G.R. No.
L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu
City and sentenced to death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which,
according to the court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous
girls and women against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and
sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here
succinctly the testimony of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and
told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told her that
Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to
Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had
nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped;
that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini
left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta
Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of
Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those first who
would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned
two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta
Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta
Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of the allegations
in court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence
adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken
from their homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese
Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente
Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S.
Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on
the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with all
her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese
Officer named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion,
Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened
her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the
car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that
when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda
were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor
exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the Japanese , and that
is why we arrested them"; that the said Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain
called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she
was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4
were fully proven beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
Bonalos on the pretext that they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against
a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and upon arriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the
residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and
intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of
Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her will;
that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls
Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had carnal
knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used as
witness in a case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a
car driven by the accused; they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and
after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her
immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap
officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her;
that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back to
their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came
and told her that the Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that
understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the
office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused
also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the
pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that
when her daughter returned to her house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told
her they would have preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the
accused had raped her.
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The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that
had elapsed between the occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court,
there could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and
admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained
in Court No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora
Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by
the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market
on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8,
1942, against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas
might make a selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to
lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and companion
nurses, saw the accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor
where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select
from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral purposes that she and her companions
were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused,
not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that
it was only her pretext that she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be
reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by
the accused do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and
preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the
efficiency of rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of
the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company kept up their morale, so
fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any
act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation
of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the
enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason
must depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not
always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as was said Cramer vs.
United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them
as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a
simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy
personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money
to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same
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count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816,
817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to
satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though
the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty
any more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve
their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated
to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable
effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as
principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been
committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which
says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the
People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the
information and established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution,
which guarantees to an accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The
contention is not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted
must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the
hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and
meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure
convicted for crime different from that designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that
such crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the
trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not charged against him and
should be ruled out. The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of
the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of
from 10 year of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of
the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties
shall not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-456 March 29, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
C. de la Victoria & Ramon Duterte and Sotto & Sotto for appellant.
First Assistance Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Jose B. Jimenez for appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the
appellants who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with
murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a complaint which as amended contains the following counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of Cebu. Philippines and
within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial
Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully
unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an enemy-
sponsored military organization knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said organization are among other to extend
every aid and cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts against the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary the said accused further adhering to the enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to
them did go out on numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in search of guerrilla and other elements and other
elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.
2. That on our about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, and the City of Cebu
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan
and the Imperial Forces with treasonable to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in violation of his allegiance and
fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines did then and there willfully unlawfully
feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai under the command of a T.
Yushida, performing the function and duties of an informer spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military
police and did during the period aforesaid in various places in the Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Court in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy with treasonable intent to give as he did give and comfort aid and
comfort to them did in company with other member of the Japanese Military Police go out on patrols to apprehend guerrilla as
they did apprehend capture and torture guerrillas loot civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the
hostile design of the enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.
3. That sometime in June 1944 in various places in the Province of Bohol Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable
intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary
attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the Japanese Army Jointly and in cooperation with soldier of the
Japanese Imperial Army did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called
mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other element engaged in resistance against said enemy
and as a result thereof ten guerrillas were killed.
4. That on or about during the period comprised between September 1944 and November 1944 in the City of Cebu Philippines
and within the Jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and the
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy did then and there
wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably help in the a construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese
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soldier against allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation
against the expected landing of America forces.
5. That on or about August 18, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines the accused Cucufate
Adlawan adhering the enemy the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did
aid and comfort to the said enemy in company with Japanese Military soldier of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino
enemy spies did then and there wilfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo
Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo a guerrilla officer to cause said
Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities.
6. That on or about December 7, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Court Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy in company with a patrol of Japanese soldier s of the Japanese Military Police and other enemy spices and
informers did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did
kick said Francisco Larrobia strike him on the face and head with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco
Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.
7. That on or about September 6, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay province of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy in his capacity as chief undercover man for the
Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with Japanese soldier and Santiago Bernaba another Japanese spy did then
and there willfully unlawfully feloniously and treasonably arrest Numariano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla thereafter
taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan Cebu City and thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa about
the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile design
and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face and body and otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.
8. That on or about August 18, 1944 in Sitio Tubod municipality of Minglanilla Province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its imperial Forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover
man informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District and in company with Japanese soldier of the Japanese
Military Police did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona and did
investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan food procurement officer of the guerrilla
and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter
by the arms so that his body dangled down striking his stomach and with an empty bottle inflicting wounds on his head and
finally striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.
9. That on or about October 2, 1944 in the municipality of Talisay Province of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces with
treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer
and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District in company with other informers said Military Police, did
then and there apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina Alpez
as to the whereabouts of her husband Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division Cebu Area Command and when
said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts herein accused did slap kick and throw her to the
ground hang her by the arms strike her on the breast with his revolver threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and
otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.
10. That on or about December 25, 1944 in the municipality of Minglanilla province of Cebu Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court the accused. Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial of Japan its
Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort said enemy in company with five
Japanese soldier and fourteen agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai and his capacity
Military Police for the Cebu District did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Victoriano Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat slap and strike said
Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times and did turn over said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to
the Japanese Military Police on the ground that said person were guerrilla and as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and
Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since then.
11. That on or about January 27, 1944 at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court the accused
Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces with treasonable intent to give
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy acting in his capacity as chief undercover man informer and spy of the Japanese
Military Police Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel
Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy.
12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
furtherance of his adherence to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the
Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and inn company with Japanese soldier, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the latter was a guerrilla.
13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did and comfort to said enemy, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and thereat herein accused did question
and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts by the enemy of guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong
denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely
beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her aforesaid husband, Pedro
Arong asking the latter to report top the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said
headquarters in compliance of said letter, he not been seen ever since.
14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at Sitio Gapas, Gaps Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Court the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable to give as he did give aid comfort to, said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man,
informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and
spies, did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question the
latter as the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerrilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the
accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on
his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla whereabouts.
15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the City of Cebu Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer
and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three
other Japanese informers and spies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Marciano Alejandro, Carlos Numera and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandro, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said
Jose Rada on the charge that said person had contact with guerrillas.
16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said
enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernardo Laborte, a guerrilla soldier
for the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.
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17. That sometime in the month of April, 1944, in different place in the Province of Cebu, Philippines, particularly in the area
comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering
to the enemy, thee Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, as member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonable join and take part in the general mopping up operation
conducted by the Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. Yushida, particularly in the area of Tubonok to Minglanilla
for the Purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy.
18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under
the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with the member of said Japanese Military Police under
the command of Sergeant T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
arrest, maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and,
did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco:
2 diamond rings, a ring and one wrist watch
P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.
19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the
accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese forces, with treasonable
intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as an informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers
of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy,
was captured.
20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent give,
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese
Military Police, Cebu District, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente
Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession
of the latter's connection with guerrillas.
21. That on or about July 19, 1944 at Cebu, City Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate
Adlawan, adhering to the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, in company
with Japanese soldier and other agent of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-tai, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up
the hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as consequence of said
maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.
22. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Court, the accused,
Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as
did give and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese Military
Police of the Cebu District, did and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and
"John Doe" her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping the guerrillas and did thereafter bring
said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat herein accused did torture them by
hanging them by their arms did otherwise maltreat them.
23. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the
accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent
to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippines
Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill
Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to the said enemy.
By his plea of guilty appellant admit having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he now pleads for
modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts:(1) voluntary surrender; (2) the facts that
the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military
commission; on and (3) the facts that the accused helped and saved the lives of many civilian and from death in the hands of
the Japanese;
2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of the assurance that
no death penalty would be imposed upon him;
3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery;
5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000.
Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the
so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the
information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is
being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,1 L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should,
therefore, be held guilty of treason only.
Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission that he was
"taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual
arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked (People vs. Conwi,2 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No.
23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil., 307.)
The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not been established
by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea guilty on the assurance that he would not be sentenced to death.
The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter
5
stating in its order denying appellant' motions for reconsideration that "No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion
in connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on the merit of the same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength
should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be
taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant
in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla
suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he
also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her
clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint
and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy
may be appreciated against him. As this said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There
is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain
and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy
will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main
criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of
which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the term of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are adsorbed in treason characterized by
killings, the killings themselves and other and other accompanying crimes should be taken in to consideration for measuring
the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the
rule treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers.
To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal
Code, to the danger and harm to which the culprit has exposed his exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and
injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code just penalties to the perversity of
the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed
standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment
with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's
aims.
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason is reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed P20,00 Giving the
appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary confession of guilty, but appreciating against him the
aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruel, the said penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since
five member of this court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.
Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-319 March 28, 1946
GO TIAN SEK SANTOS, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, Director of Prisons, respondent.
Mariano Trinidad for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor De los Angeles for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United
States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a
political prisoner. Such detention, he claims, is illegal, because he has not been charge before, nor convicted by, the judge of a
competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No. 682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States
nor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The Solicitor-General, for the respondent, admits the detention, for active collaboration with the Japanese, doubts the
allegation of citizenship, and maintains that, conceding arguendo petitioner's alienage, he may be charged for espionage, a
crime against national security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may, therefore, be held in custody under Commonwealth
Act No. 682.
As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject. The commitment order No. 291 issued by the United
States Army authorities describes him as such. But it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty now. He is included among
those contemplated by section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which reads partly:
Upon delivery the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by
him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all records,
documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with
and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as
possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security,
the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby
suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the
People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government.
His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the above provisions. As stated by the Solicitor-General,
he might be prosecuted for espionage, (Commonwealth Act No. 616) a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the
offender, and considered as an offense against national security.
The contentions advanced during the oral argument, challenging the validity of the said section 19, Commonwealth Act. No.
682, upon constitutional grounds must be overruled, in view of our decision in Laurel vs. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), copy
of which will be furnished to petitioner by the clerk of this court. The petition is denied, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
6
G.R. No. L-447 June 17, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, RICARDO NEPOMUCENO, and JOSE P. VELUZ, all
Associate Judges constituting the Second Division of the People's Court, and JOSEPH ARCACHE, respondents.
Solicitor General Tañada, Special Prosecutor Peralta, First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor General
Kapunan, Jr. for petitioner.
Vicente J. Francisco for respondent Arcache.
Respondent Judges in their own behalf.
DE JOYA, J.:
From the petition filed in this case, it appears that respondent Joseph Arcache has been accused of the crime of treason before
the People's Court, in criminal case No. 729 thereof; that in counts two (2) and three (3) contained in the information,
specifying the different kinds of properties alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese imperial forces, in the City of
Manila, during the enemy occupation, was also added the phrase "and other similar equipments"; that on March 8, 1946, said
respondent was duly arraigned before the respondent judges of the People's Court, and entered a plea of not guilty, and the
case was set for trial commencing April 8, 1946; that when the case was actually called for trial, on April 8, 1946, counsel for
respondent Joseph Arcache verbally petitioned the respondent judges that the prosecution should make more specific said
phrase "and other similar equipments" set forth in counts two (2) and three (3) of the information or have it stricken
therefrom, unless the prosecution should furnish a bill of particulars specifying what those "other similar equipments" were;
that the special prosecutor objected to said petition, on the ground that it was out of time, since respondent Joseph Arcache
had already entered a plea of not guilty to the charge; that on the same date, April 8, 1946, considering that the allegation
objected to was too broad and too indefinite to enable the accused to properly defend himself, the respondent judges granted
the petition, and, at the request of the prosecution, postponed the trial of the case to April 10, 1946, to give the special
prosecutor time to prepare the bill of particulars, which he agreed to submit not later than April 9, 1946; that on the same
date, April 9, 1946, instead of submitting a bill of particulars, the special prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order of the court, on the ground that it was contrary to law and that the court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and/or
with abuse thereof, which motion for reconsideration was denied on April 10, 1946, on the ground that the alleged defect in
the information could be cured by amendment, which might be properly ordered, in the interest of justice, so that the accused
might be clearly informed of the charges against him, and thus avoid any possible surprise, without necessity on the part of the
accused to plead anew to the amended information.
On April 26, 1946, the respondent judges filed their answer to the petition for certiorari filed in this case, relying upon the
reasons already stated, in their order dated April 10, 1946.
On April 30, 1946, respondent Joseph Arcache filed his answer to said petition, alleging that the special prosecutor was
estopped to question the legality and validity of the two orders complained of, as he had expressly agreed to submit the
specifications or bills of particulars called for, and that it was precisely at the request of the special prosecutor that the trial of
the case was postponed to April 10, 1946, to give him ample time to prepare and submit said bill of particulars; that the filing
of specifications or bills of particulars may be ordered in criminal cases in accordance with existing law and American judicial
precedents; that the defendant merely wanted to know specifically what the alleged "other similar equipments" were, without
amending the information, in the strict sense of the term, which would require him to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty;
and that the question whether to order the filing of a bill of particulars or not is purely discretionary on the part of the lower
court.
As already stated by this Court long ago, there is no specific provision of law, in this jurisdiction, expressly authorizing the filing
of specifications or bills of particulars in criminal cases. (United States vs. Schneer, 7 Phil., 523, 525.) But it is also true that, in a
subsequent case, this Court held that a detailed complaint or information cannot be properly objected to, and that the details
contained therein may be properly considered as specifications or bills of particulars. (United States vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682,
690.) It is thus evident that, in the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of
particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused.
On the contrary, they will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to
prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have.
Furthermore, in criminal cases, any defect in the accusation other than that of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be cured by good and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution, and admitted by the trial court, without any objection
on the part of the defense, and the accused may be legally convicted of the crime or offense intended to be charged and so
established by the evidence. (Serra vs. Mortiga, 11 Phil., 762; 204 U. S., 470; United States vs. Destrito and De Ocampo, 23 Phil.,
28, 30.)
Of course, it is to be expected that the defense will object to any question, which is not based upon the allegations made in the
complaint or information; but this does not preclude the possibility that immaterial evidence might be admitted, although not
supported by such allegations, due to inadvertence on the part of the defense. And inasmuch as in criminal cases not only the
liberty but even the life of the accused may be at stake, it is always wise and proper that the accused should be fully apprised
of the true charges against them, and thus avoid all and any possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and
interests; and ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or informations; and if any such
phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense, before the commencement of the trial, the court should order
either its elimination as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere matters of
form.
Considering that the two orders complained of are legal and valid, and that they were issued by the respondent judges, in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion, for the protection of the rights and interests of respondent Joseph Arcache, the petition
for certiorari filed in this case is, therefore, hereby denied and dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle, vs. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as
accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers
Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having
assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four
teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro
Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his
property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and
7
Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to
bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi
acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the
crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses
for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and
guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only
one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness
for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to
him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made
freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act
No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives
for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and
therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants,
appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as
the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed
weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of
Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias
"Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only
constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and
Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught
up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and
leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to
"dapa."3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie
down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry
them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything
one of whom was visibly tied. unusual that happened?

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told A: Yes.
Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene
asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead. Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that pumpboat?
point of a tres cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
A: Four.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him
that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?
to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis supplied).
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator
Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you."5 Juanito,
obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan. A: Only one.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).
brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them
safely ashore. Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or xxx xxx xxx
part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall
be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree COURT:
as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Q: What else did he do?
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a
vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to compel
the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking Q: What did he do with his revolver?
possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled
to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The Q: To what place did he order you to go?
testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation.
The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening — A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

8
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing
vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As
Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver
at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face
with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all
strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn
revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at
bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredations upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing
the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing
heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural
elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen
that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very
subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of
the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in
open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which
they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their
pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.
Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the
crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation
the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO
CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion
perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.
9
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and
ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente,
imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI
were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the
information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality
of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed
with firearms and taking advantage of their superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one
with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk
towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets,
merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said
accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the
said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and
wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in
dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely
medical assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id,
p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities, under a regime of so called compassionate
society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE
SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-
3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman
received goods from his store consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of
P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named
persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea and keep part of the profits for themselves. However
these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea
was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his companions were hacked
(p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC
seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of
his companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him,
were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they
brought with them had a total value of P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a
pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They
were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell
their goods at another place, Sangbay, where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and
upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able
to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p.
47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They
used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15
meters away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group
talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize (pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the
members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where
Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw
another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram
turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them
(pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized
them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to
them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards Mataja Island. On the way to
Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn).
Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de
Guzman, Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked
Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away
from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a
mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo
Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the Philippine Army station at Maluso where
he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-
68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He
pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he
took from de Guzman and de Guzman had to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72,
tsn).
10
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed:
'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial
Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding
death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de
Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also
the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they
testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial
court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when
they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family
immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all their goods would be premature. However, robbing and
killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For as the
prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas
Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were
ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily
Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The
Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made?
(Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the
defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against
them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented
showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified
piracy with triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken
by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of
helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not crediting the report of the accused or believing in
the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and placed
the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the
deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were
killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused
for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear to
have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman
noticed that near the window of a dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at
Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their
captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated
house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D)
That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the two accused
remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for
the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in
the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs.
Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his
remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a
manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July 14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on
June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material.
P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a
special complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or
gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds,
possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims
were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following
modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants
shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Gutierrez, Jr., Dela Fuente, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., for affirmance of death sentence.
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all
touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats
was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After
a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and
Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the
exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge,
although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
11
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and
were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio
for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor
of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the
two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been
robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however,
certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible
depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the
Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not
against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional
3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the
provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as
follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be
punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from
cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred
and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be
understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the
Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory
from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer,
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct
action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S.,
542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of
May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition
of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and
provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of
things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but
are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette,
Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine
Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been
disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of
the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas,
the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in
putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal
Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted
by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression
"citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of
United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning,
which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
12
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished
with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in
the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least
two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy
was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving
themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should
be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the
Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that
advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the
defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr.
Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the
equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned,
together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator
Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco,
older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr.
were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of
the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T
Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline
where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer
the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in
receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the
members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the
shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective
homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to
different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed
sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in
Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were
pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and
armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
13
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned
to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they
were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from
"M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the
effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and
Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to
work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with
additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On
board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were
paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses.
There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He
testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia,
obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two
years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in
the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio
telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker
oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan,
the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride"
but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching
Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be
designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi
Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although
no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to
procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in
the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-
side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full
name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The
surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the
quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and
drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed
on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo
operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines
to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact
vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at
Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN
OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger
Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of
piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as
accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death.
However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all
the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally,
to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate
of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are
hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return
the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery,
Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full.
After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of
Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
14
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the
proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them
of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in
the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the
Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation,
they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the
contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their
constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22
and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged
pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court
erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that
Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified
piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5)
the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary
to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the
commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were
pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal under
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted
for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a
non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate
the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when
he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters
and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature
and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also
affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that
"[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial
to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115
adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court
that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions
imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and
properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the
technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer,
Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been
made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation
of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which
is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.
15
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them
invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain
other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a
valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants
with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU")
and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words
of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no
less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March
2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its
cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the
"M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind
of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin
Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and
identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact,
boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination,
which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence
but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses
than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]).
Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said
accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks
and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their
destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is
incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain
Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a
completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that
on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a
weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering
that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco
not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts
have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain
witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a
whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the
ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to
fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to
Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way
home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the
younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping
Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from
each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were
neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by
affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its
cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while
Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532.
