AKUT, MARY CRIS S.

G.R. No. 132529 February 2 2001

NICDAO CARIÑO VS YEE CARIÑO

In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao Cariño. He had 2 children with
her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In
1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the
care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the
spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of
P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an
action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the
subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between
Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.

HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a
valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void
for the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for
their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries
earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC).

Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is
likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there
were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license;
in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which
provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been
equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each
party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.
AKUT, MARY CRIS S.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner,
v.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent

Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice
without securing the required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party
was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with
the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to
their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and
its entry on file.

Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts

the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
She had actually gave birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other
was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case
in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he had
three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that
the annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals dismissed also the
petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error

when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the
evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage
Held:

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite

enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance
of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable

intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an
officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity
of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
AKUT, MARY CRIS S.
G.R. No. 177235 July 7, 2014
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, petitioner
v.
AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN, respondent

FACTS:

Leonardo G. Mendoza, who died on November 25, 1986, is married to

petitioner Serconsision R. Mendoza. His legitimate and eldest daughter, respondent
Aurora Mendoza Fermin, was appointed as one of the administrators in the testate
proceedings of her father’s estate. In March 1989, petitioner submitted to probate court
the inventory of her husband’s properties including Lot 39, Block 12 of the consolidation
and subdivision plan Pcs-04-00250 in Parañaque City. In 1990, respondent discovered
the sale of this property to certain Eduardo c. Sanchez through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated on September 22, 1986 for an amount of Php150, 000. However, the sale was
registered in the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City only on April 30, 1991, five (5)
years after the alleged transfer. The information as to the new owner was unknown to
the tenants and the petitioner continued to collect rentals after the alleged sale.
Convinced that the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged,
respondent filed for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title
and Damages praying that:

1. Deed of Absolute Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 52593
registered in the name of Eduardo C. Sanchez be declared null and void.

2. Ofelia E. Abueg-Sta. Maria, in her capacity as the Register of Deeds of Parañaque

City, be ordered to revive and reinstate TCT No. 48946 in the name of Leonardo G.
Mendoza and Serconsision R. Mendoza.

3. Petitioner and Eduardo Sanchez be ordered to pay respondent the sum of Php
50,000 as moral damages, Php 20,000 as corrective damages, and Php 50,000 as
attorney’s fees, as well as the cost of suit.

In support of her allegation, the respondent:

1.Claimed that she is familiar with her father’s signature, having worked as his private
secretary when the latter is still a Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas.

2. Presented witnesses in the names of:

a. Noel Cruz (NBI Document Examiner) who testifies that the sample signatures of the
respondent’s father are different from that of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
b. Teresita Rosales (Tenant of Subject Property until July 11, 1990) who testifies that
petitioner forged the signature of her husband in her request for a marriage contract and
also in the payment of rental receipt dated November 24, 1986. She added that, the
petitioner even boasted that she was the one signing documents for her husband
because of the latter’s poor eyesight.

In addition, respondent had also, at hand, the Certifications from Office of the Clerk of
Court of Pasay City and City of Manila as evidences to show that Atty. Julian Tubig was
not commissioned as notary public of Pasay City at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale
was notarized. In view of these claims, the petitioner denied by presenting an expert in
the name of Zacarias Semacio, Document Examiner III of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City who testified that there was no forgery in the
signature of petitioner’s husband on the Deed of Absolute Sale compared to the latter’s
sample signatures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent had the right to seek for the annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale of her father’s estate.

HELD:

YES. The subject property was part of the conjugal property of the spouses as it
can be gleaned from TCT No. 48946 wherein it states that it is owned by “Leonardo G.
Mendoza & Serconsision R. Mendoza, both of legal age” . Although Aurora has not
adduced any proof to substantiate her allegation that Serconsision was just the
common-law wife of her father.

The applicable provision in governing the property relations of the spouses is Article 172
of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband’s consent. However, in Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo
Aldon , the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of a land belonging to the conjugal
partnership made by the wife without the consent of the husband is voidable as
supported by Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by the
husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required are annullable
at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare
the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the
wife did not give her consent. In the present case, the Court ruled that as a result of the
forged signatures, the sale should be annulled for lack of consent on Leonardo’s part
since it was executed on September 22, 1986, one month after the latter died.
Since the Deed of Absolute Sale is concluded before the Family Code took effect,
thetransaction could still be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Article 173
provides the remedy available to Leonardo in this case wherein his wife disposed their
conjugal property without his consent:

Article 173.

“The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
intowithout her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest inthe conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.”

In view of the fact that Leonardo is already dead means he can no longer exercise this
right and this death led to the dissolution of their marriage. Therefore, as one of the
heirs and administratix of her father’s estate, the respondent had the right to seek for
the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale as it deprived her and other legal heirs of
their hereditary rights.
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a
daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife
had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife
sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous
decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30,
2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L.
Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36. On December
16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In
1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to
sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a
child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended
the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husband’s last name as hers
in the invitation. March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were
manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely
used her newhusband’s last name as evidences. Fely denied the claims and asserted
that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue: Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological

incapacity?

Held: The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological

incapacity. Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

AKUT, MARY CRIS S.

G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA , petitioner
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA, respondent.

Facts:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious
law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony conducted by the
Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized
in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
1948. In ATTY. LUNA's marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely:
Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L.
Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed
to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby
they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.Sometime in 1977, ATTY.
LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project
(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
P1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36 months starting on April 15, 1978.
Said condominium unit was to be used as law office of LUPSICON. After full payment,
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the
following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,

married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz
A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
(12/100) x x x"

Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R.
Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,

married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio
J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned
by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be
25/100 share.

ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De
la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z.
Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that
the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to
the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus
her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter's
last will and testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna
excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that
SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties; that the
same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to
preserve ad administer the subject properties; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.

Issue: WON the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indiviso share
in the condominium unit; and to the law books.
Held:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted byPhilippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the
first marriageinvolving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a
foreign country lackscompetent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband whocontracts a subsequent marriage.Atty. Luna’s subsequent
marriage to Soledad was void fo r being bigamous, on the ground thatthe marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce
Decreerendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had
subsisted until thedeath of Atty. Luna.Given the subsistence of the first marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumptionthat Atty. Luna acquired the properties
out of his own personal funds and effort remained. Itshould then be justly concluded that
the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugalpartnership of gains as of the time
of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indivis o share of Atty.
Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to therespondents as the
lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.