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  • ABP12 - Q - AASHTO Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (2009)

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    Vessel collision design Of highway bridges

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    271 vizualizări60 pagini

    ABP12 - Q - AASHTO Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (2009)

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    Vessel collision design Of highway bridges

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    Guide Specifications and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges cond Edition, 2009 Nits Copyright 2008, by the Amerian Association of Siate Highway and Transportation Officials, All Rights Reserved. Printed in the United States of Americ, This book, or pars lhereof, may not be reproduced in any fori without wetten Permission of the publishers a © 200 by the AmarcenAssction of She Highway ad Traprstion Oia ‘Allright esved:Dupleaion = elton a pps ow EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2008-2009 Voting Members Officers: President: Allen Biehler, Pennsylvania Vice President: Larty L. “Butch” Brown, Sr., Mississippi Secretary-Treasurer: Carlos Braceras, Utah Regional Representatives: REGION [; Carolann Wieks, Delaware, One-Year Term Joseph Marie, Connecticut, Two-Vear Term REGION Il: Larry L. “Butch” Brown, Mississippi, One-Year Term Dan Flowers, Arkansas, Two-Year Tetm REGION Ill: Kirk T, Steudle, Michigan, One-Year Term Nancy J, Richardson, lowa, Two-Year Term REGION IV: Rhonda G. Faught, New Mexico, One-Year Term Will Kempton, California, Two-Year Term Nonvoting Members Immediate Past President: Pete K. Rahn, Missouri AASHTO Executive Director: John Horsley, Washington, DC ot (© 100 bythe Arian Asocaon of Sie Highray and Transporation Of ‘Alright sured, Depeaion vation a spt a HIGHWAYS SUBCOMMITTEE ON BRIDGES AND STRUCTURES, 2008 MALCOLM 7, KERLEY, Chair KEVIN THOMPSON, Vice Chair M, MYINT LIN, Federal Highway Aduinistation, Seeretary FIRAS I. SHEIKH IBRAHIM, Federal Highway Administration, Assistant Secretary ALABAMA, John F. Black, William P. Conway, George H. Conner ALASKA, Richard A. Pratt ARIZONA, Jean A. Nehme ARKANSAS, Phil Brand CALIFORNIA, Kevin Thompson, Susan Hida, Barton J Newton COLORADO, Mark A. Leonard, Michael G. Salamon CONNECTICUT, Gery J. Abramowier, Julie F. Georges DELAWARE, Jiten K. Songji, Burry A. Benton DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nicolas Glados,L. Donald Cooney, Konjit “Connie” Eskender FLORIDA, Robert V, Robertson, Jr, Marcus Ansley, Andre Pavlov GEORGIA, Paul V. Lites, J, Brian Summers HAWAII, Poul T. Santo IDAHO, Matthew M. Farrar ILLINOIS, Raiph E. Anderson, Thomas J. Domagalski INDIANA, Anne M, Reatick IOWA, Norman L, MeDonald KANSAS, Kenneth F, Hurst, James J. Brennan, Loren R, Risch KENTUCKY, Allen Frank LOUISIANA, Hossein Ghara, Adthur D” Andrea, Paul Fossier MAINE, David Sherlock, Jeffrey S. Folsom MARYLAND, Earle S. Freedman, Robest J. Healy MASSACHUSETTS, Alexander K, Bardow MICHIGAN, Steven P. Beok, David Juntunen MINNESOTA, Daniel L. Dorgan, Kevin Western MISSISSIPPI, Michell K. Carr B. Keith Carr MISSOURI, Dennis Heckman, Michael Harms MONTANA, Kent M Bares NEBRASKA, Lyman D. Freemon, Mark Ahlian, Hussam “Sam” Falah NEVADA, Mark P, Elicegui, Maro Grunert, Todd Stefonowier NEW HAMPSHIRE, Mark W. Richardson, David L, Soot NEW JERSEY, Richard W, Dane NEW MEXICO, Jimmy D, Camp NEW YORK, George A. Christian, Donald F, Dyer, Arthur. Yano NORTH CAROLINA, Greg R. Perfetti NORTH DAKOTA, Terrence R, Udland ONTO, Timothy J. Keller, Jawdat Siddiqh OKLAHOMA, Robert J. Rusch, Gregory D. Allen OREGON, Bruce V. Jobson, Hormoz Seradj PENNSYLVANIA, Thomas P, Macioce, Harold C. “Hal” Rogers, Jt, Lou Ruzzi PUERTO RICO, Jaime Cabré RHODE ISLAND, David Fish ‘SOUTH CAROLINA, Berry W, Bowers, Jeff Sizemore SOUTH DAKOTA, Kevin Goeden ‘TENNESSEE, Pdward P. Wasserman TEXAS, William R. Cox, David P. Hohmann US. DOT, M, Myint Lwin, Fras I. Sheikh Ibrahim, Hala Elgaaly UTAH, Richard Mille VERMONT, Willian Michael Hedges VIRGINIA, Malcolm T, Kerley, Kendal Walus, Prasad LNallapaneni, Julius F. J. Volgyi, Je. WASHINGTON, Jugesh Kapur, Tony M., Allen, Bijan Khaleghi WEST VIRGINIA, Grogory Bailey WISCONSIN, Scot Becker, Beth A. Cannestra, Fina Hubbard WYOMING, Gregg C, Fredtick, Keith R, Fulton ALBERTA, Tom Loo NEW BRUNSWICK, Doug Noble NOVA SCOTIA, Mark Pertus ONTARIO, Bala Tharmabala SASKATCHEWAN, Howard Yea GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, Kury H. Wit Nal. TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, Richard J, Raczynski N.Y. STATE BRIDGE AUTHORITY, William J. Morea PENN. TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Gary L.,Graharn ‘SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION ‘COMMAND TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING AGENCY, Robert D. Pranz US. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS— DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Paul C, "Tan U.S. COAST GUARD, Nick E, Mpras, Jacob Patna. US. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURF— FOREST SERVICE, John R, Katell (©2099 te amc Anson fa Hihny ad Tonto Oral va tights reserved. Duplication is a violation of applicable law. TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD. SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION., EL PURPOSE ses J.L.1Interiseiptinary Team 112 New Bridges 1.1.3 Existing Bridges. 12 BACKGROUND... se 1.2.1 AASHTO Guide Specification (1991) .. 1.22 AASHTO LRED Bridge Design Specifications 1.3 BASICCONCEPTS 14 DESIGN ANALYSIS. 15 FLOWCHARTS. REFERENC! SECTION 2 SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS. Design Provisions SECTION 3 GENERAL PROVISIONS.. 3.1 GENERAL. sen 3.2 APPLICABILITY OF SPECIFICATION .. 33 OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION... 3.4 DATA COLLECTION 3.5 VESSEL TYPE AND! 3.5.1 Barge Vessels 3.52 Ship Vessels, 3.53 Special Vessels. 3.6 DESIGN VESSEL... 3.7 DESIGN IMPACT SPEED. 3.8 VESSEL COLLISION ENERGY. 3.9 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON PIER, 3.10 SHIP BOW DAMAGE DEPTH 3.11 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON SUPE! 3.41.1 Bow Collision. 3.11.2 Deskhouse Collision, 3.11.3. Mast Collision _ 3.12 BARGE COLLISION FORCE ON PIER... 3.13 BARGE BOW DAMAGE DEPTH, 3.14 IMPACT LOAD COMBINATION 3.15 LOCATION OF IMPACT FORCES... 3.15.1. Substructure Design su ¥ 3.15.2 Superstructure Design... ©2009 the Areca Asoc of Ste ina ad Tnaprtation Miia ‘Aitigisesered Dapliaon fn saan o epee 3.16 MINIMUM IMPACT REQUIREMENT. 3.17 BRIDGE PROTECTION SYSTEMS... REFERENCES... SECTION 4 DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION.. AA GENERAL sonra 4.1.1 Design Method. o 4.12 Selection of Design Method... 421 Method Fenn 4.1.22 Method I 4.1.23 Method Ul. 42 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS 42.1 Channel Layout 422 Water Depths 423 Water Currents 43 BRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS. rRIBUTION 4.6 DESIGNLOADS. 47 METHOD Eon 47.1 Genera 4.7.2 Design Vessel Acceplance Criteria .n. METHODIL 4.8.1 Genera 4.82 Design Vesol Acceptance Criteria. 4.8.3 Annual Frequency of Collapse. 4.8.3.1 Vessel Frequency (N) 483.2 Probability o Aberancy (PA). 48.33 Geometric Probability (PG) 483.4 Probubility of Collapse (PC).. 4.83.5 Protection Factor (PA) 49 METHOD UL 49.1 General 49.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria 4.93 Disruption Cost. REFERENCES. 4 SECTION 5 SUBSTRUCTURE PROYISIONS.. 5. GENERAL, 5.2 ANALYSIS : 5.3 FOUNDATION DESION. REFERENCES. SECTION 6 CONCRETE AND STEEL DESIGN. 6.1 GENERAL... 62 REINFORCED CONCRETE... 63 STRUCTURAL STEEL REFERENCES {©2009 y the Ansan Assoson of Sate ih and aspen Oia ‘Alright eee Dupleaton von feta nw SECTION 7 BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS TA GENERAL. 72 DESIGN LOADS 73 PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 73.1 Fender Systems.. ‘73.1.1 Timber Fenders. 73.1.2 Rubber Fenders. 7.31.3 Conerete Fenders. 7.3.14 Steel Fenders. 73.2 Pile-Supported Systems. 73 Dolphin Protection 17344 Island Protection 73.5 Floating Protection Systems... 