Gatchalian v.

Delim
Facts:

On July 11, 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded as paying passenger a minibus
owned by respondents. While the bus was running along the highway, a “snapping sound”
was heard, and after a short while, the bus bumped a cement flower pot, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. The passengers were confined in the hospital, and their bills were paid by
respondent’s spouse on July 14. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers
sign an already prepared affidavit waiving their claims against respondents. Petitioner
was among those who signed. Notwithstanding the said document, petitioner filed a claim
to recover actual and moral damages for loss of employment opportunities, mental
suffering and inferiority complex caused by the scar on her forehead. Respondents raised
in defense force majeure and the waiver signed by petitioner. The trial court upheld the
validity of the waiver and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the
waiver was invalid, but also that the petitioner is not entitled to damages.

Issues:

(1) Whether there was a valid waiver

(2) Whether the respondent was negligent
(3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to actual and moral damages

Held:

(1) We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of
her cause of action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must
in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to
the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A
waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly
and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian
need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the
vehicular accident when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but
that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she
too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the
import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against
private respondent.

Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly
against the common carrier. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be
to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from
common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a
purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

(2) In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises that the
common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had]
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." To overcome
this presumption, the common carrier must show to the court that it had exercised
extraordinary diligence to present the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence
imposed upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the standard of
ordinary diligence. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely "as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person, with due regard to all the circumstances".

The records before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. The obvious continued failure of
respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the
driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the
"snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton
disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part
of respondent and his driver.

(3) At the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school. Her
employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. She could not be said to have in fact lost
any employment after and by reason of the accident. She may not be awarded damages
on the basis of speculation or conjecture.

Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead, is
another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that
integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her,
is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante.

Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier
is shown. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered
as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we
believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim
for P1,000.00 as attorney's fees is in fact even more modest.
Gatchalian vs Delim Case Digest
Gatchalian v Delim and Court of Appeals
203 SCRA 126

Facts: Gatchalian boarded the respondent’s “Thames” minibus at San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union bound
of the same province. On the way, a snapping sound was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and shortly
thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road and fell into a
ditch. Several passengers including the petitioner was injured. They were taken into an hospital for
treatment. While there, private respondent’s wife Adela Delim visited and paid for the expenses,
hospitalization and transportation fees. However, before she left, she had the injured passengers including
the petitioner sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit constituting a waiver of any future complaint.
However, notwithstanding this document, petitioner filed an action Ex Contractu to recover compensatory
and Actual Damages. Private respondent denied liability on the ground that it was an accident and the Joint
which constitutes as a waiver. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the waiver and the CA
affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent has successfully proved that he exercised extraordinary
diligence.

Held: The court held that they failed to prove extraordinary diligence. After a snapping sound was suddenly
heard at one part of the bus, the driver didn’t even bother to stop and look f anything had gone wrong with
the bus. With regard to the waiver, it must to be valid and effective, couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of the person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him. In this case, such waiver is not clear and unequivocal. When petitioner signed the waiver, she was
reeling from the effects of the accident and while reading the paper, she experienced dizziness but upon
seeing other passengers sign the document, she too signed which bothering to read to its entirety. There
appears substantial doubt whether the petitioner fully understood the joint affidavit.
GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

PETITIONERS: Reynalda Gatchalian


RESPONDENTS: Arsenio Delim and the Hon. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

On July 1973, Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a
point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the
bus was running along the highway, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and,
shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including Gatchalian, were injured. They were
promptly taken to the hospital for medical treatment. Gatchalian sustained physical injuries on the leg,
arm and forehead.

While the injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent,
visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner
P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before
Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint
Affidavit which stated, among other things:

“That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said
driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and
owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our
injuries.”

Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the CFI an action extra contractu
to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged that her injuries had left her with a
conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering
and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay
away from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived
her of opportunities for employment.

She prayed for an award of:

  P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities;
 P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead;
 P30,000.00 for moral damages; and
 P1,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Respondent Delim’s defense was that (1) the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure; (2)
when Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit she already waived her rights to file a case whether
civil or criminal.

ISSUES:

1. Was the waiver valid? NO.

1st REASON: The standard used in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit
is that: a waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give
up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. The phrase “That we are no
longer interested to file a complaint” is not the same as making an actual waiver of
right.

Gatchalian suffered dizziness while reading the joint affidavit, and that she only
signed because the other passengers signed. It is doubtful whether she understood
fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (she signed and whether she actually intended
thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.

2nd REASON: Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must
exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most
strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not
be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good
customs.

2. Was the vehicular mishap force majeure? NO.

The case of Servando v. Philippine Steam navigation Company sums up the essential
characteristics of force majeure:

(1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
 (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the "caso fortuito",
or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.

Respondent failed to submit any proof to substantiate his defense of force majeure. On the
contrary, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence. In her direct
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that when a "snapping sound" was suddenly
heard at one part of the bus, one of the passengers, an old woman, cried out, "What
happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver replied, nonchalantly, "That is
only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone
wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean
that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing
the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten
accustomed to it.

3. Is Gatchalian entitled to her claims?

 Loss of employment  NO
 She was found to be jobless (she was en route to see a school principal about
being hired as an assistant teacher).

 P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead
 YES
 A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity
is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is
entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before
the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante.
 NOTE: the court cited here the case of Araneta vs. Areglado. It is interesting to
note that the court said that the young boy was injured in a vehicular accident
instead of being shot in the face.
 Gatchalian was awarded P15,000 although the estimated cost was only P5,000
– P10,000 because a long time has already passed (1973 to 1991).

 P30,000.00 for moral damages  YES

 Respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in
connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner and other
passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his
wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they
were still hospitalized for their injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such
moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner
must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent
scar on her forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a
reasonable award.
 MARSH THOMSON, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE AMERICAN CHAMPER OF
COMMERCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC, Respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
on May 19, 1994, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY SET ASIDE. ANOTHER JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MARSH THOMSON TO TRANSFER THE SAID MPC [Manila
Polo Club] SHARE TO THE NOMINEE OF THE APPELLANT.

The facts of the case are:

Petitioner Marsh Thomson (Thomson) was the Executive Vice-President and, later on, the Management
Consultant of private respondent, the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc.
(AmCham) for over ten years, 1979-1989.

While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his superior, A. Lewis Burridge, retired as
AmCham's President. Before Burridge decided to return to his home country, he wanted to transfer his
proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to petitioner. However, through the intercession of
Burridge, private respondent paid for the share but had it listed in petitioner's name. This was made
clear in an employment advice dated January 13, 1986, wherein petitioner was informed by private
respondent as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

11. If you so desire, the Chamber is willing to acquire for your use a membership in the Manila Polo
Club. The timing of such acquisition shall be subject to the discretion of the Board based on the
Chamber's financial position. All dues and other charges relating to such membership shall be for your
personal account. If the membership is acquired in your name, you would execute such documents as
necessary to acknowledge beneficial ownership thereof by the Chamber. 2

xxx xxx xxx

On April 25, 1986, Burridge transferred said proprietary share to petitioner, as confirmed in a
letter 3 of notification to the Manila Polo Club.

Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the transfer fee of P40,000.00 from
his own funds; but private respondent subsequently reimbursed this amount. On November 19, 1986,
MPC issued Proprietary Membership Certificate Number 3398 in favor of petitioner. But petitioner,
however, failed to execute a document recognizing private respondent's beneficial ownership over said
share.

Following AmCham's policy and practice, there was a yearly renewal of employment contract between
the petitioner and private respondent. Separate letters of employment advice dated October 1, 1986 4,
as well March 4, 1988 5and January 7, 1989 6, mentioned the MPC share. But petitioner never
acknowledged that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the share as requested in follow-up
requests, particularly one dated March 4, 1988 as follows:

Dear Marsh:

xxx xxx xxx

All other provisions of your compensation/benefit package will remain the same and are summarized
as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

9) The Manila Polo Club membership provided by the Chamber for you and your family will continue
on the same basis, to wit: all dues and other charges relating to such membership shall be for your
personal account and, if you have not already done so, you will execute such documents as are
necessary to acknowledge that the Chamber is the beneficial owner of your membership in the
Club. 7

When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal in 1989, he notified private respondent
that he would no longer be available as Executive Vice President after September 30, 1989. Still, the
private respondent asked the petitioner to stay on for another six (6) months. Petitioner indicated his
acceptance of the consultancy arrangement with a counter-proposal in his letter dated October 8,
1989, among others as follows:

11.) Retention of the Polo Club share, subject to my reimbursing the purchase price to the Chamber,
or one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000.00). 8

Private respondent rejected petitioner's counter-proposal.

Pending the negotiation for the consultancy arrangement, private respondent executed on September
29, 1989 a Release and Quitclaim, 9 stating that "AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns,
employees and/or representatives do hereby release, waive, abandon and discharge J. MARSH
THOMSON from any and all existing claims that the AMCHAM, its directors, officers and assigns,
employees and/or representatives may have against J. MARSH THOMSON." 10 The quitclaim,
expressed in general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share.

On April 5, 1990, private respondent, through counsel sent a letter to the petitioner demanding the
return and delivery of the MPC share which "it (AmCham) owns and placed in your (Thomson's)
name." 11

Failing to get a favorable response, private respondent filed on May 15, 1990, a complaint against
petitioner praying, inter alia, that the Makati Regional Trial Court render judgment ordering Thomson
"to return the Manila Polo Club share to the plaintiff and transfer said share to the nominee of
plaintiff." 12

On February 28, 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision, 13 thus:

The foregoing considered judgment is rendered as follows:

1) The ownership of the contested Manila Polo Club share is adjudicated in favor of defendant Marsh
Thomson; and;

2) Defendant shall pay plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00

Because both parties thru their respective faults have somehow contributed to the birth of this case,
each shall bear the incidental expenses incurred. 14

In said decision, the trial court awarded the MPC share to defendant (petitioner now) on the ground
that the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit artificial persons, such as
corporations, to be club members, ratiocinating in this manner:
An assessment of the evidence adduced by both parties at the trial will show clearly that it was the
intention of the parties that a membership to Manila Polo Club was to be secured by plaintiff [herein
private respondent] for defendant's [herein petitioner] use. The latter was to execute the necessary
documents to acknowledge ownership of the Polo membership in favor of plaintiff. (Exh. C par 9)
However, when the parties parted ways in disagreement and with some degree of bitterness, the
defendant had second thoughts and decided to keep the membership for himself. This is evident from
the exhibits (E & G) where defendant asked that he retained the Polo Club membership upon
reimbursement of its purchase price; and where he showed his "profound disappointment, both at the
previous Board's unfair action, and at what I consider to be harsh terms, after my long years of
dedication to the Chamber's interest."

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding all these evidence in favor of plaintiff, however, defendant may not be declared the
owner of the contested membership be compelled to execute documents transferring the Polo
Membership to plaintiff or the latter's nominee for the reason that this is prohibited by Polo Club's
Articles & By-Laws. . . .

It is for the foregoing reasons that the Court rules that the ownership of the questioned Polo Club
membership be retained by defendant. 15 . . . .

Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On May 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals (Former Special Sixth Division) promulgated its decision 16 in
said CA-G.R. CV No. 38417, reversing the, trial court's judgment and ordered herein petitioner to
transfer the MPC share to the nominee of private respondent, reasoning thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The significant fact in the instant case is that the appellant [herein private respondent] purchased the
MPC share for the use of the appellee [herein petitioner] and the latter expressly conformed thereto as
shown in Exhibits A-1, B, B-1, C, C-1, D, D-1. By such express conformity of the appellee, the former
was bound to recognize the appellant as the owner of the said share for a contract has the force of law
between the parties. (Alim vs. CA, 200 SCRA 450; Sasuhura Company, Inc., Ltd. vs. IAC, 205 SCRA
632) Aside from the foregoing, the appellee conceded the true ownership of the said share to the
appellant when (1) he offered to buy the MPC share from the appellant (Exhs. E and E-1) upon the
termination of his employment; (2) he obliged himself to return the MPC share after his six month
consultancy contract had elapsed, unless its return was earlier requested in writting (Exh. I); and (3)
on cross-examination, he admitted that the proprietary share listed as one of the assets of the
appellant corporation in its 1988 Corporate Income Tax Return, which he signed as the latter's
Executive Vice President (prior to its filing), refers to the Manila Polo Club Share (tsn., pp. 19-20,
August 30, 1991). . . . 17

On 16 June 1994, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 18 of said decision. By

resolution 19 promulgated on August 4, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration.

In this petition for review, petitioner alleges the following errors of public respondent as grounds for
our review:

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the Decision dated 28 February 1992 of the
Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch 65, Makati, Metro Manila, in its Civil Case No. 90-1286, and in not
confirming petitioner's ownership over the MPC membership share.

II. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that "the Quitclaim executed by AmCham in favor
of petitioner of September 29, 1989 was superseded by the contractual agreement entered into by the
parties on October 13, 1989 wherein again the appellee acknowledged that the appellant owned the
MPC share, there being absolutely no evidence to support such a conclusion and/or such inference is
manifestly mistaken.

III. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in rendering judgment ordering petitioner to transfer the
contested MPC share to a nominee of respondent AmCham notwithstanding that: (a) AmCham has no
standing in the Manila Polo Club (MPG), and being an artificial person, it is precluded under MPC's
Articles of Incorporation and governing rules and regulations from owning a proprietary share or from
becoming a member thereof: and (b) even under AmCham's Articles of Incorporation, the purposes
for which it is dedicated, becoming a stockholder or shareholder in other corporation is not one of the
express implied powers fixed in AmCham's said corporate franchise. 20

As posited above, these assigned errors show the disputed matters herein are mainly factual. As such
they are best left to the trial and appellate courts' disposition. And this Court could have dismissed the
petition outright, were it not for the opposite results reached by the courts below. Moreover, for the
enhanced appreciation of the jural relationship between the parties involving trust, this Court has
given due course to the petition, which we now decide.

After carefully considering the pleadings on record, we find there are two main issues to be resolved:
(1) Did respondent court err in holding that private respondent is the beneficial owner of the disputed
share? (2) Did the respondent court err in ordering petitioner to transfer said share to private
respondent's nominees?

Petitioner claims ownership of the MPC share, asserting that he merely incurred a debt to respondent
when the latter advanced the funds for the purchase of the share. On the other hand, private
respondent asserts beneficial ownership whereby petitioner only holds the share in his name, but the
beneficial title belongs to private respondent. To resolve the first issue, we must clearly distinguish a
debt from a trust.

The beneficiary of a trust has beneficial interest in the trust property, while a creditor has merely a
personal claim against the debtor. In trust, there is a fiduciary relation between a trustee and a
beneficiary, but there is no such relation between a debtor and creditor. While a debt implies merely
an obligation to pay a certain sum of money, a trust refers to a duty to deal with a specific property
for the benefit of another. If a creditor-debtor relationship exists, but not a fiduciary relationship
between the parties, there is no express trust. However, it is understood that when the purported
trustee of funds is entitled to use them as his or her own (and commingle them with his or her own
money), a debtor-creditor relationship exists, not a trust. 21

In the present case, as the Executive Vice-President of AmCham, petitioner occupied a fiduciary
position in the business of AmCham. AmCham released the funds to acquire a share in the Club for the
use of petitioner but obliged him to "execute such document as necessary to acknowledge beneficial
ownership thereof by the Chamber". 22 A trust relationship is, therefore, manifestly indicated.

Moreover, petitioner failed to present evidence to support his allegation of being merely a debtor when
the private respondent paid the purchase price of the MPC share. Applicable here is the rule that a
trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of property in the name of another, because
of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. 23

Although petitioner initiated the acquisition of the share, evidence on record shows that private
respondent acquired said share with its funds. Petitioner did not pay for said share, although he later
wanted to, but according to his own terms, particularly the price thereof.

Private respondent's evident purpose in acquiring the share was to provide additional incentive and
perks to its chosen executive, the petitioner himself. Such intention was repeated in the yearly
employment advice prepared by AmCham for petitioner's concurrence. In the cited employment
advice, dated March 4, 1988, private respondent once again, asked the petitioner to execute proof to
recognize the trust agreement in writing:

The Manila Polo membership provided by the Chamber for you and your family will continue on the
same basis, to wit: all dues and other charges relating to such membership shall be for your personal
account and, if you have not already done so, you will execute such documents as are necessary to
acknowledge that the Chamber is the beneficial owner of your membership in the Club. 24

Petitioner voluntarily affixed his signature to conform with the employment advice, including his
obligation stated therein - for him to execute the necessary document to recognize his employer as
the beneficial owner of the MPC share. Now, we cannot hear him claiming otherwise, in derogation of
said undertaking, without legal and equitable justification.

For private respondent's intention to hold on to its beneficial ownership is not only presumed; it was
expressed in writing at the very outset. Although the share was placed in the name of petitioner, his
title is limited to the usufruct, that is, to enjoy the facilities and privileges of such membership in the
club appertaining to the share. Such arrangement reflects a trust relationship governed by law and
equity.

While private respondent paid the purchase price for the share, petitioner was given legal title thereto.
Thus, a resulting trust is presumed as a matter of law. The burden then shifted to the transferee to
show otherwise, that it was just a loan. Such resulting trust could have been rebutted by proof of a
contrary intention by a showing that, in fact, no trust was intended. Petitioner could have negated the
trust agreement by contrary, consistent and convincing evidence on rebuttal. However, on the witness
stand, petitioner failed to do so persuasively.

On cross-examination, the petitioner testified as follows:

ATTY. AQUINO (continuing)

Q. Okay, let me go to the cash advance that you mentioned Mr. Witness, is there any document
proving that you claimed cash advance signed by an officer of the Chamber?

A. I believe the best evidence is the check.

Q. Is there any document?

COURT

Other than the Check?

MR. THOMSON

Nothing more.

ATTY. AQUINO

Is there any application filed in the Chamber to avail of this cash advance?

A. Verbal only.

Q. Nothing written, and can you tell to this Honorable Court what are the stipulations or conditions, or
terms of this transaction of securing this cash advance or loan?
 xxx xxx xxx

COURT

How are you going to repay the cash advance?

MR. THOMSON

The cash advance, we never stipulate when I have to repay it, but I presume that I would, when able
to repay the money. 25

In deciding whether the property was wrongfully appropriated or retained and what the intent of the
parties was at the time of the conveyance, the court must rely upon its impression of the credibility of
the witnesses. 26 Intent is a question of fact, the determination of which is not reviewable unless the
conclusion drawn by the trier is one which could not reasonably be drawn. 27 Petitioner's denial is not
adequate to rebut the trust. Time and again, we have ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving evidence, unworthy of credence. 28

The trust between the parties having been established, petitioner advanced an alternative defense
that the private respondent waived the beneficial ownership of MPC share by issuing the Release and
Quitclaim in his favor.

This argument is less than persuasive. The quitclaim executed by private respondent does not clearly
show the intent to include therein the ownership over the MPC share. Private respondent even asserts
that at the time the Release and Quitclaim was executed on September 29, 1989, the ownership of
the MPC share was not controversial nor contested. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and
effective must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as
to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 29 A waiver may
not be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to
abandon a right vested in such person. 30 If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in
clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the cited release and quitclaim
indicates merely a clearance from general accountability, not specifically a waiver of AmCham's
beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.

Additionally, the intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. 31 Considering the terms of the quitclaim
executed by the President of private respondent, the tenor of the document does not lead to the
purported conclusion that be intended to renounce private respondent's beneficial title over its share
in the Manila Polo Club. We, therefore, find no reversible error in the respondent Court's holding that
private respondent, AmCham, is the beneficial owner of the share in dispute.

Turning now to the second issue, the petitioner contends that the Articles of Incorporation and By-
laws of Manila Polo Club prohibit corporate membership. However, private respondent does not insist
nor intend to transfer the club membership in its name but rather to its designated nominee. For as
properly ruled by the Court of Appeals:

The matter prayed for does not involve the transfer of said share to the appellant, an artificial person.
The transfer sought is to the appellant's nominee. Even if the MPC By-Laws and Articles prohibit
corporate membership, there would be no violation of said prohibition for the appellant's nominee to
whom the said share is sought to be transferred would certainly be a natural person. . . .

As to whether or not the transfer of said share the appellant's nominee would be disapproved by the
MPC, is a matter that should be raised at the proper time, which is only if such transfer is disapproved
by the MPC. 32
The Manila Polo Club does not necessarily prohibit the transfer of proprietary shares by its members.
The Club only restricts membership to deserving applicants in accordance with its rules, when the
amended Articles of Incorporation states that: "No transfer shall be valid except between the parties,
and shall be registered in the Membership Book unless made in accordance with these Articles and the
By-Laws". 33 Thus, as between parties herein, there is no question that a transfer is feasible.
Moreover, authority granted to a corporation to regulate the transfer of its stock does not empower it
to restrict the right of a stockholder to transfer his shares, but merely authorizes the adoption of
regulations as to the formalities and procedure to be followed in effecting transfer. 34

In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to hold the share and enjoy the
privileges of the club. But upon the expiration of petitioner's employment as officer and consultant of
AmCham, the incentives that go with the position, including use of the MPC share, also ceased to
exist. It now behooves petitioner to surrender said share to private respondent's next nominee,
another natural person. Obviously this arrangement of trust and confidence cannot be defeated by the
petitioner's citation of the MPC rules to shield his untenable position, without doing violence to basic
tenets of justice and fair dealing.

However, we still have to ascertain whether the rights of herein parties to the trust still subsist. It has
been held that so long as there has been no denial or repudiation of the trust, the possession of the
trustee of an express and continuing trust is presumed to be that of the beneficiary, and the statute of
limitations does not run between them. 35 With regard to a constructive or a resulting trust, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the trustee clearly repudiates or disavows the trust
and such disavowal is brought home to the other party, "cestui que trust". 36 The statute of limitations
runs generally from the time when the act was done by which the party became chargeable as a
trustee by operation of law or when the beneficiary knew that he had a cause of action, 37 in the
absence of fraud or concealment.

Noteworthy in the instant case, there was no declared or explicit repudiation of the trust existing
between the parties. Such repudiation could only be inferred as evident when the petitioner showed
his intent to appropriate the MPC share for himself. Specifically, this happened when he requested to
retain the MPC share upon his reimbursing the purchase price of P110,000, a request denied promptly
by private respondent. Eventually, petitioner refused to surrender the share despite the written
demand of private respondent. This act could then be construed as repudiation of the trust. The
statute of limitation could start to set in at this point in time. But private respondent took immediate
positive action. Thus, on May 15, 1990, private respondent filed an action to recover the MPC share.
Between the time of implicit repudiation of the trust on October 9, 1989, as evidenced by petitioner's
letter of said date, and private respondent's institution of the action to recover the MPC share on May
15, 1990, only about seven months bad lapsed. Our laws on the matter provide that actions to
recover movables shall prescribe eight years from the time the possession thereof is lot, 38 unless the
possessor has acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period of four years if in good
faith. 39 Since the private respondent filed the necessary action on time and the defense of good faith
is not available to the petitioner, there is no basis for any purported claim of prescription, after
repudiation of the trust, which will entitle petitioner to ownership of the disputed share. As correctly
held by the respondent court, petitioner has the obligation to transfer now said share to the nominee
of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of
May 19, 1994, is AFFIRMED.

COSTS against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Thomson vs. CA

G.R. No. 116631; October 28, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner was the EVP and later on the Management Consultant of the private respondent,
American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines (AmCham).

While petitioner was still working with private respondent, his superior, Burridge, retired as
AmCham's President. Burridge wanted to transfer his proprietary share in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) to
petitioner. However, through the intercession of Burridge, private respondent paid for the share but had
it listed in petitioner's name. Upon his admission as a new member of the MPC, petitioner paid the transfer
fee from his own funds; but private respondent subsequently reimbursed this amount. Thereafter, MPC
issued Proprietary Membership Certificate but petitioner failed to execute a document recognizing
private respondent's beneficial ownership over said share.

When petitioner's contract of employment was up for renewal, he notified private respondent
that he would no longer be available as EVP, but the latter insisted that he stay for 6 months. Petitioner
indicated his acceptance of the consultancy arrangement with a counter-proposal among others is the
retention of the Polo Club share. Private respondent rejected the counter-proposal. Pending the
negotiation for consultancy arrangement, private respondent executed a release and quitclaim against
petitioner.

Private respondent sent a letter to the petitioner demanding the return and delivery of the MPC
share but failed to get a response. Hence, the former filed a complaint against petitioner for the return of
MPC share. The trial court awarded the MPC share to petitioner on the ground that the AOI and By-laws
of Manila Polo Club prohibit artificial persons, such as corporations, to be club members. CA reversed the
decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in ordering petitioner to transfer the contested MPC share to a nominee of
private respondent notwithstanding MPC’s AOI and By-laws prohibition for being a club member.

HELD:

NO. Private respondent does not insist nor intend to transfer the club membership in its name but
rather to its designated nominee. The Manila Polo Club does not necessarily prohibit the transfer of
proprietary shares by its members. The Club only restricts membership to deserving applicants in
accordance with its rules, when the amended Articles of Incorporation states that: "No transfer shall be
valid except between the parties, and shall be registered in the Membership Book unless made in
accordance with these Articles and the By-Laws". Thus, as between parties herein, there is no question
that a transfer is feasible.

