POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Writ of Amparo

SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN AND CLAUDINE MARGARET SANTIAGO, Petitioners,

v. RAFFY TULFO, BEN TULFO, AND ERWIN TULFO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205039, October 21, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: When Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine Margaret (Claudine) Santiago
arrived at NAIA, they were informed that their baggage was offloaded and transferred to a different flight.
As they were lodging a complaint, they noticed a man, later identified as Ramon Tulfo (Mon), taking
photos of Claudine with his cellular phone. This eventually resulted in an altercation among them. Days
after the incident, the brothers of Mon namely, Raffy, Ben, and Erwin, aired on their TV program
comments and expletives against Spouses Santiago, and threatened that they will retaliate. Terrified by
the gravity of the threats hurled, Spouses Santiago filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
The RTC dismissed the said petition, as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration, for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of amparo may be validly issued in this case?

HELD: No. In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the
Court has already explained that the writ of amparo, under its present procedural formulation, namely,
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise known as “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” was intended to address
and, thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances, or
threats thereof. Indeed, while amparo (which literally means “protection” in Spanish) has been regarded
as a special remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters of protection are
not the same in every jurisdiction.

In Philippine jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the
remedy as a response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof.
“Extrajudicial killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings committed without
due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,” while “enforced
disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of R.A. 9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity,” “means
the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), the Court
held that it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons,
with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply
put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation. Notably, the same requirement of government participation should
also apply to extralegal killings, considering that the writ of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, intended to “hold public authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and
enforce our laws, to a high standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to our people. [In this
light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened
or violated, they will find vindication in our courts of justice.”

In this case, it is undisputed that the amparo petition before the RTC does not allege any case of
extrajudicial killing and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses above-described.
Thus, it is apparent that it falls outside the purview of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail.
POLITICAL LAW>Election Law>Candidacy>Substitution and withdrawal of candidates

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
(En Banc)

FACTS: Richard Gomez(Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District
of Leyte under the Liberal Party. Subsequently, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla
(Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street,
East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota
Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the 1 year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. The COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution granting Juntilla's petition without any qualification. Aggrieved, Richard moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc. Subsequently, Lucy Marie Torres-
Gomez (Lucy) filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal
Party endorsing her as the party's official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same
congressional post, which was approved by the COMELEC En Banc. Pending Juntilla’s Extremely Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10,
2010. During the elections, Richard, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered the highest number
of votes. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard's votes were credited in favor of Lucy; and as
a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte. Juntilla filed
an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion; however, it remained unacted.
Subsequently, Silverio Tagolino filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust Lucy
from her congressional seat; but was dismissed. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Richard was validly substituted by Lucy in view of the former's failure to meet the
1 year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution?

HELD: No. The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid
for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his
failure to comply with the 1 year residency requirement. It should be stressed that the clear and
unequivocal basis for Richard’s “disqualification” is his failure to comply with the residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for disqualification. The material misrepresentation
contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. There is
therefore no legal basis to support a finding, of disqualification within the ambit of election laws.
Accordingly, given Richard’s non-compliance with the 1 year residency requirement, it cannot be
mistaken that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of Juntilla’s “Verified Petition to Disqualify
Candidate for Lack of Qualification” -- which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard “DISQUALIFIED
and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of Representatives” and “x x x that [his]
Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED” -- carried with it the denial
of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>Accountability of Public Officers

FAUSTINO A. SILANG et. al., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213189, September 08, 2015
(En Banc)

FACTS: The LGU of Tayabas, Quezon, entered into CNAs with the Unyon ng mga Kawani ng
Pamahalaang Lokal ng Tayabas (UNGKAT), an employee's organization of the LGU of Tayabas,
Quezon, duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The local Sanggunian subsequently passed Ordinance No. 08-03 appropriating
P9.23 million for the payment of the 2008 CNA. The implementation of the ordinance was ordered
suspended by the Office of the COA Auditor, Province of Quezon. Eventually, a Notice of Disallowance
was issued against it. In the meantime, the Sanggunian passed Ordinance No. 09-01, which appropriated
P39.86 million for the 2009 CNA. This was also subsequently disallowed for the following reasons: (1)
The CNAs lacked prior registration with the CSC; (2) UNGKAT is not accredited by the CSC as the sole
and exclusive negotiation agent of the LGU concerned; and (3) Cost-cutting measures in the CNA had
not been identified.

The LGU of Tayabas, as represented by its mayor, Faustino Silang, contested the suspension and
subsequent disallowance of these ordinances. The COA Regional Director and COA en banc affirmed the
Notices of Disallowance for the following reasons:

1. UNGKAT was not accredited as the sole and exclusive negotiation agent of the LGU of Tayabas
at the time the LGU entered into CNAs with them. At the time UNGKAT entered into the CNAs, it
was merely registered with the DOLE, which gives it the right to be certified as the LGU's
exclusive negotiating representative; and
2. Funding for the 2008 CNA was sourced from the LGU's savings two months before it was signed;
this violated Item 7.1.2 of DBM Circular No. 2006-1.

Thus, Silang and the rank-and-file employees of the LGU of Tayabas filed the present petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the COA en banc's acts of affirming the Notices of
Disallowance as well as the liability of government employees directly responsible for illegal expenditures.

