People v. Alfredo Dulin, G.R. No.
171284, June 29, 2015  When he returned to the scene, he found Batulan at Danao’s door,
Bersamin, First Division
Topic: General Concepts
SUMMARY - Batulan stabbed Dulin who was able to wrest the knife from the former. Accused Dulin was
witnessed by several people to have stabbed Batulan to death. RTC convicted Dulin of murder. CA
affirmed this ruling but modified the civil liability. Dulin now argues that he should be convicted of
homicide only as there is no qualifying circumstance. He argues that there was incomplete self-defense.
RATIO - The accused who pleads self defense admits the authorship of the crime. The burden of
proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements.
Dulin posits that the totality of circumstances constituted incomplete self-defense. The Court rejected the
argument. He should have proved the elements of incomplete self-defense.
FACTS
January 7, 1991 – Information was filed, averring that on or about August 22,
1990, in the Municipality of Tugeugarao, Province of Cagayan, accused Dulin
alias Freddie was armed with a sharp bladed instrument, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab Francisco Batulan, inflicting upon him
several stab wounds on different parts of his body which caused his death.
Four witnesses were presented during trial.
(1) Alexander Tamayao:
 At 10pm of August 22, 1990, a young man ran from the house of
Vicente Danao to the house of the deceased Batulan. He shouted that
his “Uncle Totoy”, the deceased, was stabbed;
 Tamayao ran to Danao’s house which was 30 meters away and saw
Dulin stab Batulan who was prostrate face down;
 Dulin was on top of Batulan and holding him by the hair with his left
hand, and thrusting the knife at the latter with his right hand;
 Tamayao then ran to Batulan’s house and informed Dulin’s wife,
Estelita Batulan (Tamayao’s aunt) about the incident. He then went
home.
 Tamayao mentioned the long standing grudge between Batulan and
Dulin because he saw them fighting in April 1990 and heard Dulin say
on two occasions: “He will soon have his day and I will kill him”.
(2) Romulo Cabalza (barangay tanod):
 He was in his house around 10pm of the same date when he heard
the commotion in Danao’s house which was facing his house;
 Carolina, Danao’s daughter, was screaming for help. He looked for
another barangay tanod;
with Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument, about 6-7 inches long.
 Scared for his safety, he rushed to the Barangay Hall to ask help from
Edwin Cabalza and Nanding Buenaflor to bring Batulan to the
Provincial Hospital in Carig, Tuguegarao.
(3) Estelita Batulan:
 Tamayao went to her house around 10pm of the same date to tell her
that Dulin stabbed her husband in Danao’s house;
 She fainted while rushing to Danao’s house;
 She regained consciousness and went to the hospital, and on the way
there, she met Barangay Captain Meman who told her “Finally,
Freddie Dulin killed your husband as he vowed to do”. In the hospital,
she was told that her husband sustained 2 wounds in the back and
several stab wounds in front and was in the ICU before he died.
 She said that Barangay Captain Meman went to her husband’s wake
and repeated what he said about Dulin. When she confirmed about
the statement, he said “I’m sorry I cannot go and declare what I have
stated because I am afraid of Freddie and he will kill all those persons
who will testify in their favor”.
 She mentioned the heated discussion between her husband and his
nephew, Seong Bancud, in from of Danao’s house in April 1990. Then,
Dulin wielded a knife and tried to stab her husband. Dulin was pacified
when she went to aid her husband but she heard him say “You will
soon have your day, I will kill you.”
(4) Dr. Nelson Macaraniag:
 Batulan was brought to the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital in a
state of shock from his 12 stab wounds;
 Macaraniag was part of the 3 teams that conducted the surgery on
Batulan. The Medico-Legal Certificate attesting that Batulan died on
August 24, 1990 at 12:15 am and that he sustained 12 “lacerated
wounds” and stated the cause of death is “Hypovolemic shock
secondary to Massive Hemothorax secondary to Multiple stab
wounds”.
 He clarified that there were clerical errors in the preparation of the
Certificate because his handwritten records indicated that the victim
sustained stab wounds and not lacerated wounds. One of the clerks
could have misread his handwriting.
ACCUSED DULIN:
 Testified that he was in his house on that same evening in Atulayan Norte,
Tuguegara, Cagayan with 5 other people. Nicanor Annariao and
Raymond Soriano went to his house to see the fighting cocks being sold
by Alberto Eugenio. Alberto was not yet there and only arrived at 8pm to
talk with Raymund and Nicanor about the price. After the sale, Alberto
 served Nicanor and Raymund food, and Dulin and Jun Danao went with
the 2 to the highway to get a tricycle. On the way, Angel Bancud called
out and Dulin asked the others to go ahead and he would catch up.
 Dulin approached Bancud and Batulan, Dulin’s mother’s cousin, stabbed
him on the right side of his body and in the left hand. Dulin said “Uncle
you hit me (Dinigrasya nakun)”;
 Batulan replied “I will kill you”. So Dulin ran to the upper level of
Carolina Danao’s house. Batulan chased him and stabbed him again
several times;
 They grappled for the weapon and Dulin wrested it from Batulan. Dulin
the stabbed Batulan and they struggled until Dulin felt weak and fell to the
ground;
 Dulin regaind consciousness the next day at the hospital.
 Dulin said there was no grudge between him and Batulan but said that
the barangay captain would summon him to bring Batulan home every
time the later would be drunk at night.
 Erlinda Danao, Records Officer of the Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital,
authenticated the hospital records which showed that Dulin was also
injured.
 December 29, 1997 - The RTC convicted Dulin of murder and
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense.
 August 26, 2005 - Dulin argued that his crime should be homicide and not
murder. The CA affirmed the conviction and modified the civil liability.
The award of actual damages was deleted. But he was to pay the heirs
P20k for temperate damages and P50k for moral damages.
January 12, 2006 - The CA denied his MR.
ISSUES
In this case, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution mentioning
the statement of Dulin such as “He will soon have his day and I will kill him”
were not taken into consideration by the court. Its decision was based merely
on the narration of Dulin who admitted of the act of stabbing but argues self-
defense.
W/N there was self-defense – NONE
 The accused who pleads self defense admits the authorship of the crime.
The burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must
then prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
 Unlawful aggression is the most important element and it is the condition
sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying
circumstance.
 Dulin argues that all elements were present in this case. The Court affirms
the CA’s rejection of this argument and observed that although Batulan
initiated the attack, the unlawful aggression from Batulan ceased
once Dulin had wrested the weapon from him. Dulin had control of the
weapon. Whatever he did after constituted retaliation against Batulan.
Retaliation is not the same as self-defence.
 Dulin further argues that Batulan continued to follow him to end Dulin’s
life and there was no gap in the aggression initiated by Batulan. The
Court rejected this argument and said that Dulin admitted
successfully disarming Batulan and running away from him.
 Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin, ceased to be the
aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon.
 Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon –
constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was
not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim
started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-
defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor. As such, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.
WON incomplete self defense was proved – NO
 With Batulan’s aggression having ceased from the moment Dulin
disarmed him, there would be no incomplete self-defense.
 Also, he stabbed Batulan several times which shows that Dulin did not try
to defend himself or repel attack but tried to inflict injury.
WON the RTC and CA erred in appreciating the attendance of treachery
– YES
 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
 Two conditions must concur to prove treachery: one, the assailant
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act
which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and two, said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
 ITC, treachery should not be appreciated because the stabbing did not
take Batulan by surprise because the latter was sufficiently forewarned.
He had the opportunity to defend himself, or to escape, or even to recover
control of the weapon. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes
without warning, or is done in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim.
C2021
People v Raytos
G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017
Ponente: Caguioa, J.
FACTS
Version of Defense:
Raytos (Accused)
 Raytos testified that he knew the victim, David Araza, since birth
 On February 1, 2010, at around 8:00 pm, he was invited by Indo Sabio to
partake on some leftovers from the fiesta and to join them as a dance
session was being held.
 At around 11:30 pm, David Araza (victim) passed by Purok 1 and was
approached by Edgar Papiona, and the two danced.
 After they danced, the victim approached the table where Anita Sabio was
seated and invited her to dance, but the latter refused. Thereafter, the
victim and Edgar Papiona danced again.
 After dancing, the victim approached again Raytos' table and asked who
was brave enough while drawing a knife tucked in the waistband of his
pants.
o Raytos tried to escape by moving backwards and, while doing so,
he got hold of the victim's right hand.
o Raytos twisted the victim's arm, got hold of the knife and then
stabbed the victim several times on the chest.
o He delivered 3 successive stabbing blows in a quick and swift
manner because he panicked.
o He ran away immediately and surrendered himself to the
barangay officials and they proceeded to the police station.
Mado
 On February 1, 2010, at around 10:00 pm, he was watching the dance
session being held, and he saw the victim enter the dance area and
challenge the people seated on one table to a fight.
 When the victim saw Raytos, he pointed at Raytos and said "You are the
one I want" and Raytos answered saying "I [h]ave no fault against you."
 Then, the victim drew a knife from his waist and stabbed Raytos but the
latter was able to parry the stabbing blow and wrested possession of the
knife from the victim.
o Raytos used both his hands in parrying the stabbing blow
delivered by the victim and when Raytos got hold of the knife, he
stabbed the front portion of the victim's body.
o Mado did not see anything more because Raytos ran away after
the incident, and a commotion then ensued.
Version of the Prosecution:
Edgardo Papiona y Hermo (Papiona):
 On February 1, 2010, at around 12:00 a.m., he was in front of his house
with Raytos and 10 others having a dance session as it was just the day
after their barangay fiesta.
 While he was dancing with the victim, Raytos approached them and said
that he wanted to dance with the victim. Papiona acceded and went to the
side of the road just an arm's length away from the dance area.
 From his position at the side of the road, he saw Raytos stab the victim
when the latter turned his back from Raytos while dancing.
o He saw Raytos hold the right back shoulder of the victim and stab
the latter's back several times with the use of a knife measuring 8
in. long.
 Raytos then went to a hilly portion of their barangay while Papiona helped
in loading the victim on a truck and in bringing the latter to the hospital. He
did not hear any argument from both the victim and Raytos prior to the
incident. 3 days later, the victim died.
Romeo Nacase y Tarayo (Nacase)
 On February 1, 2010, at around 9:00 pm, he was having a drinking
spree with the victim and a certain Dado Nacase.
 He saw the victim and Edgar dancing and while the two danced, he
saw Raytos pull a knife from his pocket and approach the victim from
the back.
 When the victim was about to tum around, Raytos took hold of the
victim's shirt and stabbed the victim in the back.
 He was about 4 meters away when the incident happened.
 He did not hear the victim and Raytos argue or talk before the stabbing
incident.
RTC: Raytos guilty of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery
CA: affirmed Raytos' conviction while modifying the award of damages.
ISSUE/S
Whether Raytos' guilt for the crime of Murder was sufficiently proven beyond
reasonable doubt? Yes.
RULING:
Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
 ITC, the opposing sides are incessant on the truthfulness of their version
of the story, which differ in material points of fact
o the State, on one hand, has successfully presented strong
evidence of guilt for Murder, while Raytos, on the other hand,
maintains his innocence based on his plea of self-defense.
 The issue of whether the accused acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact.
o The RTC's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
great weight and respect, especially when affirmed by the CA.
o In the absence of a clear showing that the lower courts erred in
their appreciation of the facts, or in their application of the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence to such facts, their findings will
no longer be disturbed on appeal.
 In fine, given the concurrent findings of guilt made by both the RTC
and CA, SC finds that no cogent reason exists to reverse Raytos'
conviction.
Raytos Failed To Establish The Elements Of Self-Defense
 A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a
crime; accordingly, the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that
such killing was justified - failure to discharge which renders the act
punishable.
 accused must establish:
o (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim;
o (ii) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression
were reasonable; and
o (iii) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
 Of the three, unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such
element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be
appreciated.
 Raytos failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
David Araza.
 In his version of the incident, Raytos claimed that Araza drew a knife from
his left waist following a brief exchange of words between them. Raytos
then moved back, allegedly intending to escape, but instead ended up
wresting possession of the knife from Araza. After doing so, Raytos Araza
stabbed numerous times, leading to the latter's demise.
o The Court finds this narration of events to be incredible.
o Testimonial evidence, to be believable, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible
following common experience and leading to the inference of its
probability under the circumstances.
o Here, it is difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to
escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza's hand and
after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him
multiple times in quick succession
 But even if the Court were to believe this version of the events, it is evident
that no unlawful aggression can be deduced. Stated differently, there was
clearly no imminent danger on the person of Raytos as would justify
his killing Araza.
 Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected, or
imminent danger - not merely a threatening or intimidating action.
 In People v. Dulin, the Court had the occasion to elaborate on the kinds
and nature of unlawful aggression:
o Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression.
o Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
o Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if
to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an
angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
 In People v. Escarlos, the Court ruled that the mere drawing of a knife
by the victim does not constitute unlawful aggression, whether
actual or imminent, as the peril sought to be avoided by the accused
was both premature and speculative
o Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger - not merely threatening and intimidating action.
Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of
appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter
had merely drawn out his knife. There is aggression, only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just
speculative.
 People v. Borreros, the Court likewise held that the act of drawing a gun
from the waist could not yet be categorized as unlawful aggression.
 Applying to this case, Araza's alleged act of simply drawing a knife
from his waist fell short of the threshold required by law and
prevailing jurisprudence. At that point, and as correctly observed by
the courts below, there was yet no actual risk or peril to the life or
limb of Raytos.
 Parenthetically, the Court notes the testimony of Mado, the other witness
for the defense, who supplied additional details on the incident. In his
narration of events, Mado was purporting to show unlawful aggression on
the part of Araza, claiming that the latter actually delivered stabbing blows
to Raytos
o “David Araza drew his fan knife from his waist and stabbed
Lorenzo Raytos, ma'am.”
 Despite such positive testimony, however, this was not given any weight
by the RTC in arriving at a judgment of conviction, even noting certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. The following
material portions in Mado's cross-examination sheds light on his credibility
as a witness for the defense:
o Q - This is not the first time that you testified before this
Honourable Court, [a]m I right, Mr. Mado?
o A - It's my first time.
o Q - Are you sure of that, Mr. Mado?
o A - Yes, ma'am.
o Q - Is it not a fact Mr. Mado that you were here before this
Honourable Court years ago to testify in favour of one in accused
the name of Pablo Hilvano?
o A - Yes, ma'am. It was long (sic) time ago.
o Q - And that Pablo Hilvano was even acquitted on that case
because of your corroborative testimony?
o A - Yes, ma'am.
o Q - So, it is now clear and you are changing your answer that it is
not the first time you testified before this Honourable Court.
o A - Yes, ma'am.
o Q - So, your previous answer was a lie?
o A - Yes, ma'am.
 Notably, nowhere in his testimony did Raytos make mention of any
threatening behavior from Araza, aside from the drawing of the knife,
which would have necessitated immediate retaliation on his part.
o Worse, Mado's testimony was unsupported by the Medico Legal
Report dated February 4, 2010.
o Were the testimony of Mado true, that Araza actually delivered
stabbing blows to Raytos, such material detail would certainly
have been mentioned by the latter during his testimony, especially
considering that his freedom was hanging in the balance.
 Accordingly, the Court affirms the uniform findings of the RTC and CA and
adopts the latter's appreciation of the evidence on record.
 Even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression was present on the
part of Araza, there was no longer any danger on Raytos' person from the
moment he disarmed the former by wresting possession of the knife.
 When an unlawful aggression that has begun has ceased to exist, the one
who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former
aggressor. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression
warranting defense of one's self.
o Here, Raytos admitted that after obtaining possession of the
weapon, he no longer had any reason to stab Araza as in fact,
there was no showing that the latter persisted in his alleged
purpose of wanting to hurt Raytos. Thus, based on his own
statements, Raytos overstepped the acceptable boundaries of
self-preservation when he deliberately inflicted fatal injuries on
Araza, even when the purported aggression had already
ceased. By killing Araza, Raytos was no longer acting in self-
defense but in retaliation against the former.
The Qualifying Circumstance Of Treachery Was Sufficiently Established By
The Evidence
 Treachery or alevosia, is present when the offender adopts means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the felony that ensure its commission
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
 Alevosia is characterized by a deliberate, sudden and unexpected assault
from behind, without warning and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself or repel the assault and without risk to the assailant.
 In appreciating such circumstance, the RTC disposed as follows:
o The victim was dancing when he was attacked. There was no
confrontation. No forewarning. His dancing partner was even
misled into believing that accused only wanted to dance with the
victim. But of course, it was just an excuse, so that it would be
easier for the accused to attain his purpose. It was so sudden that
even the others were unprepared to do anything to prevent the
attack or at least minimize the injuries. It was an unexpected
occurrence right in the middle of a celebration which was intended
to be a joyous one.
 The medico legal report shows the following wounds:
o (+) stab wound, scapular area, (R) 2 cm.
o (+) stab wound, posterior axillary line (R), 3 cm.
o (+) stab wound, (R) flank area, 3.5 cm.
o (+) stab wound, infrascapular area, (L)
 These wounds clearly disprove the claim of accused that he was suddenly
able to stab the victim because he wrestled with him, because actually,
there was no fight that preceded the attack. There was plainly, murder.
 To stress, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were
unwavering as to the manner of killing - that Raytos suddenly
stabbed Araza from the back while holding the latter's shoulder.
o Further, that there were other people around that could have lent
their help to Araza is inconsequential as treachery considers only
the victim's means of defense at the time of the attack.
o Thus, so long as the accused deliberately employed means to
ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself from
retaliation by the victim, treachery can be properly appreciated.
 In People v. Rellon, the victim was stabbed from behind while he was
watching the singing and dancing during the Sinulog festival. Interestingly,
the accused therein, as in this case, claimed self-defense in stabbing the
victim. Said the Court:
o Accused Rellon saw Arsenic Ram sitting at the roadside when the
latter suddenly stood up, took his knife and thrust it towards
Rellon. Accused was able to ward off the thrust by holding the
deceased's arm and grappled for the possession of the knife.
Having succeeded in getting the knife, accused accidentally
stabbed the deceased in the right chest. After the stabbing
incident, the accused left the scene.
o The trial court held that the crime committed was murder. It
appreciated treachery when it took note of the fact that the victim
was suddenly stabbed from behind while he was watching the
Sinulog dance.
o The trial court stated: Treachery was appreciated in cases where
the victim while sitting on the ground unarmed and absolutely
unprepared, and without the least suspicion of the danger he was
incurring was suddenly and abruptly assaulted by the 2 accused,
without a word being uttered, and the first blow hit him on the nape
of the back, knocking him backwards to the ground, and as he
tried to get up he was stabbed in the abdomen x x x. The same
thing happened in the case at bar. The characteristic and
unmistakable manifestation of alevosia is the deliberate, sudden
and unexpected attack of the victim from behind, without any
warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself
or repel the initial assault x x x. When appellant stabbed the victim,
the latter was sitting on a bench watching the singing and dancing
during the Sinulog festival. The victim was engrossed in the
merrymaking when suddenly appellant stealthily stabbed him from
behind. An attack from behind is treachery x x x.
 Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn the
concurring findings of the RTC and the CA with respect to the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Rosales
G.R. No. 195832 | 1 Oct 2014 | Brion, J. | Castillo, A.R.L.
Facts:
 INC, in behalf of its foreign principal Interorient Shipping Co., hired
Rosales for 10 months as Chief Cook for M/V Franklin Strait under a
contract based on the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC)
 Feb 2006: while on board the vessel, Rosales experienced severe chest
pain and breathing difficulties, coupled with numbness on his left arm
o He underwent a coronary angiogram and an angioplasty in the left
anterior artery of his heart in the US, provided by the company at
its own expense
o Rosales was thereafter declared unfit to work and was advised to
continue treatment in his home country
 Rosales was diagnosed by Dr. Nicomedes Cruz in Makati Medical Center
to be suffering from acute myocardial infarction secondary to coronary
artery disease, hypertension and diabetes mellitus
o He underwent a coronary artery by-pass graft surgery at the
Philippine Heart Center
 Rosales was assessed by Dr. Cruz to have Grade 7 permanent disability
(moderate residuals of disorder) under the POEA-SEC but was later
reassessed by Dr. Efren Vicaldo to have a total disability rating of Grade
1 (highest)
 Rosales claimed permanent total disability benefits under the POEA-SEC
based on Dr. Vicaldo’s Grade 1 disability rating, but INC denied the claim
 Rosales filed a complaint for disability benefits, illness allowance,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees
against INC before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
o Rosales based his claim on Dr. Vicaldo’s Grade 1 disability rating
o Rosales stated that he was incapacitated to work for more than
120 days
o Rosales questioned Dr. Cruz’ competency since Dr. Cruz did not
actually perform the medical procedures, but based it only on the
report of Dr. Dizon. Moreover, Rosales argued that Dr. Cruz is not
a cardiologist but a general and cancer surgeon whose
assessment was partial since he was a company-designated
physician
o INC argued that Dr. Cruz only gave a Grade 7 disability rating
based on his post-treatment evaluation of Rosales; that under the
POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who is tasked
to assess the fitness of a seafarer and to give the corresponding
disability benefits rating
 o INC also pointed out that the award of disability benefits is not
dependent on the impairment of earning capacity but on the
gravity of the injury sustained
 LA found for Rosales, giving credence to Rosales’ arguments (above);
NLRC reversed, basing Rosales’ entitlements on Dr. Cruz’ assessments,
as the latter had thoroughly examined and overseen Rosales’ treatment
from repatriation to the issuance of Rosales’ disability grading, while Dr.
Vicaldo only attended to Rosales once
 CA granted Rosales’ appeal and reversed NLRC
o More than 120 days lapsed wherein Rosales had not been able to
work
o Despite medical treatment and 2 major heart operations,
Rosales’s illness persisted; these facts are more than sufficient to
conclude that Rosales could no longer perform his duties as Chief
Cook, leading to the gross impairment of Rosales’ earning
capacity and warranting Grade 1 permanent total disability
benefits
Issues:
1. W/N CA erred in finding GAD in the ruling of the NLRC that the disability
is measured in terms of gradings, not by the number of days of actual
inability to work. YES.
2. W/N CA erred in finding GAD in the ruling of the NLRC that in a conflict
of findings between the company-designated physician and the private
physician, it is the company-designated physician’s findings that should
prevail. YES.
Ratio:
1. It is the doctor’s findings which should prevail over the simple lapse of the
120-day period
 ART. 192(c)(1), LC: The following disabilities shall be deemed total and
permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120
days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules.
 This should be read in relation with Sec. 2, Rule X, Book IV, IRR, and
Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC
o expresses his disagreement by asking for the referral to a third
o Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services: If the 120 days initial
period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240
days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists
 The law and jurisprudence show that INC is obligated to pay for the
treatment of Rosales, plus his basic wage, during the 120-day period from
repatriation while he is undergoing treatment; he could not work during this
period and hence was on temporary total disability
 Permanent disability transpires when the inability to work continues
beyond one hundred twenty (120) days, regardless of whether or not
he loses the use of any part of his body. In comparison with the concept
of permanent disability, total disability means the incapacity of an
employee to earn wages in the same or similar kind of work that he
was trained for, or is accustomed to perform, or in any kind of work
that a person of his mentality and attainments can do. It does not
mean absolute helplessness.
o In disability compensation, it is not the injury that is
compensated; it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one's earning capacity
o Thus, while Rosales was entitled to temporary total disability
benefits during treatment, it does not follow that he should likewise
be entitled to permanent total disability benefits when his disability
was assessed post-treatment
 He had permanent disability because he was out of work
and could not work for more than 120 days
 But the extent of his disability (total/partial) is determined,
not by the number of days he could not work, but the
disability grading the doctor recognizes based on his
capacity to work and earn his wages
 Doctor’s findings should prevail as he/she is equipped with the proper
discernment, knowledge, expertise and experience; this serious
consideration cannot be determined by simply counting the days
2. Non-referral to a third physician, whose decision shall be considered as final
and binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC
 Re: the conflicting claims of Dr. Cruz and Dr. Vicaldo, the POEA-SEC
provides that “[i]f a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the [e]mployer
and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on
both parties.”
o In other words, the company can insist on its disability rating even
against a contrary opinion by another doctor, unless the seafarer
doctor who shall make his or her determination and whose
decision is final and binding on the parties
 Since Rosales signed the POEA-SEC, he bound himself to abide by its
conditions throughout his employment
o ITC, after obtaining a medical certificate from Dr. Vicaldo
classifying his illness as Grade 1 (contrary to Dr. Cruz' Grade 7
assessment), Rosales immediately proceeded to secure the
services of a counsel and filed this complaint
 o No explanation was ever given for the failure to comply with the
POEA-SEC, or indication of an earnest effort to secure
compliance with the POEA-SEC
 To definitively clarify how a conflict situation should be handled,
upon notification that the seafarer disagrees with the company doctor's
assessment based on the duly and fully disclosed contrary assessment
from the seafarer's own doctor, the seafarer shall then signify his intention
to resolve the conflict by the referral of the conflicting assessments to a
third doctor whose ruling, under the POEA-SEC, shall be final and binding
on the parties. Upon notification, the company carries the burden of
initiating the process for the referral to a third doctor commonly agreed
between the parties.
 The complaint was thus premature and should have been dismissed as
early as the LA’s level
 The disregard for the third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC is
unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability
claims at the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily
than if they were to be brought to court
 Even granting that the complaint should be given due course, the
company-designated physician’s assessment should prevail over the
private physician’s, since Dr. Cruz had thoroughly examined and treated
Rosales from the time of his repatriation until his disability grading was
issued (Feb 20, 2006 to Oct 10, 2006). In contrast, Dr. Vicaldo only
attended to Rosales once (Nov 9, 2006).
Petition GRANTED. CA Decision SET ASIDE. Complaint DISMISSED.
C2021
Republic of the Philippines v. Ludyson C. Catubag
G.R. No. 210580
Ponente: Reyes, Jr., J.
04/18/2018
Digester: Gueco
SUMMARY: Catubag (who has been working overseas since 2001) and
Shanaviv (who stayed behind in the Philippines) were married in 2003.
Prior to that, they have been cohabiting as husband and wife and their
union begot 2 children. On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, Catubag
was informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never
returned. He took an emergency vacation and flew back home. He
inquired about his wife's whereabouts from their friends and relatives in
Cagayan and Bicol. He aired over Bombo Radyo Philippines regarding the
fact of disappearance of his wife. He searched various hospitals and
funeral parlors in Tuguegarao City and nearby municipalities.
In 2012, Catubag filed with RTC a petition to have his wife declared
presumptively dead. RTC granted. In 2013, petitioner elevated the RTC
judgment to CA via a petition for certiorari on the ground that Catubag
failed to establish a “well-founded belief” that his wife was dead. CA
dismissed because no MFR was filed. Petitioner filed MFR, CA denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In determining whether or not there was a “well-founded belief”, the Court
looked at the cases of Republic vs. Granada, Cantor, and Orcelino-
Villanueva. The Court held that Catubag’s efforts in searching for
Shanaviv fall short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence.
He could have easily convinced the Court otherwise by providing evidence
which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or
justification was given for these glaring omissions.
FACTS
 Prior to the celebration of their marriage in 2003, private respondent
and Shanaviv had been cohabiting with each other as husband and
wife. Their union begot 2 children: Mark Bryan A. Catubag and Rose
Mae A. Catubag, born on May 18, 2000 and May 21, 2001,
respectively.
  In 2001, in order to meet the needs of his family, private respondent
took work overseas. Meanwhile, Shanaviv stayed behind in the
Philippines to tend to the needs of their children.
 On June 26, 2003, private respondent and Shanaviv tied the knot in
Rizal, Cagayan. The marriage was solemnized by Honorable Judge
Tomas D. Lasam at the Office of the Municipal Judge, Rizal, Cagayan.
 Sometime in April 2006, private respondent and his family were able
to acquire a housing unit located at Rio del Grande Subdivision, Enrile
Cagayan. Thereafter, private respondent returned overseas to
continue his work. While abroad, he maintained constant
communication with his family.
 On July 12, 2006, while working abroad, private respondent was
informed by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never
returned. In the meantime, private respondent's relatives took care of
the children.
 Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of his
children, private respondent took an emergency vacation and flew
back home. Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile Cagayan,
but to no avail. He then proceeded to inquire about Shanaviv's
whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but they too could
offer no help.
o Private respondent travelled as far as Bicol, where Shanaviv
was born and raised, but he still could not locate her.
 Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo
Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the
Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance. He
searched various hospitals and funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in
Bicol, with no avail.
PROCEDURE
 On May 4, 2012, after almost 7 years of waiting, private respondent
filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife declared presumptively
dead.
 RTC: [May 23, 2013] granted the petition
o WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. SHANAVIV G.
ALVAREZ-CATUBAG is hereby adjudged PRESUMPTIVELY
DEAD only for the purpose that petitioner LUDYSON C.
CATUBAG may contract a marriage subsequent to what he
had with SHANAVIV G. ALVAREZ-CATUBAG without
prejudice to the reappearance of the latter. SO ORDERED.
 On August 5, 2013, petitioner, through the OSG, elevated the
judgment of the RTC to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
o Petitioner's main contention is that private respondent failed
to establish a "well-founded belief' that his missing wife was
already dead.
 CA: [September 3, 2013] dismissed the petition because no motion for
reconsideration was filed with the court a quo. The CA ruled that such
defect was fatal and warranted the immediate dismissal of the petition.
 On September 18, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December
6, 2013.
 Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S
 W/N private respondent complied with the essential requisites of
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41
of the Family Code. [Relevant to topic “presumption of law”]
 W/N petitioner's resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to
challenge the decision of the RTC declaring Shanaviv presumptively
dead was proper;
RULING: WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated May 23, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11
and the Resolutions dated September 3, 2013 and December 6, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 131269 are
hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the petition of private
respondent Ludyson C. Catubag to have his wife, Shanaviv G. Alvarez-
Catubag, declared presumptively dead is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
W/N private respondent has sufficiently complied with the essential
requisites in a petition for declaration of presumptive death (no)
 Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out 4 requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied with for the
declaration of presumptive death to prosper:
o (1) the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 CC
 o (2) the present spouse wishes to remarry.
o (3) the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead.
o (4) the present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
 In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse
who has the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41
of the Family Code are present.
o Since it is private respondent who asserts the affirmative of
the issue, then it is his duty to substantiate the same. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegations will not suffice.
 The records reveal that private respondent has complied with the 1st,
2nd, and 4th requisites. Thus, what remains to be resolved is W/N
private respondent successfully discharged the burden of
establishing a well-founded belief that his wife is dead.
 The Court in Cantor, pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief'
has no exact definition under the law. Such belief depends on the
circumstances of each particular case. As such, each petition must be
judged on a case-to-case basis.
 This is not to say that there is no guide in establishing the existence
of a well-founded belief that an absent spouse is already dead.
In Republic vs. Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court, through Justice
Mendoza, provided that such belief must result from diligent efforts to
locate the absent spouse. Such diligence entails an active effort on
the part of the present spouse to locate the missing one. The mere
absence of a spouse, devoid of any attempt by the present spouse to
locate the former, will not suffice.
o “The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the
present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the
period required by law), lack of any news that the absentee
spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with
the stringent requirement of "well-founded belief' which can
only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.”
 A perusal of the cases of Republic vs. Granada, Cantor, and Orcelino-
Villanueva reveal the circumstances which do not meet the Court's
standards in establishing a "well-founded belief."
Republic v Granada
 The present spouse alleged that she exerted efforts in locating her
absent spouse by inquiring from the latter's relatives regarding his
whereabouts.
 The Court ruled against the present spouse and stated that the mere
act of inquiring from relatives falls short of the diligence required by
law. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid
of mass media. Even worse, she did not even bother to present any
of the absent spouses' relatives to corroborate her allegations.
Cantor
 The present spouse alleged that she exerted "earnest efforts" in
attempting to locate her missing husband. She claimed that she made
inquiries with their relatives, neighbors, and friends as to his
whereabouts. She even stated that she would take the time to look
through the patient's directory whenever she would visit a hospital.
 Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled otherwise.
It held that the present spouse engaged in a mere "passive-search"
 Applying the "stringent-standards" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence, the Court pointed out four acts of the present spouse
which contradict the claim of a diligent and active search:
o (1) the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband. It can be inferred from the records that her hospital
visits and her consequent checking of the patients' directory
therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a
diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him.
o (2) she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding
of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in
which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions,
we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose
spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities
or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
o (3) she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly
made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the
present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his
friends about his absent spouse's whereabouts is insufficient
as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries
 were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.
o (4) there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent search.
Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a
well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she
inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband's
whereabouts.
Orcelino-Villanueva
 The present spouse began her "search" by returning home from her
work overseas to look for her missing husband. She then inquired from
her in-laws and common friends as to his whereabouts. The present
spouse even went as far as Negros Oriental, where the absent spouse
was born. Additionally, the present spouse claimed that 15 years have
already lapsed since her husband's disappearance.
 The Court held that that it was erroneous for the lower courts to grant
the petition for declaration of presumptive death. The present spouse's
allegations should not have been given credence because:
o Applying the standard set forth by the Court in Cantor, Edna's
efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded belief of her
absent husband's death.
o Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained
unfounded as it merely consisted of bare assertions without
any corroborative evidence on record. She also failed to
present any person from whom she inquired about the
whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her
children from whom she learned the disappearance of her
husband. In fact, she was the lone witness.
o Following the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof, the Court cannot give credence
to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate
her husband.
The present case
 Applying the foregoing standards discussed by the Court in Cantor,
Granada, and Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court finds that private
respondent's efforts falls short of the degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
 First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing
wife's whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims
to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they lived and in
the place where his wife was born and raised.
o However, private respondent failed to present any of
these alleged friends or relatives to corroborate these
"inquiries." No explanation for such omission was given.
o As held in the previous cases, failure to present any of the
persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends to
belie a claim of a diligent search.
 Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned
gov’t agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the NBI.
o In Cantor, the Court reasoned that while a finding of well-
founded belief varies with the nature of the situation, it would
still be prudent for the present spouse to seek the aid of the
authorities in searching for the missing spouse.
o Absent such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the
present spouse cannot be said to have actively and diligently
searched for the absentee spouse.
 Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager,
private respondent bases his "well-founded belief' on bare assertions
that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife.
o His bare assertions, uncorroborated by any kind of evidence,
falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-
founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
 Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's
efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive.
Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court
otherwise by providing evidence which corroborated his
"earnest-efforts." Yet, no explanation or justification was given
for these glaring omissions. Again, he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it by some other means than mere allegations.
 Stripped of private respondent's mere allegations, only the act of
broadcasting his wife's alleged disappearance through a known radio
station was corroborated. This act comes nowhere close to
establishing a well-founded belief that Shanaviv has already passed
away. At most, it just reaffirms the unfortunate theory that she
abandoned the family.
 To accept private respondent's bare allegations would be to apply a
liberal approach in complying with the requisite of establishing a well-
founded belief that the missing spouse is dead.
o In Republic vs. CA (Tenth Div.), the Court cautioned against
such a liberal approach. It opined that to do so would allow
easy circumvention and undermining of the Family Code.
 Spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by
simply agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never
return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in
evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse. A lenient approach in applying the standards of diligence
required in establishing a "well-founded belief' would defeat the State's
policy in protecting and strengthening the institution of marriage.
 On this basis, it is clear that private respondent failed to fulfill the
requisite of establishing a well-founded belief that the absentee
 spouse is dead. Thus, the RTC should have denied private
respondent's petition for declaration of presumptive death.
W/N the resort to a petition for certiorari was proper (yes)
 Since what is involved in the instant case is a petition for declaration
of presumptive death, the relevant provisions of law are Articles 41,
238, and 253 of the Family Code. These provisions explicitly provide
that actions for presumptive death are summary in nature.
 Consequently, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal
decisions in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code
because by express mandate of law, judgments rendered thereunder
are immediately final and executory.
o Republic of the Phils. vs. Bermudez-Lorino, citing Atty. Veloria
vs. Comelec  The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is
it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.
Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in
Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated
differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.
 It is well settled in our laws and jurisprudence that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
 While parties are precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration or
a notice of appeal, in a petition for declaration of presumptive death,
they may challenge the decision of the court a quo through a petition
for certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
 In Republic vs. Sarenogon, Jr., the Court outlined the legal remedies
available in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death. If aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, then filing with the CA
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 would be proper. Any
subsequent decision by the CA may then be elevated to the
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
 Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner's resort
to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to challenge the
RTC's Order declaring Shanaviv presumptively dead was proper.
PEOPLE v LIKIRAN
G.R. No. 201858 | June 4, 2014
Reyes, J.
Group 1 – Protacio
SUMMARY
There was a barrio dance, where the victim was present. After a brawl,
accused-appellant Jenny and his brother went on rampage – the former had a
knife while the latter had a gun. Jerome, the brother, shot Sareno several times
and when he was down, accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. RTC and
CA convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder.
FACTS
 March 19, 2000: On the eve of the town fiesta during a dance at the
basketball court, the victim Sareno was present, together with the
witnesses that testified in favor of the prosecution – Dagangon,
Mercado, and Goloceno
 After a few hours, Jerome Likiran, accused-appellant’s brother,
punched Mercado
o Goloceno was about to assist when he saw Jerome had a
short firearm, while accused-appellant Jenny Likiran was
holding a hunting knife
 Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times
 When Sareno fell, accused-appellant stabbed him on the back
o Dagangon saw the incident first-hand since he was only three
meters away
 When they brough Sareno to the hospital, he was already dead at
point after suffering multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the
left scapular area
 Accused-appellant’s defense:
o Denied involvement in the crime
o Admitted he was at the dance, but that he did not go outside
but stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located
o Other witnesses testified for the defense
 Edgar Indanon said he saw the stabbing incident, but
it was an unknown person who did it
  Eleuterio Quiñopa said he was with the brothers
inside the dance hall
 RTC found accused-appellant guilty and that prosecution was able to
establish culpability – convicted of the crime of murder
o Dagangon’s positive identification was sufficient to convict
o Rejected Jenny’s defense of denial, as it was not supported
by evidence and that he failed to prove that it was impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime
 CA affirmed RTC decision in toto
o Sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery
o However, it found that there was no conspiracy as the
information failed to contain such allegation
o Also found that evidence failed to establish abuse of superior
strength
 Accused-appellant is protesting his conviction now
o Failure to prove the identity of the assailant and his culpability
ISSUE
W/N accused-appellant Jenny Likiran is guilty of the crime of murder - YES
RATIO
 First duty of prosecution is to prove the identity of the criminal – this
was adequately established by the testimony of Dagangon
o The place where the crime occurred was lighted
o He was only three meters away
o Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the
accused is entitled t greater weight than alibi and denial
o Absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely
testify
 Accused-appellant asserts that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing, and shooting
o Argued that the evidence on record established Sareno was
shot by some other person
o But the testimony of Dagangon identified accused-appellant
and his brother Jerome
 Relevant to the current issue of WAIVER: accused-appellant contends
that the cause of death was not made an issue in the court a quo
and that the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial
conference as proof of the fact and cause of death
 Pre-trial agreement states that one of the matters stipulated and
admitted by both sides was that the Certificate of Death issued by
Dr. Dael is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to
multiple stab wound scapular area
o Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118
o Although the pre-trial agreement was only signed by both
sides’ counsels, it may be admitted given that the defense
failed to object to its admission
 Death certificate issued in the regular performance of duty is prima
facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim
 Accused-appellant is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause
of death
 Accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno
o Stab wound he inflicted contributed to Sareno’s death
o Quinto v Andres: “The offender is criminally liable for the death
of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or
contributed to the death of the victim”
 Treachery, however, is not present
o Not present when killing is not premeditated
o Fact that shooting and stabbing was a spur of the moment
incident, a result of a brawl that happened
o Failure to show deliberate planning of the means to harm
Sareno
o Sareno was an innocent bystander who just became a target
of the rampage
 Penalty
o Indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor medium to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
o P50,000 civil indemnity, P50,000 moral damages, P30,000
actual damages, P10,000 attorney’s fees
KROHN v. CA
G.R. No. 108854
June 14, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CASE
Petition for review on certiorari (invoking the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient, seeking to enjoin her husband from disclosing
contents of a confidential psychiatric report to be used on annulment
proceedings)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married, and had three
children. The relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one
 Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing to ease the marital strain,
which proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
 Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report
on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and
Baltazar Reyes.
o He obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas
assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion
existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter."
o The decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and
Definite."
 Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz
before the trial court, citing the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation
Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either
unfounded or irrelevant."
 At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
o This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
 Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to
any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-
patient privileged communication rule," and submitted a Statement for
the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal
basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological
incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely
false, fabricated and merely an afterthought."
o Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after
their separation, Ma. Paz instructed her counsel to oppose the
suit and pursue her counterclaim even during her absence.
o Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of
the confidential psychiatric report as evidence, and moved to
strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record.
 RTC admitted the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in
evidence
o First, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the
respondent had been suffering from psychological incapacity;
o Secondly, when the said psychiatric report was referred to in
the complaint, the respondent did not object thereto on the
ground of the supposed privileged communication between
patient and physician.
o What was raised by the respondent was that the said
psychiatric report was irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the
interest of justice and for the purpose of determining whether
the respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from
psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very
material and may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn,
Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to dispute
the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and
later the psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will
be presented.
 RTC: denied the Motion to Reconsider Order and directed that the
Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was
likewise denied.
 CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari. The MR was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review.
 Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the
contents of the psychiatric report and prays for the admission of her
Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case.
o Since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which
he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a
professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third
be PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting any
medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by a physician
which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and
privileged relation with a patient."
o The reason behind the prohibition is to facilitate and make
safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and
enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be
enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient.
o To allow her husband to testify on the contents of the
psychiatric evaluation report "will set a very bad and
dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the
rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and confidence
to the relation of physician and his patient." Her thesis: what
 cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done
indirectly.
o Her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath
what she asserted in her Answer, which she failed to verify as
she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed.
o Her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading
and is not as it has never been intended to take the place of
her testimony;" hence, there is no factual and legal basis
whatsoever to expunge it from the records.
 Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules
are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . .
the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where
the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the physician of the
petitioner."
o According to him, the Rules sanction his testimony
considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a
civil case filed by one against the other.
o that privileged communication may be waived by the person
entitled thereto, and this petitioner did so when she gave her
unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation
report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale which took it into account in deciding whether
their marriage was null and void.
o Further, petitioner also gave her implied consent when she
failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in
her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report
as "either unfounded or irrelevant." Failure to interpose a
timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence
presented on privileged matters may be construed as an
implied waiver.
o With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner,
private respondent posits that this in reality is an amendment
of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its exclusion from the
records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
ISSUE: W/N the privilege may be successfully invoked – NO, it cannot.
RATIO
 The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the
communication between physician and patient is not doubted.
o statutes making communications between physician and
patient privileged are to inspire confidence in the patient and
encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his
symptoms and condition
o this prevents the physician from making public information
that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to
the patient.
o The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy,
intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of
information communicated in the context of the physician-
patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his
mental health records confidential.
o Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege is founded upon the notion that certain forms of
antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those
in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the
services of a psychotherapist.
 Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim
v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the
privilege may be successfully invoked:
(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient.
 ITC, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is the
patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by
medical practitioners. This does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the
prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed
the report.
o Petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of
private respondent on the ground that it was privileged.
o She invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay—a fatal mistake.
o For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it
was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
Magsino v. Magsino
Feb 18, 2019
Reyes
Topic: Admissibility and probative value
The OG Case: Petition to Fix the Rights of the Father Pendente Lite with
Prayers for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order and Hold Departure
Order
Facts:
 Respondent and petitioner were married on December 6, 1997 and
their union was blessed with two children
 Sometime in 2005 Melissa started suspecting Rolando of sexually
molesting their children.
 This is because she sees the children playing with their genitals and
when asked, they said they learned it from their papa.
 Thus to protect the children from abuse she left the home and took the
children to their grandparents.
 In July 2008, Rolando filed the aforesaid petition
 During pre-trial, Rolando manifested that he would be presenting,
among other witnesses, Dr. Cristina Gates (Gates), who will testify on
the mental status and fitness of Rolando to exercise parental authority
 At the hearing, Gates was presented as an expert witness. She also
discussed the findings contained in Rolando's psychological
evaluation report.
 Applying clinical hypnosis, phenomenological-existential study and
historical-contextual approach, Gates opined that Rolando could not
have molested the minors.
 As retrieved from Rolando's memory while under hypnotic trance,
Gates narrated that the children have accidentally witnessed their
parents in the act of sexual intercourse for several occasions and
explained that this experience caused them to develop sexual
hyperactivity.
 Gates was then subjected to cross-examination.
 But before propounding any questions, Melissa's counsel, in open
court, moved to strike out the direct testimony of Gates on grounds
that her expertise had not been established and that any evidence
derived from hypnotically-induced recollection is inadmissible.
 The RTC ruled to retain the testimony as part of the record subject to
a continuing objection on the qualification of the witness.
 On June 5, 2010, Melissa's counsel filed a Motion to Expunge the
testimony of Gates reiterating the doubts on her expertise and to
suppress related evidence particularly the psychological evaluation
report by reason of inadmissibility of hypnotically-induced recollection.
 In its Order dated October 11, 2010, the RTC denied the motion to
expunge the testimony on the ground of waiver of objection for failure
to timely question the qualifications of the witness.
 Hence, Melissa filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) ascribing grave abuse o f discretion on the part o f the RTC.
 CA affirmed the RTC.
 Hence this Petition.
Issue: Did the CA commit an error by denying petitioner’s motion to expunge
the testimony of gates?
Held: No.
Ratio:
 In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence
must be made at the proper time, and the grounds specified.
 Grounds for objections not raised at the proper time shall be
considered waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some
other ground.
 Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not consider any other
ground of objection, except those that were raised at the proper time.
 Section 35, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides when to
make an offer of evidence
 Section 36, Rule 132 of the same rules, provides when objection to
the evidence offered shall be made,
 In other words, objection to oral evidence must be raised at the earliest
 possible time, that is after ·the objectionable question is asked or after
the answer is given.
 The objections interposed by petitioner - as to both oral and
documentary evidence - were not timely made.
 Petitioner should have objected during the course of Gates' direct
testimony on her qualifications as an expert witness and explaining
the mechanics of the psychological examination which she conducted
on respondent.
 The reason why offer must be made at the time the witness is called
to testify and the objection thereto be made, so that the court could
right away rule on whether the testimony is necessary on the ground
of irrelevancy, immateriality or whatever grounds that are available at
 the onset.
 It bears to stress however that allowing the testimony does not mean
that courts are bound by the testimony of the expert witness.
 It falls within the discretion of the court whether to adopt or not to adopt
testimonies of expert witnesses, depending on its appreciation of the
attendant facts and applicable law.
 Objections to documentary evidence should likewise be timely raised.
 True, petitioner acted prematurely when it objected to the
psychological report at the time when it is still being identified.

Obiter/Relevant Discussion:

 At any rate, it must be stressed that admissibility of evidence

should not be confused with its probative value.
 Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers
to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an
issue.
 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.

Hence, Petition is Denied.