STATCON REVIEWER

A Lazy Law Student

ROLE OF FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE

The views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per
se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in
accordance with the intention of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced
from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.

Case: Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co.

SC Ruling:

Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and

authorities to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or
supersede the agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it
claims, would impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. (Ortigas
and Co. Limited Partnership used Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al. and Dolan v. Brown)

PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

When a foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of
identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours.

Case:

In the case of Del Scorro v. Johan, SC ruled that since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.

LEGISLATIVE INENT

The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the

meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced.

Case: People v. Concepcion

SC Ruling:

In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 25 of Act No.
2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act.
Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. 2938 has served to
take away basis for criminal prosecution. The Court holds that where an act of the
Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
Courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of
the old law.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS DETERMINED PRINCIPALLY FROM THE LANGUAGE OF

THE STATUTE

Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.

Case: Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

SC Ruling:

The aforementioned provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.

VERBA LEGIS (Plain Meaning Rule)

It is a rule in a statutory construction that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.

The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or

interpretation of a law is to examine the law itself to see what it plainly says. This is the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction.

Case: Nuez v. Apao

SC Ruling:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which
provides: "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral

electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted
that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the
messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to
the admissibility of the text messages had been laid.

NOTE: Selective Memory < Fragmented Recall

BETWEEN TWO STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS, THAT WHICH BETTER

SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW SHOULD PREVAIL.

Case: Salenillas v. Court of Appeals

SC Ruling:

The Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under "Section 119 of
the Public Land Act. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of re conveyance."

It is clear that only three types of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase
that is the applicant, his widow and legal heirs. Elena Salenillas is a legal heir of the
Enciso being their daughter.

The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made
by respondent contravenes the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law shall prevail.

CONCEPT OF VAGUE STATUTES

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible

standards that men “of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application.”

When the law is vague, it is void.

Case: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan

SC Ruling:

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and
every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.

STARE DECISIS

When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where the
facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and property of the
same.

Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters
already decided on the merits cannot be re-litigated again and again.

Cases:

1. People v. Mapa
2. People v. Macarandang
3. 3.People v. Jabinal
4. 4. People v. Santayana
Note: What is the possible justification for the different rulings in the aforementioned
cases?

THE FIRST FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURT IS TO APPLY THE LAW.

Case: People v. Mapa

SC Ruling:

SC stated that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it
shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."

The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines],
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,"
are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties.

The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in
the list therefore the accused is not exempted.

WHY ARE SALARIES OF JUSTICES, JUDGES AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS NOT

SUBJECT TO DIMINUTION?

 To protect the independence of the judges

 To prevent the possibility of influences of external factors that can intervene with
their duties
Cases:
1. Perfecto v. Meer
The imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto
amount to a diminution thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting
words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one
purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit
diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the
independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary of a judge
as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.

2. Endencia v. David
The Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income
taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by
the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be
diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated
that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted
from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is
Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

3. Nitafan v. CIR
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general
income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and
inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the
deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that
the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution´ of
salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose
income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to
income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.
WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, COURTS SHOULD NOT
DISTINGUISH
Case: Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. IAC
Facts:
[P]rivate respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection
of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in
attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a
supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00
thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the attached properties were
released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial
Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition
for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. The
respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and petitioner
herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of was issued.
Issue:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe
enforced on the counterbond of the petitioner.
Held:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved
with costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The rule, founded
on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires
that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law.
In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none
is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as
they find it and without regard to consequences.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in
accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be
charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only
a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS
What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Case: Lydia O. Chua v. The Civil Service Commission
SC Ruling:
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid
reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including
those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the
applicable maxim in this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds
that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed”.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and
CSC of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for
voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said
law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the
law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

WHEN THE LAW IS CLEAR, IT IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE OF INTERPRETATION. IT

MUST BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF WHO MAY BE AFFECTED, EVEN IF THE
LAW MAY BE HARSH OR ERRONEOUS.
The Courts’ first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to
its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a
provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity and equitable principles only
come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
WHERE THE LAW SPEAKS IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE, THERE
IS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, VACILLATION, OR EQUIVOCATION, THERE
IS ROOM ONLY FOR APPLICATION.
USE OF WORD “MAY” IN THE STATUTE GENERALLY CONNOTES A
PERMISSIBLE THING WHILE THE WORD “SHALL”IS IMPERATIVE.
Case: Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals
SC Ruling:
 The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used
the term “SHALL” and denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute, its importance ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, and the Court holds that the present case must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning.
Land registration is a proceeding in rem and as such is validated essentially in
publication this being so the process must be strictly complied with, in that the one who
is instituting the action must be able to prove his title against the whole world. Hence,
before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name
of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose, the
reason of which is DUE PROCESS.
In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. The Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application and there is no alternative. Thus, the case was dismissed without prejudice
to reapplication after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

STATUTE AS A WHOLE
A Cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of statute as a whole and not merely of a particular
provision. For, taken in abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which
is different from the one actually intended. A general provision may actually have a
limited application if read together with other provisions. Hence, a consideration of the
law itself in its entirety and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress are in order. A
provision or section, which is unclear by itself, may be clarified by readings and
construing it in relation to the whole statute.