74 MOVABLE BRIDGE PROTECTION. 7.5 MOTORIST WARNING SYSTEMS... 7.5.1 Hazard Detection Systems 17.3.2 Verification Devices 1.83 Trafic Conol end Information Devices. 7.6 AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALTERNATIVES... 7.6.1 Operational Altematives . 7.62 Standard Navigation Alternatives. 763 Blectronie Navigation Systems. REFERENCES .. SECTION 8 BRIDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES. 8.1 GENERAL... 82 LOCATION OF CROSSING. 83 BRIDGE ALIGNMENT. 84 TYPE OF BRIDGE. 8.5 NAVIGATION SPAN CLEARANCES., 8.5.1 Horizontal Clearances... 852 Vertical Clearances... 8.6 APPROACH SPANS 8.7 PROTECTION SYSTEMS .. 8.8 PLANNING PROCESS. 8.8.1 Route Location Stuly 482 Bridge Type, Size, and Location Study « 8.83 Preliminary and Final Design REFFRENCES 100 loz woe snare 26 138 a4 MS vw AT so 48 vo 148 ww 180 150 1s 132 185 WSS 136 156 136 156 156 159 139 139 160 160 160 161 162 Risk Assessment Example 1.0 INTRODUCTION... 1.1.1 Published Soureas 1.1.2 Interviews and Correspondence... 2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS 1.2.1 General Deseription 2.2 Navigation Channel £02009 by the AnaricanAstocton of Ste igh All igs ese Diplo 163 vw 164 164 164 164 so 164 ws 167 nd Tantpontion Oficial, alan of pyle 1.23 Tide Level and Tidal Range ns 6? 1.24 Current... 167 125 Water Depths. 109 1.3 PROPOSED BRIDGE ALTERNATIVES, 169 1.4 VESSEL FLEET CHARACTERISTICS.., 169 LAL Vessel Categories. 1169 1.42 Vessel Traffic GroWth snes 174 143 Vessel Transit Speeds 1s 1.44 Vessel Transit Path... 175 1.5 VESSEL IMPACT CRITERIA, 176 1.5.1 General Requirements... 176 1.5.2 Extreme Event Load Combinations (Seour) 76 1.53 Minimum Impact Load Criteria. 176 1.54 Maximum Impact Load Criteria, 176 1.55 Operational Classification, sl 1.6 MINIMUM IMPACT LOAD ANALYSIS. sol 1,7 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD 1) ANALYSIS. sense TT 1.8 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD Il) ANALYSIS, — 180 LBA Method 1! Methodology sum ses 180 18.1.1 Vessel Frequency (N), soe BT 1.8.1.2 Probability of Aberrancy (Pa), 181 1.8.13 Geometric Probability (PC), 181 1.8.1.4 Probability of Collapse (PC), 182 LB.LS Protection Factor (PP) 1.8.2. Risk Acceptance Criteria 1.8.3 Method II Risk Analysis Summa) nn 1.9. SUMMARY OF LA | PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS. 1.9.1 Vessel Impact Forces 1.9.2 Bridge Main Span Alternatives. 1.9.3 Vessel Bow Overhang Collisions. 1.94 Mast Collisions 1.10 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE COMMENTS 2.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF NEW BRIDGES 3.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF EXISTING BRIDGES. APPENDIX A—PASSED-THE-POINT QUERY FOR CARGO COMMODITY AND VESSEL, TRIP DATA (2000) APPENDIX B-~MeTi00 I ANALYSIS: BAYOU LAFOURCHE, [APPENDIX C—-MevHon II ANALYSIS: CONCRETE GIRDER OPTION A3 FUTURE FLEET (2083) EQUAL RISK. wi (©2009 he American Association af State Highway and Teneponstion Of ‘Alla estradDanleaton = satan 9 epics n FOREWORD ‘The 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge was a major tuning point in awareness and increased concern about vessel collision and the safety of bridges erasing navigable waterways in the United States, Studies initiated as a result of this wagedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund research project sponsored by U1 stees and the Federal Highway ‘Administration (FHWA) which developed a proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in evaluating structures for vessel collision. This effort culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (AASHTO, 1991), ‘The 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification established design provisions for bridges erossing navigable waterways to minimize their suscepuibilty to damage from vessel eolisions. The provisions applied to both new bridges and t0 the analysis of existing bridges to determine vulnerability and potential reuofit. The intsnt of the AASHTO provisions is to provide bridge components with a “reasonable” resistance capacity against ship and barge collisions. In navigable Waterway areus where collision by merchant vessels may be anticipated, the Guide Specification requires that bridge structures be designed to prevent collapse ofthe superstructure by considering the size and type of vessel flet navigating the channel, available water depth, vessel speed, structure response the risk of collision, and the operational classification of he bridge, This Second Edition of the Guide Specification was developed to incorporate lessons learned from the use of the ariginal 1991 Vessel Collision Guide Specitication; incorporate the eurent LRFD Bridge Design methodology; clarify some of the risk procedure elements; make minor modifications and comections; and discuss, and incomporate where deemed necessary, results from barge and ship collision research conducted since the original vessel collision publication, ‘The we ofthe Guide Specification procedures to evaluate existing bridges has been highlighted inthis revised edition, new worked example illustrating the vesse collision risk assessment procedures has been provided, Compared to mote mature and established fields such as wind and earthquake engineering, vessel collision design is {in its infancy stages. Although there are a numberof important research needs within the discipline, the key ateas of ship impact forces; barge impact forces; risk acceptance criteria; physical protection systems; and ai improvements should be highlighted as areas of future research This Second Edition was prepared by the consulting firm of Moffatt and Nichol. The principal author was Mic Knott, PLE. (ho was also the principal author of the original 1991 Guide Specification). Moffatt and Nichol provided their services under contract to HDR Engineering on behelf ofthe Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). © 200 by he Ameen Asscition of Sine Higa ond Tampon Oa Altighsresined, Duplntog sa naion oops ay SECTION INTRODUCTION 11 PURPOSE, In navigable waterway areas, where vessel collision ‘by merchant ships and barges may be anticipated, bridge siructutes shall be designed 0 prevent collapse of the superstructure by considering the size and type of the vessel, evailable water dept, vessel speed, and stricture response. ‘The requirements apply to all bridge types Which eross a navigable shallow dra inland waterway fo canal with barge trafic, and deep draft watervay's th large merchant ships, The provisions are for normal ‘merchant stel-nulled vessels (ships and barges) and are ‘ot applicable for waterways whose maritime traffic consists of recreational or other special vessels constructed of wood of fberglass. “The intent of the vessel eolision requirements is to ‘establish analysis and design provisions to. minimize bridge suscepibility 10 catastrophic collapse, The ‘purpose ofthe provisions is to provide predictable design vessel collision effects in order tw proportion hridge ‘components with a reasonable resistance t0 collapse. The provisions apply to bridges crossing navigable Waterways which carry waterborne commerce ¢8 established by federal and state agencies. Judgment should be used when applying the erteria io waterways in which no defined navigation channel exists and no commercial maritime wafiie canbe reasonably anticipated Bridges over a navigable waterway meeting the criteria above, whether existing or under design, should be evaluated as to vulnerability to vessel collision in fonder to determine prudent protective measures, The recommendations listed below summarize the essential elements which should be addtessed in developing. a ‘rogram for evaluating bridges and providing pier protection for vessel collision, 1.1 Interdiseiplinary Tea Vessel collision evaluations of new and existing bridges shouldbe conducted by an interdiseiplinary team, comprised of structural, geotechnical, and hydkaulic ‘engineers. In special eases where benetivfcost analysis of ‘isk reduction is required, an economic specialist should also be part of the’ team. Representatives and coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard the Army Comps ‘of Engineers, and other federal and state agencies as appropriate for the bridge location should also. be included inthe imerdisciptinery evaluation, 1.12 New Bridges ‘Vessel collision evaluations of new bridges over navigable waterways should be conducted in accordance ‘with this Guide Specification. ' (© 2000 he American Association of Sa Highway an Trapt Oi ‘Allriphsreseved: Duplication sa Welaono apa aw 2 ‘Guus SprcwicAt10N2 Ano ComneNtany FoR VEss8L COLLISION DISIGNOF Mi ‘The AASHTO Guide Specifications conlain three alternative analysis methods for determining the design vessel for each bridge component in the structure in accordance with two-tiered risk acceptance teria Method Tis a simple to use semi-deterministic procedure; Method Ml is a detaled risk analysis procedure; and Method II Is a cost-effectiveness of risk eduction procedure (based on a classical benefivicost analysis). The Guide Specifications require the use of Method II risk analysis for all bridges unless special circumstonces exist as described in the code forthe use ‘of Methods I and Ill. Special circumstances for using Method L include shallow draft watersiays where the ‘marine traffic consists almost exclusively of berges, and for using Method Il include very wide waterways with ny piers exposed to collision, as well as existing bridges to be retrofitted, 113 Buisting Bridges Unless an existing bridge was des.gned in accordance with the previous 1991 edition of ‘the ‘AASHTO Vessel Collision Specitications, all remaining existing bridges over navigable waterways with commercial barge and ship tific should be evaluated using a vulnerability assessment in accordance with the Method TI risk analysis procedures contained in this current guide specifications. ‘The vulnerability assessments would meet NTSB recommendations 10 AASHTO, FHWA and other federal agencies. for improved’ bridge safety based on previous vessel collision accidents involving bridge failures, ‘Based on the vulnerabily assessment evaliations of existing bridges within the slate system, a sereening process based on the estimated annusl frequency of collapse ean be used to identify and rank high risk bridges, and to prioritize vulnerable structures. for potential rehabilitation, retrofit, pler protection countermeasures, or replacernen, ‘AASHTO recognizes the potential that a signifiant portion of older bridges erossing navigable waterways the Nation may not meet the risk acceptance criteria for ew bridges contained in the AASHTO Specifications adopted since 1991, ‘The intent of performing. vessal collision vulnerabilgy assessments on the existing bridge systom Isto identify those structures that are pacularly vulnerable to cutastrophie collapse, The vesse collision vulnerability information would provide a framework for States 10 be aware of high-risk sefety needs requiring immediate or short-term action, as well as information to prioritize and budget for the long-term needs for bridge ‘chabilitation or replacement. The risk assessirent of the existing bridges will be used as a put of the prioritization process and allocation of federal funds, ‘AASHTO recognizes that the cost of retofting the potentially large number of existing beidges over ‘navigable waterways to mest the rsk acceptance eriter for new bridges may not be realistic based on current (©2009 by the Anwean Assocation of Sate Highway an Tanspataion Oia Allain, Duphaon x sinvon aap nw Secriox I—Inrmooucrion budget constraints of most State DOTS. However, the vulnerability assessments will allow States to identify those structures that ere particularly high isk and vulnerable to catastrophic collapse due to vessel collision. Federal funding may require that such high risk bridges receive priority treatment by State DOTS ‘with options for revofiting, rehabilitation, installation of pier protection system countermeasures, of replacement. 1.2 BACKGROUND Ship and barge collisions with bridges thot are focated in coastal areas and along inland waterways represent a growing and serious threat to public safety, Port operations, motorist tli pattems, and environmental protection in many cities throughout the World. In the 42-year period from 1960 to 2002, there hhave been 31 major bridge collapses worldwide due to ship or barge collision, with a total loss of life of 342 people. Seventeen of the bridge catastrophes discussed above occurred in the United States, including the 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge crossing in Tampa Bay, Plorida, in which 1,300 feet of the main span collapsed and 35 lives were lost asa result of the collision by an empty 35,000-DI7T (deadweight tonnage) bulk carer. Recent bridge collapses in the United States include the Queen Isabella Bridge connecting San Padre Island. to the Texas mainland, which was hit by a barge in September 2001 (8 fatalities); and the collapse ofthe I- 40 Bridge over the Arkansas River near Webber Falls, ‘Oklahoma, which was hit by a barge in May 2002 (13 fatalities) 1 should be noted that there are numerous vessel collision aeidents with bridges which cause damage that varies from very minor to signifieant damage, but do not necessarily result in collapse of the structure ar loss of life. A recent U.S. Coast Guard study (May 2003) of towing vessels and barge collisions with bridges located on the U.S. inland waterway system duting the 10-year period from 1992 to 2001 revealed that there were 2,692 accidents with bridges. Only 61 of these caused bridge ‘damage in excess of $500,000 (1,702 caused very minor slamage with no repair costs tothe bridge), and there were no fatalities within the study period. The staly ‘concluded that 90 percent of the barge aocidents were related to human performance (78 percent to pilot error ‘and 12 peteent t0 other operational factors). Only 5 Percent were related to moshanical problems, and forthe Femaining 5 percent there was insufficient information to assign a cause ca Many factors account for the present shiprbvidge accident problem confronting many countvies around the world, One factor is that a larger number of merchant ships are making more frequent transits past more bridges. Since 1960, the number of bridges across major ‘waterways leading to U.S. coastal pots has increased by ‘one-third. During that same petiod, the numberof vessels. the world fleet has increased three-fold and worldwide scabore tonnage hes inereased by more than 235 percent (MeDorald, 1983; U.S. Deparment of Commerce, 1978) iter factors include poorly sited bridges. Inade- «quate attention is often given to the bridge's relationship with waterborne traffie withthe result that bridges are placed too near tricky bends or turns in the navigation channel, or too near waterfom docks where berthing ‘maneuvers could threaten the bridge. Many bridges today have inadequate spans over the navigation channel for the safe transit of modem ships which regularly exceed 800 feet in length and 100 feet in width. ‘These narcow spans leave litle room for error on bohalf of the merchant vessel—partcularly under edverse wind and hydraulic current conditions. These small spans often result from economic pressure on behalf of the bridge ‘owner and designer 1 minimize the in-place cost of the substructure and superstructure of the bridge without regard to the potential for ship impact against the structure, Economic pressures have long been recognized as conflicting with safety. This is true of both the bridge industry and the maritime industry. In the later, safely concems are often placed second t0 the maintenance of ship schedule—with predictably disastrous consequenc- «3. Since masters und pilots are offen rated on thelr ability to make schedules, they are sometimes. very Feluctant to abort transits’ into harbors even during adverse environmental conditions. This may have been fone of the factors involved in’ the Skyway Bridge ‘accident, where the pilot on-board the empty inbound merchant ship attempted to transit under the bridge ducing very low visibility, dense rainfall, and high wind conditions. The vessel strick an anchor pier ofthe bridge located approximately 800 feat from the centerline ofthe channel, ‘A comprehensive literature review of the coment domestic and foreign pructce, experience, and research {©2009 by the Amsian Association of Site Highway a Tranportion Oi ‘Al igh esueved Dla eatin of pps a 4 {Gurpe Sesciricamtovs aN Cowounnrany on Vissi, COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGMWAY BRIDGES. 1.2.1 AASHTO Guide Specification (1991) The 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge was a major turning point in awareness and increased conesm for the safety of bridges crossing navigable waterways in the United States, Studies inidated as result of this tragedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund research project sponsored by 11 states and the Federal Highway” Administration (FHWA) which developed a proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in evaluating structures for vessel collision, This effort culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (AASHTO, 1991). ‘The AASHTO Guide Specification established design provisions for bridges crossing navigable ‘waterways to minimize their susceptibility to damage fiom vessel collisions. The provisions applied to both new bridges and to the analysis of existing beidges to determine vulnerability and potential retrofit. The intent ff the AASHTO provisions was to provide bridge ‘components with a “reasonable” resistance capacity against ship and barge collisions. In navigable waterway areas where collision by merchant vessels. may be anticipated, the Guide Specifications require that bridge structures ‘be designed to prevent collapse of the Superstructure by considering the size and type of vessel Meet navigating the channel, available water depth, vessel speed, structure response, the risk of collision, and the operational classification of the bridge. It should be noted that damage to the bridge (even ‘hilure of secondary structural members) is permitted by the code as long as the bridge deck carying motorist traffic docsn't collapse (i.e, sufficlent redundancy and altemate load paths exist in the remaining structure to prevent collapse of the superstructure). ‘When the original 1991 Guide Specifieation was developed in the late 1980s, most analysis was done by hand calculation; therefore, the specifeation provisions included some simplifying requirements to minimize the hhand analysis effort. With modern personal computers and software programs, the vessel callsion rsk analysis, procedures can be easily programmed. Therefore, come (of those earlier simplifications have been removed in this, 2008 Baltion ofthe Guide Specifications. (©2009 he American Associa Allis reserved Du findings available on the subject of vessel collision with bridges was performed during the development of the Guide Specifications. Particular atention was given to ‘new research conducted since the initial adoption of the 1991 Guide Specifications, as well as lessons learned From users of the 1991 specification. cia Since its adoption by AASHTO in 1991, the Guide Specification has been Used 10 design numerous new bridges and to evaluate existing structures for their susceptibility to vessel collision. Because the code was published a8 a "guide specification,” its use by the State Departnents of Transportation (DOTs) was optional, not ‘mandatory. Tn genera, the use of the code was well received in the engineering community. The major drawbacks in the carly implementation of the specifications Involved luck ‘of experience in collecting the large amount of vessel Feet data needed to perform the risk analysis for each bridge, as well as a general unfumilarity of most bridge designers (and bridge owners) in directly using risk ‘concepts in structural desig. Histocially in the United States, the risk of struotural collapse end potential loss of life have been {and to a great extent stil are) buried in various “safety factors,” “reliailiyy indexes." ete, used in structural design equations within the design codes. Similar to most ‘countries, the United States has a great amount of For 0.1 < HIP < 1.0, PC shal be computed as: ree(t (483.419) (4.3.41) 