Moya v.
Del Fiero del Fierro" or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is
G.R. No. L-46863. November 18, 1939
Laurel, J.:
FACTS:
Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for
the office of mayor of the municipality of
Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a
majority of three votes over his rival, Irineo
Moya. In the general elections held on December
14, 1937, the parties herein were contending
candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass
of the returns the municipal council of Paracale,
acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as the elected mayor of said
municipality with a majority of 102 votes.
On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a
motion of protest in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July
13, 1939 rendered the judgment hereinbefore
mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be
reviewed and reversed upon the errors alleged to
have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or
contrary to the controlling decisions of this
Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the
respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are
tenable.
HELD:
No, petitioner’s contentions are untenable.
(1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in
precinct No. 2, alleged to have been inadvertently
admitted in favor of the respondent, such
inadvertence raises a question of fact which could
have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and
which could we are not in a position to determine
in this proceeding for review by certiorari. Upon
the other hand, if the error attributed to the Court
of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot
Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the
ballot bearing the same number corresponding
to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly
appears admissible for the respondent because
the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo
technical and deserves but scanty consideration.
(2) Ballot Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 was
erroneously admitted for the respondent by the
Court of Appeals, the name written on the space
for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that
on the fourth line for the councilor "Alcalde
Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of
the elector is rendered vague and incapable of
ascertaining and the ballot was improperly
counted for the respondent. As to this ballot, the
contention of the petitioner is sustained.
(3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should
also have been rejected by the Court of Appeals.
The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O.
K." placed after the name "M. Lopis" written
on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the
petitioner in this respect is likewise sustained.
(4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was
properly admitted for respondent. On this
ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor
the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate for the
provincial board and wrote the respondent's name
immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by
him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector
to vote for the respondent for the office of the
mayor is clear under the circumstances.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption
of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a
particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate
source of the established authority. He has a voice
in his Government and whenever called upon to
act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not
to stifle it.
This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated, if
not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
Counsel for both parties have called our attention
to the different and divergent rules laid down by
this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will
serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage
in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of
these rules, although this may perhaps be
undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be
exactly the same in factual or legal environment.
It is sufficient to observe, however, in this
connection that whatever might have been said in
cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or
rules should be permitted to defeat the intention
of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from
the ballot itself, not from evidencealiunde. This
rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the
system. Rationally, also, this must be the
justification for the suggested liberalization of the
rules on appreciation of ballots which are now
incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two
ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the
respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In
view whereof it becomes unnecessary to consider
the counter-assignment of errors of the
respondent.
Badelles v. Cabili
G.R. No. L-29333. February 27, 1969
Fernando, J.:
FACTS:
In the 1967 election for mayor of Iligan City
wherein Camilo Cabili and MarianoBadelles
were candidates. Cabili was proclaimed as the
winner. This prompted Badellesto file a protest
before the CFI of Lanao. He alleged that flagrant
violations of Election Code attended
the election. He pointed out that more than 200
voters were registered per precinct contrary to
what the law mandated at 200 voters per
precinct. He also alleged that no publication of
lists of voters per precinct was made up to the
election day itself enabling around 8,300
persons to vote illegally while around 8,000
qualified voters were not able to vote since their
names were not found on the lists. Camilo Cabili
filed a motion to dismiss the protest based on
three grounds namely:
(1) failure to file the protest within the
reglementary period;
(2) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court over the subject-matter of the case; and
(3) failure to state a cause of action.
Motion to dismiss the protest was granted but only
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
In granting the MTD, the court argued that while
irregularities a swell as misconduct on the part of
election officers were alleged in the election
protests filed, there was however an absence of an
allegation that they would change the result
of the election in favor of the protestants and aga
inst the protestees, that such irregularities would
destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots
cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated
in the commission thereof. It also declared that
voters should not be deprived of their right to vote
occasioned by the failure of the election officials
to comply with the formal prerequisites to the
exercise of the right of suffrage and that the rules
and regulations for the conduct of elections while
mandatory before the voting should be considered
directory thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in granting the
motion to dismiss
HELD:
Yes. In resolving the motion to dismiss, the
allegations contained in the complaint should be
hypothetically admitted. In this case, the court
obviously erred in dismissing
the protest. The seriousness and gravity of the im
puted failure to have election
conducted freely and honestly, with such irregul
arities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and
honest, as to who were the duly elected officials.
IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT
OF SUFFRAGE If the right of suffrage would be
disregarded or frittered away, popular
sovereignty becomes a myth.
In the case of Moya v. Del Fierro, it was declared
by Justice Laurel, to wit:
As long as popular government is an end to be a
chieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may
be the modality and form devised, must continue
to be the means by which the great reservoir of
power must be emptied into the receptacular
agencies wrought by the people through their Co
nstitution in the interest of good government and
the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it
implies the adoption of a representative type of
government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as aparticle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the
established authority. "A republic then to be true
to its name requires that the government rests on
the consent of the people, consent freely given,
intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded ,and
thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really
looked upon as the ultimate sources of established
authority. It is their undeniable right to have
officials of their unfettered choice. The election
law has no justification except as a means for
assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of
their views. It is of the essence that corruption and
irregularities should not be permitted to taint the
electoral process.
Tolentino v. Comelec
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
Dissenting Opinion Justice Puno
The case at bar transcends the political fortunes
of respondent Senator Gregorio B. Honasan. At
issue is the right of the people to elect their
representatives on the basis and only on the basis
of an informed judgment. The issue strikes at
the heart of democracy and representative
government for without this right, the sovereignty
of the people is a mere chimera and the rule of
the majority will be no more than mobocracy. To
clarify and sharpen the issue, 1 shall first unfurl
the facts.
RULING:
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and
the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are
central to an informed exercise of the right of
suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the
present case have led us to conclude
that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice
did not invalidate the special senatorial election
held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take
chances in future elections. We remind
COMELEC to comply strictly with all the
requirements under applicable laws relative to
the conduct of regular elections in general and
special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack
of merit.
FACTS:
A Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30, 2004
was vacated with the appointment of then Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President of the
Philippines. The Senate adopted Resolution No.
84 certifying the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001, and the
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. In the deliberations of
the Senate on the resolution, the body agreed that
the procedure it adopted for determining the
winner in the special election was for the
guidance and implementation of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC had no discretion to alter the
procedure.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the
position of senator to serve the unexpired three-
year term in the special election. All the
senatorial candidates filed the certificates of
candidacy for the twelve regular Senate seats to
be vacated on June 30, 2001 with a six-year term
expiring on June 30, 2007. COMELEC
distributed nationwide official documents such as
the Voter Information Sheet, List of Candidates
and Sample Ballot. The List of Candidates did
not indicate a separate list of candidates for the
special election. The Sample Ballot and the
official ballots did not provide two different
categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the
twelve regular six-year term seats and the single
three-year term seat. Nor did the ballots provide
a separate space for the candidate to be voted in
the special election and instead provided thirteen
spaces for thirteen senatorial seats.
Without any COMELEC resolution or notice on
the time, place and manner of conduct of the
special election, the special election for senator
was held on the scheduled May 14, 2001 regular
elections. A single canvass of votes for a single
list of senatorial candidates was done.
Petitioners filed with the Court their petition for
prohibition to stop respondent COMELEC from
proclaiming any senatorial candidate in the May
14, 2001 election as having been elected for the
lone senate seat for a three-year term. Copies of
the petition were served on respondent
COMELEC twice, first on June 20, 2001 by
registered mail, and second on June 21, 2001, by
personal delivery of petitioner Mojica. On June
26, 2001 the Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent COMELEC to comment within ten
days from notice.
On the day of its promulgation, respondent
COMELEC forwarded Resolution No. NBC-01-
006 to the President of the Senate. On July 23,
2001, the thirteen senators, inclusive of
respondents Honasan and Recto, took their
oaths of office before the Senate President.