Moreover, authority granted to a corporation to regulate the transfer of its stock does not
empower it to restrict the right of a stockholder to transfer his shares, but merely authorizes the adoption
of regulations as to the formalities and procedure to be followed in effecting transfer.
 In this case, the petitioner was the nominee of the private respondent to hold the share and enjoy
the privileges of the club. But upon the expiration of petitioner's employment as officer and consultant of
AmCham, the incentives that go with the position, including use of the MPC share, also ceased to exist. It
now behooves petitioner to surrender said share to private respondent's next nominee, another natural
person.
ARTICLE 8
People vs. Jabinal
55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal
Court of Batangas finding the accused guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction
was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that
on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license
a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as
Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm
in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial
court nonetheless decided otherwise, citing that People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently
abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in

Macarandana and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the
completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Reason:

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the time appellant was found in
possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the
faith thereof.
People of the Philippines v. Jose Jabinal
G.R.No.L-30061, 27 February 1974,
G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985
FACTS:

The instant case was an appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the
conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People v Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he
was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the
requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the
governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the
authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in People v Macarandang and People v Lucero, the accused sought for
his acquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People v Macarandang and People v Lucero were reversed and subsequently
abandoned in people v mapa.

ISSUE:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine
in Mapa?

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a
firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license
and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act
which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

SCRIBD
People vs. Jabinal
February 27, 1974
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license
or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had
appointments as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the said firearm. The accused further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on
the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the cases
of Macarandang and of Lucero.
Ruling:
The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
law means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by the
Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the
land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is
true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties
who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the
appellant should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.

_____________________
*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be
“peace officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly
provide that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a
firearm.
Ting vs Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING,

Petitioner,

- versus -

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009

Facts:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant
with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car
twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had
money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care
of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert
witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the
marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:

1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:

1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be
applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
 By Jay R. Bautista

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ TING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution
in CAG. R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution,
affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu
City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. At first, they resided at Benjamins
family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. When their second child was born, the couple
decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City. In September 1975, Benjamin
passed the medical board examinations.

In 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of
its active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer. On October 21, 1993,
after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was
only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the

following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell
the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his
debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center, as his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
and his (Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr.
Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the
latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.

The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed
to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial courts
ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the
conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
and his

Profession may ground null and void ab intio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:

The petitioner denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for
leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she
already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but
such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any preexisting psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be
incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided
diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners
behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that
there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater
weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins
deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with
Benjamins brothers. Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling

problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such
a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent,
to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV
No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SCRIBD
BENJAMIN G. TING vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING

G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009

FACTS:

Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent
was already pregnant with their first child.

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter.

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to
drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly
and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances
when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house. Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as
anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to
pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but
Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink
and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
circumstances.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in
the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage.

petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court’s
ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin
was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of
the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.

Carmen filed a MR, it was denied then she filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, SC directed CA to decide on
Carmen’s case. On review, CA reversed it’s earlier ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the
Santos and Molina cases.

HELD:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code.

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later
adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical
development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm.” The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the
beginning of the 18th century, “it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the
same points come again in litigation.” As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual
principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the
decision.”

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, “strict rules and precedents” are necessary to prevent
“arbitrary discretion in the courts.” Madison agreed but stressed that “x x x once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.” Prof. Consovoy well
noted that Hamilton and Madison “disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that
would allow a judge to abandon a precedent.” He added that their ideas “reveal a deep internal
conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error
correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries.”

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have
been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of
lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The
second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents.
Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed,
stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional
stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes.
The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in
constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is
not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is
again called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein, the venerable Justice
Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it.” In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of
statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed, either
by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires
a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself.”
This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional
law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's “separate but equal doctrine.” Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that “separate . . . is inherently unequal.” Thus, by
freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans
from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining
Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling
and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts
 put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and
its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a
remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be
seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument
was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained
that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted.
It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith,
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not. By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
 III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s “defects” were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on
the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such “defects” to be incurable.

*** The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she is about to assume

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the
marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these
experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a
personality disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover,
there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report
furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s)
personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.