ISSUE: Whether or not the involved government employees of Tayabas Quezon who were directly
responsible for the illegal expenditures of public funds were liable?

HELD: Yes, the law expressly provides that public employees directly responsible for an illegal
expenditure regardless of his or her part in authorizing its release, in making the payment, or in otherwise
taking part shall be solidarily liable for its reimbursement. Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the
Administrative Code expressly provides that persons who are directly responsible for the illegal
expenditures of public funds shall be liable: Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor.

This similarly finds support in the Local Government Code, which imputes personal liability for unlawful
expenditures against the official or employee responsible for it, viz: Section 351. Expenditures of funds or
use of property in violation of this shall be a personal liability of the official or employee responsible
therefor.

Book VI, Chapter V, Section 43 of the Administrative Code expounds on direct responsibility for illegal
expenditures, particularly the extent of personal liability for reimbursement that each participating public
employee would bear: Every expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in violation of the provisions
of this Code or of the general and special provisions contained in the annual General or other
Appropriations Act shall be void. Every payment made in violation of said provisions shall be illegal and
every official or employee authorizing or making such payment, or taking part therein, and every person
receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally liable to the Government for the full amount so paid
or received.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Eminent Domain>Just Compensation

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND

HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner vs. LEONOR MACABAGDAL, represented by EULOGIA
MACABAGDAL PASCUAL (formerly John Doe "DDD"), Respondent.
G.R. No. 227215, January 10, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH, filed before the RTC a
complaint against Leonor Macabagdal, represented by Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, for the expropriation
of a lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City, for the construction of the C-5 Northern Link Road
Project. It thereafter applied for, and was granted a writ of possession over the lot on May 5, 2008, and
was required to deposit with the court the amount of ₱550,000.00 representing the zonal value thereof.
Macabagdal did not oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional deposit. The RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, found the said recommendation to be reasonable and just, and among others, imposed legal
interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the lot until
full payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable rate of interest should be at 12% p.a. on the unpaid balance,
computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment?

HELD: No. The Court recognizes that in expropriation proceedings, the owner's loss is not only his
property, but also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its
value must be immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income
lost. The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation
due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum
after taking has been completed. This shall comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the
expropriated property, and constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just
compensation in eminent domain.

In addition, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but
from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession, since it is from this date that the fact of the
deprivation of property can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should
begin from this date.

In this case, from the date of the taking of the lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC issued a Writ of
Possession, until the just compensation therefor was finally fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., the DPWH had
only paid a provisional deposit in the amount of ₱550,000.00. Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the
"principal sum of the just compensation," warranting the imposition of interest. The 12% p.a. rate of legal
interest is only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at 6% p.a. in line with
BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>Accountability of public officers;Judges have the sworn
duty to administer justice without undue delay

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCHES 72 AND 22, NARVACAN, ILOCOS SUR.
A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012
(Third Division)

FACTS: The report of the judicial audit team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) revealed that
as of the last day of the audit on April 5, 2006, Branch 72, the regular court of Judge Buenavista, had a
caseload of 333 cases (126 civil cases and 207 criminal cases) while Branch 22, where he acted as
pairing judge, had 302 cases (106 civil cases and 196 criminal cases).
The audit team noted that Judge Buenavista had several cases submitted for decision beyond the 90-day
reglementary period, with minimal periods of delay in some cases. While he was able to dispose many of
the cases submitted for decision in both branches, and even decided six (6) cases after the conduct of the
judicial audit, most of them were resolved beyond the reglementary period. The audit team likewise
disclosed that there were cases where no action had been taken since their filing, and others did not
progress for unreasonable periods of time – some as early as 2000 – for various reasons. Judge
Buenavista explained that the death of his wife a year prior to the audit and his slowly failing eyesight,
compounded by his designation as pairing judge of Branch 22, contributed to the dismal state of his case
docket.
The team concluded that Judge Buenavista failed to assume a more active and steadfast control over the
cases which resulted in the unreasonable delay in their disposition and the consequent clogging of the
court dockets. The OCA recommended that Judge Buenavista be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for
failing to decide twelve (12) cases and resolve the incidents in seven (7) cases within the reglementary
period, and for his failure to effectively manage the court dockets in RTC Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur. In arriving at its recommendation, the OCA took into account the demise of Judge
Buenavista’s wife the year preceding the audit; his failing eyesight; the fact that he presided over two (2)
RTC branches for almost four (4) years; his diligence in disposing twenty-five (25) cases before he
retired; and the information that the periods of delay in deciding cases were minimal, save for a few
cases.
Judge Buenavista filed a Manifestation respectfully submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings and/or records already on file.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Buenavista should be imposed the penalty as recommended by the OCA
for his failure to assiduously perform his official duties?
HELD: Yes. Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is
justice denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy
disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the judicial system.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline
for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide
even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative
sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>The Civil Service

RE: REPORT OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE SOLIVER C. PERAS, RTC OF CEBU CITY, BRANCH 10, ON
THE ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION OF UTILITY WORKER 1 CATALINA Z. CAMASO, OFFICE OF
THE CLERCK COURT, RTC.
A.M. No. 15-02-47-RTC, March 21, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS:Executive Judge SolivarPeras filed a complaint for gross insubordination against Utility Worker I
Office of the Clerk of Court of Cebu City, Catalina Z. Camaso. In his complaint, Judge Peras alleged that
on September 10, 2014, he issued a Memorandum temporarily detailing Camaso to Branch 10 to assist in
the filing, delivery, and mailing of letters and correspondences in the said court. When Camaso did not
report to the said court, Judge Peras sent her two subsequent memoranda directing her to explain
however, Camaso ignored such directives. Judge Peras further averred that Camaso was acting strange
with actions that would risk her safety. In view of the foregoing, Judge Peras requested the OCA to
conduct a psychiatric evaluation on Camaso to determine her fitness to work.

In light thereof, the OCA issued a Memorandumrecommending that Camaso be required to comment on
why she should not be dropped from the rolls for being mentally unfit. Camaso contended that Judge
Peras's imputation of gross insubordination has no basis, contending that Judge Peras has no jurisdiction
over her. The OCA recommended that Camaso be dropped from the rolls without forfeiture of any
benefits due her, for being mentally unfit to perform her duties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Camaso should be dropped from the rolls for being mentally unfit to perform her
duties?

HELD: Yes. The Court adopts the findings and the recommendations of the OCA.Section 93 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) authorizes and provides the
procedure for the dropping from the rolls of employees who, inter alia, are no longer fit to perform his or
her duties. Portions of this provision pertinent to this case read:

Section 93. Grounds and Procedure for Dropping from the Rolls. — Officers and employees
who are shown to be physically and mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from
the rolls subject to the following procedures:

c. Physically Unfit

3. An officer or employee who is behaving abnormally and manifests continuing mental disorder
and incapacity to work as reported by his/her co-workers or immediate supervisor and
confirmed by a competent physician, may likewise be dropped from the rolls.
 4. For the purpose of the three (3) preceding paragraphs, notice shall be given to the officer or
employee concerned containing a brief statement of the nature of his/her incapacity to work.

In this case, Judge Peras received reports from Camaso's colleagues regarding the latter's strange and
abnormal behavior, thus, prompting the OCA to recommend that Camaso be subjected to a series of
tests to evaluate her neuro-psychiatric well-being. After conducting such tests, the psychologist found that
there are already: (a) deterioration in almost all facets of Camaso's mental functioning; and (b) distortion
in her perception of things, making a limited grasp of reality.These findings are then corroborated by the
psychiatrist, who found Camaso to be suffering from a psychological impairment, i.e., Delusional
Disorder, Mixed Type (Grandiose and Persecutory), which gives her a distorted view of reality that affects
her social judgment, planning, and decision-making. Worse, when asked to comment on this case,
Camaso not only failed to refute such findings against her, but also exhibited her impaired mental
cognition and deteriorating mental health.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Searches and Seizures>Warrantless
searches and seizures

RAMON MARTINEZ y GOCO/RAMON GOCO y MARTINEZ, Petitioner,

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198694, February 13, 2013
(Second Division)

FACTS: Martinez assailed the RTC and CA’s decisions convicting him of the crime of possession of
dangerous drugs punished under Section 11(3) Article II of RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drug
Acts of 2002. Antecedent facts provided that Martinez was apprehended during the routine foot patrol of
PO2 Soque, PO2 Cepe, and PO3 Zeta, and during said patrol they heard Martinez shouting
“Putanginamo! Limangdaan na ba ito?” For violating a city ordinance which punishes breaches of the
peace, said officers apprehended Martinez and asked to empty his pockets. In the course thereof, police
officers were able to recover from him small transparent plastic sachet containing substance suspected to
be shabu. Police officers requested for laboratory examination of the confiscated specimen and was
confirmed by PNP Crime Laboratory as positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu).
Martinez was then charged and convicted by RTC with the crime of possession of dangerous drugs,
finding all its elements to have been established through the testimonies of the prosecution’s interested
witnesses. In relation, it also upheld the legality of Martinez’ warrantless arrest, observing that Martinez
was disturbing the peace in violation of the ordinance during the time of his apprehension. CA confirmed
said ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained during the arrest of Martinez, as an incident of a lawful
warrantless arrest for breach of the peace he committed in the presence of the officers, admissible?

HELD: No, the evidence obtained during Martinez’ arrest was inadmissible. The search made in the
person of Martinez did not fall squarely within the exclusionary rule of Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable…

Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured by
government authorities in contravention of the foregoing are rendered inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose, in any proceeding. In this regard, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that: Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [referring to Section 2] shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

Commonly known as the "exclusionary rule," the above-cited proscription is not, however, an absolute
and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence, the traditional exceptions are customs searches, searches of
moving vehicles, seizure of evidence in plain view, consented searches, "stop and frisk" measures and
searches incidental to a lawful arrest. This last-mentioned exception is of particular significance to this
case and thus, necessitates further disquisition.

A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search is one that is carried out under the
parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires that the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the
term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Consequently, as it cannot be said that Martinez was validly arrested. The warrantless search that
resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject shabu purportedly seized from Martinez is inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree as mandated by the above discussed
constitutional provision. In this regard, considering that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, Martinez’ acquittal should therefore come as a matter of course.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Eminent Domain>Just Compensation

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. VIRGINIA PALMARES, et al., Respondents

G. R. No. 192890, June 17, 2013

(Second Division)

FACTS: Virginia Palmares (Palmares) inherited a 19.98-hectare agricultural land located in Barangay
Tagubang, Passi City, Iloilo. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) acquired 19.1071 hectares of the
entire area, which was valued by LBP at P440,355.92 but Palmares rejected the said amount.
Consequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) conducted summary
proceedings but it resolved to adopt LBP's valuation. Palmares filed for judicial determination of just
compensation where the RTC of Iloilo ordered the LBP to recompute. The Landbank of the Philippines
(LBP) yielded to an amount of P503,148.97 but despite the increase Palmares still rejected it. The RTC
rendered the amount of P669, 962.53.

The LBP appealed to the CA. The CA contended that the RTC was given ample discretion and decided in
favor of the RTC. The LBP filed a motion for reconsideration contending that there was a double take up
in the computation of the RTC. The formula should be in accordance with the DAR AO No. 6 Series of
1992, but the RTC based its computation on the market value of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in affirming with modification the order of the
Special Agrarian Court in fixing the compensation?

HELD:Yes.The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which
enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the determination thereof: (1) the
acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income;
(4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government
assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by
the government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land, if any. Pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of the
same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula.

In the instant case, the trial court found to be "unrealistically low" the total valuation by LBP and the DAR
in the amount of P440,355.92, which was computed on the basis of DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by DAR AO No. 11, Series of 1994. It then merely proceeded to add said valuation to the
market value of the subject land as appearing in the 1997 Tax Declaration, and used the average of such
values to fix the just compensation at P669,962.53.The court agrees with LBP in the instant case that the
"double take up" of the market value per tax declaration as a valuation factor completely destroys the
rationale of the formula laid down by the DAR and held that consolidation of cases is proper when there is
a real need to forestall, as in this case, the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Eminent Domain>Just Compensation

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs ALFREDO HABABAG, SR. substituted by his

wife, CONSOLACION, and children, namely: MANUEL, SALVADOR, WILSON, JIMMY, ALFREDO,
JR., and JUDITH, all surnamed HABABAG, respondents

G.R. No. 172352, June 8, 2016

(Special First Division)

FACTS: Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the September
2016 Decision/Motion for Clarification of the Date of Taking dated December 2015, seeking: (a) to be
discharged from the payment of legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, and (b)
clarification of the date of taking from which to reckon the computation of legal interest on the unpaid
balance of the just compensation, in case its MR is denied. The Court upheld CA’s valuation which made
use of the DAR formula as reflective of the factors set forth under Sec 17 of the RA 6657 and rejected the
compensation fixed by the RTC, which applied the Income Productivity Approach as contrary to the
jurisprudential definition of just compensation in expropriation cases, i.e “market value” at the time of
actual taking by the government.

ISSUE:(1) Whether or not the just compensation paid at the time of taking is reflective of the market value
stipulated in RA 6657?

(2) Whether or not the legal interest should be charged from the date of taking?

HELD:(1) No, in the recent case of LBP v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Supreme Court (SC)
reemphasized that just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment, and elucidated that
“prompt payment” of just compensation encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the
landholders as finally determined by the courts. Hence, the requirement of the law is not satisfied by the
mere deposit by the LBP with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by
the DAR, and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set
forth by RA 6657.

(2) Yes. Interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the unpaid
balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), or
emancipation patents (EPs) are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at six
percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP’s alternative Motion for
Clarification, illumines that the interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
(p.a.) on the unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and
thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. However, while the LBP averred that the
landowner’s title was cancelled in favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic’s title/s was/were not
attached to the records of these consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to
submit certified true copies of the Republic’s title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases, and the latter
to compute the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the said titles/s.

In Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, 632 SCRA 727 (2010), the Court had illuminated that the substantiality
of the payments made by the LBP is not the determining factor in the imposition of interest as nothing
less than full payment of just compensation is required. The value of the landholdings themselves should
be equivalent to the principal sum of the just compensation due, and that interest is due and should be
paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this principal sum after the taking has been completed.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>Rights and liabilities of public officers; Judges
Retirement; Creditable Service

Re: Request of (Ref) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Recomputation of His Creditable
Service for the Purpose of Recomputing His Retirement Benefits
690 SCRA 242, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC, February 12, 2013
(En Banc)

FACTS: When former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban reached the compulsory age of retirement on
December 7, 2006, he was credited with eleven (11) years, one (1) month and twenty-seven (27) days or
11.15844 years of government service. The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) did not include in the
computation his 4-year service as Legal Counsel to the Department of Education and its then Secretary,
Alejandro R. Roces, and as Consultant to the Board of National Education in a concurrent capacity, from
January 1962 to December 1965, on the ground that consultancy “is not considered government service
pursuant to Rule XI (Contract of Services/Job Orders) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292.” On January 10, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved R.A.
9946, which reduced the requisite length of service under R.A. 910 from 20 years to 15 years to be
entitled to the retirement benefits with lifetime annuity. Thus, the instant letter-request of CJ Panganiban
seeking a recomputation of his creditable government service to include the previously-excluded 4-year
government service to enable him to meet the reduced service requirement of 15 years for entitlement to
retirement benefits under R.A. 9946.

ISSUE: Whether or not CJ Panganiban is entitled to enjoy the benefits and privileges under R.A. 9946?

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing
upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in
cases of disability or death while in actual service or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave
credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-
retirement service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full
benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal
counselling work for a government body or institution as creditable government service.

