila and its
environs.

Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20
and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no serious
consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by the emergency.

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the requisites. (Jones vs.
Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to
make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for the issuance of a
marriage license. The firstpractically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated
without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5 this marriage should not also be voidable for
lack of such affidavit.
12. ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES
TRINIDAD (PANGANIBAN)
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be
proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of
Appeals 1 Decision promulgated December 1, 19942 and Resolution promulgated on February 8,
19953 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioner's action for partition and damages.
4
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and damages
against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Branch I. 5 On October 25, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
substituted as a party.6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in
which it ruled:8
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of
Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is
1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that
he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no
evidence introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This
court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other
and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:9
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's] complaint and the counterclaim
thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for reconsideration, dated December 15,
1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit
the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition. 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: 12
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan,
Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that
he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who
was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4)
parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him
the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 ,
before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed
that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death
of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children,
he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime
after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of
land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual
shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby
reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in
1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified
that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4
years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association
of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she
knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad
and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and
his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness
was about 30 meters away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go there 2 or 3
times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the
father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified
she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was
Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in
Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness
answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels
belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon.
Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely:
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the 3
children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in
the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified
by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the
witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes
Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and
Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She
testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was
holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court
when . . . the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if
Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his
parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name
Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being
July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she
used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area
as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures
presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present
during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all
of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only
sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She
testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes,
Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left
them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the
parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant
pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes
Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite
Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that
during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and
usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of
Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and
Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present.
The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him
when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while
Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken
care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad
wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants,
Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his
father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia
Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already
dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate
of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned
during World War 2 hut he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as
his mother was already dead. Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated
him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19,
he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria
Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and
children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants
when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as
Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter, his uncle
and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously
marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's son. According to
him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the
defendants. That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate
the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked
for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which
parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100
coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: East-
Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio
Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1
bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio
Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the
deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a
years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico
Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540
square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with
reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-
half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the
cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration
No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl.
No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting
the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that
his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in
New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a
municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he
was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who
died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his
mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this
case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the
produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and
they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's] highest educational attainment is
Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident
of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia
Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the
brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes
Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he
knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with
his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his
children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited
with anybody before his death, he answered, "That I do not know", neither does he kn[o]w a
person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the
lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had
lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because
he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt,
Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not
know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he
knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he
stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there.
When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case
before the court, witness answered that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3
children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of
Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead
before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was
buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land because
the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is
the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the
lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man
wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked
if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated
that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother
and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of
her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and
returned to Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in Manila,
witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in
Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of
Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in
Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, she said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them.
According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with
his grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died
already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived
with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad
went to visit her in her house, witness also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents,
Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix
Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only
remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same
manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She herself
testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children.
According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot
in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo
was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true
that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and
March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When she was
presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic]
the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; "Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita
Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to
be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the
parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; "Maybe there was."
When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness
identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church and
that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latter's child was
taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She
likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother,
Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the
plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are already blurred.
Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child
held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his
wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can
she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason.
When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the
son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness
testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew
Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also
knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they
were her cousins. She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad
died in their lola's house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that
Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his
father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 1/2
months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew
Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad.
According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was horn in
1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can
remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied
Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in
their private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would
carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a
resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she knew both the [petitioner] and the
[private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them.
When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from
Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in
that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister,
Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house. According to the
said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by
the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan.
That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by
Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from
Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to
present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978
issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New
Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the
municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
Respondent Court ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove
that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not
prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that
Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in
rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington,
Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended
the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of
the marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21,
1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one
of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in
(Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).
Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the
concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964,
when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than
ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
 The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the
marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that
he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-
appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the
Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became
effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be attached collaterally by the
private respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of
the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for
partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. 16 His right as
a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court
holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the
face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply
here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case. 17
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married,
and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent
Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has
been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove
the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a
witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and
the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan
that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case.
Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant
evidence may take its place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and
former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and
Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away.22 On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended
petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes evidence of
common reputation respecting marriage. 24 It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records relative to his birth were either
destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on
June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and
his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first
daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case
was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they show
that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem
motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows
her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only because
she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she
recognized her late brother — but not petitioner, his wife and the couple's children — slyly
explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an
illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either
consanguinity or affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding
pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents' self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died
unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified
that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was
willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese
forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only
three months, and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: 33
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or
not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them", to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad
and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he
had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody
with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed
with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that when the Japanese occupied
Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick.
Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue
in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who
was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The
Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan
was not occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead
in the cemetery In Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from
private respondents — a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that
of the adverse party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial
court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to
Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court
may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest
or want thereof, and their personal credibility. 40 Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and
convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor. It declared:
 . . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of
being their nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own
where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes.
The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family
pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not
broached the idea of getting his father's share. . . . His demand for the partition of the share of
his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. . . . In
this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when
plaintiff demanded for the partition . . . as he was already having a family of his own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of
the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence,
among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness
was already 77 years old at the time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the
plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She
has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either
cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom,
petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence, there is no
more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause.
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose
benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does
not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner
(Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin
vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the
other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118
[1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.

Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription SO ORDERED.

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested
parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and
because private respondents had been in possession — in the concept of owners — of the parcels
of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.

The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question
by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners,
unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner
or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.

In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the
concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land
in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of
petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in
their father's name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940
and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
held: 44
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III (QUISUMBING)
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A.
Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on
a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the
first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article
26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to
file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long
and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of
the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would
not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
14. REPUBLIC v. JENNIFER B.CAGANDAHAN (QUISUMBING)
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and
seeking a reversal of the Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed
by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry, baptismal certificate, and
certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
"female" to "male."
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are as follows. Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN
in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics COMPLIED WITH; AND,
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where II. CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE"4
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected 108 of the Rules of Court.
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer
to Jeff. The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG
appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf. further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The OSG
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained that respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally and she has two sex organs - female and male. He testified that this On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was
condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent's condition is Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8 respondent is actually a male
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, 9 change of
sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the
The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads: requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner's body produces male Rule 103
hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to CHANGE OF NAME
be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
SECTION 1. Venue. - A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the Domestic Relations Court].
prescribed fees:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. - The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the SEC. 7. Order. - After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and
SEC. 4. Hearing. - Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
the Republic. which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
SEC. 5. Judgment. - Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court had.12 Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.13The corresponding
such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition. petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. - Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be Section 6,15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
Together with Article 37616 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
904817 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register.18
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
108 of the Rules of Court.19
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
made parties to the proceeding.
in the civil register.
 female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: chromosomes. However, respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) features of a male.
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
minor; and (16) changes of name. having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
those that occur after birth.20
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance
of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a
or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
medication,26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male,
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully
such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000
his male characteristics.
to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
CAH is one of many conditions21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
either male or female.22 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
"is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. 23 Since the rise
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent">27 and in the absence
of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
genitals.24 More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
female.
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a `no-man's land' for those individuals who are
neither truly `male' nor truly `female'"25 The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced
by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
and the consequences that will follow.28 The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name
from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change
consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find
in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in
scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
his birth certificate from female to male.
subject's birth certificate entry is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
15. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
REPUBLIC (CORONA) fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
female. (Genesis 5:1-2) read:

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came with his present sex.
two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
Maganda)
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex?
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always
to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s
misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of taken against him.
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel their dreams.
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as
"male."
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition
despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and interpose any [o]pposition.
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling
trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-
from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex
from "male" to "female."
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the
of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof
or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled
to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now
primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law
is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first
name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended
to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or
any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
 (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities
and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration
shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or
by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date
and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations
to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there
is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the
Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore
be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the
contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function
that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33Female is
"the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding
do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been
used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion
a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can
only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who
has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the
law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
17. RAQUEL G. KHO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO (PERALTA) Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;

Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA- Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal
GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil
Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent
petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was
petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows: celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
x x x x
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk as affidavits of witnesses.
to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage
between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive
so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony; portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between
actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of
a public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the
venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
June 1, 1972;
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement
of a marriage license; SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such,
was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent
dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby null and void ab initio.
rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most essential
requisite; Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated
its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the
neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of such marriage Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
license; between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for
all intents and purposes.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after
due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered: The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is
a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law
which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January
14, 2009. (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit: (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
"ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH
VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT; (7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN are based;
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING not disputed by the respondents; and
PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING
marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for
THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
this Court to review these findings.
RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil
due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner
in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent. (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

The Court finds for the petitioner. (2) Their consent, freely given;

At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in
nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these issues in a petition for review (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
on certiorari. character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
The Court does not agree.
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and
those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of
Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo
the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a
mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not
marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
without exceptions, viz.:
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. 15 The rationale for
the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
into their capacity to contract marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that
marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.17 there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not
affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage subject marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed. without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.

The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this
and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which
principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically state that the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.

On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to
prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his
favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove
the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of
the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid
marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no
record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the
basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has
been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it
is she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that
burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their
marriage contract from the National Archives and Records Section, where information regarding
the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she
also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all
attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a
marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to
present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification
issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or
entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that "such document
does not exist in their records despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28, 26 Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as
to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that
would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court
considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage
license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This
ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic
v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this
Court relied on the Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to
petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said
case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty
has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
"The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the
subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. 33 As
cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to
79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged
illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite
under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED
18. RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE (BRION)
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo
challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry
each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that
they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding.
Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange
their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. 6She heard the petitioner instructing the
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to
her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the
ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the
municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where
she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and
imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s
act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition
of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a
marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the
RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC
applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its
provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one
month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the
latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of
the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had
transpired. It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve
more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis
of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 According
to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a
marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article
350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities
such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code
and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple
take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in
writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing
officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. 18 Second, under the
principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such
as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions
nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue
to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and
what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of the
Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article
3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a
marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties
before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this
fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to
timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission
regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed
been the declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and
convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to
the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code
when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is
required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has
paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration
and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage
ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of
a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the
essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As
correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage
Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation
of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely
under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of
the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of
the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.
The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision
clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The
penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39
of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing
marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or
parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or
minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than
two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC
that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section
39, of the Marriage Law.