People v.

Balbar, 21 SCRA 1119

FACTS:

Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where schoolteacher Ester Gonzales was conducting
her classes. Without warning, he allegedly placed his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked,
Gonzales instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to flee. He allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local
dagger) and pursued her, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Balbar
embraced her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of
which complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness were filed. Balbar was accused with of the crime of Assault upon a Person in Authority,
committed as he did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Gonzales, a public school
teacher, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the
occasion. That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside
the public school building and during school classes.

The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that the complaint charged two offenses
which constitute only one and that he shall then be placed in double jeopardy. The Court a quo agreed.

The information of Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority was quashed on the ground that
"while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main allegations of the information
may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important element of the crime of direct
assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential element is the knowledge of the accused
that the victim is a person in authority. The Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance
to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries."

ISSUE:

Whether or not quashing the information for Direct Assault should be set aside by reason of
absence of knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority

HELD:

NO. The lower court’s dismissal of the information on the ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority is clearly erroneous.
 Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she
was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge
on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law
and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).

Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance."

By express provision of law "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority,
in applying the provisions of Article 148." to give them protection, dignity, and respect while in the
performance of their official duties.

WHOLE STORY

G.R. No. L-20216 and L-20217 November 29, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TIBURCIO BALBAR, defendant-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro M. Belmi for defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

On August 20, 1960 defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where
schoolteacher Ester Gonzales, complainant herein, was conducting her classes. Without warning
and right after complainant had finished writing on the blackboard, defendant allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, complainant instinctively pushed Balbar away
and tried to flee. Defendant allegedly brought out his "daga" (a local dagger) and pursued
complainant, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Defendant embraced
her again, at the same time holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which
complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Two informations, one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority and another for Acts of
Lasciviousness(Criminal Cases Nos. 823 and 841 respectively) were filed by the Assistant Provincial
Fiscal against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the latter charge upon
written complaint filed by the offended party duly sworn to before the Clerk of Court.

The information for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority is hereunder quoted:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault
upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Camba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
 above named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss
Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school building of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or on the occasion
therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, braced and kissed, and repeatedly trying to
embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of having committed it inside the public school building and
during school classes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The information for Acts of Lasciviousness reads:

At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case the undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses TIBURCIO BALBAR of the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in the Barrio of Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with the deliberate intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of lasciviousness on the person of Miss Ester
Gonzales, a public school teacher, by then and there placing himself close to her, embracing
and kissing her against her will and by means of force, and as a consequence thereof said
offended party fell to the floor resulting to her injury which caused her pain and tenderness
on the right side of the trunk on the posterior surface of the right arm which injuries may
require 3 to 4 days to heal; that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance
that the same was perpetrated inside the public school building and during class hour.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The accused filed separate motions to quash, contending that "(a) with respect to Criminal Case No.
823 for Direct Assault, the information does not charge a sufficient cause of action and that it
charges two offenses in a single complaint; and (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 841 for Acts of
Lasciviousness, . . . that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy and that the complaint
charges two offenses." On August 16, 1962, over the opposition of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal,
the court a quo issued an order quashing the two informations. Said the court:

After reading the informations in both criminal cases, the Court agrees with counsel that the
acts committed by the accused as alleged in the two informations constitute one offense.

As regards the motion to quash filed in Criminal Case No. 841, the grounds alleged in
support thereof are: (1) that the accused would be placed in double jeopardy; and (2) that the
criminal complaint charges two offenses. Without discussing the merits of these grounds
above-quoted, the Court believes that the information filed in Criminal Case No. 841 should
be dismissed or quashed for the reason that the offense charged therein is already absorbed
in the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 823.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, it is the opinion of this Court that the information in Criminal Case No. 823
which charges only unjust vexation or physical injuries should be quashed for the reason that
the same is within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. And, as to the
information in criminal Case No. 841, the same should likewise be quashed on the ground
that the acts complained of is already included in Criminal No. 823.
From this order, the Government interposed the present appeal.

Stated differently in the rationale of its order, the court a quo quashed Criminal Case No. 823 on the
following ground: That "while the offense is designated as direct assault, nevertheless the main
allegations of the information may at most constitute unjust vexation for the reason that an important
element of the crime of direct assault is conspicuously absent in the information. This essential
element is the knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority. . . .This being the
case and since . . . sufficient allegations are contained in the information in question to hold the
accused responsible for an offense, the Court believes that the information is sufficient in substance
to at least constitute unjust vexation or physical injuries."

Direct assault is committed "by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, . . . shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents,
while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such performance." (See Art.
148, Revised Penal Code.)

By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed
persons in authority, in applying the provisions of Article 148." This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express
allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person
in authority. This is clearly erroneous.

Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that fact,
since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew
that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law. It matters not that
such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority
being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his
part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal
(De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.

With respect to the dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, we agree with the
conclusion reached by the court a quo. Although it is true that the same acts may constitute more
than one offense, we are of the opinion, upon an examination of the events which gave rise to the
filing of the two aforementioned informations, that the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness does not
appear to have been committed at all.

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct
makes one amendable to the provisions of article 439 (now article 336) of the Penal Code.
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of
each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd
and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say where the line of
demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover. (U. S.
v. Gomez, 30 Phil. 22, 25)

The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. In the instant case, considering the manner, place and time under
which the acts complained of were done, even as alleged in the information itself, lewd designs can
hardly be attributed to accused. The factual setting, i.e., a schoolroom in the presence of
complainant's students and within hearing distance of her co-teachers, rules out a conclusion that
the accused was actuated by a lustful design or purpose or that his conduct was lewd or lascivious.
It may be that he did embrace the girl and kiss her but, this of itself would not necessarily bring the
case within the provision of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the order of the court a quo quashing the information for Direct Assault is hereby set
aside and this case is remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits; and with respect to the
dismissal of the information for Acts of Lasciviousness, the same is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
COMPLETE STORY

GODOFREDO MORALES, Petitioner, v. SKILLS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY AND/OR MAHER DAAS

AND MARIVIC DAAS AND/OR WALLAN AL WALLAN, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 1 dated 28
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58795. The Court of Appeals' Decision dismissed petitioner's Petition
for Certiorari and had, in effect, affirmed the Resolution 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which in turn sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter 3 that petitioner did not have a cause of
action against respondent Skills International Company (Skills International).

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 1 September 1997, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondent Skills International before the NLRC
claiming that he was illegally dismissed from service by his foreign employer, Wallan Al Wallan. In his
Complaint, 4 petitioner sought the payment of the following: unpaid salaries for one and one-half months;
refund of his plane fare; illegal deductions; attorney's fees and litigation expenses; and moral and
exemplary damages. The complaint was amended on 2 October 1997 5 to implead respondents Maher Daas,
Marivic Daas, and Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner likewise sought the payment of these items: the six and one-
half months unexpired portion of his contract; refund of the amount of 5,000.00 Saudi Riyals allegedly
deducted from his salary; unpaid overtime pay and medical care.

In his Position Paper, 6 petitioner alleged that his employment was illegally terminated on 14 April 1997 in
gross violation of the Constitution and of the Labor Code. Because of this, he claimed that he was entitled to
receive payment for the unexpired portion of his employment agreement as well as moral, exemplary, and
nominal damages, and attorney's fees.

For its part, respondent Skills International alleged that it previously deployed petitioner for work abroad in
April 1995 until he came home in July 1996. Later on, petitioner met his new employer at respondent Skills
International's office in Malate, Manila. Respondent Skills International, however, clarified that petitioner's
new employer, Wallan Al Wallan, was not its accredited principal. This being the case, it argued that
petitioner did not have any cause of action against it because as a recruitment agency, it could only be held
solidarily liable with the employer if the latter is an accredited principal of the agency. Respondent Skills
International also averred that petitioner's deployment was processed under the Balik Manggagawa program
of the government so that he could immediately return to work abroad.7

On 31 July 1998, Labor Arbiter Felipe Pati rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the case for lack of merit stating
that if there was anyone liable for petitioner's illegal dismissal, it was none other than his foreign employer,
Wallan Al Wallan.

Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC but the same was resolved against him 9 prompting petitioner
to elevate his case to the Court of Appeals. In the Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals
dismissed his Petition for Certiorari with the decretal portion of the Decision stating:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.10

In sustaining the NLRC, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner's arguments were a mere reiteration of
those he earlier presented before the NLRC and which were already passed upon by the latter.11 The Court
of Appeals also held that petitioner failed to present any basis to support his argument that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving the case in favor of respondent Skills International.12

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied; 13 hence, the present recourse where
petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its findings that:
A. ) There is no formal, valid and signed contract of employment that binds the petitioner and the private
respondents;

b.) Petitioner was hired directly by his foreign employer and was processed as a Balik-Manggagawa; and

c.) Petitioner did not pay any placement fee and he did not mention that he was deducted placement fee by
the respondent [Skills International].14

Petitioner claims that the relationship between Wallan Al Wallan and respondent Skills International was
sufficiently established when the latter stated in its Position Paper that it was in its office in Malate, Manila,
where petitioner met his new employer. Petitioner insists that if Wallan Al Wallan were not an accredited
principal of respondent Skills International, then he had no business being in the latter's office. But since as
petitioner and Wallan Al Wallan met each other within the confines of respondent Skills International's office,
it can be said that respondent Skills International had a hand in their meeting. More than this, it was
respondent Skills International which handled his deployment for work abroad as a balik-manggagawa.

Petitioner also points out that in the medical examination report dated 6 September 1996 issued by Angelina
Apostol Punzalan Medical Clinic, 15 it is clearly stated that it was respondent Skills International which
recommended him for physical examination. He argues that the medical clinic would not have attended to
him had it not been for the referral of respondent Skills International as under Section 3, Rule VII, Book II
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment, 16 "[m]edical examination of workers for overseas employment shall be conducted only after
the agency and/or its principal shall have interviewed and trade tested or have pre-qualified the worker for
an existing overseas position duly covered by an approved job order." 17

Likewise, in the Standard Employment Contract for Various Skills 18 which petitioner signed, it is stated that
his local placement agency is respondent Skills International while his principal in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, is
Wallan Al Wallan. Petitioner claims that while he signed and even affixed his thumbmark on said contract, he
avers that he could not explain why no responsible officer or employee of respondent Skills International
signed said document.

In addition, petitioner maintains that he does not fall within the category of balik-manggagawa as the term
refers to "a landbased contract worker who is on vacation or on emergency leave, and who is returning to
the same work site to resume his employment." 19 Obviously then, he should not have been considered as
a balik-manggagawa since he was neither here on vacation nor on emergency leave; instead, he went back
abroad under an entirely new employment contract.

As for the lack of placement fee he paid to respondent Skills International, petitioner claims that the Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals failed to take notice of the receipt, written in Saudi Arabian
language, showing that his employer abroad deducted 5,000 Saudi Riyals from his salary as placement
fee.20

Given these circumstances, petitioner concludes that respondent Skills International should be held liable to
him for the illegal dismissal perpetuated by its accredited principal, Wallan Al Wallan, as provided for under
Section [60] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 21 which states:

Section 60. Solidary Liability. - The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency
on any and all claims under this Rule shall be joint and solidary. This liability shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond
to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.

If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not
be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.

On the other hand, respondent Skills International insists that this Petition should be dismissed as it seeks a
review of the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals - a task which clearly
does not fall within the ambit of a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Nevertheless, respondent Skills
International proceeded to address the matters stated in the Petition. It contends that although it had
previously deployed petitioner abroad, such deployment was for its accredited principal, the Saudi
Automotive Services Company and not for Wallan Al Wallan. While it may be true that Wallan Al Wallan and
petitioner met one another at its office, respondent Skills International argues that this does not readily lead
to the conclusion that Wallan Al Wallan was its accredited principal. As one of its officers is from the Middle
East, respondent Skills International avers that it is customary that it invites visitors from said region to
come to their office.

Anent the medical examination which was undergone by petitioner, respondent Skills International claims
that it could not have possibly recommended him for such a procedure as precisely, there was no job order
as far as Wallan Al Wallan's company was concerned.

Respondent Skills International also denies having facilitated petitioner's deployment as an alleged balik-
manggagawa as petitioner's Balik-Manggagawa Information Sheet does not indicate the name of any local
placement or recruitment agency. Moreover, on 19 June 1998, POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson issued
an Order, 22 the pertinent portion of which reads:

The issue posed for Our resolution is whether or not the respondent agency (herein respondent) should be
held liable for withholding worker's salaries should be resolved in the negative. As discussed, complainant
(herein petitioner) was hired directly by his employer and the respondent agency had no participation
whatsoever in his overseas employment. Wanting in factual and legal [bases], the charged offense must be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant case be, as it is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of
merit.23

Respondent Skills International also insists that it did not receive placement fee from petitioner for the
simple reason that it did not deploy him to work abroad for Wallan Al Wallan and that only petitioner and
said employer are the ones privy to the circumstances surrounding the alleged salary deductions committed
by the latter.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Skills International
could be held solidarily liable for the alleged illegal dismissal of petitioner necessarily hinges on the
primordial question of whether respondent Skills International was the one responsible for his deployment
abroad. This indubitably raises a question of fact which is not a proper subject of a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. It is axiomatic that in an appeal by certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.24

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact was comprehensively discussed in the case
of Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., 25 thus:

The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the
doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the
doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining
the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to
presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query
is factual.26

In this case, the issues brought for our consideration calls for the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the parties and the determination of whether the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals erred
in their respective evaluation of the same. This we cannot do without blurring the difference between a
question of fact and a question of law - a significant distinction as far as the remedy of appeal
by certiorari is concerned.

Furthermore, factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.27 This is so because of the special knowledge and
expertise gained by these quasi-judicial agencies from presiding over matters falling within their
jurisdiction.28 So long as these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not
disturb the same.29

As earlier stated, in this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are unanimous in their
factual conclusions that Wallan Al Wallan is not an accredited principal of respondent Skills International and
we sustain said findings. As aptly observed by the NLRC'

In the instant case, the alleged Employment Contract, Annex "A" for the complainant (herein petitioner)
appears to be one which is not perfected by herein parties, because said contract does not bear the
signatures of the respondents or any of their authorized representatives. It only bears the signature and
thumbmark of the complainant. On its face, the Employment Contract readily shows that respondent agency
has neither participated nor is it a [privy] to any party who executed the contract binding it to the terms and
conditions of the same.

Even in the Complainant's Overseas Employment Certificate No. 144592-A, the name of respondent agency
does not appear to be the one that recruited and deployed the complainant. Likewise, the Balikbayan Info
Sheet of complainant does not indicated that herein respondent agency is the contracting agency in the
Philippines. x x x.

Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the allegations of the [respondents] that they neither
participated in the contract of employment of complainant (Annex "A" for the complainant) nor were they
privy to the terms and conditions appearing therein. The evidence submitted are not sufficient to hold
respondent agency liable. The copy of the receipt for the alleged placement fee was not issued by the
respondent agency but by the employer of complainant which is not its accredited principal - another fact
which was never controverted by the complainant. This being the case, complainant has no cause of action
against herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could not prosper in the instant case.

The Solidary Liability under Section [60] of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas and Filipino Act of 1995, will only apply if there is an existing valid contract and signed by the
parties concerned.30

To this, we add our own observations. Petitioner insists that he does not qualify as a balik-manggagawaas
the term is defined under the law. Nevertheless, it does not escape us that in his pleadings, 31 he asserts
that respondent Skills International handled his deployment as a balik-manggagawa to expedite his
deployment abroad. In addition, he never denied having filled-up the entries in the Balik-
Manggagawa Information Sheet leaving the portion pertaining to the name of the placement or recruitment
agency blank. To our mind, it is clear that petitioner utilizes the Balik-Manggagawa program of the
government whenever it is convenient for him. Thus, he availed himself of said program in order to fast-
track his deployment abroad and yet now that said Info Sheet is being used against him, he claims that he
could not have been processed as a balik-manggagawa as defined by law. We simply cannot countenance
such trifling regard for the law by awarding to petitioner the money claims he is seeking in the present case.

As for the medical examination result which petitioner belatedly presented before the Court of Appeals, the
law clearly requires that there should first be a job order relating to an existing overseas position before a
worker shall be subjected to a medical examination. In this case, as petitioner is the one insisting that a job
order exists, he bears the burden of producing the same. After all, the rule is settled that he who alleges
must prove.32 Petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 28 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 58795, affirming the Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 31 January 2000, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

BM No. 2540 ● September 24, 2013

Statement of Facts:

Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took

and passed the same year’s bar examinations and took the Attorney’s Oath, failed to sign

the Attorney’s Roll. After more than 30 years of practicing the profession of law, he filed

the instant Petition on February 2012, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of

Attorneys. Medado said that he was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys because he

misplaced the notice given to him and he believed that since he had already taken the

oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is not urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a

lawyer.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatory conference on

the matter recommended to the Supreme Court that the instant petition be denied for

petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.

Issue:

WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?

Ruling:
 Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the

payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the

practice of law.

The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys because

such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is reserved to the most serious ethical

transgressions of members of the Bar.

The Court cited three main points which demonstrate Medado’s worth to become

a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. First, Medado demonstrated good faith and

good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of

Attorneys. It was Medado himself who admitted his own error and not any third person.

Second, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice

of law. He strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession and

that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member

of the Philippine Bar. Third, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal

practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil

Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development

Corporation.

However, the Court cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of

inaction. His justification of his action, that it was “neither willful nor intentional but based

on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment” was opposed by the Court.

“A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is

presumed to know the law and its consequences.” Although an honest mistake of fact
could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he could no

longer claim it as a valid justification by the moment he realized that what he had signed

was merely an attendance record. His action of continuing the practice of law in spite of

his knowledge of the need to take the necessary steps to complete all requirements for

the admission to the bar constitutes unauthorized practice of law. Such action

transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized

practice of law.

With respect to the penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law. However, in the instant case the Court

could not warrant the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to Medado because

he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer. Instead, the Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty

similar to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one ( 1) year after

receipt of the Resolution and to fine him in the amount of P32,000.

The instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is Affirmed. Petitioner Michael
A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of
the Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED
to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by the
Court.