TOPIC: Definition of Statutory Construction same process of selecting winners, drawing of stubs, as the “Regional Contests”.

The contest is to be open to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers".
Participation in the contest also did not require a fee to be paid or Caltex products
- Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution vests judicia​l ​power in the
to be bought.
Supreme Court and such other courts established by law.
- Judicial powers includes:
Foreseeing the extensive use of mails or the postal system in the promotion of the
- “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
contest, Caltex asked the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
involving the rights which are legally demandable and
advance for its possible violation against the Postal Law or sections 1954(a), 1982
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. These sections condemns as
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud
jurisdiction on any part of any branch or instrumentality of the
orders against, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to,
government”
any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the
- “the right to determine actual controversies arising between
distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction”
of any kind".Despite this, the Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme
- The exercise by the courts of judicial power in resolving actual
falls within the purview of the provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the
controversies often times requires the construction of statutes
requested clearance.
- Construction
- “The act or result of construing, interpreting or explaining the
ISSUE​: Whether or not the scheme proposed by the Caltex is within the coverage
meaning or effect of a statute or contract
of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?

Caltex vs. Palomar RULING

NO. The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence,

FACTS
In 1960, Caltex Inc. conceptualized a promotional scheme entitled “Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest” to drum up patronage for its oil products. The mechanics of the
contest requires individuals to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense at a certain time. The promotional
scheme would be a three-stage winner selection system. The top winner in the
station level or “Dealer contest”, whose estimate is the closest amount of liters in
the hooded gas pump of a specific station,” would then participate in the next stage
or the “Regional Contests”. Unlike the “Dealer Contest”, the winners in this level
would come from the drawing of participant stubs. The winners in this stage would
then go to the final stage or “National Contest”. This level would also have the
concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate means, and to
avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its
products. In contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the enforcement
of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress
transgressions thereof — particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under
Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. To the appellee, the
uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction
hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the
suppression of the appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he
has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty.
But the Court cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is
here no question of construction because the said appellant "simply applied the
clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the
contest", hence, there is no room for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose
lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter
of their application to the appellee's contest.
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law ​with respect to its application to a
given case​, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, ​by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law​. Whether or not
the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used therein.
The appellant underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in
this case if he believes that it will not have the final and pacifying function that a
declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will
be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction,
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal
system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions
assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby
but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
The SC then ruled that the issue calls for the construction of Section 1954 of the
Revised Administrative Code, inasmuch as the resolution of the question of
whether the scheme falls within the prohibitive provisions of the aw “inescapable
requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used there it. It found
that that the term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc.,
and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. In this case, prize and chance are
present but lacks the element of consideration. Viewed from all angles or turned
inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would
brand it as a lottery. The term “gift lottery” is also not applicable to this case. If
“lottery” and “gift lottery” are similar in meaning, it is only logical that the term under
a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only
if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so
construed
TOPIC: When Construction is Necessary
People vs. Mapa
FACTS
This is an appeal of a judgment of conviction from the lower court’s decision to
convict the accuse of “the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the
costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of
the Government."
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, a secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then
Governor of Batangas, is accused of violating of Section 878 in connection with
Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code. This came about when Mapa
was found to be in possession of one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, and six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret
agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition?
RULING
NO. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used
in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and
public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such
he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts
is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." The
conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. The accused also
cannot use People vs. Macarandang for his defense since it is not within the power
of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision
DECISION: ​Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Daong vs. Municipal Judge
FACTS
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a
petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption
of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. But on 22 April, 1971, Roderick
and Rommel Daoang filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971,
and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil
Code?
RULING
LAW: Art. 335. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
The Court, however, found that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the
Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in
law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren or
"to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate
to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude
what is not included".
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that
only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of
statutory construction.
DECISION​: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED.
Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
TOPIC: Characteristics of Construction
Art or Process
 - Construction of statutes is not an exact science = it doesn’t depend on a
set of formulas = not readily applicable
- Statue may be interpreted differently if different maxims of construction
are applied
- The principles of statutory law construction should not be used if its
application will run counter to the clear legislative intent which can be
determined from the other parts of the law
- The very NATURE of construction lends itself to subjectivity and
uncertainty
Involves Determination of Legislative Intent
Necessary when legislative intent cannot be readily
ascertained from the words used in law as applied under a set
of facts
Alonzo vs. IAC
FACTS
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal ​pro indiviso ​shares a parcel of land
registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share
of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the
same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the
sum of P 440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an
area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with
their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house
on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem
the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla
Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother.
The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted
of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with
her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition
ISSUE
RULING
LAW: Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows: Should any of the heirs
sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price
of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that
intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to ​render
justice.
Thus, the Court interprets and applies the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. To be sure, there are ​some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances​. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that circumstances of this case.
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. "Courts are apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, DECISION: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them.”​ ​While we admittedly respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered
way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
Judicial Functions
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is
properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting
time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it Endencia vs. David
is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to
begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a FACTS
day or two.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590, which contained a provision that removed
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was all income tax exemptions of public officers, including that of judges.
invoked not ​days ​but ​years ​after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The
complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and
Justices Endencia and Jugo of the Court of Appeals filed a case to declare it
fourteen years after the second sale. By this time, the right of redemption had
unconstitutional before the CFI of Manila. The CFI of Manila ruled in their favor and
already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired
declared the said provision unconstitutional. It also ordered the Collector of Internal
Also, in the face of the established facts, the Court cannot accept the private Revenue, Saturno David, to refund the income tax collected from the magistrates.
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother
and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, the Court Citing Perfecto v. Meer, the trial court declared that the collection of income taxes
would be closing their eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim was a diminution of magistrates’ compensation. This allegedly violated Sec. 9,
of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which states that “members of the Supreme
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive compensation will not be
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, diminished during their continuance in the office.”
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
The Solicitor General argued that the Republic Act was promulgated precisely
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is deviating from the strict letter of the law, because of the unfavorable reception of the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer.
which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify
the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. What the Court is
and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers?

RULING
Article VIII SEC. 9 of the Constitution: ​ The members of the Supreme Court and
all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach
the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, ​which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office​. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:​ No salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
The situation, the Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution,
particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from
payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a
diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes
the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a
judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds
to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is
assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged
with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the
interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not,
it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of
the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and
has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch
may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy
vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature
by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional
because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty
of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is
imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute
is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give
effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial
matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion
that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the
judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most
important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions
and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of
the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress
says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation.
This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the
phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute
is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914,
emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional
provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional
inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is
assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them.
This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution,
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may
declare what a law means,or what a specific portion of the Constitution means,
especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and
instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the
Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That
would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly
those governing the separation of powers.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial
officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that
the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting
a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
DECISION:​ In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
TOPIC: Purpose of Construction; limits the power
of construction
Purpose of Construction; determining legislative intent
Nitafan vs. CIR
FACTS
Petitioners submit that they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Despite the Court dealing with the matter administratively (allowed the the
deduction of withholding tax of the Justices of the SC and other members of the
judiciary), the filling of this present petition led to the Court’s decision to deal with
the issue with a judicial pronouncement. The Court hereby reiterates that the
salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject to a general income tax law
applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by
Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not Justices and Judges of the SC have the privilege of tax
exemptions as mentioned in Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: ​NO
LAW: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution: Section 13. The salary of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of the
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos
There was a clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the
proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of
the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of
Government". In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made
clear, specially with regard to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted
amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of
members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the
final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987.
During the debates of the draft article, there was a debate on whether to include
the provision that Justices and Judges of the SC had tax exemptions.
FR. BERNAS said: Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment
saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to income
tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just fall back on
the decision in Perfecto vs Meer and in Dencia vs. David [should be Endencia and
Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which excludes them from income tax, but rather
I would propose that the statement will read: "During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL
INCOME TAX."IN support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to
be that the justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they
already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there are
many people who have accepted employment in the government involving a
reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So, they are not the
only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service in government.
xxxxx
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the General
Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after "DECREASED," it is on
the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David will
not apply anymore.
The proposed amendment of Fr. Bernas was discussed and agreed upon without
objection.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.10 The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution.11it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs. David
14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning
and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted
DECISION: ​WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby
dismissed.
People vs. Conception
FACTS
By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of
the Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension
of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. This
special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum order of President
Concepcion dated May 17, 1918, limiting the discretional power of the local
manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and discount negotiable documents to
P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to P10,000. Pursuant to this
authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm of "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C.," the only security required consisting of six demand notes.
The notes, together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.
ISSUE: ​W/N the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion an "indirect loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
RULING
Section 35 of Act No. 2747​: "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly,
grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to
agents of the branch banks."
Section 49 of Act No. 2747: ​"Any person who shall violate any of the provisions
of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of
the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of
the bank. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar
maxim that no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes
with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the
husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business
venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls
within the prohibition.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is
shown by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to
mingle his personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan
P300,000 to a partnership of no established reputation and without asking for
collateral security. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is plainly to erect
a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank.
DECISION
Limitation on the power of the courts to construe
Tanada vs. Yulo
FACTS
Juan Tanada, the petitioner, was appointed a justice of the peace of Alabat,
Tayabas by the Governor-General with the consent of Ph. Commission. On his
own request, he was transferred from Alabat to the municipality of Perez, Tayabas.
Upon reaching the age of 65, Tanada was directed by the Judge of First Instance
of Tayabas (acting upon instructions from the DOJ) to cease to act as a justice of
the peace pursuant to provisions of Sec 203 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act No. 3899. This provides that “present justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed
sixty-five years of age, shall cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred
and thirty-three.” Tanada surrendered his office under protest, and thereafter
instituted this original action for quo warranto.
He argues that he is not covered by the mandatory requirement because he
reached the age of 65 on October 5 1934 aka after the effectivity of Art. No. 3899.
It is stated that we have examined microscopically word for word the terminology
used. Having done so, it is supposedly clear that a justice of the peace who
became 65 on Oct. 5 1934, was not included in law that ceases the holding of
office on January 1 1933.
On the other hand, the respondent argued that a liberal construction of Art No.
3899 is called for, considering the seeming defect in the language of the law used
when a literal interpretation thereof would lead to a conclusion that only those
justices of the peace who turned 65 years old before the effectivity are covered by
the mandatory retirement provision. By the liberal construction of statutes, courts
from the language used, subject matter, and purpose are able to find out their true
meaning/legislative intent.
It is crucial to note that there is a difference between construction of the nature
above and the act of a court to engraft something in the law which has been
omitted. The first is liberal construction thus a legitimate exercise of judicial power decision of the higher court. It is understood that the transfer simply depicts a
whereas the latter is a judicial legislation which is forbidden. change of jurisdiction not a new appointment.

ISSUE DECISION

1. W/N Act. No. 3899 applies to all justices of the peace who reach the age of 65 Accordingly, the writ will be granted and the petitioner Juan Tanada will be placed
years in possession of the office of justice of the peace of Perez, Tayabas. So ordered,
without special pronouncement as to the costs.
2. W/N the acceptance of a transfer by Tanada denotes a new appointment
bringing him within the purview of the cited law
Floresca vs. Philex
RULING
FACTS
1. ​No​. Act. No. 3899 does not apply to a justice of the peace appointed prior to the
approval of the Act who completed 65 years after January 1, 1933. The SC held ISSUE
that Tanada was not included in the law. Cited here is the case of Regalado v.
Yulo in which they rule that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the approval of RULING
the act and who completed 64 years of age is not affected by the act fixed for
cessation from office. DECISION
It is important that the determination of the legislative intent is the primary
consideration. This principle must be adhered to even though the court is
convinced by extraneous circumstances that the Legislation intended to enact
something quite different from what it did enact. An obscurity cannot be created to
be cleared up by construction and hidden meanings at variance with the language
used cannot be sought out.

2. ​No​. The Organic Act states that the appointment of a justice of the peace by the
Governor-General must be consented to by the Senate. In this case, the transfer of
Tanada was done without the advice and consent of the Senate. The case
referenced here is Nicolas v. Alberto in which it was decided that the consent of
Senate was a necessary attribute. But when taken to the US SC, it was held that
consent was unnecessary. In accordance with the decision of the SC in that case,
it overrules the second defense of the government as it is our duty to follow the