Furthermore, the generous extent of the Court’s liberality in granting retirement benefits is obvious in Re:
Justice Efren I. Plana:

“It may also be stressed that under the beneficent provisions of Rep. Act 910, as
amended, a Justice who reaches age 70 is entitled to full retirement benefits with no
length of service required. Thus, a 69 year old lawyer appointed to the bench will get full
retirement benefits for the rest of his life upon reaching age 70, even if he served in the
government for only one year. Justice Plana served the government with distinction for
33 years, 5 months, and 11 days, more than 5 years of which were served as a Justice of
the Court of Appeals of this Court.”

In sum, those who may render service with the government, without occupying any public office or without
having been elected or appointed a public officer evidenced by a written appointment recorded in the
CSC, do so outside of the concept of government service. The ponencia interestingly broadens this
concept of "government service." It literally interprets the term to include any service performed for the
government; it thus claims that the "law x x x did not require a specific job description or job specification"
and "the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance.
POLITICAL LAW>Administrative Law>Administrative Agencies, National Telecommunication
Jurisdiction

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014
(Second Division)

FACTS: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA), which has been granted a legislative franchise to construct,
install, operate and maintain radio and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines for a period of
25 years under R.A. 7252, enacted on March 20, 1992, filed with the NTC an application for the issuance
of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to install, operate and maintain a –kilowatt amplitude
modulation (AM) radio station in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Pending approval, NTC issued an order
provisionally authorizing GMA to install, operate and maintain said radio station. The PA was valid for 18
months and expressly stated that it may be subject to amendments, alteration, suspension, revocation or
cancellation when public welfare, morals and national security so requires or when grantee operates
beyond its authorization granted.” GMA failed to renew its PA upon its expiration. Nevertheless, it
continued its broadcast operations on the basis of temporary permits issued by the NTC. Some four (4)
years after the expiration of its PA, GMA filed with the NTC an Ex Parte Motion for issuance of CPC,
claiming: (a) full compliance with the terms and conditions of its PA; and (b) its current operation of said
radio station by virtue of temporary permit. GMA explained in a clarificatory hearing with NTC that its
failure to timely renew its PA was without deliberate intent but by mere inadvertence caused by the
confusion in the turn-over of the custody of its documents from its previous lawyer, and that it immediately
filed the Ex-Parte Motion upon discovering its omission. Further, it alleged that notwithstanding the non-
renewal of its PA, it had fully complied with the terms and conditions thereof, and that its continued
operation was actually authorized by the NTC by virtue of the four (4) temporary permits. Finally, invoking
the 60-day prescriptive period under Section 28 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Public Service Act" (Public Service Act), it argued that the NTC could no longer sanction
the late filing of its Ex-Parte Motion considering the lapse of more than six (6) years from its filing on
September 13, 2002.
The NTC renewed GMA’s PA for three (3) years, or until July 14, 2012, but, pursuant to Section 21 of the
Public Service Act, imposed upon it a fine of ₱152,100.00 for operating its radio station with an expired
PA from July 14, 1998 to September 13, 2002, or for 1521 days (the fine having been pegged at the rate
of ₱100 per day).
Consequently, GMA filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration from the imposition of the aforesaid fine,
but the NTC, in an Order dated January 8, 2010, merely reduced its amount to ₱76,050.00. Dissatisfied,
GMA elevated the matter to the CA, contending that: (a) the 60-day prescriptive period provided under
Section 28 of the Public Service Act already barred the NTC from imposing said fine; (b) the fine imposed
amounts to more than ₱25,000.00 and, hence, contrary to the policy embodied in Section 23 of the Public
Service Act; and (c) the imposition of said fine was improper considering that the NTC had already
authorized it to operate its radio station through temporary permits. The CA dismissed the appeal.
Further, the CA found that the NTC’s imposition of the assailed fine at the reduced rate of ₱50.00 per day
was well within the limit of Section 21 of the Public Service Act, noting too that the fine was, at best,
minimal and conservative in light of the duration of GMA violation. Feeling aggrieved, GMA moved for
reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the ₱76,050.00 fine imposed by the NTC upon GMA?

HELD: No. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), in so far as the regulation of the
telecommunication industry is concerned, has exclusive jurisdiction to “establish and prescribe rules,
regulations, standards and specifications in all cases related to the issued Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC) and administer an enforce the same”. As such, and considering further its expertise
on the matter, its interpretation of the rules and regulations it itself promulgates are traditionally accorded
by the court with great weight and respect. As enunciated in Eastern Telecommunication Phils., Inc. v.
International Communication Corporation.
The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its
special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives,
is in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently
yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules
unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>The Civil Service; Misconduct; Dismissal from the
Service; Neglect of Duty; Conduct prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service

COMMISSION ELECTIONS, Petitioner vs. BAI HAIDY D. MAMALINTA, Respondent

G.R. No. 226622, March 14, 2017
(En Banc)

FACTS: During the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Petitioner Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) appointed Mamalinta as Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC)
for South Upi, Maguindanao. While MBOC performs their functions, the MBOC allegedly committed the
following acts: (a) on May 16, 2004, the MBOC proclaimed Datu Israel Sinsuat (Sinsuat) as Mayor, Datu
Jabarael Sinsuat as Vice-Mayor, and eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Bayan as winning
candidates, on the basis of nineteen (19) out of the thirty-five (35) total election returns; (b) on even date,
the MBOC caused the transfer of the place for canvassing of votes from Tinaman Elementary School,
South Upi, Maguindanao to Cotabato City without prior authority from the COMELEC; and (c) two days
later or on May 18, 2004, they proclaimed a new set of winning candidates, headlined by Antonio Gunsi,
Jr. (Gunsi) as Mayor and four (4) new members of the Sangguniang Bayan on the basis of thirty (30) out
of thirty-five (35) election returns. Thus, Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director of the COMELEC
Regional Office No. XII, reported the incidents to the COMELEC En Banc, which in turn, directed the
COMELEC Law Department to conduct a fact-finding investigation on the matter. Thereafter, the
COMELEC Law Department recommended the filing of administrative and criminal cases against the
members of the MBOC, and subsequently, Mamalinta was formally charged with Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty, Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.
In her defense, Mamalinta denied the charges against her, essentially claiming that the MBOC's acts of
double proclamation and transferring the place for canvassing were attended by duress in view of the
imminent danger to their lives due to the violence and intimidation initiated by Gunsi's supporters. The
COMELEC En Banc found Mamalinta guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and accordingly, dismissed her from public service, with
imposition of all accessory penalties relative thereto. Mamalinta moved for reconsideration, which was
denied. Aggrieved, she appealed to the CSC. The CSC affirmed the COMELEC En Banc ruling.
Dissatisfied, Mamalinta filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA reversed and set aside the CSC ruling,
and accordingly, reinstated Mamalinta to her former position prior to her dismissal, without loss of
seniority rights, and with payment of the corresponding back salaries and all benefits which she would
have been entitled to if not for her illegal dismissal. The COMELEC moved for reconsideration, which
was, however, denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the CSC ruling, and consequently,
absolved Mamalinta from the administrative charges of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service?
HELD: Yes. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public
officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.
As compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference, Gross Neglect of
Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the
consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty.
In the instant case, records reveal that Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC of South Upi, Maguindanao,
were under heavy duress from supporters of mayoralty candidate Gunsi. As stated in Mamalinta's Joint
Affidavit with Mato, the Vice-Chairman of the MBOC, they were forcibly taken and held hostage by Gunsi'
s supporters, and while detained, were forced, intimidated, and coerced into declaring Gunsi as the
winning candidate, despite their earlier proclamation that Sinsuat was the true winner of the mayoralty
elections. Mamalinta and Mato' s statements in their Joint Affidavit were then corroborated by the Minutes
of the MBOC dated May 14 and 15, 2004 and the Report dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by Pefiafiel,
another member of the MBOC, stating inter alia, that while the MBOC was canvassing the votes, Gunsi's
supporters kicked open the doors of the room, rushed towards the members of the MBOC, and even
attempted to throw chairs to them. Irrefragably, the foregoing incidents show that duress and intimidation
were clearly exercised against Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC, and thus, the latter succumbed to
the same by performing the aforesaid acts, i.e., the double proclamation and the unauthorized transfer of
the place for canvassing, albeit against their will.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Right to the speedy disposition of cases

ANGELITO MAGNO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: On May 14, 2003, Angelito Magno was charged before the RTC with Multiple Frustrated Murder
and Double Attempted Murder. After arraignment, he objected to the formal appearance of one Atty.
Adelino Sitoy, who intended to act as a private prosecutor for and in behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the Orders dated September 25, 2003 and October 1, 2003, the RTC ruled that only the
Ombudsman may prosecute the instant case. The Ombudsman and Atty. Sitoy questioned the RTC's
aforesaid Orders to the CA which ruled that the private prosecutor may prosecute the case in
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman. Eventually, the matter reached the
Court, which nullified the CA's pronouncements on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the
Ombudsman and Atty. Sitoy should have sought recourse from the Sandiganbayan instead (Private
Prosecutor Case).

While the Private Prosecutor Case was still pending before the CA, the latter court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), and thereafter, a preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC from implementing its
Orders. This notwithstanding and upon motion by the prosecution, the CA clarified in a Resolution
dated January 19, 2005 that the injunctive writs do not operate to enjoin the proceedings in Crim. Case
No. DU-10123, provided that it is conducted in the presence of the private prosecutor. Thus, the
prosecution moved to set the case for trial and started presenting one of its witnesses on March 29, 2005.
In the course of the prosecution's presentation of witnesses, the RTC sustained petitioner's objection on
the admissibility of one of the witness's testimony, prompting the prosecution to elevate the matter to the
SB (Objection Case). Initially, the SB issued a sixty (60)-day TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding with
Crim. Case No. DU-10123. In a Decision dated February 12, 2007, the SB dismissed the Objection Case.

Meanwhile and after the expiration of the TRO in the Objection Case, Magno filed on March 16, 2006 a
Motion to Set Case for Continuous Hearing before the RTC, invoking his right to speedy trial. The RTC
granted his motion, and accordingly, set the hearing on September 1, 2006. The prosecution moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Thus, under threat of being cited in contempt, the prosecution
continued its presentation of witnesses on September 1, 2006. Such presentation continued all the way
until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset the hearing to August 16, 2007 due to the
handling prosecutor's illness. However, it appears that from such postponement until around early 2010,
no hearings were conducted in the case. In fact, records show that there were only two (2) incidents
during that time, namely: (a) petitioner's Motion for Substitution of Bond and Cancellation of Annotation
which was resolved on October 9, 2009; and (b) Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation's Motion to
Release a vehicle involved in a case which was resolved on December 9, 2013.

In view of the foregoing, Magno moved for the continuation of the trial, the hearing of which was set on
April 22, 2010, which was further reset to September 2, 2010. At the September 2, 2010 hearing, only
Magno’s counsel appeared. Thus, on September 17, 2010, Magno filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. The RTC granted Magno’s motion to dismiss, finding that
Crim. Case No. DU-10123 had already been pending for 13 years and yet, remained unresolved. On
appeal, the Sandiganbayan set aside the RTC ruling and, accordingly, ordered the reinstatement of Crim.
Case No. DU- 10123 and for the RTC to conduct further proceedings immediately. Magno moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Magno’s right to speedy trial has been violated?

HELD: Yes. An accused's right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in criminal
cases by Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as
one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its 'salutary objective' being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having
his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. In Tan v. People, the Court made a thorough
discussion on the matter, to wit:

“The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against
him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only
when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by
precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length
of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
Prejudice to the defendant. x x x.”

Examining the incidents of this case vis-a-vis the aforesaid jurisprudential parameters in determining the
existence of violation of such right, the Court holds that Magno’s right to speedy trial had been violated.

First, more than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information in Crim. Case No. DU-10123 was
filed on May 14, 2003, until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November
28, 2014 dismissing the case on the ground of violation of Magno’s right to speedy trial. Notably, when
the RTC dismissed the case, the prosecution has yet to complete the presentation of its evidence in chief.

Second, for the purpose of determining whether or not a violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial
indeed exists, the Court deems it appropriate to highlight 2 distinct periods, namely: (a) the period from
the filing of the information on May 14, 2003 until June 7, 2007 when the prosecution requested to reset
the hearing due to the handling prosecutor's illness (First Period); and (b) from June 7, 2007 until
September 17, 2010 when Magno finally filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial (Second Period). Although the numerous delays and postponements that occurred during the
First Period were excusable, the very long delay that occurred during the Second Period largely remains
unjustified.

Third, Magno was not remiss in asserting his right to speedy trial. Records show that during the First
Period and after the TROs and/or injunctions issued by the higher courts enjoining the proceedings on the
main were already dissolved, Magno filed on March 16, 2006 a Motion to Set Case for Continuous
Hearing, already invoking such right. In fact, this directly resulted in the Court ordering the prosecution to
continue with the presentation of its witnesses. Unfortunately, the case progress bogged down once
again after the prosecution asked for a postponement of the June 7, 2007 hearing, and thereafter, failed
to move forward with the proceedings. In fact, the prosecution only moved to continue the presentation of
its evidence after petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial.

Fourth, the Court recognizes the prejudice caused to Magno by the lengthy and unjustified delay in Crim.
Case No. DU-10123. To stress, the right to speedy trial is not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the resolution of Crim. Case No. DU-10123 as well as
the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, the Court concludes that Magno’s right
to speedy trial had been violated. While this pronouncement should, as a matter of course, result in the
acquittal of petitioner that would bar his further prosecution for the same offense, it does not necessarily
follow that he is entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a
subsequent case which the private complainant/s may opt to pursue.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Searches and Seizures>Stop and Frisk
Searches (Terry Searches)

ALVIN COMERCIANTE y GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015
(First Division)

FACTS: Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II were aboard a
motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. They spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, Alvin Comerciante and Erick Dasilla
standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets
to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached
them. PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and
confiscated 2 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, later confirmed as
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. They were charged before the RTC with violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. After the
prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his
acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered
his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found
Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt, further holding that P03 Calag had probable cause to effect
the warrantless arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid stop and frisk search?

HELD: No. In People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively
explain “stop and frisk” searches:

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The
balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police
officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and
criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern -- based on facts that
they themselves observe -- whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner.
Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. x x x Normally,
“stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a
judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest
cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court
approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is
that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there
was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.”

In this case, the Court ruled that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and handing
over something to him do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a
reasonable inference of criminal activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for P03 Calag to
conduct a stop and frisk search. In sum, since there was no valid stop and frisk search made on
Comerciante, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>Termination of official relation

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LEMUEL H. VENDIOLA, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN CITY, LAGUNA (RTC)
A.M. No. 17-11-272-RTC, January 31, 2018
(Second Division)

FACTS: The records of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), show that Vendiola has not
submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since May 2012 up to the present. He neither submitted any
application for leave. His service record shows that he was appointed Utility Worker I in the RTC, Branch
24 on November 10, 2004. On April 27, 2009, he was appointed temporarily as Sheriff IV in the OCC,
RTC. He was reappointed to the same position on a permanent capacity on June 3, 2010. Vendiola did
not submit the requirements for initial salary; he did, however, submit his DTR until April 2012.

Consequently, in a Letter dated February 21, 2013, Executive Judge Teodoro N. Solis of the RTC,
Branch 25, requested the OCA to drop Vendiola from the rolls and declare his position vacant considering
his absences without official leave since April 2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vendiola’s prolonged absence without leave warranted OCA’s decision to drop
Vendiola’s name from the rolls?

HELD: Yes, Vendiola’s prolonged leave without approved leave is valid ground for dropping his name
from the rolls.

Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13,
Series of 2007, states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is continuously
absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence
without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls
without prior notice.

Based on this provision, Vendiola should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of
his continued absence since April 2012.

Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it disrupted the
normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve with the utmost degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be reiterated and stressed that a court
personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and
maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to report for work since April 2012 up to the
present, Vendiola grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to
adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government service.

The dropping from the rolls, however, shall be without prejudice to his liability, if any, upon completion of
the audit.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public Officers>Termination of official relation, The Civil Service

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF MS. JANICE C. MILLARE, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY

A.M. No. 17-11-131-MeTC, February 07, 2018

(Second Division)

FACTS: The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), show that Janice C. Millare, Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC of
Quezon City, has not submitted her DTRs since July 2017 up to the present. She neither submitted any
application for leave. Thus, she has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since July 17, 2017.
As a consequence, the OCA recommended that: (a) Millare's name be dropped from the rolls effective
July 17, 2017 for having been absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) working days; (b) her
position be declared vacant; and (c) she be informed about her separation from the service or dropping
from the rolls at her last known address on record. The OCA added, however, that Millare is still qualified
to receive the benefits she may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the
government.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dropping of the name of Millare’s from the rolls, for being absent without official
leave for more than 30 working days, was proper?

HELD:Yes.The Court agrees with OCA’s recommendation to drop Millare’s name for the rolls. Section 63,
Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,11 states:

Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x xx.

x xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Based on this provision, Millare should be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls in view of
her continued absence since July 17, 2017.

Millare's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it disrupted the
normal functions of the court. It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve with the utmost degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. It should be reiterated and stressed that a court
personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of upholding public accountability and
maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary. By failing to report for work since July 17, 2017 up to the
present, Millare grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of her office. Undeniably, she failed to
adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government service.
POLITICAL LAW>Constitutional Law II>Bill of Rights>Searches and Seizures>Warrantless
searches and seizures

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI,

accused-appellant

G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013

(Second Division)

FACTS: PO3 De Leon was riding his motorcycle, on his way home when he saw Villareal from a distance
holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic of sachet of shabu. PO3 De Leon, a member of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit recognized Villareal as someone he had previously arrested for
illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3De Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly
apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. Subsequently, PO3 De Leon brought Villareal to the station
and turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of Villareal to PO2 Hipolito who, in turn
executed an acknowledgment receipt and prepared a letter request for the laboratory examination of the
seized substance. Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Sec 11, Art II of RA 9165 for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged
upon finding all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been
established. Finding no ill motive on the part of PO3 De Leon to testify falsely against Villareal, coupled
with the fact that he has previously been arrested by for illegal possession of drugs under RA 6425, RTC
gave full faith and credit to PO3 De Leon’s testimony. Moreover, RTC found the plain view doctrine to be
applicable, as the confiscated item was in plain view of PO3 De Leon at the place and time of arrest. CA
likewise affirmed the RTC’s decision citing that it was a “clear case of in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest as provided for under Sec 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It held that
appellant “exhibited an overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion”, aggravated
by the existence of his past criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 approached him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision convicting Villarealof the
offense charged?

HELD: Yes, Paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it. For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires
for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

The SC finds it inconceivable how PO3 De Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able
to identify with reasonable accuracy from a distance and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, the
inside of the plastic sachet allegedly held by Villareal as shabu. Absent any other circumstance upon
which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to Villareal as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 De Leon that he had just committed a crime.

There being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
liability.
POLITICAL LAW>Law on Public officers>The Civil Service

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,vs ROGER F. BORJA, Respondents, et.al

G.R. No. 201830, November, 10, 2015

(First Division)

FACTS:The Board of Directors of San Pablo City Water District (SPCWD) dismissed its division chiefs,
Evelyn Eje (Eje) and Racquel Tolentino (Tolentino), on the basis of the administrative complaint filed by
its General Manager, Borja. The CA, set aside the dismissal and awarded the division chiefs back wages
and other employment benefits. The back wages which were, however, taken from SPCWD's funds upon
Borja's approval.

Borja and the other officers of SPCWD were charged administratively, the complaint alleged that Borja
and the other respondents therein used public funds to settle a private obligation, considering that Eje
and Tolentino's back wages and other benefits were Borja's personal liabilities. Borja maintained on the
other hand that the ruling of the RTC in the civil case for reimbursement could not be used as basis to
hold him administratively liable inasmuch as the condition imposed thereat, for the COA to conduct an
audit, has not been complied with. The Ombudsman held Borja guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service
and accordingly, suspended him from service for one (1) year without pay. The CA found that Borja
should not be held administratively liable on the ground that he made the payment in good faith, as found
by the COA En Banc in its ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not Borja is administratively liable for prejudicial conduct.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that Borja should be held administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to the best interest of the service. By
causing SPCWD to pay the back wages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja clearly placed
said office in a financial disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not belong to it,
especially considering that the amount involved and taken from SPCWD's funds, P1,942,031.82, is by no
means negligible. In doing so, the integrity of Borja's office was put in to question, and SPCWD was
placed in a deleterious financial position.

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has been consistently held to pertain to acts that
tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, although not necessarily related or connected to the
public officer's function. Thus, while the absence of bad faith may negate criminal liability for graft and
corrupt practices under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, it does not automatically absolve Borja of administrative
liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that the only question
material to the latter is whether the public officer's acts tarnished the image or integrity of the public office.
At this juncture, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that a public office is a public trust. As such, public
officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency.