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Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not
that the case was re-raffled to another branch disallow the presentation of evidence on the incidents
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was on custody, support, and property relations. It is
being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an clear in the assailed orders that the trial court judge
Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the merely deferred the reception of evidence relating
said judge of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute to custody, support, and property relations. And the
Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02- trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge
11-10-SC, and that the case on the declaration on Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc
nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
opposed this motion. Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, evidence on custody, support, and property relations
saying that the main cause of action is the after the trial court renders a decision granting the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents petition:
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was
denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a
certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
the judgment of the trial court. that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after
ISSUE: Whether the main issue of nullity of compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
marriage must be submitted for resolution first Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Page |2
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
him. initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
RTC declared their marriage void ab initio. should be declared void without waiting for the
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE liquidation of the properties of the parties.
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon Since the property relations of the parties in art 40
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family and 45 are governed by absolute community of
Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties before a decree of annulment could be
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family issued. That is not the case for annulment of
Code” marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
ISSUE: rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the liquidation of properties owned in common by
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
Family Code ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
HELD: property relations of parties in a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The
102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
of its cause, the property relations of the parties spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
during the period of cohabitation is governed either Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of agreement between the parties or by judicial
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to liquidate
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and for declaration of nullity of marriage.
respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present: Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to 675 SCRA 642
marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband FACTS :
and wife; and Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
their marriage is void (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3
All these elements are present in this case and there minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining
is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code properties shall be divided equally between the
applies to the property relations between petitioner spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the
and respondent. children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that liabilities.Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final favor of the common children because Brigido is the
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family offending spouse.Neither party filed a motion for
Page |4
reconsideration and appeal within the period 20 of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal
days7 later or after more than nine months from the properties.
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed
before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for
RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned. dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of
ISSUE :Whether the offending spouse acquired Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial
vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
partnership. No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her
conjugal share in respondents inheritance as per the
HELD:N0,In the present case, the petitioner was settlement of the estate of respondents parents,
accorded his right to due process. First, he was well- Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on
aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979,
that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. respectively.Petitioner also prayed for a monthly
In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in
trial court divide the community assets between the the conjugal partnership; the appointment of a
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory annulment of all contracts, agreements, and
of all the community properties of the parties. documents signed and ratified by respondent with
Second, when the decision for legal separation was third persons without her consent; and payment of
promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the appearance and attorneys fees.
trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court
termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of ISSUE: Whether or not the action for dissolution of
the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim the CPG should be dismissed.
being deprived of his right to due process.
RULING:
YES.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15
UGALDE VS YSASI February 1951. The applicable law at the time of
GR NO 130623 their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code),
FACTS: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde which took effect on 30 August 1950. Pursuant to
(petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of
married before Municipal Judge Remigio Pea of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951, Rev. of gains.
Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church
wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod
City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial
ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de separation of property results in the termination of
Ysasi III. the conjugal partnership of gains:
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
April 1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly terminates:
contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor
Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and (3) When the marriage is annulled;
personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful (4) In case of judicial separation of property under
wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded Article 191. (Emphasis supplied)
Page |5
No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994 applies to and without exhausting the personal properties of
governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court Erlinda.
and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent
the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving ISSUE: WON wife’s criminal liability is chargeable to
the same issues in other tribunals or agencies as a the conjugal partnership.
form of forum shopping.
HELD:
ISSUE: NO. Article 122 of FC explicitly provides that
Whether or not the signing of one of the spouses in payment of personal debt contracted by the husband
the certification substantially complies with the rule or wife before or during the marriage shall not be
on certification of non-forum shopping. charged to the conjugal partnership except in so far
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The
Held: CPG has no duty to make payments for the liability of
YES. The petitioners were sued jointly, or as “Mr. and debtor-spouse.
Mrs.” over a property in which they have a common
interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of
them in the certification substantially complies with
the rule on certification of non-forum shopping. ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, BANKING CORPORATION
Petitioners, G.R. No. 124642
vs. February 23, 2004
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former
Division, and ROMULO NICOL, Respondents. FACTS:
G.R. No. 145222 Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.
April 24, 2009 (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President
FACTS: Alfredo Ching executed a continuing guaranty with
Civil case for damages that arose from the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI
slander filed by spouses Buado against Erlinda Nicol. defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed
RTC ruled that Erlinda is liable and ordered her to a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI.
pay for damages, which was affirmed by CA and SC. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
Court issued a writ of execution, directing against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to
the sheriff to collect indemnification from Erlinda. attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
Finding Erlinda’s personal properties insufficient, answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T.
sheriff deigned to issue a notice of levy on real Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set
property on execution, and thereafter a notice of Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that
sheriff’s sale was issued. the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff
Two days prior to the bidding, a Third Party were acquired by her and her husband during their
Claim was received at the sheriff’s office from one marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses
Arnulfo Fulo, prompting spouses Buado to put up a aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of
sheriff’s indemnity bond. Sale proceeded with the the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling
spouses Buado emerging as the highest bidder. factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal
One year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, nature of stocks under Art. 121 and that such
husband of Erlinda filed a complaint for annulment of presumption subsists even if the property is
Certificate of Sale and Damages with Preliminary registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in
injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the
and alleged that the property was directly levied upon petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not
Page |8
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
profession or business. the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred
ISSUE: WON the 100,000 shares of stocks may be from the fact that when the petitioner-husband
levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans entered into an accommodation agreement or a
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
HELD: burdened to establish that such benefit redounded
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides to the conjugal partnership.
that all the properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY
husband, or to the wife. The presumption of the vs.
conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the MAR TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C.
marriage subsists in the absence of clear, MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and RICARDO
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the A. LOPA
same. G.R. No. 143382
In this case, the evidence adduced by the November 29, 2006
petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were FACTS:
issued to and registered in its corporate books in the Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through
name of the petitioner-husband when the said its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
was done during the subsistence of the marriage of Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner
the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, approved the application and entered into a credit
thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership line agreement with respondent corporation. It was
property of the petitioners. The private respondent secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner- individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves
money.The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks jointly and severally with respondent corporation for
were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp the payment of the loan.
Investment Philippines solely in the name of the Respondent corporation was not able to pay all
petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that its debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a
owned the same. complaint against respondent corporation and
Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now individual respondents.
Article 121[2 and 3]of the Family Code of the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real
Philippines) provides: and personal properties of respondent corporation
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: and individual respondent Martinez including the
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, that it did not redound to the benefit of his family,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.
partnership. Petitioner appealed to CA. It affirmed RTC's
In this case, the private respondent failed to decision. Hence this petition.
prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s ISSUE: WON the conjugal partnership may be held
act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the
agreement with the private respondent for and in husband to accommodate a third party
Page |9
Munoz, Jr. vs Ramirez (spouses) It was error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the
CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True,
FACTS: On April 6, 1989, Eliseo(husband), a Bureau respondents were married during the effectivity of
of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged a property the CC and thus its provisions should govern their
owned by Erlinda(with consent) to the GSIS. This was property relations. With the enactment of the FC
P a g e | 10
income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall
that the joint affidavit they submitted before the of Manila.
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to
Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. During On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-
trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, meter townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Niño,
5845 and 4 were registered in the name of Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque townhouse unit).
respondent, these properties were acquired with the The Registry of Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer
money he received from the Dutch government as his Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P.
disability benefit12 since respondent did not have Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa,
sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also Japanese citizen[,] both of legal age.”
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted
before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of
invalid. bigamy (nullity of marriage case). During the
ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to assail the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the
decision of the RTC and CA? Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an
HELD: The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He
may not own lands in the Philippines. However, there asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or
are no restrictions to the ownership of buildings or encumbering all of the properties registered in her
structures on lands of foreigners. As such, the two name. At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are considered co-owned her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of
by the parties. While admitting to have previously the properties registered in her name during the
executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application
funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise and motion moot. Said undertaking was annotated on
claimed that his personal disability funds were used the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit or TCT No.
to acquire the same. The Court cannot, even on the 99791.
grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of
subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd.
purchase. A contract that violates the Constitution (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the
no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Parañaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.
The instrument was submitted to the Register of
Pacific Ace v Yanagisawa Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same
G.R. No. 175303, [April 11, 2012] date.
the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did notmake
annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage case) any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn
against Evelyn and PAFIN. owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled
that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over
For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the said question and should not have been interfered
the October 2, 1996 Order against Evelyn. It with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified
admitted, however, that it did not conduct any that it was improper for the Parañaque RTC to have
verification of the title with the Registry of Deeds reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
of Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good,
friendly and trusted neighbor.” PAFIN maintained Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the
that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership issue because
the REM because a foreign national cannot own real it was essential for the determination of the validity
properties located within the Philippines. of the REM.
Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows
2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
property with her own funds and that she has townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as
exclusive ownership thereof. his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead, Eiji
invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed
allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC),
co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT
that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution No. 99791.
with its declaration that an alien can have an interest
in real property located in the Philippines. It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity
to own real property as their defense to the suit.
ISSUE/S: They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to
own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to
1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be the REM contract for its validity. But this argument
part of the community property of a Filipina and her is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the
foreigner spouse; right asserted by Eiji. This defense does not negate
Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of
2. Whether a real property registered solely in the the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal
name of the Filipina wife is paraphernal or conjugal; with the registered property, to the annotations
entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in
3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned dismissing the complaint based on this defense.
above when the marriage is declared void?
Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate
4. Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue court’s ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN
of ownership, even as the same issue was already executed the REM in complete disregard and violation
ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in of the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and
the CA. the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did not dispute
the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on
HELD: Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the Parañaque
townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is
The petition has no merit. a mortgagee in bad faith.
No. Petitioners waited for twelve years before Whether or not the marriage between Aurelio and
claiming their inheritance and are thus guilty of Luisita is void.
laches which precludes them from assailing the
donation made by their father in favor of Maria. HELD:
Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exerting due That exception involved by respondent in accordance
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. with Art. 83 of the NCC refers to the subsequent
marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the
5. WON Lanoy Takayeng’s testimony that remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the seven
Georde gave Fani-is money to purchase the Sum-at year period has lapsed; That this exception cannot be
property means that the money came from the invoked because it was Aurelio who had left his first
proceeds of the sale of the Otucan property. wife. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to
Consejo, his subsequent marriage to respondent
No. Lanoy could not state with certainty when the Luisita was void for being bigamous. There is no basis
alleged meeting took place, the amount of money for holding that the property in question was
given by George to Fani-is and when the purchase property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and
took place or if the sale was consummated in Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the
accordance with George’s instructions. first place. Until otherwise shown in an appropriate
action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed.
Held: Petitioners have not sufficiently shown the
nullity of private respondents’ title to the lots Matabuena v. Cervantes
purchased by them. Decision of CA affirmed. G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
P a g e | 18
heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter NO, Article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to
can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had contracts, is not applicable to the present case. The
prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a case at bar is a donation propter nuptias which is not
donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there valid and did not create any right, since it was not
must be proof that the value of the donated property made in a public instrument. Article 633 provides
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the that in order that a donation of real property may be
donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is
donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said that, the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in
with the evidence then before the court, it was in any so far as its formal validity is concerned. Hence,
position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation Article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court
involved here, and to order its reduction and applied is not applicable thereto. The last named
reconveyance of the deducted portion to the article provides that, should the law require the
respondents. execution of an instrument or any other special form
in order to make the obligations of a contract
effective, the contracting parties may compel each
SOLIS V. BARROSO (53 PHIL 912) other to comply with such formality from the moment
that consent has been given, and the other
TOPIC: Article 1773 requirements for the validity of the contract exist.
FACTS: Suffice it to state that this article refers to
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso made contracts and is inapplicable to the donation in
a donation of propter nuptias of the lands described question which must be governed by the rules on
in the complaint in favor of their son AlejoLambino donations. It may further be noted, at first sight,
and Fortunata Solis in a private document in that this article presupposes the existence of a valid
consideration of the marriage which the latter were contract and cannot possibly refer to the form
about to enter into. One of the conditions of this required in order to make it valid, which it already
donation is that in case of the death of one of the has, but rather to that required simply to make it
donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would effective, and for this reason, it would, at all events,
revert to the donors while the surviving donee would be inapplicable to the donation in question, wherein
retain the other half. AlejoLambino and Fortunata the form is required precisely to make it valid.
Solis were married and immediately thereafter the Moreover, in donations propter nuptias, the marriage
donors delivered the possession of the donated lands is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being
to them. However, doneeAlejoLambino died and in the necessary to give birth to the obligation. This may be
same year donor Juan Lambino also died. After the clearly inferred from Article 1333, which makes the
latter's death, Juan’s wife recovered possession of fact that the marriage did not take place a cause for
the donated lands. the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for
The surviving doneeFortunata Solis filed the action, granted that there may be a valid donation propter
which is the subject matter of this appeal, against nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has
the surviving donors and heirs of the deceased donor not existed cannot be revoked. And such a valid
Juan Lambino, with their respective husbands, donation would be forever valid, even if the marriage
demanding of the defendants the execution of the never took place, if the proper action for revocation
proper deed of donation according to law. The court were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the
rendered judgment based upon Article 1279 of the lapse of the statutory period of prescription. This is,
Civil Code in favor of plaintiff. so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias
is rather a resolutory condition which, as such,
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 1279 of the Civil presupposes the existence of the obligation which
Code is applicable may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition
necessary for the birth of the obligation.
RULING:
P a g e | 20
Valencia v Loquiao
GR 122134, October 3, 2003
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: