SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 219548. October 17, 2018.]

GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. STANLEY FERNANDEZ, FLORENTINO AMPIL, JR., and
NOEL CABANGON, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Gerarda H. Villa (Villa) seeking to reverse the
Decision 2 dated 13 February 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated 23 July 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
127891, which dismissed Criminal Case No. C-38340 against respondents Stanley Fernandez (Fernandez), Florentino Ampil,
Jr. 4 (Ampil), and Noel Cabangon (Cabangon).

The Facts

The present case stemmed from the death of Leonardo "Lenny" H. Villa, a neophyte-participant at the initiation rites
of the Aquila Legis Fraternity (Aquila) in 1991.
Because of his death, an Amended Information charging 35 members of the Aquila with the crime of Homicide was
filed on 15 November 1991. Out of the 35 members, 26 members were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), while 9 members were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. C-38340. The 26 members were jointly tried,
while the trial against the remaining 9 members was held in abeyance.
After the promulgation of the decision against the 26 members who were tried separately, the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City (RTC), Branch 121, ordered for: (a) the issuance of warrants of arrest against five of the nine members,
namely: Enrico de Vera III (de Vera), Anselmo Adriano (Adriano), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Fernandez, and Cabangon;
and (b) the arraignment of four of the nine members, namely: Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), Manuel Escalona II (Escalona),
Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion), and Ampil on 24 November 1993. 5 A few days after, all of the nine members entered a
plea of not guilty.
On 5 August 2002, the RTC Branch 130 granted the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
Concepcion, upon finding that the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time violated
his right to speedy trial. 6
On the other hand, on 29 October 2003, the RTC Branch 130 denied the separate Motions to Dismiss filed by
Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano. On 18 January 2005, the RTC Branch 130 also denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by Ramos.
The RTC Branch 130 reasoned out that the trial against the remaining eight members could now proceed, since the
prosecution could already obtain the original records of the case from the CA, which already decided the appeal of the 26
members. 7 Upon denial of their motions to dismiss, Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano appealed to the CA.
Meanwhile, on 8 March 2005, the RTC Branch 130 denied: (1) the "Motion to Quash Amended Information" filed
by Ampil on 10 October 1994; and (2) the "Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) To Adopt the Motion to Quash Amended
Information of Accused Florentino L. Ampil; and (b) To Quash Amended Information" filed by Fernandez on 19 October
1994. 8
On 25 October 2006, the CA granted the appeal of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano and dismissed Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against them after finding that their right to speedy trial was violated.
On 5 December 2006, Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss 9with the RTC Branch 130,
alleging that: (1) their constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated because the suit has been pending for more than 15
years, or since the filing of the Amended Information on 15 November 1991; (2) the CA's Decision dismissing Criminal Case
No. C-38340 against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano due to the violation of their right to speedy trial should also
apply to them because they are similarly situated with Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano; and (3) their participation in
 In its Comment and/or Opposition, 10 the private prosecutor alleged that: (1) Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon are
not similarly situated with Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano, because they only raised the alleged violation of their right
to speedy trial after the promulgation of the CA Decision dismissing Criminal Case No. C-38340 against Ramos, Saruca,
Escalona, and Adriano; and (2) considering that Fernandez, Ampil and Cabangon did not promptly raise the issue of the
alleged violation of their right to speedy trial, they are deemed to have waived and abandoned their right.
On 1 February 2012, the Court, in Villareal v. People of the Philippines (Villareal), 11convicted 5 of the 26
members of Aquila charged in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, and affirmed
the acquittal of 20 of the 26 members. The case against one of the 26 members was closed and terminated due to his death
during the pendency of the case. In the same case, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Criminal Case No. C-38340 against
Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano due to violation of the right to speedy trial. 12

The Decision of the RTC

Meanwhile, on 9 January 2012, the RTC Branch 130 issued an Order denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by
Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon.
The RTC Branch 130 explained that the following incidents caused the slow progress of Criminal Case No. C-
38340: (1) Presiding Judge Jaime T. Hamoy (Judge Hamoy), who handled the case, was dismissed from the service; (2) while
Acting Presiding Judge Luisito Sardillo (Judge Sardillo) continued the proceedings of the case, nothing much was
accomplished as he had to attend to both the proceedings in this sala as well as that of in his own sala; (3) another accused in
this case filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and the CA issued a restraining order enjoining the trial court from
proceeding with the hearing of the case; and (4) the private prosecutor filed a Motion for Transfer of Trial Venue and Motion
for Inhibition. Finding that the pending incidents were already resolved, the RTC Branch 130 held that it can now continue
with the trial of the case. The dispositive portion of its Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused Farley (sic) Ampil,
Stanley Fernandez and Noel Cabangon is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Motion for Inhibition filed
by the Private Prosecutor is likewise ordered DENIED for lack [of] merit.
In the meantime the continuation of the prosecution evidence is hereby set on February 9 and 24,
and March 2, 9, and 23, 2012 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Notify all the parties concerned thru the Sheriff of this Court with proper return.
SO ORDERED. 13
Thereafter, the RTC Branch 130, in another Order 14 dated 18 September 2012, denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon.

The Decision of the CA

In a Decision dated 13 February 2015, the CA reversed the findings of the RTC Branch 130 and dismissed Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon. The CA held that the RTC Branch 130 committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon, because it failed to recognize
and uphold their constitutional right to speedy trial. The CA found that the delays in the proceedings against Fernandez,
Ampil, and Cabangon were unjustified and not attributable to them. The CA also held that their active participation in the
initial stages of trial was not deemed a waiver of their right to speedy trial.
The CA also found that Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon are similarly situated with Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and
Adriano, since they all experienced the same delay in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340. Thus, since the Court
in Villareal already dismissed Criminal Case No. C-38340 against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano for violation of
their right to speedy trial, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon should also be dismissed
applying the principle of equal protection of the law.
In a Resolution dated 23 July 2015, the CA denied Villa's motion for reconsideration, upon finding that there is no
valid ground to modify, reverse, or set aside its decision. The CA also held that Villa has no personality to move for a
reconsideration, because it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of the State in all criminal
proceedings before the appellate courts.

The Issues

Villa raises the following issues for resolution:

I.
 WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN FINDING THAT THE DELAY IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 38340 IS OF SUCH NATURE THAT VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS TO
SPEEDY TRIAL.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH
THEIR FORMER CO-ACCUSED REYNALDO CONCEPCION, MANUEL ESCALONA II, MARCUS
JOEL RAMOS, CRISANTO SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO, WHOSE CASES, IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. C-38340, WERE DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS
DECISION IN CA G.R. S.P. NO. 89060 AND S.P. NO. 901532, ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF
THEIR RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL. 15

The Ruling of the Court

We do not find merit in the petition.

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public, trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14 (2) of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 16 Its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his or her guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he or she may interpose. 17 Thus,
the right to speedy trial is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having one's case tried. 18 Equally applicable is the balancing test used
to determine whether a person has been denied the right to speedy trial, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right,
and prejudice resulting from the delay, are considered. 19
In Villareal, we held that the right to speedy trial of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano was violated, because the
prosecution failed to comply with the Orders of the trial court requiring it to secure certified true copies of the records of the
case from the CA and there was no action at all on the part of the trial court for a period of almost seven years. We also
pointed out that: "on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately,
the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment." 20
In the present petition, Villa insists that the right to speedy trial of Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon was not violated
because the reasons for the delay were attributable to them, and they failed to timely invoke their right, unlike Ramos, Saruca,
Escalona, and Adriano.
Contrary to Villa's assertion, the CA's ruling, as supported by the records, reveals that the following circumstances
delayed the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon: (1) the prosecution failed to comply with the Order of the
RTC Branch 130 dated 21 September 1995, reiterated in another Order dated 27 December 1995, requiring it to secure the
records of Criminal Case No. 38340(91) from the CA; (2) from Ampil's and Cabangon's arraignment on 29 November 1993
and Fernandez's arraignment on 3 December 1993, the initial trial of the case commenced only on 28 March 2005, or more
than 11 years later; (3) the RTC Branch 130 resolved Ampil's motion to quash filed on 10 October 1994, and Fernandez's
omnibus motion filed on 19 October 1994, only on 8 March 2005 or more than 10 years after the motions were filed; and (4)
the RTC Branch 130 resolved Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon's Joint Motion to Dismiss filed on 5 December 2006, only on
9 January 2012, or more than five years after the motion was filed. Moreover, the RTC Branch 130, in its Order, stated the
reasons for the delay of the proceedings before it, such as: (1) the dismissal from the service of Judge Hamoy; (2) Judge
Sardillo's heavy workload; (3) the CA's order restraining the proceeding of the case; and (4) the Motion for Transfer of Trial
Venue and the Motion for Inhibition filed by the prosecution. Clearly, the reasons for the delay of the proceedings against
Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon are not attributable to them.
Moreover, the reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano are similar to
the reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon. In Villareal, we held that the
prosecution's failure to comply with the Orders of the trial court and the inaction of the trial court for almost seven years
amount to a violation of the right to speedy trial of Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano. In this case, not only were the
reasons for the delay in the proceedings against Ramos, Saruca, Escalona, and Adriano present as to Fernandez, Ampil, and
Cabangon, but also more unjustifiable circumstances added delay to the proceedings against them, such as the RTC's delayed
resolution of the motions to quash and motion to dismiss. Thus, there is more reason to apply our ruling in Villareal to
Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon, and find that their right to speedy trial has been violated.
Furthermore, contrary to Villa's contention that Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon failed to invoke their right, Villa's
petition before us states that: "[o]n 19 April 2005, Ampil filed a Manifestation vehemently objecting to the indefinite
suspension of the pre-trial and trial proceedings of the case. x x x. On 09 May 2005, Fernandez, and Cabangon filed their
 Ampil, and Cabangon filed with RTC Branch 130 on 5 December 2006 the Joint Motion to Dismiss invoking violation of
their right to speedy trial, which Motion to Dismiss was resolved only on 9 January 2012 or five years later. In Almeda v.
Office of the Ombudsman, 22 we held that petitioner's letter and manifestations seeking the immediate resolution of her case
cannot be considered late, and no waiver of her right to speedy trial or acquiescence may be attached to the same, as she was
not required as a rule to follow up on her case; instead, it is the State's duty to expedite the same. Similarly in this case, we
find that Fernandez, Ampil, and Cabangon timely invoked and did not waive their right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 13 February 2015 and the Resolution
dated 23 July 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127891.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Villa v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 219548, [October 17, 2018])
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993.]

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.J., DEAN CYNTHIA

ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO
TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA and RAMON ERENETA, petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134 ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST
MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
MANUEL ESCALONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenez for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS; MINIMUM STANDARD TO BE SATISFIED IN IMPOSING

DISCIPLINARY SANCTION BY AN ACADEMIC INSTITUTION. — Corollary to respondent students' contention of denial of
due process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay case [69 Phil. 635 (1940)] and not the Guzman case [142 SCRA 699], which
is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more aproposto the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: "(1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the
right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINIMUM STANDARD SATISFIED IN CASE AT BAR. — In view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent
students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While some of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February
18, 1991 to file their statements. Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners'
notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of
Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to
adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them. The requisite assistance of counsel was met when,
from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales
Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
3. ID.; ID.; DISCIPLINARY CASES INVOLVING STUDENTS, ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE; RIGHT TO CROSS
EXAMINE, NOT INVOLVED. — Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the
opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were
denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination.
An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the
investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that
this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA, Q.C. Branch, 161 SCRA 20.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT REQUIRED. — With regard to the charge of hazing,
respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were
furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of
students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be over-emphasized that the charge filed before the Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal case requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due
process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases
of a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be
which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the
subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation
under scrutiny.
5. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — It
is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law,
as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.
6. ID.; ACADEMIC FREEDOM CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential
freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
"Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been
associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university
communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of
Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure. But obviously,
its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license.
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of
independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom
have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach. It is to be realized that this individual aspect of
academic freedom could have developed only pari passuwith its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be
taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study. In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded
coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which
was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2)
states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and
what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to
the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right
"to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right
is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. [Section
9 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, effective September 11, 1982]. "For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules
and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are
under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." (Yap
Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals [Resolution], G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989) Such rules are "incident to the very object of
incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to
student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very
survival.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; PROPER ISSUANCE

THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since
petitioners do not stand to suffer irreparable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be
so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority
of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

DECISION

ROMERO, J p:

In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola
School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding
accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue
her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner
possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of
a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the
petition did not prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by
the Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University
proper, is again challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the
respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case,
the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability
to meet the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly
informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your
orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted
much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H.
Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital on February 10,
1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding
the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime,
they were placed on preventive suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and
pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991;
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice
Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent
students. Cdpr
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from
participation in acts of hazing committed during the Aquila Legis initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against
you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered
respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge on or before February 22, 1991, otherwise they would be
deemed to have waive their defense. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held
in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answers
with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to petitioners
dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1,
1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also
informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman
vs. National University; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill
of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;
 d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing
incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i.e. Respondent Joaquin
Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean del Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to
impose the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this
case be decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master
auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to
participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the
neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by
the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The
Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced
respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the
President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondent students or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila
University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that
even assuming that they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondent students are still guilty in accordance with the principle
that "where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one
or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the
whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the
respondents can be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized
behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12

In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas
and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was
promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on
March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as
students for the second semester of schoolyear 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be prevented
from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students
and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary
restraining order issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional
respondents to the original petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplemental Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to
the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against
respondent students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the
supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond
its mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10,
1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered
petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take,
and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issues of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza concluded its investigation. On
May 20, 1991, it imposed the penalty of dismissal on respondent students Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza and directed the
dropping of their names from its roll of students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondent
students of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
questioning the order of respondent judge reinstating respondent students dated May 17, 1991. On May 30, 1991, this Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its
rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether
or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances. Cdpr
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of
the charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the
Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are
constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a
school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v PSBA, Q.C.
Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held
before they were expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denial of due process is their argument that it is the Ang Tibay case 25 and not the Guzman case
which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
"(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case." 26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While some of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension
of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to
answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiller and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings
in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that
respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling
in Alcuaz. 32
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 order clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2,
1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions. prcd
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege
that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such
charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal
case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases of a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly,
disciplinary charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given
prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance
with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We
deem this sufficient for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a student, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing
frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it
has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby bypassing the latter and the Court of Appeals. 3 5
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, 36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to
their dismissal from petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer
irreparable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated
petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school.
This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973
and the present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic
freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. LibLex
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has deservedly earned for
himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of
his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as
punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the
forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:
"Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to
hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of
persons, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and
then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This
confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why,
what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear
to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching
things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected — which is the truth;
and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues,
they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies." 38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether
State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and
blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual
centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of
freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the
new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1575), Helmstadt (1574) and
Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human
rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to
intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words,
with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue,
discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into
unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such
individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect
of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional
counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish
their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is
articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government,
namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under
the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to
await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by
the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State university at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the
Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest. prcd
In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8 (2): "All institutions of
higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who
was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 39
Has the right been carried over to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage,
the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was
none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what
aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom
is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts
to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 40
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?"
Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . ." Gascon finished off the broken thought, — "the faculty and the students."
Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. 42
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of
students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually
and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." 43
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The
rules may include those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of
"right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the
rules laid down by the school.
Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its
curriculum and assiduously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the
order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more
reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are
sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said,
is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the
Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students.
Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute
longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them. cdphil
Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally
conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus, the decision of petitioner
university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento. 47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its
decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted
hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo
Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent
students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the
imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty
of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondent
students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of
Ateneo de Manila University dated March 10, 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING
respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, [May 27, 1993])
 SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 151258. December 1, 2014.]

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. No. 154954. December 1, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO
JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III,
NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II,
EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B.
PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 155101. December 1, 2014.]

FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080. December 1, 2014.]

GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J p:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing.
While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration,
we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resolved. Some of these matters include the effect of our Decision on
the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda), Junel Anthony D. Ama
(Ama), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek
probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012. 1 The Court
modified the assailed judgments 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while
aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of
the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide. 3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision 4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and
ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their
right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision: 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty
of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
— finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries — is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
 under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the
date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio. caIACE
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case: 6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs"
Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo
"Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what
to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing,"
they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda
compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the
"Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their
legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of
lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their
arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round," in which the
auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day — 9 February 1991 — the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs.
Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them
physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was
so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and
difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. DEcSaI
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him.
They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
 Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
 On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused
commenced anew. acADIT
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the
accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz.:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants — Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) — were acquitted, as their individual guilt
was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants — Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) — were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants — Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal — were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicideunder Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the
years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial
court's Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration 7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
(Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution. 8 Villa reiterates her
previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al. did not
timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She
again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial
trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then
insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration 9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill
(animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which
the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been
equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature and
gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction
between dolo and culpa by considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the
initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought. ETDHaC
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed despite
the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda,
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his
 Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al., 10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al. contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from
their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise
known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 2002 12and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof,
discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents attached 14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for Probation and
the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them
terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were
concerned, when they waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to
speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation discharged them
from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her
Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed
upon in our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation
of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal, 15 and
that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double jeopardy. 16 Though we have
recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion, 17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA's Decision dismissing the case was attended by a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to
dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the
facts and the evidence. 19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner's arguments and found no basis to rule
that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos. 155101
(Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of
the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari. HEDSCc
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG's theory that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or
negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the
finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies
involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses
thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed.
 Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful act
is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: 20
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. . . . The identity of mens rea —
defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent — is the predominant
consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to
exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. . . . . The element of intent — on which this Court shall focus — is described as
the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and
the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intent concerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other
hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart
or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer
to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act.
Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus — that the act or omission be done
"willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxx xxx xxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill — or animus interficendi — cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim's death must not have been the
product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or
criminal intent — but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence — the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxx xxx xxx
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala
in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer — iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found
guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must
be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-
being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical
injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are. aAHTDS
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act
 Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which
an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution
or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave
fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain
line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow
that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.
In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus
malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of the
OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the
nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal
Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpa on the one hand and
felonies committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties
provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the
imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are
automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These
imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subject to the discretion of the court. We have already resolved — and the
OSG agrees — that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting
physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions, 21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight physical
injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate
discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. 22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v. People 23 to support their contention that the CA judgment
can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court. aIcTCS
The OSG counters 24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorari also prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is
ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz.:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when
the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 25 and Section 1 of Rule 122, 26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that
of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict 27 against putting a person twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the
state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused's
waiver of the right to appeal — as when applying for probation — makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating: 28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because
the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant's
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only
the defendant's already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice
would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a
second trier of the defendant's guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first
trial, all in a process where the government's power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant's individual means. That the second opportunity comes viaan appeal does not make the effects any
less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket
invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute,
and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal
judgment. 29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote: 30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an
appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where
the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a
validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision's error or correctness. Under the
exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party
asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted) SADECI
While this Court's Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon
as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the
penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main
case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65
petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is no modification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose
resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of
jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and
irrelevant where the court's jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of
a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the
partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our criminal
justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the
power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That power and capacity
includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment, 32 and enforce or suspend 33 the execution of a
sentence in accordance with law.
The OSG questions 34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was
not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 (91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
 SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. . . . . (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial
court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 — not Branch 130 — of the Caloocan City RTC. 35 Neither the
judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al. in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City
RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340 (91), the ruling was made specifically
applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e., accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch
130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation,
as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the
probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the case were still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation
applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted. 37 If a
party appeals the trial court's judgment or final order, 38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the
decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. 39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire
case the moment the other party's time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease —
including the authority to order execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the
appellate court. 41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide
the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain
with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the
nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place. CTcSIA
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment."
A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
conditions among others: 42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal;
upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when
the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries
of judgments. 43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final older must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. 44 The
court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may
settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, 45 including the convicts' applications for
probation. 46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications 47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA 48 and the records were still with
that court. 49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court. 50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications, 51 the OSG had filed Manifestations
of Intent to File Petition for Certiorariwith the CA 52 and this Court. 53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002. 54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a
comment thereon. 55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their
consolidated memoranda. 56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of
Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final
discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pas is a clear evidence of
either gross ignorance of the law or an underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both — to
which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation 58 is a special
privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to
appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma
of an incarceration record by making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to
help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their
reintegration with the community.
 It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or clemency
conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or
by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of
any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within
them. (Emphases supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out that when they
appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968(the Probation Law). CAHaST
We refer again to the full text of Section 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In the
2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 62 this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation
even after the trial court has imposed a non-probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a
sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years
of prisión mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after the CA
reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligible for
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no
ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that all offenders who previously
appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this
Court enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a
genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable
to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders
discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court
since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals 63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore,
should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20
days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have
nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested
the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare
all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et
al. null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan 64 applicable, viz.:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it,
no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis
supplied)
 The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts 65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of their
discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To
support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment
had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event; Tecson et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to replace the
original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the
convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the
conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases
supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al. remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People, 68 we revisited our ruling in Francisco and modified our pronouncements insofar
as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En
Banc in effect abandoned Lagrosa and settled the following once and for all: 69 ECSaAc
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of
the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for
a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court's judgment — even if this
has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court's erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals that the probation law requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply
for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By
 denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's
greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right
to apply for that privilege.
xxx xxx xxx
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only
of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and
imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel
the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault
of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy
is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to
be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused
not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done
right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply
for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?(Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al. ultimately liable for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of theRevised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto
mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years,
4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we
rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby
clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC Branch. 130, which granted the Applications for Probation,
we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and
have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider
their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the terms,
conditions, and period thereof. AcHCED
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the penalty imposed
on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper
to discuss the matter ex proprio motu in the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision
dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL), 70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the
first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.
In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on
Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically
attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The applicable accessory
penalty is determined by using as reference the principal penalty imposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed
in accordance with the ISL. 72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes of penalties mentioned in an indeterminate
"penalty" 73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of
imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the salve offense. 75 The two penalties are only relevant
insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually
seek the shortening of the prison term. 76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period. As this provision grants
courts the discretion to lay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
the imposable penalty must also be within the aforementioned range. 77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty 78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional. 79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries
with it 80 the following accessory penalties:
ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years
and two months 81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately,
once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer
a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, if this accessory
penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office;
(b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a
pardon. 85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, should the trial court find
them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, 86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections: 87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the
order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
for the duration of the probation. . . . . During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation,
we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection
thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson,
and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines, 88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any. aIDHET
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and hereby
delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as
follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.
||| (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, [December 1, 2014])