G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014
, issued
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON.
DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient services,
the law allows local government units the power to reorganize. In
doing so, they should be given leeway to entice their employees to
avail of severance benefits that the local government can afford.
However, local government units may not provide such when it
amounts to a supplementary retirement benefit scheme.
In this special civil action for certiorari,1 the city of General Santos
asks us to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Audit (COA). On January 20, 2011, respondent
Commission on Audit affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector
in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring Ordinance No. 08, series of
2009, as illegal. This was reiterated in respondent Commission’s
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration dated October 17,
2011.2
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was enacted by the city of General
Santos on August 13, 2009. It is entitled An Ordinance Establishing
the GenSan Scheme on Early Retirement for Valued Employees
Security (GenSan SERVES).3
It is important to view this ordinance in its proper context.
Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr.
Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams
pursuant to its organization development program. This was
patterned after Executive Order No. 366 dated October 4, 2004
entitled Directing a Strategic Review of the Operations and
Organizations of the Executive Branch and Providing Options and
Incentives for Government Employees who may be Affected by the
Rationalization of the Functions and Agencies of the Executive Branch
and its implementing rules and regulations.4
Mayor Pedro B. Acharon, Jr. declared the city’s byword of "Total
Quality Service" in his state of the city address in 2005. This was
followed by the conduct of a process and practice review for each
department, section, and unit of the local government. The product
was an organization development masterplan adopted as Executive
Order No. 13, series of 2009.5
This was followed by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting
for the mayor’s support for GenSan SERVES, an early retirement
program to be proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together
with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to entice
those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to
avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early
retirement package."6
This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series
of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
The ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified employees below
sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly
employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40)
years may avail of the incentives under the program.7 In other words,
the ordinance "provides for separation benefits for sickly employees
who have not yet reached retirement age."8 Section 5 of the
ordinance states:
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any
personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this
program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS
or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement
incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and one-
half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every
year of service in the City Government.9
Also, the ordinance provides:
Section 6. GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives – Upon
availment of early retirement, a qualified employee shall enjoy the
following in addition to the above incentives:
(a) Cash gift of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) for the sickly
employees;
(b) Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos City Hospital;
(c) Annual aid in the maximum amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00), if admitted at General Santos City Hospital; and
(d) 14 karat gold ring as a token.10
As provided, payment would be made in two tranches: 50% paid in
January 2010 and the remainder in July 2010.11 Petitioner city
alleged that out of its 1,361 regular employees, 50 employees
applied, from which 39 employees qualified to avail of the incentives
provided by the ordinance.12 The first tranche of benefits was
released in January 2010.13
In a letter dated February 10, 2010, the city’s audit team leader,
through its supervising auditor, sent a query on the legality of the
ordinance to respondent Commission on Audit’s director for Regional
Office No. XII, Cotabato City.14
In his second indorsement dated March 15, 2010, respondent
Commission’s regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal
basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s
Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector, for a more
authoritative opinion.15
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021
on March 25, 2010. The opinion explained that Ordinance No. 08,
series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary retirement benefit plan.
In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186,
as amended, prohibits government agencies from establishing
supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time the
Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while
those plans already existing when the charter was enacted were
declared abolished.16
The opinion discussed that this prohibition was reiterated in Conte v.
Commission on Audit.17 Laraño v. Commission on Audit,18 on the
other hand, ruled that an early retirement program should be by
virtue of a valid reorganization pursuant to law in order to be valid.
The opinion concludes as follows:
In fine, since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early
Retirement Program] of the City Government of General Santos, a
law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the absence,
however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a
necessary consequence.
It is hoped that the foregoing sufficiently answers the instant
query.19
Petitioner city, through then mayor, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., filed a
letter-reconsideration dated June 7, 2010. They followed through
with two letters addressed to respondent Commission’s chairman
dated July 26, 2010 and October 6, 2010, respectively, for the
reconsideration of COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.20
Respondent Commission on Audit treated these letters as an appeal.
On January 20, 2011, it rendered its decision denying the appeal and
affirming COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021.21 It also denied
reconsideration by resolution dated October 17, 2011.22 The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit and COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021 dated
March 25, 2010 of the OGC, this Commission is hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the ATL of General Santos City is hereby directed to issue
a Notice of Disallowance on the illegal disbursements made under
the Gen[S]san SERVES.23
Respondent Commission on Audit agreed that Ordinance No. 08,
series of 2009, partakes of the nature of a supplementary retirement
benefit plan proscribed by Section 28, paragraph (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended. It also cited Conte v.
Commission on Audit24 and Laraño v. Commission on Audit.25
In its opinion, respondent Commission on Audit observed that
GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on
ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.26 Moreover,
nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local
government units to establish an early retirement program.
Mayor Acharon, Jr. submitted that other local government units such
as Cebu in 2005 and 2008 have adopted their own early retirement
programs. The resolutions of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu
invoked Republic Act No. 6683 dated December 2, 1988, which
provided for early retirement and voluntary separation. The
questioned decision mentioned that respondent Commission on
Audit would look into this program supposedly adopted by Cebu.27
Assuming Cebu’s invocation of Republic Act No. 6683 was proper,
respondent Commission on Audit explained that this has already
been amended by Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the
GSIS Act of 1997. Moreover, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 668328
provides for limited application.29
The present petition raises this sole issue:
WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE
NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT
PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS VALIDITY
I
This court has consistently held that findings of administrative
agencies are generally respected, unless found to have been tainted
with unfairness that amounted to grave abuse of discretion:
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers
but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted
to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted
with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there
is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the
judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice,
whim and despotism.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
We have ruled that "not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion."31 Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as follows:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. x x x.32
In Yap v. Commission on Audit,33 this court explained that the
Commission on Audit has the duty to make its own assessment of the
merits of the disallowance and need not be limited to a review of the
grounds relied upon by the auditor of the agency concerned:
x x x we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal,
respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to the grounds
relied upon by a government agency’s auditor with respect to
disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance
with its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally
permitted, but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the
merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict itself
to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of
the government agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render
COA’s vital constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless
and ineffective.34
Moreover, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that
"unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof." Rule 64, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that "a judgment or final order
or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided."
Thus, we proceed to determine whether respondent Commission on
Audit acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the opinion of
its Legal Services Sector and finding that the entire Ordinance No. 08,
series of 2009, partakes of the nature of a proscribed supplementary
retirement benefit plan.
II
According to petitioner city, GenSan SERVES does not provide for
supplementary retirement benefits, and Conte does not apply.35
Petitioner city explains that unlike the facts in Conte, Ordinance No.
08, series of 2009, was designed to entice employees who are
unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives by way
of an early retirement package. In essence, the incentives are
severance pay. Those who have reached retirement age are
disqualified.36
Petitioner city adds that GenSan SERVES is a one-time offer. It is
available only to qualified employees who applied within two months
from the ordinance’s effectivity. In fact, out of its 1,361 regular
employees, 50 employees applied. Out of all that applied, only 39
employees qualified to avail of the incentives provided by the
ordinance.37
These incentives are independent and distinct from the Government
Service Insurance System retirement package.38
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was amended by
Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, "to exclude those GSIS and PAG-
IBIG benefits the payment[s] of which are passed on [to] the
employer."39 This was to remove any doubt as to its coverage and
applicability and to ensure that no employee will be paid twice.40
The amended provision reads:
Section 5. Gen[S]an SERVES Program Incentives On Top of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits
– Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of
this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the
GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee,
except those benefits the payment of which are passed on to the
employer. In which case, the benefits granted under this ordinance
shall only be considered as one of the options available to a retiring
city employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement
incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and one-
half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every
year of service in the City Government. (Emphasis supplied)
According to petitioner city, GenSan SERVES is an initial step pursuant
to its organization development masterplan,41 which began with the
city mayor’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008,
creating change management teams.42
Petitioner city cites Sections 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code
as its authority to reorganize. It argues that these provisions
necessarily imply the authority of petitioner city to provide
retirement benefits, separation pay, and other incentives to those
affected by the reorganization.43
Petitioner city also cites Republic Act No. 6656, otherwise known as
An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization.44
According to petitioner city, this not only requires good faith in the
implementation of reorganization but mandates the payment of
appropriate separation pay, retirement, and other benefits under
existing laws within 90 days from effectivity date of separation.45
Even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No.
184 entitled Directing the Reorganization and Streamlining of the
National Development Company on March 10, 2003. In Section 4, it
provides for a separation package anchored on Republic Act No.
6656.46 Petitioner city submits that if the President can reorganize in
the absence of any law authorizing her to do so and provide
compensation based on Republic Act No. 6656, with more reason
that a local government unit can reorganize as its power to
reorganize is expressly provided in the Local Government Code.47
Respondent Commission on Audit counters that it correctly found
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as invalid in the absence of a law
passed by Congress specifically authorizing the enactment of an
ordinance granting an early retirement scheme.48
Respondent Commission on Audit contends that Sections 16 and 76
of the Local Government Code do not confer authority upon any local
government unit to create a separate or supplementary retirement
benefit plan.49 As for Republic Act No. 6656, this contemplates
situations where a government position has been abolished, or
rendered redundant, or a need to merge, divide or consolidate
positions for lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law exists.50
According to respondent Commission on Audit, petitioner city failed
to demonstrate arbitrariness on its part as it merely observed the
proscription under Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 when it found the ordinance a nullity.51
We agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as
Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned. We declare Section 6 on
post-retirement incentives as valid.
III
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner
city’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating
change management teams52 as an initial step for its organization
development masterplan.
Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to
streamline and reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of
the Local Government Code on organizational structure and staffing
pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare
clause:
Section 76. Organizational Structure and Staffing Pattern. - Every
local government unit shall design and implement its own
organizational structure and staffing pattern taking into
consideration its service requirements and financial capability,
subject to the minimum standards and guidelines prescribed by the
Civil Service Commission.
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of
culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people
to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that
"any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon
shall be resolved in favor or devolution of powers x x x."
Section 5, paragraph (c) also provides that "the general welfare
provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community." These rules of interpretation emphasize the policy of
local autonomy and the devolution of powers to the local
government units.

Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own
"organizational structure and staffing pattern" also implies the power
to revise and reorganize. Without such power, local governments will
lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents. Effective and
efficient governmental services especially at the local government
level require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed
in good faith from time to time.
This was implied in Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners,
Commission on Audit.53 In that case, this court declared as valid the
ordinance passed by the province granting and releasing
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits to its officials and
employees. This court held that Section 2 of Administrative Order No.
10354 requiring the President’s prior approval before the grant of
any allowance or benefit is applicable only to offices under the
executive branch.55 Section 2 does not mention local government
units, thus, the prohibition does not apply to them.56 This court then
referred to the policy of local autonomy as follows:
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II and
Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991, we
declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees
were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by petitioner’s
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.57
Local autonomy allows an interpretation of Sections 76 and 16 as
granting petitioner city the authority to create its organization
development program.
Petitioner city’s vision in 2005 of "Total Quality Service" for "the
improvement of the quality of services delivered by the city to the
delight of its internal and external customers"58 is a matter within its
discretion. It then conducted a process and practice review for each
and every unit within the city, resulting in the formulation of an
organization development masterplan adopted as Executive Order
No. 13, series of 2009.59
Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, was later passed requesting for
the mayor’s support for GenSan SERVES. The third preambular clause
states that in order "to transform the bureaucracy into [an] effective
and result[s]-oriented structure, redounding to improved
governance, there is a need to entice employees aged 50-59 years
old, to retire earlier than [age] 65 for them to enjoy their retirement
while they are still healthy."60 Consequently, Ordinance No. 08,
series of 2009, was passed creating the GenSan SERVES program.
In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, NAPOCOR,61 this court explained
that a streamlining of organization for a more efficient system must
pass the test of good faith in order to be valid:
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions.62 It could result in the loss of one's position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for
the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient
to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab
initio.63 (Emphasis supplied)
There are indicia of bad faith, none of which are present in this case.
Republic Act No. 6656 invoked by petitioner city as authority for the
creation of GenSan SERVES, for example, enumerates situations
considered as bad faith when employees are removed as a result of
any reorganization:
SECTION 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant
or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order
to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in
the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions in created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially
the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
None of these badges of bad faith exist in this case.
Petitioner city followed the order of priority under Section 4 of its
ordinance.64 It required applicants to undergo medical examination
with the local hospital and considered the hospital chief’s
recommendations.65
Unfortunately, these allegations showing good faith is not enough to
declare the program created by petitioner city as a reorganization
that justifies the creation of a retirement benefit plan.
Petitioner city alleged that the positions occupied by those who
qualified for GenSan SERVES remained vacant, and it would neither
hire replacements nor promote employees earlier than June 30,
2011.66 This means the positions left by those who availed of the
program will eventually be filled up by others. Their positions were
not abolished or merged with other positions for streamlining in the
service.
IV
The assailed decision by respondent Commission on Audit was
anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
186, otherwise known as the Government Service Insurance Act,67
as amended by Republic Act No. 4968.68 This proscribes all
supplementary retirement or pension plans for government
employees:
(b) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers or
employees shall be created by any employer. All supplementary
retirement or pension plans heretofore in force in any government
office, agency, or instrumentality or corporation owned and
controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or
abolished: Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible
to retire thereunder shall not be affected.
Jurisprudence has discussed the nature and purpose of retirement
benefits and pension plans as follows:
Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an employee’s
loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden
of worrying about his financial support or upkeep. On the other hand,
a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree
for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the
government service, and to permit them to retire from the service
with relative security, not only for those who have retained their
vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by illness
or accident.69 (Emphasis supplied)
In Conte v. Commission on Audit,70 this court discussed the purpose
behind the proscription found in Section 28, paragraph (b), as
amended. It was to address the need to prevent the proliferation of
inequitous plans:
x x x Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars
the creation of any insurance or retirement plan – other than the GSIS
– for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this
and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
government office or agency to put up its own supplementary
retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial
assistance.71
Section 2 of the ordinance, as amended, defined "applicants" as
referring to "qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but
not less than fifty (50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50)
years of age but not less than forty (40) years old from the effectivity
of this Ordinance and shall have rendered service in the City
government for at least 15 years."
This means that even employees other than those who are
unproductive due to health reasons may apply under the ordinance.
Albeit last in priority, they may still qualify to avail of the incentives
pursuant to Section 4, paragraph (d), as amended:
Section 4. Prioritization. – The following applicants shall be prioritized
in availing the program:
a) First – Employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than
fifty (50) years who are determined by the Chief of General Santos
City Hospital to be qualified to avail of the program;
b) Second – Employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than
fifty (50) years who are under continuous medication as determined
by the Chief of General Santos City Hospital;
c) Third – Employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than
forty (40) years who are determined by the Chief of General Santos
City Hospital to be physically or mentally incapacitated to further
continue rendering service with the City Government and
recommended to avail of the program; and
d) Fourth – Employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than
fifty (50) years who are desirous to avail of the program.
Moreover, Section 3 of the ordinance, as amended, enumerates
those who are covered by the program and may thus apply under the
ordinance:
Section 3. Coverage. – GenSan SERVES program covers the following
employees of the City Government:
(a) personnel occupying permanent positions;
(b) those who are below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty
(50) years on the date of application;
(c) those who are below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty
(40) years on the date of application but confirmed by the Chief of
General Santos City Hospital to be sickly and recommended to avail
early retirement; and
(d) those who must have served the City Government of General
Santos a minimum of fifteen (15) continuous years.
Under paragraph (d), employees should have served for a minimum
of 15 years to qualify. This requirement is consistent with the
definition of a retirement plan as a form of reward for an employee’s
loyalty and service to the employer. Moreover, pension plans as
defined permit employees to retire with relative security, especially
for those who have been incapacitated by illness.72
Section 5 states that "an eligible employee shall receive an early
retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of 1 1/2
months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service
in the City Government." This may be more than the amount of
annuity provided in Section 11, paragraph (a) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 as amended,73 considering that an applicant must have
rendered at least 15 years of service in the city government to
qualify.74
Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of
which is pegged on the beneficiary’s years of service in the city
government. The ordinance provides that only those who have
rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may
apply.75 Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a
retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form of
reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government,
and it is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of
his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.
V
In any case, those who availed of the GenSan SERVES were separated
from the service. Those who are separated from the service, whether
compulsorily for lawful cause,76 or voluntarily when incentivized to
retire early for streamlining purposes,77 should consequently be
entitled to a form of separation or severance pay.
Petitioner city invoked Republic Act No. 6656, which provides that
employees separated from the service as a result of any
reorganization shall be entitled to separation pay, retirement, and
other benefits:
Section 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil
Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as
the case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full
pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate
separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws
within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their
appeals as the case may be: Provided, That application for clearance
has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the
corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to
said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the amount
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such
separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of
payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.
(Emphasis supplied)
Separation or severance pay has been defined as "an allowance
usually based on length of service that is payable to an employee on
severance x x x, or as compensation due an employee upon the
severance of his employment status with the employer."78
Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement incentives provides for
benefits that are not computed based on years of service. They are
lump sum amounts and healthcare benefits:
Section 6. GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives – Upon
availment of early retirement, a qualified employee shall enjoy the
following in addition to the above incentives:
(e) Cash gift of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) for the sickly
employees;
(f) Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos City Hospital;
(g) Annual aid in the maximum amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00), if admitted at General Santos City Hospital; and
(h) 14 karat gold ring as token.
The text of the ordinance indicates its purpose of encouraging
employees, especially those who are unproductive due to health
reasons, to avail of the program even before they reach the
compulsory retirement age. Section 6 provides for a form of
severance pay to those who availed of GenSan SERVES, which was
executed in good faith.
We should not be misled by the use of the term "retirement" in
Section 6 in determining the nature of the benefits it provides. Labels
are not determinative of substantive content. It is the purpose
behind these incentives, as read from the text of the ordinance and
as inferred from the effect of the ordinance as applied, which must
govern.
The purpose of Section 6 is also different from the benefits
proscribed in Conte v. Commission on Audit,79 and the nature of its
benefits must be taken in the context of its rationale. The benefits
provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner city’s
employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire
early. Respondent Commission on Audit’s observation that the
benefit provided is broader than that provided in Conte v
Commission on Audit fails to take this rationale into consideration.
Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVES were only given to
a select few—the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons.
Certainly, this negates the position that the benefits provide for
supplementary retirement benefits that augment existing retirement
laws.
In Conte v. Commission on Audit80 cited by respondent Commission
on Audit, this court held that the "financial assistance" option for the
difference of benefits under Republic Act No. 660 and Republic Act
No. 1616 violated Section 28, paragraph (b) as amended. Social
Security System (SSS) Resolution No. 56 subject of that case provides
in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That all the SSS employees who
are simultaneously qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or
for optional retirement at a lower age be encouraged to avail for
themselves the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended; x x x.81
The fifth preambular clause of Resolution No. 56 also states that "it
is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote and to
protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for
their well-being during both their working and retirement years."82
The financial assistance provides benefits to all Social Security System
employees who are retirable under existing laws and who are
qualified to apply. It is available to all present and future Social
Security System employees upon reaching retirement age.83
Without doubt, this financial assistance of Conte augments the
retirement benefits provided under existing laws, in violation of
Section 28, paragraph (b), as amended.
On the other hand, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009
limits its coverage.1a\^/phi1 Only qualified employees below sixty
(60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly
employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40)
years from the effectivity of the ordinance, with at least 15 years of
service, are considered. Out of 1,361 regular employees of petitioner
city, only 50 employees applied, from which only 39 employees
qualified to avail of the ordinance benefits.84 Petitioner city alleged
that there was one more applicant who was supposed to qualify, but
she had died of acute renal failure secondary to diabetes
nephropathy before her application was acted upon.85
Furthermore, unlike in Conte, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was
a one-time limited offer.86 The availment period was only within two
months from the ordinance’s effectivity.87
In any case, petitioner city is authorized by the Local Government
Code to approve ordinances to provide for the care of the sick:
SECTION 458. – Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a)
The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to section 16
of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities,
shall:
xxxx
(xiv) Provide for the care of disabled persons, paupers, the aged, the
sick, persons of unsound mind, abandoned minors, juvenile
delinquents, drug dependents, abused children and other needy and
disadvantaged persons, particularly children and youth below
eighteen (18) years of age; and, subject to availability of funds,
establish and provide for the operation of centers and facilities for
said needy and disadvantaged persons[.] (Emphasis supplied)
This is also consistent with the constitutional mandate for a
comprehensive approach to health development, with priority for
the needs of the sick:
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Thus, the cash gift for the sickly employees, lifetime free medical
consultation in petitioner city's hospital, and other similar benefits
under Section 6 of the ordinance are valid.
The proscription under Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 186, as amended, does not apply to Section 6 of the
ordinance.1âwphi1 Consequently, the Commission on Audit acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire ordinance
void and of no effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Commission on Audit decision dated January 20, 2011 and resolution
dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar
as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by
Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 156556-57 October 4, 2011
ENRIQUE U. BETOY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari1 and
supplemental petition for mandamus,2 specifically assailing National
Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as
Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001
(EPIRA). Also assailed is Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of
restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the
assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
Pursuant to Section 483 of the EPIRA, a new National Power Board of
Directors (NPB) was created. On February 27, 2002, pursuant to
Section 774 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of the Department of Energy
promulgated the IRR.
On the other hand, Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation
benefits to officials and employees who would be affected by the
restructuring of the electric power industry and the privatization of
the assets of the NPC, to wit:
Section 63. Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of
Affected Agencies. - National Government employees displaced or
separated from the service as a result of the restructuring of the
electricity industry and privatization of NPC assets pursuant to this
Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and other benefits in
accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations or be entitled to
avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall
be one and one-half month salary for every year of service in the
government: Provided, however, That those who avail of such
privileges shall start their government service anew if absorbed by
any government-owned successor company. In no case shall there be
any diminution of benefits under the separation plan until the full
implementation of the restructuring and privatization.
Displaced or separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if
qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the manpower
requirements of the privatized companies. x x x5
Rule 336 of the IRR provided for the coverage and the guidelines for
the separation benefits to be given to the employees affected.
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule
33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-1247 which,
among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation
benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-
1258 which created a transition team to manage and implement the
separation program.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U.
Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC
were terminated.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari with petitioner praying for the
grant of the following reliefs from this Court, to wit:
1. Declaring National Power Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and
2002-125 and its Annex "B" Null and Void, the fact [that] it was done
with extraordinary haste and in secrecy without the able
participation of the Napocor Employees Consolidated Union (NECU)
to represent all career civil service employees on issues affecting
their rights to due process, equity, security of tenure, social benefits
accrued to them, and as well as the disclosure of public transaction
provisions of the 1987 Constitution because during its proceeding the
National Power Board had acted with grave abuse of discretion and
disregarding constitutional and statutory injunctions on removal of
public servants and non-diminution of social benefits accrued to
separated employees, thus, amounting to excess of jurisdiction;
2. Striking down Section 11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136
(EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional;
3. Striking Section 34 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being exorbitant display
of State Power and was not premised on the welfare of the FILIPINO
PEOPLE or principle of salus populi est suprema lex;
4. Striking down Section 38 for RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being a prelude
to Charter Change without a valid referendum for ratification of the
entire voter citizens of the Philippine Republic;
5. Striking down all other provisions of RA 9136 (EPIRA) found
repugnant to the 1987 Constitution;
6. Striking down all provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA found repugnant to the 1987
Constitution;
7. Striking down Section 63 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for classifying such
provisions in the same vein with Proclamation No. 50 used against
MWSS employees and its failure to classify which condition comes
first whether the restructuring effecting total reorganization of the
electric power industry making NPC financially viable or the
privatization of NPC assets where manpower reduction or
sweeping/lay-off or termination of career civil service employees
follows the disposal of NPC assets. This is a clear case of violation of
the EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, therefore, unconstitutional;
8. Striking down Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules [and] Regulations
(IRR) for disregarding the constitutional and statutory injunction on
arbitrary removal of career civil service employees; and
9. For such other reliefs deemed equitable with justice and fairness
to more than EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000) EMPLOYEES of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) whose fate lies in the sound disposition of
the Honorable Supreme Court.9
In addition, petitioner also filed a supplemental petition for
mandamus praying for his reinstatement.
The petition is without merit.
Before anything else, this Court shall first tackle whether it was
proper for petitioner to directly question the constitutionality of the
EPIRA before this Court.
Section 5(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.10
Based on the foregoing, this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
while concurrent with that of the Regional Trial Courts and the Court
of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
forum from which to seek such relief.11 The determination of
whether the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations
contravene the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of regular
courts. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the Regional Trial Courts.12
It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.13 Thus, herein petition should
already be dismissed at the outset; however, since similar petitions
have already been resolved by this Court tackling the validity of NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the EPIRA, this Court shall
disregard the procedural defect.
Validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125
The main issue raised by petitioner deals with the validity of NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125.
In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National
Power Corporation (NPC),14 this Court had already ruled that NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal
effect.
NPC Drivers involved a special civil action for Injunction seeking to
enjoin the implementation of the same assailed NPB Resolutions.
Petitioners therein put in issue the fact that the NPB Resolutions
were not concluded by a duly constituted Board of Directors since no
quorum in accordance with Section 48 of the EPIRA existed. In
addition, petitioners therein argued that the assailed NPB
Resolutions cannot be given legal effect as it failed to comply with
Section 47 of the EPIRA which required the endorsement of the Joint
Congressional Power Commission and the President of the
Philippines. Ruling in favor of petitioners therein, this Court ruled that
NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no
legal effect for failure to comply with Section 48 of the EPIRA, to wit:
We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those
who shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the
legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their
judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion
may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the
principles of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under
the circumstances, without willfulness or favor. Discretion, when
applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred
upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. It is to be
presumed that in naming the respective department heads as
members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these
secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their
personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to
occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the
department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of
the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board
resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be
exercised in the fulfilment of such responsibility.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving
NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the
representatives of the secretaries of the different executive
departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised
judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that
it is the signatures of the respective representatives that are affixed
to the questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty
imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to
employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate
powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere
representatives in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must
not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary
number of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions
may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three valid votes cast
out of the nine board members, namely those of DOE Secretary
Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S.
Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void
and are of no legal effect.15
However, a supervening event occurred in NPC Drivers when it was
brought to this Court's attention that NPB Resolution No. 2007-55
was promulgated on September 14, 2007 confirming and adopting
the principles and guidelines enunciated in NPB Resolutions No.
2002-124 and No. 2002-125.
On December 2, 2009, this Court promulgated a Resolution16
clarifying the amount due the individual employees of NPC in view of
NPB Resolution No. 2007-55. In said Resolution, this Court clarified
the exact date of the legal termination of each class of NPC
employees, thus:
From all these, it is clear that our ruling, pursuant to NPB Resolution
No. 2002-124, covers all employees of the NPC and not only the 16
employees as contended by the NPC. However, as regards their right
to reinstatement, or separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
pursuant to a validly approved Separation Program, plus backwages,
wage adjustments, and other benefits, the same shall be computed
from the date of legal termination as stated in NPC Circular No. 2003-
09, to wit:
a) The legal termination of key officials, i.e., the Corporate Secretary,
Vice-Presidents and Senior Vice-Presidents who were appointed
under NP Board Resolution No. 2003-12, shall be at the close of office
hours of January 31, 2003.
b) The legal termination of personnel who availed of the early leavers'
scheme shall be on the last day of service in NPC but not beyond
January 15, 2003.
c) The legal termination of personnel who were no longer employed
in NPC after June 26, 2001 shall be the date of actual separation in
NPC.
d) For all other NPC personnel, their legal termination shall be at the
close of office hours/shift schedule of February 28, 2003.17
As to the validity of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55, this Court ruled that
the same will have a prospective effect, to wit:
What then is the effect of the approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-
55 on 14 September 2007? The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-
55, supposedly by a majority of the National Power Board as
designated by law, that adopted, confirmed and approved the
contents of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 will
have a prospective effect, not a retroactive effect. The approval of
NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 cannot ratify and validate NPB
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 as to make the
termination of the services of all NPC personnel/employees on 31
January 2003 valid, because said resolutions were void.
The approval of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 on 14 September 2007
means that the services of all NPC employees have been legally
terminated on this date. All separation pay and other benefits to be
received by said employees will be deemed cut on this date. The
computation thereof shall, therefore, be from the date of their illegal
termination pursuant to NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125 as clarified by NPB Resolution No. 2003-11 and NPC
Resolution No. 2003-09 up to 14 September 2007. Although the
validity of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 has not yet been passed upon
by the Court, same has to be given effect because NPB Resolution No.
2007-55 enjoys the presumption of regularity of official acts. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. Thus,
until and unless there is clear and convincing evidence that rebuts
this presumption, we have no option but to rule that said resolution
is valid and effective as of 14 September 2007.18
Based on the foregoing, this Court concluded that the computation
of the amounts due the employees who were terminated and/or
separated as a result of, or pursuant to, the nullified NPB Board
Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 shall be from their date
of illegal termination up to September 14, 2007 when NPB Resolution
No. 2007-55 was issued.
Thus, the resolution of the validity of NPB Board Resolutions No.
2002-124 and No. 2002-125 is, therefore, moot and academic in view
of the Court's pronouncements in NPC Drivers.
Anent the question of the constitutionality of Section 63 of RA 9136,
as well as Rule 33 of the IRR, this Court finds that the same is without
merit.
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions.19 It could result in the loss of one’s position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for
the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient
to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab
initio.20
It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution
found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization.
The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of
its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to
terminate employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower
requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and
restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its
primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy
more efficient.
In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission,21
this Court discussed why there was a need for a shift towards the
privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry, to wit:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in
recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure
and regulatory framework for the electric power industry.
The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and
improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the
highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long been
acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To attract
private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the
industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission
sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution side was
fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic.
The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing
generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates;
poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable
performance of the government power sector; high system losses;
and an inability to develop a clear strategy for overcoming these
shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the
industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure,
and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and
the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into
four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,
distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have
to be privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized
thereafter.22
Petitioner argues that bad faith is clearly manifested as the
reorganization has an eye to replace current favorite less competent
appointees. In addition, petitioner contends that qualifications and
behavioral aspect were being set aside.23
Section 2 of R.A. No. 665624 cites certain circumstances showing bad
faith in the removal of employees as a result of any reorganization,
thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed
except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization,
a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a
need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim
for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in
the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially
the same functions as the original offices; and
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof.
The Solicitor General, however, argues that petitioner has not shown
any circumstance to prove that the restructuring of NPC was done in
bad faith. We agree.
Petitioner's allegation that the reorganization was merely
undertaken to accommodate new appointees is at most speculative
and bereft of any evidence on record. It is settled that bad faith must
be duly proved and not merely presumed. It must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence,25 which is absent in the case at bar.
In addition, petitioner has no legal or vested right to be reinstated as
Section 63 of the EPIRA as well as Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR clearly
state that the displaced or separated personnel as a result of the
privatization, if qualified, shall be given preference in the hiring of the
manpower requirements of the privatized companies. Clearly, the
law only speaks of preference and by no stretch of the imagination
can the same amount to a legal right to the position. Undoubtedly,
not all the terminated employees will be re-hired by the selection
committee as the manpower requirement of the privatized
companies will be different. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the selection of employees for purposes of re-hiring them
necessarily entails the exercise of discretion or judgment.26 Such
being the case, petitioner, cannot, by way of mandamus, compel the
selection committee to include him in the re-hired employees, more
so, since there is no evidence showing that said committee acted with
grave abuse of discretion or that the re-hired employees were merely
accommodated and not qualified.
Validity of Sections 11, 48, and 52 of RA 9136
Petitioner argues that Sections 11,27 48,28 and 5229 of the EPIRA are
unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
x x x x.30
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,31 this Court explained
that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
function of said official's office, to wit:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation
in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these
posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials. To characterize these
posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among which
are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National
Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive
Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defence, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would
then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members.
The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also
be prohibited.
xxxx
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order
of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term
is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the official's primary functions. Examples of designations
to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries
of Finance and Budget, sitting as members of the Monetary Board,
and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, acting as
Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil
Aeronautics Board.32
The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does
not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the
privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves
the close coordination and policy determination of various
government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the
policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary and
environmental concerns as well as coordination with local
government units, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of
the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a
regime of free and fair competition and full public accountability to
achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance
the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market;

(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and
private sector entities
in the process of restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and
services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources
and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable
energy resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence
on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the
assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and
system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive
operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of
demand side management.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing enumeration, the restructuring
of the electric power industry inherently involves the participation of
various government agencies. In Civil Liberties, this Court explained
that mandating additional duties and functions to Cabinet members
which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their
offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge,
expertise and skill in their respective executive offices, is a practice
long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and coordination
among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge
of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting
national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to
the people.33
The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national
interest and is a basic commodity expected by the people. This Court,
therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the
Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid.
This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of the EPIRA is
not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned Cabinet secretaries
compose the NPB Board only in an ex-officio capacity. It is only in
Section 52 creating the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation (PSALM) that they are so designated in an
ex-officio capacity. Sections 4 and 6 of the EPIRA provides:
Section 4. TRANSCO Board of Directors.
All the powers of the TRANSCO shall be vested in and exercised by a
Board of Directors. The Board shall be composed of a Chairman and
six (6) members. The Secretary of the DOF shall be the ex-officio
Chairman of the Board. The other members of the TRANSCO Board
shall include the Secretary of the DOE, the Secretary of the DENR, the
President of TRANSCO, and three (3) members to be appointed by
the President of the Philippines, each representing Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao, one of whom shall be the President of PSALM.
x x x x.

Section 6. PSALM Board of Directors.
PSALM shall be administered, and its powers and functions exercised,
by a Board of Directors which shall be composed of the Secretary of
the DOF as the Chairman, and the Secretary of the DOE, the Secretary
of the DBM, the Director-General of the NEDA, the Secretary of the
DOJ, the Secretary of the DTI and the President of the PSALM as ex-
officio members thereof.
Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of the Solicitor
General that the constitutional prohibition was not violated,
considering that the concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely
imposed additional duties and their posts in the NPB do not
constitute "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition.
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors
were designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to
the officials concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of the
Board of Directors. Designation connotes an imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.34 Designation does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so
designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer
to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's
right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and
approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.35
Hence, Congress specifically intended that the position of member of
the Board of NPB shall be ex-officio or automatically attached to the
respective offices of the members composing the board. It is clear
from the wordings of the law that it was the intention of Congress
that the subject posts will be adjunct to the respective offices of the
official designated to such posts.
The foregoing discussion, notwithstanding, the concerned officials
should not receive any additional compensation pursuant to their
designation as ruled in Civil Liberties, thus:
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no
right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he
is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and
banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
In relation thereto, Section 14 of the EPIRA provides:
SEC. 14. Board Per Diems and Allowances. – The members of the
Board shall receive per diem for each regular or special meeting of
the board actually attended by them and, upon approval of the
Secretary of the Department of Finance, such other allowances as the
Board may prescribe.
Section 14 relates to Section 11 which sets the composition of the
TRANSCO Board naming the Secretary of the Department of Finance
as the ex officio Chairman of the Board. The other members of the
TRANSCO Board include the Secretary of the Department of Energy
and the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. However, considering the constitutional prohibition, it is
clear that such emoluments or additional compensation to be
received by the members of the NPB do not apply and should not be
received by those covered by the constitutional prohibition, i.e., the
Cabinet secretaries. It is to be noted that three of the members of
the NPB are to be appointed by the President, who would be
representing the interests of those in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao,
who may be entitled to such honorarium or allowance if they do not
fall within the constitutional prohibition.
Hence, the said cabinet officials cannot receive any form of additional
compensation by way of per diems and allowances. Moreover, any
amount received by them in their capacity as members of the Board
of Directors should be reimbursed to the government, since they are
prohibited from collecting additional compensation by the
Constitution.
These interpretations are consistent with the fundamental rule of
statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that
would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,36 and is supported
by the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.37
Constitutionality of Section 3438 of the EPIRA
The Constitutionality of Section 34 of the EPIRA has already been
passed upon by this Court in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,39 to
wit:
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative,
or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this
presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.40
In Gerochi, this Court ruled that the Universal Charge is not a tax but
an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. The Universal
Charge is imposed to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry.
Petitioner argues that the imposition of a universal charge to address
the stranded debts and contract made by the government through
the NCC-IPP contracts or Power Utility-IPP contracts or simply the
bilateral agreements or contracts is an added burden to the
electricity-consuming public on their monthly power bills. It would
mean that the electricity-consuming public will suffer in carrying this
burden for the errors committed by those in power who runs the
affairs of the State. This is an exorbitant display of State Power at the
expense of its people.41
It is basic that the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive
oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves a
question of fact and, thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the
same.
Validity of Section 3842 of the EPIRA
Petitioner argues that the abolishment of the ERB and its
replacement of a very powerful quasi-judicial body named the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC), pursuant to Section 38 up to Section
43 of the EPIRA or RA 9136, which is tasked to dictate the day-to-day
affairs of the entire electric power industry, seems a prelude to
Charter Change. Petitioner submits that under the 1987 Constitution,
there are only three constitutionally-recognized Commissions, they
are: the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Commission on Audit
(COA) and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).43
Petitioner’s argument that the creation of the ERC seems to be a
prelude to charter change is flimsy and finds no support in law. This
Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s thesis that "in order for the
newly-enacted RA 9136 or EPIRA to become a valid law, we should
have to call first a referendum to amend or totally change the
People's Charter."44
In any case, the constitutionality of the abolition of the ERB and the
creation of the ERC has already been settled in Kapisanan ng mga
Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board v. Commissioner Fe Barin,45 to
wit:
All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the
Constitution.
A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer
or tribunal to which the power to create the office has been
delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries
with it the power to abolish. President Corazon C. Aquino, then
exercising her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing
Executive Order No. 172 on 8 May 1987.
The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of
legislative intent. There should not be any controversy if there is an
explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself. Section 38 of RA 9136
explicitly abolished the ERB. x x x46
Moreover, in Kapisanan, this Court ruled that because of the
expansion of the ERC's functions and concerns, there was a valid
abolition of the ERB.47
Validity of Section 6348
Contrary to petitioner's argument, Section 63 of the EPIRA and
Section 33 of the IRR of the EPIRA did not impair the vested rights of
NPC personnel to claim benefits under existing laws. Neither does the
EPIRA cut short the years of service of the employees concerned. If
an employee availed of the separation pay and other benefits in
accordance with existing laws or the superior separation pay under
the NPC restructuring plan, it is but logical that those who availed of
such privilege will start their government service anew if they will
later be employed by any government-owned successor company or
government instrumentality.
It is to be noted that this Court ruled in the case of Herrera v. National
Power Corporation,49 that Section 63 of the EPIRA precluded the
receipt by the terminated employee of both separation and
retirement benefits under the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) organic law, or Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186.50
However, it must be clarified that this Court’s pronouncements in
Herrera that separated and retired employees of the NPC "are not
entitled to receive retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186," referred
only to the gratuity benefits granted by R.A. No. 1616,51 which was
to be paid by NPC as the last employer. It did not proscribe the
payment of retirement benefits to qualified retirees under R.A. No.
660,52 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146,53 R.A. No. 8291,54 and
other GSIS and social security laws.
The factual and procedural antecedents of Herrera reveal that it
arose from a case between NPC and several of its separated
employees who were asking additional benefits from NPC under R.A.
No. 1616 after receiving from the former separation benefits under
Section 63 of R.A. No. 9136.
Unable to resolve the issue with its former employees amicably, NPC
filed a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case SCA No.
Q-03-50681,55 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, raising
the issue of whether or not the employees of NPC are entitled to
receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 1616 over and above the
separation benefits granted by R.A. No. 9136.56
Under R.A. No. 1616, a gratuity benefit is given to qualified retiring
members of the GSIS, which is payable by the last employer. In
addition to said gratuity benefits, the qualified employee shall also
be entitled to a refund of retirement premiums paid, consisting of
personal contributions of the employee plus interest, and
government share without interest, payable by the GSIS. It effectively
amended Section 12 (c) of C.A. No. 186, as follows:
(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to any official or employee,
appointive or elective, regardless of age and employment status, who
has rendered a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three
years of which are continuous. The benefit shall, in addition to the
return of his personal contributions with interest compounded
monthly and the payment of the corresponding employer's
premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without
interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every
year of the first twenty years of service, plus one and one-half
months’ salary for every year of service over twenty but below thirty
years and two months’ salary for every year of service over thirty
years in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. This
gratuity is payable on the rates of pay as provided by law. This
gratuity is payable by the employer or officer concerned which is
hereby authorized to provide the necessary appropriation or pay the
same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its
appropriations. Officials and employees retired under this Act shall
be entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick
leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may have to
their credit at the time of retirement. x x x57 (Emphasis supplied.)
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision ruling against the NPC
employees, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Republic Act No. 9136 DID NOT
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZE the National Power Corporation to grant
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1616 in addition to
separation pay under Republic Act No. 9136.
SO ORDERED.58
Petitioners therein then sought recourse directly to this Court on a
pure question of law. In the preparatory statement of the Petition for
Review on Certiorari,59 it is apparent that the case was limited only
to the interpretation of Section 63 of R.A. No. 9136, in relation to R.A.
No. 1616, on the matter of retirement benefits, to wit:
This is a case of first impression limited to the interpretation of
Section 63, R.A. 9136 (EPIRA), granting separation pay to terminated
NAPOCOR employees, in relation to R.A. 1616, on the matter of
retirement benefits. Respondents NAPOCOR and DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT erroneously contend that the
entitlement to the separation pay under R.A. 9136 forfeits the
retirement benefit under R.A. 1616. Petitioners most respectfully
submit that since R.A. 9136 and R.A. 1616 are not inconsistent with
each other and they have distinct noble purposes, entitlement to
separation pay will not disqualify the separated employee who is
qualified to retire from receiving retirement benefits allowed under
another law. x x x60
However, in the Decision dated December 18, 2009, it was held that
petitioners therein were not only entitled to receive retirement
benefits under R.A. No. 1616 but also were "not entitled to receive
retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended," which, in effect, might lead to the conclusion that the
declaration encompassed all other benefits granted by C.A. No. 186
to its qualified members.
In relation to R.A. No. 1616, Herrera should have affected only the
payment of gratuity benefits by NPC, being the last employer, to its
separated employees. It was even categorically stated that
petitioners therein were "entitled to a refund of their contributions
to the retirement fund, and the monetary value of any accumulated
vacation and sick leaves,"61 which is clearly congruous to the
mandate of R.A. No. 1616. The matter of availment of retirement
benefits of qualified employees under any other law to be paid by the
GSIS should not and was not covered by the decision. In the first
place, it was never an issue.
In the case of Santos v. Servier Philippines, Inc.,62 citing Aquino v.
National Labor Relations Commission,63 We declared that the
receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from receiving
separation pay. Separation pay is a statutory right designed to
provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that
he/she is looking for another employment. On the other hand,
retirement benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the
remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his
financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and service
to the employer. A separation pay is given during one’s employable
years, while retirement benefits are given during one’s
unemployable years. Hence, they are not mutually exclusive.64
Even in the deliberations of Congress during the passage of R.A. No.
9136, it was manifest that it was not the intention of the law to
infringe upon the vested rights of NPC personnel to claim benefits
under existing laws. To assure the worried and uneasy NPC
employees, Congress guaranteed their entitlement to a separation
pay to tide them over in the meantime.65 More importantly, to
further allay the fears of the NPC employees, especially those who
were nearing retirement age, Congress repeatedly assured them in
several public and congressional hearings that on top of their
separation benefits, they would still receive their retirement
benefits, as long as they would qualify and meet the requirements
for its entitlement.
The transcripts of the Public Consultative Meeting on the Power Bill
held on February 16, 2001, disclose the following:
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. J. OSMENA). Well, the other labor
representation here is Mr. Anguluan.
MR. ANGULUAN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. J. OSMENA). Okay. Will you present your
paper?
MR. ANGULUAN: We have prepared a paper which we have sent to
the honorable members of the Bicam. x x x.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. J. OSMENA). I don’t think anyone is going to
deprive you of your rights under the law. You will enjoy all your rights.
You will receive retirement benefits, separation pay, and all of the
rights that are provided to you by law. What we have objected to in
the Senate is retirement benefits higher than what everybody else
gets, like 150 percent or subject to the approval of the board which
means sky is the limit. So, we have objected to that. But what you are
entitled to under the law, you will get under the law and nobody will
deprive you of that.66
A year later, on February 12, 2002, the Joint Congressional Power
Commission was held. The transcripts of the hearing bare the
following:
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. BADELLES). They will still be subject to the
same conditions. Meaning, NPC has the discretion whether to
reabsorb or hire back those that avail of the separation benefits.
SEN. OSMENA (J). No. But they are not being - - the plants are not
being sold, so they are – but what we are giving them is a special
concession of retiring early.
No, okay. You consider . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. BADELLES). We are not speaking of retirement
here, we are speaking of their separation benefits . . .
SEN. OSMENA (J). Okay, separation benefits.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. BADELLES). Precisely, if they are considered
terminated.
SEN. OSMENA (J). All right. Separation . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. BADELLES). A retirement plan is a different
program than separation.
SEN. OSMENA (J). Separation benefits, okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. BADELLES). All right.67
Thus, it is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization
of the NPC and retirement benefits at the appropriate future time are
two separate and distinct entitlements. Stated otherwise, a
retirement plan is a different program from a separation package.
There is a whale of a difference between R.A. No. 1616 and C.A. No.
186, together with its amendatory laws. They have different legal
bases, different sources of funds and different intents.
In R.A. No. 1616, which is the subject issue in Herrera, the retirees
are entitled to gratuity benefits to be paid by the last employer and
refund of premiums to be paid by the GSIS. On the other hand,
retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No.
8291, are to be paid by the GSIS. Stated otherwise, under R.A. No.
1616, what would be paid by the last employer, NPC, would be
gratuity benefits, and GSIS would merely refund the retirement
premiums consisting of personal contributions of the employee plus
interest, and the employer’s share without interest. Under C.A. No.
186, as amended, it is the GSIS who would pay the qualified
employees their retirement benefits.
Indeed, with several amendments to C.A. No. 186,68 the Court finds
it necessary to clarify Herrera and categorically declare that it
affected only those seeking benefits under R.A. No. 1616.69 It could
not have meant to affect those employees who retired, and who will
retire, under the different amendatory laws of C.A. No. 186 like R.A.
No. 660,70 P.D. No. 114671 and R.A. No. 8291.72

At any rate, entitlement of qualified employees to receive separation
pay and retirement benefits is not proscribed by the 1987
Constitution. Section 8 of Article IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution reads:
SEC. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from
any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double,
or indirect compensation.73
Moreover, retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186 are not even
considered as compensation. Section 2 (e) of C.A. No. 186
categorically states that
Benefits granted by this Act by virtue of such life or retirement
insurance shall not be considered as compensation or emolument.74
Under the GSIS law, the retired employees earned their vested right
under their contract of insurance after they religiously paid
premiums to GSIS. Under the contract, GSIS is bound to pay the
retirement benefits as it received the premiums from the employees
and NPC.
In Marasigan v. Cruz,75 this Court ratiocinated that:
A retirement law such as C.A. 186 and amendatory laws is in the
nature of a contract between the government and its employees.
When an employee joins the government service, he has a right to
expect that after rendering the required length of service and fulfilled
the conditions stated in the laws on retirement, he would be able to
enjoy the benefits provided in said laws. He regularly pays the dues
prescribed therefore. It would be cruel to deny him the benefits he
had been expecting at the end of his service by imposing conditions
for his retirement, which are not found in the law. It is believed to be
a legal duty as well as a moral obligation on the part of the
government to honor its commitments to its employees when as in
this case, they have met all the conditions prescribed by law and are
therefore entitled to receive their retirement benefits.76
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected
by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under
pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits
that have become due as provided under the terms of the public
employees’ pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his
pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and
opportunity to be heard.77 Verily, when an employee has complied
with the statutory requirements to be entitled to receive his
retirement benefits, his right to retire and receive what is due him by
virtue thereof becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or
impaired.1avvphi1
Moreover, Section 63 of the EPIRA law, if misinterpreted as
proscribing payment of retirement benefits under the GSIS law,
would be unconstitutional as it would be violative of Section 10,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution78 or the provision on non-
impairment of contracts.
In view of the fact that separation pay and retirement benefits are
different entitlements, as they have different legal bases, different
sources of funds, and different intents, the "exclusiveness of
benefits" rule provided under R.A. No. 8291 is not applicable. Section
55 of R.A. No. 8291 states: "Whenever other laws provide similar
benefits for the same contingencies covered by this Act, the member
who qualifies to the benefits shall have the option to choose which
benefits will be paid to him."
Accordingly, the Court declares that separated, displaced, retiring,
and retired employees of NPC are legally entitled to the retirement
benefits pursuant to the intent of Congress and as guaranteed by the
GSIS laws. Thus, the Court reiterates:
1] that the dispositive portion in Herrera holding that separated and
retired employees "are not entitled to receive retirement benefits
under Commonwealth Act No. 186," referred only to the gratuity
benefits under R.A. No. 1616, which was to be paid by NPC, being the
last employer;
2] that it did not proscribe the payment of the retirement benefits to
qualified retirees under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, R.A. No. 8291,
and other GSIS and social security laws; and
3] that separated, rehired, retiring, and retired employees should
receive, and continue to receive, the retirement benefits to which
they are legally entitled.
Petition for Mandamus
As for petitioner's prayer that he be reinstated, suffice it to state that
the issue has been rendered moot by the Decision and Resolutions of
this Court in the case of NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC
DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC)79 and by the above
disquisitions.
In Conclusion
While we commend petitioner's attempt to argue against the
privatization of the NPC, it is not the proper subject of herein petition.
Petitioner belabored on alleging facts to prove his point which,
however, go into policy decisions which this Court must not delve
into less we violate separation of powers. The wisdom of the
privatization of the NPC cannot be looked into by this Court as it
would certainly violate this guarded principle. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.80 Every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.81
As in National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union
(NECU) v. National Power Corporation (NPC),82 this Court held:
Whether the State’s policy of privatizing the electric power industry
is wise, just, or expedient is not for this Court to decide. The
formulation of State policy is a legislative concern. Hence, the
primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness
and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature.83
WHEREFORE, premises considered and subject to the above
disquisitions, the Petition for Certiorari and the Supplemental
Petition for Mandamus are Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
IMBONG VS OCHOA
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's
emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered
in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of
the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be
a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of
society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the
Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government,
endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement
these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within
the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch,
oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts
its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds
Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues
of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in
every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the
subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various
media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies
by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members
of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has
caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to
withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law,
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys.
James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal
capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their
minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family
Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria
Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life
Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in
their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a
citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer
and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine
Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several
others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses
Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn.
Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of
the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life
Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B.
Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for
Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as
citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and
Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in
his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B
UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law
provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public
funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious
objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,
medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an
affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited
under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-
eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered
by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no
longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is
claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define
the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates
the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right
to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility
they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores
the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers
to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The
petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family
protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law
providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes
upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance
with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will
undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real
dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to
mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of
a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation
of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is
non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under
Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local
Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their
respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of
the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59
and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to
intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of
the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal
reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore,
the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of
the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments
raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining
the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period
of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the
counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent
issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues
were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013,
and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until
further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed
several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed
the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No.
4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be
sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained
provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-
conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it
was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the
Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person
without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN
Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population
problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male
vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67
Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August
16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on
Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made
part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will
be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality
and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E .
Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December
8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a
broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a
part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable
methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country
gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on Population
and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted
R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among
others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health
services and programs for women, including family planning and sex
education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the
country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry
number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million
in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the
measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law
was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem
family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide
for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it
more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers
to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify
and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's
health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the
government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of
the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI
prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of
the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and
Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay
officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder
and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family
planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the
parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following
principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
 I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of
5] Declaratory Relief judicial review over the controversy.

6] One Subject/One Title Rule The Power of Judicial Review

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional: In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG
asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of
1] Right to Life Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the
RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75
2] Right to Health and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The
OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive
4] The Family norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77
It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the
6] Due Process validity of the acts of the legislature.79

7] Equal Protection Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it
cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be
8] Involuntary Servitude enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has
yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not
a speech-regulating measure.80
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of
DISCUSSION the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that
the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of
procedural impediments. powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c)
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has
truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of
powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the
doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts
proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the
acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the
policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social
disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses
upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch
done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very
limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court
may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its
unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial
power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no
distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial
scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The
reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance
with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by
the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing
the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1
of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally
declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal
v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and
countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that
it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution
is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through
the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the
judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does
not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim
of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that
the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz
: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet
to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the
petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one
has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there
is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial
review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-
definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic
of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an
unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court
has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners'
and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that
the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to
render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because
medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by
the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also
known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes
not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the
Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and
religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law
can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on
the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file
their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge"
lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government
has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are
abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in
establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the
rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if
he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a
violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule
is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on
standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-
traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held
that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional
questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and
a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first
Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not
be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality
which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed,
thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit
they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance
of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not
only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised
must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues
of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep
division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no
doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this
time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled
to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her
child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According
to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is
not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the concepts
of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the
Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus
of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As
stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods.
These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to
reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal
and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however,
covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact,
the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions
that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses
its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including
pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided
for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one
bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections
and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require
the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which
the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood"
are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control
the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section
2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of
a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it
would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal
of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life
and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting
abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that
prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives
that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection
to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-
abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the
fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human
good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive
use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of
man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or
supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also
considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it
shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent
of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of
abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the
Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination
that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As
the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies
and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and
other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional
protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of
the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is
constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys
the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or
dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample
protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the
enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs
and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male
vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need
to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the
years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting
women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's
well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not
merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford
protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made
on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male
sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert
that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar
Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that
where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it
is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second,
because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever
be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the
word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and
reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act
of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization
that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception"
as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon
resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies
as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at
all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest
in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the
fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the
intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the
ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the
beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The
first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum
alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it
processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly,
as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell
division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is
no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally
categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the
ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from
the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total
of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I
repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must
conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as
night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of
conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not
because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized
ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want
to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample
protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the
purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the
moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to
Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to
begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be
very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins
from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So
we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on
that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise
during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed
already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean
when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are
abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If
fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the
fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the
provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be
banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what
is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and
should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress
to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are
abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers
of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the
Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from
enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have
a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient
is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible. Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution: The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987
Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
xxx xxx xxx arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy,
even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am
pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of Atty. Noche:
the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world
by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of Justice Bersamin:
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the
interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that There is no life.
question again for a categorical answer.
Atty. Noche:
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," So, there is no life to be protected.
not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee Justice Bersamin:
or does it disagree with me?
To be protected.
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would
be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped. Atty. Noche:

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about Under Section 12, yes.
some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually
stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to Justice Bersamin:
the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what
really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be So you have no objection to condoms?
unconstitutionalized.
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have
porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your
Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to
be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to
form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the
formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition
that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that:
"Human development begins after the union of male and female
gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with
the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte
(ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei
of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large
diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human
being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same
position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process,
fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby
formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid
number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The
embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out
with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible
Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same
time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred
because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life,
begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and
that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and
after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this
objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a
human organism and that the life of a new human being commences
at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This
conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and
independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view
of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under
medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of
the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception,
that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory
advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation.165
According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical
and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized
ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any
legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life
but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt
it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also
to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the
utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation
of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion
and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was
to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of
the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion
laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent
and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to
make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from
the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH
Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe
travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under
Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to
reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive
health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose
of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have
children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination,
coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so;
and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against
abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary
to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic
Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in
prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or,"
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds
that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first,
prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which,
as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second,
prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is
an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at
all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman
suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be
given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather,
it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum
which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be
protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it
reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from
killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords
protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction
abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted
in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier.
And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces
abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section
9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in
the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as
an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its
expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used
as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every
instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal
and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that
the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative
intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be
included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the
proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that
provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or
acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills,
abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other
forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the
RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning
of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined
as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined,
viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically
proven modern family planning method, device, or health product,
whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from
being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives"
and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or
the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del
Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the
word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be
struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is
danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way
for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR,
it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as
an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent
here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit
the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients
because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the
FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this,
together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the
EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting
abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed
in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting
abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section
3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives
that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively
"open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization
in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion"
embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health
because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in
the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the
regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners
posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly
increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to
women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given
the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under
Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert
that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have
pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the
administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory,
the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that
contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health.
In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting
and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty
to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food
and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health,
manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled
person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance,
and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices
and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are
self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now
is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases
supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners,
particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives
per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not
prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly
licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is
to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention
at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are
still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure
the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available
to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the
same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the
Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed
by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent
with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No.
4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or
without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such
sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion
which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization
of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or
agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months
or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA
No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices.
No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind
or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through
a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners
that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted
and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section
10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. -
The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of
family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall
coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply
and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current
levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to
space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement,
distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and
devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still
in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all
possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in
supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or
incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has
yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves
the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that
food and medicines available to the public are safe for public
consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various
kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the
constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as
the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot
legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are
safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that
ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after
they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The
FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and
non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family
planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and
other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is
not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that
they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination
by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal
ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are
those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not,
are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially
claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but
also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing
with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception
is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses;
it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the
transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of
contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on
contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to
address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious
objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the
duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the
conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to
do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to
refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because
although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the
option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive
health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c)
teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are
also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile,
contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health
care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those
objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling
them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too
secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos.
Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects,
mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health
services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those
upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious
objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care
services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as
it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right
to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither
harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state
interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions
no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does
not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health,
education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met
as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law
requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible
parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious
beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine
and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions,
the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does
not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used,
be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion
or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in
line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only
prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their
right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law
only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that
no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free
will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family
planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going
against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right
they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other
words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional,
the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this
on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the
same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to
keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs
access to information and who has the right to expect that the health
care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and
23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of
others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is
minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the
respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an
opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information
received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that
natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics
and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance
of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous
society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and
religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all
- the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus,
the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a
Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure
to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God "
manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness
as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind
the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that
the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-
versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on
mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the
internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate
against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely
believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be
preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision
utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the
"Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide
an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular
objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in
Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987
Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher,
or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides
two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state
religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition
of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L.
ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said
that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each
man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state
regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance,
unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct.
144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to
serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while
the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the
principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two
parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief.
The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of
orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome
power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the
rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the
State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality.
This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is
not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but
an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,'
whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the
compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these
limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause,
American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present
danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued
to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case
then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom
is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.
The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger"
test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may
burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive
means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano
, German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test.
The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and
present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society.
Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form
or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on
freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag
which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano
was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to
the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger"
and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech
has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest"
test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some
effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and
far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in
preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos
implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a
right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to
carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would
allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between
the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert
which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end,
the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount
interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which,
religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to
determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation
in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from
a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that
matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the
case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has
authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority
to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it
does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects
religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with
assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will.
Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the
following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right
to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of
the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood."
[Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access,
without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective
natural and modern methods which have been proven medically
safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as
those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other
government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That
the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern
natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation
Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and
couples to have the number of children they desire with due
consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing
laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of
family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious
convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) ,
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based
organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to
ensure that reproductive health and population and development
policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of
women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is
likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and
achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their
children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted
allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners,
however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs
should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that
the State cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded
to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation
line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive
health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the
Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached
with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened
by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest
test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption
from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds
in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so,
the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in
Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the
law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners
whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law
promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the
RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it
is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health
providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find
morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do
indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal,
but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily
intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization
of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be
silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows
the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for
simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what
is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of
choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the
liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of
one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions
of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the
other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded
primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt
from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be
compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it
would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court
of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater
Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to
be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's
Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or
support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226
The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according
to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this
would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable
principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions
if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and
health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH
Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office
of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this
preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law
endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for
either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless
and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective
implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the
Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot
allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act
and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the
religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious
objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After
all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even
if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior
to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to
think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and,
thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition,
and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such
exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative
of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and
the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-
Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting
religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications.
Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I
have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in
the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals
such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals,
head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private
practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health
professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you
agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the
religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the
law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the
respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1]
demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law
is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions
proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to
adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the
oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion.
The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the
compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a
conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a
compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation
involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free
exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship
between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would
limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however
few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It
also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one
believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life
or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject
provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is
contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she
even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the
burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is
immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the
infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the
respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to
show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective
is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act
of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested
as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to
achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by
other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a
person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves
the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the
Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or
the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna
Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna
Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health
Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services,
due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the
rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood,
and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and
health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections,
including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like
breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and
disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and
children victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive
health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and
legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities
are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely,
complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-
stated aspects of women's health in government education and
training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth and the development of moral character and the right
of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity;
and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied
that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per
day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by
concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization
reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48
percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law
at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state
interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of
social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be
solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid
exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service
providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right
to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a
referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of
service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing
CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a
child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If,
however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal
author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle
of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect.
In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother)
when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct
harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed,
the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and,
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child
because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures
endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against
the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this
case would have been more than justified considering the life he
would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition
for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be
a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-
be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type
of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them,
are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable,
and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof
violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital
privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the
family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article
XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control
population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the
family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the
father from participating in the decision making process regarding
their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of
their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is
already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of
consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case
of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures
shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like
tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should
require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the
wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State
shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person
cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-
making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would
undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger
the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the
State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a
private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any
decision they would reach would affect their future as a family
because the size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the
procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one
cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not
shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they
chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women,"
provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the
number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law
should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the
absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the
protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would
encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first
recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje
adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the
use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its
amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of
married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy
rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will
decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases
where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not
be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that
when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the
parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor
with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated,
the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need
to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the
comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State
cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the
family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional
mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In
this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the
right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is
superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to
mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose
of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life,
would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his
family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino
tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special
contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the
family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the
role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or
not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their
parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception
provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the
consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information
about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information
is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the
acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the
exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her
to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State
to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones'
health, access to such information with respect to reproductive
health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might
be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are
not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their
minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has
already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be
put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized
that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249
should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of
parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies
the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny
them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24
thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom .
According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even
if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States
and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-
wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance
of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging
of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of
Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will
be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict
the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973
Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society.
Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is
superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid
parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the
Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering
that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and
children and other forms of gender based violence and teen
pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule
10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself
provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender
sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents -
the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed
provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties
of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory
reproductive health education program shall be developed in
conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their
objection to their participation in the reproductive health education
program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and,
thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to
them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who
is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation
exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering
reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It
is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving
reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from
rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding,
restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same
time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are
vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is
a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of
"private health care service provider," reference must be made to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service
provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted
primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing
care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine,
a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery
of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited government and
NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the
community after having been accredited to function as such by the
local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by
the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in
Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider,"
should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they
are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service
and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The
terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law
punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold,
restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed
provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination
thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health including
the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to
agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate,
faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other
hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness
that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand
that health care service providers give their honest and correct
medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and
services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with
the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no
less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal
protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against
the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the
number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH
Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by
the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the
occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is
that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially,
and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not
just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments
of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the
class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all
others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only,
or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in
the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not
leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's
reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address
the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce
their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it
does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who
intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children
only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look
into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from
the mandatory reproductive health education program under
Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions
does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as
it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
requiring private and non-government health care service providers
to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health
services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned
in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to
slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners
with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as
it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for
the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare,
the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary
servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or
other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private
and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to
render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with
PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their
will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same
to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it
should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not
allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the
FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is
to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register
and cover health services and methods. It is the only government
entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do
so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall
under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A.
No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created
an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the
Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of
health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation
of health products standards, and to recommend standards of
identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements
to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and
spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers,
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer
users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that
reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to
the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient,
or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and
desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty
( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of
any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties
of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the
mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency
that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public,
the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication,
the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and
safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
"service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it
is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone
the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that
the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government
units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said
Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining
to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x
x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c)
of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual
General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive
orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing
agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as
the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring
of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute.
The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are
merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the
wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability
of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot
be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.

The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local
governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does
not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10
and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to
by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the
RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact
legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite
the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the
regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on
all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural
law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a
legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from
what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent
rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists
of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction,
rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve
as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the
very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is
not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it
conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural
law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances
involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the
taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It
only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the
poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional
insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-
abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom
is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State,
one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the
rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for
diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as
we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not
escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising
poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the
cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the
unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is
controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country
in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked
on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with
adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a
significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one,
Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances
from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an
ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if
the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the
fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This
would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the
State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of
the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless,
the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid
down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking
body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what
is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to
question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may
arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature
to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality,
the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the
law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere
compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and
reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the
Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still
be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No.
4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of
Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-
coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as
they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which
is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR
insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to
elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public
officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall
do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR
regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so
far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as
extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar
as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared
as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002
HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive Judge, Branch
28),
ULRIC R. CAÑETE (Presiding Judge, Branch 25),
AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge, Branch 56),
HON. MTC JUDGES TEMISTOCLES M. BOHOLST (Presiding Judge,
Branch 1),
VICENTE C. FANILAG (Judge Designate, Branch 2),
and WILFREDO A. DAGATAN (Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all of
Mandaue City, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the
decision1 and resolution2, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28,
1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished
the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
stationed in Mandaue City.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In
1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55)
which provided that:
"x x x xxx xxx
2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government
units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional
allowances and other benefits to national government officials and
employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in
the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces
and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to
the following conditions:
a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;
b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including
the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the
budget;
c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324
and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and
d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.3" (italics
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity
without need of publication:
"5.0 EFFECTIVITY
This Circular shall take effect immediately."
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued
notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC
Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Cañete, Agustin R. Vestil,
Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag
and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC
55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of
the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also
asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000
from April to September, 1994.
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a
protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor
treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the
same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional
Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation
that the same be denied.
On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The COA held that:
The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the
City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of
allowances to the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the
DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994.
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local
government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and
compensation policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated
March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique; COA letter dated May 17,
1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental
Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order
No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines
clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation and classification of
local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions
of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of
said Administrative Order provides that:
"Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead
administrator of RA No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and
Position Classification Bureau, continue to have the following
responsibilities in connection with the implementation of the Local
Government Code of 1991:
a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government
positions and on the specific rates of pay therefore;
b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and
additional forms of compensation to local government employees;
xxx." (underscoring supplied)
To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued
LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides
that:
xxx xxx xxx
"5.0 EFFECTIVITY
This Circular shall take effect immediately."
It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by administrative or executive officer in accordance
with, and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or
partake the nature of a statute (Victorias Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalo's Statutory
Construction, 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice Cruz's Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed.,
p. 103; Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314;
Antique Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17 SCRA 316).
xxx xxx xxx
There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to
judges in excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local
government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds
no substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the
City Auditor, Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the allowances in
question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the MTC and
RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by
Circular Letter No. 91-7, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
xxx xxx x x x4
On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for
and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May
28, 1996, the COA denied the motion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges, submitting
the following questions for resolution:
I stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported
HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS
TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO THE CITY?
II
CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR OR GUIDELINE SUCH AS LOCAL
BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 RENDER INOPERATIVE THE POWER OF THE
LEGISLATIVE BODY OF A CITY BY SETTING A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT OF
THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER?
III
HAS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED LOCAL
BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
IN FIXING THE CEILING OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS
TO BE PROVIDED TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO
MANDAUE CITY BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT AT P1,000.00 PER
MONTH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING
ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00 MONTHLY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS?
IV
IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED MARCH 15, 1994 ISSUED
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT VALID AND
ENFORCEABLE CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT DULY PUBLISHED IN
ACCODANCE WITH LAW?5
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local
autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local
government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the
President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of
publication.
On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for
additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par.
(a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, which provides that:
Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16
of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx

(xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for
additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors,
public elementary and high school teachers, and other national
government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics
supplied)
Instead of filing a comment on behalf of respondent COA, the
Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the
petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues that (1) DBM only
enjoys the power to review and determine whether the
disbursements of funds were made in accordance with the ordinance
passed by a local government unit while (2) the COA has no more
than auditorial visitation powers over local government units
pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to
inspect at any time the financial accounts of local government units.
Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that "the DBM and the
respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a
Budget Operations Manual for local government units, to improve
and systematize methods, techniques and procedures employed in
budget preparation, authorization, execution and accountability"
pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out
that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned
provisions.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional
and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances
to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set
limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President,
through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are
being followed by the local government units.
One such law imposing a limitation on a local government unit's
autonomy is Section 458, par. (a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, which
authorizes the disbursement of additional allowances and other
benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the
city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely
enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a uniform maximum
amount for the additional allowances that a city government can
release to judges stationed therein.
Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void, respondent COA maintains
that the provisions of the yearly approved ordinance granting
additional allowances to judges are still prohibited by the
appropriation laws passed by Congress every year. COA argues that
Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of
judges from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). But the General
Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention the
disbursement of additional allowances to judges as one of the
allowable uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said ordinance
granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to herein
petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law.
To resolve the instant petition, there are two issues that we must
address: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President and for not having been
published and (2) whether the yearly appropriation ordinance
enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional
allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws
enacted by Congress.
We rule in favor of the petitioner judges.
On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void.
We recognize that, although our Constitution6 guarantees autonomy
to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x
In Pimentel vs. Aguirre7, we defined the supervisory power of the
President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by
Congress. Thus:
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
In Mondano v. Silvosa,i 5 the Court contrasted the President's power
of supervision over local government officials with that of his power
of control over executive officials of the national government. It was
emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed
in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."ii 6
In Taule v. Santos,iii 7 we further stated that the Chief Executive
wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local
governments or their officials were performing their duties as
provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot
interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control,
is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body,"iv 8 we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,v 9 the difference between
control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay
down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If
these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the
act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it
themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do
they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to
conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except
to see to it that the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested
in the President.vi10 The members of the Cabinet and other
executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to
the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they
can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed,
suspended or reversed.vii 11 In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere
of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter
has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the
President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local
affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore
by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of
local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.
Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes.
LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given
by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and
cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA
7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55,
allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the
finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not
authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional
allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point
that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said
city government exceed its annual expenditures. Thus, to illustrate, a
city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40
million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional
allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as
the finances of the city can afford it.
Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458,
par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of
supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition
that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other
words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in
violation of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera8 where we held that:
xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative agency and the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Respondent COA claims that publication is not required for LBC 55
inasmuch as it is merely an interpretative regulation applicable to the
personnel of an LGU. We disagree. In De Jesus vs. Commission on
Audit9 where we dealt with the same issue, this Court declared void,
for lack of publication, a DBM circular that disallowed payment of
allowances and other additional compensation to government
officials and employees. In refuting respondent COA's argument that
said circular was merely an internal regulation, we ruled that:
On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in
the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v.
Tuvera, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No.
10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which
is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be
effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC
No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other
additional compensation to government officials and employees,
starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal
regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it
tends to deprive government workers of their allowance and
additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul
together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may
be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government
officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by
the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines – to the end that
they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition
they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This
approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments
of fairness and transparency. (emphasis supplied)
In Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on
Audit10, we again declared the same circular as void, for lack of
publication, despite the fact that it was re-issued and then submitted
for publication. Emphasizing the importance of publication to the
effectivity of a regulation, we therein held that:
It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-
issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official
Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9,
1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and
retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were
disallowed in audit?
The answer is in the negative, precisely for the reason that
publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of
a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and
regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same.
From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the
filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo
due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañada v. Tuvera, "prior
publication of laws before they become effective cannot be
dispensed with, for the reason that it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it."11
We now resolve the second issue of whether the yearly appropriation
ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances
for judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down
as null and void.
According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55 were void, the
ordinances enacted by Mandaue City granting additional allowances
to the petitioner judges would "still (be) bereft of legal basis for want
of a lawful source of funds considering that the IRA cannot be used
for such purposes." Respondent COA showed that Mandaue City's
funds consisted of locally generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989
to 1995, Mandaue City's yearly expenditures exceeded its locally
generated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. During all those years,
it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus.
Respondent avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said
additional allowances and this violated paragraph 2 of the Special
Provisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of
1995)12 and paragraph 3 of the Special Provision, page 1225, of RA
7663 (The General Appropriations Act of 1994)13 which specifically
identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in said
provisions of the two budgetary laws does it say that the IRA can be
used for additional allowances of judges. Respondent COA thus
argues that the provisions in the ordinance providing for such
disbursement are against the law, considering that the grant of the
subject allowances is not within the specified use allowed by the
aforesaid yearly appropriations acts.
We disagree.
Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to
spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no
evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses
of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the
COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated
revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year.
Aside from these items, no data or figures were presented to show
that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In
other words, just because Mandaue City's locally generated revenues
were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the
additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA
and not from the city's own revenues.
Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered
a disapproval of Mandaue City's appropriation ordinances, in
accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of
RA 7160 which provide that:
Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly
Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and
Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or
supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities,
independent component cities, and municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately
succeeding Section.
Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component
Cities and Municipalities.- The sangguninang panlalawigan shall
review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental
appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same
manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of
other ordinances.
If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance,
the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same
shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and
shall continue to be in full force and effect. (emphasis supplied)
Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation
ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise,
such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and
deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the
DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the
subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to
lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the
said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in
the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28,
1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182574 September 28, 2010
THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, represented by its
Governor ISIDRO P. ZAYCO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT; THE DIRECTOR,
CLUSTER IV-VISAYAS; THE REGIONAL CLUSTER DIRECTORS; and THE
PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing Decision No.
2006-0442 dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No. 2008-0103 dated 30
January 2008 of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing premium
payment for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of
1,949 officials and employees of the Province of Negros Occidental.
The Facts
On 21 December 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros
Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating ₱4,000,000 of its
retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. After a
public bidding, the Committee on Awards granted the insurance
coverage to Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care).
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its then
Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela, and Philam Care entered into a Group
Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of ₱3,760,000
representing the insurance premiums of its officials and employees.
The total premium amount was paid on 25 January 1996.
On 23 January 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial
Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-1015 suspending the
premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the
President (OP) as provided under Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO
103) dated 14 January 1994. The Provincial Auditor explained that
the premium payment for health care benefits violated Republic Act
No. 6758 (RA 6758),7 otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Law.
Petitioner complied with the directive post-facto and sent a letter-
request dated 12 January 1999 to the OP. In a Memorandum dated
26 January 1999,8 then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA
to lift the suspension but only in the amount of ₱100,000. The
Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead
issued Notice of Disallowance No. 99-005-101(96)9 dated 10
September 1999 stating similar grounds as mentioned in Notice of
Suspension No. 97-001-101.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA. In a Decision dated
14 July 2006, the COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor’s Notice of
Disallowance dated 10 September 1999.10 The COA ruled that under
AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is
exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting
additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the
policy of standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758. The
COA added that Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 relied upon by
petitioner does not stand on its own but has to be harmonized with
Section 1212 of RA 6758.
Further, the COA stated that the insurance benefits from Philam
Care, a private insurance company, was a duplication of the benefits
provided to employees under the Medicare program which is
mandated by law. Being merely a creation of a local legislative body,
the provincial health care program should not contravene but instead
be consistent with national laws enacted by Congress from where
local legislative bodies draw their authority.
The COA held the following persons liable: (1) all the 1,949 officials
and employees of the province who benefited from the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits with regard to
their proportionate shares; (2) former Governor Rafael L. Coscolluela,
being the person who signed the contract on behalf of petitioner as
well as the person who approved the disbursement voucher; and (3)
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan members who passed Resolution No.
720-A. The COA did not hold Philam Care and Provincial Accountant
Merly P. Fortu liable for the disallowed disbursement. The COA
explained that it was unjust to require Philam Care to refund the
amount received for services it had duly rendered since insurance law
prohibits the refund of premiums after risks had already attached to
the policy contract. As for the Provincial Accountant, the COA
declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution was sufficient
basis for the accountant to sign the disbursement voucher since
there were adequate funds available for the purpose. However, being
one of the officials who benefited from the subject disallowance, the
inclusion of the accountant’s name in the persons liable was proper
with regard to her proportionate share of the premium.
The dispositive portion of the COA’s 14 July 2006 decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding no substantial ground
or cogent reason to disturb the subject disallowance, the instant
appeal is hereby denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, Notice of
Disallowance No. 99-005-101(96) dated 10 September 1999 in the
total amount of ₱3,760,000.00 representing the hospitalization and
insurance benefits of the officials and employees of the Province of
Negros Occidental is hereby AFFIRMED and the refund thereof is
hereby ordered.
The Cluster Director, Cluster IV-Visayas, COA Regional Office No. VII,
Cebu City shall ensure the proper implementation of this decision.13
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 October 2006
which the COA denied in a Resolution dated 30 January 2008.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the disallowance of ₱3,760,000 for premium paid for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the
Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner insists that the payment of the insurance premium for the
health benefits of its officers and employees was not unlawful and
improper since it was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings
pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance. Petitioner states that
such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the
principle of local fiscal autonomy which includes the power of Local
Government Units (LGUs) to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. Petitioner adds that while it is true that
LGUs are only agents of the national government and local autonomy
simply means decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal
control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that although LGUs are
afforded local fiscal autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 and
their actions are subject to the scrutiny of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) and applicable auditing rules and
regulations enforced by the COA. Respondents add that the grant of
additional compensation, like the hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits in the present case, must have prior Presidential
approval to conform with the state policy on salary standardization
for government workers.
AO 103 took effect on 14 January 1994 or eleven months before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Negros Occidental
passed Resolution No. 720-A. The main purpose of AO 103 is to
prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel, national or local, who do not receive, or who
receive less, productivity incentive benefits or other forms of
allowances or benefits. This is clear in the Whereas Clauses of AO 103
which state:
WHEREAS, the faithful implementation of statutes, including the
Administrative Code of 1987 and all laws governing all forms of
additional compensation and personnel benefits is a Constitutional
prerogative vested in the President of the Philippines under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, the Constitutional prerogative includes the determination
of the rates, the timing and schedule of payment, and final authority
to commit limited resources of government for the payment of
personal incentives, cash awards, productivity bonus, and other
forms of additional compensation and fringe benefits;
WHEREAS, the unilateral and uncoordinated grant of productivity
incentive benefits in the past gave rise to discontentment,
dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel
who have received less or have not received at all such benefits;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law and in
order to forestall further demoralization of government personnel do
hereby direct: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Sections 1 and 2 of AO 103 state:
SECTION 1. All agencies of the National Government including
government-owned and/or -controlled corporations and
government financial institutions, and local government units, are
hereby authorized to grant productivity incentive benefit in the
maximum amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) each to
their permanent and full-time temporary and casual employees,
including contractual personnel with employment in the nature of a
regular employee, who have rendered at least one (1) year of service
in the Government as of December 31, 1993.
SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including
government owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their
respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited
from authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and
all forms of allowances/benefits without prior approval and
authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President.
Henceforth, anyone found violating any of the mandates in this
Order, including all officials/agency found to have taken part thereof,
shall be accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the
applicable provisions of existing administrative and penal laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of
allowances/benefits and all forms of additional compensation usually
paid outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A. 6758, the Salary
Standardization Law, that are inconsistent with the legislated policy
on the matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby
revoked. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all
agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the
maximum amount of ₱2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each
employee who has rendered at least one year of service as of 31
December 1993. In Section 2, the President enjoined all heads of
government offices and agencies from granting productivity
incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and
benefits without the President’s prior approval.
In the present case, petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released the disbursement for
the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of the
province’s officials and employees without any prior approval from
the President. The COA disallowed the premium payment for such
benefits since petitioner disregarded AO 103 and RA 6758.
We disagree with the COA. From a close reading of the provisions of
AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the
President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to
"government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing
boards." Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also
applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior approval from the
President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus,
offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under
the Executive branch. In other words, AO 103 must be observed by
government offices under the President’s control as mandated by
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution which states:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general
supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions. (Emphasis supplied)
The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a
superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions
according to law.14 This is distinguished from the President’s power
of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate
officer.15 The power of control gives the President the power to
revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.16
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of
the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that
rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President
may only point out that rules have not been followed but the
President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the
discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be
valid.
Also, while it is true that LGUs are still bound by RA 6758, the COA
did not clearly establish that the medical care benefits given by the
government at the time under Presidential Decree No. 151917 were
sufficient to cover the needs of government employees especially
those employed by LGUs.
Petitioner correctly relied on the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 33 (CSC MC No. 33), series of 1997, issued
on 22 December 1997 which provided the policy framework for
working conditions at the workplace. In this circular, the CSC
pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 97-4684 dated 18 December 1997
took note of the inadequate policy on basic health and safety
conditions of work experienced by government personnel. Thus,
under CSC MC No. 33, all government offices including LGUs were
directed to provide a health program for government employees
which included hospitalization services and annual mental, medical-
physical examinations.
Later, CSC MC No. 33 was further reiterated in Administrative Order
No. 40218 (AO 402) which took effect on 2 June 1998. Sections 1, 2,
and 4 of AO 402 state:
Section 1. Establishment of the Annual Medical Check-up Program. –
An annual medical check-up for government of officials and
employees is hereby authorized to be established starting this year,
in the meantime that this benefit is not yet integrated under the
National Health Insurance Program being administered by the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC).
Section 2. Coverage. – x x x Local Government Units are also
encouraged to establish a similar program for their personnel.
Section 4. Funding. – x x x Local Government Units, which may
establish a similar medical program for their personnel, shall utilize
local funds for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC, through CSC MC No. 33, as well as the President, through
AO 402, recognized the deficiency of the state of health care and
medical services implemented at the time. Republic Act No. 787519
or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995 instituting a National
Health Insurance Program (NHIP) for all Filipinos was only approved
on 14 February 1995 or about two months after petitioner’s
Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 720-A. Even with
the establishment of the NHIP, AO 402 was still issued three years
later addressing a primary concern that basic health services under
the NHIP either are still inadequate or have not reached geographic
areas like that of petitioner.
Thus, consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II20
and Section 2, Article X,21 and the Local Government Code of
1991,22 we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization
and health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and
employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed by
petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
In sum, since petitioner’s grant and release of the questioned
disbursement without the President’s approval did not violate the
President’s directive in AO 103, the COA then gravely abused its
discretion in applying AO 103 to disallow the premium payment for
the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of petitioner’s
officials and employees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE
Decision No. 2006-044 dated 14 July 2006 and Decision No. 2008-010
dated 30 January 2008 of the Commission on Audit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130775 September 27, 2004
THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L.
DAVID in his capacity as National President and for his own Person,
President ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT, represented the HON.
SECRETARY ROBERT Z. BARBERS and MANUEL A. RAYOS,
respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 131939 September 27, 2004
LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN and BONY TACIO,
petitioners,
vs.
DILG Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS and DILG Undersecretary
MANUEL SANCHEZ, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of
the Liga ng mga Barangay and questions the extent of the power of
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), as alter ego of the President. More immediately, the petition
disputes the validity of the appointment of the DILG as the interim
caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner
therein], Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District
II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan,1 alleging that respondent therein Alex L. David [now
petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City
and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the
Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain
irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed
synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in 1997. According to
the petition, the irregularities consisted of the following: (1) the
publication of the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without notifying
in writing the individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;2 (2) the
Notice of Meeting dated 08 June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of
Caloocan City did not specify whether the meeting scheduled on 14
June 1997 was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the
meeting was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan;3 and (3) the
deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy having been set
at 5:00 p.m. of the third "day prior to the above election day", or on
11 June 1997,4 Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not
able to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of
Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed
to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13
June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of
the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of
Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.5
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein
petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-
Caloocan was held as scheduled.6 Petitioner David was proclaimed
President of the Liga-Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and
assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time
for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and
damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7
Rayos alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan
Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the
Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8
On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining
therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and
Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but
only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for
a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours.9
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner David’s instance, Special
Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was
consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before Branch 124.10
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG
through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an
Urgent Motion,11 invoking the President’s power of general
supervision over all local government units and seeking the following
reliefs:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic
services to the people, the maintenance of public order and to
further protect the interests of the forty-one thousand barangays all
over the country, herein respondent respectfully prays:
a) That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed
as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the
Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall
have been duly elected and assumed office; ...12
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following
grounds: (1) the DILG Secretary exercises the power of general
supervision over all government units by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the Liga ng mga Barangay
is a government organization; (3) undue interference by some local
elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of
the Liga ng mga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of
the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National
Liga Board; (5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies measured
in view of the confusion and chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga
Barangay and the incapacity of the National Liga Board to address the
problems properly.
On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILG’s Urgent Motion,
claiming that the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed
to seek any sanction against a co-respondent like David, such as by
filing a cross-claim, without first seeking leave of court.13 He also
alleged that the DILG’s request to be appointed interim caretaker
constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since
the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.14
Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and
before it was acted upon by the lower court, the DILG through then
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No.
97-176.15 It cited the reported violations of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Constitution and By-Laws by David and "widespread chaos and
confusion" among local government officials as to who were the
qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians.16
Pending the appointment of the DILG "as the Interim Caretaker of the
Liga ng mga Barangay by the court and until the officers and board
members of the national Liga Chapter have been elected and have
assumed office," the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial
governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional
directors and other concerned officers, as follows:
1. All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga
Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio
members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice from the
Courts or this Department;
2. All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement
and/or directive issued by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter
relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until further notice
from the Courts or this Department.17
On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A.
Paredes issued the assailed order,18 the pertinent portions of which
read, thus:
The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction
over local government units, including the different leagues created
under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) finds basis in
Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. Specifically,
Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order provides a broad
premise for the supervisory power of the DILG. Administratively, the
DILG’s supervision has been tacitly recognized by the local barangays,
municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences
presented by respondent David himself (See Annexes "A" to "C"). The
fact that the DILG has sought to refer the matters therein to the
National Liga Board/Directorate does not ipso facto mean that it has
lost jurisdiction to act directly therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law
and cannot be claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by
individuals. What respondent David may term as "interference"
should caretakership be allowed, this Court would rather view as a
necessary and desirable corollary to the exercise of supervision.19
Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the
delivery of basic services and the perquisites of public service. In this
case, the fact of confusion arising from conflicting appointments,
non-action, and uninformed or wavering decisions of the incumbent
National Liga Board/Directorate, having been satisfactorily
established, cannot simply be brushed aside as being politically
motivated or arising therefrom. It is incumbent, therefore, that the
DILG exercise a more active role in the supervision of the affairs and
operations of the National Liga Board/ Directorate at least until such
time that the regular National Liga Board/Directorate may have been
elected, qualified and assumed office.20
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG
for appointment as interim caretaker, until such time that the
regularly elected National Liga Board of Directors shall have qualified
and assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs of the
National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.21
On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the
reconsideration of the assailed order and to declare respondent
Secretary Barbers in contempt of Court.22 David claimed that the 04
August 1997 order divested the duly elected members of the Board
of Directors of the Liga National Directorate of their positions without
due process of law. He also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in
contempt for having issued, through his Undersecretary,
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, even before respondent judge
issued the questioned order, in mockery of the justice system. He
implied that Secretary Barbers knew about respondent judge’s
questioned order even before it was promulgated.23

On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-
193,24 providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized
elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the
election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
Memorandum Circular set the synchronized elections for the
provincial and metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the
national chapter on 06 September 1997.
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment25
in favor of respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay of Caloocan City. The appointment purportedly served as
Rayos’s "legal basis for ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan City" and "to qualify and participate in the
forthcoming National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga
Barangay."26
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections
of Provincial and Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06
September 1997, the National Liga Chapter held its election of
officers and board of directors, wherein James Marty L. Lim was
elected as President of the National Liga.27
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied David’s motion
for reconsideration,28 ruling that there was no factual or legal basis
to reconsider the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the
National Liga Board and to cite Secretary Barbers in contempt of
court.29
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari30 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul
public respondent judge’s orders of 04 August 1997 and 01 October
1997. They dispute the latter’s opinion on the power of supervision
of the President under the Constitution, through the DILG over local
governments, which is the same as that of the DILG’s as shown by its
application of the power on the Liga ng mga Barangay. Specifically,
they claim that the public respondent judge’s designation of the DILG
as interim caretaker and the acts which the DILG sought to
implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the scope
of the Chief Executive’s power of supervision.
To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative
Order No. 267, Series of 1992, the power of general supervision of
the President over local government units does not apply to the Liga
and its various chapters precisely because the Liga is not a local
government unit, contrary to the stance of the respondents.31
Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160)32
provides that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and
By-laws. Petitioners posit that the duly elected officers and directors
of the National Liga elected in 1994 had a vested right to their
positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause by
affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership
pursuant to the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not by mere
issuances of the DILG, even if bolstered by the dubious authorization
of respondent judge.33 Thus, petitioners claim that the questioned
order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of the Liga
of their right to their respective offices without due process of law.
Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term "local
governments," over which the President, through the DILG Secretary,
has the power of supervision,34 petitioners point out that still there
is no legal or constitutional basis for the appointment of the DILG as
interim caretaker.35 They stress that the actions contemplated by
the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, as what it had
sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set
aside the actions of the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute
its judgment over that of the latter — which are all clearly one of
control.36 Petitioners question the appointment of Rayos as Liga-
Caloocan President since at that time petitioner David was occupying
that position which was still the subject of the quo warranto
proceedings Rayos himself had instituted.37 Petitioners likewise
claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing
supplemental guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga,
replaced the implementing rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its
Constitution and By-laws.38 In fact, even before its appointment as
interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all heads of government
units from recognizing petitioner David and/or honoring any of his
pronouncements relating to the Liga.39
Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,40 which, they claim,
already passed upon the "extent of authority of the then Secretary of
Local Government over the katipunan ng mga barangay or the
barangay councils," as it specifically ruled that the "Secretary [of
Local Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of officers of the katipunan."41
For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the
DILG supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions and since
members of the various leagues, such as the Liga in this case, are
themselves officials of local government units, it follows that the Liga
members are subject to the power of supervision of the DILG.42 He
adds that as the DILG’s management and administration of the Liga
affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions
were consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision
under existing laws.43 He asserts that in assailing the appointment of
the DILG as interim caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision
of positive law in support of their stance. Thus, he adds, "if a law is
silent, obscure or insufficient, a judge may apply a rule he sees fit to
resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with
general interest, order, morals and public policy,"44 in consonance
with Article 9 of the Civil Code.45
On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has
shared petitioners’ position. He states that the DILG’s act of
managing and administering the affairs of the National Liga Board are
not merely acts of supervision but plain manifestations of control and
direct takeover of the functions of the National Liga Board,46 going
beyond the limits of the power of general supervision of the
President over local governments.47 Moreover, while the Liga may
be deemed a government organization, it is not strictly a local
government unit over which the DILG has supervisory power.48
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly
elected President of the National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File
Comment in Intervention,49 with his Comment in Intervention
attached,50 invoking the validity of the DILG’s actions relative to the
conduct of the Liga elections.51 In addition, he sought the dismissal
of the instant petition on the following grounds: (1) the issue of
validity or invalidity of the questioned order has been rendered moot
and academic by the election of Liga officers; (2) the turn-over of the
administration and management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers;
and (3) the recognition and acceptance by the members of the Liga
nationwide.52
In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order,53 was filed by several presidents
of Liga Chapters, praying that this Court declare the DILG Secretary
and Undersecretary are not vested with any constitutional or legal
power to exercise control or even supervision over the National Liga
ng mga Barangay, nor to take over the functions of its officers or
suspend its constitution; and declare void any and all acts committed
by respondents therein in connection with their caretakership of the
Liga.54 The petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it
was eventually dismissed because the petitioners failed to submit an
affidavit of service and proof of service of the petition.55
Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was
substituted by his legal representatives.56
Petitioners have raised a number of issues.57 Integrated and
simplified, these issues boil down to the question of whether or not
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of
the National Liga Board, per its order dated 04 August 1997.58 In
turn, the resolution of the question of grave abuse of discretion
entails a couple of definitive issues, namely: (1) whether the Liga ng
mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject to the
DILG Secretary’s power of supervision over local governments as the
alter ego of the President, and (2) whether the respondent Judge’s
designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga has invested
the DILG with control over the Liga and whether DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-176, issued before it was designated as such interim
caretaker, and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and other acts
which the DILG made in its capacity as interim caretaker of the Liga,
involve supervision or control of the Liga.
However, the Court should first address the question of mootness
which intervenor Lim raised because, according to him, during the
pendency of the present petition a general election was held; the
new set of officers and directors had assumed their positions; and
that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the management
and administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and directors.59
Respondent Rayos has joined him in this regard.60 Forthwith, the
Court declares that these supervening events have not rendered the
instant petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this
Court.
This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the
DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga and the Liga officers and
directors who were elected to replace petitioner David and the
former officers. At the core of the petition is the validity of the DILG’s
"caretakership" of the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as such
caretaker which exceeded the bounds of supervision and were
exercise of control. At stake in this case is the realization of the
constitutionally ensconced principle of local government
autonomy;61 the statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of
barangays and municipalities "by providing them opportunities to
participate actively in the implementation of national programs and
projects;"62 and the promotion of the avowed aim to ensure the
independence and non-partisanship of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty
buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in
the affairs of the local governments are tolerated and left unchecked.
Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and
political subdivisions should enjoy genuine meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals.63 In the case of De Leon v. Esguerra,64
the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine
and meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-
reliant communities.65
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition,
yet evading review."66 For the question of whether the DILG may
validly be appointed as interim caretaker, or assume a similar
position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect
again, and yet the question may not be decided before the actual
assumption, or the termination of said assumption even.
So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead
to the wrong impression that the challenged order and issuances are
valid. Verily, that does not appear to be the correct conclusion to
make since by applying opposite precedents to the issues the
outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum
circulars.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is
subject to DILG supervision, and whether the questioned
"caretakership" order of the respondent judge and the challenged
issuances and acts of the DILG constitute control in derogation of the
Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the barangay, as the
lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and
coordination.
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary
planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans,
programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum
wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed,
crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably
settled.67
On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay68 is the organization of
all barangays, the primary purpose of which is the determination of
the representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation,
articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting barangay
government administration and securing solutions thereto, through
proper and legal means.69 The Liga ng mga Barangay shall have
chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan
political subdivision levels.70 The municipal and city chapters of the
Liga are composed of the barangay representatives from the
municipality or city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and
city chapters of the Liga form the provincial or metropolitan political
subdivision chapters of the Liga. The presidents of the chapters of the
Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro Manila area
and other metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the National
Liga ng mga Barangay.71
As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is
positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire
country. This was heralded by the adoption of the bottom-to-top
approach process of development which requires the development
plans of the barangay to be considered in the development plans of
the municipality, city or province,72 whose plans in turn are to be
taken into account by the central government73 in its plans for the
development of the entire country.74 The Liga is the vehicle assigned
to make this new development approach materialize and produce
results.
The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels,
automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office
as presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond
the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.75
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote
the development of barangays and secure the general welfare of
their inhabitants.76 In line with this, the Liga is granted the following
functions and duties:
a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of
the barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and
projects of the national government;
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people’s
participation in local government administration in order to promote
untied and concerted action to achieve country-wide development
goals;
c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful
employment within the barangay;
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with
government and non-governmental organizations and thereby
promote the social, economic and political well-being of the
barangays; and
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and
promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants.77
The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local
Government Code. However, they are empowered to make their own
constitution and by-laws to govern their operations. Sec. 507 of the
Code provides:
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All
other matters not herein otherwise provided for affecting the
internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall
be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are
hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided,
That said Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the
provision of the Constitution and existing laws.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay
adopted its own Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the
corporate powers of the Liga, expressed or implied, shall be vested in
the board of directors of each level of the Liga which shall:
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the
said Liga; including the power of appointment, assignment and
delegation;
b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of
said Liga;
c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and
expenditures for the year, including the plans or schemes for funding
purposes; and
d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or
member of the said board on grounds cited and in the manner
provided in hereinunder provisions.78
The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the
conduct of its Liga’s general elections.79 And, as early as 28 April
1997, the Liga National Chapter had already scheduled its general
elections on 14 June 1997.80
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X
of the Constitution, which reads in part:
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the
President’s power of supervision over local governments and his
power of control of the executive departments bureaus and
offices.81 Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier
Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control.82
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,83 this Court defined
supervision as "overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to take such
action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform
their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.84 In Taule v.
Santos,85 the Court held that the Constitution permits the President
to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a local
government or its officers perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments.86 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body.87
The case of Drilon v. Lim88 clearly defined the extent of supervisory
power, thus:
…The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter
except to see that the rules are followed…89
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng
mga Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG
suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,90 where the
Court ruled that the President’s power of the general supervision, as
exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to
the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the President’s power of general supervision extend to the liga
ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the
Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a
government organization, being an association, federation, league or
union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are
either appointed or elected government officials. The Local
Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining
the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto.91
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite
evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The
Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented
therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of
the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and
provincial sanggunians. As such, they enjoy all the powers and
discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city
councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus,
the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the
enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the
legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the
same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach
of development.
In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the
DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing local government
officials not to recognize David as the National Liga President and his
pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the
action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness and
injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which
maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local
government units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be
forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the Ligas
especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role played
by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion
of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full
support and respect of the other agencies of government. As the
Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,92 our
national officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of
liberty upon which these provisions are based.93
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim
caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she
effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board
and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at
the DILG’s prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to
manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that
the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and
assumed office" reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take
control over the Liga. Even if said "caretakership" was contemplated
to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume
office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in
derogation of the Constitution.
With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the
Liga, Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and
promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11
August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the
1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan
chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng
mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan
and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as
president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.
These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision
and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only
of the Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution.
The election of Liga officers is part of the Liga’s internal organization,
for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In succession,
the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs,
issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the
effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG
wielded was the power of control which even the President does not
have.
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed
respondent Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to
the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although petitioner
David’s term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice,
who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of the punong barangay
of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner David. The
latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio
member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga
Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment
to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the position was the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos himself,
thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that
the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made
use of the power with evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay,
the DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the
rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does
it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular
case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the
incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to
determine if they committed any violation of the Liga’s Constitution
and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board
and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered
the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Liga’s
own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither
had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the
Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not
subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
In the Bito-Onon94 case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for
review of the decision of the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with
the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved
the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already
promulgated by the Liga. The decision reads in part:
xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act
undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising
officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed rules. He
cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act.
xxx
xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of
the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control,
which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG
is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances,
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring
compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor
means to "watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the
power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments,
which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per
statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG
Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of
the greater autonomy of the local government.95
In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government
had no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election
of officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that
case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government
regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the
election of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay
Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary
Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and
ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled:
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general
supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that
respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the
Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the
barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order
that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional
Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the
political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the
limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local
governments.97
All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued
with grave abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent
Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No.
97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the
conferment or exercise of control — a power which is denied by the
Constitution even to the President.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional
Trial Court dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are
declared VOID for being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175368 April 11, 2013
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and
HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DENR,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,1 praying
that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional
Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known
as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising
control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent
Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources'
(DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale
Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation
(Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136
hectares situated in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso,
Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2
On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden
Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR
Regional Office No. III.3
On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office),
and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29, 1998.4
On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending,
Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato
Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for
Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area subject of Golden
Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.5
On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying
Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated
April 29, 1998.
On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation
(AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for
Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered
by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement.6
On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in
response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum
query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-
Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11,
2004, fifteen (15) days after Golden Falcon received the said Order,
per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued by the Postmaster
II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta, Rizal.7
Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the
PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the
subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing
valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former
area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004 of the MGB
Director, Central Office.8
On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed
AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F.
Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of denial of Golden
Falcon's application/appeal – April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 − is to be
considered in the deliberation of the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board (PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land subject
of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be considered open for
application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion
issued a legal opinion stating that the Order dated July 16, 2004 of
the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the Order dated
April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998
should be the reckoning period of the denial of the application of
Golden Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal
protest against the aforesaid Applications for Quarry Permit on the
ground that the subject area was already covered by its Application
for Exploration Permit.9
On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the
concurrent Chairman of the PMRB, endorsed to the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid
Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted
to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly
Liberato Sembrano).10
On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda
recommending to Governor Dela Cruz the approval of the aforesaid
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit.11
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding
Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12
Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the
grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1)
The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the Applications
for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal
protest; (2) The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall
within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application for
Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were
illegally converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4)
DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that the subject areas
became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was
controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void
because they covered areas that were never declared People's Small-
Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the People's
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as
one of the quarry resources, as defined by Section 43 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an
Application for Quarry Permit.13
On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a
Decision14 in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed with MGB
Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location
only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden
Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order
dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden Falcon's appeal.
According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the
letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on
April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the resolution of the
appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office. He stated that the
Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when
the area was still closed to mining location; hence, the Small-Scale
Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and
void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC
filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already
open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC’s Application for
Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held
that the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of
the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942,
because the area was never proclaimed to be under the People's
Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR Secretary stated that
iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretary’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be
given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of
Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-
05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are
declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby
CANCELLED.15
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments
incorporated under R.A. No. 7160. Petitioner declares that it is
composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province alone, but
the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a
favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces
and all local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-
SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON THE
LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING,
VOIDING AND CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS
AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL, NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND
USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL PROVINCES.16
To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this
petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the
provincial level;17 adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare
of all provinces and its officials and employees;18 and exercise such
other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the
league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.19
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the Government, it bears emphasis that
ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a
statute is presumed to be valid.20 This presumption is rooted in the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for
each other's acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or
portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt
or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had
the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control
over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining
Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the
provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local
Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small
Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.24 The pertinent provisions of law
sought to be declared as unconstitutional by petitioner are as
follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units
shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to,
the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control
and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to
community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale
mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment;
and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby
created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a
provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board,
which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the
Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale
mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-
scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims
within a people’s small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the
goals and objectives of this Act.26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR
Administrative Order No. 9640 (the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly
confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power
to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by
the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of respondent
DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the
Provincial Governor and the PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, which
confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power
of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the
President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos) has the
power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local
government units, and grants the local government units autonomy,
thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect
to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional
provision is mirrored in the Local Government Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a)
Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President
shall exercise general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.

The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over
provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component
cities; through the province with respect to component cities and
municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to
barangays.28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991 show that the relationship
between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the
alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of
executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term
"control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter, while the term "supervision" is the power of a
superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function
in accordance with law.29
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond
mere executive supervision and exercised control when he nullified
the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan, as the former substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate
small-scale mining has been devolved to all provinces. In the exercise
of devolved powers, departmental approval is not necessary.30
Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No.
7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991
granting the power of control to the DENR/DENR Secretary are not
nullified, nothing would stop the DENR Secretary from nullifying,
voiding and canceling the small-scale mining permits that have been
issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to
respondents is unconstitutional, as the Constitution only allows
supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the
executive departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, stated that contrary to the assertion of petitioner,
the power to implement the small-scale mining law is expressly
limited in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code, which
provides that it must be carried out "pursuant to national policies and
subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR." Moreover,
the fact that the power to implement the small-scale mining law has
not been fully devolved to provinces is further amplified by Section 4
of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which provides,
among others, that the People's Small-Scale Mining Program shall be
implemented by the DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony) of the Constitution31 provides that "the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
provides that "the Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization
of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or
the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, was enacted,
establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination
with other concerned government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale
mining" as "refer[ring] to mining activities, which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implement and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment."32
It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733
provides that the DENR is, subject to law and higher authority, in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate, under
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the
country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale
mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of
1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that
the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local
government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution
states that "[t]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the Local
Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the
President means no more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully
executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.34
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local
autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more
technical language, the decentralization of government authority.35
It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.36
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but
subject to limitations like following national policies or standards,37
and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring
of local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities,
and resources among the different local government units and local
officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of
Congress38 under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact
a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in
the province, Section 17 of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units
shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to,
the following:

xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control
and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to
community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale
mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment;
and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes;39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the provincial
government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control
and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher
authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in
harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act
of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program
to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared of the State to
promote, develop, protect and rationalize viable small-scale mining
activities in order to generate more employment opportunities and
provide an equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and natural
resources, giving due regard to existing rights as herein provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of
carrying out the declared policy provided in Section 2 hereof, there is
hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, hereinafter called the Department, in
coordination with other concerned government agencies, designed
to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational scheme for the small-
scale development and utilization of mineral resources in certain
mineral areas in order to address the social, economic, technical, and
environmental problems connected with small-scale mining
activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – There is hereby
created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a
provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board,
which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the
Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale
mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-
scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims
within a people’s small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the
goals and objectives of this Act.42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the
Rules and Regulations to implement R.A. No. 7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale
Mining Program. − The following DENR officials shall exercise the
following supervisory functions in the implementation of the
Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary – direct supervision and control over the
program and activities of the small-scale miners within the people's
small-scale mining area;
21.2 Director − the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into
account the: (1) size of membership and capitalization of the
cooperative; (2) size of mineralized areas; (3) quantity of mineral
deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5) environmental impact and
other considerations;
b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in
consultation with the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor of
an affected area upon declaration of a small-scale mining area;
c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the
people's small-scale mining area when it can no longer be feasibly
operated on a small-scale basis; and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-
scale mines safety rules and regulations.
xxxx
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − The
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. 7076
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review
by the Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale
mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for
people's small-scale mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners’ cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A.
7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims
within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or complaints;
Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days
from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution
otherwise the same is considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve
the goals and objectives of R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. – The Board
created under R.A. 7076 shall have the authority to declare and set
aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore suitable for
small-scale mining operations subject to review by the DENR
Secretary thru the Director.43
DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on August 15,
1995, provides under Section 12344 thereof that small-scale mining
applications should be filed with the PMRB45 and the corresponding
permits shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except small-scale
mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known
as the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942,
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on
December 19, 1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining
Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor
through the concerned Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board for
areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the Director though
the Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations.46 Moreover,
it provides that Local Government Units shall, in coordination with
the Bureau/ Regional Offices and subject to valid and existing mining
rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel,
quarry x x x and gravel permits not exceeding five (5) hectares."47
Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A.
No. 7076, DENR Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted
the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of control, but did not
confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power
to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by
the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale
mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − There is hereby
created under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary a
provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board,
which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the
Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims
within a people's small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a
small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in
Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The
Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board created under R.A. No. 7076
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review
by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims
within ninety (90) days upon filing of protests or complaints;
Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days
from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution
otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, the AMTC filed
on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against
the Applications for Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto
Cruz, Liberato Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo
Cruz on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its
Application for Exploration Permit.48 However, on August 8, 2005,
the PMRB issued Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11,
resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the
granting/issuance of the said permits.49 On August 10, 2005, the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits
to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz
based on the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal Officer and the
Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary,
appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 05-1317 and Resolution Nos.
05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB
of Bulacan, which resolutions gave due course and granted, on
August 10, 2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz involving parcels of
mineral land situated at Camachin, Doña Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an
administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076, which cannot be
equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be
conducted, but it is enough that the parties were given the
opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the questioned
resolutions it issued were in accordance with the mining laws and
that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were registered ahead
of AMTC's Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board
stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to approve the
Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved
these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject mining area open for
mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the
applicants have valid applications.1âwphi1 The pertinent portion of
the decision of the DENR Secretary reads:
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open
only to mining location on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the
receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the subject
Order of July 16, 2004.1âwphi1 The filing by Golden Falcon of the
letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial issued on
April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the Resolution thereof
on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance
with the procedures of the PMRB, however, the AQPs were filed on
February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining location.
Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the Governor are
null and void making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it
having been filed when the area is already open to other mining
applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These
are two (2) different applications. The questioned SSMPs were issued
in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the
Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the
area was never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining
Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered among the
quarry resources.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is declared valid and may now be
given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of
Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-
05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are
declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby
CANCELLED.50
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered
in accordance with the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in
Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.52 It is noted that although AMTC filed a
protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application
for Exploration Permit over the Applications for Quarry Permit, which
were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not
resolve the same, but issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on
August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of
Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo
Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the
granting of the said permits. After the Provincial Governor of Bulacan
issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on August 10, 2005, AMTC
appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the
granting of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the
Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be
given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits
issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to
review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of
the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial
Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function,
which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the
legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter
in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR Secretary
exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in
settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This
quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated
with "substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing
Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC
over conflicting claims based on the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional,
the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of Health, 54
which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and
beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a
law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to
overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.