JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.

versus

FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., et al.

FACTS:

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and
as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.

Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating
them in their use of La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.

They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or
cause of action for JCHA, etal. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and
each may be affected differently than the others. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants
averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz
Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a
voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.

ISSUES:k/md

1. Whk/mdether or not the complaint was properly filed as a class suit?gk/mdgk/mdddd

HELD:

1. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. “The
individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.”

NOTES:

 Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action?

The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding
the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. In the present case, the Court finds the allegations
in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action

 A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable

injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for
its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue,
the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be
clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

Joseph v. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540 (’89)

 FACTS: Joseph was a paying passenger in a cargo truck. The cargo truck tried to overtake a
tricycle proceeding in the same direction. At the same time, a pick-up truck tried to overtake the
cargo truck, thus the cargo truck was forced to veer towards the shoulder of the road & rammed a
mango tree in the process. Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. Joseph sued the
owner of the cargo truck for breach of the contract of carriage & the owner of the pick-up for
quasi-delict for injuries he sustained. The owner of the pick-up paid Joseph the amount he was
claiming thru a settlement agreement. Joseph still wants to maintain the action vs. the truck owner
claiming that he still has another cause of action vs. the latter, for breach of contract of carriage.
 HELD: When there is only one delict or wrong (i.e. one injury), there is only one cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person (violation
of contract of carriage & quasi-delict).
 The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights
of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted fr. several acts, only 1 cause of action
arises. In this case, the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit w/ the correlative rights of action vs. the different respondents thru
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
 The resps. having been found to be solidarily liable to the pet., the full payment made by some of
the solidary debtors & their subsequent release fr. any & all liability to pet. inevitably resulted in
the extinguishment & release fr. liability of other solidary debtors.

 GR. No. 165142 December 10, 2007EDUARDO RAYOv.METROBANK Q !" mb!#$, %.&A'T()
 Midas Diversified Export obtained loans from Metrobank. To secure the payment of
the loan, a mortgage was executed in favor of Metrobank over three parcels of land. When Midas
failed to pay, Metrobankextra udiciallyforclosed thereal estate mortgage. !t the bidding,
Metrobank ac"uired the property. Metrobank posted a bond re"uired for issuance of a writ of
possession. #ayo, a co$assignee of the property filed an action for nullification of the sale.
Metrobank opposed for themotion contending that he is not real party in interest.
 *((UE)
 Whether or not petitioner has a legal personality in the suit.
 +E D)
 %nitially, it is recogni&ed herein petitioner as the co$assignee of the sub ectreal properties.
'owever, while petitioner would be in ured by the udgment in thissuit, that the petitioner has no
present substantial interest to institute the annulmentof udgment proceedings and nullify
the order granting the writ of possession. #ayo would not be in ured by the udgment. !n
ex$parte application for a writ of possession not strictly udicial process contemplated in article
(()of the new civilcode. %t is a udicial proceeding for the enforcement of one*s right of
possession.
 D*(-O(*T*ON)
 Wherefore the petition is denied for lack of merit. The assailed resolutionsdated
+une -, //( and !ugust ), //( of the 0ourt of !ppeals in 0!$1#. 23 4o. 5)56- are
hereby affirmed. 0ost against the petitioner.
 COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
 COMMISSIONER DOMINGO VS. SCHEER G.R. No. 154745. January 29, 2004

 FACTS:

 Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given permanent status to reside in the Philippines
on July 18, 1986. He married a Filipina and have 3 children. He also opened a restaurant in
Puerto Prinsesa.

 One day, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) received information that Scheer was
wanted by the German Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued against him.

 The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation against Scheer.

 In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice-Consul on
its speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the
respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the
respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in
Palawan. The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but an
undesirable alien as well.

 When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then
BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in
the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the
German Embassy.

 Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not resolve the respondent's motion. The
respondent was neither arrested nor deported.

 Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision dismissing
the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries. The German Embassy in Manila,
thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.

 In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his
passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his
request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995, and
the restoration of his permanent resident status.[19] Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the
German Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.

 The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the respondents March 1, 1996, Letter.

 The respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March
20, 1997, the Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien
 Employment Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa
City.

 In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She
wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police.
On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted.

 At about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the
respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner. He was whisked to the BID Manila Office
and there held in custody while awaiting his deportation. Despite entreaties from the
respondent's wife and his employees, the petitioner refused to release the respondent.

 Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer.
The latter filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondent's temporary liberty.

 On June 11, 2002, the respondent's counsel filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction, to enjoin the petitioner from proceeding with the respondent's
deportation.

 The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were
premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy
remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law and that his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved
despite the lapse of more than six years.

 The respondent averred that he was a fully documented alien, a permanent resident and a law-
abiding citizen.

 CA issued a status quo order restraining the petitioner from deporting the respondent on a bond
of P100,000.00.

 BOC issued an Omnibus Resolution dated June 14, 2002, pendente lite denying the respondents
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Bail/Recognizance.

 On August 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent
granting his petition for certiorari and prohibition and permanently enjoining the petitioner
from deporting the respondent.

 ISSUE:

 1. WON the Board of Commissioners is an indispensable party.
 2. WON the the Non-joinder of an Indispensable Party is a Ground for the Dismissal of the
Petition
 3. WON The CA had Jurisdiction Over the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus


 HELD:

 2. YES. The BOC is an Indispensable Party. We agree with the petitioner's contention that the
BOC was an indispensable party to the respondents' petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the Court of Appeals. The respondent was arrested and detained on the basis of
the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC. The petitioner caused the arrest of the respondent
in obedience to the said Deportation Order. The respondent, in his Memorandum, prayed that
the CA annul not only the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC but also the latter's Omnibus
Resolution, and, thus, order the respondents immediate release. The respondent also prayed
that the CA issue a writ of mandamus for the immediate resolution of his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. The said motion had to be resolved by the BOC as the order sought to be
resolved and reconsidered was issued by it and not by the petitioner alone. The powers and
duties of the BOC may not be exercised by the individual members of the Commission.

 2. NO. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be
joined as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without
the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real
finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Lack of
authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of
impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.

 However, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA did not require the respondent (petitioner
therein) to implead the BOC as respondent but merely relied on the rulings of the Court in Vivo
v. Arca, and Vivo v. Cloribel. The CAs reliance on the said rulings is, however, misplaced. The acts
subject of the petition in the two cases were those of the Immigration Commissioner and not
those of the BOC; hence, the BOC was not a necessary nor even an indispensable party in the
aforecited cases.

 3. YES. The settled rule is that the authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting
international relation is vested in the political department of the government, and is to be
regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority
according to the regulations so established, except in so far as the judicial department has been
authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. The judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom or the justice of the measures
executed by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred on it, by statute or as required by
the Constitution. Congress may, by statute, allow the decision or order of the Immigration
Commissioner or the BOC to be reviewed by the President of the Philippines or by the courts, on
the grounds and in the manner prescribed by law.

 Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and the
lower courts such as the Court of Appeals, as established by law. Although the courts are
without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to
 execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may
look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with grave
abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department violates the law or
the Constitution. In Harvy Bridges v. I.F. Wixon, the United States Federal Supreme Court
reversed an Order of Deportation made by the Attorney General for insufficiency of evidence
and for improper admission of evidence. In Nging v. Nagh,the United States Court of Appeals
(9th Circuit Court) held that conclusions of administrative offices on the issues of facts are
invulnerable in courts unless when they are not rendered by fair-minded men; hence, are
arbitrary. In Toon v. Stump, the Court ruled that courts may supervise the actions of the
administrative offices authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no
evidence to sustain them. When acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency are involved, a
petition for certiorari or prohibition may be filed in the Court of Appeals as provided by law or
by the Rules of Court, as amended.


In this case, the respondent alleges that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, contrary to law and with
grave abuse of discretion in causing his arrest and detention at a time when his Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration of the BOCs Summary Deportation Order had yet to be resolved. There was
no factual or legal basis for his deportation considering that he was a documented alien and a
law-abiding citizen; the respondent, thus, prayed for a writ of mandamus to compel the
petitioner, the Chairperson of the BOC, to resolve the said motion. The petition before the CA
did not involve the act or power of the President of the Philippines to deport or exclude an alien
from the country. This being so, the petition necessarily did not call for a substitution of the
Presidents discretion on the matter of the deportation of the respondent with that of the
judgment of the CA.
DOMINGO V CARAGUE

FACTS:
This case was a petition for

certiorari

is the legality of a resolution No. of the Commission on Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The
petitioners alleged therein that this Plan is intrinsically void for want of an enabling law which gives that COA to
undertake the same and providing for the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines, and
parameters. Petitioners further alleged COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners have no legal standing to file the
present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome of the case" or an actual or potential injury that can
be redressed by our favorable decision. In essence, it is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners
claim otherwise by reason that the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere
reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon its audit performance.
This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a
matter of transcendental importance.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.
HELD:
The Supreme Court decided, NO.It stated that: (Locus Standi) There was no showing that they had any

direct and personal interest

in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There was also of an admission that "they do not seek any affirmative relief nor
impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative
relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain." Hence, the
petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. This case was decided by the Supreme Court En
Banc.He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. A party
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in
order to warrant an invocation of the court

Heirs of Bertido Hinog v Melicor

FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages"
against Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the disputed
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998, while trial
was still pending, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services was
terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his
appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all
court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the
complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that
non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the
complaint to be expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court
reinstated the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee.

On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for certiorari
and prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency docket fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is proper.

HELD:

No, it is not proper.

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitioners for extraordinary writs.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious
time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues because the Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to certiorari unless
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
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Spouses Alguro v City of Naga

White v City of Manila

FACTS:
The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774
which is entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes
in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" on December 3,
1992.

petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying

that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. RTC
eventually rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance
null and void. It was then elevated to the Court of Appeals
which reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutional of the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void
RULING:
Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme
Court, is to eliminate and if not, minimize the use of covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals by themselves are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. However,
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for
their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution,
and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive
theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism.

The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving

patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business
ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy
of the Ordinance as police power measure. It must appear that
the interest of the public, generally, as distinguished from
those of particular class, require an interference with private
rights and that the means employed be reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of the private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
exist between the purpose of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.