St.

Thomas Aquina Natural Law

Through his wisdom God is the founder of the universe of things . . . .And so, as being the principle through which the universe is created, divine wisdom
means art, or exemplar, or idea, and likewise it also means law, as moving all things to their due ends. Accordingly the Eternal law is nothing other than
the exemplar of divine wisdom directing the motions and acts of everything.
St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Q. 93,a.1

Best Known Works (two systematic treatises):

(a) Summa Contra Gentiles (A Summary Against the Gen-tiles): an apology for the Christian faith; aims was to show that the Christian faith rests on a
rational foundation and that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily lead to a view of the world which excludes Christianity either implicitly or
explicitly.

(b) Summa Theologica (A Summary of Theology): a sys-tematic and summary exposition of theology for "novices" in this branch of study; divided into 3
parts; but the second part is itself divided into 2 parts, known respectively as the Prima secundae (first part of the second part) and the Secunda
secundae (second part of the second part):

Theory of the Natural Law

Metaphysical world-View

Neo-Platonic Theory of Participation –

Where many beings are found to be – intrinsically similar in that they share some one perfection common to all yet are diverse (dissimilar), this
common perfection of similarity cannot find its adequate sufficient reason in these many participants precisely as many and diverse. The only adequate
sufficient reason for this common sharing must be some one unitary source from which this common perfection derives.
What all beings share in common is the act of existence itself. Hence, all beings necessarily point back to one single ultimate source of existence itself.

Thomistic Synthesis:

- Aristotle’s concern with change, Aquinas transformed into the question of existence: God is both efficient and final cause of all beings.
- Relation between beings and Being is conceptualized in terms of the Neo-Platonic theory of Participation.

Aquinas existentialized both Aristotle and Plato to show that all beings not only come from God as their First Cause but also return to Him as to their
perfection as the Final Cause.

The Great Circle of Being:

The Universe as Journey.

But no sooner has the outgoing journey begun than it pivots upon itself and starts back on a journey home again to its Source ( reditus), drawn by the
pull of the Good in each being. This pull arises as the inner act of being of each thing pours over into its characteristic goal-oriented action, seeking the
fullness of its own perfection, and drawn to this goodness ultimately, through the channels of participation, by the same Infinite Goodness from which
its original act of existence flowed in the first place, but this time as Final Cause.

CONCLUSION
It is this metaphysical framework–God as both first and final cause--that enables Aquinas to assert that from the very fact that the human being has a
nature, he is dynamically oriented toward a goal, a final end. This orientation toward a final end is not something up to the human being's free choice; it
is already inscribed in her nature, and her will in particular, as an a priori necessary tendency she can do nothing about.
The moral life, in this context, involves the realm of the human being's free choice as he walks to ward or away from his end--who is God. (Metaphysics
of Natural Law, 148)

The Nature of Law in General

 “Law is a kind of direction or measure for human activity through which a person is led to do something or held back.” (Q.90,a.1)
Now direction and measure come to human acts from reason.” (Q.90,a.1)
Taken as a rule and measure, law can be present in two man-ners, first, and this is proper to the reason, as in the ruling and measuring principle, and in
this manner it is in the reason alone; second, as in the subject ruled and measured, and in this man-ner law is present wherever it communicates a
tendency to something, which tendency can be called derivatively, though not essentially, a ‘law.’ (Q.90,a.1)

“Law is engaged above all with the plan of things for human happiness…every law is shaped to the common good.” (Q.90,

It is nothing than a reasonable direction of beings toward the common good, promulgated by the one who is charged with the community. (ST,I-
II,q.90,a.4,c
As stated above, law is nothing but a dictate of practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a complete community. Granted that the world is
ruled by divine Providence, . . . [then] it is evident that the whole community of the universe is governed by God’s mind. Therefore the ruling idea of
things which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them all has the nature of law. . . . It follows that this law should be called eternal. (Q.91,a.1,c)

Ideas in the divine mind and in the human mind do not stand in the same relationship to things. For the human mind is measured by things, in such
wise that its concept is not true of itself, but because it agrees with a thing. According to what a thing is or is not objectively so the view we form of it is
true or false. God’s mind, however, is the measure of things, for, as we have shown, each has truth to the extent that it reflects the divine mind.
Consequently the divine mind is true of itself, and hence the exemplar there is truth itself. (Q 93, a.1, R.3).

The Eternal Law is nothing other than the exemplar of divine wisdom directing the motions and acts of everything. (Q.93,a.1)

Law is a rule and measure, as we have said, and therefore can exist in two manners, first as in the thing which is the rule and measure, second as in the
thing that is ruled and measured, and the closer the second to the first the more regulated and measured it will be. Since all things are regulated and
measured by Eternal Law, as we have seen, it is evident that all somehow share in it, in that their tendencies to their own proper acts and ends are from
its impression. (Q.91,a.2)

A thing may be known in two ways, the first, in itself, the other, in its effects, in which some likeness to it is discovered, as when not seeing the sun itself
we nevertheless see daylight. So then it should be said that no one, except God himself and the blessed who see him in his essence, can know the
Eternal Law as it is in itself, but that every rational creature can know about it according to some dawning, greater or lesser, of its light. (Q 93, a.2)

The natural law is nothing other than the sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures.

Precepts of the Natural law

The precepts of the natural law are to human conduct what the first principles of thought are to demonstration. There are several first principles of
thought, and so, also, several precepts of natural law. (Q.94,a.2)

That which first appears is the real, and some insight into this is included in whatsoever is apprehended. This first indemonstrable principle, ‘There is no
affirming and denying the same simultaneously’, is based on the very nature of the real and the non-real: on this principle, as Aristotle notes, all other
propositions are based.

To apply the analogy: as to be real first enters into human apprehending as such, so to be good first enters the practical reason’s apprehending when it
is bent on doing something. For every agent acts on account of an end, and to be an end carries the meaning of to be good.

SYNDERESIS
The first principle for the practical reason is based on the meaning of good, namely that it is what all things seek after. And so this is the first command
of law, ‘that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided’. (Q94,a.2)

Reason, reflecting upon human beings’ natural inclinations, promulgates the order of the primary precepts of natural law which follows the order of
natural inclinations:

1. Every substance tends to conserve its existence according to its own kind. Together with all substances, human beings have a natural
tendency to preserve their being, and reason reflecting on this tendency as present in human beings promulgates the precept, that life is to
be preserved.

2. Human beings have inclinations that is common to all animals. These are inclinations involving propagation of species and bringing up offspringS.
Again, reason reflecting on these tendencies, promulgates the precept that the species is to be propagated and children educated.

3. Human beings have inclinations proper to rational beings. In virtue of the rational nature of human beings, there are those inclinations to
know the truth, live in society . . . etc. Again, reason, reflecting on these inclinations of the rational nature, promulgates such precepts as
human beings should seek the truth and avoid ignorance, especially about those things knowledge of which is necessary for the right ordering
of human lives, and that human beings should live in society with others.

According to the natural law, then, everything that is right by nature is right either
– because the universal nature of being is such, or
– because the universal nature of animal is such, or
– because the rational nature is such.

Secondary Precepts of the Natural Law

Reason, reflecting further on human nature can discover even less general and more particular precepts. There is a decreasing generality in the
precepts.

The moral agent's action may begin with the more universal precepts. But she cannot stop there because the more universal the precept is, the less it
has to say about what action to pursue. Hence, the moral agent, in the process of practical reasoning, must move forward beyond the realm of general
rules through a series of more and more particular judgments, until eventually reaching the single decision to act or not to act.

We can thus isolate three moments in the whole process of applying the natural law:
First, we are disposed to “do good and avoid evil.” This is synderesis: the disposition by which a human being is in possession of the fundamental
principle of morality.
Second, reason discerns the matter at hand and applies the general principles of natural law to the concrete situation.
Third, there is the judgment to do something because it is good or avoid it because it is evil. This whole process is what we call conscience

Further Clarifications:
First: The term, “natural law” itself is misleading because it implies that ethical laws are like "laws of nature" or scientific laws.
Second: It also misleading to think of it as being similar to civil law: they apply equally to all human beings, regardless of the conventions, customs, or
beliefs of their particular society.

Therefore, we can say that natural law refers to ethical guidelines or rules that stipulate what people ought to do rather than what they in fact do, and
that they apply equally to all humanity because they are rooted in human nature itself.

Third: Note the Significant Role of Reason: Through reason, the human being can reflect on his fundamental inclinations of his nature (Remember:
these are inclinations to the dev-elopment of his potentials and attainment of his good).
And then, having reflected on his fundamental inclinations, the human being promulgates to himself the natural moral law.
Thus, by the light of his reason, the human being can arrive at some knowledge of the natural law. And since this law is a participation in or reflection
of the eternal law – the human being is not left in ignorance of the eternal law which is the ultimate rule of all conduct.

Further Questions:
a) But why should we take our "inclinations" seriously?
There are two modes in the determination of judgment:
 Way of cognition: I take a certain judgment, let us say, s is p, and I wonder how it is determined. Roughly, it may be determined by antecedent
cognitions. Perhaps, the predicate is really contained in the subject (analytic). Or we take a proposition of experience, and we determine the truth of
this proposition by antecedent knowledge.
 Way of inclination: Many judgments are determined not by way of cognition but by way of inclination. We say "yes" or "no" to all sorts of
propositions as a result of inclination. Is this arbitrary thinking? In many cases, cognition is not available and all we have is judgment by way of
inclination.

Very often though, in the case of natural law, the inclination involved is not purely intellectual. We cannot give a strictly demons-trable justification for
our knowledge of the natural law. All we can say perhaps is that the inclination involved is that of the good, honest will, and the expert is the prudent,
the wise.

Thus: We can conclude that the natural law is known by reason, but reason sort of divines our inclinations.

b) Is natural moral law one and the same for all human beings?
Obviously, one and the same for all, in its primary and more easily known rules. As for secondary precepts, although more complicated, they are still
rather close in meaning to primary principles. Hence, they are relatively right for all and are known to all, in most cases. But the more particular we
get, the more remote are these precepts from the primary. These precepts are not easily known by all.
What this means is that the more particular moral precepts, requiring developed capacities of practical reasoning, may be erroneously or
inadequately grasped by some people who are led astray by bad reasoning or corrupt habits.

(c) Can Natural Law be Changed?

It is sometimes claimed that human nature is always and everywhere the same, hence natural moral laws must be permanent and incapable of change.
This claim is too rigorous and simplistic.
On the basis of decreasing universality: the primary precepts remain immutable. But as we move to more particular precepts, these can be "changed"--
i.e., the circumstances of an act may be such that it no longer falls under the class of actions prohibited by reason.

In its general form then, the precepts remains valid.

CONCLUSION

All other things being equal, we hold that it is better to live than to die, that it is better that mothers should take care of their babies rather
than dispose of them, that it is better not to lie than to lie. This is so because of what these things are: because a human being is a being, because a
mother is a mother, because human beings are rational agents.
We express these natures rationally, and thus we have the first component of the definition of law: it is a work of the reason. But it is a
reason measured by things, which bows before things: that is what we mean when we say that things are right by nature.
Thus, the natural law exists in nature before it exists in our judgment, and it enjoys the latter existence – that is what natural law means! – by reason
of what the nature of things is.
Even then, human reason is not the ultimate, but only the proximate or immediate promulgator of the natural moral law. As mentioned
before, this law is not without a relation to something above itself: it is related always to the eternal law.