8 ‘Table C4833-1—Computation of Standard Deviation for ‘Normal Distribution of Historie Colsions with Bridges ‘Tasman Bridge Fraser River Bridge Benjerin Harrison Tingstad Bridge Second Narows RR Second Nerve RR ‘Alm (Tjor) Bridge Sunshine Seyway [Newpon Bridge Sorsind Bridge Outterige (NY) Ouereridge (NY) Outreridge ONY) Ricnond/San Rael ai3778 whee © = stand deviation and o= [sory]? =[1s.709n4}" whore X= ratio of the approximate vessel impact distance from centerline of vessel transit to the LOA of the vessel, Xa ~ mean of distribution = 0.0, and n= umber of collisions = 15 c4g34 The probability that the bridge will collapse, PC, fonee it has been struck by an aberrant vessel is’ very complex and is a function of the vessel size, type, configuration, speed, direction, mass, and the nature of the collision. It is’ also dependent on the stifiness, resistance, and stability characteristics of the bridge pier and span to resist the colision impact loads ‘The Guide Specification methodology for estimating the probability of bridge collapse was derved from stud ies performed by Fujii in Japan (1978) using historical information about damage to ships colliding at sea, The ‘curves in Figure CI are reproduced fiom Fujil's paper ‘where the following definitions are used: x =the damage rate is defined as the ratio between the estimated darauge cost tothe ship (excluding the toss of cargo) and the estimated value of the ship {©2009 y the AmecanArocaton of Sis Highway an Transportation Oi ‘Alright eseied pleat a vlan pple %6 Guioe Spvcirica ons AND Cowman Ho VESSEL, COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES For HIP> 1.0 Po=00 (4.83.4-16) here: PC = probability of eollapse; HH = ultimate bridge element resistance, Hp oF Hs (ipa) and P= vessel impact foree, Ps, Pos Pam Pons OF Pu (ips). Figure 1 isa plot of the above probability of collapse relationships. From Figure 1, the following results are evident: ‘in cases where the pier or span impact resistance capacity exceeds the vessel collision impact force of the design vessel, the bridge collapse probability becomes zero; ‘+ in cases where the pier or span impact resistance is inthe range 10 to 100. percent of the collision force of the design vessel, the bridge collapse probability varies linearly between zero and 0.10; + and in cases where the pier or span impact resistance capacity is below 10 percent of the collision foree, the bridge collapse probability varies linearly bet ‘tween 0.10 and 1.0, GRT ratio is of “the other shi related 95 the rato between GRT ” to the ship to which x is yw To equate Fujis results wit the size ofthe collision force, p, 2 damage rat is defined as: x= (C4841) Pow Forx= 1.0, the actual impact fore, p, isthe same as the maximum possible impact fores, and the vessel has ben totally damaged, The damage to bridge piers is estimated based on the information on ship damage since damage for collisions bridges is relatively searee. Cowiconsult (19878 and ) developed the probability density function shown in Figure C2 for the relative magnitude of the collision force using Fuji’s results and the following assumptions: ‘+The pier is considered as a large collision object relative to the ship (Le, the GRT ratio y = 10 t0 100) ‘©The relative magnitude ofthe collision foree (Pa) {is related to the damage rte, x, + From Figure C1 for ppaa 2 0.1, the probability is spproximaely 0.1. ‘The probability density function for ppg has been simplified to be uniform in each ofthe intervals 0 to Oud and. tL ‘The distribution function, F for pau 2%» shown in Figure C2b was derived by integrating fom the upper ‘end in Figure C2a, Figure 1 in the Guide Specification is. the same as Figure C2b except thatthe nomenclature for the terms was changed to agree with the Guide Specfi- cation terminology. {©2009 y the AmeticanAsaciton of Sate igh and Tasprision Oficial ‘Al ighsesoved Dupleson i lation a pple SecTION 4—DEsiGN Vessel SELKCTION m 4 T T 5 € 2 8 oot & y>32 2 10~32 5 soso 3 1>3.2 g ose £ 3B i ° 0.001 0.1~0.32 q Hi ° eo

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