Kant’s Moral Philosophy Midterm Exam

While Kantian Ethics remains a strongly defended and well-regarded position in the contemporary
field of moral philosophy, those who seek to propound it have always had to justify several
considerably unintuitive prescriptions that are to be found in Kant’s work. Perhaps one of the most
controversial in this regard is the unconditional imperative to truthfulness that he derives from his
‘categorical imperative’. Such an imperative is defended in the context of the infamous ‘axe-murderer
case’ in the debate with French Philosopher Constant. While this paper will not attempt to vitiate the
principle of unconditional truthfulness as such, it will try to reinterpret and problematise Kant’s
response to the case within the resources of his own theoretical apparatus. Specifically, it will be
argued that one can read the case (with minor modifications) as creating a kind of antinomy for the
categorical imperative, as one is forced to choose between two acts, neither of which can be
universalized.

The paper will begin with a brief account of Kant’s categorical imperative, it will then sketch out the
‘axe-murder’ controversy and list the kinds of arguments that Kant adopts in his interpretation of the
problem. Following this, the paper will begin to develop the ‘antinomial’ reading of the situation and
will try to elaborate the specific problems it poses for the Kantian moral-philosophical project. Finally,
the paper will consider potential objections that might be made by one seeking to support the original
Kantian perspective.

When introducing his central moral principle, Kant says a couple of words about its character. He
claims that “It is not concerned with the matter of the action and its intended result, but rather with
the form of the action and the principle from which it follows; what is essentially good in the action
consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may”. (Kant 1993, pg. 26). Thus,
for Kant, the moral content of an act is derived not from its consequences, but from the form of the
act itself. It is an act done entirely for the sake of duty, and that is what makes it moral. If it is coerced,
or one finds a latent self-serving motive to ground it, then it is no longer moral no matter how good
one may deem its consequences.

That normal reaction to such a construal would justifiably be that such a formal principle does not
really tell one ‘what to do’ in particular circumstances, and it is in relation to this worry that Kant
provides his ‘categorical imperative’, a maxim to derive particular duties from the very form of duty
itself. The principle is stated as follows: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the
same time will that it should become a universal law” (ibid, pg. 30)

In order to flesh out the application of such a law, Kant offers a series of example maxims that fail the
test of universalization (and so the imperative says we must not adopt them). These involve taking
one’s own life, treating others as means, telling lies, not cultivating one’s habits or refusing to aid
others. For Kant, such actions could not be universalized. They would lead to either a kind of logical
contradiction or they would work to undermine the very basis for sustained rational pursuits (by, for
instance, injuring or splintering the community). Thus, such actions cannot be recommended as laws.

Now, the extent to which Kant wants to posit these duties as unconditional is brought out in his debate
with Constant. The latter was convinced that Kant’s categorical imperative led to absurdities, and in
order to point this out he constructed the following scenario: There is a blood-thirsty axe-murderer
loose in town, and for some reason, he wants to attack your best friend as his next victim. Suppose he
shows up at your door, and asks you if your friend is inside the house (which he is), would it still be
moral to insist on truthfulness here?
Kant, of course, answers with a resounding yes. Within the stipulations of the case, (which include
such conditions as one cannot refrain from answering, run away etc), Kant believes that the
prescription of the categorical imperative still stands. He makes several arguments in this regard. For
one, he claims that while the consequences of one’s true statement might cause harm to an individual,
lying “does harm to humanity in general, inasmuchas it vitiates the very source of right
[Rechtsquelle].” (ibid, pg. 64) Furthermore, there is an argument in terms of finitude. One cannot fully
predict what the consequences will be, so one might make matters worse by one’s well-intentioned
lie. As Kant argues: “It is indeed possible that after you have honestly answered Yes to the murderer's
question as to whether the intended victim is in the house, the latter went out unobserved and thus
eluded the murderer, so that the deed would not have come about. However, if you told a lie and said
that the intended victim was not in the house, and he has actually (though unbeknownst to you) gone
out, with the result that by so doing he has been met by the murderer and thus the deed has been
perpetrated, then in this case you may be justly accused as having caused his death” (ibid, pg.65)

Finally, what stands behind both of these arguments seems to be a more basic distinction that Kant
draws, which seems to play a defining role in his position: he claims that Constant “confuses the action
whereby someone does harm (nocet) to another by telling the truth when its avowal cannot be
avoided with the action whereby someone does wrong to (laedit) another” (ibid) The first is merely
an accident, whereas the second is a free act. In a sense then, one cannot be held accountable for
consequences of the first, for one acted on duty to tell the truth.

It here that we may slowly approach our critical objection. For, what if the case can be recast as one
that poses the dilemma of a conflict between unconditional duties? For, it seems implicit in the reading
Kant pursues that we experience this situation as posing the choice: ‘should I or should I not tell the
truth?’, but it can easily be imagined that we experience it as something like ‘should I or should not
aid one who wants to treat others as a means?’. If one is willing to grant few extra details to the case
(the murderer has no justifiable reason to kill our friend, it is sheer bloodlust, and we know it to be so)
then it seems fair that both descriptions are equally applicable to the situation we find ourselves in.

Why does this matter? Precisely because in way Kant understand the problem, it is a conflict about
how to judge the case: should one look to the possible consequences or the maxim that justifies one’s
action? For Kant, only the latter can be material for moral judgement. However, in the manner in
which we are posing the problem, the conflict is at the level of justificatory maxims themselves. One
can well imagine that the categorical imperative would support such a duty as “do not aid those who
seek to use others as means”, for it is a mere extension of the already instituted duty of “do not treat
others as mean, but as ends in themselves”.

If one is willing to accept such a duty, then one can see what is meant by the idea that this case
generates an antinomy of sorts for the categorical imperative. For if one chooses to avoiding being
complicit in treating someone as means, one has failed the duty of truthfulness. If one chooses to
avoid lying, one has failed the duty of not treating others as means. If the question is posed in this
way, one need to get into the contingencies of the case, about whether we can predict the outcome
adequately, for the dilemma that confronts the rational agent is purely justificatory one. There are
two moral imperatives that may be drawn on to justify one’s maxim, but they are mutually exclusive
and unconditional at the same time. How is one to resolve the difficulty if this is the case?

Now, one may object that in the case in question, we don’t know motives of the killer and his
relationship with the friend and so on. Thus, we cannot jump to the conclusion of him trying to use
our friend as means. However, to take this strategy would amount to simply running from the
problem, and not denying its existence. For one would have to admit that one does to need a great
leap of imagination to conceive the situation in terms where the problem does apply.
If one is willing to concede that one can extend the case in this way, one might still be able to resolve
the dilemma by claiming that the two imperatives are not equal. One might posit a priority between
them, for instance by claiming that the imperative not to lie is stronger for it leads to straight logical
contradiction. Whereas, the imperative to not treat others as means can be interpreted to jeopardize
society but not to be logically self-defeating. It is not clear that this would-be Kant’s position, but it
seems to be a fair point to make. If one can justify such a distinction of priority between imperatives,
then one might still be able to fully affirm Kant’s response to the axe-murderer case.

That said, even this response does not solve, in principle, the idea of a situation that creates an
antinomy for the categorical imperative. Could one not imagine a situation where telling the truth
would be tantamount to suicide? Would the same prioritizing move still hold in this case? The question
would need further elaboration of the theoretical apparatus that Kant is constructing. At the very
least, if one grants that such a problem can potentially occur, and that it is not immediately clear how
one is to act in such matters, one can at least problematise Kant’s response to the axe-murderer case.

References:

Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the metaphysics of morals: With on a supposed right to lie because of
philanthropic concerns. Hackett Publishing, 1993.