With the turn of events after the filing of the
petition on June 20, 2001, the Court ordered
petitioners on March 5, 2002 and September 17,
2002 to amend their petition. In their amended
petition, petitioners assailed the manner by which
the special election was conducted citing
as precedents the 1951 and 1955 special
senatorial elections for a two-year term which
were held simultaneously with the regular general
elections for senators with six year terms, viz:
(a) A vacancy in the Senate was created by the
election of Senator Fernando Lopez as Vice-
President in the 1949 elections. A special election
was held in November 1951 to elect his successor
to the vacated Senate position for a term to expire
on 30 December 1953. Said special election was
held simultaneously with the regular election of
1951. A separate space in the official ballot was
provided for Senatorial candidates for the two
year term; moreover, the candidates for the
single Senate term for two years filed certificates
of candidacy separate and distinct from those
certificates of candidacy filed by the group of
Senatorial candidates for the six year term.
(...the votes for the twenty (20) candidates who
filed certificates of candidacy for the eight
Senate seats with six year terms were tallied and
canvassed separately from the votes for the five
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for
the single Senate seat with a two year term...)
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Again, a vacancy was created in the Senate by
the election of then Senator Carlos P. Garcia to
the Vice Presidency in the 1953 presidential
elections. A special election was held in
November 1955 to elect his successor to the
vacated Senatorial position for a two year
term expiring on 30 December 1957.
Said special election for one senator to fill the
vacancy left by the Honorable Carlos Garcia was
held in November 1955 simultaneously with the
regular election for eight Senate seats with a six
year term. Here, separate spaces were provided
for in the official ballot for the single Senate seat
for the two year term as differentiated from the
eight Senate seats with six year terms. The
results as recorded by Senate official files show
that votes for the candidates for the Senate seat
with a two-year term were separately tallied from
the votes for the candidates for the eight Senate
seats with six-year term...[1] (emphases supplied)
Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the
following:
(a) that no special election was conducted by
respondent COMELEC for the single Senate seat
with a three year term in the 14 May 2001
election.
(b) null and void respondent COMELECs
Resolutions No. NBC01-005 dated 5 June 2001
and NBC01-006 dated 20 July 2001 for having
been promulgated without any legal authority at
all insofar as said resolutions proclaim the
Senatorial candidate who obtained the thirteenth
highest number of votes canvassed during the 14
May 2001 election as a duly elected Senator.[2]
Respondents filed their respective comments
averring the following procedural flaws: (1) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for quo
warranto; (2) the petition is moot; and (3) the
petitioners have no standing to litigate. On the
merits, they all defend the validity of the special
election on the ground that the COMELEC had
discretion to determine the manner by which the
special election should be conducted and that the
electorate was aware of the method the
COMELEC had adopted. Moreover, they dismiss
the deviations from the election laws with respect
to the filing of certificates of candidacy for the
special elections and the failure to provide in the
official ballot a space for the special election vote
separate from the twelve spaces for the regular
senatorial election votes as inconsequential. They
claim that these laws are merely directory after
the election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special election for the single
Senate seat with 3 year term was validly held
simultaneous with the general elections.
HELD:
R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No.
7166 which provides in Section 4, viz:
SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election
and Special Election. - The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling
of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6,
and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall
be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by
a majority vote of its members...
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the
Senate or House of Representatives at least one
(1) year before the expiration of the term, the
Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty
(60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after
the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case
of such vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election. (emphases
supplied)
The Senates observation that the procedure for
the special election that it adopted would be less
costly for the government as the ballots need not
be printed again to separately indicate the
candidate voted for the special election does not
also lend justification for the manner of conduct
of the May 14, 2001 special election. We cannot
bargain the electorates fundamental right to vote
intelligently with the coin of convenience. Even
with the Senate stance, the regular ballot had to
be modified to include a thirteenth space in the list
of senatorial seats to be voted for. At any rate,
reliance on R.A. No. 6645 is erroneous. This law
provides that when a vacancy arises in the Senate,
the Senate, by resolution, certifies to the
existence of the vacancy and calls for a special
election. Upon receipt of the resolution,
the COMELEC holds the special election. R.A.
No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166.
The latter law provides that when a permanent
vacancy occurs in the Senate at least one year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission
(on Elections) shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy... Since under R.A. No.
7166, it is the power and duty of the COMELEC,
and not the Senate, to call and hold the election,
the Senate cannot, by mere resolution, impose
upon the COMELEC the procedure for the special
election that it intended such that Comelec will
not have the flexibility to deviate therefrom. As a
constitutional body created to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections,
it was the duty of the COMELEC to give to the
electorate notice of the time, place and manner of
conduct of the special elections and to adopt only
those mechanisms and procedures that would
ascertain the true will of the people.
In sum, I submit that the ruling of
the ponencia would result not just to a step back
in an age of information, but would constitute a
fall in the nations rise to democracy begun as
early as the Malolos Constitution and begun anew
in the 1987 Constitution after the 1986 People
Power Revolution. Informing the electorate on the
issues and conduct of an election is a prerequisite
to a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. Free elections does not only mean that
the voter is not physically restrained from going
to the polling booth, but also that the voter is
unrestrained by the bondage of ignorance. We
should be resolute in affirming the right of the
electorate to proper information. The Court
should not forfeit its role as gatekeeper of our
democratic government run by an informed
majority. Let us not open the door to ignorance.
COMELEC Cases
Purisima v. Salanga
G.R. No. L-46863. November 18, 1939
Laurel, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Purisima is a candidate for any of the
three offices of Provincial Board Member of
Ilocos Sur. During the canvass, he notes that the
returns from precints (41) showed on their face
that the words and figures for Gregorio Cordero
had been obviously and manifestly erased and
superimposed with other words and figures. For
comparison, the Nacionalista Party copies of
returns were submitted to the board of canvassers
and discrepancy was found.Purisima requested
for suspension of the canvass, which the board
denied upon the ground that it was not yet
ascertainable whether the discrepancies would
materially affect the result. After the canvass,
Cordero got the last spot with 1, 857 votes more
than Purisima. The petitioner again called the
attention to the erasures which the board again
denied and proceeded with the proclamation of
Cordero. Purisima went to the COMELEC to
annul the canvass and proclamation to whichthe
Commission respinded by passing a resolution
annulling the canvass and proclamation. He filed
a petition for recount with the CFI which was
dismissed. It was argued that the Nacionalista
copies cannot be made basis of a petition for
recount accdg to Sec. 163 of the Revised Election
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court is correct in dismissing the
petition for recount and its interpretation of Sec.
163 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
The dismissal of petition for recount set aside.
There is no more question now that the number of
votes involved in said discrepancy is more than
enough to alter the result. The record shows that
the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to
the board the COMELEC copies of returns was
because the board declined to suspend the canvass
and proclamation. He should not be prejudiced by
such. It is the duty of canvassers to suspend in
case of patent irregularity in the returns as in the
present case. Interpretation of election laws
should give effect to the expressed will of the
electorate.
Cauton v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-25467. April 27, 1967
Zaldivar, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent Pablo
Sanidad, along with Godofredo S. Reyes, were
candidates for the office of Representative in the
second congressional district of Ilocos Sur.
During the canvass by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Ilocos Sur of the votes cast for the
candidates for Representative in the second
congressional district of Ilocos Sur, and
particularly after the Board had opened the
envelopes containing the copies of the election
returns from each of the election precincts in the
municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz
that were presented by the Provincial Treasurer of
Ilocos Sur to the Board, respondent Sanidad
brought to the attention of the Board the fact that
the entries of votes for the candidates for
Representative in those copies of the election
returns that came from the envelopes presented
by the provincial treasurer differed from the
entries appearing in the copies of the returns
from the same election precincts that were in
the possession of the Liberal Party.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent Sanidad filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections praying for the opening
of the ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon,
Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to retrieve the
election returns deposited therein so that those
election returns might be used in the canvass of
the votes for the candidates for Representative in
the second district of Ilocos Sur, and that in the
meantime the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Ilocos Sur be ordered to refrain from proclaiming
the winning candidate for the office of
Representative in said district. The Commission
on Elections issued the restraining order prayed
for by respondent Sanidad and set his petition for
hearing.
After hearing, the Commission on Elections
found "that it had been clearly established that the
copies of the election returns for the Municipal
Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and
for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality
of Santa Cruz have uniform alterations in the
entries of the votes cast for representative
showing different number of votes compared with
the Liberal Party copies, while the copies of the
election returns for the Commission on Elections
and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities
of Candon and Santiago have likewise uniform
alterations and showing different numbers
compared with the Liberal Party copies. The
copies of the election returns were not verified.
Pursuant to the instructions of respondent
Commission, contained in the resolution of
December 22, 1965, the ballot boxes from all the
precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta.
Cruz and Santiago were opened by the Chief of
the Law Enforcement Division of the
Commission, Atty. Fernando Gorospe, Jr., in the
presence of witnesses, and the envelopes
containing the election returns found inside the
ballot boxes were taken and brought to Manila on
December 23, 1965.
On the same date, December 23, 1965, herein
petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution
of the respondent Commission on Elections dated
December 22, 1965 ordering the opening of the
ballot boxes used in all the precincts of Candon,
Sta. Cruz and Santiago in the elections of
November 9, 1965 be annulled and set aside. The
petition further prays that the Commission on
Elections be restrained from opening, the
envelopes containing the election returns found in
the afore-mentioned ballot boxes and be ordered
to return the said envelopes to the corresponding
ballot boxes. In his petition, petitioner alleges that
the respondent Commission on Elections acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court
gave due course to the petition, but did not issue
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. This
petition is now the case before Us.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC can open ballot
boxes in precincts and envelopes containing
election returns to enable the aggrieved party to
establish discrepancy between copies of the
election returns provided by law in the
aforementioned precincts for the purpose of
obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of
Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
Yes, COMELEC can open ballot boxes in
precincts and envelopes containing election
returns. We believe that in issuing the resolution
in question the Commission on Elections simply
performed a function as authorized by the
Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and ... exercise
all other functions which may be conferred upon
it by law." The Commission has the power to
decide all administrative questions affecting
elections, except the question involving the right
to vote.
The Commission on Elections has the power to
inquire whether there exist discrepancies among
the various copies of the election returns. It is
noteworthy that the Revised Election Code does
not provide that it is the courts that have the power
to order the opening of the ballot box in a situation
like this.
Roque v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009.
Velasco, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prater for a
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
and are suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
They seek to nullify respondent COMELEC’s
award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to
the JV of Total Information Management
Corporation and Smartmatic International
Corporation and to permanently prohibit the
Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing
and/or implementing the corresponding contract-
award.
The Congress enacted RA 8346 authorizing the
adoption of an automated election system in the
national and local elections and onwards.
However, during 1998, 2001 and 2004, purely
manual elections were done.
The amendatory of RA 9369 was passed
authorizing again the COMELEC to use the AES
Sec. 5 of that law authorized the COMELEC.
However, the COMELEC did not use any AES in
2007 elections.
The Comelec, TIM and Smartmaric signed the
contract for the automated tallying and recording
of votes cast nation-wide in the 2010 elections.
For around Php 7 billion, the COMELEC leased
82,200 optical scanners, related equipment and
hired ancillary services provider to be used in the
2010 elections.
Hence, this petition was filed to enjoin the signing
of the contract or its implementation and to
compel disclosure of the terms of the contract and
other agreements between the providers and
subcontractors.
Petition sought the contract’s invalidation for
non-compliance with the requirement in Sec 5 of
RA 8436 mandating the partial use of an
automated election system before deploying it
nationwide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an infringement of the
constitutional right of the people to secrecy of the
ballot.
HELD:
No, there was not infringement of the
constitutional right of the people to secrecy of the
ballot.
Roque v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 188456. February 10, 2010.
Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS:
Petitioners Roque, et al. are again before
the Court on a motion for reconsideration, as
supplemented, praying, as they did earlier, that the
contract award be declared null and void on the
stated ground that it was made in violation of the
Constitution, statutes, and
jurisprudence.[1] Intervening petitioner also
interposed a similar motion, but only to pray that
the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to
manually count the ballots after the printing and
electronic transmission of the election returns.
Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants
herein, seek a reconsideration of the September
10, 2009 Decision on the following issues or
grounds:
1. The Comelecs public pronouncements
show that there is a high probability that there will
be failure of automated elections;
2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional
functions in favor of Smartmatic;
3. There is no legal framework to guide
the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in
case the PCOS machines fail;
4. Respondents cannot comply with the
requirements of RA 8436 for a source code
review;
5. Certifications submitted by private
respondents as to the successful use of the
machines in elections abroad do not fulfill the
requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;
 6. Private respondents will not be able to
provide telecommunications facilities that will
assure 100% communications coverage at all
times during the conduct of the 2010 elections;
and
7. Subcontracting the manufacture of
PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelecs
bidding rules.
HELD:
On the basis of the arguments, past and
present, presented by the petitioners and
intervenor, the Court does not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in
awarding the automation contract to the joint
venture of private respondents.
In closing, the Court harks back to its
parting message embodied in its September 10,
2009 Decision, but this time even more mindful
of warnings and apprehensions of well-meaning
sectors of society, including some members of the
Court, about the possibility of failure of elections.
The Court, to repeat, will not venture to say that
nothing could go wrong in the conduct of the 2010
nationwide automated elections. Neither will it
guarantee, as it is not even equipped with the
necessary expertise to guarantee, the effectiveness
of the voting machines and the integrity of the
counting and consolidation software embedded in
them. That difficult and complex undertaking
belongs at the first instance to the Comelec as part
of its mandate to insure orderly and peaceful
elections. The Comelec, as it were, is laboring
under a very tight timeline. It would accordingly
need the help of all advocates of orderly and
honest elections, all men and women of goodwill,
to assist Comelec personnel in addressing the
fears expressed about the integrity of the system.
After all, peaceful, fair, honest, and credible
elections is everyones concern.
WHEREFORE, the instant separate motions for
reconsideration of the main and intervening
petitioners are DENIED.
Arroyo v. DOJ
G.R. No. 199082. July 23, 2013.
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
These are separate motions for reconsideration
filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in
G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in
G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a
second look at our September 18, 2012
Decision3 dismissing their petitions and
supplemental petitions against respondents
Commission on Elections (Comelec), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino
M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-
Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee
(Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-
Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ
issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in the
May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces
of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao
was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that
Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike
Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation
for electoral sabotage and manipulating the
election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court
separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of
the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the
assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October
20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the
Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the
2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been
conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared
VALID.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel
undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct
preliminary investigation only when deputized by
the Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction
HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec
and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions
of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the
Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules
of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that
we the the court cannot consider the creation of
the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution
2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not
repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law
The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on
simultaneous exercise of power between two
coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the
situation where one files a complaint against a
respondent initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which
was immediately acted upon by said office and the
re-filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction by the second office
over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it
is a settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
FALLO: petition is denied
Ongsiako Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.
FACTS:
The petitioners assail through a petition for
certiorari with prayer for TRO and preliminary
injunction resolution of the COMELEC ordering
the cancellation of the CoC of petitioner for the
position of Respresentative of the lone district of
Marinduque.
Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an
amended petition to deny due course or to cancel
the CoC of Ongsiako Reyes, on the ground that it
contained material representations. The
COMELEC cancelled the CoC of the petitioner.
She filed a MR. The Comelec en banc denied her
MR.
However, she was proclaimed winner of 2013
elections. The Comelec declared the resolution
final and executory. The petitioner took her oath
of office before Feliciano Belmonte. She has yet
to assume office at that time, as her term officially
starts at noon June 30 2013. According to
petitioner, the COMELEc was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Sec 17 of Art VI of 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of HoR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over
the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and
who has already taken her oath of office.
HELD.
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a member of HoR. Req: 1.
Valid proclamation, 2. Proper oath 3. Assumption
of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a
member of the HR yet as she has not yet assumed
office yet.
Voters
Ombudsman Election Code
Section 118. Disqualifications. - The following
shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment for not
less than one year, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon
or granted amnesty: Provided, however,
That any person disqualified to vote
under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five years after service of
sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by competent court or tribunal
of having committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly
constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-
subversion and firearms laws, or any
crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political
 rights in accordance with law: Provided,
That he shall regain his right to vote
automatically upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by
competent authority.
Republic Act No. 7166
Sec. 12. Absentee Voting. - Absentee voting as
provided for in Executive Order No. 157 dated
March 30, 1987 shall apply to the elections for
President, Vice-President and Senators only and
shall be limited to members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police and other government officers and
employees who are duly registered voters and
who, on election day, may temporarily be
assigned in connection with the performance of
election duties to place where they are not
registered voters.
Macalintal v. COMELEC
Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters
Act – Proclamation of Winners in a National
Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer,
questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the
validity of the said act on the following grounds,
among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already
considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed
to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act
No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law
violates the constitutional mandate under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President
shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.
(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections, promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-
absentee voters. Further, as understood in election
laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably
used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile
(insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention
to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he
is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could
not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the
winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still
lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred
to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates
those who are disqualified voting under this Act.
It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the host
country. However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner claims that this is violative of the
residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be
a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and
a resident in the place where he proposes to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding an
election.
However, OSG held that ruling in said case does
not hold water at present, and that the Court may
have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of
the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the
presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile
shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained
his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence
from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does
not only require the promise to resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines
not later than 3 years after approval of
registration but it also requires the Filipino
abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a
temporary visitor or even on business trip, must
declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship
in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the
Philippines otherwise consequences will be met
according to RA No. 9189.
Although there is a possibility that the Filipino
will not return after he has exercised his right to
vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the
wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such
law is found to be impractical. However, it can be
said that the Congress itself was conscious of this
probability and provided for deterrence which is
that the Filipino who fails to return as promised
stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly,
the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because
he was qualified to vote on the date of the
elections.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets
down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is
prevented from making it mean what the Court
pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent
of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory
construction and intent of the framers, which is to
grant Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents abroad the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V)
the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is
not constitutionally defective.
(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed
COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the
proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty
and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to
proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators
and Party-list Reps.
(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to
approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No.
9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon
the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is
left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
silence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional. Read full text
People v. Corral
Facts:
Appellant was charged having voted
illegally at the general elections. After due trial,
he was convicted on the ground that he had voted
while laboring under a legal disqualification. The
judgment of conviction was based on section
2642 in connection with section 432 of Revised
Admin Code.
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by
final judgment of this court promulgated on
March 1910 to suffer 8 yrs and 1 day. No evidence
was presented to show that prior June 1934, he
had been granted plenary pardon. ICounsel for the
appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter
voted in 1928 his offense had already prescribed
and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal
voting at the general elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state has the right to deprive a
person’s right to suffrage.
Whether or not the appellant’s contention that the
end of his punishment thus ends of his dq for
election has merit.

HELD:
Yes, the state has the right to deprive persons to
right of suffrage by reason of their having been
convicted of crime.

No. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory

of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it
as a punishment when, as already indicated, the
correct view is that it is imposed for protection
and not for punishment, the withholding of a
priviledge and not the denial of a personal right.
Judicial interpretation and long established
administrative practice are against such view.