He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He
maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No.
532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement
or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the
complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
16
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any
person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or
the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the
high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is
no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the
law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as
well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential
Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate
laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive
vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer
was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage
and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he
induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who
knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or
brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of
piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in
accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless
the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any
person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its
transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal
transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other
provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and
utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could
have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition
of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi
17
Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the
vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the
vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose
of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the
transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride"
was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any
receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its
arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to
falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired
from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed
above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from
his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of
the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself
received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided
any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a
single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the
identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the
transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily
do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that
the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange
rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been
aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for
transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying
records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is
justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that
the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212).
Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk,
Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was
an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the
implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal
and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
judgment of the trial court in toto.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. L-496 December 31, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant, vs. WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellant.
William Lane O'Neill, for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August,
1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the
cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to
appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case
made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the Government,
counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the
crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the
city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the
jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the
Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of
the United States has been vested in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the
order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued that the President of the
United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a
judicial system with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of
some of the States of the Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was without jurisdiction to try the
accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of
the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order the prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was
brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as
well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer
jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While
the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to
criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively
dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1
adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and
offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the
Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance
with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for
crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of
this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
18
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or
sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of
State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the
occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from
the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the
possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant;
that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of
international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in
articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of
the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in
the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of
sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains
vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to
the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and
therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes
to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described,
and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his
own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military
forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of
the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is
nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a citizen who
resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public
order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose
his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and
would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in
the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into
the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as
treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against
public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because
they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government
were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as
against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of
the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new
ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for
the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague
Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the
military occupant dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey
them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in
force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding
upon said inhabitants;
19
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to
his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed
by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the
inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the
occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory
were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the
former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small
and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them
in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and
thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing
the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom
and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the
Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1,
Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that
"All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to
certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was
recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above
quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United States;
that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the
United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in
fact all the attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a
principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the
Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States; that
just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may
have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the
sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to
Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution
provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence,
the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is
hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a
separate opinion.
G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First Division of the
People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines
Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member
of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the
guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain
him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor
Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused
herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose
of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the
Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13
constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said
accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with
respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of
Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his
companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which
he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with the result that the
penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the
20
standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killing were
murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an
armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of treason. They
were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or
intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The
defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its sentiment to give the
defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed
and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of
means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate the
penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process
requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to
overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the
use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of
brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its
inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even terms
according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There
is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain
and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within
the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by
killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and
gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the
highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such
incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the
danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted
from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that
conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the
enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to
entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to
reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of
guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special prosecutor introduced
evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The
defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of
P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first
witness, testified that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the accused walked
behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day
in March, 1945, he saw the accused following an American and the accused were Japanese and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness stated that the American was walking as well as
his captors. And there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night when he and Albano had a drink of
tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the
whole overt act but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder
and physical injuries," with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders
and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying circumstances.
The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense
committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member
of the Japanese Military Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide
and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie
his hands behind him and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his Japanese
companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and
from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an
informer and agent for the Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did
in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the
21
hands of said Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face and in other parts of
the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day
while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused acting as an
enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin
who were forthwith tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and Santiago
Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did
cause the torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are
not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes
of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be,
and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be
punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion
or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course,
preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit
specifically for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or physical injuries are
charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be
taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since
they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal
objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused
pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another
attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial)
that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the
trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It
is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary.
(U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the
defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no
necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present
counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do
not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. if
Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did
not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an
aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court will be modified in
this respect accordingly. In all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs of this instance against
the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-1678 November 10, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff -appellee, vs. ELEUTERIO CAÑA, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Montilla for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Office of the Solicitor Jose G. Bautista for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The appellant Eleuterio Caña was charged in the People's Court with treason under seven counts. After trial, he was sentence
to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P5,000, plus costs.
This is relatively an old case. The reason for the delay in the determination of appeal is that it was first received in the court
and later, because of the penalty imposed which apparently had jurisdiction over it. However, said court because according to
its resolution the case to the opinion that the penalty applicable is reclusion perpetua.
For purpose of reference, we are reproducing the first five counts under which the People Court found the appellant guilty:
1. That said accused, Eleuterio Caña , with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, wilfully , feloniously and treasonably
acted and served as puppet Mayor of the Japanese in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines, and from June to October,
1942, and from November, 1943, to August, 1944, and as such puppet Mayor he willfully, feloniously and treasonably
performed the following acts:
(a) That he forced the people of Abuyog including government employees to dig trenches and foxholes and build stables for the
Japanese Armed Forces;
(b) That he told the people of Abuyog that the Americans would not return to the Philippine and that he was not afraid of the
Filipino soldiers and guerrillas because the Japanese Armed Forces were behind him;
(c) That the people of Abulog must obey his orders and tell the guerrillas and their relatives to surrender; and
(d) That he provided the Japanese soldiers with houses to live and ejected the Filipino civilians of Abuyog out of their houses to
give room to the Japanese.
2. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caña, with intent to give aid and or comfort to give aid and or comfort to the enemy
during his incumbency as puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, Philippines, especially in November, 1943, February and May, 1944,
22
wilfully, feloniously, treasonably led, guided and accompanied Japanese patrols to the barrios of Abuyog to apprehend guerrilla
suspects and their supports and also to locate hideouts.
3. That during the months of April and May, 1944, the herein accused, Eleuterio Caña, with intent to give aid and/or comfort to
the enemy, and taking advantage of his position as puppet Municipal Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte did then there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably force the people to harvest palay in the outlying farms and did confiscate the palay taken
therefrom giving part of it to Japanese soldier.
4. That the herein accused, Eleuterio Caña, with intent to give aid and or comfort to the enemy, during the time of the his
incumbency as puppet Municipal Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, did then and there lead, guide and accompany patrols composed
patrols composed of Japanese and Constabulary soldiers patrols to the barrios of Himara, Mahapalag, Union, Ogis, Mahayahay,
Polahongon all in the Layog District, and in the barrios of Bayabas, Dingle, Combos, Laray, Taleque, Habadyang, sitio Malasiga,
sitio Maitum, parts of the Barrio Anglad, of the all of Hogasaan District, which patrols machine gunned and burned the houses
in the abovementioned places.
5. That sometime during the month of July, 1944, the herein accused , Eleuterio Caña, with intent to give aid and /or comfort
to enemy, during his incumbency as puppet Mayor of Abuyog, Leyte wilfully, feloniously and treasonably informed the
Japanese garrison of Abuyog as a guerrilla suspect, was the father-law of the guerrilla lieutenant named Nicolas Camintoy, and
due to this information, said Basilio Pacatan was investigated, imprisoned and tortured by the Japanese soldiers for a period of
over thirty days.
In the open court the accused admitted that he was and had always been a Filipino citizen.
The following facts are not disputed. In the last elections helds before the last World (Pacific ) War, Pedro Gallego and
defendant Eleuterio Caña were elected Mayor and Vice Mayor respectively, for the town of Abuyog, Leyte. When the Japanese
forces went to Abuyog in June, 1942, they found the town without a Mayor because Gallego served as town chief executive
only to May, 1942, after which he went to the mountains and joined the guerrilla forces as a Mayor. The appellant being the
vice mayor elect, was designated acting mayor by the provincial governor and he acted as such form June to October, 1942,
when the Japanese garrison was removed form the town. Again, he acted as Mayor form November, 1943 when another
Japanese garrison was stationed there, until August, 1944, when the garrison was withdrawn. The acts of treason of which he
was accused were supposedly committed during his incumbency as Acting Mayor of Abuyog.
Under the first count, we find from the evidence that the defendant really recruited laborers to dig trenches, foxholes and air
raids shelters around the Japanese garrison and in some streets, and to build stables for the Japanese cavalry horses. It has also
been established that the accused had intervened in the Japanese soldiers and officers stationed in the town, although there is
evidence to the effect that rent was paid by said Japanese forces for the use of the houses. It was also proven that in the
poblacion of Abuyog as well as in some barrios, such as Malagikay, Anlag and San Roque he called people to meetings where
he made speeches in the Visayan dialect, telling the people that the real government was the one established and sponsored
by the Japanese; that the Americans, will never come back to the Philippine because they were afraid of the Japanese forces
who where stronger; that they must pay their taxes for the support of the Japanese sponsored government; and that he
(defendant) was note afraid of the guerrillas because the Japanese Army was behind him.
Considering the fact that the accused was then acting as mayor of his under orders of the Japanese garrison commander, there
is every reason to believe that defendants act in recruiting laborers for the construction of the trenches, foxholes. air raid
shelters and stables for the use of the Japanese forces was in obedience to the wishes and orders of the Japanese commander.
The same thing may be said of the commandeering of private houses. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which we may take
judicial notice, that during the occupation, not infrequently, the enemy forces restored labor to fill in their military needs and
also commandered indiscriminately private houses not only for their accommodation but even for their civilian agencies, and
that in such cases then services or intervention of the executive of the town were availed of, voluntarily or otherwise.
Furthermore, we agree with the Solicitor General that these acts of collaboration, including his making speeches during the
meeting is called by him, endorsing the Japanese regime may be considered as political in nature are covered by Amnesty
Proclamation No. 51 of the January 1, 1948, which he now invokes (People vs. Alvero, 86 Phil., 58 ). We may therefore discard
count No. 1.
Under counts 2 and 4, is the following evidence:
Bonifacio Laher, barrio lieutenant of Anlag, Abuyog stated that on February 2, 1944, a Japanese patrol of about 80 soldiers
arrived at his barrio, headed by the defendant Caña who was armed with a revolver. Caña called a meeting which about 60
residents attend. The accused made a speech in the Visayan dialect and asked the people about the whereabouts of Mayor
Gallego and Captain Landia of the guerrillas, saying that if they ever came with their forces, the resident should report the
matter to him or to the Japanese government was the real government. The patrol spent the night in the barrio and the
witness as lieutenant of the barrio was ordered by the accused to return the following morning to accompany the patrol. The
next day, February 3rd. Laher a accompanied the accused and the Japanese troops to the mountains. On reaching sitio
Malasiga, The patrol passed by the houses of Gonzalo Ablanque and Rosendo Fortaleza, and the latter was called from his
house and made to join the patrol to the house of Daniel Bolero where the soldiers ate pineapples and papaya. The defendant
asked Bolero who were the owners of the two houses they had passed and on being informed that they belonged to Ablanque
and Fortaleza, appellant exclaimed: "These are the houses where the guerrillas used to live." Thereafter, the defendant
conversed with Capt. Mikawa who commanded the patrol, after which Mikawa called two Japanese soldiers and ordered them
to burn the houses of Ablanque and Fortaleza. At the time said two houses contained agricultural products of different kinds,
including furniture and household goods. According to Fortaleza, he pleaded with the defendant not to burn his house, but the
accused paid no attention to him and the two houses were burned to the ground.
Laureano Pacia, a captain of the guerrillas told the court that on February 3rd, a Japanese patrol of about 80 soldiers headed by
the accused who was then armed with a revolver, arrived at the barrio of Anlag. The next day the patrol went to the barrio of
Malagikay. Pacia followed the patrol at a safe distance in order to observe as per instructions of his superiors. He saw that in
Malagikay the Japanese soldiers shot pigs and chickens for food. The defendant called the people to attend a meeting in front
of the barrio school building at which meeting he spoke and asked about the guerrillas , particularly Major Gallego and Captain
Landia. He urged his hearers to fight them (the guerrillas) if they ever came and to report their presence to the poblacion. After
the defendant, a lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary also spoke.
About these doings of defendant and the Japanese patrol in Malagikay, Pacia was corroborated by Major Gallego who was with
Pacia observing what was happening and listening to the speeches, particularly that of the defendant.
Major Gallego in his testimony also told the People's Court that on May 27, 1944, he saw the defendant Caña armed with a
revolver at the head of a Japanese patrol composed of about 80 soldiers in the barrio of San Roque, Abuyog. They shots pigs
and chickens for food and in the afternoon. The school bell and assembled the people , and at the meeting the defendant
made a speech in the Visayan dialect, asking the people if there were any guerrillas in the vicinity, telling them that if they
(guerrillas) came. The people should not give them food so that they would starve, and to report their presence to them town
so that the Japanese forces could come and catch them. He urged the people to help the government, the real government
sponsored by the Japanese, and not wait for the Americans go will never come back. With sarcasm he told the people that if
they were still interested in the Americans, they had better swim across the Pacific Ocean to get to them in America. At the
time that the accused spoke, there were no Japanese around him. In his testimony about the arrival of the Japanese patrol in
San Roque and the speech of the appellant, Gallego was corroborated by Felix Balga who added that the defendant in his
speech said that to show that the government sponsored by the Japanese was the true government he (defendant) was
accompanying the Japanese patrol.
Pelagio Elmeda stated to court that on February 2, 1944. He was at his post at barrio Bayabas on duty as captain of the
Volunteer Guards attached to the guerrillas under orders of Captain Landia. On that date, he saw a Japanese patrol of about 80
soldiers headed by the accused pass by the said barrio of Bayabas, apparently the same patrol that later went to the barrio of
Anlag and still later to the barrio of Malagikay on February 4th. The accused was then carrying a revolver. When the patrol saw
23
no people in the said barrio the soldiers burned all the five houses in the vicinity. The owners of said houses were then in the
mountains, having evacuated thereto because of the fear of the Japanese.
Under the court 3, Filomeno Tupa and Marcial Costen testified to the effect that the defendant as Mayor asked the people in
the poblacion of Abuyog belonging to the neighborhood associations to go to the farms and under the protection of Japanese
soldiers, harvest palay therefrom: that one-half of the harvest was given to the harvester; one fourth to the municipality and
the remaining one-forth to the Japanese garrison to feed its cavalry forces. The evidence on this point, however, further shows
that almost invariably, the owners of these lands had evacuated to the mountains and that said owners were afraid to harvest
their own palay for fear of the Japanese soldiers who might suspect them of harvesting said palay to give to the guerrillas who
frequented the farms. Their is reason to believe who frequented the farms. There is reason to believe and conclude from the
evidence that these harvests of palays directed by the defendant were not made with the intention of aiding the enemy but
rather to avoid loss or prevent the ripe palay form rotting in the fields and to utilized the harvest to aid the people. As already
stated , one-half of the harvest was given to the people who effected the harvest and one-fourth was given to the municipality,
said portion according to the uncontradicted evidence for the defense having been utilized to feed the indigent people, and
that a portion of it was sent to the capital (Tacloban) presumably. For the same purpose of aiding the poor in the province.
It will be remembered that during the occupation there was no importation of rice in order to make up for the deficiency, our
production being insufficient for the needs of the population, and that if the palay crop belonging to those who had evacuated
to the mountains were not harvested the critical food situation would have worsened. It is not difficult to see that members of
the neighborhood associations living in the poblacion of Abuyog and needing rice for their consumption, may have even
suggested to the defendant to harvest the palay in the outlying districts under the protection of the Japanese soldiers against
the guerrillas. Among the farms where palay was then growing and ready for harvest there must have been some which
belonged to these very members of neighborhood association living in the poblacion who, fearing that the guerrillas would
interfere with the harvest of their own palay, asked for protection from the Japanese Forces.
As to the one fourth portion of the harvest given to the Japanese garrison, undoubtedly, said portion was given pursuant to the
wishes and orders of said garrison for its needs and also in return for the protection services rendered by its solders during the
harvest. We find that under the circumstances the defendant cannot be held liable under this count No. 3.
Under count 5, Basilio Pacatan, 69 years of age, stated in court that on June 1, 1944, a Japanese patrol composed of about 44
soldiers headed by the defendant who was then armed with a revolver came to the barrio of Quarry, Abuyog and found him
pasturing his carabao. Some of the soldiers in the patrol caught him, tied his hands behind his back and then took him to the
main body of the patrol where the defendant was. He was asked about Capt. Landia and Capt. Nicolas Camintoy, his (Pacatan's)
son in law, both of the guerrillas. He told them that when Col. Kangleon passed by that place he took some of the resident with
him, presumably including Camintoy. The defendant Caña told Pacatan that until his son-in law Nicolas, surrendered he
(Pacatan) will be kept as a hostage. After being slapped and kicked by the Japanese soldiers he was taken to the garrison in the
poblacion and imprisoned there for a month and a half. As regards his arrest and his arrest and his being tied and taken to the
poblacion, Pacatan was corroborated by his stepson Pio Balida who stated that in the Japanese patrol there were four Filipinos,
among them the defendant Caña. He said that he saw all this because at the time he was with his step father Pacatan altho at
some distance from him.
In connection with the imprisonment of Basilio Pacatan in the Japanese garrison in the poblacion of Abuyog, Filomeno Tupa
and Maricel Costen in their testimonies said that the accused had once stated within their hearing that he would oppose the
release of Basilio Pacatan unless his son in law , Nicolas Camintoy, a captain in the guerrilla first surrendered and that when a
delegation composed of leaders of neighborhood association went to petition the Japanese captain for release of Pactan,
saying that he was a good man, the defendant who was present voiced objection to the release his (Pacatan's) guerrilla son-in-
law , Nicolas Camintoy. first surrendered as a result of which Pacatan's release was refused by the Japanese officer. It was
further stated that the defendant enjoyed the confidence of the Japanese officers, in proof of which , he had previously
obtained the release of three prisoners, C. Tan, Barcelo and Briones who had sons in the guerrilla forces and who promised to
have said surrender to the Japanese.
In his defense, the appellant with his witnesses tried prove that although he accompanied the Japanese patrols in their
reconnaissance trips to the barrios, he did so not of his own free will but under compulsion by the Japanese officer of the
garrison . He also said that he acted merely as interpreter of Japanese officer who spoke at the meetings held in the barrios.
The People's Court did not believed this claim of the defendant and we find nothing in the record to warrant correcting and
disturbing this mental attitude and action of the People's Court. There is ample evidence to show that when appellant spoke in
the barrios as head of Japanese patrols, he did not act as a mere interpreter but that he made his own speeches. Many times
there were no Japanese around when he spoke because the members of the patrol were either going around the barrio or the
house evidently checking up and looking for guerrillas, or doing things looking toward their accommodation and shelter for the
night or preparing their meals from the pigs and chickens they had previously shot. And the vehemence or apparent sincerity
of the accused in his speeches wherein he urged the people to support the municipal government which he head, to support
the presence of guerrillas in the barrios and to abandon all hope of the return of the Americans because they were afraid of
the Japanese soldiers, sufficiently shows that he went with the patrols voluntarily and of his own free will. He was really
determined to suppressed the guerrilla movement in his locality as may be inferred from his speeches but also from his strong
opposition to the release from the garrison of Basilio Pacatan unless the latter's son-in-law first surrendered. His action telling
the Japanese officer of the patrol in the sitio of Malasiga that the houses of Ablanque and Fortaleza had been occupied by the
guerrillas. Followed by his private conference with said Japanese officer after which said two house were set on fire and
burned to the ground despite the pleas of Fortaleza with him, fortifies this belief and finding.
Considering all the evidence submitted, we agree with the People's Court and Solicitor General that appellant is guilty under
counts 2,4 and 5. Ordinarily, in the penalty should be imposed in its medium degree, namely, reclusion perpetua as opined by
the Court of Appeals. However, taking a broad view of the case, we are inclined to impose a lighter penalty as did the People
Court. We must bear in mind that treason is not considered and punished according to the presence or absence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances provided for in Revised Penal Code. It is a very serious crime committed during war by one who,
forgetting his loyalty and oath of allegiance to his own country, aids the enemy and gives it aid and comfort. The amount or
degrees of said aid or comfort given the enemy as well as the separate and distinct acts of treason committed by the accused,
rather than the circumstances aggravating or mitigating attending its commission. determine of the penalty to be imposed.
This court as rule, has imposed the death penalty upon treason indicates proven not only to have aided the enemy but also
while giving such aid, to have either tortured or killed their own countrymen, and even then, only when the necessary number
of votes was secured. Where the necessary number of votes could not be obtained even when the defendant was guilty of
killing or torturing his own countrymen, the penalty imposed has been reclusion perpetua. Where the acts of treason by a
defendant in a treason case, consist in acting as a spy for the Japanese, as a result of which guerrillas or suspects tortured or
killed by the Japanese forces themselves without any direct participation by the defendant, the punishment imposed has
invariably been reclusion perpetua. That is to say, the penalty for treason in its medium period. And when the acts proven
against an accused has been acting as informer and spy for the enemy resulting merely in the temporary confinement of
guerrillas suspects, we have imposed the penalty in its minimum, namely, reclusion temporal. In other words, we have
punished the commission of treason on the basis of the seriousness of the treasonable acts, and of the presence or absence of
atrocities on the victim, rather the presence of atrocities on the victims, rather than on the presence or absence of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. Here there has been no killing, not even torture of prisoners, at least not on the part of appellant.
The People's Court may have been imbued with this same attitude and viewpoint when it imposed an imprisonment of 15
years without making any reference to the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We might add that the fact
that the appellant has been in jail since the beginning of a liberal and benign view of his case.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant .
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes and Bautista, JJ., concur.
24
G.R. No. L-1006 June 28, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. FILEMON ESCLETO, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People's Court with treason on three counts, namely:
1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give
aid or comfort to Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with the Imperial
Japanese Forces, going out with them in patrols in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in
sympathy with the resistance movements in the Philippines; bearing arms against the American and guerrilla forces in the
furtherance of the war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces against the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and mounting guard and performing guard duty for the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines.
2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give
aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with Japanese
soldiers in and around the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of
persons aiding or in sympathy with the resistance movement in the Philippines.
3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,
did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and/or cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla and
did turn him over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their garrison, since which time, that is, since the said 18th
day of March, 1944, nothing has been heard from said Antonio Conducto and is considered by his family to have been killed by
the Japanese military authorities.
The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant's membership in the U. N. or Makapili organization nor on what the
patrols he accompanied actually did once they were out of town", and so was, "constrained to rule that the evidence of the
prosecution fails to establish, in connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act of treason." We may add that no two
witnesses coincided in any specific act of the defendant. The People's Court, believed, however, "that the same evidence is
sufficient to prove beyond question defendant's adherence to the enemy."
As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People's Court was that it had been fully substantiated..
The record shows that on or about, March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of seventeen men and one officer was
ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now Quezon. As a result, some of
inhabitants of Bibito and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were arrested and others were ordered to report at
the poblacion. Among the latter were Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto's wife, parents and other
relatives.
Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, obedience to the
Japanese order, she and the rest of her family went to the town from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Filemon
Escleto's house, Escleto told them to stop and took down their names. With her were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her
son Antonio Conductor, and three grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison in the
poblacion where they were questioned by some whose name she did not know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and
she said yes but did not know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go home with many others, but Antonio
Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-examination she said that when Escleto took down
their names Antonio Conducto asked the accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and Escleto answered,
"Nothing will happen to you because I am to accompany you in going to town."
Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her, her mother-in-law, her husband, her three
children, her brother-in-law and the latter's wife and took down their names; that after taking their names Escleto and the
Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and
his family, and Escleto said "nothing" and assured Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go home; that
Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that afterward
they were sent upstairs and she did not know what happened to her husband.
The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court's findings. It will readily be seen from a cursory examination thereof
that the only point on which the two witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the accused took down the
names of Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and came along with them to the town. Granting the veracity of this
statement, it does not warrant the inference that the defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing so. What he
allegedly did was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant of his barrio, he thought it convenient as part of his
duty to make a list of the people under his jurisdiction who heeded the Japanese order.
It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conducto's name in order to report on him. The two men appeared to be from
the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto intimately, and the latter was on his way to town to present himself. If the accused
had a treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have furnished his name and identity to the enemy by word of mouth.
This step would have the added advantage of concealing the defendant's traitorous action from his town mates and of not
appraising Conducto of what was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel Conducto to escape.
That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best demonstrated by the fact that it included,
according to witnesses, Conducto's wife and parents and many others who were discharged the next day. The fact that,
according to the evidence of the prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in the screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt
that the defendant had a hand in Conducto's misfortune.
In short, Escleto's making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of overt act is weak, vague and uncertain.
The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and damaging is Patricia Araya's testimony that Escleto
told a Philippine Constabulary soldier, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But the prosecution did not elaborate on
this testimony, nor was any other witness made to corroborate it although Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and
relatives who would have heard the statement if the defendant had uttered it.
Leaving aside the question of Patricia's veracity, the failure to corroborate her testimony just mentioned makes it ineffective
and unavailing as proof of an overt act of treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony is inoperative as a corroboration of the
defendant's taking down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa. It has been seen that the testimony was not
shown to have been made for a treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. This process of evaluating
evidence might sound like a play of words but, as we have said in People vs. Adriano (44 Off. Gaz., 43001) the authors of the
two-witness provision in the American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely made it
"severely restrictive" and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we adverted to the following authorities, among others:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the
overt act. (VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.).
25
It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the same
overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths;. . . . (Opinion of Judge Learned Hand quoted as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)
The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the
accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every action,
movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two
witnesses. (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., 65 S. Ct., 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.)
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather
more reliance on direct testimony than modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best or that its protection of
innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or
not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson
that "Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult-as in a traitorous
correspondence with an Enemy." The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of
prosecution but because of them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that
venerated group considered that "prosecution for treason were generally virulent." (Cramer vs. U.S. of A., supra.)
The decision of the People's Court will be and the same is reversed with the costs de oficio.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., Mr. Justice Pablo voted to reverse.
G.R. No. L-9529 August 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO T. VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosia Padilla and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.
J. M. Cajucom for appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death by the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court for the crime of
treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of the appeal duly interposed by
the accused but also under the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides mandatory review by
this Tribunal of all decisions or judgments of the lower courts imposing death penalties. Meantime, it was discovered that the
transcript of stenographic notes taken down on October 8, 1947, before the People's Court was missing and unavailable, by
reason of which and upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, we promulgated a resolution on August 1, 1952,
remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses who
testified before the People's Court, namely, Gregorio Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and the accused himself. Thus
the case was sent to that court.
On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that he be allowed to withdraw
his appeal so as to avail himself of the benefits of the Executive clemency granted to all prisoners convicted of treason,
including those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo returned the case to us for whatever action we may take in view of the withdrawal requested, for, at all
events, the case had to be reviewed by us regardless of defendant's appeal. The case was included in the agenda prepared by
the Clerk of Court for September 21, 1953, only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without
calling the attention of the Tribunal that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which
decision called for an automatic review and judgment by us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this Tribunal of acting
favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where briefs had not been filed, as in the present case, said petition for
withdrawal was granted by resolution of September 21, 1953. However, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
date, and after the passing of the resolution, appellant filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating his request for
withdrawal of appeal previously made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching thereto two documents said to be
copies of the conditional pardon granted him and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the office of the President addressed to
the Director of Prisons. It was only on considering this second petition when we realized the nature of the case and that the
withdrawal of appeal granted on September 21, 1953, was a mistake and contrary to legal precedents. So, in a resolution dated
October 19, 1953, this Tribunal reconsidered its resolution of September 21st granting withdrawal of appeal, and again
reminded the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimonies above referred to, with instructions
that a new decision be rendered based on the said testimonies and on the standing evidence adduced before the People's
Court. The resolution of October 19th read as follows:
By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court after trial of appellant Pedro T.
Villanueva on a charge of treason on several counts, found him guilty of treason and murder and sentenced him thus —
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, finding the accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of the complex crime
of treason and murders as defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 48 of the same Code,
sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the
amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of Sofia Tambirao
in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the proceedings."
Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were sent up to us not only by virtue of the appeal but also under the
provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal of all cases in
which the death penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or
not.
It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, could not
be located, and following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution was promulgated on August 1, 1952,
remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of the testimony of said witnesses.
Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated August 24, 1953, stating that about July 4,
1953, the Chief Executive granted executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose cases were
pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn, supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower
court, and asking that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
issued an order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of the case to this Court for whatever action it may take in the
premises, in view of the petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant and because the case had to be reviewed by
the Supreme Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the defendant.
The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court on that date as regards this was prepared by
the Clerk of Court's Office only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the defendant. Our attention was not
called to the fact that defendant had previously appealed from a decision sentencing him to death, which decision called for an
automatic review and judgment by us. So, following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on petitions for withdrawal
of appeals where the briefs have not yet been filed, as in the present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal was granted
by resolution of September 21, 1953. On the same date, however, and presumably after the passing of the resolution,
appellant Villanueva filed directly with this Court a petition reiterating the request for withdrawal of his appeal previously
made with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits "A" and "B", said to be copies of the conditional
pardon and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the Office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on
considering said petition that we realized the nature of the case and the decision appealed to this Court, the withdrawal of
which appeal had been granted by the resolution of September 21, 1953.
26
An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant
in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the
jurisdiction of this Court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed.
Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In
fact, as was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of
review by this Court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final,
and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en
consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final
judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final
and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something
which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.
Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of retaking the testimony of those witnesses
who testified on October 8, 1947, the case was virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the evidence and the testimony
received during the trial before the People's Court which is still intact and available shall stand and the new trial will be
confined to the testimony of the same witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of
which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the trial court to render a new decision because the
new trial is being held before a new Judge and there is no assurance that the witnesses testifying, altho the very same ones
who were on the witness stand on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same facts and in the same manner that they did at
the former trial, altho they are supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al, 46 O. G. No. 1, p.
390). Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the said
witnesses as far as possible confine themselves to the same points on which they testified on October 8, 1947, because the
testimonies of said witnesses including the defendant are referred to and described in the decision of the People's Court on
pages 87, 123, and 124 to 129, and that there are only four witnesses including the accused himself.
Examining Exhibits "A" and "B" submitted by appellant in relation to his petition for the withdrawal of his appeal, we find that
although his name appears in the list of prisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed to be pardoned conditionally,
the pardon itself refers to the remission of the "unexpired portions of the prison sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners
listed below who were convicted by the defunct People's Court of treason and committed to the new Bilibid Prison to serve
their sentence." It is highly doubtful that the pardon could have contemplated and included appellant herein because his
sentence of death does not merely involve a prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death sentence is not exactly served
but rather executed. Moreover, Exhibit "B" says that "those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall be released
only after their appeal has been withdrawn." The implication is that the withdrawal of the appeal rendered the decision of the
People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this to bring it into harmony with Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the Constitution which
requires conviction as a condition precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we have already stated, despite
defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision imposing the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or
sentence until and after this Tribunal has reviewed the case and rendered its own decision affirming, modifying or reversing
that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision of the trial court based on the new trial a sentence other than
death is imposed, in which case there would be no automatic review by us.
Let the record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for new trial and thereafter, for a new
decision.
At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the defense, Ambrosio Tuble and Basilio Taborete, were introduced.
Appellant also presented documentary evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly granted him. The Court of First
Instance of Iloilo found nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the decision of the People's Court, and, reproducing
said decision, rendered judgment on October 11, 1955, sentencing appellant to capital punishment. The case was again
elevated to us for automatic review and judgment and given the present docket number.
In the amended information filed before the People's Court, appellant was accused of treason on ten counts, but the
prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower court found that Counts
1 and 2 were not proven, and convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
The prosecution established that during the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is a Filipino citizen, and owing allegiance to
the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid and comfort by rendering service
with the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in
the performance of such service, he participated actively and directly in the punitive expeditions periodically made by the
Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the province of Iloilo, and committed robberies, arson and mass-murders,
specifically as follows:
Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information recites:
6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of Baroc and Atabayan, municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and
spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and several Japanese soldiers, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco,
Melchor Trieco, Cosme Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto, Napoleon Luceno, Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio
Belandrez on the charge that they were guerrilla soldiers and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and torture them;
that subsequently the persons above-mentioned were taken away and were not seen or heard of since then; that on the
occasion of the aforementioned patrol, the above-named accused and his companions, with intent of gain and without consent
of the owners thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously loot the house of Jose T. Belandrez, taking
therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the amount of P300; emergency notes in the amount of P1,200; jewelry value at
P500; clothing valued at P200; and other personal effects; and from the house of Toribia Taleon, jewelry, watches, clothing and
other personal effects with a total value of P160 more or less.
Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and Maria Mendoza, corroborating one another, testified that at dawn of
June 10, 1943, appellant, accompanied by some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house of Jose T. Belandrez
situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and took therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry worth P300, and clothing valued at P200; that they also
arrested Dionisio Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno, members of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the
guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said three members of the Bolo Battalion never returned.
Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this Count, reads as follows:
7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August, 1943, in the municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy,
and with treasonable intent to give, as he did give said enemy, aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of
the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and apprehend several persons suspected of guerrilla activities,
among whom were Federico Tinamisan, Eustaquio Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador Tedor, Tomas Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta,
Andres Tayo, Victorio Tuante, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirante, Rufo Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilarion Toga
and several others, who were gathered in the Chapel at barrio Napnapan, where the persons aforesaid were investigated,
maltreated and tortured, as a consequence of which Salvador Tedor died of the beating and torture inflicted upon him by the
herein accused and his companions; that the following morning about thirty-seven persons were taken to the yard of Valentina
Amandoron's house, where Jesus Astrologo, Carlos Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the Japanese killed by
beheading Andres Tai, Victorio Tuante, Roque Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania, Pufo Tulato, Agapito Trompeta, Tomas
Trompeta, Celedonio Tupino, Simeon Ledesma, Hermenegildo Taleon, Marcelo Turid, Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid, Jose
Tamon, Cornelio Taghap, Eustaquio Doga, Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU) Lucio (LNU), Juan (LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo
27
(LNU), and several others whose names are unknown, while Alfredo Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and wounded on
their necks but miraculously escaped death.
Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa Gua, Natividad Duga, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilario Taghap and Valentina
Amandoron who, corroborating one another, stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was a Monday, at about six o'clock in
the evening, while Eustaquio Duga and his family were at their home in Tigbauan, Iloilo, he saw Japanese soldiers and some
Filipinos approaching their house; that Eustaquio Duga notified his wife and they immediately started to flee; that
unfortunately, they were overtaken by the Japanese soldiers, and Eustaquio Duga was arrested by herein appellant who was in
company with said Japanese soldiers; that Eustaquio Duga was taken to the nearby barrio of Napnapan; that sometime later,
Severa Gua found the dead body of Eustaquio Duga, with his head almost severed, among other corpses in the yard of the
house of Valentina Amandoron.
On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his companion Roque Teologo were walking in a barrio road in Napnapan,
Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that Trompeta and Teologo were taken
to the barrio of Ermita, of the same municipality, where they were investigated together with about thirty persons who were
suspected as guerrillas; thence they were brought to the house of Valentina Amandoron where appellant and his companions
killed in cold blood Trompeta's companions as well as these persons who were brought there earlier. Among the twenty-five
persons killed on that occasion, were Andres Tayo, Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato, Roque Teologo, Jose Taucon and Matias
Tiranea.
Count No. 8. The information equally recites:
8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent
to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial
Japanese Army; and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme Calacasan, Nazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos
Sobrevega, Jose Canillas, Aurelio Calacasan, Graciano (LNU), Juan (LNU), and three others, names unknown, on the charge that
the persons aforesaid were guerrilla soldiers or guerrilla sympathizers; that thereafter these persons were taken to barrio Taal,
municipality of San Miguel, where the accused and his companions set fire to and burned several houses in the aforesaid
barrio; and later to barrio Baguingin, municipality of Leon, where the above-named accused and his companions investigated,
maltreated and tortured them; that the above-named accused further adhering to the enemy did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, and with evident premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to death Cosme Calacasan,
while tied to a tree with hands tied behind his back; while Nazario Calimutan was bayonetted and killed in the same manner by
Jesus Astrologo, Filipino co-spy of the herein accused; while Graciano (LNU) and Juan (LNU) and two others (names unknown)
were bayonetted to death by the Filipino and Japanese companions of the accused; that after the killing of the aforesaid
persons, the above-named accused and his companions did gather the corpses of their victims in the house of Juan Caya and
thereafter did set fire to and burn that house the dead bodies inside.
Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each other, testified that at about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12,
1943, while Aurelio Calacasan, Cosme Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevieja
and Jose Canillas and several others were in the barrio of Anonang, Leon, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers and
taken to the barrio of Taal, of the same municipality, where they saw appellant and his companions. After setting afire the
houses in said barrio, appellant and his companions brought the prisoners to barrio Agboy, of the same municipality, where
they were investigated regarding their guerilla activities or connections; that during the investigations, appellant stabbed to
death Cosme Calacasan who was a member of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that after several prisoners
were killed, their corpses were gathered and placed in a house which was set on fire.
Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended information recites:
9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy and with treasonable intent to
give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer, spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese
Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably conduct and carry out a raid against and mass arrest of persons suspected as guerrilla soldiers and sympathizers,
as a consequence of which, about eighty persons, male and female, both young and old were arrested and gathered in a
schoolhouse and chapel in the barrio of Buenavista, and thereat investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused
and his companions; that subsequently about thirty persons including women and children were taken to the house of Aquilino
Sales, where about fourteen persons were bayonetted and killed by Japanese soldiers, namely, Julia Cabilitasan, Mercedes
Calopez, Andrea Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel Canag, Rosalia Calopez, Luz Caldito, Estelita Camorahan, Roman Cabilinga,
Tomas Canag, Luis Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin, Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio Caldito; while Paulina Cantara, Alejandro Calsona
and Bienvenido Cabankalan received and sustained bayonet wounds but survived and were able to escape after the house of
aforesaid Aquilino Sales was set on fire and burned by said patrol of Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers.
Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro Calsena and Perpetua Canag, who testified for the prosecution,
corroborating one another, stated that at about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943, several residents of barrio,
Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were arrested by the appellant, who was armed with revolver and bayonet, and his companions
consisting of Filipinos and Japanese soldiers; that said barrio residents were brought to the barrio schoolhouse where they
were investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan was singled out by the appellant who tied her hands behind her
back and brought her under a "doldol" (kapok) tree, near a chapel, where she was stripped of all her clothings until she was
naked. Appellant investigated her regarding the whereabouts of her husband who was a USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after
severely beating Julia Cabilitasan, brought her to the house of Aquilino Sales where there were other Filipino prisoners. Shortly
thereafter, appellant and his companions started the massacre of the prisoners. Appellant stabbed Julia Cabilitasan three times
with a bayonet. In that massacre, fourteen persons including women and children were killed. Among those killed were Julia
Cabilitasan, Macario Cabilitasan, Roman Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia Calpit. Later, said house was set on fire.
Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding this Count, recites:
10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the municipalities of Guimbal and Tubuñgan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy,
and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the
Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies, Bureau of Constabulary and Japanese
soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina
Escorido, Romero Escorido, Edgardo Escorido, Editha Escorido, Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor Tabanda, Elena Gierza,
Natividad Gersalino, Jovita Gersalino, Ernesto Tambirao, Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio Tortugalete, Paz Tabora,
Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with unknown names on the charge that the persons
aforesaid were either guerrilla soldiers, sympathizers and supporters; that the aforesaid persons were then taken to the house
of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein accused, did then and their investigate, maltreat, or otherwise torture Basilisa Taborete,
Gloria Escorido and Eustaquia Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess as to their connection with the guerrilla
movement and the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that subsequently the herein accused further adhering to the enemy
did deliver to a Japanese executioner Juan Gelario, Felipe Tanato, David Garnica, Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz
Tabiana, who were all executed and kill one after another; that the killing of Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana
took place shortly after they were abused and raped by the Japanese and BC soldiers in the house of Jacinto Taborete; that
while this was going on, Jovita Gersalino and Lourdes Tabanda were taken to another house by the herein accused, Filemon
Palacios, Jr., Vicente Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they were abused and raped; that subsequently the persons
gathered were asked who of them were relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga for they would be released and when an old woman
answered that they were all relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga, the Japanese soldiers at once started to inflict and deliver
bayonet thrusts on the persons gathered and as a consequence of which about thirty of them were killed and several were
wounded: that subsequently, the herein accused and his companions proceeded to barrio Buluañgan, where one Saturnino
(LNU) was arrested, investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused and later killed by the Japanese.
28
Gloria Escorido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza, testifying in support of this Count, and corroborating one another, stated
that at about seven o'clock in the morning of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and several Japanese soldiers were on a
punitive expedition in the barrio of Miadan, Guimbal, Iloilo, they arrested the barrio residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in
Tubongan, Iloilo; that the barrio residents, who were about fifty persons, were brought to the barrio of Laguna, Tubongan,
Iloilo, were they were investigated and maltreated; that during the investigation, appellant tied the feet of Gloria Escorido,
hanged her with her head downward and beat her with the branch of an "aguho" tree; that appellant likewise brought to the
house of Jacinto Batorete three females, namely, Luz Tabiana, Jesusa Jimenez and Juana Tabiana where the said girls were
abused by the appellant and his companions; that appellant also bayoneted to death Sofia Tambirao for the simple reason that
she was the cousin of Tranquilino Geonanga, an officer of the guerrillas; that appellant and his companions massacred on that
occasion around thirty persons, among whom were Jovita Gersalino, Carolina Escorido, Romero Escorido, Sofia Tambirao, and
Edgardo Escorido.
We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated actively in the punitive raids made by the Japanese soldiers and in
arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas, but personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely 16 years of age at the time
(Count 10), and killed in cold blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three times (Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise
bayoneting her three times, with the added ignominy of stripping her stark naked moments before killing her (Count 9), and
Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of appellant as testified to by eyewitnesses who have survived the
harrowing massacres, speak eloquently that his adherence to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort, was accompanied by
cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton disregard of the feelings and decency of his fellow citizens.
The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence for appellant, his defense in the lower court merely consisting of (1)
his denial of the overt acts imputed upon him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective force of the Japanese Army since
January 1st, 1944, it was because he was made to accept the position under duress, and that his acceptance of such position
was for the good of the people, he having saved many Filipino lives from Japanese atrocities.
We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record because of the seriousness of the charges against appellant, and we find
that the evidence for the prosecution is overwhelming, such that appellant's counsel de officio instead of filing a brief, made a
manifestation dated November 29, 1955, stating that "after a thorough study of the records of the case, he finds nothing
therein sufficient to disturb the decisions of the People's Court and of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo imposing capital
punishment on the accused." Said counsel further stated that "The accused's only evidence which directly attacked the
government's proofs was his denial of what several witnesses testified to." This manifestation was considered by this Tribunal
as appellant's brief, in its resolution of December 6, 1955. Certainly mere denial by appellant cannot prevail upon the positive
assertion of the witnesses for the government establishing incriminating facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence that as
between positive and negative testimony, the former deserves more weight and credit.
Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon appellant for which he had to serve in the detective force
of the Japanese Army, we agree with the Solicitor General that "except the lone and self-serving testimony of the appellant
that he was coerced to cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers, there is not an iota of proof that he was in fact
compelled or coerced by the Japanese. Much less is there any evidence showing that the alleged compulsion or coercion was
grave and imminent."
Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. (16 C. J., 91).
To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily harm
must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or self-
defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield himself from prosecution for crime by
merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person. (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).
Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by the law. No man, from fear or circumstances to himself has the right to
make himself a party to committing mischief upon mankind (Lord Denman in Reg. vs. Tyler, 8 Car. and P. (Eng.) 616, vs.
Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 273).
When the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking of lost testimonies, appellant attempted to
give the case a new twist by filing a motion to quash on the ground that the pardon extended him has already extinguished his
criminal liability and that his conviction by the People's Court had placed him in jeopardy. This motion was denied, but during
the trial appellant was allowed to present documentary evidence relative to the clemency extended him, consisting of Exhibit 1
which is a certified copy of his conditional pardon; Exhibit 2, a certified copy of the letter of the Legal Assistant of the President
dated June 30, 1953, addressed to the Director of Prisons; Exhibit 3 the motion to withdraw appeal filed before the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo; and Exhibit 4, the Tribunal's resolution of September 21, 1953, granting said withdrawal. In addition,
appellant presented an Exhibit 5 the decision of the People's Court in the case of People vs. Jesus Astrologo, dated December
11, 1947, sentencing him to death; Exhibit 6 the conditional pardon extended to said accused dated June 27, 1953; and Exhibit
7 the letter of the Legal Assistant of the Office of the President to the Director of Prisons, to show that said Jesus Astrologo
who is now enjoying his freedom by reason of the pardon extended, has been allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw his appeal
pending review of his death sentence.
Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we reiterate our ruling in our resolution of October 19, 1953, hereinbefore
quoted. As to appellant's contention respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find it untenable, for the Astrologo
case (88 Phil., 423) was elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he filed his brief on October 21, 1949, and we rendered
judgment on March 30, 1951, commuting the sentence to life imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon granted him
on June 27, 1953, or more than two years after the final judgment, was therefore in order, and cannot be invoked by herein
appellant as a precedent.
As to the payment of indemnity in the amount of P2,000 to the respective heirs of each of the victims of appellant, the
Solicitor-General recommends that this amount imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000. We find this
recommendation to be correct, as it is in consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal on the matter; hence the
decision of the lower court should be amended accordingly. Furthermore, although the facts of the case verily justify the
imposition of death penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty should be, as it is hereby commuted to reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with law.
Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance
of Manila, respondents.1
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
29
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the
absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this
Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto
governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief
proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also
provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as
executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall
remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was organized
by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B.
Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central
administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said Commander in
Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1
and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First
Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same
jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in
Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be
observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said
Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the
existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected
thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission,
and in the laws they administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the
People of the Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of
the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to
the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that
all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all
judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been
invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said
courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic
of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the United States and Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those
governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament
and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the
cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by
the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto
governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs.
Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but
which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1),
that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established
and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing
greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered,
also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in
the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example
is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page
(9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war with the
country of which the territory so possessed was part."
30
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of
1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides
"the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his
power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the
laws in force in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to
insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can
suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to
respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in
the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other
hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear
arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in
abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own
hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial
officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their
positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant.
These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by
the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the
conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules
are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of
publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or
changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure
either change the existing laws or make new ones."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said
Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the
occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as
continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the
occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of
justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between
man and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X,
p. 209.)
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of Thorington vs.
Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de facto government. In that case, it was held
that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at Castine and
Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less
actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are examples. . . .
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts
of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the administration of justice
and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and
afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just
rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart
(17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations
maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer
and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not
hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or was done in respect of
such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be
invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution;
this, because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within
the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil
government or the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as
organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or
unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been
entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective
states composing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose
or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on
January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by
the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government established over an
enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over
the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government
be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a
government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those
laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806,
when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a
french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France,
authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an English superior.
(Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own
officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall,
International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the
Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of
its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government
styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the
people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the
31
Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people,
before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or
sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in
International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of
the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does
not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of
occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the
Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent
magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was
established under the mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the
Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had
organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have
been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States.
And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of
secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of
Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto
government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to
the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed
a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the
Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on
February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class of de facto
governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a government de facto, but
which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the government
of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same
principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of
those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known
principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its
legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader,
which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not
of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control,
and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it
otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the
individuals the evil would be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be
ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the
disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the
abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the
occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently
in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International
Law, p. 615.)
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain
valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to
abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as used in the
above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of the
Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated,
according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so
after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable
construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court proceedings,
for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation
demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of
military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and
before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and
occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed
that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the
United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the
law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be
presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal
citizens of the Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not
only reverse the international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions
of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public interests would
be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights
nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may
have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been
destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that where
great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or
great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not
intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory
occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent
32
occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be
sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would
not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would
not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if judgments
rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese
regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines
on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have
heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision
impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been
invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases
which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to
March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of
by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the
Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's
acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that
no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does
happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than
this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge
"draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the
restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide;
that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the
matter, imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws,
regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact
that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not
necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his
intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or
by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this
court to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void.
But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his
powers as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established
between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from the law of
nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the
Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant
the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent
occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him
to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of
the Court of Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is
required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting
or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the
restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation
during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to
declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and action of the nationals of the
territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do
something will not at the same time empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or
commanding officer of the United States Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is
obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules
of international law and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United
States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state
in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14
Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in command of
the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the
acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military commanders designated,
within the States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in
question. . . . The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts
should be so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether
Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending
rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond
what the exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1
Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the
order was void."
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws,
regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and
proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said
judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to,
and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic
of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine
Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.
Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as
soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own
hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War
on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it
may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of
the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit."
(Taylor, International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and
33
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January
3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and
ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their
duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in
Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and
February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese
Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence
upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed.,
p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or
other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute
crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance
of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final
judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of
the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the left pending
therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true
enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws — and the courts had
become the institutions — of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and
institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if
continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily
occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not
serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may
continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the
occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by
the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which
prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit
everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to
innovate in the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as
the courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in
the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the
victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate
that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High
German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French
people and government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their
sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later
offered to allow use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p.
244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the
some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of
Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the
Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into
existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society.
Once created, it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next
change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law
continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and
continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are
expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration
of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired
sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the
laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising
the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until
they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. As a
consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another
court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts
are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings
commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the
proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the
United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance
of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First
Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of
sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First
Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere
proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of
the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of
1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper
tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them
according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3
of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court
created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can
continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is
confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second
question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3
as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the
34
Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that
the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth
Government; for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or
which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the
Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive
Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the
Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2,
1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of
political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final
judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth
Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the
court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus
is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the
question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the
courts of these Islands.
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil
case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-10678 August 17, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. MANUEL BAUTISTA, defendant-appellant.
Mauricio Ilagan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of assault upon agents of the authorities and insulting them. Upon said complaint
the defendant was arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and sentenced by the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno to be
imprisoned for a period of four years two months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of article 61
of the Penal Code, to pay a fine of P300, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, in accordance with the
provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
In this court the appellant alleges that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause was not sufficient to show that he
was guilty of the crime charged in the complaint.
The record shows that some time in the month of November, 1914, an order of arrest was issued for the defendant and placed
in the hands of the chief of police of the municipality of Gerona. On or about the 15th of November, the chief of police,
accompanied by another policeman, went to the house where the defendant was staying for the purpose of making the arrest.
Upon arrival at the house, inquiry was made of some of the occupants whether or not the defendant was there. Upon being
informed that he was in the house, the policeman who accompanied the chief of police entered the house without permission
and attempted to arrest the defendant without explaining to him the cause or nature of his presence there. The defendant,
according to the declaration of the chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his neighbors for assistance, using the following
language: "Come here; there are some bandits here and they are abusing me." Many of his neighbors, hearing his cry,
according to the testimony of the chief of police, immediately came to his assistance and surrounded his house.
The policeman, who accompanied the chief, in his declaration said that when he attempted to arrest the defendant, the
defendant said to him: "Why do you enter my house, you shameless brigands?" and called to one Basilio, saying:
There are some bandits here!"
The policeman further testified that he then informed the defendant that he came there for the purpose of arresting him, and
the defendant asked him if he had an order of arrest, which question was answered by the policeman in the affirmative. Said
policeman further testified that immediately after he had notified the defendant that he was a policeman and had an order of
arrest, the defendant submitted to the arrest without further resistance or objection.
The whole record shows that the resistance given by the defendant was done under the belief that the persons who had
entered his house were tulisanes. The record also shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, that as soon
as he had been informed that they were officers of the law, armed with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and
accompanied them. We do not believe that the law contemplates the punishment of persons for resistance of the authorities
under circumstances such as those which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant believed that those who had
entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified in calling his neighbors and making an attempt to expel
them from his premises.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the record does not disclose sufficient facts to justify
the sentence imposed by the lower court. The defendant is not guilty of the crime described in the complaint. The sentence of
the lower court is therefore hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby ordered dismissed, and the defendant is discharged from
the custody of the law. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and
RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y
Elausa and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the
Municipality of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-
named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y
Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of
35
Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and armed with bladed weapons
and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle, with
intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and
feloniously take, steal and carry away against the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona)
properties belonging to the crew members and passengers of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money amounting to
Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos (P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of passengers and
crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's compass, navigational charts and
instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned owners in
the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00)
Philippine Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed
accused to take, steal and carry away the properties abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treacherously attack,
assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior strength, use personal violence upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag,
Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad, Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul
Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho,
Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico
Canizares, Omar Tahil Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal,
Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H.
Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could have produced the death of said persons, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of
superior strength. (pp. 97-98, Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge, were convicted on March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it
with that of guilty. On March 10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of
death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four defendants because "there was a separate civil
action for breach of contract and damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants,
including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26, L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.
Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the
name of Hadji Noria Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the
following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On
board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or three hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles
from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor
launch to hide and on his way through the engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario
Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles, started firing towards Que's companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's
house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman, another passenger, while Que and the other crew members
were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter Chiong, Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente
America. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down
among the sacks of copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs
as they were firing shots until Fred Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move,
he realized that he was also hit on the right side of his stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the
door but it could not be opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind
the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men
crawled and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter
Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something worse would
happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure
pumpboats. Macasaet was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico
Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them:
dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on
September 2, 1981 and saw at the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran
Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir
and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death
penalty to the accused-appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias
Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce
y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I-5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in
holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; (4) in holding that the defense of Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00 which was
his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100,
and Dario Dece in G.R. No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law,
amending Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape,
murder or no homocide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims
without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
36
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed
is mandatory death penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants
as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty,
it shag be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to the Malaysian authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau
of Investigation of Manila. When said statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same
was not objected to by the defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce, on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of
said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence
shows that his participation in the commission of the offense was positively testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil
Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him
(Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon
indiscriminately at the passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting
and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed, joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in
conspiracy with the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a statement to the authorities stating therein his
participation as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of
Investigation authorities fetched and brought them to Manila where they executed their respective statements after Rico
Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI, P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex
watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to the Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to
wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under investigation here in connection with the robbery
committed on the M/V Noria last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and
to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You have the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this
investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one we will provide a lawyer for you free.
Should you decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you
understand an these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you so understand all your rights as above stated and
that you do not need the services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with
each other as each admits his participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy
existed among them. The conduct of appellant
Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the
commission of the crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part,
G.R. No. L-985 January 23, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty of treason and
sentencing him to suffer fifteen years of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand pesos and the costs.
According to the information, from February, 1944, to March, 1945, in Cebu City and its environs, the appellant (1) "did
consistently and continuously traffic in war materials and sold them to the enemy," and (2) "did join and serve the enemy as
informer, agent, and spy." The People's Court held that the second count was not proven, and the appealed judgment of
conviction is predicated solely on the first count.
37
Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is inferable from the following alleged facts: (a) In
the afternoon of September 20, 1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, the
latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese, examined appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's
identification card written in Japanese and Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese undercover.
(b) In January 1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that
Japanese notes were no longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was arrested by the
Japanese and their undercovers and asked about things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her
release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for the consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A
Japanese also used to sleep once in a while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized in the brief for
Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to
the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity
some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known. About the third week of December, 1944, the appellant
was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate
and high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of sovereignty as heretofore expressed, the Court is
of the opinion that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of
alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not
corroborated by any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee
admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore
lacking. No pretense was made that the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck and auto tires,
batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail that may at most be considered established by the prosecution
refers to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even uncertain
in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or the high school building. Indeed
it was acknowledged by the lower court that the witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of
the articles loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not
per se constitute treason. As said articles or materials were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry
an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable
in view of the other proven acts showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears, however, that the alleged acts of
adherence performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant
made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two probabilities
arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R.
No. L-778, October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs, Carmelito Victoria comes to
us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the
crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or about the dates
hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder stated, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to
their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena,
Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol
composed of about eight spies and a Japanese soldier, which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking
Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico
Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused directed several men in
the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the same party of
spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and
did feloniously, willfully, unlawfully and treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to
be at the house; that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after setting fire on
the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben
Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc,
Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson
and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio
information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same day, but on the
next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo
Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving
and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed
him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were
concealing themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by two Japanese Military
Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went
38
to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena, Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese
Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison
where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting as an informer of the Japanese
Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest
and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and
unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives, for the purpose of
giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought
him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably joined the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their
enemies; that he took military training from the Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier,
taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon
orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from Bautista to the mountains of
Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño, where he
was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of
armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in
the commission thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the mutilated corpses of
Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the houses of the victims which were burned and
looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest, effected by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and
several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several
bayonet thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times
as Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of. Appellant's
testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous morning raid, he did not come along with party that
conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and Godoy took place, was not given by the lower
court enough weight to prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in the raid of the house
of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only the latter was accepted by the lower court,
in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The
last that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the
exhumation having been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts relate to
the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower court found that on
February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in
San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The accused simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in
Gagalañgin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to accompany them in the
raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who,
according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this
defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the
prosecution.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the lower court, has been
abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest because appellant himself testified that he
promised to see what he could do about Labalan and accepted three chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the
interpreter at the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one, two, three, four, and six
of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that,
although appellant's brief compromises one hundred thirty printed pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in
the conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty
imposed is unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes against the
victimized persons.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of
armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in
the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains
that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of
such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single
time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much
so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not
changing the nature of the offense committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the
People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel wants us to consider
what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty,
not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the correction of the guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with
appellant's death as decreed by the lower court.

Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids only because he was
forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it either in obedience to a summon of his
friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some prisoners; that he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor
Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the
Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only
after he had been made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary promise exacted
from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the
clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the prosecution. Appellant's claim that he, too, was a
guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not
relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were
declared proven by the People's Court.

The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved
the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of a single human being to give aid and comfort to the
enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one
point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10).

We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as treason and that the
People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and
sovereignty.

Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there is disagreement as to
the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking part in the decision of this case voted for
the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the lower court, the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty
the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law.

The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances alleged in the information as follows:
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