De Guzman v.

CA

Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he
gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan,
respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging
fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman
contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970,
respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck
carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value
of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he was a
common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled against
the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying
of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It
appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even
though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner,
and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for
others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their
goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here. A certificate of
public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting
causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of
extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of
the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the
goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or
force." we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall
that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary
diligence.

First Philippine Industrial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387. Sometime in January
1995, petitioner applied for mayor’s permit in Batangas. However, the Treasurer required petitioner
to pay a local tax based on gross receipts amounting to P956,076.04. In order not to hamper its
operations, petitioner paid the taxes for the first quarter of 1993 amounting to P239,019.01 under
protest. On January 20, 1994, petitioner filed a letter-protest to the City Treasurer, claiming that it is
exempt from local tax since it is engaged in transportation business. The respondent City
Treasurer denied the protest, thus, petitioner filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term “common
carrier” which refers solely to ordinary carriers or motor vehicles. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, and such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether a pipeline business is included in the term “common carrier” so as to entitle the petitioner
to the exemption
Held:
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public."
The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
(1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and
must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a
business and not as a casual occupation;
(2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
(3) He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his
established roads; and
(4) The transportation must be for hire.
Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner is a common
carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum products, for
hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all
persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition
of a common carrier.
PERENA VS. ZARATE
G.R. NO. 157917
August 29, 2012
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:

Perenas were engaged in the business of transporting students to Don Bosco. The Zarates
engaged Perenas services to transport their son, Aaron, to school.

While on the way to school, the van’s air-conditioned unit was turned on and the stereo playing
loudly. The driver took a detour because they were running late due to the traffic in SLEX. The
detour was through a narrow path underneath the Magallanes Interchange used as short cut into
Makati. When the van was to traverse the PNR railroad crossing, the van was tailing a large
passenger bus so the driver’s view of the oncoming train was blocked. The train hit the van at the
rear end and the impact threw 9 students including Aaron out of the van. Aaron landed in the path
of the train which dragged his body and severed his head, instantaneously killing him.

The Zarates filed for damages against Alfaro, Perenas, PNR, and the train driver. The cause of
action against Perena was for contract of carriage while for PNR, quasi delict. Perena posited the
defense of diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of their driver

ISSUE/S: Were Perenas and PNR jointly and severally liable for damages? Is the petitioner a
common carrier?

RULING:

YES. A school bus operator is a common carrier.

Perena’s defense of diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of their driver is
unavailable for breach of contract of carriage. Perenas operated as a common carrier; and their
standard of care was extraordinary diligence, not only diligence of a good father.

A carrier is a person or corporation who undertakes to transport or convey goods from one place to
another, gratuitously or for hire. They may be private or common

Private carrier is one who, without holding himself or itself out to the public as ready to act for all
who may desire his or its services, undertakes, by special agreement in a particular instance only,
to transport goods or persons from one place to another either gratutitously or for hire. The
diligence required of a private carrier is only ordinary

Common Carrier is a person, corporation, firm or association engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering such
services to the public. Diligence required is to observe extraordinary diligence, and is presumed to
be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of effects of passengers, or death or
injuries to passengers
The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of business actually transacted, or
the number of conveyances, BUT WHETHER the undertaking is a part of the activity that he has
held out to the general public as his business or occupation.

The Perenas held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a
particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee. Perena, being
a common carrier, was already presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident because death
occurred to their passenger. The omissions of care on the part of the driver constituted negligence.