MEJOFF V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 PHIL.
70 (1951) security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils
Facts: Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the
US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March 18, 1948. He was
turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate
disposition. His case was decided on by the Board of Commissioners
of Immigration who declared him as an illegal alien. The Board
ordered his immediate deportation. In the meantime, we was placed
in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back home to Russia.
Two Russian boats have been requested to bring him back to Russia
but the masters refused as they had no authority to do so. Two years
passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will
take him home.
This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent
held that the Mejoff should stay in temporary detention as it is a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable
aliens. It further states that is has the right to do so for a reasonable
length of time.
Issue: Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison
awaiting his deportation.
Ruling: The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from
custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance of the
immigration authorities to insure that he keep peace and be available
when the Government is ready to deport him. In the doctrine of
incorporation, the Philippines in its constitution adops the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nations.
Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations in its Resolution
entitled “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in proclaiming that
life and liberty and all other fundamental rights shall be applied to all
human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the
are no longer at war.
KURODA V. JALANDONI, 83 PHIL. 171 (1949)
Facts: Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army,
was prosecuted for war crimes before the Military Commission set
up by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines.
Kuroda challenged the legality and constitutionality of the Military
Commission and contended that it lacked jurisdiction to try him for
violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War,
since the Philippines was not a signatory to these conventions.
Issue: Whether or not the established Military Commission is legal
and constitutional.
Held: The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal and
constitutional base on the citation of Article II, Section 3 of the
Philippine Constitution declaring that “the Philippine adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the nation”.
The court ruled that in accordance with the generally accepted
principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention, and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all
those persons, military or civilian, who had been guilty of planning,
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in
violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization,
were held accountable therefore. Although the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them, our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not
confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international
law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been
or shall be a signatory. Consequently, in the promulgation and - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and
Philippines had acted in conformity with the generally accepted highways.
principles and policies of international law which are part of our
The assailed Letter of Instruction quoted important clauses that the
Constitution.
hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized
AGUSTIN V. EDU, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations
Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
Organization (U.N.); and, that the said Vienna Convention, which was
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation
drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
of road safety signs and devices.
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance
with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land It is undisputable therefore that the Declaration of Principle found in
Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the the Constitution possesses relevance: “the Philippines adopts the
compliance thereof. generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land”. The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to
administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
delegation of police power.
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the morality.
subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional
J.B.L. REYES V. BAGATSING, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The
Facts: Petitioner retired Justice J.B.L Reyes on behalf of the Anti-
statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were
Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a
definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to
peaceful march and rally starting from the Luneta Park (Public Park)
promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
to the gates of the United States Embassy. There was an assurance in
instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken “to
of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and
ensure a peaceful march and rally.”
basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations
It turned out that the permit was denied by the respondent Mayor.
Petitioner was unaware of such denial as it was sent through an
ordinary mail.
The reason of refusing the permit was due to “police intelligence
reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such
permit. To be more specific, reference was made to “persistent
intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations
where a large number of people are expected to attend. Mayor
suggested, however, that a permit may be issued for the rally if it will
be held in Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed areas where the
safety of the participants and general public may be assured. The
Mayor also posed the applicability of Ordinance No.7925 of the City
of Manila prohibiting the holding and staging of rallies or
demonstration within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission
or chancery in this case the US Embassy. However, there was no
proof that the US Embassy was indeed 500 feet away.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of permit to rally by the respondent
Mayor is valid.
Held: No. Even if it can be shown that such condition existed (500
feet away), it does not follow that the respondent could legally act
the way he did. Such denial can still be challenged as to the
constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention which calls
for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission. But, the
denial of permit to rally in front of the US Embassy is only justified in
the presence of clear and present danger to life or property of the
embassy. This is binding on the Philippines to take appropriate steps
to protect the premises of the mission against intrusion or damage
and prevent any disturbance of peace or impairment of its dignity. To
the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law, it should be part
of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and
present danger of any intrusion or damage or disturbance of peace
of the mission or impairment of its dignity, there would be a
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point
would be the US Embassy - but there was none.
Respondent official was ordered to grant the permit.
Mandatory injunction prayed for is GRANTED. No cost.
PHILIP MORRIS V. CA, 234 SCRA 576 (1993)
Facts: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
to seek the reversal and setting aside of the following issuances of
the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical
exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule
58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling
“MARK” cigarettes in the local market. Banking on the thesis that
petitioners’ respective symbols “MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and
“MARK”, also for cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized
appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing
on an isolated transaction, They Invoked provisions of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property.
As corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris Union, they
can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or
for unfair competition, without need of obtaining registration or a
license to do business in the Philippines, and without necessity of
actually doing business in the Philippines.
Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement
and damages against Fortune Tobacco before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the
trademark “Mark” which is identical and confusingly similar to Philip
Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition
at bar.
Issue: Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right
of property to such trademark or trade name.
Ruling: No. There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which
they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark
applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for
commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines.
A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual
use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the
acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint
that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it inevitably
follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to
mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the
absence of their “right” to be protected.
Discussion: Following universal acquiescence and comity, our
municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use
in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement
inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal
tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of
international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under
the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislative enactments
SHANGRILA HOTEL V. DEVELOPERS GROUP, 486 SCRA 405 (2006)
Facts: Respondent DGCI applied for and was granted registration of
the ‘Shangri-La’ mark and ‘S’ logo in its restaurant business.
Petitioner Shangri-La, chain of hotels and establishments owned by
the Kuok family worldwide, moved to cancel the registration of the
mark on the ground that it was illegally and fraudulently obtained
and appropriated by respondents. Petitioner also moved to register
the mark and logo in its own name. Later, respondent DGCI filed
before the trial court a complaint for infringement against petitioner
alleging that DGCI had been the prior exclusive user and the
registered owner in the Philippines of said mark and logo. Petitioner
Shangri-La argued that respondent had no right to apply for the
registration because it did not have prior actual commercial use
thereof. The trial court found for respondent. CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s prior use of the mark is a
requirement for its registration.
Ruling: Yes. While the present law on trademarks has dispensed with
the requirement of prior actual use at the time of registration, the
law in force at the time of registration must be applied. Under the
provisions of the former trademark law, R.A. No. 166, as amended,
hence, the law in force at the time of respondent’s application for
registration of trademark, the root of ownership of a trademark is
actual use in commerce. Section 2 of said law requires that before a
trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in
commerce and service for not less than two months in the Philippines
prior to the filing of an application for its registration. Trademark is a
creation of use and therefore actual use is a pre-requisite to exclusive
ownership and its registration with the Philippine Patent Office is a
mere administrative confirmation of the existence of such right.
While the petitioners may not have qualified under Section 2 of R.A.
No. 166 as a registrant, neither did respondent DGCI, since the latter
also failed to fulfill the 2-month actual use requirement. What is
worse, DGCI was not even the owner of the mark. For it to have been
the owner, the mark must not have been already appropriated (i.e.,
used) by someone else. At the time of respondent DGCI’s registration
of the mark, the same was already being used by the petitioners,
albeit abroad, of which DGCI’s president was fully aware.
Discussion: The term "trade mark" includes any word, name, symbol,
emblem, sign or device or any combination thereof adopted and used
by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured, sold or dealt in by others.
The term "service mark" means a mark used in the sale or advertising
of services to identify the services of one person and distinguish them
from the services of others and includes without limitation the marks,
names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and
distinctive features of radio or other advertising. [Emphasis supplied]
Clearly, from the broad definitions quoted above, the petitioners can
be considered as having used the "Shangri-La" name and "S" logo as
a tradename and service mark.
The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293,
undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to observe and
follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of
the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is,
oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for
unfair competition) include persons whose internationally well-
known mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or
confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a mark that is
sought to be registered or is actually registered.
However, while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris
Convention, the IPC only took effect on January 1, 1988, and in the
absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies. Under the
prevailing law and jurisprudence at the time, the CA had not erred in
ruling that:
The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded
to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention,
without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered,
licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying
that the same runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the
actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or
devise. The apparent conflict between the two (2) was settled by the
Supreme Court in this wise –
"Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the
Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch
as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal
(Mortensen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of Judiciary of
Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions 93; Paras, International Law and World
Organization, 1971 Ed., p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means
imply the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal,
not superior, to national legislative enactments (Salonga and Yap,
Public International Law, Fourth ed., 1974, p. 16)." [Emphasis
supplied]
Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the
Paris Convention. Nevertheless, with the double infirmity of lack of
two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in the respondent's
registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be
guilty of infringement. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the
petitioners guilty of infringing a mark when they are actually the
originator and creator thereof.
Nor can the petitioners' separate personalities from their mother
corporation be an obstacle in the enforcement of their rights as part
of the Kuok Group of Companies and as official repository, manager
and operator of the subject mark and logo. Besides, R.A. No. 166 did
not require the party seeking relief to be the owner of the mark but
"any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark or trade name."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
PHARMACEUTICAL & HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION. V. DUQUE,
535 SCRA 265 (2007)
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed
impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the
questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers
granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give
effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured
that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of
society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued
herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issues:
1. W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are
part of the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through
the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements
2. Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is
unconstitutional;
Held:
1. Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic
law by transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e
treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they
have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been
transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the
Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of
ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish
that the provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law
that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to
be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule
is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to
comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS
whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via
the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24
Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes)
have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our
country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of
their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as
SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of
the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that
can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature.

2. Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come

into force for members, in the same way that conventions or
agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come
into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make

recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the
competence of the Organization for an international rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules