G.R. No.

113779-80 February 23, 1995

ALVIN TUASON y OCHOA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged with Robbery.
The incident happened when the house of Cipriana Torres was robbed and the only person inside her house is
her maid Jovina Madaraog Torres. Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City
and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog and Quintal described the physical
features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. One of those drawn by the artist was a person with
a large mole between his eyebrows.9 On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next
day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes at bench.

He was arrested more than one (1) month after the robbery. Petitioner ALVIN TUASON, 12 on the other
hand, anchored his defense on alibi and insufficient identification by the prosecution. he has lived within the
neighborhood of the Torres family since 1978. He averred that on July 19, 1988, he was mixing dough and
rushing cake orders from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon at his sisters' TipTop
bakeshop in Antipolo Street, Tondo, Manila. It takes him two (2) hours to commute daily from Lagro, Novaliches
to Tondo.

The prosecution presented Jovina and a certain Barbieto while Tuason maintained his alibi and
corroborated by the testimony of his sister Angeli Tuason.

The trial court convicted Tuason. He appelled to respondent CA which affirmed in toto the decision of
lower court. Thus, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON CA erred for ignoring or disregarding the glaring and fatal infirmities of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, specially as identification, as well as to the palpable improbability of herein petitioner
having been a supposed participant in the offenses charged, the error being tantamount to gross
misapprehension of the record.

RULING: The SC reversed the decision.

The court ruled that evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness
but the same must be credible in itself. The trial court and respondent appellate court relied mainly on the
testimony of prosecution witness Madaraog that from her vantage position near the door of the bedroom she
clearly saw how petitioner allegedly participated in the robbery. After a careful review of the evidence, we find
that the identification of petitioner made by Madaraog and Quintal is open to doubt and cannot serve as a basis
for conviction of petitioner.

it must be emphasized that of the four (4) prosecution witnesses, only the maid Madaraog actually saw
petitioner in the act of committing the crimes at bench. Witnesses Quintal and Barbieto testified they only saw
petitioner at the vicinity of the crimes before they happened. There is, however, a serious doubt whether
Madaraog and Quintal have correctly identified petitioner. At the NBI headquarters, Madaraog described
petitioner as 5'3" tall and with a big mole between his eyebrows. While Quintal also described petitioner as 5'3"
and with a black mole between his eyebrows. On the basis of their description, the NBI cartographer made a
drawing of petitioner showing a dominant mole between his eyes. As it turned out, petitioner has no mole but
only a scar between his eyes. Moreover, he is 5'8 1/2" and not 5'3" tall.
 The records do not show any fact from which the trial court can logically deduce the conclusion that
petitioner covered up his scar with black coloring to make it appear as a mole. Such an illogical reasoning cannot
constitute evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This palpable error was perpetrated by respondent
appellate court when it relied on the theory that this "fact" should not be disturbed on appeal because the trial
court had a better opportunity to observe the behavior of the prosecution witnesses during the hearing. This is a
misapplication of the rule in calibrating the credibility of witnesses. The subject finding of the trial court was not
based on the demeanor of any witnesses which it had a better opportunity to observe. Rather, it was a mere
surmise, an illogical one at that. By no means can it be categorized as a fact properly established by evidence.

The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed this claim of petitioner as self-serving. Under our law of
evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's
testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open
the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and
affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.3Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he
was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-serving.

G.R. No. 127553 November 28, 1997

EDDIE MANUEL, ROMEO BANA, ROGELIO PAGTAMA, JR. and JOEL REA, petitioners,
vs.
N.C. CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, JOHNNY LIM, ANITA SY and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), respondents.

FACTS : The security guards of respondent company caught Aurelio Guevara, and Jay Calso, taking out from
the company premises two rolls of electrical wire worth P500.00 without authority. Calso was brought to the
Pasig Police station for questioning. During the investigation, Calso named seven other employees who were
allegedly involved in a series of thefts at respondent company, among them petitioners Manuel, Bana, Pagtama,
Jr. and Rea.Petitioners received separate notices from respondent company informing them that they were
positively identified by their co-worker, Calso, They were thus invited to the Pasig police station for investigation
regarding their alleged involvement in the offense.

Atty. Ramon Reyes, private respondents' counsel conducted in their behalf an investigation regarding
petitioners' involvement in the theft. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being positively
identified by Jay Calso, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of
any criminal charge against them.Petitioners Bana and Rea filed separate resignation letters while petitioners
Manuel and Pagtama, Jr. tendered their resignations orally. Petitioner Bana's resignation letter.

Reyes accepted the resignation letter however, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents
for illegal dismissal. Petitioners alleged that they were not informed of the charge against them nor were they
given an opportunity to dispute the same. They also alleged that their admission made at the Pasig police station
regarding their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not voluntary but were obtained by
private respondents' lawyer by means of threat and intimidation.

The LA ruled in favor of petitioners and found their dismissal to be illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for a just cause. It held that petitioners
failed to adduce competent evidence to show a vitiation of their admission regarding their participation in the
theft. It further stated that such admission may be admitted in evidence because Section 12 Article III of the 1987
Constitution applies only to criminal proceedings but not to administrative proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring that
the admission of petitioners is admissible in evidence despite the fact that it was obtained in a hostile environment
and without the presence or assistance of counsel

RULING: The SC affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

The SC reject petitioners' argument that said admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section
12 Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to
protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect who had been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to
elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel
attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3) Section
12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admission made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.

In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted by
private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their employment.
Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a
crime. The investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal
investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial investigation
as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.

G.R. No. 119220 September 20, 1996

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NILO SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.

FACTS: SPO3 Niño and his team were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence
officer to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran when they
met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they
observed that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.

Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which
he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long
homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered
that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal
possession of firearm.

Solayao claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves
since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to
him after the others had been used up.

The trial court convicted the accused. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

RULING: The SC ruled that accused-appellant's arguments are hardy tenable

Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was
the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated his
constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only
was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides, inter alia:

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon, et al. 12 where this Court
declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a
lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil
that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first
undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and
arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law."

In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified himself
as a government agents. The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing,
the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming
in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused
their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant
was carrying hid a firearm.

Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence.

G.R. No. 128046 March 7, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Evidence on record shows that SPO1 Nepomuceno acted as a poseur buyer and transacted
a sale of shabu with Chua Uy. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the
accused of his constitutional rights before placing him under arrest. The team brought accused Chua
Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course
thereof, it was learned that there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the
accused. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court
to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride. However,
accused Chua Uy claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit drug allegedly seized
from him were merely "planted" by the police officers.

The trial court convicted the accused with two charges in relation to RA 6425. Unsatisfied, he
appealed from decision of trial court. RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in giving credence
to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the defense; and (2)
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of drug pushing and drug possession. He
assails the credibility of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, thus, the
female confidential agent/police informer should have testified in court to prove her claims against him.
RAMON submits that without the testimony of NBI Forensic Chemist, the prosecution's case "falls to
pieces." Bravo's testimony cannot be waived since only he could say whether the substance allegedly
seized is indeed shabu, and also determine its actual weight upon which depends the penalty to be
imposed. Thus, whatever he said in his report is hearsay and hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, has no probative value. He insists that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the
chemist but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.

ISSUE: (1) WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution and discredited
the evidence of defense.

(2) WON the testimony of NBI Forensic is considered as hearsay.

RULING: The SC find no merit.

(1) The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court because
of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may
be dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case,
when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.

As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a
buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from
him, RAMON's negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness. The failure to present
the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable
service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would
be merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the sale of the
illegal drug.

Since RAMON was caught in flagrante selling shabu, the trial court correctly ruled that his
warrantless arrest and the seizure of his attache case containing more shabu was also valid and
lawful. Besides, Ramon never raised, on constitutional grounds, the issue of inadmissibility of the
evidence thus obtained.

(2) RAMON's premise is that at the pre-trial he did not waive the Forensic Chemist's testimony
but only "stipulated on the markings of the prosecution's evidence.” The record disclosed that
during pre-trial conducted immediately after the arraignment, duly represented by counsel de
parte Atty. Gerardo Alberto, and the prosecution stipulated on the markings of the
prosecution's exhibits, and agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Loreto
F. Bravo.

RAMON nor his counsel made express admission that the contents of the plastic bags to "be
marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride.
That RAMON agreed to dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered
an admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. To bind the accused the pre-
trial order must be signed not only by him but his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is
to further safeguard the rights of the accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or
admissions which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived
his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the
facts agreed upon.

In addition to the foregoing admission by RAMON of the prosecution's exhibits, he likewise never
raised in issue before the trial court the non-presentation of Forensic Chemist Bravo. RAMON cannot
now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The familiar
rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents upon the ground of hearsay if not
urged before the court below cannot, for the first time, be raised on appeal. In U.S. v. Choa Tong where
the defense counsel did not object to the form or substance of a laboratory report that the specimen
submitted was opium, the Court ruled that "[t]he objection should have been made at the time the said
analysis was presented.

As to the reports of Forensic Chemist Bravo, it must be stressed that as an NBI Forensic
Chemist, Bravo is a public officer, and his report carries the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his function and duty. Besides, by virtue of Section 44, Rule 130, entries in official records made in
the performance of office duty, as in the case of the reports of Bravo, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. We are also aware that "the test conducted for the presence of 'shabu' (infrared
test) is a relatively simple test which can be performed by an average or regular chemistry graduate"
and where "there is no evidence to show that the positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride ('shabu') are erroneous coupled with the undisputed presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed, said results" may "adequately establish" that the specimens submitted were
indeed shabu.

G.R. No. 124832 February 1, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DANTE CEPEDA y SAPOTALO, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Conchita claims that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1994, Dante Cepeda
went to her house at Buhang, Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, and asked her to [go to] his house to
massage (hilot) his wife who was suffering from stomach ache. Regina Carba, her neighbor, was in her
house and she asked her to go with her. Cepeda was at his kitchen door when they reached his house.
He told Gina to leave as his wife, who was Muslim, would get angry if there were many people in their
home. He insisted on this many times so that Gina had to leave. Cepeda led the complainant to his
bedroom. At the door, Conchita peeped inside and saw a figure covered by a blanket whom she
presumed was Cepeda's wife. At that instance, accused immediately placed his left arm around her
shoulders and pointed a knife at the pit of her stomach saying: "Just keep quiet, do not make any noise,
otherwise I will kill you."

She elbowed him, stooped and shouted "Help!" three times but Cepeda covered her mouth then
carried her to the room by her armpits. Shaking herself, free from, his grasp, she hit her left shin at the
edge of the floor of the bedroom. Inside the room, he threatened her with a knife and ordered her to
remove her panty and lie on the bed. Afraid she did as ordered and the accused also removed his pants
and brief. He placed himself on top of her, spread her legs with his legs, inserted his penis inside her
vagina and had sexual intercourse with her at the same time embracing and kissing her. After he was
through, she ran towards the kitchen with Cepeda chasing her.

This charge is refuted by the accused claiming that he and Conchita are lovers. Conchita asked
him to leave his wife to elope with her as she would also leave her husband. He rejected this proposal
because he loved his wife and Conchita had three daughters. Conchita, according to him, was
displeased because he would not elope with her. On April 2, 1994, Conchita again came to his house
and while they were petting, somebody outside his house said: "You there, what are you doing?" At
this Conchita left his house and went home.

The trial convicted the accused with the crime of rape.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of Conchita is credible.

RULING: The appeal is bereft of merit.

Accused-appellant's allegation of an illicit amorous relationship is too shopworn to deserve

serious consideration and is totally unworthy of credence. A circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses
that the "illicit love affair" angle appears as a fabrication by accused-appellant. As an affirmative
defense, the alleged "love affair" need convincing proof. Having admitted to having had carnal
knowledge of the complainant several times, accused-appellant bears the burden of proving his
defense by substantial evidence. The record shows that other than his elf-serving assertions, there is
no evidence to support the claim that accused-appellant and private complainant were in love.

Other than accused-appellant's self-serving testimony, no other evidence like love letters,
mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged amorous relationship with private
complainant. Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this pretended illicit affair. If
accused-appellant were really the paramour of private complainant, she would not have gone to the
extent of bringing this criminal action which inevitably exposed her to humiliation of recounting in public
the violation of her womanhood. Moreover, she would not have implicated a person, who is allegedly
her lover, as the perpetrator of an abominable crime and thereby lay open their illicit relationship to
public shame and ridicule not to mention the ire of a cuckolded husband and the withering contempt of
her children were it not the truth.

Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in
itself such as one that the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this
country, women by custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution
is observed so that their reputation remains untainted. Such circumspection must have prompted the
victim to request Regina Carba to accompany her on the errand of mercy to accused-appellant's house.
Unfortunately, Carba was shooed away by accused-appellant on the pretext that his wife who was a
Muslim was averse to having too many people in their house.

In scrutinizing the credibility of witnesses, case law has established the following doctrinal
guidelines: first, the appellate tribunal will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a
showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case; second, the findings of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality since it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand; and third, a witness who
testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness.

The find the private complainant's prompt report of her defilement to her husband as well as the
authorities as convincing indications that she has been truly wronged. A complainant's act in
immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor
strengthening her credibility.