TAN JR. vs.

CA
GR 136368

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in favor of
spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered
into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to
redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that
while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable
mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid; xxx

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On
March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of Tan
has expired. Tan, Jr. opposed that until an entry of judgment has been issued by the CA and copy thereof furnished the parties, the
appealed decision of the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. The period of redemption on his part
commenced to run from receipt of entry of judgment.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed Tan to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned
from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should be given retroactive effect.

RULING:

NO! Sec 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great
injustice to Tan. Undoubtedly, Tan has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Tan followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he
redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this
procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the
laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time
provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of
judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The
record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate
that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be
immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, promulgating the revised provision on execution of judgments, which states
that: it appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be promptly enforced because of
undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery of
said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which
can remedy the procedural impasse created by said contingencies.

Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a solution to the aforestated
problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following section thereof on execution of judgments, amending Section 1,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Xxx
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in Sec. 1, Rule 39 as
follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution.

There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well-delineated exceptions.

Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. They include rules of
pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to
be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that "a
retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is
to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the
time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is
presumptively applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.

Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply
where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to
apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive
application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be
applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the
courts."

ASIA UNITED BANK vs. GOODLAND, INC.

FACTS:

On July 21, 1999, Goodland mortgaged its two real properties in Laguna to AUB as security for the loans SPI. Goodland’s vice
president, Gilbert G. Guy, signed the contract of real estate mortgage on its behalf.

On January 29, 2002, Goodland sent a letter to AUB repudiating the mortgage over the Laguna properties and accusing them of fraud
and falsification. Goodland claimed that Guy signed a blank deed of real estate mortgage on the understanding that the company would
act as a third-party accommodation mortgagor for SPI. Goodland did not intend to secure the loans of SPI or mortgage the Laguna
properties. Also, Goodland demanded to release the encumbrance over the Laguna properties. AUB ignored respondent’s demand.

On January 16, 2003, Goodland filed Civil Case B-6242 in RTC-Biñan to nullify the mortgage over the Laguna properties on the ground
of fraud. Meanwhile, AUB foreclosed on the Laguna properties due to SPI’s failure to pay its loans. The properties were sold in a public
auction in which the bank emerged as the highest bidder.

On November 26, 2006, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-7110 in RTC-Biñan. Goodland sought to nullify the foreclosure of the Laguna
properties on the ground that it never agreed to mortgage the same to AUB as security for SPI’s loans. On the motion of AUB, Civil
Case No. B-7110 was dismissed with prejudice on the ground of forum-shopping.

On August 16, 2007, the RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. B-6242 with prejudice on motion of AUB on the ground of forum-
shopping. Goodland counters that it did not commit forum shopping because the causes of action for the Injunction and Annulment
Cases are different. The Annulment Case is for the annulment of REM; while the Injunction Case is for the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Goodland argues that any judgment in the Annulment Case, regardless of which party is successful,
would not amount to res judicata in the Injunction Case. On August 11, 2009, the CA reversed RTC’s decision and reinstated Civil Case
No. B-6242.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Goodland committed forum-shopping.

RULING:

YES! There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as
"the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."

The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature)
which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the
REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the
prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief sought in
the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of
the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said
reliefs remains the same — the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping,
i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still
forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.

There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case
without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of
action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings
will conflict with each other. This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.

The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the
REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that "a party cannot, by varying the form of action,
or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall
not be twice litigated."

CABRERA vs. NG
GR 201601

FACTS:

On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against spouses Cabrera, alleging that the latter
issued to him 3 checks totaling P2.569 million which were all dishonored as the accounts were already closed. Spouses Cabrera
admitted that they issued the 2 checks to Ng and were dishonored. However, they claimed that they paid Ng through his son Richard
Ng. Further, they deny having issued the other check to him, alleging that the said check was forcibly taken from them his son.

On August 7, 2007, the RTC decided in favor of Ng. On August 8, 2007, the spouses received a copy of the RTC Decision dated August
7, 2007. On August 14, 2007, the spouses filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing on August 17,
2007.

The motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the said court had just
assumed office, which was rescheduled on September 25, 2007. On September 20, 2007, Ng filed an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and alleged that it is a mere scrap of paper since it violated the three-day notice requirement. Ng pointed out that the
spouses Cabrera sent to him a copy of their motion for reconsideration, which was set for hearing on August 17, 2007, via registered
mail on August 14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only on August 21, 2007 – four days after the scheduled hearing
thereon.

The motion was actually heard by RTC on October 26, 2007. On December 19, 2007, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the spouses because of violation of Sec. 4, Rule 15 which mandates that every motion required to be heard should be served
by the movant in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. The spouse
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was denied on October 21, 2009

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial the motion for reconsideration is valid.
RULING:

NO! Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an
integral component of procedural due process. A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to
act upon. Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing
or pendency.

Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to
be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice
requirement is deemed realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with.

This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement
in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is
considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of
the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be
given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert
the grounds upon which it is based.

It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due
notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two
months had passed since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent
was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent
was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007.

Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses
Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus,
the RTC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to comply with the three-day
notice requirement.

SEBASTIAN vs. MORALES

FACTS:

Leonila Sarenas, et al. are the heirs of the late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate on June 27, 1986. During his lifetime, Guillermo
owned the following agricultural landholdings, all located in Samon and Mayapyap Sur, Cabanatuan City. Also, Guillermo was the
registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, being tenanted by Manuel Valentin and
Wenceslao Peneyra.The tenants tilling the farm lots had already been issued emancipation patents.

On July 14, 1993, Sarenas, et al filed an application with the DAR Regional -San Fernando, Pampanga for retention of over five
hectares of the late Guillermo’s landholdings. On June 6, 1997, the DAR-San Fernando granted the application. On June 16, 1997,
Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the order which was granted, and instead, allowed Sarenas, et al. to retain a parcel of land with
an area of 4.9993 hectares located at San Ricardo, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Sarenas, et al. then appealed the order to the DAR
Secretary which was granted.

Sebastian then filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the DAR Secretary in an order dated January 26, 1999. Thus, on
February 22, 1999, Sebastian filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction with the CA which was dismissed because of the wrong mode of appeal. It found that the orders of the DAR Secretary sought
to be reviewed were final orders for they finally disposed of the case and left nothing more to be decided on the merits. Hence, the
proper remedy available to petitioners was a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioners failed to attach a certified true copy
or duplicate original of the assailed order of June 18, 1998 as required by Rule 46, Section 3, and hence, it had no alternative but to
dismiss the action pursuant to said Section 3. Sebastian moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal by the Court of Appeals is valid and proper.

RULING:

YES! Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues
may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure.

In the instant case, Sebastian failed to show any compelling reason for not resorting to the proper remedy. Instead, we find from our
perusal of their pleadings before the appellate court that they stoutly and persistently insisted that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
was their correct remedy. We agree with the appellate court that Sebastian reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 is not merely a
mistake in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous appeal from the assailed Orders. For in relying solely on
Section 54, petitioners patently ignored or conveniently overlooked Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides
that:

An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a
petition for review with the Supreme Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of said decision.

Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be read in relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to
include: Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.21cräläwvirtualibräry

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this Court issued Circular 1-95 dated May 16, 1995 governing appeals from all quasi-judicial
bodies to the Court of Appeals by petition for review, regardless of the nature of the question raised. Said circular was incorporated in
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The
Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By
pursuing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under Rule 43, petitioners opted
for the wrong mode of appeal.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satisfy the requirements for the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43
does not necessarily mean that one is the same as the other. Or that one may be treated as the other, for that matter. A petition for
review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction.
It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for
review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. In the instant case, petitioners
failed to show any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction on the part of the DAR Secretary. When a court, tribunal,
or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is
an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.
For if every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial
would never end and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure. Hence, no error may be attributed to the
appellate court in refusing to grant petitioners request that their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 be treated as a petition for review
under Rule 43.

SABLAS vs. SABLAS

The court cannot declare a defending party in default without a motion from the other party. Where there is no declaration of
default, answer may be admitted even if filed out of time. Where answer has been filed, there can be no declaration of default anymore.

FACTS:
A complaint for judicial partition, inventory and accounting was filed by Esterlita S. Sablas and Rodulfo S. Sablas against the spouses
Pascual Lumanas and Guillerma S. Sablas in the RTC-Leyte. Spouses Sablas were served with summons and a copy of the complaint
on October 6, 1999. On October 21, 1999, they filed a motion for extension of time requesting an additional period of 15 days, or until
November 5, 1999, to file their answer. However, they were able to file it only on November 8, 1999. While the trial court observed that
the answer was filed out of time, it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare spouses in default was filed.

The following day, Estrelita et al. filed a motion to declare petitioner spouses in default was denied by the trial court. Estrelita et
al. moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Thereafter, they challenged the order in the CA in a petition for certiorari which was
granted by the CA on July 17, 2000, stating that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion because, pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their
answer on or before November 5, 1999. Spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari to SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC-Leyte committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Estrelita’s motion to declare Spouses in default after the
latter filed their answer outside the reglementary period?

RULING:

NO! An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. It can be properly issued against the defending party who
failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending
party
.
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party in default: (1) the claiming party must file a
motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in
default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of
Court.

The rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant
fails to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default as the
rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not under any circumstances act as counsel of
the claiming party.

It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the
reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to
extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period. Thus, the appellate court erred
when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or
before November 5, 1999.

The rule is that the defendant’s answer should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to
the plaintiff. Where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no
showing that defendant intends to delay the case, the answer should be admitted. Therefore, the trial court correctly admitted the
answer of petitioner spouses even if it was filed out of time because, at the time of its filing, they were not yet declared in default nor
was a motion to declare them in default ever filed. Neither was there a showing that petitioner spouses intended to delay the case.

Since the trial court already admitted the answer, it was correct in denying the subsequent motion of respondents to declare petitioner
spouses in default.

The policy of the law is to have every litigant’s case tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned
upon. A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims and present their arguments and
adduces evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are
subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached
by the courts.

SLU vs. COBARRUBIAS

FACTS:

Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the SLU College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the Union of
Faculty and Employees of SLU (UFESLU). The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and
UFESLU contain the following common provision on forced leave:
Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years shall be on forced leave for one (1)
regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended.

SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the 1 st sem of SY 2007-2008 when she failed the evaluation for 3 years, with the rating of
85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required rating of 87 points. To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought
recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery. Despite the conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, prompting
Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE-
Baguio City. When circulation and mediation again failed, the parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before
VA Daniel T. Fariñas.

Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave
for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the
same five-year period. SLU countered that the CA decision cannot be considered in deciding the present case since it is presently on
appeal with SC, thus, is not yet final.

On October 26, 2007, VA Fariñas dismissed the case.because CA is not yet final because of the pending appeal with SC. On
December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to
attach to the petition copies of the material portions of the record. Thus, on January 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition outright for
Cobarrubias’ procedural lapses.

On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration. On July 30, 2008, the CA reversed its decision found that
Cobarrubias substantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias’ petition despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period.

RULING:

YES! Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set
by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for
review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall
pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient
ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal has been filed.

Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance
the efficiency of our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a
party’s substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from aninjustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

GIPA, ET AL. vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

FACTS:

On February 26, 1996, Southern Luzon Institute in Bulan, Sorsogon, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with
Damages against Alonzo Gipa, et al. SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Poblacion, Bulan,
Sorsogon. However, Gipa, et al who had been informally occupying a portion of the said property refused to vacate the same despite
demand. Hence, SLI sought that they be ordered to immediately vacate the premises, turn over the same to SLI, and pay
compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

Gipa et al asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believed that they have the right to stay on the said property.
petitioners They averred that SLI had not even for a single moment taken possession of the subject property and was merely able to
procure a title over the same thru fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation. RTC ruled in favor of SLI. Also, the CA dismissed the appeal
since it was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid.

Gipa et al filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of ₱3,000. In view of this, the CA
granted the said motion. The CA further required Gipa et al ,to remit within ten days from notice the amount of ₱30 for legal research
fund, which apparently was not included in the ₱3,000 appeal fee previously paid by them. Despite the lapse of nine months from their
counsel’s receipt of the said resolution, Gipa et al, however, failed to comply with the CA’s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the
appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal filed by Gipa et al. for failure to remit the meager amount of P30 after
having advanced a substantial portion of the docket fees.

RULING:

NO! The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at the outset. It may be recalled that while
petitioners paid a substantial part of the docket fees, they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short of ₱30.
Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already become final and executory due to non-perfection, the CA
could have dismissed the appeal outright. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of ₱30 was lacking and considering that
the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the docket fees are paid, it still required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the
reglementary period, to complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from notice.

The CA’s leniency over Gipa et al. cause did not end there. Although they were given only 10 days to remit the ₱30.00 deficiency, the
said court allowed an even longer period of nine months to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would be on its
way. But as no payment was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the appeal for non-perfection. Surprisingly, petitioners were
again heard of when they filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a postal money order of ₱30.00. Nevertheless, they
did not offer any plausible explanation either as to why they, at the start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or why they failed to
comply with the CA’s directive for them to remit the ₱30.00-deficiency. Instead, they focused on begging the CA for leniency, arguing
that the meager amount of the deficiency involved justifies relaxation of the rules. What is worse is that even if the CA already took note
of the lack of such explanation in its Resolution denying Gipa et al’s motion for reconsideration, petitioners, up to now, have not
attempted to tender one in this Petition and instead continue to capitalize on substantial justice, fair play and equity to secure a reversal
of the dismissal of their appeal. The Court cannot, therefore, help but conclude that there is really no plausible reason behind the said
omission.

Suffice it to say that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule
have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Petitioners’ failure to advance
any explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the period allowed by
the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted. Neither do the
cases cited by petitioners help because they are not in point.

Also, Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on
payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case. Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the
clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or
the record on appeal.

The procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal
may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is
an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY vs. MAGHARI III

FACTS:

On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña filed a Petition before RTC-Bacolod praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate of
her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. Hofileña was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and
other children. On June 9, 1998, the RTC designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in
the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution8 dated September 14, 2007. In other
proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El.

In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy. Magdalena Uy,
through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of
Johnny K.H. Uy. On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.Magdalena Uy, through
Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated December 8, 2010. The Regional Trial Court subsequently
denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration

As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum. At this
point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar. Wilson
Uy learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been
copying the professional details of Atty. Natu-El. Wilson Uy then filed a Motion to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt

RTC declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt. Wilson Uy filed before SC a disbarment case for Maghari's act of repeatedly
changing and using another lawyer's professional details. Maghari does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by
complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were mere overlooked errors.
For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had been printed and ready for signature, all what he did after
cursorily going over it was to affix his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without giving any special... or particular
attention to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Maghari should incur disciplinary liability.

RULING:

YES! A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through his or her
signature, a party's counsel makes a positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has read the pleading,
that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics.
Signing a pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task
to... non-lawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members
of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.

The inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information
aid in the service of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate better representation of a
client's cause.

Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are products of mere
inadvertence.

To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer. These details somehow found their way into
respondent's own pleadings.

Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and professional tax
receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el.

Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were discarded while some were retained. The December 8,
2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no longer his IBP official receipt
number and... professional tax receipt number

This gradual act of segregating information, discarding some while retaining others, and retaining less over time, reveals that the author
of these markings must have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded from those that were to be
retained.

Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a matter of clerical errors. He willfully used false
information. In so doing, he misled courts, litigants—his own client included— professional colleagues, and all others who may have
relied on the... records and documents on which these false details appear.

REPUBLIC vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORP.

FACTS:

Kenrick Development Corporation constructed a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation
Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some prime land. KDC
claimed ownership over the property. It presented TCT registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the LR Aand found that there is no record of TCT. The land was also found to be
within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines against KDC and Alfonso Concepcion. On December 5, 1996, KDC filed its answer signed by Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for KDC.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a
hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998,
one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, KDC’s former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted
an unsigned draft to KDC’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to
sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic filed a motion to declare respondent in default predicated on its failure to file a valid answer.
The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the
answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap of paper and
produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court granted the Republic’s motion. KDC elevated the matter to the CA. On May 31, 2001, CA reversed
it and found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA err in reversing the trial court’s order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer.

RULING:

YES! Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. Signature by
agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority
respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There
was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled
that KDC’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. KDC was properly declared in default and the
Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

KDC insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned
pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be set aside. Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly
labeled as mere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside
may result in arbitrariness and injustice.

Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by
the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended
to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. In
this case, KDC failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

BACOLOR, ET AL vs. MAKABALI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.

FACTS:

A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed by Drs. Lynman Bacolor ,et al. against VL Makabali Hospital Inc. Alejandro
S. Makabali, its owner and President, and Melchor Catambing, ER Manager. Allegedly, the Hospital engaged Drs. Bacolor, et al, as
resident physicians assigned in its ER for one year. Despite the expiration of their contracts, the Hospital continued to employ Doctors.

Doctors stated that on May 3, 2006, Catambing and one Dr. Lopez instructed them to resign, and re-apply to the Hospital as resident
physicians under a one-year fixed term contract and directed them to sign a. waiver and offered them "gratitude" pay of P27,000.00 but
they refused to resign; and because of their refusal, respondents demoted them as assistant physicians in the OR of the Hospital.

Additionally, Doctors insisted that to compel them to resign, respondents issued notices to explain to them. Consequently, Doctors filed
a case for constructive illegal dismissal against respondents. They argued that despite their complaint, respondents still conducted an
administrative investigation against them. On June 30, 2006, Drs. Bacolor and Galura received notices of termination from the Hospital.

Doctors contended that they were constructively dismissed when respondents demoted them as assistant physicians in the OR of the
Hospital. They stated that such demotion was neither necessary nor temporary, and was arbitrarily done to force them to resign. They
further averred that Drs. Bacolor and Galura were actually illegally dismissed after they were given respective notices of termination.

On July 23, 2010, the LA found the respondents guilty of illegally dismissing the Doctors. The Hospital appealed to the NLRC which
reversed the LA Decision. Also, the NLRC decreed that Dr. Zheila did not even sign the verification and certificate of non-forum
shopping in this case.
On July 12, 2012, the CA ruled in favor of the NLRC and declared that the 3 out of 6 Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
With Undertaking is executed by Atty. Carlos Raphael N. Francisco, allegedly counsel of record of the doctors, not by themselves, in
violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the verifications executed by the Doctors and by their Counsel constituted full compliance with the required verification.

RULING:

YES! In Altres v. Empleo, the Court summarized the basic tenets involving non-compliance with the requirements on, or filing of
defective verification and certificate against forum shopping, to wit:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons".

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating
his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

As properly pointed out by the CA, the Verification/Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping with Undertaking executed by petitioners'
counsel is not valid. As stated in Altres, a certificate against forum shopping must be signed by the party and in case his counsel signs
the same on his behalf, the counsel must be armed with a special power of attorney. Since petitioners' counsel is not shown to have
been authorized by Drs. Villegas, Canlas and Zheila to sign a certificate of non-forum shopping on their behalf, the execution of said
certificate by counsel violates the foregoing rules.

Nonetheless, the CA failed to consider the concept of "substantial compliance" to the requirements of verification and certificate of non-
forum shopping, as it has been shown that three of the six petitioners executed their own verification and certificate against forum
shopping.

The verification of a pleading is a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement. It is intended to assure that the allegations in a pleading
are true and correct. As such, the court may order the correction of unverified pleadings, or it may act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules. The verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when a person who has sufficient
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and matters alleged therein have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. Thus, there is substantial compliance if at least one of the petitioners makes a proper
verification.

In this case, three out of six petitioners signed three separate verifications appended to the Petition for Certiorari. Their signatures are
sufficient assurance that the allegations in the Petition were made in good faith, or are true and correct. Thus, there is substantial
compliance with the verification requirement.

On the other hand, as a rule, the certificate against forum shopping must be signed by all plaintiffs or petitioners; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable situations, such as when the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of one of them in the certificate against forum
shopping is considered substantial compliance with the rules. Here, three of six petitioners signed the certificate of non-forum
shopping.

The Court, nevertheless, holds that there are justifiable reasons for the relaxation of the rules on the filing of a certificate of non-forum
shopping and that the certificate against forum shopping signed by three out of six petitioners suffices. Specifically, petitioners' cause of
action revolves on the same issue. The requirement of strict compliance with the rules on filing of certificate against forum shopping
highlights the mandatory character of the submission of such certificate. However, this mandatory requirement allows substantial
compliance provided that there are justifiable circumstances for the relaxation of the rules.
 CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORP vs. CIR

FACTS:

CVDC operates two drugstores, one in Tuguegarao, and the other in Roxas, Isabela, under the name Mercury Drug. CVDC alleged that
in CY1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified senior citizens on purchases of medicine pursuant to RA 74323. In compliance
with RR 2-94, CVDC treated the 20% sales discounts in 1995 as deductions from the gross sales in order to arrive at the net sales,
instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of RA 7432.

On December 27, 1996, CVDC filed with the BIR a claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted
to senior citizens for the CY 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083.The BIR’s inaction on the claim for refund/tax credit compelled
CVDC to file on March 18, 1998 a petition for review before the CTA in order to forestall the two-year prescriptive period provided under
Sec. 2304 of the 1977 Tax Code.
On April 26, 2000, CTA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. CVDC appealed the case to CA. On August 31, 2000, the CA dismissed
the petition on procedural grounds. CA held that the person who signed the verification and certification of absence of forum shopping,
a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of CVDC, failed to adduce proof that he was authorized by the board of directors to do so.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by the President of CVDC is sufficient compliance with
Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

RULING:

YES! There is no question that litigants must sign the sworn verification and certification unless they execute a power of attorney
authorizing another person to sign it. With respect to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5, Rule 7 on certification
against forum shopping are silent as to who the authorized signatory should be. Said rules do not indicate if the submission of a board
resolution authorizing the officer or representative is necessary.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the
General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the
rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."

In Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, we ruled that only individuals vested with
authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The action can be
dismissed if the certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority. We believe that appending the board
resolution to the complaint or petition is the better procedure to obviate any question on the authority of the signatory to the verification
and certification. The required submission of the board resolution is grounded on the basic precept that corporate powers are exercised
by the board of directors,15 and not solely by an officer of the corporation. Hence, the power to sue and be sued in any court or quasi-
judicial tribunal is necessarily lodged with the said board.

In the case at bar, we so hold that petitioner substantially complied with Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure. First, the requisite board resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in
Lepanto with the rationale that the President of petitioner is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in
the petition. Third, the President of petitioner has signed the complaint before the CTA at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or
tax credit.

MID-PASIG LAND DEV’T CORP vs. TABLANTE

FACTS:

MPLDC is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in Pasig City. On December 6, 1999, MPLDC, represented by its Chairman
and President, Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises, represented by its proprietor, Mario P. Tablante, executed an agreement
whereby the former would lease to the latter 1 hectare of the aforesaid land, for a period of 3 months, to be used as the staging area for
the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair.

On March 6, 2000, the date of the expiration of the Lease Agreement, Tablante assigned all his rights and interests under the said
agreement to respondents Laurie M. Litam and/or Rockland Construction Company, Inc. MPLDC eventually learned that Tablante had
executed a Contract of Lease with MC Home Depot, Inc. on November 26, 1999 over the same parcel of land. Thereafter, Tablante MC
Home Depot, Inc. constructed improvements on the land and subdivided the area into 59 commercial stalls, which it leased to various
entities. Upon the expiration of the lease on March 6, 2000, MPLDC demanded that respondents vacate the land.
Rockland filed a case for Specific Performance with the RTC-Pasig to compel MPLDC to execute a new lease contract for another 3
years. Consequently, MPLDC filed unlawful detainer against the respondents. On April 29, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment
dismissing the unlawful detainer case. On appeal, RTC-Pasig affirmed the MTC decision.

A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA which was dismissed on November 20, 2003 on the ground that the verification and
certification against non-forum shopping was signed by Antonio A. Merelos as General Manager of the MPLDC without attaching
therewith a Corporate Secretary’s certificate or board resolution that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of MPLDC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed by a General Manager without attaching a Corporate
Secretary’s certificate or board resolution that he is authorized to sign for and on behalf of the Corporation is invalid.

RULING:

NO! In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court ruled that: “It must be borne in mind that Sec.
23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted,
and all properties controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and
officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer
cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been
our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.”

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or
acting general manager to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping;

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of
a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.1avvphi1

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the
rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition."

From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Merelos’s
authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be considered fatal to the filing of the petition.
Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. Considering
that petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we have
emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure that
all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of
technicalities.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs. CA

FACTS:

On 24 December 1997, BERI filed a complaint for sum of money against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Lolita Toledo answered
that Manuel is already dead since 13 July 1995. As a result, BERI required Lolita to disclose the heirs of Manuel. Lolita submitted the
names and addresses of the heirs. BERI moved for the substitution by his children as party-defendants which was granted by the
Court.

On 7 October 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel under Sec. 5, Rule 86 and that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased
Manuel by his heirs. On 8 November 2004, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time. Respondent
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is estopped from questioning trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo .

RULING:

NO! The principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of
the parties are pertinent herein.
In the first place, jurisdiction over the person of Manuel was never acquired by the trial court. A defendant is informed of a case against
him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of
such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person."

In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons
upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.

Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is the dismissal of the case as against
him, the trial court err when it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the party to be
substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the
duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of
his legal representative or representatives. x x x

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator x x x.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30)
days from notice.

Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and,
in effect, there was no party to be substituted.

The concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3)
jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of
the litigation.

The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter.