Thomas ContraGentiles2 Creation

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CONTRA GENTILES
BOOK TWO: CREATION
translated by
James F. Anderson

CONTENTS
1. The connection between the 49. That the intellectual substance is not a
following considerations and body
the preceding ones 50. That intellectual substances are
2. That the consideration of immaterial
creatures is useful for 51. That the intellectual substance is not a
instruction of faith material form
3. That knowledge of the nature 52. That in created intellectual substances,
of creatures serves to destroy being and what is differ
errors concerning God 53. That in created intellectual substances
4. That the philosopher and the there is act and potentiality
theologian consider creatures 54. That the composition of substance and
in different ways being is not the same as the
5. Order of procedure composition of matter and form
6. That it is proper to God to be 55. That intellectual substances are
the source of the being of other incorruptible
things 56. In what way an intellectual substance
7. That active power exists in God can be united to the body
8. That God’s power is His 57. The position of Plato concerning the
substance union of the intellectual soul with the
9. That God’s power is His action body
10. How power is attributed to God 58. That in man there are not three souls,
11. That something is said of God nutritive, sensitive, and intellective
in relation to creatures 59. That man’s possible intellect is not a
12. That relations predicated of separate substance
God in reference to creatures 60. That man derives his specific nature,
do not really exist in Him not from the passive, but from the
13. How the aforesaid relations are possible, intellect
predicated of God 61. That this theory is contrary to the
14. Continued teaching of Aristotle
15. That God is to all things the 62. Against Alexander’s opinion concerning
cause of being the possible intellect
16. That God brought things into 63. That the soul is not a temperament, as
being from nothing Galen maintained
17. That creation is neither motion 64. That the soul is not a harmony
nor change 65. That the soul is not a body
18. How objections against 66. Against those who maintain that
creation are solved intellect and sense we the same
19. That in creation no succession 67. Against those who hold that the
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exists possible intellect is the imagination
20. That no body is capable of 68. How an intellectual substance can be
creative action the form of the body
21. That the act of creating 69. Solution of the arguments advanced
belongs to God alone above in order to show that an
22. That God is omnipotent intellectual substance cannot be united
23. That God does not act by to the body as its form
natural necessity 70. That according to the words of Aristotle
24. That God acts conformably to the intellect must be said to be united to
His wisdom the body as its form
25. How the omnipotent God is 71. That the soul is united to the body
said to be incapable of certain without intermediation
things 72. That the whole soul is in the whole
26. That the divine intellect is not body and in each of its parts
confined to limited effects 73. That there is not one possible intellect
27. That the divine will is not in all men
restricted to certain effects 74. Concerning the theory of Avicenna,
28. How dueness is entailed in the who said that intelligible forms are not
production of things preserved in the possible intellect
29. Continued 75. Solution of the seemingly
30. How absolute necessity can demonstrative arguments for the unity
exist in created things of the possible intellect
31. That it is not necessary for 76. That the agent intellect is not a
creatures to have always separate substance, but part of the soul
existed 77. That it is not impossible for the possible
32. Arguments of those who wish and agent intellect to exist together in
to demonstrate the world’s the one substance of the soul
eternity from the point of view 78. That Aristotle held not that the agent
of God intellect is a separate substance, but
33. Arguments of those who wish that it is a part of the soul
to prove the eternity of the 79. That the human soul does not perish
world from the standpoint of when the body is corrupted
creatures 80. Arguments to prove that the corruption
34. Arguments to prove the eternity of the body entails that of the soul [and
of the world from the point of their solution]
view of the making of things 81. Continued
35. Solution of the foregoing 82. That the souls of brute animals are not
arguments, and first of those immortal
taken from the standpoint of 83. That the human soul begins to exist
God when the body does
36. Solution of the arguments 84. Solution of the preceding arguments
proposed from the point of view 85. That the soul is not made of God’s
of the things made substance
37. Solution of the arguments 86. That the human soul is not transmitted
taken from the point of view of with the semen
the making of things 87. That the human soul is brought into
38. Arguments by which some try being through the creative action of
to show that the world is not God
eternal 88. Arguments designed to prove that the
39. That the distinction of things is human soul is formed from the semen
not the result of chance 89. Solution of the preceding arguments
40. That matter is not the first 90. That an intellectual substance is united
cause of the distinction of only to a human body as its form
things 91. That there are some intellectual
41. That a contrariety of agents substances which are not united to
does not account for the bodies
distinction of things 92. Concerning the great number of
42. That the first cause of the separate substances
distinction of things is not the 93. Of the nonexistence of a plurality of
world of secondary agents separate substances of one species
43. That the distinction of things is 94. That the separate substance and the
not caused by some secondary soul are not of the same species
agent introducing diverse forms 95. How in separate substances genus and
into matter species are to be taken
44. That the distinction of things 96. That separate substances do not
does not have its source in the receive their knowledge from sensible
diversity of merits or demerits things
45. The true first cause of the 97. That the intellect of a separate
distinction of things substance is always in act of
46. That the perfection of the understanding
universe required the existence 98. How one separate substance
of some intellectual creatures understands another
47. That intellectual substances 99. That separate substances know
are endowed with will material things
48. That intellectual substances 100. That separate substances know
have freedom of choice in singulars
acting 101. Whether separate substances have
natural knowledge of all things at the
same time
Caput 1 Chapter 1
Continuatio sequentium ad THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
praecedentia FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS AND
THE PRECEDING ONES
Meditatus sum in omnibus “I meditated upon Your works: I meditated
operibus tuis, et in factis manuum upon the works of Your hands” (Ps. 142
tuarum meditabar. Psalm. 1425. 5).
Rei cuiuslibet perfecta cognitio [1] Of no thing whatever can a perfect
haberi non potest nisi eius knowledge be obtained unless its
operatio cognoscatur. Ex modo operation is known, because the measure
enim operationis et specie and quality of a thing’s power is judged
mensura et qualitas virtutis from the manner and type of its operation,
pensatur, virtus vero naturam rei and its power, in turn, manifests its
monstrat: secundum hoc enim nature; for a thing’s natural aptitude for
unumquodque natum est operari operation follows upon its actual

quod actu talem naturam sortitur. possession of a certain kind of nature.
Est autem duplex rei operatio, ut [2] There are, however, two sorts of
philosophus tradit, in IX operation, as Aristotle teaches in
metaphysicae: una quidem quae Metaphysics IX [8]: one that remains in
in ipso operante manet et est the agent and is a perfection of it, as the
ipsius operantis perfectio, ut act of sensing, understanding, and willing;
sentire, intelligere et velle; alia another that passes over into an external
vero quae in exteriorem rem thing, and is a perfection of the thing
transit, quae est perfectio facti made as a result of that operation, the
quod per ipsam constituitur, ut acts of heating, cutting and building, for
calefacere, secare et aedificare. example.
Utraque autem dictarum [3] Now, both kinds of operation belong to

operationum competit Deo: prima God: the former, in that He understands,
quidem in eo quod intelligit, vult, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that
gaudet et amat; alia vero in eo He brings things into being, preserves
quod res in esse producit, et eas them, and governs them. But, since the
conservat et regit. Quia vero former operation is a perfection of the
prima operatio perfectio operantis operator, the latter a perfection of the
est, secunda vero perfectio facti; thing made, and since the agent is
agens autem naturaliter prius est naturally prior to the thing made and is the
facto et causa ipsius: oportet quod cause of it, it follows that the first of these
prima dictarum operationum sit types of operation is the ground of the
ratio secundae et eam praecedat second, and naturally precedes it, as a
naturaliter, sicut causa effectum. cause precedes its effect. Clear evidence
Quod quidem in rebus humanis of this fact, indeed, is found in human
manifeste apparet: consideratio affairs; for in the thought and will of the
enim et voluntas artificis craftsman lie the principle and plan of the
principium est et ratio work of building.
aedificationis.
Prima igitur dictarum [4] Therefore, as a simple perfection of

operationum, tanquam simplex the operator, the first type of operation
operantis perfectio, operationis claims for itself the name of operation, or,
vindicat sibi nomen, vel etiam again, of action; the second, as being a
actionis: secunda vero, eo quod perfection of the thing made, is called
sit perfectio facti, factionis nomen making so that the things which a
assumit; unde manufacta dicuntur craftsman produces by action of this kind
quae per actionem huiusmodi ab are said to be his handiwork.
artifice in esse procedunt.
De prima quidem Dei operatione [5] Of the first type of operation in God we

in praecedenti libro iam diximus, have already spoken in the preceding
ubi est actum de cognitione et Book of this work, where we treated of the
voluntate divina. Unde, ad divine knowledge and will. Hence, for a
completam divinae veritatis complete study of the divine truth, the
considerationem, restat nunc de second operation, whereby things are
secunda operatione tractare, per made and governed by God, remains to
quam scilicet res producuntur et be dealt with.
gubernantur a Deo.
Quem quidem ordinem ex [6], In fact, this order we can gather from

praemissis verbis sumere the words quoted above. For the Psalmist
possumus. Praemittit namque first speaks of meditation upon the first
primae operationis meditationem, type of operation, when he says: “I have
cum dicit, meditatus sum in meditated on all your operations”; thus,
omnibus operibus tuis: ut operatio operation is here referred to the divine act
ad divinum intelligere et velle of understanding and will. Then he refers
referatur. Subiungit vero de to meditation on God’s works: “and I
factionis meditatione, cum dicit, et meditated on the works of Your hands”;
in factis manuum tuarum so that by “the works of Your hands” we
meditabar: ut per facta manuum understand heaven and earth, and all that
ipsius intelligamus caelum et is brought into being by God, as the
terram, et omnia quae procedunt handiwork produced by a craftsman.
in esse a Deo sicut ab artifice
manufacta procedunt.
Caput 2 Chapter 2
Quod consideratio creaturarum THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF
utilis est ad fidei instructionem CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR
INSTRUCTION OF FAITH
Huiusmodi quidem divinorum [1] This sort of meditation on the divine
factorum meditatio ad fidem works is indeed necessary for instruction
humanam instruendam de Deo of faith in God.
necessaria est.
Primo quidem, quia ex factorum [2] First, because meditation on His works

meditatione divinam sapientiam enables us in game measure to admire
utcumque possumus admirari et and reflect upon His wisdom. For things
considerare. Ea enim quae arte made by art are representative of the art
fiunt, ipsius artis sunt itself, being made in likeness to the art.
repraesentativa, utpote ad Now, God brought things into being by
similitudinem artis facta. Deus His wisdom; wherefore the Psalm
autem sua sapientia res in esse (103:24) declares: “You made all things in
produxit: propter quod in Psalmo wisdom.” Hence, from reflection upon
dicitur: omnia in sapientia fecisti. God’s works we are able to infer His
Unde ex factorum consideratione wisdom, since, by a certain
divinam sapientiam colligere communication of His likeness, it is
possumus, sicut in rebus factis per spread abroad in the things He has
quandam communicationem suae made. For it is written: “He poured her
similitudinis sparsam. Dicitur enim out,” namely, wisdom, “upon all His
Eccli. 110: effudit illam, scilicet works” (Eccl. 1:10). Therefore, the
sapientiam, super omnia opera Psalmist, after saying: “Your knowledge is

sua. Unde, cum Psalmus diceret, become wonderful to me: it is high, and I
mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex cannot reach it,” and after referring to the
me: confortata est, et non potero aid of the divine illumination, when he
ad eam: et adiungeret divinae says: “Night shall be my light,” etc.,
illuminationis auxilium cum dicit. confesses that he was aided in knowing
Nox illuminatio mea etc.; ex the divine wisdom by reflection upon
consideratione divinorum operum God’s works, saying: “Wonderful are Your
se adiutum ad divinam sapientiam works, and my soul knows right well” (Ps.
cognoscendam confitetur, dicens: 138:6, 11, 14).
mirabilia opera tua, et anima mea
cognoscet nimis.
Secundo, haec consideratio in [3] Secondly, this consideration [of God’s

admirationem altissimae Dei works] leads to admiration of God’s
virtutis ducit: et per consequens in sublime power, and consequently inspires
cordibus hominum reverentiam in men’s hearts reverence for God. For
Dei parit. Oportet enim quod virtus the power of the worker is necessarily
facientis eminentior rebus factis understood to transcend the things made.
intelligatur. Et ideo dicitur Sap. 13 And so it is said: “If they,” namely, the
4: si virtutem et opera eorum, philosophers, “admired their power and
scilicet caeli et stellarum et effects,” namely of the heavens, stars,
elementorum mundi, mirati sunt, and elements of the world, “let them
scilicet philosophi, intelligant understand that He that made them is
quoniam qui fecit haec, fortior est mightier than they” (Wis. 13:4). Also it is
illis. Et Rom. 120 dicitur: invisibilia written: “The invisible things of God are
Dei per ea quae facta sunt clearly seen, being understood by the
intellecta conspiciuntur: things that are made: His eternal power
sempiterna quoque virtus eius et also and divinity” (Rom. 1:20). Now, the
divinitas. Ex hac autem fear and reverence of God result from this
admiratione Dei timor procedit et admiration. Hence, it is said: “Great is
reverentia. Unde dicitur Ierem. 10 Your name in might. Who shall not fear
6 magnum est nomen tuum in You, O King of Nations?” (Jer. 10:67).
fortitudine. Quis non timebit te, o
rex gentium?
Tertio, haec consideratio animas [4] Thirdly, this consideration incites the
hominum in amorem divinae souls of men to the love of God’s
bonitatis accendit. Quicquid enim goodness. For whatever goodness and
bonitatis et perfectionis in diversis perfection is distributed to the various
creaturis particulariter distributum creatures, in partial or particular measure,
est, totum in ipso universaliter est is united together in Him universally, as in
adunatum, sicut in fonte totius the source of all goodness, as we proved
bonitatis, ut in primo libro in Book I. If, therefore, the goodness,
ostensum est. Si igitur beauty, and delightfulness of creatures
creaturarum bonitas, pulchritudo are so alluring to the minds of men, the
et suavitas sic animos hominum fountainhead of God’s own goodness,
allicit, ipsius Dei fontana bonitas, compared with the rivulets of goodness
rivulis bonitatum in singulis found in creatures, will draw the
creaturis repertis diligenter enkindled minds of men wholly to Itself.
comparata, animas hominum Hence it is said in the Psalm (91:5): “You
inflammatas totaliter ad se trahet. have given me, O Lord, a delight in Your
Unde in Psalmo dicitur: delectasti doings, and in the works of Your hands I
me, domine, in factura tua, et in shall rejoice.” And elsewhere it is written
operibus manuum tuarum concerning the children of men: “They
exsultabo. Et alibi de filiis shall be inebriated with the plenty of Your
hominum dicitur: inebriabuntur ab house,” that is, of all creatures, “and You
ubertate domus tuae, quasi totius shall make them drink of the torrent of
creaturae, et sicut torrente Your pleasure: for with You is the fountain
voluptatis tuae potabis eos: of life” (Ps. 35:910). And, against certain
quoniam apud te est fons vitae. Et men, it is said: “By these good things that
Sap. 131, dicitur contra quosdam: are seen,” namely, creatures, which are
ex his quae videntur bona, scilicet good by a kind of participation, “they
creaturis, quae sunt bona per could not understand Him that is” (Wis.
quandam participationem, non 13:1), namely, truly good; indeed, is
potuerunt intelligere eum qui est, goodness itself, as was shown in Book I.
scilicet vere bonus, immo ipsa
bonitas, ut in primo ostensum est.
Quarto, haec consideratio [5] Fourthly, this consideration endows

homines in quadam similitudine men with a certain likeness to God’s
divinae perfectionis constituit. perfection. For it was shown in Book I
Ostensum est enim in primo libro that, by knowing Himself, God beholds all
quod Deus, cognoscendo other things in Himself. Since, then, the
seipsum, in se omnia alia intuetur. Christian faith teaches man principally
Cum igitur Christiana fides about God, and makes him know
hominem de Deo principaliter creatures by the light of divine revelation,
instruit, et per lumen divinae there arises in man a certain likeness of
revelationis eum creaturarum God’s wisdom. So it is said: “But we all
cognitorem facit, fit in homine beholding the glory of the Lord with open
quaedam divinae sapientiae face, are transformed into the same
similitudo. Hinc est quod dicitur 2 image” (2 Cor. 3:18).
Cor. 318: nos vero omnes,
revelata facie gloriam domini
speculantes, in eandem imaginem
transformamur.
Sic igitur patet quod consideratio [6] It is therefore evident that the
creaturarum pertinet ad consideration of creatures has its part to
instructionem fidei Christianae. Et play in building the Christian faith. And for
ideo dicitur Eccli. 4215: memor this reason it is said: “I will remember the
ero operum domini, et quae vidi works of the Lord, and I will declare the
annuntiabo: in sermonibus domini things I have seen: by the words of the
opera eius. Lord are His works” (Sirach 42:15).
Caput 3 Chapter 3
Quod cognoscere naturam THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE
creaturarum valet ad destruendum OF CREATURES SERVES TO
errores qui sunt circa Deum DESTROY ERRORS CONCERNING
GOD
Est etiam necessaria creaturarum [1] The consideration of creatures is

consideratio non solum ad veritatis further necessary, not only for the
instructionem, sed etiam ad errores building up of truth, but also for the
excludendos. Errores namque qui destruction of errors. For errors about
circa creaturam sunt, interdum a creatures sometimes lead one astray
fidei veritate abducunt, secundum from the truth of faith, so far as the
quod verae Dei cognitioni errors are inconsistent with true
repugnant. Hoc autem multipliciter knowledge of God. Now, this happens in
contingit. many ways.
Primo quidem, ex hoc quod [2] First, because through ignorance of
creaturarum naturam ignorantes in the nature of creatures men are
hoc pervertuntur quandoque quod sometimes so far perverted as to set up
id quod non potest nisi ab alio as. the first cause and as God that
esse, primam causam et Deum which can only receive its being from
constituunt, nihil ultra creaturas something else; for they think that
quae videntur aestimantes: sicut nothing exists beyond the realm of
fuerunt illi qui corpus quodcumque visible creatures. Such were those who
Deum aestimaverunt; de quibus identified God with this, that, and the
dicitur Sap. 132: qui aut ignem, aut other kind of body; and of these it is
spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut said: “Who have imagined either the fire,
gyrum stellarum, aut nimiam or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle
aquam, aut solem et lunam, deos of the stars, or the great water, or the
putaverunt. sun and moon to be the gods” (Wis. 13:
2).
Secundo, ex hoc quod id quod Dei [3] Secondly, because they attribute to

solius est creaturis aliquibus certain creatures that which belongs
adscribunt. Quod etiam ex errore only to God. This also results from error
circa creaturas contingit. Quod concerning creatures. For what is
enim natura rei alicuius non patitur, incompatible with a thing’s nature is not
ei non attribuitur nisi quia eius ascribed to it except through ignorance
natura ignoratur: sicut si homini of its nature—as if man were said to
attribueretur habere tres pedes. have three feet. Now, what belongs
Quod autem solius Dei est natura solely to God is incompatible with the
creaturae non patitur: sicut quod nature of a created thing, just as that
solius hominis est non patitur which is exclusively man’s is
alterius rei natura. Ex hoc ergo incompatible with another thing’s nature.
quod natura creaturae ignoratur, Thus, it is from ignorance of the
praedictus error contingit. Et contra creature’s nature that the aforesaid error
hunc errorem dicitur Sap. 1421: arises. And against this error it is said:
incommunicabile nomen lignis et “They gave the incommunicable name
lapidibus imposuerunt. In hunc to stones and wood” (Wis. 14:21). Into
errorem labuntur qui rerum this error fell those who attribute the
creationem, vel futurorum creation of things, or knowledge of the
cognitionem, vel miraculorum future, or the working of miracles to
operationem, aliis causis quam Deo causes other than God.
adscribunt.
Tertio vero, ex hoc quod divinae [4] Thirdly, because through ignorance
virtuti in creaturas operanti aliquid of the creature’s nature something is
detrahitur per hoc quod creaturae subtracted from God’s power in its
natura ignoratur. Sicut patet in his working upon creatures. This is
qui duo rerum principia constituunt; evidenced in the case of those who set
et qui res non ex divina voluntate, up two principles of reality; in those who
sed ex necessitate naturae a Deo assert that things proceed from God, not
procedere asserunt; et illi etiam qui by the divine will, but by natural
res, vel omnes vel quasdam, necessity; and again, in those who
divinae providentiae subtrahunt; aut withdraw either all or some things from
eam posse praeter solitum cursum the divine providence, or who deny that
operari negant. Haec enim omnia it can work outside the ordinary course
divinae derogant potestati. Contra of things. For all these notions are
quos dicitur Iob 2217: quasi nihil derogatory to God’s power. Against such
possit facere omnipotens, persons it is said: “Who looked upon the
aestimabant eum; et Sap. 1217: Almighty as if He could do nothing” (Job
virtutem ostendis tu, qui non 22:17), and: “You show Your power,
crederis esse in virtute when men will not believe You to be
consummatus. absolute in power” (Wis. .12: 17).
Quarto. Homo, qui per fidem in [5] Fourthly, through ignorance of the
Deum ducitur sicut in ultimum nature of things, and, consequently, of
finem, ex hoc quod ignorat naturas his own place in the order of the
rerum, et per consequens gradum universe, this rational creature, man,
sui ordinis in universo, aliquibus who by faith is led to God as his last
creaturis se putat esse subiectum end, believes that he is subject to other
quibus superior est: ut patet in illis creatures to which he is in fact superior.
qui voluntates hominum astris Such is evidently the case with those
supponunt, contra quos dicitur who subject human wills to the stars,
Ierem. 102, a signis caeli nolite and against these it is said: “Be not
metuere, quae gentes timent; et in afraid of the signs of heaven, which the
illis qui Angelos creatores heathens fear” (Jer. 10:2); and this is
animarum existimant; et animas likewise true of those who think that
hominum esse mortales; et si qua angels are the creators of souls, that
similia hominum derogant dignitati. human souls are mortal, and, generally,
of persons who hold any similar views
derogatory to the dignity of man.
Sic ergo patet falsam esse [6] It is, therefore, evident that the
quorundam sententiam qui opinion is false of those who asserted
dicebant nihil interesse ad fidei that it made no difference to the truth of
veritatem quid de creaturis quisque the faith what anyone holds about
sentiret, dummodo circa Deum creatures, so long as one thinks rightly
recte sentiatur, ut Augustinus narrat about God, as Augustine tells us in his
in libro de origine animae: nam book On the Origin of the Soul [De
error circa creaturas redundat in anima et ejus origine, IV, 4]. For error
falsam de Deo sententiam, et concerning creatures, by subjecting
hominum mentes a Deo abducit, in them to causes other than God, spills
quem fides dirigere nititur, dum over into false opinion about God, and
ipsas quibusdam aliis causis takes men’s minds away from Him, to
supponit. whom faith seeks to lead them.
Et ideo illis qui circa creaturas [7] For this reason Scripture threatens
errant poenas sicut infidelibus punishment to those who err about
Scriptura comminatur, dicens in creatures, as to unbelievers, in the
Psalmo: quoniam non intellexerunt words of the Psalm (27:5): “Because
opera domini et in opera manuum they have not understood the works of
eius, destrues illos et non the Lord and the operations of His
aedificabis eos; et Sap. 221 haec hands, You shall destroy them, and shall
cogitaverunt et erraverunt, et not build them up”; and: “These things
subiungit, 22 non iudicaverunt they thought and were deceived,” and
honorem animarum sanctarum. further on: “They did not esteem the
honor of holy Souls” (Wis. 7:2122).
Caput 4 Chapter 4
Quod aliter considerat de creaturis THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND
philosophus et theologus THE THEOLOGIAN CONSIDER
CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS
Manifestum est autem ex praedictis [1] Now, from what has been said it is

quod considerationem circa creaturas evident that the teaching of the
habet doctrina fidei Christianae Christian faith deals with creatures so
inquantum in eis resultat quaedam far as they reflect a certain likeness of
Dei similitudo, et inquantum error in God, and so far as error concerning
ipsis inducit in divinorum errorem. Et them leads to error about God. And so
sic alia ratione subiiciuntur praedictae they are viewed in a different light by
doctrinae, et philosophiae humanae. that doctrine and by human
Nam philosophia humana eas philosophy. For human philosophy
considerat secundum quod considers them as they are, so that
huiusmodi sunt: unde et secundum the different parts of philosophy are
diversa rerum genera diversae partes found to correspond to the different
philosophiae inveniuntur. Fides autem genera of things. The Christian faith,
Christiana eas considerat, non however, does not consider them as
inquantum huiusmodi, utpote ignem such; thus, it regards fire not as fire,
inquantum ignis est, sed inquantum but as representing the sublimity of
divinam altitudinem repraesentat, et God, and as being directed to Him in
in ipsum Deum quoquo modo any way at all. For as it is said: “Full of
ordinatur. Ut enim Eccli. 42 dicitur: the glory of the Lord is His work. Did
gloria domini plenum est opus eius. the Lord not make the saints declare
Nonne dominus fecit enarrare all His wonderful works?” (Sirach 42:
sanctos omnia mirabilia sua? 1617)
Et propter hoc etiam alia circa [2] For this reason, also, the
creaturas et philosophus et fidelis philosopher and the believer consider
considerat. Philosophus namque different matters about creatures. The
considerat illa quae eis secundum philosopher considers such things as
naturam propriam conveniunt: sicut belong to them by nature—the upward
igni ferri sursum. Fidelis autem ea tendency of fire, for example; the
solum considerat circa creaturas believer, only such things as belong to
quae eis conveniunt secundum quod them according as they are related to
sunt ad Deum relata: utpote, quod God—the fact, for instance, that they
sunt a Deo creata, quod sunt Deo are created by God, are subject to
subiecta, et huiusmodi. Him, and so on.
Unde non est ad imperfectionem [3] Hence, imperfection is not to be
doctrinae fidei imputandum si multas imputed to the teaching of the faith if it
rerum proprietates praetermittat: ut omits many properties of things, such
caeli figuram, et motus qualitatem. as the figure of the heaven and the
Sic enim nec naturalis circa lineam quality of its motion. For neither does
illas passiones considerat quas the natural philosopher consider the
geometra: sed solum ea quae same characters of a line as the
accidunt sibi inquantum est terminus geometrician, but only those that
corporis naturalis. accrue to it as terminus of a natural
body.
Si qua vero circa creaturas [4] But any things concerning
communiter a philosopho et fideli creatures that are considered in
considerantur, per alia et alia principia common by the philosopher and the
traduntur. Nam philosophus believer are conveyed through
argumentum assumit ex propriis different principles in each case. For
rerum causis: fidelis autem ex causa the philosopher takes his argument
prima; ut puta, quia sic divinitus est from the proper causes of things; the
traditum; vel quia hoc in gloriam Dei believer, from the first cause—for such
cedit; vel quia Dei potestas est reasons as that a thing has been
infinita. handed down in this manner by God,
Unde et ipsa maxima sapientia dici or that this conduces to God’s glory, or
debet, utpote super altissimam that God’s power is infinite.
causam considerans: secundum illud Hence, also, [the doctrine of the faith]
Deut. 46: haec est sapientia vestra ought to be called the highest wisdom,
et intellectus coram populis. since it treats of the highest Cause; as
Et propter hoc sibi, quasi principali, we read in Deuteronomy (4:6): “For
philosophia humana deservit. Et ideo this is your wisdom and understanding
interdum ex principiis philosophiae in the sight of nations.” And, therefore,
humanae, sapientia divina procedit. human philosophy serves her as the
Nam et apud philosophos prima first wisdom.
philosophia utitur omnium scientiarum Accordingly, divine wisdom sometimes
documentis ad suum propositum argues from principles of human
ostendendum. philosophy. For among philosophers,
too, the first philosophy utilizes the
teachings of all the sciences in order
to realize its objectives.
Exinde etiam est quod non eodem [5] Hence again, the two kinds of
ordine utraque doctrina procedit. Nam teaching do not follow the same order.
in doctrina philosophiae, quae For in the teaching of philosophy,
creaturas secundum se considerat et which considers creatures in
ex eis, in Dei cognitionem perducit, themselves and leads us from them to
prima est consideratio de creaturis et the knowledge of God, the first
ultima de Deo. In doctrina vero fidei, consideration is about creatures; the
quae creaturas non nisi in ordine ad last, of God. But in the teaching of
Deum considerat, primo est faith, which considers creatures only
consideratio Dei et postmodum in their relation to God, the
creaturarum. Et sic est perfectior: consideration of God comes first, that
utpote Dei cognitioni similior, qui of creatures afterwards. And thus the
seipsum cognoscens alia intuetur. doctrine of faith is more perfect, as
Unde, secundum hunc ordinem, post being more like the knowledge
ea quae de Deo in se in primo libro possessed by God, who, in knowing
sunt dicta, de his quae ab ipso sunt Himself, immediately knows other
restat prosequendum. things.
Erit autem hic prosecutionis ordo, ut [6] And so, following this order, after
primo agamus de productione rerum what has been said in Book I about
in esse; secundo, de earum God in Himself, it remains for us to
distinctione; tertio vero de ipsarum treat of the things which derive from
rerum productarum et distinctarum Him.
natura, quantum ad fidei pertinet
veritatem.
Caput 5 Chapter 5
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Erit autem hic prosecutionis [1] We shall treat of these matters in the
ordo, ut primo agamus de following order: first, the bringing forth of
productione rerum in esse; things into being [638]; second, their
secundo, de earum distinctione; distinction [3945]; third, the nature of
tertio vero de ipsarum rerum these same things, brought forth and
productarum et distinctarum distinct from one another, so far as it is
natura, quantum ad fidei pertinet relevant to the truth of the faith [46101].
veritatem.
Caput 6 Chapter 6
Quod Deo competit ut sit aliis THAT IT IS PROPER TO GOD TO BE
principium essendi THE SOURCE OF THE BEING OF
OTHER THINGS
Supponentes igitur quae in [1] Presupposing the things already

superioribus ostensa sunt, demonstrated in Book I, let us now
ostendamus nunc quod competit show that it belongs to God to be the
Deo ut sit aliis essendi principium et principle and cause of being to other
causa. things.
Ostensum est enim supra, per [2] For in Book I of this work it was
demonstrationem Aristotelis, esse shown, by means of Aristotle’s
aliquam primam causam efficientem, demonstration, that there is a first
quam Deum dicimus. Efficiens autem efficient cause, which we call God. But
causa suos effectus ad esse an efficient cause brings its effects into
conducit. Deus igitur aliis essendi being. Therefore, God is the cause of
causa existit. being to other things.
Item. Ostensum est in primo libro, [3] Also, it was shown in Book I, by the

per rationem eiusdem, esse aliquod argument of the same author, that
primum movens immobile, quod there is a first immovable mover, which
Deum dicimus. Primum autem we call God. But the first mover in any
movens in quolibet ordine motuum order of movements is the cause of all
est causa omnium motuum qui sunt the movements in that order. Since,
illius ordinis. Cum igitur multa ex then, many things are brought into
motibus caeli producantur in esse, in existence by the movements of the
quorum ordine Deum esse primum heaven, and since God has been
movens ostensum est, oportet quod shown to be the first mover in the order
Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi. of those movements, it follows
necessarily that God is the cause of
being to many things.
Amplius. Quod per se alicui convenit, [4] Furthermore, that which belongs to

universaliter ei inesse necesse est: a thing through itself must be in it
sicut homini rationale, et igni sursum universally; as for man to be rational
moveri. Agere autem aliquem and fire to tend, upwards. But to enact
effectum per se convenit enti in actu: an actuality is, through itself, proper to
nam unumquodque agens secundum a being in act; for every agent acts
hoc agit quod in actu est. Omne according as it is in act. Therefore,
igitur ens actu natum est agere every being in act is by its nature apt to
aliquid actu existens. Sed Deus est enact something existing in act. But
ens actu, ut in primo libro ostensum God is a being in act, as was shown in
est. Igitur sibi competit agere aliquid Book I. Therefore, it is proper to Him to
ens actu, cui sit causa essendi. enact some being in act, to which He is
the cause of being.
Adhuc. Signum perfectionis in rebus [5] It is, moreover, a sign of perfection

inferioribus est quod possunt sibi in things of the lower order of reality
similia facere: ut patet per that they are able to produce their like,
philosophum, in IV Meteororum. as Aristotle points out in his
Deus autem est maxime perfectus, ut Meteorology [IV, 3]. But, as was shown
in primo libro ostensum est. Ipsi igitur in Book I, God is supremely perfect.
competit facere aliquid sibi simile ens Therefore, it belongs to Him to produce
in actu, ut sic sit causa essendi. something actual, like Himself, so as to
be the cause of its existence.
Item. Ostensum est in primo libro [6] Then, too, it was shown in Book I
quod Deus vult suum esse aliis that God wills to communicate His
communicare per modum being to other things by way of
similitudinis. De perfectione autem likeness. But it belongs to the will’s
voluntatis est quod sit actionis et perfection to be the principle of action
motus principium: ut patet in III de and of movement, as is said in De
anima. Cum igitur divina voluntas sit anima III [10]. Therefore, since God’s
perfecta, non deerit ei virtus will is perfect, He does not lack the
communicandi esse suum alicui per power of communicating His being to a
modum similitudinis. Et sic erit ei thing by way of likeness. And thus He
causa essendi. will be the cause of its being.
Adhuc. Quanto alicuius actionis [7] Moreover, the more perfect is the
principium est perfectius, tanto principle of a thing’s action, to so many
actionem suam potest in plura more and more remote things can it
extendere et magis remota: ignis extend its action: thus, fire, if weak,
enim, si sit debilis, solum propinqua heats only things nearby; if strong, it
calefacit; si autem sit fortis, etiam heats even distant things. But pure act,
remota. Actus autem purus, qui Deus which God is, is more perfect than act
est, perfectior est quam actus mingled with potentiality, as it is in us.
potentiae permixtus, sicut in nobis But act is the principle of action. Since,
est. Actus autem actionis principium then, by the act which is in us we can
est. Cum igitur per actum qui in nobis proceed not only to actions abiding in
est possumus non solum in actiones us, such as understanding and willing,
in nobis manentes, sicut sunt but also to actions which terminate in
intelligere et velle, sed etiam in things outside of us, and through which
actiones quae in exteriora tendunt, certain things are made by us, much
per quas aliqua facta producimus; more can God, because He is in act,
multo magis Deus potest, per hoc not only understand and will, but also
quod actu est, non solum intelligere produce an effect. And thus He can be
et velle, sed etiam producere the cause of being to other things.
effectum. Et sic potest aliis esse
causa essendi.
Hinc est quod dicitur Iob 59: qui facit [8] Hence, it is said: “Who does great

magna et mirabilia et inscrutabilia things and unsearchable things without
absque numero. number” (Job 5:9).
Caput 7 Chapter 7
Quod in Deo sit potentia activa THAT ACTIVE POWER EXISTS IN
GOD
Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus [1] Now, from this it is clear that God is
est potens, et quod ei convenienter powerful, and that active power is
potentia activa attribuitur. fittingly attributed to Him.
Potentia enim activa est principium [2] For active power is the principle of

agendi in aliud secundum quod est acting upon another, as such. But it is
aliud. Deo autem convenit esse proper to God to be the source of being
aliis principium essendi. Ergo to other things. Therefore, it pertains to
convenit sibi esse potentem. Him to be powerful.
Amplius. Sicut potentia passiva [3] Again, just as passive potency
sequitur ens in potentia, ita potentia follows upon being in potency, so active
activa sequitur ens in actu: potency follows upon being in act; for a
unumquodque enim ex hoc agit thing acts in consequence of its being in
quod est actu, patitur vero ex hoc act, and undergoes action because it is
quod est potentia. Sed Deo in potency. But it is proper to God to be
convenit esse actu. Igitur convenit in act. Therefore, active power belongs
sibi potentia activa. to Him.
Adhuc. Divina perfectio omnium [4] The divine perfection, furthermore,

perfectiones in se includit, ut in includes in itself the perfections of all
primo libro ostensum est. Virtus things, as was shown in Book I. But
autem activa de perfectione rei est: active power belongs to the perfection of
unumquodque enim tanto maioris a thing; for the more perfect any thing is,
virtutis invenitur quanto perfectius so much the greater is its power found to
est. Virtus igitur activa Deo non be. Therefore, active power cannot be
potest deesse. wanting in God.
Praeterea. Omne quod agit potens [5] Moreover, whatever acts has the
est agere: nam quod non potest power to act, since that which has not
agere, impossibile est agere; et the power to act cannot possibly act; and
quod impossibile est agere, what cannot possibly act is necessarily
necesse est non agere. Deus nonactive. But God is an acting and a
autem est agens et movens, ut moving being, as was shown in Book I.
supra ostensum est. Igitur potens Therefore, He has the power to act; and
est agere: et potentia ei active, but not passive, potency is
convenienter adscribitur activa, sed properly ascribed to Him.
non passiva.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: [6] Thus it is said in the Psalm (88:9):
potens es, domine. Et alibi: “You are mighty, O Lord,” and
potentiam tuam Deus, et iustitiam elsewhere: “Your power and Your justice,
tuam usque in altissima quae fecisti O God, even to the highest great things
magnalia. You have done.” (Ps. 70: 1819).
Caput 8 Chapter 8
Quod Dei potentia sit eius THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS
substantia SUBSTANCE
Ex hoc autem ulterius concludi [1] Now, from this the further conclusion
potest quod divina potentia sit ipsa can be drawn that God’s power is His
Dei substantia. very substance.
Potentia enim activa competit [2] For active power belongs to a thing
alicui secundum quod est actu. according as it is in act. But God is act
Deus autem est actus ipse, non itself, not a being whose actuality is due
autem est ens actu per aliquem to an act that is other than itself; for in
actum qui non sit quod est ipse: God there is no potentiality, as was
cum in eo nulla sit potentialitas, ut shown in Book I of this work. Therefore,
in primo libro ostensum est. Est God is His own power.
igitur ipse sua potentia.
Adhuc. Omnis potens qui non est [3] Again, we argue from the fact that
sua potentia, est potens whatever is powerful and is not its own
participatione potentiae alicuius. power is powerful by participation of
De Deo autem nihil potest dici another’s power. But nothing can be said
participative: cum sit ipsum suum of God participatively, since He is His
esse, ut in primo libro ostensum very own being, as was shown in Book I.
est. Est igitur ipse sua potentia. Therefore, He is His own power.
Amplius. Potentia activa ad [4] Then, too, active power pertains to a
perfectionem rei pertinet, ut ex thing’s perfection, as we have just seen.
praedictis patet. Omnis autem But every perfection of God is contained
divina perfectio in ipso suo esse in His very being, as was shown in Book
continetur, ut in primo libro I. Therefore, God’s power is not other
ostensum est. Divina igitur than His very being, as we likewise
potentia non est aliud ab ipso esse proved in Book I. Therefore, He is His
eius. Deus autem est suum esse, own power.
ut in primo libro ostensum est. Est
igitur sua potentia.
Item. In rebus quarum potentiae [5] Again, in things whose powers are not

non sunt earum substantiae, ipsae their substance, the powers themselves
potentiae sunt accidentia: unde are accidents. Hence, natural power is
potentia naturalis in secunda placed in the second species of quality.
specie qualitatis ponitur. In Deo But in God there can be no accident, as
autem non potest esse aliquod was shown in Book I. Therefore, God is
accidens: ut in primo ostensum His power.
est. Deus igitur est sua potentia.
Praeterea. Omne quod est per [6] Moreover, everything which is through

aliud, reducitur ad id quod est per another is reduced to that which is

se sicut ad primum. Alia vero through itself, as to that which is first. But
agentia reducuntur in Deum sicut other agents are reduced to God as first
in primum agens. Est igitur agens agent. Therefore, God is agent through
per se. Quod autem per se agit, His very self. But that which acts through
per suam essentiam agit. Id autem itself acts through its essence, and that
quo quis agit, est eius activa by which a thing acts is its active power.
potentia. Ipsa igitur Dei essentia Therefore, God’s very essence is His
est eius activa potentia. active power.
Caput 9 Chapter 9
Quod Dei potentia sit eius actio THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS ACTION
Ex hoc autem ostendi potest quod [1] From this it can be shown that God’s

potentia Dei non sit aliud quam sua power is not other than His action.
actio.
Quae enim uni et eidem sunt [2] For things identical with one and the
eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. same thing are identical with one
Divina autem potentia est eius another. But God’s power is His
substantia, ut ostensum est. Eius substance, as was just proved. And His
etiam actio est eius substantia, ut action is His substance, as was shown in
in primo libro ostensum est de Book P with regard to His intellectual
intellectuali operatione: eadem operation; for the same argument
enim ratio in aliis competit. Igitur in applies to His other operations.
Deo non est aliud potentia et aliud Therefore, in God power is not distinct
actio. from action.
Item. Actio alicuius rei est [3] The action of a thing, moreover, is a
complementum quoddam potentiae complement of its power; for action is
eius: comparatur enim ad compared to power as second act to
potentiam sicut actus secundus ad first. But God’s power is not completed
primum. Divina autem potentia non by another than Himself, since it is His
completur alio quam seipso: cum very essence. Therefore, in God power
sit ipsa Dei essentia. In Deo igitur and action are not distinct.
non est aliud potentia et aliud actio.
Amplius. Sicut potentia activa est [4] Then, too, just as active power is
aliquid agens, ita essentia eius est something acting, so is its essence
aliquid ens. Sed divina potentia est something being. But, as we have seen,
eius essentia, ut ostensum est. God’s power is His essence. Therefore,
Ergo suum agere est suum esse. His action is His being. But His being is
Sed eius esse est sua substantia. His substance. Therefore, God’s action
Et sic ut prius. is His substance; and thus the same
conclusion follows as before.
Adhuc. Actio quae non est [5] Furthermore, an action that is not the

substantia agentis, inest ei sicut substance of the agent is in the agent as
accidens subiecto: unde et actio an accident in its subject; and that is why
unum inter novem praedicamenta action is reckoned as one of the nine
accidentis computatur. In Deo categories of accident. But nothing can
autem non potest esse aliquid per exist in God in the manner of an
modum accidentis. In Deo igitur accident. Therefore, God’s action is not
sua actio non est aliud a sua other than His substance and His power.
substantia et sua potentia.
Caput 10 Chapter 10
Qualiter potentia in Deo dicatur HOW POWER IS ATTRIBUTED TO
GOD
Quia vero nihil est sui ipsius [1] But, since nothing is its own
principium, cum divina actio non sit principle, and God’s action is not other
aliud quam eius potentia, manifestum than His power, it is clear from the
est ex praedictis quod potentia non foregoing that power is attributed to
dicitur in Deo sicut principium God, not as principle of action, but as
actionis, sed sicut principium facti. Et principle of the thing made. And since
quia potentia respectum ad alterum power implies relation to something
importat in ratione principii, est enim else as having the character of a
potentia activa principium agendi in principle (for active power is the
aliud, ut patet per philosophum in V principle of acting on something else,
Metaph.; manifestum est quod as Aristotle says in Metaphysics V
potentia dicitur in Deo per respectum [12]), it is evident that power is in truth
ad facta, secundum rei veritatem; non attributed to God in relation to things
per respectum ad actionem nisi made, not in relation to action, except
secundum modum intelligendi, prout according to our way of
intellectus noster diversis understanding, namely, so far as our
conceptionibus utrumque considerat, intellect considers both God’s power
divinam scilicet potentiam et eius and His action through diverse
actionem. Unde, si aliquae actiones conceptions. Hence, if certain actions
Deo conveniant quae non in aliquod are proper to God which do not pass
factum transeant sed maneant in into something made but remain in
agente, respectu harum non dicetur Him, power is not attributed to Him in
in Deo potentia nisi secundum their regard, except according to our
modum intelligendi, non secundum manner of understanding, and not
rei veritatem. Huiusmodi autem according to reality. Such actions are
actiones sunt intelligere et velle. understanding and willing. Properly
Potentia igitur Dei, proprie loquendo, speaking, therefore, God’s power does
non respicit huiusmodi actiones, sed not regard such actions, but only
solos effectus. Intellectus igitur et effects. Consequently, intellect and will
voluntas in Deo non sunt ut are in God, not as powers, but only as
potentiae, sed solum ut actiones. actions.
Patet etiam ex praedictis quod [2] From the foregoing it is clear, also,

multitudo actionum quae Deo that the multifarious actions attributed
attribuitur, ut intelligere, velle, to God, as understanding, willing,
producere res, et similia, non sunt producing things, and the like are not
diversae res: cum quaelibet harum diverse realities, since each of these
actionum in Deo sit ipsum eius esse, actions in God is His very being, which
quod est unum et idem. Quomodo is one and the same. Indeed, from
autem multiplicitas significationis what has been shown be clearly seen
unius rei veritati non praeiudicet, ex how a thing may be signified in many
his quae in primo libro ostensa sunt, ways without prejudice to the truth of
manifestum esse potest. its oneness in reality.
Caput 11 Chapter 11
Quod de Deo dicitur aliquid THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN
relative ad creaturas RELATION TO CREATURES
Cum autem potentia Deo [1] Now, since power is proper to God in
conveniat respectu suorum relation to His effects, and since power, as
effectuum; potentia autem was said, has the character of a principle,
rationem principii habeat, ut and since principle expresses relationship
dictum est; principium autem to that which proceeds from it, it is evident
relative ad principiatum dicitur: that something can be said of God
manifestum est quod aliquid relatively, with regard to His effects.
relative potest dici de Deo in
respectu suorum effectuum.
Item. Non potest intelligi aliquid [2] It is, moreover, inconceivable that one
relative dici ad alterum nisi e thing be said in relation to another unless,
converso illud relative diceretur conversely, the latter be said in relation to
ad ipsum. Sed res aliae relative it. But other things are spoken of in relation
dicuntur ad Deum: utpote to God; for instance, as regards their being,
secundum suum esse, quod a which they possess from God, they are
Deo habent, ut ostensum est, ab dependent upon Him, as has been shown.
ipso dependentes. Deus igitur e Conversely, therefore, God may be spoken
converso relative ad creaturas of in relation to creatures.
dicetur.
Adhuc. Similitudo est relatio [3] Further. Likeness is a certain kind of
quaedam. Deus autem, sicut et relation. But God, even as other agents,
cetera agentia, sibi simile agit. produces something like to Himself.
Dicitur igitur aliquid relative de Therefore, something is said of Him
ipso. relatively.
Amplius. Scientia ad scitum [4] Then, too, knowledge is spoken of in
relative dicitur. Deus autem non relation to the thing known. But God
solum sui ipsius, sed etiam possesses knowledge not only of Himself,
aliorum scientiam habet. Igitur but also of other things. Therefore,
aliquid relative dicitur de Deo ad something is said of God in relation to
alia. other things.
Adhuc. Movens dicitur relative [5] Again. Mover is spoken of in relation to

ad motum, et agens ad factum. thing moved, and agent in relation to thing
Deus autem est agens et done. But, as was shown, God is an agent
movens non motum, ut and an unmoved mover. Therefore
ostensum est. Dicuntur igitur de relations are predicated of Him.
ipso relationes.
Item. Primum relationem [6] And again. First implies a relation, and

quandam importat similiter so does highest. But it was shown in Book I
summum. Ostensum est autem that God is the first being and the highest
in primo ipsum esse primum ens good.Patet igitur quod multa de Deo
et summum bonum. relative dicuntur.
[7] It is, therefore, evident that many things
are said of God relatively.
Caput 12 Chapter 12
Quod relationes dictae de Deo ad THAT RELATIONS PREDICATED OF
creaturas non sunt realiter in Deo GOD IN REFERENCE TO
CREATURES DO NOT REALLY EXIST
IN HIM
Huiusmodi autem relationes quae [1] Now, these relations which refer to
sunt ad suos effectus, realiter in God’s effects cannot possibly exist in
Deo esse non possunt. Him really.
Non enim in eo esse possent sicut [2] For they cannot exist in Him as
accidentia in subiecto: cum in ipso accidents in a subject, since there is no
nullum sit accidens ut in primo libro accident in Him, as was shown in Book
ostensum est. Nec etiam possent I. Neither can they be God’s very
esse ipsa Dei substantia. Cum enim substance, because, as Aristotle says in
relativa sint quae secundum suum the Categories [VII], relative terms are
esse ad aliud quodammodo se those “which in their very being refer
habent, ut philosophus dicit in somehow to something else”; so that
praedicamentis, oporteret quod Dei God’s substance would then have to be
substantia hoc ipsum quod est ad referred to something else. But that
aliud diceretur. Quod autem ipsum which is essentially referred to another
quod est ad aliud dicitur, depends upon it in a certain way, since
quodammodo ab ipso dependet: it can neither be nor be understood
cum nec esse nec intelligi sine eo without it. Hence, it would follow that
possit. Oporteret igitur quod Dei God’s substance would depend on
substantia ab alio extrinseco esset something else extrinsic to it, so that He

dependens. Et sic non esset per would not be, of Himself, the necessary
seipsum necesseesse, ut in primo being, as He was shown to be in Book I.
libro ostensum est. Non sunt igitur Therefore, such relations do not really
huiusmodi relationes secundum rem exist in God.
in Deo.
Item. Ostensum est in primo quod [3] It was shown in Book I, moreover,
Deus omnium entium est prima that God is the first measure of all
mensura. Comparatur igitur Deus things. Hence, He stands in relation to
ad alia entia sicut scibile ad other beings as the knowable to our
scientiam nostram, quod eius knowledge, which is measured by the
mensura est: nam ex eo quod res knowable; for “opinion or speech is true
est vel non est, opinio et oratio vera or false according as a thing is or is not,
vel falsa est, secundum as Aristotle says in the Categories [V].
philosophum in praedicamentis. But, although a thing is said to be
Scibile autem licet ad scientiam knowable in relation to knowledge, the
relative dicatur, tamen relatio relation is not really in the knowable, but
secundum rem in scibili non est, only in the knowledge. Thus, as
sed in scientia tantum: unde Aristotle observes in Metaphysics v, the
secundum philosophum, in V knowable is so called relatively, “not
Metaph., scibile dicitur relative, non because it is itself related, but because
quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud something else is related to it.”
refertur ad ipsum. Dictae igitur Therefore the relations in question have
relationes in Deo non sunt realiter. no real being in God.
Adhuc. Relationes praedictae [4] A further point. The aforesaid

dicuntur de Deo non solum relations are predicated of God with
respectu eorum quae sunt actu, sed respect not only to those things that are
respectu eorum quae sunt in in act, but to those also that are in
potentia: quia et eorum scientiam potency; for He both has knowledge of
habet, et respectu eorum dicitur et them and in relation to them is called
primum ens et summum bonum. the first being and the supreme good.
Sed eius quod est actu ad id quod But there are no real relations of that
non est actu sed potentia, non sunt which is actual to that which is not
relationes reales: alias sequeretur actual, but potential; otherwise, it would
quod essent infinitae relationes actu follow that there are actually an infinity
in eodem, cum numeri infiniti in of relations in the same subject, since
potentia sint maiores binario, quibus potentially infinite numbers are greater
omnibus ipse est prior. Deus autem than the number two, which is prior to
non aliter refertur ad ea quae sunt them all. God, however, is not referred
actu quam ad ea quae sunt to actual things otherwise than to
potentia: quia non mutatur ex hoc potential things, for He is not changed
quod aliqua producit. Non igitur as the result of producing certain things.
refertur ad alia per relationem Therefore, He is not referred to other
realiter in ipso existentem. things by a relation really existing in
Him.
Amplius. Cuicumque aliquid de [5] Furthermore, we observe that

novo advenit, necesse est illud whatever receives something anew
mutari, vel per se vel per accidens. must be changed, either essentially or
Relationes autem quaedam de accidentally. Now, certain relations are
novo dicuntur de Deo: sicut quod predicated of God anew; for example,
est dominus aut gubernator huius that He is Lord or Governor of this thing
rei quae de novo incipit esse. Si which begins to exist anew. Hence, if a
igitur praedicaretur aliqua relatio relation were predicated of God as
realiter in Deo existens, sequeretur really existing in Him, it would follow
quod aliquid Deo de novo adveniret, that something accrues to God anew,
et sic quod mutaretur vel per se vel and thus that He is changed either
per accidens. Cuius contrarium in essentially or accidentally; the contrary
primo libro ostensum est. of this having been proved in Book I.
Caput 13 Chapters 13 and 14
Quomodo praedictae relationes de HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS
Deo dicantur ARE PREDICATED OF GOD
Non autem potest dici quod [1] It cannot be said, however, that these

relationes praedictae sint relations exist as realities outside God.
existentes exterius quasi res
aliquae extra Deum.
Cum enim Deus sit primum entium [2] For, if they did, we should have to

et summum bonorum, oporteret ad consider yet other relations of God to
illas etiam relationes, quae sunt those that are realities, seeing that God is
aliquae res, Dei relationes alias the first of beings and highest of goods.
considerare. Et si illae iterum sint And if these also are realities, we shall be
res aliquae, oportebit iterum tertias compelled to find third relations; and so
relationes adinvenire. Et sic in on endlessly. The relations by which God
infinitum. Non igitur relationes is referred to other things, therefore, are
quibus Deus ad res alias refertur, not realities existing outside Him.
sunt res aliquae extra Deum
existentes.
Item. Duplex est modus quo [3] Moreover, there are two ways in which

aliquid denominative praedicatur. a thing is predicated denominatively: first,
Denominatur enim aliquid ab eo from something external to it; as from
quod extra ipsum est, sicut a loco place a person is said to be somewhere;
dicitur aliquis esse alicubi, et a from time, somewhen; second, from
tempore aliquando: aliquid vero something present in it; as white from
denominatur ab eo quod inest, whiteness. Yet in no case is a thing
sicut ab albedine albus. A denominated from a relation as existing
relatione vero non invenitur aliquid outside it, but only as inhering in it. For
denominari quasi exterius example: a man is not denominated
existente, sed inhaerente: non father except from the fatherhood which
enim denominatur aliquis pater is in him. Therefore, the relations by
nisi a paternitate quae ei inest. which God is referred to creatures cannot
Non igitur potest esse quod possibly be realities outside Him.
relationes quibus Deus ad
[4] Having proved that these relations
creaturas refertur, sint res aliquae have no real existence in God, and yet
extra ipsum. are predicated of Him, it follows that they

Cum igitur ostensum sit quod non are attributed to Him solely in accordance
sint in ipso realiter, et tamen with our manner of understanding, from
dicuntur de eo, relinquitur quod et the fact that other things are referred to
attribuantur solum secundum Him. For in understanding one thing to be
intelligentiae modum, ex eo quod referred to another, our intellect
alia referuntur ad ipsum. simultaneously grasps the relation of the
Intellectus enim noster, latter to it, although sometimes that thing
intelligendo aliquid referri ad is not really related.
alterum, cointelligit relationem
illius ad ipsum: quamvis
secundum rem quandoque non
referatur.
Et sic etiam patet quod alio modo [5] And so it is evident, also, that such
dicuntur de Deo praedictae relations are not said of God in the same
relationes, et alia quae de Deo way as other things predicated of Him.
praedicantur. Nam omnia alia, ut For all other things, such as wisdom and
sapientia, voluntas, eius will, express His essence; the aforesaid
essentiam praedicant: relationes relations by no means do so really, but
vero praedictae minime, sed only as regards our way of
secundum modum intelligendi understanding. Nevertheless, our
tantum. Nec tamen intellectus est understanding is not fallacious. For, from
falsus. Ex hoc enim ipso quod the very fact that our intellect
intellectus noster intelligit understands that the relations of the
relationes divinorum effectuum divine effects are terminated in God
terminari in ipsum Deum, aliqua Himself, it predicates certain things of
praedicat relative de ipso: sicut et Him relatively; so also do we understand
scibile relative intelligimus et and express the knowable relatively, from
significamus ex hoc quod scientia the fact that knowledge is referred to it.
refertur ad ipsum.
Patet etiam ex his quod divinae [6] [Chapter 14] From these considerations

simplicitati non derogat si it is clear, also, that it is not prejudicial to
multae relationes de ipso God’s simplicity if many relations are
dicuntur, quamvis eius predicated of Him, although they do not
essentiam non significent: quia signify His essence; because those
sequuntur intelligendi modum. relations are consequent upon our way of
Nihil enim prohibet intellectum understanding. For nothing prevents our
nostrum intelligere multa, et intellect from understanding many things,
multipliciter referri ad id quod and being referred in many ways to that
est in se simplex, ut sic ipsum which is in itself simple, so as to consider
simplex sub multiplici relatione that simple reality under a manifold

consideret. Et quanto aliquid est relationship. And the more simple a thing,
magis simplex, tanto est maioris the greater is its power, and of so many
virtutis et plurium principium, ac more things is it the principle, so that it is
per hoc multiplicius relatum understood as related in so many more
intelligitur: sicut punctum ways. Thus, a point is the principle of more
plurium est principium quam things than a line is, and a line than a
linea, et linea quam superficies. surface. Therefore, the very fact that many
Hoc igitur ipsum quod multa things are predicated of God in a relative
relative de Deo dicuntur, eius manner bears witness to His supreme
summae simplicitati attestatur. simplicity.
Caput 15 Chapter 15
Quod Deus sit omnibus causa THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE
essendi CAUSE OF BEING
Quia vero ostensum est quod Deus [1] Now, because it has been proved
est aliquibus essendi principium, that God is the source of being to
oportet ulterius ostendere quod nihil some things, it must be demonstrated
praeter ipsum est nisi ab ipso. further that everything besides God
derives its being from Him.
Omne enim quod alicui convenit non [2] For whatever does not belong to a

secundum quod ipsum est, per thing as such appertains to it through
aliquam causam convenit ei, sicut some cause, as white to man; that
album homini: nam quod causam non which has no cause is primary and
habet, primum et immediatum est, immediate, so that it must needs be
unde necesse est ut sit per se et through itself and as such. But no
secundum quod ipsum. Impossibile single entity can as such belong to two
est autem aliquod unum duobus things and to both of them; for what is
convenire et utrique secundum quod said of a thing as such is limited to that
ipsum. Quod enim de aliquo very thing; the possession of dam
secundum quod ipsum dicitur, ipsum angles equal to two right angles is
non excedit: sicut habere tres proper to the triangle exclusively. So, if
angulos duobus rectis aequales non something belongs to two things, it will
excedit triangulum. Si igitur aliquid not belong to both as such. Therefore,
duobus conveniat, non conveniet no single thing can possibly be
utrique secundum quod ipsum est. predicated of two things so as to be
Impossibile est igitur aliquod unum de said of neither of them by reason of a
duobus praedicari ita quod de neutro cause. On the contrary, either the one
per causam dicatur, sed oportet vel must be the cause of the other—as
unum esse alterius causam, sicut fire is the cause of heat in a mixed
ignis est causa caloris corpori mixto, body, and yet each is called hot—or
cum tamen utrumque calidum dicatur; some third thing must be the cause of
vel oportet quod aliquod tertium sit both, as fire is the cause of two
causa utrique, sicut duabus candelis candles giving light. But being is
ignis est causa lucendi. Esse autem predicated of everything that is.
dicitur de omni eo quod est. Hence, there cannot possibly be two
Impossibile est igitur esse aliqua duo things neither of which has a cause of
quorum neutrum habeat causam its being, but either both of them must
essendi, sed oportet utrumque exist through a cause, or the one must
acceptorum esse per causam, vel be the cause of the other's being.
alterum alteri esse causam essendi. Everything which is in any way at all
Oportet igitur quod ab illo cui nihil est must then derive its being from that
causa essendi, sit omne illud quod whose being has no cause. But we
quocumque modo est. Deum autem have already shown that God is this
supra ostendimus huiusmodi ens being whose existence has no cause.
esse cui nihil sit causa essendi. Ab Everything which is in any mode
eo igitur est omne quod quocumque whatever, therefore, is from Him. Now,
modo est. Si autem dicatur quod ens to say that being is not a univocal
non est praedicatum univocum, nihil predicate argues nothing against this
minus praedicta conclusio sequitur. conclusion. For being is not predicated
Non enim de multis aequivoce dicitur, of beings equivocally, but analogically,
sed per analogiam: et sic oportet fieri and thus a reduction to one must be
reductionem in unum. made.
Amplius. Quod alicui convenit ex sua [3] Furthermore, whatever a thing

natura, non ex alia causa, minoratum possesses by its own nature, and not
in eo et deficiens esse non potest. Si from some other cause, cannot be
enim naturae aliquid essentiale diminished and deficient in it. For, if
subtrahitur vel additur, iam altera something essential be subtracted
natura erit: sicut et in numeris accidit, from or added to a nature, another
in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta nature will at once arise, as in the
speciem variat. Si autem, natura vel case of numbers, where the addition
quidditate rei integra manente, aliquid or the subtraction of the unit changes
minoratum inveniatur, iam patet quod the species of the number. If, however,
illud non simpliciter dependet ex illa the nature or quiddity of a thing
natura, sed ex aliquo alio, per cuius remains integral, and yet something in
remotionem minoratur. Quod igitur it is found to be diminished, it is at
alicui minus convenit quam aliis, non once clear that this diminution does
convenit ei ex sua natura tantum, sed not derive simply from that nature, but
ex alia causa. Illud igitur erit causa from something else, by whose
omnium in aliquo genere cui maxime removal the nature is diminished.
competit illius generis praedicatio: Therefore, whatever belongs to one
unde et quod maxime calidum est thing less than to others belongs to it
videmus esse causam caloris in not by virtue of its own nature alone,
omnibus calidis, et quod maxime but through some other cause. Thus,
lucidum causam omnium lucidorum. that thing of which a genus is chiefly
Deus autem est maxime ens, ut in predicated will be the cause of
primo libro ostensum est. Ipse igitur everything in that genus. So we see
est causa omnium de quibus ens that what is most hot is the cause of
praedicatur. heat in all hot things; and what is most
light, the cause of all illuminated
things. But as we proved in Book I,
God is being in the highest mode.
Therefore, He is the cause of all things
of which being is predicated.
Adhuc. Secundum ordinem effectuum [4] Then, too, the order of causes

oportet esse ordinem causarum: eo necessarily corresponds to the order
quod effectus causis suis of effects, since effects are
proportionati sunt. Unde oportet commensurate with their causes.
quod, sicut effectus proprii reducuntur Hence, just as effects are referred to
in causas proprias, ita id quod their appropriate causes, so that which
commune est in effectibus propriis, is common in such effects must be
reducatur in aliquam causam reduced to a common cause. Thus,
communem: sicut supra particulares transcending the particular causes of
causas generationis huius vel illius the generation of this or that thing is
est sol universalis causa the universal cause of generation—the
generationis; et rex est universalis sun; and above the particular
causa regiminis in regno, supra governors of the kingdom, as, indeed,
praepositos regni et etiam urbium of each city in it, stands the king, the
singularium. Omnibus autem universal cause of government in his
commune est esse. Oportet igitur whole realm. Now, being is common to
quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua everything that is. Above all causes,
causa cuius sit dare esse. Prima then, there must be a cause whose
autem causa Deus est, ut supra proper action is to give being. But we
ostensum est. Oportet igitur omnia have already shown in Book I that God
quae sunt a Deo esse. is the first cause. Everything that is
must, therefore, be from God.
Item. Quod per essentiam dicitur, est [5] Moreover, the cause of everything

causa omnium quae per said to be such and such by way of
participationem dicuntur: sicut ignis participation is that which is said to be
est causa omnium ignitorum so by virtue of its essence. Thus, fire
inquantum huiusmodi. Deus autem is the cause of all hot things as such.
est ens per essentiam suam: quia est But God is being by His own essence,
ipsum esse. Omne autem aliud ens because He is the very act of being.
est ens per participationem: quia ens Every other being, however, is a being
quod sit suum esse non potest esse by participation. For that being which
nisi unum ut in primo ostensum est. is its own act of being can be one only,
Deus igitur est causa essendi as was shown in Book I. God,
omnibus aliis. therefore, is the cause of being to all
other things.
Praeterea. Omne quod est possibile [6] Again, everything that can be and
esse et non esse, habet causam notbe has a cause; for considered in
aliquam: quia in se consideratum ad itself it is indifferent to either, so that
utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet something else must exist which
esse aliquod aliud quod ipsum ad determines it to one. Since, then, it is
unum determinet. Unde, cum in impossible to go on to infinity, there
infinitum procedi non possit, oportet must exist a necessary being which is
quod sit aliquid necessarium quod sit the cause of all things that can he and
causa omnium possibilium esse et notbe. Now, there is a certain kind of
non esse. Necessarium autem necessary being whose necessity is
quoddam est habens causam suae caused. But in this order of things,
necessitatis: in quo etiam in infinitum also, progression to infinity is

procedi non potest; et sic est impossible; so that we must conclude
devenire ad aliquid quod est per se to the existence of something which is
necesseesse. Hoc autem non potest of itself necessary being. There can be
esse nisi unum, ut in primo libro but one such being, as we proved in
ostensum est. Et hoc est Deus. Book I. And this being is God.
Oportet igitur omne aliud ab ipso Everything other than God, therefore,
reduci in ipsum sicut in causam must be referred to Him as the cause
essendi. of its being.
Amplius. Deus secundum hoc [7] Moreover, as we proved above,
factivus est rerum quod actu est, ut God is the maker of things inasmuch
supra ostensum est. Ipse autem sua as He is in act. But by virtue of His
actualitate et perfectione omnes actuality and perfection God embraces
rerum perfectiones comprehendit, ut all the perfections of things, as was
in primo probatum est: et sic est shown in Book I; and thus He is
virtualiter omnia. Est igitur ipse virtually all things. He is, therefore, the
omnium factivus. Hoc autem non maker of all things. But this would not
esset si aliquid aliud esset natum be the case if something besides God
esse non ab ipso: nihil enim natum were capable of being otherwise than
est esse ab alio et non ab alio; quia, from Him; for nothing is of such a
si natum est non ab alio esse, est per nature as to be from another and not
seipsum necesseesse, quod from another, since if a thing is of a
numquam potest ab alio esse. Nihil nature not to be from another, then it is
igitur potest esse nisi a Deo. through itself a necessary being, and
thus can never be from another.
Therefore, nothing can be except from
God.
Item. Imperfecta a perfectis sumunt [8] A final argument. Imperfect things

originem: ut semen ab animali. Deus originate from perfect things, as seed
autem est perfectissimum ens et from the animal. But God is the most
summum bonum, ut in primo perfect being and the highest good, as
ostensum est. Ipse igitur est omnibus was shown in Book I. Therefore, He is
causa essendi: praecipue cum the cause of the being of all things,
ostensum sit quod tale non possit and this is especially so in view of the
esse nisi unum. truth already demonstrated that such a
cause cannot but be one.
Hoc autem divina confirmat [9] Now, this truth is confirmed by
auctoritas. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: qui divine authority; for it is said in the
fecit caelum et terram, mare, et Psalm (145:6): “Who made heaven
omnia quae in eis sunt. Et Ioan. 13: and earth, the sea, and all the things
omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine that are in them”; and: “All things were
ipso factum est nihil. Et Rom. 1136: made by Him, and without Him was
ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, et in made nothing” (John 1:3); and: “Of
quo omnia, ipsi gloria in saecula. Him, and by Him, and in Him are all
things: to Him be glory for ever” (Rom.
11:36).
Per hoc autem excluditur antiquorum [10] The error of the natural

naturalium error, qui ponebant philosophers of old, who asserted that
corpora quaedam non habere certain bodies exist without a cause, is
causam essendi. Et etiam by this truth abolished, as well as the
quorundam qui dicunt Deum non error of those who say that God is not
esse causam substantiae caeli, sed the cause of the substance of the
solum motus. heaven, but only of its motion.
Caput 16 Chapter 16
Quod Deus ex nihilo produxit res in THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO
esse BEING FROM NOTHING
Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus [1] Now, what has been said makes it
res in esse produxit ex nullo clear that God brought things into
praeexistente sicut ex materia. being from no preexisting subject, as
from a matter.
Si enim est aliquid effectus Dei, aut [2] For, if a thing is an effect produced

praeexistit aliquid illi, aut non. Si non, by God, either something exists before
habetur propositum: scilicet quod it, or not. If not, our assertion stands,
Deus aliquem effectum producat ex namely, that God produces some effect
nullo praeexistente. Si autem aliquid from nothing preexisting. If something
illi praeexistit, aut est procedere in exists before it, however, we must
infinitum, quod non est possibile in either go on to infinity, which is
causis naturalibus, ut philosophus impossible in natural causes, as
probat in II metaphysicae: aut erit Aristotle proves in Metaphysics II [2],
devenire ad aliquod primum quod or we must arrive at a first being which
aliud non praesupponit. Quod presupposes no other. And this being
quidem non potest esse nisi ipse can be none other than God Himself.
Deus. Ostensum est enim in primo For we proved in Book I that God is not
libro quod ipse non est materia the matter of any thing; nor, as we
alicuius rei: nec potest esse aliud a have shown, can there be anything
Deo cui Deus non sit causa essendi, other than God which is not made to
ut ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur be by Him. It therefore follows that in
quod Deus in productione sui the production of His effects God
effectus non requirit materiam requires no antecedent matter to work
praeiacentem ex qua operetur. from.
Adhuc. Unaquaeque materia per [3] Every matter, furthermore, is limited

formam superinductam contrahitur to some particular species by the form
ad aliquam speciem. Operari ergo ex with which it is endowed.
materia praeiacente superinducendo Consequently, it is the business of an
formam quocumque modo, est agent limited to some determinate
agentis ad aliquam determinatam species to produce its effect from pre
speciem. Tale autem agens est existing matter by bestowing a form
agens particulare: causae enim upon it in any manner whatsoever. But

causatis proportionales sunt. Agens an agent of this kind is a particular
igitur quod requirit ex necessitate agent; for causes are proportionate to
materiam praeiacentem ex qua their effects. So, an agent that
operetur, est agens particulare. Deus necessarily requires preexistent
autem est agens sicut causa matter from which to produce its effect
universalis essendi, ut supra is a particular agent. Now, it is as the
ostensum est. Igitur ipse in sua universal cause of being that God is an
actione materiam praeiacentem non agent, as we proved in the preceding
requirit. chapter. Therefore, in His action He
has no need of any preexisting matter.
Item. Quanto aliquis effectus est [4] Again. The more universal an effect

universalior, tanto habet propriam is, the higher its proper cause; for the
causam altiorem: quia quanto causa higher the cause, to so many more
est altior, tanto ad plura virtus eius things does its power extend. But to be
extenditur. Esse autem est is more universal than to be moved,
universalius quam moveri: sunt enim since, as the philosophers also teach,
quaedam entium immobilia, ut etiam there are some beings—stones and
philosophi tradunt, ut lapides et the like—which are immobile. So,
huiusmodi. Oportet ergo quod supra above the kind of cause which acts
causam quae non agit nisi movendo only by moving and changing there
et transmutando, sit illa causa quae must exist that cause which is the first
est primum essendi principium. Hoc principle of being, and this, as we have
autem ostendimus esse Deum. Deus proved in the same place, is God.
igitur non agit tantum movendo et Thus, God does not act only by moving
transmutando. Omne autem quod and changing. On the other hand,
non potest producere res in esse nisi every agent which cannot bring things
ex materia praeiacente, agit solum into being except from preexisting
movendo et transmutando: facere matter, acts only by moving and
enim aliquid ex materia est per changing, for to make something out of
motum vel mutationem quandam. matter is the result of some kind of
Non ergo impossibile est producere motion or change. Therefore, to bring
res in esse sine materia praeiacente. things into being without preexisting
matter is not impossible. Hence, God
brings things into being without pre
existing matter.
Praeterea. Quod agit tantum per [5] Moreover, to act only by motion and

motum et mutationem non competit change is incompatible with the
universali causae eius quod est universal cause of being; for, by motion
esse: non enim per motum et and change a being is not made from
mutationem fit ens ex non ente absolute nonbeing, but this being from
simpliciter, sed ens hoc ex non ente this nonbeing. Yet, as was shown,
hoc. Deus autem est universale God is the universal principle of being.
essendi principium, ut ostensum est. Therefore, to act only by motion or by
Non igitur sibi competit agere tantum change is contrary to His nature.
per motum aut per mutationem. Neither, then, is it proper to Him to
Neque igitur sibi competit indigere need preexisting matter in order to
praeiacenti materia ad aliquid make something.

faciendum.
Amplius. Unumquodque agens sibi [6] An additional argument. Every

simile agit, quoquo modo. Agit autem agent produces something in some
unumquodque agens secundum way like itself. But every agent acts
quod actu est. Illius igitur agentis erit according as it is in act. Therefore, to
producere effectum causando aliquo produce an effect by somehow causing
modo formam materiae inhaerentem a form to inhere in a matter will be the
quod est actu per formam sibi proper function of an agent actualized
inhaerentem, et non per totam by a form inherent in it, and not by its
substantiam suam: unde whole substance. Hence, in
philosophus, in VII Metaph., probat Metaphysics VII [8], Aristotle proves
quod res materiales, habentes that material things, which possess
formas in materiis, generantur a forms in matter, are generated by
materialibus agentibus habentibus material agents having forms in matter,
formas in materia, non a formis per not by forms existing through
se existentibus. Deus autem non est themselves. But God is a being in act,
ens actu per aliquid sibi inhaerens, not through anything inherent in Him,
sed per totam suam substantiam, ut but through His whole substance, as
supra probatum est. Igitur proprius was proved above. Therefore, the
modus suae actionis est ut producat proper mode of His action is to
rem subsistentem totam, non solum produce the whole subsisting thing,
rem inhaerentem, scilicet formam in and not merely an inhering entity,
materia. Per hunc autem modum agit namely, a form in a matter. Now, every
omne agens quod materiam in agent which does not require matter
agendo non requirit. Deus igitur for its action acts in this way. In His
materiam praeiacentem non requirit action, consequently, God requires no
in sua actione. preexisting matter.
Item. Materia comparatur ad agens [7] Then, too, matter stands in relation

sicut recipiens actionem quae ab to an agent as the recipient of the
ipso est: actus enim qui est agentis action proceeding from that agent. For
ut a quo, est patientis ut in quo. Igitur that same act which belongs to the
requiritur materia ab aliquo agente ut agent as proceeding therefrom
recipiat actionem ipsius: ipsa enim belongs to the patient as residing
actio agentis in patiente recepta est therein. Therefore, matter is required
actus patientis et forma, aut aliqua by an agent in order that it may receive
inchoatio formae, in ipso. Deus the action of the agent. For the agent’s
autem non agit actione aliqua quam action, received in the patient, is an
necesse sit in aliquo patiente recipi: actuality of the patient’s, and a form, or
quia sua actio est sua substantia, ut some inception of a form, in it. But God
supra probatum est. Non igitur ad acts by no action which must be
producendum effectum requirit received in a patient, for His action is
materiam praeiacentem. His substance, as was proved above.
Therefore, He requires no preexisting
matter in order to produce an effect.
Praeterea. Omne agens quod in [8] Again. Every agent whose action
agendo requirit materiam necessitates the prior existence of

praeiacentem, habet materiam matter possesses a matter
proportionatam suae actioni, ut proportioned to its action, so that
quicquid est in virtute agentis, totum whatever lies within the agent’s power
sit in potentia materiae: alias non exists in its entirety in the potentiality of
posset in actum producere quicquid the matter; otherwise, the agent could
est in sua virtute activa, et sic frustra not actualize all that lies within its
haberet virtutem ad illa. Materia active power, and hence, as regards
autem non habet talem proportionem the things it could not actualize, it
ad Deum. Non enim in materia est would possess that power in vain. But
potentia ad quantitatem matter stands in no such relation to
quamcumque, ut patet per God. For in matter there does not exist
philosophum, in III physicorum: cum potentiality to any particular quantity,
tamen divina potentia sit simpliciter as Aristotle points out in Physics III [6];
infinita, ut in primo ostensum est. whereas God’s power is absolutely
Deus igitur non requirit materiam infinite, as we proved in Book I of this
praeiacentem ex qua de necessitate work. No preexisting matter, therefore,
agat. is required by God as necessary
ground for His action.
Adhuc. Diversarum rerum diversae [9] Diverse things, furthermore, have

sunt materiae: non enim est eadem diverse matters; for the matter of
materia spiritualium et corporalium, spiritual things is not the same as that
nec corporum caelestium et of corporeal things, nor is the matter of
corruptibilium. Quod quidem ex hoc the heavenly bodies the same as that
patet quod recipere, quod est of corruptible bodies. This, indeed, is
proprietas materiae, non eiusdem clear from the fact that receptivity,
rationis est in praedictis: nam which is the property of matter, is not
receptio quae est in spiritualibus est of the same nature in these things. For
intelligibilis, sicut intellectus recipit receptivity in spiritual things is
species intelligibilium non secundum intelligible in character; thus, the
esse materiale; corpora vero intellect receives the species of
caelestia recipiunt innovationem intelligible things, though not according
situs, non autem innovationem to their material being; while the
essendi, sicut corpora inferiora. Non heavenly bodies acquire new
est igitur una materia quae sit in positions, but no new existences, as
potentia ad esse universale. Ipse the lower bodies do. Hence, there is no
autem Deus est totius esse activus one matter which is in potentiality to
universaliter. Ipsi igitur nulla materia universal being. But God is universally
proportionaliter respondet. Non igitur productive of the total being of things.
materiam ex necessitate requirit. There is, then, no matter
corresponding, in proportionate
fashion, to Him. Hence, He stands in
no need of matter.
Amplius. Quorumcumque in rerum [10] Moreover, wherever in the

natura est aliqua proportio et aliquis universe we find some mutual
ordo, oportet unum eorum esse ab proportion and order among things,
alio, vel ambo ab aliquo uno: oportet one of those things must derive its
enim ordinem in uno constitui being from another, or both from some

respondendo ad aliud; alias ordo vel one thing. For an order must be
proportio esset a casu, quem in founded in one term by it
primis rerum principiis ponere est corresponding to another; otherwise,
impossibile, quia sequeretur magis order or proportion would be the result
omnia alia esse a casu. Si igitur sit of chance, which cannot be allowed in
aliqua materia divinae actioni the first principles of things, since it
proportionata, oportet vel quod would then follow with even greater
alterum sit ab altero, vel utrumque a force that all else are fortuitous. So, if a
tertio. Sed cum Deus sit primum ens matter commensurate with God’s
et prima causa, nec potest esse ab action exists, it follows either that the
aliqua tertia causa. Relinquitur igitur, one is derived from the other, or both
si invenitur aliqua materia from a third thing. But, since God is the
proportionata divinae actioni, quod first being and the first cause, He
illius ipse sit causa. cannot be the effect of matter, nor can
He derive His being from any third
cause. It remains, therefore, that, if any
matter proportioned to God’s action
exists, then He Himself is the cause of
it.
Adhuc. Quod est in entibus primum, [11] The first existent, furthermore, is
oportet esse causam eorum quae necessarily the cause of the things that
sunt: si enim non essent causata, exist; for, if they were not caused, then
non essent ab ipso ordinata, ut iam they would not be set in order from that
ostensum est. Inter actum autem et first being, as we have just shown.
potentiam talis est ordo quod, licet in Now, the order that obtains between
uno et eodem quod quandoque est act and potentiality is this: although in
potentia quandoque actu, potentia sit one and the same thing which is
prior tempore quam actus, licet actus sometimes in potentiality and
sit prior natura; tamen simpliciter sometimes in act, the potentiality is
loquendo, oportet actum potentia prior in time to the act, which however
priorem esse, quod patet ex hoc, is prior in nature to the potentiality,
quod potentia non reducitur in actum nevertheless, absolutely speaking, act
nisi per ens actu. Sed materia est is necessarily prior to potentiality. This
ens in potentia. Ergo oportet quod is evident from the fact that a
Deus, qui est actus purus, sit potentiality is not actualized except by
simpliciter ea prior: et per a being actually existing. But matter is
consequens causa ipsius. Non ergo only potentially existent. Therefore,
suae actioni praesupponitur materia God who is pure act, must be
ex necessitate. absolutely prior to matter, and
consequently the cause of it. Matter,
then, is not necessarily presupposed
for His action.
Item. Materia prima aliquo modo est: [12] Also, prime matter in some way is,
quia est ens in potentia. Deus autem for it is potentially a being. But God is
est causa omnium quae sunt, ut the cause of everything that is, as was
supra ostensum est. Deus igitur est shown above. Hence, God is the
causa materiae primae. Cui nulla cause of prime matter—in respect to
praeexistit. Divina igitur actio which nothing preexists. The divine
naturam praeexistentem non requirit. action, therefore, requires no pre
existing nature.
Hanc autem veritatem divina [13] Holy Scripture confirms this truth,
Scriptura confirmat, dicens, Gen. 11: saying: “In the beginning God created
in principio creavit Deus caelum et heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1). For to
terram. Nihil enim est aliud creare create means nothing else than to
quam absque materia praeiacenti bring something into being without any
aliquid in esse producere. preexisting matter.
Ex hoc autem confutatur error [14] This truth refutes the error of the
antiquorum philosophorum qui ancient philosophers who asserted that
ponebant materiae omnino nullam matter has no cause whatsoever, for
causam esse, eo quod actionibus they perceived that in the actions of
particularium agentium semper particular agents there is always an
videbant aliquid actioni praeiacere: antecedent subject underlying the
ex quo opinionem sumpserunt, action; and from this observation they
omnibus communem, quod ex nihilo assumed the opinion common to all,
nihil fit. Quod quidem in that from nothing, comes nothing. Now,
particularibus agentibus verum est. indeed, this is true of particular agents.
Ad universalis autem agentis, quod But the ancient philosophers had not
est totius esse activum, cognitionem yet attained to the knowledge of the
nondum pervenerant, quem nihil in universal agent which is productive of
sua actione praesupponere necesse the total being, and for His action
est. necessarily presupposes nothing
whatever.
Caput 17 Chapter 17
Quod creatio non est motus neque THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOTION
mutatio NOR CHANGE
Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum [1] In the light of what has been proved,

est quod Dei actio, quae est it is evident that God’s action, which is
absque materia praeiacente et without preexisting matter and is called
creatio vocatur, non sit motus creation, is neither a motion nor a
neque mutatio, proprie loquendo. change, properly speaking.
Motus enim omnis vel mutatio est [2] For all motion or change is the “act of

actus existentis in potentia that which exists potentially, as such.”
secundum quod huiusmodi. In hac But in the action which is creation,
autem actione non praeexistit nothing potential preexists to receive
aliquid in potentia quod suscipiat the action, as we have just shown.
actionem, ut iam ostensum est. Therefore, creation is not a motion or a
Igitur non est motus neque mutatio. change.
Item. Extrema motus vel mutationis [3] Moreover, the extremes of a motion

cadunt in eundem ordinem: vel or change are included in the same
quia sunt sub uno genere, sicut order, either because they fall under one
contraria, ut patet in motu augmenti genus, as contraries—for example, in
et alterationis et secundum locum the motion of growth or alteration and of
lationis; vel quia communicant in carrying a thing from one place to
una potentia materiae, ut privatio et another—or because they share in one
forma in generatione et potentiality of matter, as do privation and
corruptione. Neutrum autem potest form in generation and corruption. But
dici in creatione: potentia enim ibi neither of these alternatives can be
non est, nec aliquid eiusdem attributed to creation; for in this action no
generis quod praesupponatur potentiality is present, nor does there
creationi, ut probatum est. Igitur exist anything of the same genus as this
non est ibi neque motus neque action and which is presupposed for it,
mutatio. as we have proved. In creation,
therefore, neither motion nor change
exists.
Praeterea. In omni mutatione vel [4] Again, in every change or motion
motu oportet esse aliquid aliter se there must be something existing in one
habens nunc et prius: hoc enim way now and in a different way before,
ipsum nomen mutationis ostendit. for the very word change shows this.
Ubi autem tota substantia rei in But, where the whole substance of a
esse producitur, non potest esse thing is brought into being, there can be
aliquod idem aliter et aliter se no same thing existing in different ways,
habens: quia illud esset non because such a thing would not itself be
productum, sed productioni produced, but would be presupposed to
praesuppositum. Non est ergo the production. Hence, creation is not a
creatio mutatio. change.
Adhuc. Oportet quod motus vel [5] Furthermore, motion or change must
mutatio duratione praecedat id precede that which results therefrom; for
quod fit per mutationem vel motum: in the being of the made lies the
quia factum esse est principium beginning of rest and the term of motion.
quietis et terminus motus. Unde Every change, then, must be a motion or
oportet omnem mutationem esse a terminus of motion, which is
motum vel terminum motus, qui est successive. And for this reason, what is
successivus. Et propter hoc, quod being made is not; because so long as
fit non est: quia, quandiu durat the motion endures, something is
motus, aliquid fit et non est; in ipso coming to be, and is not; whereas in the
autem termino motus, in quo incipit very terminal point of motion, wherein
quies, iam non fit aliquid, sed rest begins, a thing no longer is coming
factum est. In creatione autem non to be; it is. In creation, however, this is
potest hoc esse: quia, si ipsa impossible. For, if creation preceded its
creatio praecederet ut motus vel product, as do motion or change, then
mutatio, oporteret sibi praestitui some subject would have to be prior to it;
aliquod subiectum; quod est contra and this is contrary to the nature of
rationem creationis. Creatio igitur creation. Creation, therefore, is neither a

non est motus neque mutatio. motion nor a change.
Caput 18 Chapter 18
Quomodo solvantur ea quae HOW OBJECTIONS AGAINST
contra creationem obiiciuntur CREATION ARE SOLVED
Ex hoc autem apparet vanitas [1] Now, what has been said makes
impugnantium creationem per apparent the fruitless effort of those who
rationes sumptas ex natura impugn creation by arguments derived
motus vel mutationis: utpote from the nature of motion or change—the
quod oportet creationem, sicut contention, for example, that creation, like
ceteros motus vel mutationes, other motions or changes, must take place
esse in aliquo subiecto; et quod in a subject, or that in creation nonbeing
oportet non esse transmutari in must be transmuted into being, just as fire
esse, sicut ignis transmutatur in is changed into air.
aerem.
Non enim est creatio mutatio, [2] For creation is not a change, but the
sed ipsa dependentia esse creati very dependency of the created act of
ad principium a quo statuitur. Et being upon the principle from which it is
sic est de genere relationis. produced. And thus, creation is a kind of
Unde nihil prohibet eam in creato relation; so that nothing prevents its being
esse sicut in subiecto. in the creature as its subject.
Videtur tamen creatio esse [3] Nevertheless, creation appears to be a

mutatio quaedam secundum kind of change from the point of view of our
modum intelligendi tantum: way of understanding only, namely, in that
inquantum scilicet intellectus our intellect grasps one and the same thing
noster accipit unam et eandem as not existing before and as existing
rem ut non existentem prius, et afterwards.
postea existentem.
Apparet autem, si creatio relatio [4] But, clearly, if creation is some sort of
quaedam est, quod res quaedam relation, then it is a certain reality; and
est: et neque increata est; neque neither is it uncreated nor is it created by
alia relatione creata. Cum enim another relation. For, since a created effect
effectus creatus realiter depends really upon its creator, a relation
dependeat a creante, oportet of real dependency, such as this, must
huiusmodi relationem esse rem itself be something real. But everything real
quandam. Omnis autem res a is brought into being by God; it therefore
Deo in esse producitur. Est igitur owes its being to God. It is not, however,
in esse a Deo producta. Non created by a creation other than that
tamen alia creatione creata, whereby this first creature itself is said to
quam ipsa creatura prima quae be created. For just as accidents and forms
per eam creata dicitur. Quia do not exist by themselves, so neither are
accidentia et formae, sicut per se they created by themselves; creation is the
non sunt, ita nec per se creantur, production of a being. Rather, just as
cum creatio sit productio entis: accidents and forms exist in another, so
sed, sicut in alio sunt, ita aliis are they created when other things are
creatis creantur. Praeterea. created. Moreover, a relation is not referred
Relatio non refertur per aliam through another relation, for in that case
relationem, quia sic esset abire we would fall into an infinite regress; but it
in infinitum: sed per seipsam is referential of itself, because it is a
refertur, quia essentialiter relatio relation by essence. Hence, there is no
est. Non igitur alia creatione need for another creation by which creation
opus est, qua ipsa creatio itself is created, and so on to infinity.
creetur, et sic in infinitum
procedatur.
Quod in creatione non sit successio Chapter 19
Apparet etiam ex praedictis quod THAT IN CREATION NO
omnis creatio absque successione SUCCESSION EXISTS
est.
Nam successio propria est motui. [1] From the foregoing it is also clear
Creatio autem non est motus; nec that all creation is successionless. [2]
terminus motus, sicut mutatio. Igitur For succession characterizes motion.
nulla est in ipsa successio. But creation is not a motion, nor the
term of a motion, as a change is;
hence, there is no succession in it.
Item. In omni motu successivo est [3] In every successive motion,
aliquid medium inter eius extrema: furthermore, there exists some mean
quia medium est ad quod continue between the extremes of the motion; for
motum primo venit quam ad a mean is that which a continuously
ultimum. Inter esse autem et non moved thing attains first before
esse, quae sunt quasi extrema reaching the terminal point. But
creationis, non potest esse aliquid between being and nonbeing, which
medium. Igitur non est ibi aliqua are as it were the extremes of creation,
successio. no mean can possibly exist. Therefore,
in creation there is no succession.
Adhuc. In omni factione in qua est [4] Again, in every making involving
successio, fieri est ante factum succession, a thing is in process of
esse: ut probatur in VI physicorum. becoming prior to its actual production,
Hoc autem in creatione non potest as is shown in Physics VI [6]. But this
accidere. Quia fieri quod cannot occur in creation. For the
praecederet factum esse creaturae, becoming which would precede the
indigeret aliquo subiecto. Quod non creature’s actual production would
posset esse ipsa creatura de cuius require a subject. The latter could not
creatione loquimur, quia illa non est be the creature itself, of whose creation
ante factum esse: nec etiam in we are speaking, since, before being
factore, non enim moveri est actus made, the creature is not. Nor would
moventis, sed moti. Relinqueretur that subject lie in the maker, because to
igitur quod fieri haberet pro subiecto be moved is an act not of the mover,
aliquam materiam facti but of the thing moved. It therefore
praeexistentem. Quod est contra remains that some preexisting matter
creationis rationem. Impossibile est of the thing produced would be the
igitur in creatione successionem subject of the process of becoming.
esse. This is contrary to the idea of creation.
It is therefore impossible that creation
should involve succession.
Amplius. Omnem factionem [5] And again. Every successive making

successivam in tempore oportet must take place in time; since before
esse: prius enim et posterius in and after in motion are numbered by
motu numerantur tempore. Simul time. But time, motion, and the thing
autem dividitur tempus, et motus, et that is in motion are all simultaneously
id super quod transit motus. Quod divided. This, indeed, is manifestly so in
quidem in motu locali manifestum local motion; for, if the motion is regular,
est: nam in medietate temporis half the motion will occupy half the time.
regulariter motum pertransit medium Now, the division in forms
magnitudinis. Divisio autem in formis corresponding to the division of time is
respondens divisioni temporis in terms of intensification and
attenditur secundum intensionem et diminution; thus, if a thing is heated to a
remissionem: ut, si aliquid in tanto certain degree in so much time, it is
tempore tantum calefit, in minori heated to a less degree in less time.
minus. Secundum hoc igitur potest Hence, there can be succession in
esse successio in motu, vel motion, or in any making, so far as that
quacumque factione, quod id which is affected by motion is divisible,
secundum quod est motus, est either in point of quantity, as in local
divisibile: vel secundum motion and in growth, or as regards
quantitatem, sicut in motu locali et in intensity and remission, as in alteration.
augmento; vel secundum The latter, however, takes place in two
intensionem et remissionem, sicut in ways: in one way, because the form,
alteratione. Hoc autem secundum which is the term of the motion, is
contingit dupliciter: uno modo, quia divisible with respect to intensity and
ipsa forma quae est terminus motus, remission, as is evidently the case
est divisibilis secundum intensionem when a thing is in process of motion
et remissionem, sicut patet cum toward whiteness; in another way,
aliquid movetur ad albedinem; alio because a division of this kind occurs in
modo, quia talis divisio contingit in dispositions to such a form; thus, the
dispositionibus ad talem formam, process whereby the form of fire comes
sicut fieri ignis successivum est to exist is successive on account of
propter alterationem praecedentem preceding alteration in the dispositions
circa dispositiones ad formam. towards the form. But the very
Ipsum autem esse substantiale substantial being of the creature is not
creaturae non est divisibile modo divisible in this way; for “substance is
praedicto: quia substantia non not susceptible of degrees. Nor do any
suscipit magis et minus. Nec in dispositions precede creation, since
creatione praecedunt dispositiones, there is here no preexisting matter, and
materia non praeexistente: nam disposition is on the side of matter. It
dispositio ex parte materiae est. follows that in creation no succession is
Relinquitur igitur quod in creatione possible.
non possit esse aliqua successio.
Praeterea. Successio in rerum [6] Successiveness in the making of

factionibus ex defectu materiae things, moreover, derives from a defect
provenit, quae non convenienter est of the matter, which is not suitably
a principio ad receptionem formae disposed from the beginning for the
disposita: unde, quando materia iam reception of the form; so that, when the
perfecte disposita est ad formam, matter is already perfectly disposed for
eam recipit in instanti. Et inde est the form, it receives it immediately. For
quod, quia diaphanum semper est in instance, because a transparent body is
ultima dispositione ad lucem, statim always in a state of complete readiness
ad praesentiam lucidi in actu to receive light, it is illuminated at once
illuminatur; nec aliquis motus by the presence of a luminous object;
praecedit ex parte illuminabilis, sed nor is there here any antecedent motion
solum motus localis ex parte on the part of the illuminable thing, but
illuminantis, per quem fit praesens. only the illuminating agent’s local
In creatione autem nihil praeexigitur motion by which it becomes present.
ex parte materiae: nec aliquid deest But nothing having the character of
agenti ad agendum quod postea per matter is prerequisite to creation; nor
motum ei adveniat, cum sit for the accomplishment of His action
immobilis, ut in primo huius operis does God as agent lack anything which
ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur quod might accrue to Him afterwards through
creatio sit in instanti. Unde simul movement~ because He is immobile,
aliquid, dum creatur, creatum est: as we proved in Book I of this work. It
sicut simul illuminatur et illuminatum therefore remains that creation is
est. instantaneous. Thus, a thing
simultaneously is being created and is
created, even as a thing at the same
moment is being illuminated and is
illuminated.
Et inde est quod Scriptura divina [7] And so it is that holy Scripture
creationem rerum in indivisibili proclaims the creation of things to have
factam pronunciat, dicens: in been effected in an indivisible instant;
principio creavit Deus caelum et for it is written: “In the beginning God
terram; quod quidem principium created heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1).
Basilius principium temporis exponit; And Basil explains that this beginning is
quod oportet esse indivisibile, ut in “the beginning of time” and is
VI physicorum probatur. necessarily indivisible, as Aristotle
proves in i VI [3].
Caput 20 Chapter 20
Quod nullum corpus potest creare THAT NO BODY IS CAPABLE OF
CREATIVE ACTION
Ex hoc autem evidenter apparet [1] The preceding considerations make it

quod nullum corpus potest aliquid perfectly clear that no body can produce
per modum creationis producere. anything by creation.
Nullum enim corpus agit nisi [2] A body acts only if it is moved, for the

moveatur: eo quod oporteat agens agent acting and the patient being acted
et patiens esse simul, vel faciens et upon, or the maker making and the thing
factum; simul autem sunt quae in being made, must exist together,
eodem loco sunt, ut habetur in V simultaneously. Now, “those things are
Phys.; locum autem non acquirit simultaneously existent which are in the
corpus nisi per motum. Nullum same place,” as is pointed out in Physics
autem corpus movetur nisi in V [3], and it is only by motion that a body
tempore. Quicquid igitur fit per acquires a place. But no body is moved
actionem corporis, fit successive. except in time. Therefore, whatever is
Creatio autem, ut ostensum est made by the action of a body comes to
non habet successionem. Nihil be successively. Yet, as we have just
igitur potest a corpore quocumque shown, creation is successionless.
per modum creationis produci. Therefore, nothing can be produced
creatively by any bodily thing
whatsoever.
Praeterea. Omne agens quod agit [3] Again. Every agent that acts so far as

inquantum movetur, de necessitate it is moved, necessarily moves that upon
movet illud in quod agit: factum which it acts; the thing made and the
enim et passum consequitur thing acted upon are determined by the
dispositionem facientis et agentis, disposition of the maker and agent, for
eo quod omne agens agit sibi every agent produces its like. So, if an
simile, unde, si agens, non in agent, while varying in disposition, acts
eadem dispositione se habens, agit in that it is changed by movement, a
inquantum per motum variatur, succession of new dispositions must
oportet quod etiam in patiente et also arise in the patient and in the thing
facto quaedam renovatio made; and this cannot take place without
dispositionum fiat, quod sine motu motion. But as was shown, a body does
esse non potest. Omne autem not move unless it is moved. Therefore,
corpus non movet nisi motum, ut nothing is made by the action of a body
probatum est. Nihil igitur fit a except through the motion or change of
corporis actione nisi per motum vel the thing made. It was, however, shown
mutationem facti. Creatio autem above that creation is neither a change
non est mutatio nec motus, ut nor a motion. It remains that no body
ostensum est. Igitur nullum corpus can cause anything by creating it.
potest aliquid causare creando.
Item. Cum agens et factum [4] Moreover, since agent and effect
oporteat sibi esse similia, non must be similar to each other, a thing
potest esse productivum totius that does not act by its total substance
substantiae facti quod non tota sua cannot produce the total substance of its
substantia agit: sicut e converso effect. Thus, Aristotle proves [Metaph.
probat philosophus, in VII Metaph., VI, 8], conversely, that an immaterial

quod forma sine materia, quae tota form, which acts by its whole self, cannot
se agit, non potest esse causa be the proximate cause of a process of
proxima generationis, secundum generation whereby the form alone is
quam sola forma in actum educitur. actualized. But no body acts by its total
Nullum autem corpus tota sua substance, although the whole
substantia agit, etsi totum agat: substance acts. For, since every agent
quia, cum omne agens agat per acts through the form by which it is in
formam qua actu est, illud solum act, only that thing whose total
per totam suam substantiam agere substance is a form will be capable of
poterit cuius est tota substantia acting by its total substance. Of no body
forma; quod de nullo corpore potest can it be said that its whole substance
dici, cum omne corpus habeat consists of form; every body possesses
materiam, eo quod omne corpus matter because every body is mutable.
est mutabile. Ergo nullum corpus Therefore, no body can produce a thing
potest aliquid producere secundum according to its total substance; and this
totam eius substantiam: quod est pertains to the very essence of creation.
de ratione creationis.
Amplius. Creare non est nisi [5] Furthermore, creation is the act of an

potentiae infinitae. Tanto enim est infinite power alone. For the greater the
maioris potentiae agens aliquod, power of an agent, the greater is its
quanto potentiam magis ab actu capacity for actualizing a potentiality
distantem in actum reducere more and more remote from actual
potest: ut quod potest ex aqua existence; a power able to produce fire
ignem facere, quam quod ex aere. from water is greater than one that can
Unde, ubi omnino potentia make fire from air; so that where pre
praeexistens subtrahitur, exceditur existing potentiality is altogether
omnis determinatae distantiae eliminated, every relation of a
proportio, et sic necesse est determinate distance is transcended;
potentiam agentis quae aliquid and thus the power of an agent which
instituit nulla potentia produces something from no preexisting
praeexistente, excedere omnem potentiality whatever must immeasurably
proportionem quae posset surpass the power of an agent which
considerari ad potentiam agentis produces something from matter. Now,
aliquid ex materia facientis. Nulla no power possessed by a body is infinite
autem potentia corporis est infinita: as Aristotle proved in Physics VIII [10].
ut probatur a philosopho in VIII Hence, no bodily thing is capable of
physicorum. Nullum igitur corpus creating—of making something from
potest aliquid creare, quod est ex nothing.
nihilo aliquid facere.
Adhuc. Movens et motum, faciens [6] Again, as Aristotle proves in Physics

et factum, oportet simul esse: ut VII [2], there is nothing intermediate
probatur in VII physicorum. Corpus between this mover moving and this
autem agens non potest adesse thing moved by it— this thing making
suo effectui nisi per contactum, quo and this thing made by it; mover and
tangentium ultima fiunt simul. Unde moved, maker and made must exist
impossibile est aliquod corpus together. But a bodily agent can be
agere nisi tangendo. Tactus autem present to its effect only by contact,
alicuius ad alterum est. Et sic, ubi whereby the extremities of contiguous
non est aliquid praeexistens things come together. No bodily thing,
praeter agens, sicut in creatione then, can act except by contact. Now,
accidit, tactus esse non potest. contact involves the relation of one thing
Nullum igitur corpus potest agere to another. Consequently, where there is
creando. nothing preexistent besides the agent,
there can be no contact; and this is the
case in creation. Hence, no body can act
by creating.
Patet igitur falsitas positionis [7] Patently false, therefore, is the
quorundam dicentium substantiam position of those who said that the
caelestium corporum causam substance of the heavenly bodies
materiae elementorum esse: cum causes the matter of the elements;
materia causam habere non possit matter can have no other cause than an
nisi id quod creando agit; eo quod agent which acts by creating, for matter
ipsa est primum motus et is the first subject of motion and change.
mutationis subiectum.
Caput 21 Chapter 21
Quod solius Dei est creare THAT THE ACT OF CREATING
BELONGS TO GOD ALONE
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest [1] In the light of what has been said, it
ulterius quod creatio est propria can be shown further that creation is an
Dei actio, et quod eius solius est action proper to God, and that He alone
creare. can create.
Cum enim secundum ordinem [2] Corresponding to the order of agents

agentium sit ordo actionum, eo is the order of actions; for the nobler the
quod nobilioris agentis nobilior est agent, the nobler is its action; so that the
actio: oportet quod prima actio sit first action must belong to the first agent.
primi agentis propria. Creatio But creation is the first action because it
autem est prima actio: eo quod presupposes no other action, whereas
nullam aliam praesupponit, omnes all others presuppose it. Therefore,
autem aliae praesupponunt eam. creation is exclusively proper to God,
Est igitur creatio propria Dei solius who is the first agent.
actio, qui est agens primum.
Item. Ex hoc ostensum est quod [3] Moreover, it was proved that God
Deus creat res, quia nihil potest creates things, from the fact that there
esse praeter ipsum ab eo non can be nothing besides Himself that is
causatum. Hoc autem nulli alii not caused by Him. But of nothing else
convenire potest: cum nihil aliud sit can this be said, for only He is the
universalis causa essendi. Soli universal cause of being. Hence,
igitur Deo competit creatio, sicut creation belongs to God alone, as His
propria eius actio. proper action.
Adhuc. Effectus suis causis [4] Furthermore, effects correspond

proportionaliter respondent: ut proportionally to their causes, so that we
scilicet effectus in actu causis attribute actual effects to actual causes,
actualibus attribuamus, et effectus potential effects to potential causes, and,
in potentia causis quae sunt in similarly, particular effects to particular
potentia; et similiter effectus causes and universal effects to universal
particulares causis particularibus, causes, as Aristotle teaches in Physics II
universalibus vero universales; ut [3]. Now, the act of being is the first
docet philosophus, in II effect, and this is evident by reason of
physicorum. Esse autem est the universal presence of this act. It
causatum primum: quod ex ratione follows that the proper cause of the act
suae communitatis apparet. Causa of being is the first and universal agent,
igitur propria essendi est agens namely, God. Other agents, indeed, are
primum et universale, quod Deus not the cause of the act of being as
est. Alia vero agentia non sunt such, but of being this—of being a man
causa essendi simpliciter, sed or being white, for example. On the
causa essendi hoc, ut hominem vel contrary, the act of being, as such, is
album. Esse autem simpliciter per caused by creation, which presupposes
creationem causatur, quae nihil nothing; because nothing can preexist
praesupponit: quia non potest that is outside being as such. By
aliquid praeexistere quod sit extra makings other than creation, this being
ens simpliciter. Per alias factiones or such being is produced; for out of pre
fit hoc ens vel tale: nam ex ente existent being is made this being or such
praeexistente fit hoc ens vel tale. a being. It remains that creation is the
Ergo creatio est propria Dei actio. proper action of God.
Amplius. Quicquid est causatum [5] Again, whatever is caused as regards

secundum aliquam naturam, non some particular nature cannot be the first
potest esse prima causa illius cause of that nature, but only a second
naturae, sed secunda et and instrumental cause; for example,
instrumentalis. Socrates enim, quia since the human nature of Socrates has
habet suae humanitatis causam, a cause, he cannot be the first cause of
non potest esse prima humanitatis human nature; if so, since his human
causa: quia, cum humanitas sua sit nature is caused by someone, it would
ab aliquo causata, sequeretur quod follow that he was the cause of himself,
esset sui ipsius causa, cum sit id since be is what he is by virtue of human
quod est per humanitatem. Et ideo nature. Thus, a univocal generator must
oportet quod generans univocum have the status of an instrumental agent
sit quasi agens instrumentale in respect to that which is the primary
respectu eius quod est causa cause of the whole species. Accordingly,
primaria totius speciei. Et inde est all lower efficient causes must be
quod oportet omnes causas referred to higher ones, as instrumental
inferiores agentes reduci in causas to principal agents. The existence of
superiores sicut instrumentales in every substance other than God is
primarias. Omnis autem alia caused, as we proved above. No such
substantia praeter Deum habet substance, then, could possibly be the
esse causatum ab alio, ut supra cause of existence otherwise than as
probatum est. Impossibile est igitur instrumental and as acting by virtue of

quod sit causa essendi nisi sicut another agent. But it is only in order to
instrumentalis et agens in virtute cause something by way of motion that
alterius. Instrumentum autem an instrument is ever employed; for to be
nunquam adhibetur nisi ad a moved mover is the very essence of
causandum aliquid per viam motus: an instrument. We have already shown,
est enim ratio instrumenti quod sit however, that creation is not a motion.
movens motum. Creatio autem non Hence, no substance besides God can
est motus, ut ostensum est. Nulla create anything.
igitur substantia praeter Deum
potest aliquid creare.
Item. Instrumentum adhibetur [6] An instrument, moreover, is used

propter convenientiam eius cum because it is adapted to a certain effect,
causato, ut sit medium inter and can therefore mediate between the
causam primam et causatum et first cause and the effect, being in
attingat utrumque, et sic influentia contact with both; the influence of the
primi perveniat ad causatum per first cause thus reaches the effect
instrumentum. Unde oportet quod through the instrument. Hence, there
sit aliquid recipiens primi must be a recipient of the influx of the
influentiam in eo quod per first cause upon that which is caused by
instrumentum causatur. Quod est the instrument. But this is contrary to the
contra rationem creationis: nam notion of creation, which presupposes
nihil praesupponit. Relinquitur igitur nothing whatever. It therefore remains
quod nihil aliud praeter Deum that nothing besides God can create,
potest creare, neque sicut either as principal agent or as
principale agens neque sicut instrument.
instrumentum.
Praeterea. Omne agens [7] Furthermore, it is by an action proper

instrumentale exequitur actionem and connatural to itself that every
principalis agentis per aliquam instrumental agent carries out the action
actionem propriam et connaturalem of the principal agent; thus, by processes
sibi: sicut calor naturalis generat of dissolving and dividing, natural heat
carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, generates flesh, and a saw, by cutting,
et serra operatur ad perfectionem plays its part in completing the work of
scamni secando. Si igitur aliqua making a stool. If, therefore, there exists
creatura sit quae operatur ad a creature which participates in the work
creationem sicut instrumentum of creation as an instrument of the first
primi creantis, oportet quod hoc creator, it must do so by an action due
operetur per aliquam actionem and proper to its own nature. Now, the
debitam et propriam suae naturae. effect answering to an instrument’s
Effectus autem respondens actioni proper action is prior, in the order of
propriae instrumenti est prior in via productive process, to the effect
generationis quam effectus corresponding to the principal agent. So
respondens principali agenti, ex it is that the ultimate end corresponds to
quo provenit quod primo agenti the first agent; thus, the cutting of the
finis ultimus respondet: prius enim wood precedes the form of the stool, and
est sectio ligni quam forma scamni, the digestion of food, the production of
et digestio cibi quam generatio flesh. Hence, by the proper operation of

carnis. Oportebit igitur aliquid esse the creating instrument, something will
effectum per propriam operationem have to be produced that is prior, in the
instrumentalis creantis quod sit order of production, to being—which is
prius in via generationis quam the effect corresponding to the action of
esse, quod est effectus the first agent. But this is impossible,
respondens actioni primi creantis. because, the more universal a thing is,
Hoc autem est impossibile: nam the greater its priority in the order of
quanto aliquid est communius, production; so, as Aristotle says in his
tanto est prius in via generationis; book On the Generation of Animals [II,
sicut prius est animal quam homo 3], animal precedes man in the
in generatione hominis, ut generation of man. That any creature
philosophus dicit, in libro de should exercise creative action, either as
generatione animalium. Impossibile principal agent, or instrumentally, is,
est ergo quod aliqua creatura therefore, impossible.
creet, neque sicut principale agens
neque instrumentaliter.
Item. Quod est secundum aliquam [8] Again, that which is caused with
naturam causatum, non potest respect to some nature cannot be the
esse simpliciter illius naturae cause of that nature simply, for then it
causa, esset enim sui ipsius causa: would be the cause of itself. It can,
potest autem esse causa illius however, be the cause of that nature in
naturae in hoc, sicut Plato est this individual; if Plato is the cause of
causa humanae naturae in human nature in Socrates, he is not so
Socrate, non autem simpliciter, eo absolutely speaking, for Plato is himself
quod ipse est causatus in humana caused with respect to human nature.
natura. Quod autem est causa Now, that which is the cause of
alicuius in hoc, est attribuens something in this individual is the
naturam communem alicui per communicator of a common nature to
quod specificatur vel individuatur. some particular thing whereby that
Quod non potest esse per nature is specified or individuated. Such
creationem, quae nihil communication cannot be effected by
praesupponit cui aliquid attribuatur creation, which presupposes nothing to
per actionem. Impossibile est igitur which anything can be communicated by
aliquod ens creatum esse causam action. That a created being should be
alterius per creationem. the creative cause of anything else is
thus impossible.
Amplius. Cum omne agens agat [9] And again, since every agent acts so

secundum quod actu est, oportet far as it is in act, the mode of action must
modum actionis esse secundum follow the mode of a thing’s actual being;
modum actus ipsius rei: unde the hotter a thing actually is, the more
calidum quod magis est in actu beat it gives. Therefore, anything whose
caloris, magis calefacit. actuality is subject to generic, specific,
Cuiuscumque igitur actus and accidental determinations must have
determinatur ad genus et speciem a power that is limited to effects similar
et accidens, eius virtutem oportet to the agent as such; for every agent
esse determinatam ad effectus produces its like. But nothing whose
similes agenti inquantum being is finite can be like another of the
huiusmodi: eo quod omne agens same genus or species, except as
agit sibi simile. Nihil autem quod regards the nature of the genus or the
habet esse determinatum, potest species; for each single being, so far as
esse simile alteri eiusdem generis it is this particular thing, is distinct from
vel speciei nisi secundum rationem every other one. Therefore, nothing
generis vel speciei: nam secundum whose being is finite can be the efficient
quod est hoc aliquid, cause of another, except as regards its
unumquodque est ab alio possession of a genus or species, not as
distinctum. Nihil igitur cuius esse regards its subsisting as distinct from
finitum est, potest per suam others. Hence, that by which the effect of
actionem esse causa alterius nisi a finite agent subsists as an individual is
quantum ad hoc quod habet genus the necessary precondition of such an
vel speciem: non autem quantum agent’s action. Therefore, it does not
ad hoc quod subsistit ab aliis create. Rather, the act of creation
distinctum. Omne igitur agens belongs solely to that agent whose being
finitum praesupponit ad suam is infinite, and which, as we proved in
actionem hoc unde causatum Book I, embraces in itself the likeness of
suum individualiter subsistit. Non all being.
ergo creat: sed solum hoc est
agentis cuius esse est infinitum,
quod est omnis entis
comprehendens similitudinem, ut
supra ostensum est.
Adhuc. Cum omne quod fit ad hoc [10] Moreover, since the reason why
fiat ut sit, oportet, si aliquid fieri anything is made is that it may be, if a
dicatur quod prius fuerit, quod hoc thing is said to be made which existed
non fiat per se, sed per accidens, before, it follows that it is made not
per se vero illud quod prius non through itself, but by accident; whereas
fuit: ut, si ex albo fiat nigrum, fit that is made through itself which was not
quidem et nigrum et coloratum, sed before. Thus, if from white a thing is
nigrum per se, quia fit ex non nigro, made black, it indeed is made both black
coloratum autem per accidens, and colored; but black through itself,
nam prius coloratum erat. Sic igitur, because it is made from notblack, and
cum fit aliquod ens, ut homo vel colored by accident, since it was colored
lapis, homo quidem fit per se, quia before. So, in the production of a being
ex non homine: ens autem per of some particular kind, what is made
accidens, quia non ex non ente through itself is that particular being;
simpliciter, sed ex non ente hoc, ut what is made by accident is simply a
philosophus dicit, in I physicorum. being; when a human being is born, it is
Cum igitur aliquid fit omnino ex non a man that comes to be in an unqualified
ente, ens per se fiet. Oportet igitur sense, a being that comes to be in a
quod ab eo quod est per se causa qualified sense, because a man is made,
essendi: nam effectus not from nonbeing as such, but from this
proportionaliter reducuntur in particular nonbeing, as Aristotle says in
causas. Hoc autem est primum ens Physics I [8]. Therefore, when a thing
solum, quod est causa entis comes to be from nonbeing
inquantum huiusmodi: alia vero unqualifiedly speaking, what it made
sunt causa essendi per accidens, through itself is a being. In that case it
et huius esse per se. Cum igitur must derive from that which is, through
producere ens non ex ente itself, the cause of being, for effects are
praeexistente sit creare, oportet referred to their proportionate causes.
quod solius Dei sit creare. Now, it is the first being alone which is
the cause of being as being; other things
are the cause of being, by accident, and
of this particular being, through
themselves. Since to create is to
produce being from nothing preexisting,
it follows that this act is exclusively
God’s own.
Huic autem veritati sacrae [11] The authority of Sacred Scripture
Scripturae auctoritas attestatur, bears witness to this truth, affirming that
quae Deum omnia creasse God created all things: “In the beginning
affirmat, Gen. 11: in principio God created heaven and earth” (Gen.
creavit Deus caelum et terram. 1:1). Damascene, also, in the second
Damascenus etiam, in secundo sui part of his work writes: “All those who
libri, dicit: quicumque vero aiunt say that the angels are creators of any
Angelos creatores esse substance whatever have the devil as
cuiuscumque substantiae, hi their father, for no creatures in existence
omnes sunt patris sui Diaboli: are creators” [De fide orthodoxa]. [12]
creaturae enim existentes non sunt Thus is destroyed the error of certain
creatores. Per haec autem philosophers who said that God created
destruitur quorundam the first separate substance, which in
philosophorum error qui dixerunt turn created the second, and so on in
Deum creasse primam substantiam orderly fashion to the last one.
separatam, et ab ea fuisse creatam
secundam, et sic quodam ordine
usque ad ultimam.
Caput 22 Chapter 22
Quod Deus omnia possit THAT GOD IS OMNIPOTENT
Ex hoc autem apparet quod divina [1] It is evident, then, that God’s power
virtus non determinatur ad aliquem is not determined to some single effect.
unum effectum.
Si enim solius Dei creare est, ab [2] For, if God alone can create, then
ipso immediate producta esse anything that can be brought into being
oportet quaecumque a sua causa only by creative causality must
produci non possunt nisi per necessarily be produced by Him. In this
modum creationis. Huiusmodi category fall all separate substances—
autem sunt omnes substantiae which are not composed of matter and
separatae, quae non sunt form, and whose existence we now
compositae ex materia et forma, suppose, as well as the totality of
quas esse nunc supponatur; et corporeal matter. These diverse

similiter omnis materia corporalis. existents, then, are the immediate
Haec igitur, tam diversa existentia, effects of God’s power. Now, no power
praedictae virtutis immediatus which produces immediately a number
effectus sunt. Nulla autem virtus of effects, but not from matter, is
producens immediate plures determined to one particular effect. I say
effectus non ex materia, est immediately, because, if it produced
determinata ad unum effectum. them through intermediaries, the
Dico autem immediate: quia, si per diversity might result from the latter. And
media produceret, posset provenire I say not from matter, because the same
diversitas ex parte mediarum agent by the same action causes
causarum. Dico etiam non ex diverse effects in accordance with the
materia: quia idem agens et eadem diversity of the matter involved; the heat
actione causat diversos effectus of fire hardens clay and melts wav.
secundum materiae diversitatem, God’s power, therefore, is not
sicut calor ignis, qui indurat lutum et determined to one effect.
dissolvit ceram. Dei igitur virtus non
est determinata ad unum effectum.
Item. Omnis virtus perfecta ad ea [3] Again, every perfect power reaches
omnia se extendit ad quae suus per out to all those things to which the effect
se et proprius effectus se extendere possessed by it through itself and
potest: sicut aedificativa ad omnia proper to it can extend; whatever can
se extendit, si perfecta sit, quae have the character of a dwelling falls
possunt rationem habere domus. within the range of the art of building, if
Virtus autem divina est per se it is perfect. Now, God’s power is
causa essendi, et esse est eius through itself the cause of being, and
proprius effectus, ut ex dictis patet. the act of being is His proper effect, as
Ergo ad omnia illa se extendit quae was made clear above. Hence, His
rationi entis non repugnant: si enim power reaches out to all things with
in quendam tantum effectum virtus which the notion of being is not
eius posset, non esset per se causa incompatible; for, if God’s power were
entis inquantum huiusmodi, sed limited to some particular effect, He
huius entis. Rationi autem entis would not be through Himself the cause
repugnat oppositum entis, quod est of a being as such, but of this particular
non ens. Omnia igitur Deus potest being. Now, the opposite of being,
quae in se rationem non entis non namely, nonbeing, is incompatible with
includunt. Haec autem sunt quae the notion of being. Hence, God can do
contradictionem implicant. all things which do not essentially
Relinquitur igitur quod quicquid include the notion of nonbeing, and
contradictionem non implicat, Deus such are those which involve a
potest. contradiction. It follows that God can do
whatever does not imply a contradiction.
Adhuc. Omne agens agit inquantum [4] Furthermore, every agent acts so far
actu est. Secundum igitur modum as it is in act. Hence, the mode of an
actus uniuscuiusque agentis est agent’s power in acting accords with its
modus suae virtutis in agendo: mode of act; man begets man, and fire
homo enim generat hominem, et begets fire. Now, God is perfect act,
ignis ignem. Deus autem est actus possessing in Himself the perfections of

perfectus, in se omnium all things, as we have already shown.
perfectiones habens, ut supra His active power, therefore, is perfect,
ostensum est. Est igitur sua virtus extending to everything not repugnant
activa perfecta, ad omnia se to the notion of that which is being in
habens quaecumque non act; namely, to everything except that
repugnant rationi eius quod est which implies a contradiction. God,
esse in actu. Hoc autem est solum then, is omnipotent as regards all but
quod contradictionem implicat. this.
Omnia igitur praeter haec Deus
potest.
Amplius. Omni potentiae passivae [5] Corresponding to every passive

respondet potentia activa. Potentia power, moreover, there is an active one;
enim propter actum est, sicut because potency is for the sake of act,
materia propter formam. Non potest as is matter for the sake of form. Now, it
autem ens in potentia consequi is only by the power of a thing existing
quod sit actu nisi per virtutem actually that a potentially existent being
alicuius existentis in actu. Otiosa can be made actual. A potency would
igitur esset potentia nisi esset virtus thus be without purpose unless there
activa agentis quae eam in actum existed the active power of an agent
reducere posset: cum tamen nihil sit which could actualize it. And yet, in the
otiosum in rebus naturae. Et per real world, there is nothing purposeless.
hunc modum videmus quod omnia Thus, we see that all things potentially
quae sunt in potentia materiae existent in the matter of generable and
generabilium et corruptibilium, corruptible entities can be actualized by
possunt reduci in actum per the active power present in the
virtutem activam quae est in heavenly body, which is the primary
corpore caelesti, quod est primum active force in nature. Now, just as the
activum in natura. Sicut autem heavenly body is the first agent in
corpus caeleste est primum agens respect to lower bodies, so God is the
respectu corporum inferiorum, ita first agent as regards the totality of
Deus est primum agens respectu created being. Therefore, by His active
totius entis creati. Quicquid igitur est power God is able to do everything
in potentia entis creati, totum hoc whatsoever that lies within the potency
Deus per suam virtutem activam of the created being. But in the potency
facere potest. In potentia autem of the created being is everything that is
entis creati est omne quod enti not opposed to itself; just as human
creato non repugnat: sicut in nature is patient of everything except
potentia naturae humanae sunt that which would destroy it. Therefore,
omnia quae naturam humanam non God can do all things.
tollunt. Omnia igitur Deus potest.
Praeterea. Quod effectus aliquis [6] Furthermore, there are three reasons

non subsit potentiae alicuius why some particular effect may escape
agentis, potest ex tribus contingere. the power of some particular agent.
Uno modo, per hoc quod non habet First, because the effect has no likeness
cum agente affinitatem vel or affinity to the agent—for every agent
similitudinem: agens enim omne produces its like in some fashion. Thus,
agit sibi simile aliquo modo. Unde the power in human seed cannot
virtus quae est in semine hominis, produce an irrational animal or a plant,
non potest producere brutum vel yet it can produce a man—a being
plantam: hominem autem potest, superior to those things. Secondly,
qui tamen praedicta excedit. Alio because of the excellence of the effect,
modo, propter excellentiam which is disproportionate to the agent’s
effectus, qui transcendit power; thus, an active corporeal power
proportionem virtutis activae: sicut cannot produce a separate substance.
virtus activa corporalis non potest Thirdly, because the effect requires a
producere substantiam separatam. matter upon which the agent cannot act;
Tertio modo, propter materiam a carpenter cannot make a saw, since
determinatam ad effectum, in quam his art does not enable him to act upon
agens agere non potest: sicut iron, from which a saw is made.
carpentarius non potest facere
[7] But for none of these reasons can
serram, quia sua arte non potest any effect be withdrawn from God’s
agere in ferrum, ex quo fit serra. power. For, first, not because of its
Nullo autem istorum modorum dissimilarity to Him can any effect be
potest aliquis effectus subtrahi impossible to Him, since every being, so
divinae virtuti. Neque enim propter far as it has being, is similar to Him, as
dissimilitudinem effectus aliquid ei was shown above. Nor, secondly,
impossibile esse potest: cum omne because of the excellence of the effect,
ens, inquantum habet esse, sit ei since it has been shown already that
simile, ut supra ostensum est. Nec God transcends all things in goodness
etiam propter effectus excellentiam: and perfection. Nor, thirdly, because of
cum ostensum sit quod Deus est any material deficiency, since God is
supra omnia entia in bonitate et Himself the cause of matter, which
perfectione. Nec iterum propter cannot be produced except by creation.
defectum materiae: cum ipse sit Moreover, in acting, God needs no
causa materiae, quae non possibilis matter, because He brings a thing into
est causari nisi per creationem. Ipse being where nothing whatever existed
etiam in agendo non requirit before; hence, His action cannot be
materiam: cum, nullo praeexistente, hindered from producing its effect
rem in esse producat. Et sic propter because of any lack of matter.
materiae defectum eius actio [8] We therefore conclude that God’s
impediri non potest ab effectus power is not limited to some particular
productione. effect, but that He is able to do
Restat igitur quod divina virtus non absolutely all things; in other words, He
determinetur ad aliquem effectum, is omnipotent.
sed simpliciter omnia potest: quod
est eum esse omnipotentem.
Hinc est quod etiam divina Scriptura [9] So too, Divine Scripture teaches this
fide tenendum hoc tradit. Dicitur as a matter of faith. For in the person of
enim Gen. 171, ex ore Dei: ego God Himself it is said: “I am the
Deus omnipotens: ambula coram almighty God: walk before me and be
me et esto perfectus; et Iob 422: perfect” (Gen. 17:1); and Job (42:2)
scio quia omnia potes; et Lucae 1 says: “I know that You can do all things”;
37, ex ore Angeli: non erit and in the person of the angel: “No word
impossibile apud Deum omne shall be impossible with God” (Luke
verbum. 1:37).
Per hoc autem evacuatur [10] Thus is eliminated the error of
quorundam philosophorum error qui certain philosophers who asserted that
posuerunt a Deo immediate produci God produced immediately one effect
unum effectum tantum, quasi virtus only, as if His power were limited to the
eius ad illius productionem production of it, and that God can
determinata esset; et quod Deus produce another only by acting in
non potest aliud facere nisi accordance with the natural train of
secundum quod cursus rerum events. Of such persons it is written:
naturalium se habet; de quibus “Who looked upon the Almighty as if He
dicitur Iob 2217: quasi nihil posset could do nothing” (Job 22:17).
omnipotens, aestimabant eum.
Caput 23 Chapter 23
Quod Deus non agat ex necessitate THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT BY
naturae NATURAL NECESSITY
Ex hoc autem ostenditur quod Deus [1] From what has been said it follows

agit in creaturis non per that God acts, in the realm of created
necessitatem naturae, sed per things, not by necessity of His nature,
arbitrium voluntatis. but by the free choice of His will.
Omnis enim agentis per [2] For the power of every agent which

necessitatem naturae virtus acts by natural necessity is determined
determinatur ad unum effectum. Et to one effect; that is why all natural
inde est quod omnia naturalia things invariably happen in the same
semper eveniunt eodem modo, nisi way, unless there be an obstacle; while
sit impedimentum: non autem voluntary things do not. God’s power,
voluntaria. Divina autem virtus non however, is not ordered to one effect
ordinatur ad unum effectum tantum, only, as we have just shown.
ut supra ostensum est. Deus igitur Therefore, God acts, not out of natural
non agit per necessitatem naturae, necessity, but by His will.
sed per voluntatem.
Adhuc. Quicquid non implicat [3] Also, as we have demonstrated,
contradictionem, subest divinae whatever does not imply a
potentiae, ut ostensum est. Multa contradiction is subject to the divine
autem non sunt in rebus creatis quae power. Now, there are many entities
tamen, si essent, contradictionem which do not exist in the realm of
non implicarent: sicut patet created things, but which, if they did so
praecipue circa numerum, exist, would imply no contradiction;
quantitates et distantias stellarum et particularly obvious examples are the
aliorum corporum, in quibus si aliter number, quantities, and distances of
se haberet ordo rerum, contradictio the stars and of other bodies, wherein,
non implicaretur. Multa igitur subsunt if the order of things were different, no
divinae virtuti quae in rerum natura contradiction would be implied. Thus,
non inveniuntur. Quicumque autem numerous entities, nonexistent in the

eorum quae potest facere quaedam order of reality, are subject to the
facit et quaedam non facit, agit per divine power. Now, whoever does
electionem voluntatis, et non per some of the things that he can do,
necessitatem naturae. Deus igitur leaving others undone, acts by choice
non agit per necessitatem naturae, of his will, not by necessity of his
sed per voluntatem. nature. Therefore, God acts by His will,
not by necessity of His nature.
Item. Unumquodque agens hoc [4] Then, too, the mode of any agent’s

modo agit secundum quod similitudo action is in keeping with the way in
facti est in ipso: omne enim agens which the likeness of its effect exists in
agit sibi simile. Omne autem quod it; for every agent produces its like.
est in altero, est in eo per modum Now, whatever is present in something
eius in quo est. Cum igitur Deus sit else exists in it conformably to the
per essentiam suam intelligens, ut latter’s mode. But God is intelligent by
supra probatum est, oportet quod His essence, as we have shown, so
similitudo effectus sui sit in eo per that the likeness of His effect must
modum intelligibilem. Igitur per exist in Him in an intelligible mode.
intellectum agit. Intellectus autem Therefore, He acts by His intellect. But
non agit aliquem effectum nisi the intellect does not produce an effect
mediante voluntate, cuius obiectum except by means of the will, whose
est bonum intellectum, quod movet object is a good apprehended by the
agentem ut finis. Deus igitur per intellect and which moves the agent as
voluntatem agit, non per an end. God, therefore, acts by His
necessitatem naturae. will, not of natural necessity.
Amplius. Secundum philosophum, in [5] Moreover, there are two modes of

IX Metaph., duplex est actio: una action distinguished by Aristotle in
quae manet in agente et est perfectio Metaphysics IX [8]: a kind of action
ipsius, ut videre: alia quae transit in which remains in the agent and is a
exteriora et est perfectio facti, sicut perfection of that agent—for example,
comburere in igne. Divina autem seeing; another, which passes into
actio non potest esse de genere things outside the agent, and is a
illarum actionum quae non sunt in perfection of the thing made as a result
agente: cum sua actio sit sua of that action, as burning in the case of
substantia, ut supra ostensum est. fire. Now, God’s action cannot belong
Oportet igitur quod sit de genere to the class of actions which are not
illarum actionum quae sunt in agente immanent in the agent, because His
et sunt quasi perfectio ipsius. action is His substance, as was shown
Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi above. Hence, it must be of the order
actiones cognoscentis et appetentis, of actions which are present in the
Deus igitur cognoscendo et volendo agent as actualities perfecting its own
operatur. Non igitur per necessitatem being. Such actions, however, are
naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis. exclusively proper to a being endowed
with knowledge and appetite. So, God
acts by knowing and by willing—not by
necessity of His nature, therefore, but
by the decision of His will.
Adhuc. Deum agere propter finem ex [6] That God acts for an end can also

hoc manifestum esse potest quod be evident from the fact that the
universum non est a casu, sed ad universe is not the result of chance,
aliquod bonum ordinatur: ut per but is ordered to a good, as Aristotle
philosophum patet, in XI makes clear in Metaphysics XI [10].
metaphysicae. Primum autem agens Now, the first agent acting for an end
propter finem oportet esse agens per must act by intellect and will, for things
intellectum et voluntatem: ea enim devoid of intellect act for an end as
quae intellectu carent, agunt propter directed thereto by another. This is
finem sicut in finem ab alio directa. obviously true in the world of things
Quod quidem in artificialibus patet: made by art; it is the archer that directs
nam sagittae motus est ad the flight of the arrow to a definite
determinatum signum ex directione mark. This must be the case also in
sagittantis. Simile autem esse the realm of natural things; the right
oportet et in naturalibus. Ad hoc ordering of a thing to a due end
enim quod aliquid directe in finem requires knowledge of that end and of
debitum ordinetur, requiritur cognitio the means to it, and of the due
ipsius finis, et eius quod est ad proportion between both; and this
finem, et debitae proportionis inter knowledge is found only in an agent
utrumque: quod solum intelligentis endowed with intelligence. But God is
est. Cum igitur Deus sit primum the first agent; therefore, He acts, not
agens, non agit per necessitatem by a necessity of His nature, but by His
naturae, sed intellectum et intellect and will.
voluntatem.
Praeterea. Quod per se agit, prius [7] Moreover, that which acts by itself
est eo quod per aliud agit: omne is prior to that which acts by another,
enim quod est per aliud, reduci for whatever is by another must be
oportet in id quod per se est, ne in referred to that which is by itself;
infinitum procedatur. Quod autem otherwise, we fall into an infinite
suae actionis non est dominus, non regress. A thing that is not master of its
per se agit: agit enim quasi ab alio own action, however, does not act by
actus, non quasi seipsum agens. itself; it acts as directed by something
Oportet igitur primum agens hoc else, not as directing itself. Hence, the
modo agere quod sui actus dominus first agent must act as master of His
sit. Non est autem aliquis sui own action. But it is only by will that
dominus actus nisi per voluntatem. one is master of his own action. It
Oportet igitur Deum, qui est primum follows, therefore, that God, who is the
agens, per voluntatem agere, non first agent, acts by His will, not by
per naturae necessitatem. necessity of His nature.
Adhuc. Primo agenti debetur prima [8] A further argument. To the first
actio: sicut et primo mobili primus agent belongs the first action, even as
motus. Sed naturaliter actio the first motion pertains to the first
voluntatis est prior quam actio thing movable. But the will’s action is
naturae. Illud enim naturaliter prius naturally prior to that of nature. For that
est quod est perfectius: licet in uno which is more perfect is prior in nature,
quodam sit tempore posterius. Actio though in one and the same particular
autem agentis per voluntatem est thing it be temporally posterior. Now,
perfectior: quod ex hoc patet quod voluntary action is more perfect than
perfectiora sunt ea apud nos quae natural action; in the realm of our own
per voluntatem agunt, quam quae experience, agents which act by will
per naturae necessitatem. Ergo Deo, are obviously more perfect than those
qui est primus agens, debetur actio whose actions are determined by
quae est per voluntatem. natural necessity. Action by way of the
will is, therefore, proper to God, the
first agent.
Amplius. Ex hoc idem apparet quod, [9] This is likewise evident from the

ubi coniungitur utraque actio, fact that when both actions are found
superior est virtus quae agit per together, the power which acts by will
voluntatem ea quae agit per naturam is superior to that which acts by nature,
et utitur ea quasi instrumento: nam in and uses the latter as an instrument;
homine superior est intellectus, qui thus in man the intellect, which acts by
agit per voluntatem, quam anima means of the will, is superior to the
vegetabilis, quae agit per naturae vegetative soul, which acts by natural
necessitatem. Divina autem virtus est necessity. The power of God, however,
suprema in omnibus entibus. Ergo is supreme over all things. It therefore
ipsa agit in res omnes per acts on all things by will, not by natural
voluntatem, non per naturae necessity.
necessitatem.
Item. Voluntas habet pro obiecto [10] Again, the will has for its object a
bonum secundum rationem boni: good considered precisely as such,
natura autem non attingit ad whereas nature does not attain to
communem boni rationem, sed ad goodness in its universal aspect, but
hoc bonum quod est sua perfectio. only to this particular good which is its
Cum igitur omne agens agat perfection. Now, every agent acts
secundum quod ad bonum intendit, inasmuch as it aims at a good,
quia finis movet agentem; oportet because the end moves the agent; so
quod agens per voluntatem ad agens that the agent acting by will must be
per necessitatem naturae compared to the agent acting by
comparetur sicut agens universale natural necessity as universal agent to
ad agens particulare. Agens autem particular agent. But a particular agent
particulare se habet ad agens is related to a universal one as
universale sicut eo posterius, et sicut posterior to it and as its instrument.
eius instrumentum. Ergo oportet Therefore, the primary agent must be a
quod primum agens sit voluntarium, voluntary one, and not an agent by
et non per necessitatem naturae natural necessity.
agens.
Hanc etiam veritatem divina [11] Divine Scripture teaches us this
Scriptura nos docet. Dicitur enim in truth, too, declaring: “Whatever the
Psalmo: omnia quaecumque voluit Lord wished He has done” (Ps. 134:6),
dominus fecit; et Ephes. 111: qui and: “Who works all things according
operatur omnia secundum to the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11).
propositum voluntatis suae. [12] And Hilary, too, in his work De
Et Hilarius, in libro de synodis: synodis writes: “God’s will gave
omnibus creaturis substantiam substance to all creatures.” And he

voluntas Dei attulit. Et infra: talia adds: “For the whole universe of things
enim cuncta creata sunt, qualia Deus were created such as God willed them
ea esse voluit. to be.”
Per haec autem removetur error [13] This also abolishes the error of
quorundam philosophorum qui those philosophers who maintain that
dicebant Deum agere per naturae God’s action is determined by natural
necessitatem. necessity.
Caput 24 Chapter 24
Quod Deus agit secundum suam THAT GOD ACTS CONFORMABLY TO
sapientiam HIS WISDOM
Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus [1] Now, it evidently follows from the
effectus suos producit secundum foregoing that God produces His effects
suam sapientiam. according to His wisdom.
Voluntas enim ad agendum ex [2] For the will is moved to act as the
aliqua apprehensione movetur: result of some sort of apprehension; the
bonum enim apprehensum est apprehended good is indeed the object of
obiectum voluntatis. Deus autem will. But, as was just shown, God is a
est agens per voluntatem, ut voluntary agent. Since in Him there exists
ostensum est. Cum igitur in Deo intellectual apprehension—no other kind
non sit nisi intellectualis —and since He understands nothing
apprehensio; nihilque intelligat nisi except in the very act of understanding
intelligendo se, quem intelligere Himself, and since this act is itself an act
est sapientem esse: relinquitur of wisdom, it follows that God produces
quod omnia Deus secundum suam all things according to His wisdom.
sapientiam operatur.
Item. Omne agens agit sibi simile. [3] Moreover, because every agent

Unde oportet quod secundum hoc produces its like, it necessarily acts in
agat unumquodque agens keeping with the way in which the
secundum quod habet likeness of its effect exists in it; fire heats
similitudinem sui effectus: sicut according to the measure of heat present
ignis calefacit secundum modum in it. But the likeness of the effect
sui caloris. Sed in quolibet agente produced by any voluntary agent, as
per voluntatem, inquantum such, is present in that agent according
huiusmodi, est similitudo sui to the apprehension of his intellect, and
effectus secundum intellectus not only according to the disposition of
apprehensionem: si enim the agent’s nature; for in the latter case,
secundum naturae dispositionem the agent would produce but one effect,
solum inesset similitudo effectus because the natural principal of that
agenti voluntario, non ageret nisi which is one is itself one. Thus, every
unum, quia ratio naturalis unius voluntary agent produces its effect
est una tantum. Omne igitur agens according to the nature of his intellect.

voluntarium producit effectum But in the preceding chapter we proved
secundum rationem sui intellectus. that God acts by His will. It is by the
Deus autem agit per voluntatem, wisdom of His intellect, therefore, that
ut ostensum est. Igitur per God brings things into being.
sapientiam sui intellectus res in
esse producit.
Amplius. Secundum philosophum, [4] Moreover, according to the

in I Metaph., ordinare sapientis Philosopher, “it is the office of a wise man
est: ordinatio enim aliquorum fieri to set things in order.” For things can be
non potest nisi per cognitionem ordered only by knowing their relation
habitudinis et proportionis and proportion to one another, and to
ordinatorum ad invicem, et ad something higher, which is their end; for
aliquid altius eius, quod est finis the order of certain things to one another
eorum; ordo enim aliquorum ad is for the sake of their order to an end.
invicem est propter ordinem eorum But only a being endowed with intellect is
ad finem. Cognoscere autem capable of knowing the mutual relations
habitudines et proportiones and proportions of things; and to judge of
aliquorum ad invicem est solius certain things by the highest cause is the
habentis intellectum; iudicare prerogative of wisdom. All ordering,
autem de aliquibus per causam therefore, is necessarily effected by
altissimam sapientiae est. Et sic means of the wisdom of a being
oportet quod omnis ordinatio per endowed with intelligence. Even so, in
sapientiam alicuius intelligentis the world of the mechanical arts, the
fiat. Unde et in mechanicis planners of buildings are called the wise
ordinatores aedificiorum sapientes men of their craft. Now, the things
illius artificii dicuntur. Res autem produced by God have a mutual order
quae sunt a Deo productae, among themselves which is not
ordinem ad invicem habent non fortuitous, since this order is observed
casualem, cum sit semper vel in always or for the most part. That God
pluribus. Et sic patet quod Deus brought things into being by ordering
res in esse produxit eas them is thus evident. Therefore, God
ordinando. Deus igitur per suam brought things into being by His wisdom.
sapientiam res in esse produxit.
Adhuc. Ea quae sunt a voluntate, [5] Then, too, things which proceed from

vel sunt agibilia, sicut actus the will are either thingstobedone, such
virtutum, qui sunt perfectiones as acts of the virtues, which are
operantis: vel transeunt in perfections of the doer, or thingstobe
exteriorem materiam, quae made, which pass into matter outside the
factibiles dicuntur. Et sic patet agent. So it is clear that creatures
quod res creatae sunt a Deo sicut proceed from God as things made. Now,
factae. Factibilium autem ratio est as Aristotle says, “art is the reason
ars, sicut philosophus dicit. concerned with things to be made.” All
Comparantur igitur omnes res created things, therefore, stand in
creatae ad Deum sicut artificiata relation to God as products of art to the
ad artificem. Sed artifex per artist. But the artist brings his works into
ordinem suae sapientiae et being by the ordering of his wisdom and
intellectus artificiata in esse intellect. So, too, did God make all things

producit. Ergo et Deus omnes by the ordering of His intellect.
creaturas per ordinem sui
intellectus fecit.
Hoc autem divina auctoritate [6] This truth is confirmed by divine
confirmatur. Nam dicitur in authority. For we read in a Psalm
Psalmo: omnia in sapientia fecisti; (103:24): “You have made all things in
et Proverb. 319: dominus wisdom”; and in the Book of Proverbs
sapientia fundavit terram. (3:19): “The Lord by wisdom has founded
the earth.”
Per haec autem excluditur [7] Excluded hereby is the error of those

quorundam error qui dicebant who said that all things depend on the
omnia ex simplici divina voluntate simple will of God, without any reason.
dependere, absque aliqua ratione.
Caput 25 Chapter 25
Qualiter omnipotens dicatur HOW THE OMNIPOTENT GOD IS
quaedam non posse SAID TO BE INCAPABLE OF
CERTAIN THINGS
Ex praemissis autem accipi potest [1] Now, from what has been said
quod, quamvis Deus sit already, we can see that, although God
omnipotens, aliqua tamen dicitur is omnipotent, He is nevertheless said
non posse. Ostensum enim est to be incapable of some things. [2] For
supra in Deo esse potentiam we proved above that active power
activam: potentiam vero passivam exists in God; that there is no passive
in eo non esse iam supra in primo potency in Him had already been
fuerat probatum. Secundum autem demonstrated in Book I of this work.
utramque potentiam dicimur posse. (We, however, are said tobeable as
Illa igitur Deus non potest quae regards both active and passive
posse potentiae passivae est. Quae potentiality.) Hence, God is unable to do
autem huiusmodi sint, those things whose possibility entails
investigandum est. passive potency. What such things are
is, then, the subject of this inquiry.
Primo quidem igitur potentia activa [3] Let us observe, first of all, that active

ad agere est, potentia autem potency relates to acting; passive
passiva ad esse. Unde in illis solis potency, to existing. Hence, there is
est potentia ad esse quae materiam potency with respect to being only in
habent contrarietati subiectam. Cum those things which have matter subject
igitur in Deo passiva potentia non to contrariety. But, since there is no
sit, quicquid ad suum esse pertinet, passive potency in God, His power does
Deus non potest. Non potest igitur not extend to any thing pertaining to His
Deus esse corpus, aut aliquid own being. Therefore, God cannot be a

huiusmodi. body or anything of this kind.
Adhuc. Huius potentiae passivae [4] Furthermore, motion is the act of this

motus actus est. Deus igitur, cui passive potency of which we are
potentia passiva non competit, speaking. But, since there is no passive
mutari non potest. potency in God, He cannot be changed.
Potest autem ulterius concludi quod It can be concluded further that He

non potest mutari secundum cannot be changed with respect to the
singulas mutationis species: ut various kinds of change: increase and
quod non potest augeri vel minui, diminution, or alteration, coming to be
aut alterari, aut generari aut and passing away—all are foreign to
corrumpi. Him.
Amplius. Cum deficere quoddam [5] Thirdly, since a deprivation is a

corrumpi sit, sequitur quod in nullo certain loss of being, it follows that God
deficere potest. can lack nothing.
Praeterea. Defectus omnis [6] Moreover, every failing follows upon

secundum privationem aliquam est. some privation. But the subject of
Privationis autem subiectum privation is the potency of matter. In no
potentia materiae est. Nullo igitur way, therefore, can God fail.
modo potest deficere.
Adhuc. Cum fatigatio sit per [7] Then, too, since weariness results
defectum virtutis, oblivio autem per from a defect of power, and
defectum scientiae, patet quod forgetfulness from defect of knowledge,
neque fatigari neque oblivisci God cannot possibly be subject to
potest. either.
Amplius. Neque vinci aut violentiam [8] Nor can He be overcome or suffer

pati. Haec enim non sunt nisi eius violence, for these are found only in
quod natum est moveri. something having a movable nature.
Similiter autem neque poenitere [9] Likewise, God can neither repent,
potest, neque irasci aut tristari: cum nor be angry or sorrowful, because all
haec omnia in passionem et these things bespeak passion and
defectum sonent. defect.
Rursus. Quia potentiae activae [10] An additional argument is this. The

obiectum et effectus est ens factum, object and effect of an active power is a
nulla autem potentia operationem being made, and no power is operative
habet ubi deficit ratio sui obiecti, if the nature of its object is lacking; sight
sicut visus non videt deficiente is inoperative in the absence of the
visibili in actu: oportet quod Deus actually visible. It must therefore be said
dicatur non posse quicquid est that God is unable to do whatever is
contra rationem entis inquantum est contrary to the nature of being as being,
ens, vel facti entis inquantum est or of made being as made. We must
factum. Quae autem sint huiusmodi, now inquire what these things are.
inquirendum est.
Primo quidem igitur contra rationem [11] First of all, that which destroys the

entis est quod entis rationem tollit. nature of being is contrary to it. Now,
Tollitur autem ratio entis per suum the nature of being is destroyed by its
oppositum: sicut ratio hominis per opposite, just as the nature of man is
opposita eius vel particularum destroyed by things opposite in nature
ipsius. Oppositum autem entis est to him or to his parts. But the opposite
non ens. Hoc igitur Deus non of being is nonbeing, with respect to
potest, ut faciat simul unum et idem which God is therefore inoperative, so
esse et non esse: quod est that He cannot make one and the same
contradictoria esse simul. thing to be and not to be; He can not
make contradictories to exist
simultaneously.
Adhuc. Contradictio contrariis et [12] Contradiction, moreover, is implied

privative oppositis includitur: in contraries and privative opposites: to
sequitur enim, si est album et be white and black is to be white and
nigrum, quod sit album et non not white; to be seeing and blind is to be
album; et si est videns et caecum, seeing and not seeing. For the same
quod sit videns et non videns. Unde reason, God is unable to make
eiusdem rationis etiam est quod opposites exist in the same subject at
Deus non possit facere opposita the same time and in the same respect.
simul inesse eidem secundum
idem.
Amplius. Ad remotionem cuiuslibet [13] Furthermore, to take away an

principii essentialis sequitur remotio essential principle of any thing is to take
ipsius rei. Si igitur Deus non potest away the thing itself. Hence, if God
facere rem simul esse et non esse, cannot make a thing to be and not to be
nec etiam potest facere quod rei at the same time, neither can He make
desit aliquod suorum principiorum a thing to lack any of its essential
essentialium ipsa remanente: sicut principles while the thing itself remains
quod homo non habeat animam. in being; God cannot make a man to be
without a soul.
Praeterea. Cum principia [14] Again, since the principles of

quarundam scientiarum, ut logicae, certain sciences—of logic, geometry,
geometriae et arithmeticae, and arithmetic, for instance—are
sumantur ex solis principiis derived exclusively from the formal
formalibus rerum, ex quibus principles of things, upon which their
essentia rei dependet, sequitur essence depends, it follows that God
quod contraria horum principiorum cannot make the contraries of those
Deus facere non possit: sicut quod principles; He cannot make the genus
genus non sit praedicabile de not to be predicable of the species, nor
specie; vel quod lineae ductae a lines drawn from a circle’s center to its
centro ad circumferentiam non sint circumference not to be equal, nor the
aequales; aut quod triangulus three angles of a rectilinear triangle not
rectilineus non habeat tres angulos to be equal to two right angles.
aequales duobus rectis.
Hinc etiam patet quod Deus non [15] It is obvious, moreover, that God
potest facere quod praeteritum non cannot make the past not to have been,
fuerit. Nam hoc etiam for this, too, would entail a contradiction;
contradictionem includit: eiusdem it is equally as necessary for a thing to
namque necessitatis est aliquid be while it is as to have been while it
esse dum est, et aliquid fuisse dum was.
fuit.
Sunt etiam quaedam quae [16] Also, there are things incompatible

repugnant rationi entis facti with the nature of thing made, as such.
inquantum huiusmodi. Quae etiam And these God cannot make, because
Deus facere non potest: nam omne whatever He does make must be
quod facit Deus, oportet esse something made.
factum.
Ex hoc autem patet quod Deus non [17] And from this it is clear that God
potest facere Deum. Nam de cannot make God. For it is of the
ratione entis facti est quod esse essence of a thing made that its own
suum ex alia causa dependeat. being depends on another cause, and
Quod est contra rationem eius quod this is contrary to the nature of the being
dicitur Deus, ut ex superioribus we call God, as is evident from things
patet. previously said.
Eadem etiam ratione, non potest [18] For the same reason God cannot
Deus facere aliquid aequale sibi. make a thing equal to Himself; for a
Nam illud cuius esse ab alio non thing whose being does not depend on
dependet, potius est in essendo et another is superior in being, and in the
in ceteris dignitatibus eo quod ab other perfections, to that which depends
alio dependet, quod ad rationem on something else, such dependence
entis facti pertinet. pertaining to the nature of that which is
made.
Similiter etiam Deus facere non [19] Likewise, God cannot make a thing

potest quod aliquid conservetur in to be preserved in being without
esse sine ipso. Nam conservatio Himself. For the preservation of each
esse uniuscuiusque dependet a and every thing depends on its cause,
causa sua. Unde oportet quod, so that, if the cause is taken away, the
remota causa, removeatur effectus. effect is necessarily removed also.
Si igitur res aliqua posset esse Hence, if there can be a thing which is
quae a Deo non conservaretur in not kept in being by God, it would not be
esse, non esset effectus eius. His effect.
Rursus. Quia ipse est per [20] Moreover, since God is a voluntary

voluntatem agens, illa non potest agent, that which He cannot will He
facere quae non potest velle. Quae cannot do. Now, we can see what He
autem velle non possit, considerari cannot will if we consider how there can
potest si accipiamus qualiter in be necessity in the divine will; for that
divina voluntate necessitas esse which necessarily is cannot notbe, and
possit: nam quod necesse est esse, what cannot be necessarily is not.
impossibile est non esse; et quod
impossibile est esse, necesse est
non esse.
Patet autem ex hoc quod non [21] It clearly follows that God cannot
potest Deus facere se non esse, vel make Himself not to be, or not to be
non esse bonum aut beatum: quia good or happy; because He necessarily
de necessitate vult se esse, bonum wills Himself to be, to be good and
esse et beatum, ut in primo happy, as we, have shown in Book I of
ostensum est. this work.
Item ostensum est supra quod [22] We proved also, in that same Book,

Deus non potest velle aliquod that God cannot will any evil. It is
malum. Unde patet quod Deus therefore evident that God cannot sin.
peccare non potest.
Similiter ostensum est supra quod [23] And it has already been
Dei voluntas non potest esse demonstrated that the will of God
mutabilis. Sic igitur non potest cannot be mutable; so, what He wills He
facere id quod est a se volitum, non cannot cause to be not fulfilled.
impleri.
Sciendum tamen quod hoc alio [24] But observe that God is said to be
modo dicitur non posse a unable to do this in a different sense
praemissis. Nam praemissa than in the preceding instances, for in
simpliciter Deus nec velle nec those cases God’s inability either to will
facere potest. Huiusmodi autem or to make is absolute, whereas in this
potest quidem Deus vel facere vel case God can either make or will if His
velle, si eius voluntas vel potentia will or His power be considered in
absolute consideretur, non autem si themselves, though not if they be
considerentur praesupposita considered on the supposition of His
voluntate de opposito: nam voluntas having willed the opposite. For the
divina respectu creaturarum divine will, as regards creatures, has
necessitatem non habet nisi ex only suppositional necessity, as was
suppositione, ut in primo ostensum shown in Book I. Thus, all such
est. Et ideo omnes istae locutiones, statements as that God cannot do the
Deus non potest facere contraria contrary of what He has designed to do
his quae disposuit facere, et are to be understood compositely, for so
quaecumque similiter dicuntur, understood they presuppose the divine
intelliguntur composite: sic enim will as regards the opposite. But, if such
implicant suppositionem divinae expressions be understood in a divided
voluntatis de opposito. Si autem sense, they are false, because they
intelliguntur divise, sunt falsae: quia then refer to God’s power and will
respiciunt potentiam et voluntatem absolutely.
Dei absolute.
Sicut autem Deus agit per [25] Now, as we have shown, just as
voluntatem, ita et per intellectum et God acts by will, so also does He act by
scientiam ut ostensum est. Pari intellect and knowledge. It follows that
igitur ratione non potest facere quae He cannot do what He has foreseen
se facturum non praescivit, aut that He will not do, or abstain from
dimittere quae se facturum doing what He has foreseen that He will
praescivit, qua non potest facere do, for the same reason that He cannot
quae facere non vult, aut dimittere do what He wills not to do, or omit to do
quae vult. Et eodem modo what He wills. That God is unable to do
conceditur et negatur utrumque: ut these things is both conceded and
scilicet praedicta non posse dicatur, denied: conceded on a certain condition
non quidem absolute, sed sub or supposition; denied with respect to
conditione vel ex suppositione. His power or will considered absolutely.
Caput 26 Chapter 26
Quod divinus intellectus non THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS
coartatur ad determinatos effectus NOT CONFINED TO LIMITED
EFFECTS
Quoniam autem ostensum est quod [1] We have shown above that God’s
divina potentia ad determinatos power is not limited to certain
effectus non limitatur, ac per hoc determinate effects, because He acts
quod ex necessitate naturae non not by a necessity of His nature, but by
agit, sed per intellectum et His intellect and will. But, lest someone
voluntatem; ne cui forte videatur should think that His intellect or
quod eius intellectus vel scientia ad knowledge can only attain to certain
determinatos effectus solummodo effects, and thus that He acts by a
possit extendi, et sic agat ex necessity of His knowledge, though
necessitate scientiae, quamvis non not of His nature, it must be shown
ex necessitate naturae: restat that His knowledge or intellect is
ostendere quod eius scientia vel limitless in its effects.
intellectus nullis effectuum limitibus
coartatur.
Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus [2] For it was demonstrated in Book I

omnia alia quae ab eo procedere of this work that all that can proceed
possunt comprehendit suam from Him God comprehends in the act
essentiam intelligendo, in qua omnia of understanding His own essence,
huiusmodi esse necessarium est per wherein all such things must
aliqualem similitudinem, sicut necessarily exist by some kind of
effectus virtute sunt in causa. Si igitur likeness, even as effects exist virtually
potentia divina ad effectus in their cause. So, if God’s power is
determinatos non coartatur, ut supra not limited to certain determinate
ostensum est, necessarium est et de effects, as we have shown, a like
eius intellectu similem sententiam judgment must be made concerning
proferre. His intellect.
Adhuc. Divinae essentiae infinitatem [3] We argue further from our proof of
supra ostendimus. Infinitum autem, the infinity of the divine essence. By no
quantalibet adiectione finitorum facta, addition of finite things, even if their
adaequari non potest quin infinitum number were infinite, is it possible to
excedat quantalibet finita, si etiam equal the infinite, because the infinite
numero infinita existant. Nihil autem exceeds the finite, however great. But
aliud praeter Deum constat esse it is certain that nothing besides God is
secundum essentiam infinitum: cum infinite in essence; for, by the very
omnia alia secundum essentiae nature of their essence, all other things
rationem sub determinatis generibus are included under certain genera and
et speciebus concludantur. species. Hence, no matter bow many
Quotcumque igitur et quanticumque or bow great divine effects be taken
divini effectus comprehendantur, into account, the divine essence will
semper in divina essentia est ut eos always exceed them; it can be the
excedat. Et ita plurium ratio esse raison d’être of more. Therefore, God’s
possit. Divinus igitur intellectus, qui intellect as we have shown, which
perfecte divinam essentiam knows the divine essence perfectly,
cognoscit, ut supra ostensum est, surpasses all finiteness in the realm of
omnem finitatem effectuum effects. Therefore, it is not necessarily
transcendit. Non igitur ex necessitate confined to these or those effects.
ad hos vel illos effectus coartatur.
Item. Supra ostensum est quod [4] Also, we have proved that the
divinus intellectus infinitorum est divine intellect is cognizant of infinite
cognitor. Deus autem per sui things. But God brings things into
intellectus scientiam res producit in being by way of intellectual knowledge.
esse. Causalitas igitur divini Consequently, the causality of the
intellectus ad finitos effectus non divine intellect is not restricted to the
coartatur. production of finite effects.
Amplius. Si divini intellectus [5] If, moreover, the causality of God’s

causalitas ad effectus aliquos, quasi intellect were confined to certain
de necessitate agens, artaretur, hoc effects, as though it produced them of
esset respectu illorum qui ab eo necessity, this would have to do with
producuntur in esse. Hoc autem esse the things brought into being by it. But
non potest: cum supra ostensum sit that is impossible, since, as we have
quod Deus intelligit etiam quae shown before, God knows even those
nunquam sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt. things which never are, nor will be, nor
Non igitur Deus agit ex necessitate have been. Hence, it is not by any
sui intellectus vel scientiae. necessity on the part of His intellect or
His knowledge that God works.
Praeterea. Divina scientia [6] Again. God’s knowledge is in

comparatur ad res ab ipso productas relation to the things produced by it as
sicut scientia artificis ad res the knowledge of the craftsman to his
artificiatas. Quaelibet autem ars se handiwork. Now, every art includes in
extendit ad omnia quae possunt its scope all the things that can be
contineri sub genere subiecto illius comprised under the generic subject of
artis: sicut ars aedificatoria ad omnes that art; the art of building, for
domos. Genus autem subiectum example, extends to all houses. But
divinae arti est ens: cum ipse per the genus that is subject to the divine
suum intellectum sit universale art is being, since, as we have shown,
principium entis, ut ostensum est. God is by His intellect the universal
Igitur intellectus divinus ad omnia source of being. Hence, the causality
quibus entis ratio non repugnat, of the divine intellect extends to
suam causalitatem extendit: everything not incompatible with the
huiusmodi enim omnia, quantum est notion of being; for it is the nature of all
de se, nata sunt sub ente contineri. such things, considered in themselves,
Non igitur divinus intellectus ad to be contained under being. The
aliquos determinatos effectus divine intellect, therefore, is not
coartatur. restricted to the production of certain
determinate effects.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: [7] So it is said in a Psalm (146:5):
magnus dominus, et magna virtus “Great is the Lord, and great is His
eius, et sapientiae eius non est power, and of His wisdom there is no
numerus. number.”
Per haec autem excluditur [8] Excluded hereby is the position of
quorundam philosophorum positio those philosophers who say that,
dicentium quod ex hoc quod Deus because God understands Himself,
seipsum intelligit, fluit ab ipso de this particular disposition of things
necessitate talis rerum dispositio: flows from Him necessarily—as though
quasi non suo arbitrio limitet singula He did not, by His own free choice,
et universa disponat, sicut fides determine the limits of each single
Catholica profitetur. thing and the disposition of them all, as
the Catholic faith declares.
Sciendum tamen quod, quamvis [9] Bear in mind, however, that,
divinus intellectus ad certos effectus although God’s intellect is not
non coartatur, ipse tamen sibi statuit restricted to these or those effects, He
determinatos effectus quos per suam nevertheless decides on certain
sapientiam ordinate producat: sicut determinate effects to be produced in
sapientiae 1121 dicitur: omnia in a definite order by His wisdom. Thus,
numero, pondere et mensura we read in the Book of Wisdom
disposuisti, domine. (11:21): “Lord, You have ordered all
things in number, weight, and
measure.”
Caput 27 Chapter 27
Quod divina voluntas ad THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT
determinatos effectus non artatur RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN
EFFECTS
Ex his etiam ostendi potest quod nec [1] From the preceding considerations,
eius voluntas, per quam agit, ad it can also be shown that God’s will, by
determinatos effectus necessitatem which He acts, is subject to no
habet. necessity as regards the production of
certain determinate effects.
Voluntatem enim suo obiecto [2] For the will must be commensurate

proportionatam esse oportet. with its object. But the object of will is a
Obiectum autem voluntatis est good grasped by the intellect, as stated
bonum intellectum, ut patet ex supra above. Therefore, it is of the nature of
dictis. Voluntas igitur ad quaelibet se will to reach out to whatever the
nata est extendere quae ei intellect can propose to it under the
intellectus sub ratione boni aspect of goodness. Therefore, if, as
proponere potest. Si igitur intellectus we have proved, God’s intellect is not
divinus ad certos effectus non restricted to certain effects, it follows
coartatur, ut ostensum est, that neither is the divine will
relinquitur quod nec divina voluntas necessitated to produce certain
determinatos effectus ex necessitate determinate effects.
producit.
Praeterea. Nihil agens per [3] Moreover, nothing acting by the will

voluntatem producit aliquid non produces a thing by not willing. But it
volendo. Ostensum est autem supra was previously shown that, with
quod Deus circa alia a se nihil vult respect to things other than Himself,
ex necessitate absoluta. Non igitur God wills nothing by absolute
ex necessitate divinae voluntatis necessity. Therefore, effects proceed
aliqui effectus procedunt, sed ex eius from God’s will, not of necessity, but as
libera dispositione. He freely ordains.
Qualiter in rerum productione HOW DUENESS IS ENTAILED IN
debitum inveniatur THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS
Ostendere etiam ex praedictis [1] From the foregoing it must also be
oportet quod Deus non ex shown that in the creation of things
necessitate operatus est in rerum God did not work of necessity, as
creatione quasi ex debito iustitiae though He brought things into being as
res in esse produxerit. a debt of justice.
Iustitia enim, secundum [2] As Aristotle points out, justice

philosophum, in V Ethic., ad alterum involves a relationship to another, to

est, cui debitum reddit. Universali whom it renders what is due. But, for
autem rerum productioni nihil the universal production of things,
praesupponitur cui aliquid debeatur. nothing is presupposed to which
Ipsa igitur universalis rerum anything may be due. It follows that the
productio ex debito iustitiae universal production of things could not
provenire non potuit. result from a debt of justice.
Item. Cum iustitiae actus sit reddere [3] Then too, since the act of justice

unicuique quod suum est, actum consists in rendering to each that
iustitiae praecedit actus quo aliquid which is his own, the act by which a
alicuius suum efficitur, sicut in rebus thing becomes one’s own property is
humanis patet: aliquis enim prior to the act of justice, as we see in
laborando meretur suum effici quod human affairs; a man’s work entitles
retributor per actum iustitiae sibi him to possess as his own that which
reddit. Ille igitur actus quo primo his employer, by an act of justice, pays
aliquid suum alicuius efficitur, non to him. The act by which a person first
potest esse actus iustitiae. Sed per acquires something of his own cannot,
creationem res creata primo incipit therefore, be an act of justice. But, by
aliquid suum habere. Non igitur the act of creation, a created thing first
creatio ex debito iustitiae procedit. possesses something of its own. It is
not from a debt of justice, therefore,
that creation proceeds.
Praeterea. Nullus debet aliquid alteri [4] Furthermore, no one owes anything
nisi per hoc quod aliqualiter to another except because he depends
dependet ab ipso, vel aliquid accipit on him in some way, or receives
ab eo vel ab altero, ratione cuius something either from him or from
alteri debet: sic enim filius est debitor someone else, on whose account he is
patri, quia accipit esse ab eo; indebted to that other person; a son is
dominus ministro, quia ab eo accipit a debtor to his father, because he
famulatum quo indiget; omnis homo receives being from him; a master to
proximo propter Deum, a quo bona his servant, because he receives from
cuncta suscepimus. Sed Deus a him the services he requires; and every
nullo dependet, nec indiget aliquo man is a debtor to his neighbor, on
quod ab altero suscipiat, ut ex supra God’s account, from whom we have
dictis manifeste apparet. Deus igitur received all good things. God,
non produxit res in esse ex aliquo however, depends on nothing, nor
iustitiae debito. does He stand in need of anything that
He may receive from another, as things
previously said make perfectly clear.
Hence, it was from no debt of justice
that God brought things into being.
Amplius. In quolibet genere quod est [5] Another argument is this. In every

propter se est prius eo quod est genus that which is for its own sake is
propter aliud. Illud igitur quod est prior to that which is for the sake of
primum simpliciter inter omnes something else. Thus, that which is
causas, est causa propter seipsum absolutely the first of all causes is a
tantum. Quod autem agit ex debito cause solely on its own account. But
iustitiae, non agit propter seipsum whatever acts by reason of a debt of
tantum: agit enim propter illud cui justice acts not on its own account
debet. Deus igitur, cum sit prima alone, but on account of that to which it
causa et primum agens, res in esse is indebted. Now, since God is the first
non produxit ex debito iustitiae. cause and the primal agent, He did not
bring things into existence because of
any debt of justice.
Hinc est quod Rom. 11 dicitur: quis [6] Hence St. Paul says: “Who hath first

prior dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? given to him, and recompense shall be
Quoniam ex ipso et per ipsum et in made him? For of Him, and by Him,
ipso sunt omnia. Et Iob 412: quis and in Him, are all things” (Rom. 13:35
ante dedit mihi, ut reddam ei? Omnia 36); and in the Book of Job (41:2) we
quae sub caelo sunt, mea sunt. read: “Who has given me before that I
should repay him? All things that are
under heaven are mine.”
Per haec autem excluditur error [7] Thus is set aside the error of those

quorundam probare nitentium quod who try to prove that God can do
Deus non potest facere nisi quod nothing except what He does, on the
facit, quia non potest facere nisi argument that He can do only that
quod debet. Non enim ex debito which He ought to do; on the contrary,
iustitiae res operatur, ut ostensum as we have proved, God does not
est. produce things from a debt of justice.
Licet autem universalem rerum [8] True enough, prior to the universal
productionem nihil creatum production of things, nothing created
praecedat cui aliquid debitum esse exists to which anything can be due;
possit, praecedit tamen aliquid nevertheless, it is preceded by
increatum, quod est creationis something uncreated, namely, the
principium. Quod quidem dupliciter principle of creation. And this
considerari potest. Ipsa enim divina precedence can be considered in two
bonitas praecedit ut finis et primum ways. For the divine goodness
motivum ad creandum: secundum precedes as end and prime motivating
Augustinum, qui dicit: quia Deus principle of creation—as Augustine
bonus est, sumus. Scientia autem says, “because God is good, we are.”
eius et voluntas praecedunt sicut ea And God’s knowledge and will precede
quibus res in esse producuntur. as that by which things are brought into
Si igitur ipsam divinam bonitatem being.
absolute consideremus, nullum [9] Therefore, if we consider God’s
debitum in creatione rerum goodness absolutely, we find nothing
invenimus. Dicitur enim uno modo due in the creation of things. For in one
aliquid alicui debitum ex ordine way a thing is said to be a person’s due
alterius ad ipsum, quod scilicet in by reason of the relation of another
ipsum debet referre quod ab ipso person to him, so that he is obliged to
accepit: sicut debitum est make a return to that person for what
benefactori quod ei de beneficiis he has received from him; thanks are
gratiae agantur, inquantum ille qui due a benefactor for his kindness
accepit beneficium hoc ei debet. Hic because the recipient owes this to him.
tamen modus debiti in rerum This sort of dueness, however, has no
creatione locum non habet: cum non place in the creation of things, because
sit aliquid praeexistens cui possit there is nothing preexistent that could
competere aliquid Deo debere, nec owe anything to God, nor does any
aliquod eius beneficium praeexistat. benefaction of His preexist. In another
Alio modo dicitur aliquid alicui way, something is said to be due a
debitum secundum se: hoc enim est thing according to itself; for whatever is
ex necessitate alicui debitum quod required for a thing’s completeness is
ad eius perfectionem requiritur; sicut necessarily due that thing; it is a man’s
homini debitum est habere manus due to possess hands or strength,
vel virtutem, quia sine his perfectus since without these he cannot be
esse non potest. Divina autem complete. But for the fulfillment of His
bonitas nullo exteriori indiget ad sui goodness God needs nothing outside
perfectionem. Non est igitur per Him. Therefore, the production of
modum necessitatis ei debita things is not due Him by way of
creaturarum productio. necessity.
Adhuc. Deus sua voluntate res in [10] Moreover, as we have shown, God

esse producit, ut supra ostensum brings things into being by His will.
est. Non est autem necessarium, si Now, if God wills His own goodness to
Deus suam bonitatem vult esse, be, He is under no necessity of willing
quod velit alia a se produci: huius the production of anything else; the
enim conditionalis antecedens est antecedent of this conditional
necessarium, non autem proposition is necessary, but not the
consequens; ostensum est enim in consequent; for, as we proved in Book
primo libro quod Deus ex I, God necessarily wills His goodness
necessitate vult suam bonitatem to be, but He does not necessarily will
esse, non autem ex necessitate vult anything else. Therefore, the
alia. Igitur non ex necessitate production of creatures is not
debetur divinae bonitati creaturarum something due the divine goodness of
productio. necessity.
Amplius. Ostensum est quod Deus [11] Also, it has been shown that God
producit res in esse non ex brings things into being neither by a
necessitate naturae, neque ex necessity of His nature, nor of His
necessitate scientiae, neque knowledge, nor of His will, nor of His
voluntatis, neque iustitiae. Nullo justice. By no mode of necessity, then,
igitur modo necessitatis divinae is it due the divine goodness that
bonitati est debitum quod res in esse things be brought into being.
producantur.
Potest tamen dici esse sibi debitum [12] It may be said, however, that this
per modum cuiusdam condecentiae. is God’s due by way of a certain
Iustitia autem proprie dicta debitum fittingness. But justice, properly so
necessitatis requirit: quod enim ex called, requires a debt of necessity, for
iustitia alicui redditur, ex necessitate what is rendered to someone by an act
iuris ei debetur. of justice is owed to him by a necessity
Sicut igitur creaturarum productio of right.
non potest dici fuisse ex debito [13] Therefore, it cannot be said that
iustitiae quo Deus creaturae sit the production of creatures arose from
debitor, ita nec ex tali iustitiae debito a debt of justice by which God is the
quo suae bonitati sit debitor, si creature’s debtor, nor from a debt of
iustitia proprie accipiatur. Large justice whereby He is a debtor to His
tamen iustitia accepta, potest dici in own goodness, if justice be taken in its
creatione rerum iustitia, inquantum proper sense. But, if the term be taken
divinam condecet bonitatem. broadly, we may speak of justice in the
creation of things, meaning that
creation befits the divine goodness.
Si vero divinam dispositionem [14] If, however, we consider the plan
consideremus qua Deus disposuit which God by His intellect and His will
suo intellectu et voluntate res in esse laid down for the production of things,
producere, sic rerum productio ex then the latter proceeds from the
necessitate divinae dispositionis necessity of that plan. For it is
procedit: non enim potest esse quod impossible that God should plan to do
Deus aliquid se facturum disposuerit a certain thing which afterwards He did
quod postmodum ipse non faciat; not; otherwise, His decision would be
alias eius dispositio vel esset either changeable or weak. The
mutabilis vel infirma. Eius igitur fulfillment of His ordinance is therefore
dispositioni ex necessitate debetur something necessarily due.
quod impleatur. Sed tamen hoc Nevertheless, this dueness does not
debitum non sufficit ad rationem suffice for introducing the notion of
iustitiae proprie dictae in rerum justice, properly so called, into the
creatione, in qua considerari non creative production of things, wherein
potest nisi actio Dei creantis: nothing can be considered except the
eiusdem autem ad seipsum non est act of God creating. (And, as Aristotle
iustitia proprie dicta, ut patet per explains in Ethics V [11], there is no
philosophum, in V Ethicorum. Non justice properly speaking between a
igitur proprie dici potest quod Deus man and himself.) Therefore, it cannot
ex debito iustitiae res in esse properly be said that God brought
produxerit, ea ratione quia per things into being from a debt of justice,
scientiam et voluntatem se disposuit on the grounds that by His knowledge
producturum. and will He ordained Himself to their
production.
Si autem alicuius creaturae [15] [Chapter 29] On the other hand,
productio consideretur, poterit ibi considering the production of a
debitum iustitiae inveniri ex particular creature, we can see a debt of
comparatione posterioris creaturae justice in it by comparing a posterior
ad priorem. Dico autem priorem non creature to a prior one; and I say prior,
solum tempore, sed natura. not only in time but also in nature.
Sic igitur in primis divinis effectibus [16] Thus, in the effects to be produced

producendis debitum non invenitur. first by God, we discover nothing due,
In posteriorum vero productione whereas in the production of

invenitur debitum, ordine tamen subsequent effects, dueness is found,
diverso. Nam si illa quae sunt priora yet in a different order. For, if things
naturaliter, sint etiam priora in esse, prior in nature are also prior in being,
posteriora ex prioribus debitum those which follow become due on
trahunt: debitum enim est ut, positis account of those naturally prior; given
causis, habeant actiones per quas the causes, the possession of actions
producunt effectus. Si vero quae by which to produce their effects is due
sunt priora naturaliter, sint them. On the other hand, if things prior
posteriora in esse, tunc e converso in nature are posterior in being, then the
priora debitum trahunt a prior become due on account of the
posterioribus: sicut medicinam posterior; for medicine to come first in
debitum est praecedere ad hoc order that health may follow, is
quod sanitas consequatur. something due. Both cases have this in
Utrobique autem hoc commune common: the dueness or necessity is
existit, quod debitum sive taken from that which is naturally prior
necessitas sumitur ab eo quod est in relation to that which is naturally
prius natura, circa id quod est posterior.
natura posterius.
Necessitas autem quae est a [17] Now, the necessity arising from that

posteriori in esse licet sit prius which is posterior in being, although
natura, non est absoluta necessitas, prior in nature, is not absolute, but
sed conditionalis: ut, si hoc debeat conditional; if this ought to come to
fieri, necesse est hoc prius esse. pass, then this must precede. So, in
Secundum igitur hanc necessitatem accordance with this kind of necessity,
in creaturarum productione debitum dueness is found in the production of
invenitur tripliciter. Primo, ut creatures in three ways. First, there is a
sumatur conditionatum debitum a conditional indebtedness on the part of
tota rerum universitate ad quamlibet the whole universe of things in relation
eius partem quae ad perfectionem to each part of it that is necessary for
requiritur universi. Si enim tale the perfection of the whole; for, if God
universum fieri Deus voluit, debitum willed the production of such an
fuit ut solem et lunam faceret, et universe, it was due that He should
huiusmodi sine quibus universum make the sun and moon, and like things
esse non potest. Secundo, ut without which the universe cannot be.
sumatur conditionis debitum ex una Secondly, something conditionally due
creatura ad aliam: ut, si animalia et is found in one creature in relation to
plantas Deus esse voluit, debitum another; if God willed the existence of
fuit ut caelestia corpora faceret, ex animals and plants, then it was due that
quibus conservantur; et si hominem He should make the heavenly bodies by
esse voluit, oportuit facere plantas which those things are kept in being;
et animalia, et alia huiusmodi and if He willed the existence of man,
quibus homo indiget ad esse then He has to make plants and
perfectum; quamvis et haec et illa animals, and the other things which
ex mera Deus fecerit voluntate. man requires for a complete existence.
Tertio, ut in unaquaque creatura And yet God made both these and other
sumatur conditionale debitum ex things of His pure will. Thirdly, there is
suis partibus et proprietatibus et something conditionally due in each
accidentibus, ex quibus dependet creature as regards its parts, properties,
creatura quantum ad esse vel and accidents, upon which the creature

quantum ad aliquam sui depends either for its being or for some
perfectionem: sicut, supposito quod perfection proper to it. For example,
Deus hominem facere vellet, given that God willed to make man, it
debitum ex hac suppositione fuit ut was man’s due, on this supposition, that
animam et corpus in eo God should unite in him soul and body,
coniungeret, et sensus, et alia and furnish him with senses, and other
huiusmodi adiumenta, tam like aids, both intrinsic and extrinsic.
intrinseca quam extrinseca, ei Now, in all these cases, rightly
praeberet. In quibus omnibus, si considered, God is said to be a debtor,
recte attenditur, Deus creaturae not to the creature, but to the fulfillment
debitor non dicitur, sed suae of His own purpose.
dispositioni implendae.
Invenitur autem et alius necessitatis [18] But there is also another mode of

modus in rerum natura secundum necessity in the nature of things
quod aliquid dicitur necessarium whereby a thing is said to be necessary
absolute. Quae quidem necessitas absolutely; and this necessity depends
dependet ex causis prioribus in on causes which are prior in being—on
esse: sicut ex principiis essential principles, for instance, and on
essentialibus, et ex causis efficient or moving causes. But this kind
efficientibus sive moventibus. Sed of necessity can have no place in the
iste modus necessitatis in prima first creation of things so far as efficient
rerum creatione locum habere non causes are concerned, since in that
potest quantum ad causas creation the sole efficient cause was
efficientes. Ibi enim solus Deus God, who alone can create, as we have
causa efficiens fuit, cuius est solius already shown. But, as we have also
creare, ut supra ostensum est; ipse proved, it is not by any necessity of His
autem non necessitate naturae, sed nature but by His will, that God works
voluntate operatur creando, ut while creating; and things done by the
supra ostensum est; ea vero quae will can have no necessity except only
voluntate fiunt, necessitatem on the supposition of the end; for the
habere non possunt nisi ex sola existence of those things by which an
finis suppositione, secundum quam end is attained is that end’s due. As
debitum est fini ut ea sint per quae regards formal or material causes, on
pervenitur ad finem. Sed quantum the other hand, nothing prevents our
ad causas formales vel materiales, finding absolute necessity even in the
nihil prohibet etiam in prima rerum primal creation of things; for just
creatione necessitatem absolutam because certain bodies were composed
inveniri. Ex hoc enim quod aliqua of the elements it was necessary that
corpora ex elementis fuerunt they be hot or cold; and from the very
composita, necessarium fuit ea fact that a surface was extended in the
calida aut frigida esse. Et ex hoc form of a triangle it was necessary for it
quod aliqua superficies producta est to have three angles equal to two right
triangularis figurae, necessarium fuit angles. But this kind of necessity results
quod tres angulos aequales duobus from the relation of an effect to its
rectis haberet. Haec autem created material, or formal, cause, so
necessitas est secundum ordinem that God cannot be said to be a debtor
effectus ad causam creatam from the point of view of such necessity;
materialem vel formalem. Unde here the debt of necessity falls upon the
secundum hanc Deus debitor dici creature. However, in the propagation of

non potest, sed magis in creaturam things, where the creature is already
necessitatis debitum cadit. In rerum active, an absolute necessity can arise
autem propagatione, ubi iam from the created efficient cause; the
creatura efficiens invenitur, potest sun’s motion, for example, necessarily
esse necessitas absoluta a causa gives rise to changes in terrestrial
efficiente creata: sicut ex motu solis bodies.
inferiora corpora necessario
[19] According to the foregoing kinds of
immutantur. dueness, then, natural justice is found in
Sic igitur ex praedictis debiti things, both as regards the creation of
rationibus iustitia naturalis in rebus things and as regards their propagation.
invenitur et quantum ad rerum And so it is that God is said to have
creationem, et quantum ad earum formed and to govern all things justly
propagationem. Et ideo Deus dicitur and reasonably.
iuste et rationabiliter omnia
condidisse et gubernare.
Sic igitur per praedicta excluditur [20] By what has been said a double
duplex error. Eorum scilicet qui, error is eliminated: the error of those
divinam potentiam limitantes, who, setting limits to God’s power, said
dicebant Deum non posse facere that God can do only that which He
nisi quae facit, quia sic facere does because He is bound to this; and
debet; et eorum qui dicunt quod the error of those who assert that all
omnia sequuntur simplicem things follow from the sheer will of God,
voluntatem, absque aliqua alia there being no other reason either to be
ratione vel quaerenda in rebus vel sought in things, or to be assigned.
assignanda.
Caput 30 Chapter 30
Qualiter in rebus creatis esse potest HOW ABSOLUTE NECESSITY CAN
necessitas absoluta EXIST IN CREATED THINGS
Licet autem omnia ex Dei voluntate [1] Although all things depend on the
dependeant sicut ex prima causa, will of God as first cause, who is subject
quae in operando necessitatem non to no necessity in His operation except
habet nisi ex sui propositi on the supposition of His intention,
suppositione, non tamen propter nevertheless absolute necessity is not
hoc absoluta necessitas a rebus on this account excluded from things,
excluditur, ut sit necessarium nos so as to compel us to say that all things
fateri omnia contingentia esse: are contingent. (One might infer this
quod posset alicui videri, ex hoc from the fact that things have with no
quod a causa sua non de absolute necessity proceeded from their
necessitate absoluta fluxerunt: cum cause, for usually, in things, an effect is
soleat in rebus esse contingens contingent which does not proceed from
effectus qui ex causa sua non de its cause necessarily.) On the contrary,
necessitate procedit. Sunt enim there are some things in the universe
quaedam in rebus creatis quae whose being is simply and absolutely
simpliciter et absolute necesse est necessary.
esse.
Illas enim res simpliciter et absolute [2] Such is the being of things wherein

necesse est esse in quibus non est there is no possibility of notbeing. Now,
possibilitas ad non esse. Quaedam some things are so created by God that
autem res sic sunt a Deo in esse there is in their nature a potentiality to
productae ut in earum natura sit nonbeing; and this results from the fact
potentia ad non esse. Quod quidem that the matter present in them is in
contingit ex hoc quod materia in eis potentiality with respect to another form.
est in potentia ad aliam formam. On the other hand, neither immaterial
Illae igitur res in quibus vel non est things, nor things whose matter is not
materia, vel, si est, non est receptive of another form, have
possibilis ad aliam formam, non potentiality to nonbeing, so that their
habent potentiam ad non esse. Eas being is absolutely and simply
igitur absolute et simpliciter necesse necessary.
est esse.
Si autem dicatur quod ea quae sunt [3] Now, if it be said that whatever is

ex nihilo, quantum est de se in from nothing of itself tends toward
nihilum tendunt; et sic omnibus nothing, so that in all creatures there is
creaturis inest potentia ad non the power not to be—this clearly does
esse: manifestum est hoc non not follow. For created things are said to
sequi. Dicuntur enim res creatae eo tend to nothing in the same way in
modo in nihilum tendere quo sunt ex which they are from nothing, namely,
nihilo. Quod quidem non est nisi not otherwise than according to the
secundum potentiam agentis. Sic power of their efficient cause. In this
igitur et rebus creatis non inest sense, then, the power not to be does
potentia ad non esse: sed creatori not exist in created things. But in the
inest potentia ut eis det esse vel eis Creator there is the power to give them
desinat esse influere; cum non ex being, or to cease pouring forth being
necessitate naturae agat ad rerum into them, for He produces things not by
productionem, sed ex voluntate, ut a necessity of His nature, but by His
ostensum est. will, as we have shown.
Item. Ex quo res creatae ex divina [4] Moreover, it is because created
voluntate in esse procedunt, oportet things come into being through the
eas tales esse quales Deus eas divine will that they are necessarily such
esse voluit. Per hoc autem quod as God willed them to be. Now, the fact
dicitur Deum produxisse res in esse that God is said to have produced
per voluntatem, non per things voluntarily, and not of necessity,
necessitatem, non tollitur quin does not preclude His having willed
voluerit aliquas res esse quae de certain things to be which are of
necessitate sint et aliquas quae sint necessity and others which are
contingenter, ad hoc quod sit in contingently, so that there may be an
rebus diversitas ordinata. Nihil igitur ordered diversity in things. Therefore,
prohibet res quasdam divina nothing prevents certain things that are
voluntate productas necessarias produced by the divine will from being
esse. necessary.
Adhuc. Ad divinam perfectionem [5] Then, too, it pertains to God’s
pertinet quod rebus creatis suam perfection to have placed the seal of His
similitudinem indiderit, nisi quantum own likeness upon created things,
ad illa quae repugnant ei quod est excluding only entities incompatible with
esse creatum: agentis enim perfecti the nature of created being; for it
est producere sibi simile quantum belongs to the perfect agent to produce
possibile est. Esse autem necesse its like as far as possible. But to be
simpliciter non repugnat ad simply necessary is not incompatible
rationem esse creati: nihil enim with the notion of created being; for
prohibet aliquid esse necesse quod nothing prevents a thing being
tamen suae necessitatis causam necessary whose necessity
habet, sicut conclusiones nevertheless has a cause, as in the
demonstrationum. Nihil igitur case of the conclusions of
prohibet quasdam res sic esse demonstrations. Hence, nothing
productas a Deo ut tamen eas esse prevents certain things being produced
sit necesse simpliciter. Immo hoc by God in such fashion that they exist in
divinae perfectioni attestatur. a simply necessary way; indeed, this is
a proof of God’s perfection.
Amplius. Quanto aliquid magis [6] Again, the more distant a thing is
distat ab eo quod per seipsum est from that which is a being by virtue of
ens, scilicet Deo, tanto magis itself, namely, God, the nearer it is to
propinquum est ad non esse. nonbeing; so that the closer a thing is
Quanto igitur aliquid est propinquius to God, the further is it removed from
Deo, tanto magis recedit a non nonbeing. Now, things which presently
esse. Quae autem ima sunt, exist are near to nonbeing through
propinqua sunt ad non esse per hoc having potentiality to nonbeing.
quod habent potentiam ad non Therefore, that the order of things be
esse. Illa igitur quae sunt Deo complete, those nearest to God, and
propinquissima, et per hoc a non hence the most remote from nonbeing,
esse remotissima, talia esse must be totally devoid of potentiality to
oportet, ad hoc quod sit rerum ordo nonbeing; and such things are
completus, ut in eis non sit potentia necessary absolutely. Thus, some
ad non esse. Talia autem sunt created things have being necessarily.
necessaria absolute. Sic igitur
aliqua creata de necessitate habent
esse.
Sciendum est itaque quod, si rerum [7] And so we must bear in mind that if
creatarum universitas consideretur the universe of created things be
prout sunt a primo principio, considered as deriving from their first
inveniuntur dependere ex voluntate, principle, then they are seen to depend
non ex necessitate principii, nisi on a will, and on no necessity of their
necessitate suppositionis, sicut principle, except a suppositional one, as
dictum est. Si vero comparentur ad we have said. On the other hand, if
principia proxima, inveniuntur created things be considered in relation
necessitatem habere absolutam. to their proximate principles, they are
Nihil enim prohibet aliqua principia found to have absolute necessity. For
non ex necessitate produci, quibus nothing prevents the nonnecessary
tamen positis, de necessitate production of certain principles on the
sequitur talis effectus: sicut mors supposition of which such and such an
animalis huius absolutam effect nevertheless follows necessarily;
necessitatem habet propter hoc the death of this animal is an absolutely
quod iam ex contrariis est necessary consequence of its being
compositum, quamvis ipsum ex composed of contraries, although it was
contrariis componi non fuisset not absolutely necessary for it to be
necessarium absolute. Similiter composed of contraries. Similarly, the
autem quod tales rerum naturae a production of such and such natures by
Deo producerentur, voluntarium fuit: God was voluntary; but, having been so
quod autem, eis sic statutis, aliquid constituted, something having absolute
proveniat vel existat, absolutam necessity comes forth from them or
necessitatem habet. exists as a result.
Diversimode autem ex diversis [8] In created things, however, there are

causis necessitas sumitur in rebus diverse modes of necessity arising from
creatis. Nam quia sine suis diverse causes. For, since a thing
essentialibus principiis, quae sunt cannot be without its essential
materia et forma, res esse non principles, which are matter and form,
potest, quod ex ratione principiorum whatever belongs to a thing by reason
essentialium rei competit, of its essential principles must have
absolutam necessitatem in omnibus absolute necessity in all cases.
habere necesse est.
Ex his autem principiis, secundum [9] Now, from these principles, so far as

quod sunt essendi principia, they are principles of existing, there
tripliciter sumitur necessitas arises a threefold absolute necessity in
absoluta in rebus. Uno quidem things. First, through the relation of a
modo, per ordinem ad esse eius thing’s principles to its act of being.
cuius sunt.
Et quia materia, secundum id quod Since matter is by its nature a being in
est, ens in potentia est; quod autem potentiality, and since that which can be
potest esse, potest etiam et non can also not be, it follows that certain
esse: ex ordine materiae necessario things, in relation to their matter, are
res aliquae corruptibiles existunt; necessarily corruptible animals because
sicut animal quia ex contrariis they are composed of contraries; fire
compositum est, et ignis quia eius because its matter is receptive of
materia est contrariorum susceptiva. contraries.
Forma autem, secundum id quod On the other hand, form is by its nature

est, actus est: et per eam res actu act, and through it things exist in act; so
existunt. Unde ex ipsa provenit that from it there results in some things
necessitas ad esse in quibusdam. a necessity to be. And this happens
Quod contingit vel quia res illae sunt either because those things are forms
formae non in materia: et sic non not existing in matter, so that there is no
inest ei potentia ad non esse, sed potentiality to nonbeing in them, but
per suam formam semper sunt in rather by their forms they are always
virtute essendi; sicut est in able to be, as in the case of separate
substantiis separatis. Vel quia substances; or because their forms
formae earum sua perfectione equal in their perfection the total
adaequant totam potentiam potentiality of their matter, so that there
materiae, ut sic non remaneat remains no potentiality to another form,
potentia ad aliam formam, nec per nor consequently, to nonbeing; such is
consequens ad non esse: sicut est the case with the heavenly bodies. But
in corporibus caelestibus. In quibus in things whose form does not fulfill the
vero forma non complet totam total potentiality of the matter, there still
potentiam materiae, remanet adhuc remains in the matter potentiality to
in materia potentia ad aliam another form; and hence in such things
formam. Et ideo non est in eis there is no necessity to be; rather, the
necessitas essendi, sed virtus power to be is in them the result of the
essendi consequitur in eis victoriam victory of form over matter, as we see in
formae super materia: ut patet in the elements and things composed of
elementis et elementatis. Forma them. The form of an element does not
enim elementi non attingit materiam embrace the matter in its total
secundum totum eius posse: non potentiality, for matter receives the form
enim fit susceptiva formae elementi of one element only by being made
unius nisi per hoc quod subiicitur subject to one of two contraries; but the
alteri parti contrarietatis. Forma vero form of a mixed body embraces the
mixti attingit materiam secundum matter according as it is disposed by a
quod disponitur per determinatum certain kind of mixture. Now, contraries,
modum mixtionis. Idem autem and all intermediaries resulting from the
subiectum oportet esse mixture of extremes, must have a
contrariorum et mediorum omnium, common identical subject. The manifest
quae sunt ex commixtione consequence of this fact is that all
extremorum. Unde manifestum est things which either have contraries or
quod omnia quae vel contrarium are composed of contraries are
habent vel ex contrariis sunt, corruptible, whereas things not of this
corruptibilia sunt. Quae autem sort are everlasting—unless they be
huiusmodi non sunt, sempiterna corrupted accidentally, as forms which
sunt: nisi per accidens are not subsistent but which exist by
corrumpantur, sicut formae quae being in matter.
non subsistunt sed esse earum est
per hoc quod insunt materiae.
Alio vero modo ex principiis [10] Secondly, from essential principles
essentialibus est in rebus absoluta of things absolute necessity arises in
necessitas per ordinem ad partes them from the order of the parts of their
materiae vel formae, si contingat matter or of their form, if it happens that
huiusmodi principia in aliquibus non in certain things these principles are not
simplicia esse. Quia enim materia simple. For, since man’s proper matter
propria hominis est corpus is a mixed body, having a certain
commixtum et complexionatum et temperament and endowed with
organizatum, necessarium est organs, it is absolutely necessary that a
absolute hominem quodlibet man have in himself each of the
elementorum et humorum et elements and humours and principal
organorum principalium in se organs. Even so, if man is a rational
habere. Similiter, si homo est animal mortal animal, and this is his nature or
rationale mortale, et haec est natura form, then it is necessary for him to be
vel forma hominis, necessarium est both animal and rational.
ipsum et animal et rationale esse.
Tertio modo est in rebus necessitas [11] Thirdly, there is absolute necessity

absoluta per ordinem principiorum in things from the order of their
essentialium ad proprietates essential principles to the properties
consequentes materiam vel flowing from their matter or form; a saw,
formam: sicut necesse est serram, because it is made of iron, must be
quia ex ferro est, duram esse; et hard; and a man is necessarily capable
hominem disciplinae perceptibilem of learning.
esse.
Necessitas vero agentis [12] However, the agent’s necessity has

consideratur et quantum ad ipsum reference both to the action itself and
agere; et quantum ad effectum the resulting effect. Necessity in the
consequentem. Prima autem former case is like the necessity that an
necessitatis consideratio similis est accident derives from essential
necessitati accidentis quam habet principles; just as other accidents result
ex principiis essentialibus. Sicut from the necessity of essential
enim alia accidentia ex necessitate principles, so does action from the
principiorum essentialium necessity of the form by which the
procedunt, ita et actio ex agent actually exists; for as the agent
necessitate formae per quam agens actually is, so does it act. But this
est actu: sic enim agit ut actu est. necessitation of action by form is
Differenter tamen hoc accidit in different in the case of action that
actione quae in ipso agente manet, remains in the agent itself, as
sicut intelligere et velle; et in actione understanding and willing, and in action
quae in alterum transit, sicut which passes into something else, as
calefacere. Nam in primo genere heating. In the first case, the necessity
actionis, sequitur ex forma per of the action itself results from the form
quam agens fit actu, necessitas by which the agent is made actual,
actionis ipsius: quia ad eius esse because in order for this kind of action
nihil extrinsecum requiritur in quod to exist, nothing extrinsic, as a terminus
actio terminetur. Cum enim sensus for it, is required. Thus, when the sense
fuerit factus in actu per speciem power is actualized by the sensible
sensibilem, necesse est ipsum species, it necessarily acts; and so, too,
sentire; et similiter cum intellectus does the intellect when it is actualized
est in actu per speciem by the intelligible species. But in the
intelligibilem. In secundo autem second case, the action’s necessity
genere actionis, sequitur ex forma results from the form, so far as the
necessitas actionis quantum ad power to act is concerned; if fire is hot,
virtutem agendi: si enim ignis sit it necessarily has the power of heating,
calidus, necessarium est ipsum yet it need not heat, for something
habere virtutem calefaciendi, tamen extrinsic may prevent it. Nor in this
non necesse est ipsum calefacere; question does it make any difference
eo quod ab extrinseco impediri whether by its form one agent alone
potest. Nec ad propositum differt suffices to carry out an action, or
utrum agens sit unus tantum ad whether many agents have to be
actionem sufficiens per suam assembled in order to perform a single
formam vel oporteat multos agentes action—as, for example, many men to
ad unam actionem agendam pull a boat—because all are as one
congregari, sicut multi homines ad agent, who is put in act by their being
trahendam navim: nam omnes sunt united together in one action.
ut unus agens, qui fit actu per
adunationem eorum ad actionem
unam.
Necessitas autem quae est a causa [13] Now, the necessity in the effect or

agente vel movente in effectu vel thing moved, resulting from the efficient
moto, non tantum dependet a causa or moving cause, depends not only on
agente, sed etiam a conditione the efficient cause, but also on the
ipsius moti et recipientis actionem condition of the thing moved and of the
agentis, cui vel nullo modo inest recipient of the agent’s action; for the
potentia ad recipiendum talis recipient is either in no way receptive of
actionis effectum, sicut lanae ut ex the effect of such action—as wool to be
ea fiat serra; vel est potentia made into a saw—or else its receptivity
impedita per contraria agentia, vel is impeded by contrary agents or by
per contrarias dispositiones contrary dispositions in the movable or
inhaerentes mobili aut formas, by contrary forms, to such an extent
maiori impedimento quam sit virtus that the agent’s power is ineffective; a
agentis in agendo, sicut ferrum non feeble heat will not melt iron. In order
liquefit a debili calido. Oportet igitur, that the effect follow, it is therefore
ad hoc quod sequatur effectus, necessary that receptivity exist in the
quod in passo sit potentia ad patient, and that the patient be under
recipiendum, et in agente sit victoria the domination of the agent, so that the
supra passum, ut possit ipsum latter can transform it to a contrary
transmutare ad contrariam disposition. And if the effect in the
dispositionem. Et si quidem effectus patient resulting from the agent’s victory
consequens in passum ex victoria over it is contrary to the natural
agentis supra ipsum fuerit contrarius disposition of the patient, then there will
naturali dispositioni patientis, erit be necessity by way of violence, as
necessitas violentiae: sicut cum when a stone is thrown upwards. But if
lapis proiicitur sursum. Si vero non the effect is not contrary to the natural
fuerit contraria naturali dispositioni disposition of its subject, there will be
ipsius subiecti, non erit necessitas necessity not of violence, but of natural
violentiae, sed ordinis naturalis: order; the movement of the heaven, for
sicut est in motu caeli, qui est a example, results from an extrinsic active
principio agente extrinseco, non principle, and yet it is not contrary to the
tamen est contra naturalem natural disposition of the movable
dispositionem mobilis, et ideo non subject, and hence is not a violent but a
est motus violentus, sed naturalis. natural movement. This is true also in
Similiter est in alteratione corporum the alteration of lower bodies by the
inferiorum a corporibus caelestibus: heavenly bodies, for there is a natural
nam naturalis inclinatio est in inclination in lower bodies to receive the
corporibus inferioribus ad influence of higher bodies. Such is the
recipiendam impressionem case, also, in the generation of the
corporum superiorum. Sic etiam est elements; for the form to be
in generatione elementorum: nam engendered is not contrary to prime
forma inducenda per generationem matter, which is the subject of
non est contraria primae materiae, generation, although it is contrary to the
quae est generationis subiectum, form that is to be cast aside; for matter
licet sit contraria formae existing under a contrary form is not the
abiiciendae; non enim materia sub subject of generation.
forma contraria existens est
generationis subiectum.
Ex praedictis igitur patet quod [14] It is therefore clear from what we
necessitas quae est ex causa have said that the necessity which
agente, in quibusdam dependet ex arises from an efficient cause in some
dispositione agentis tantum; in cases depends on the disposition of the
quibusdam vero ex dispositione agent alone; but in others, on the
agentis et patientis. Si igitur talis disposition of both agent and patient.
dispositio secundum quam de Consequently, if this disposition,
necessitate sequitur effectus, fuerit according to which the effect follows of
necessaria absolute et in agente et necessity, be absolutely necessary both
in patiente, erit necessitas absoluta in the agent and in the patient, then
in causa agente: sicut in his quae there will be absolute necessity in the
agunt ex necessitate et semper. Si efficient cause, as with things that act
autem non fuerit absolute necessarily and always. On the other
necessaria sed possibilis removeri, hand, if this disposition be not
non erit necessitas ex causa agente absolutely necessary, but removable,
nisi ex suppositione dispositionis then from the efficient cause no
utriusque debitae ad agendum: sicut necessity will result, except on the
in his quae impediuntur interdum in supposition that both agent and patient
sua operatione vel propter defectum possess the disposition necessary for
virtutis, vel propter violentiam acting. Thus, we find no absolute
alicuius contrarii; unde non agunt necessity in those things that are
semper et ex necessitate, sed ut in sometimes impeded in their activity
pluribus. either through lack of power or the
violent action of a contrary; such things,
then, do not act always and necessarily,
but in the majority of cases.
Ex causa autem finali consequitur in [15] The final cause is responsible for a
rebus necessitas dupliciter. Uno twofold necessity in things. In one way,
quidem modo, prout est primum in necessity results from that cause
intentione agentis. Et quantum ad inasmuch as it is first in the intention of
hoc, eodem modo est necessitas ex the agent. And in this regard, necessity
fine et ab agente: agens enim in derives from the end in the same way
tantum agit in quantum finem as from the agent; for it is precisely so
intendit, tam in naturalibus quam in far as an agent intends an end that an
voluntariis. In rebus enim agent acts. This is true of natural as
naturalibus, intentio finis competit well as voluntary actions. For in natural
agenti secundum suam formam, per things the intention of the end belongs
quam finis est sibi conveniens: unde to the agent in keeping with the latter’s
oportet quod secundum virtutem form, whereby the end is becoming to it;
formae tendat res naturalis in finem; hence, the natural thing necessarily

sicut grave secundum mensuram tends to its end in accordance with the
gravitatis tendit ad medium. In rebus power of its form; a heavy body tends
autem voluntariis, tantum voluntas toward the center according to the
inclinat ad agendum propter finem measure of its gravity. And in voluntary
quantum intendit finem: licet non things the will inclines to act for the
semper tantum inclinetur ad sake of an end only so far as it intends
agendum haec vel illa quae sunt that end, although the will, as much as it
propter finem quantum appetit desires the end, is not always inclined
finem, quando finis non solum per to do this or that as means to it, when
haec vel illa haberi potest, sed the end can be obtained not only by this
pluribus modis. Alio vero modo est or that means, but in several ways.
ex fine necessitas secundum quod Now, in another way, necessity follows
est posterius in esse. Et haec est from the end as posterior in actual
necessitas non absoluta, sed being; and such necessity is not
conditionata: sicut dicimus necesse absolute, but conditional. Thus, we say
fore ut serra sit ferrea si debet that a saw will have to be made of iron if
habere serrae opus. it is to do the work of saw.
Caput 31 Chapter 31
Quod non est necessarium THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR
creaturas semper fuisse CREATURES TO HAVE ALWAYS
EXISTED
Ex praemissis autem restat [1] It remains for us to show from the
ostendere quod non est foregoing that it is not necessary for
necessarium res creatas ab created things to have existed from
aeterno fuisse. eternity.
Si enim creaturarum universitatem, [2] For, if the existence of the whole

vel quamcumque unam creaturam, universe of creatures, or of any single
necesse est esse, oportet quod creature, is necessary, then its necessity
necessitatem istam habeat ex se, must be derived either from itself or from
vel ex alio. Ex se quidem eam something else. But it cannot owe its
habere non potest. Ostensum est necessity to itself; for we proved above
enim supra quod omne ens oportet that every being must derive its
esse a primo ente. Quod autem existence from the first being. But
non habet esse a se, impossibile anything whose being is not selfderived
est quod necessitatem essendi a cannot possibly have necessary
se habeat: quia quod necesse est existence from itself, because that which
esse, impossibile est non esse; et necessarily is cannot notbe; so,
sic quod de se habet quod sit whatever of itself has necessary
necesseesse, de se habet quod existence is for that reason incapable of
non possit esse non ens; et per not being; and it follows that it is not a
consequens, quod non sit non ens; nonbeing, and hence is a being.
et ita quod sit ens.
Si autem haec necessitas [3] But, if the creature’s necessity of
creaturae est ab alio, oportet quod which we speak is derived from
sit ab aliqua causa quae sit something other than itself, then this
extrinseca: quia quicquid accipiatur must be from some extrinsic cause; for
intrinsecum creaturae, habet esse whatever is received within a creature
ab alio. Causa autem extrinseca owes its being to another. An extrinsic
est vel efficiens, vel finis. Ex cause, however, is either an efficient or a
efficiente vero sequitur quod final one. Now, from the efficient cause it
effectum necesse sit esse, per hoc follows that the effect exists necessarily
quod agentem necesse est agere: when the agent necessarily acts; for it is
per actionem enim agentis effectus through the agent’s action that the effect
a causa efficiente dependet. Si depends on the efficient cause.
igitur agentem non necesse sit Consequently, if the agent need not act
agere ad productionem effectus, in order to produce the effect, then it is
nec effectum necesse est esse not absolutely necessary for the effect to
absolute. Deus autem non agit ex be. God, however, acts out of no
aliqua necessitate ad creaturarum necessity in the production of creatures,
productionem, ut supra ostensum as we have shown. Therefore, it is not
est. Non est igitur absolute absolutely necessary for the creature to
necesse creaturam esse be, as concerns necessity dependent on
necessitate pendente a causa the efficient cause. Nor is it necessary as
efficiente. Similiter nec necessitate regards dependence on the final cause.
pendente a causa finali. Ea enim For the means to an end derive
quae sunt ad finem, necessitatem necessity from the end only so far as
a fine non recipiunt nisi secundum without them the end either cannot be—
quod finis sine eis vel non potest life cannot be preserved without food—
esse, sicut conservatio vitae sine or cannot well be—as a journey without
cibo; vel non ita bene esse, sicut a horse. Now, as we have shown in
iter sine equo. Finis autem divinae Book I, the end of God’s will, whereby
voluntatis, ex qua res in esse things came into being, cannot be
processerunt, non potest aliud anything else than His own goodness.
esse quam sua bonitas, ut in primo But the divine goodness does not
ostensum est. Quae quidem a depend on creatures, either as to being,
creaturis non dependet: nec since it is necessarily existent in virtue of
quantum ad esse, cum sit per se itself, or as to wellbeing, since it is by
necesseesse; nec quantum ad itself absolutely perfect. (All these points
bene esse, cum sit secundum se have been previously demonstrated.)
perfecta simpliciter; quae omnia Therefore, it is not absolutely necessary
supra ostensa sunt. Non est igitur for a creature to exist; nor, then, is it
creaturam esse absolute necessary to maintain that a creature
necessarium. Nec igitur always existed.
necessarium est ponere creaturam
semper fuisse.
Adhuc. Quod est ex voluntate, non [4] Consider, also, that nothing

est absolute necessarium, nisi forte proceeding from a will is absolutely
quando voluntatem hoc velle est necessary, except when it chances to be
necessarium. Deus autem non per necessary for the will to will it. But, as we
necessitatem naturae, sed per have shown, God brings creatures into
voluntatem producit creaturas in being not through a necessity of His

esse, ut probatum est: nec ex nature, but voluntarily. Nor, as proved in
necessitate vult creaturas esse, ut Book I, does He necessarily will the
in primo ostensum est. Non igitur existence of creatures. Hence, it is not
est absolute necessarium absolutely necessary for the creature to
creaturam esse. Neque ergo be, and therefore neither is it necessary
necessarium est eas semper for creatures to have existed always.
fuisse.
Amplius. Ostensum est supra quod [5] Moreover, we proved above that

Deus non agit aliqua actione quae God’s action is not outside Himself, as
sit extra ipsum, quasi ab ipso though passing from Him and
exiens et in creaturam terminata, terminating in the created thing, in the
sicut calefactio exit ab igne et way in which heat issues from fire and
terminatur in ligna: sed eius velle terminates in wood. On the contrary, His
est eius agere; et hoc modo sunt act of will is identical with His action; and
res, secundum quod Deus vult eas things are as God wills them to be. But it
esse. Sed non est necessarium is not necessary that God will a creature
quod Deus velit creaturam semper to have existed always, for indeed, as
fuisse: cum etiam non sit we proved in Book I, it is not necessary
necessarium Deum velle quod that God will a creature to be at all.
creatura sit omnino, ut in primo Hence, it is not necessary for a creature
ostensum est. Non igitur est to have always been.
necessarium quod creatura semper
fuerit.
Item. Ab agente per voluntatem [6] Then, too, a thing does not proceed
non procedit aliquid ex necessitate necessarily from a voluntary agent
nisi per rationem alicuius debiti. Ex except because of something due. But,
nullo autem debito Deus creaturam as we have shown above, it is not by
producit, si absolute universalis reason of any debt that God brings the
creaturae productio consideretur, ut creature into being, if the universal
supra ostensum est. Non igitur ex production of creatures be considered
necessitate Deus creaturam absolutely. Therefore, God does not of
producit. Nec igitur necessarium necessity produce the creature. Nor,
est, si Deus sempiternus est, quod then, is it necessary that God should
creaturam ab aeterno produxerit. have produced the creature from eternity
because He Himself is eternal.
Praeterea. Ostensum est supra [7] Also, we have just shown that
quod absoluta necessitas in rebus absolute necessity in created things
creatis non est per ordinem ad results not from a relation to a first
primum principium quod per se principle which is of itself necessarily
necesse est esse, scilicet Deum, existent, namely, God, but from a
sed per ordinem ad alias causas, relation to other causes whose existence
quae non sunt per se necesse is not essentially necessary. But the
esse. Necessitas autem ordinis ad necessity arising from a relation to that
id quod non est per se necesse which is not of itself necessarily existent
esse, non cogit aliquid semper does not make it necessary for
fuisse: sequitur enim, si aliquid something to have always existed; if a
currit, quod moveatur; non tamen thing runs, it follows that it is in motion,
necesse est quod semper motum yet it is not necessary for it to have
fuerit, quia ipsum currere non est always been in motion, because the
per se necessarium. Nihil ergo running itself is not essentially
cogit creaturas semper fuisse. necessary. There is, therefore, no
necessity that creatures should have
existed always.
Caput 32 Chapter 32
Rationes volentium probare ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH
aeternitatem mundi ex parte Dei TO DEMONSTRATE THE WORLD’S
acceptae ETERNITY FROM THE POINT OF
VIEW OF GOD
Sed quia multorum positio fuit quod [1] However, since many have held that

mundus semper et ex necessitate the world has existed always and of
fuerit, et hoc demonstrare conati necessity, and have attempted to
sunt, restat rationes eorum ponere, demonstrate this, it remains for us to
ut ostendatur quod non de present their arguments, so as to show
necessitate concludunt mundi that they do not constitute a necessary
sempiternitatem. Primo, autem, demonstration of the world’s eternity.
ponentur rationes quae sumuntur First, we give the arguments taken from
ex parte Dei. Secundo, quae God’s side of the matter; second, those
sumuntur ex parte creaturae. taken from the point of view of the
Tertio, quae sumuntur a modo creature; third, those derived from a
factionis rerum, secundum quem consideration of the mode of the
ponuntur de novo incipere esse. production of things, according to which
they are held to begin to exist anew.
Ex parte autem Dei, ad [2] On the part of God the following
aeternitatem mundi ostendendam arguments are used in order to prove the
sumuntur rationes huiusmodi. eternity of the world.
Omne agens quod non semper [3] Every agent which does not always
agit, movetur per se vel per act is moved through itself or by
accidens. Per se quidem, sicut accident: through itself, as in the case of
ignis qui non semper comburebat, a fire which, not always burning, begins
incipit comburere vel quia de novo to burn either because it is newly lit or
accenditur; vel quia de novo because it is for the first time placed in
transfertur, ut sit propinquum proximity to the fuel; by accident, as
combustibili. Per accidens autem, when an agent that moves an animal
sicut motor animalis incipit de novo begins to move it by some new
movere animal aliquo novo motu movement made in its regard, either
facto circa ipsum: vel ex interiori, from within, as an animal begins to be
sicut, cum animal expergiscitur moved when it awakes after having
digestione completa, incipit moveri; digested its food, or from without, as
vel ab exteriori, sicut cum de novo when actions arise anew that lead to the
veniunt actiones inducentes ad initiation of some new action. Now, God
aliquam actionem de novo is moved neither through Himself nor by
inchoandam. Deus autem non accident, as we proved in Book I of this
movetur neque per se neque per work. Therefore, God acts always in the
accidens, ut in primo probatum est. same way. And by His action created
Deus igitur semper eodem modo things take their place in being. Hence,
agit. Ex sua autem actione res creatures always have been.
creatae in esse consistunt. Semper
igitur creaturae fuerunt.
Adhuc. Effectus procedit a causa [4] Again, an effect proceeds from its
agente per actionem eius. Sed efficient cause through the latter’s
actio Dei est aeterna: alias fieret de action. But God’s action is eternal;
potentia agente actu agens; et otherwise, from being an agent
oporteret quod reduceretur in potentially He would become an agent
actum ab aliquo priori agente, quod actually; and He would have to be
est impossibile. Ergo res a Deo actualized by some prior agent—which
creatae ab aeterno fuerunt. is impossible. Therefore, the things
created by God have existed from
eternity.
Amplius. Posita causa sufficienti, [5] And again. Given a sufficient cause,

necesse est effectum poni. Si enim its effect must be granted. For if, given
adhuc, posita causa, non necesse the cause, it were still unnecessary to
est effectum poni, possibile igitur grant its effect, it would then be possible
erit, causa posita, effectum esse et that the effect should be and not be; the
non esse; consecutio igitur effectus sequence from cause to effect will in that
ad causam erit possibilis tantum; case be only possible. But that which is
quod autem est possibile, indiget possible needs something to make it
aliquo quo reducatur in actum; actual. Some cause, therefore, will have
oportebit igitur ponere aliquam to be posited in order to do this; thus, the
causam qua fiat ut effectus first cause was not sufficient. God,
reducatur in actum; et sic prima however, is the sufficient cause of the
causa non erat sufficiens. Sed production of creatures; otherwise, He
Deus est causa sufficiens would not be a cause; rather, He would
productionis creaturarum: alias non be in potentiality to a cause, since in that
esset causa, sed magis in potentia case He would become a cause by the
se ad causam haberet; aliquo enim addition of something. But this is clearly
addito fieret causa; quod patet impossible. Since, then, God has existed
esse impossibile. Videtur igitur from eternity, it seems to follow
necessarium quod, cum Deus ab necessarily that the creature also has
aeterno fuerit, quod creatura etiam existed from eternity.
fuerit ab aeterno.
Item. Agens per voluntatem non [6] Also, a voluntary agent delays in
retardat suum propositum exequi carrying out its intention only because of

de aliquo faciendo nisi propter something expected but not yet present,
aliquid in futurum expectatum quod and this sometimes is in the agent itself,
nondum adest: et hoc quandoque as when complete competency to do
est in ipso agente, sicut cum something, or the removal of an
expectatur perfectio virtutis ad impediment to one’s power, is waited for;
agendum, aut sublatio alicuius while sometimes this anticipated thing is
impedientis virtutem; quandoque outside the agent, as when one awaits a
vero est extra agentem, sicut cum person in whose presence an action is to
expectatur praesentia alicuius be done, or at any event when one looks
coram quo actio fiat; vel saltem forward to the presence of an opportune
cum expectatur praesentia alicuius moment that has not yet arrived. For, if
temporis opportuni quod nondum the will be perfectly equipped, the power
adest. Si enim voluntas sit acts at once, unless there be a defect in
completa, statim potentia exequitur, it; at the will’s command the movement
nisi sit defectus in ipsa: sicut ad of a limb follows immediately, if no defect
imperium voluntatis statim sequitur exists in the motive power carrying out
motus membri, nisi sit defectus the movement. And from this we see
potentiae motivae exequentis that when one wills to do something and
motum. Et per hoc patet quod, cum it is not done at once, this failure must
aliquis vult aliquid facere et non be due either to a defect in the power, of
statim fiat, oportet quod vel hoc sit which defect one awaits the removal, or
propter defectum potentiae, qui to the fact that the will is not perfectly
expectatur removendus; vel quia equipped to do this thing. By the will
voluntas non est completa ad hoc being perfectly equipped I mean that it
faciendum. Dico autem wills to do something absolutely, in every
complementum voluntatis esse, respect; whereas the will is imperfectly
quando vult hoc absolute facere equipped when one does not will
omnibus modis: voluntas autem absolutely to do a thing, but on the
incompleta est, quando aliquis non condition that something exist which is
vult facere hoc absolute, sed not yet present or that a present
existente aliqua conditione quae obstacle be removed. It is certain
nondum adest; vel nisi subtracto however, that God has willed from
impedimento quod adest. Constat eternity the existence of whatever He
autem quod quicquid Deus nunc now wills to exist, for no new movement
vult quod sit, ab aeterno voluit quod of will can possibly accrue to Him. Nor
sit: non enim novus motus could any defect or obstacle stand in the
voluntatis ei advenire potest. Nec way of His power, nor could anything
aliquis defectus vel impedimentum else be looked for as cause of the
potentiae eius adesse potuit: nec universal production of creatures, since
aliquid aliud expectari potuit ad nothing besides Him is uncreated, as we
universalis creaturae have proved above. Therefore, it seems
productionem, cum nihil aliud sit necessary to conclude that God brought
increatum nisi ipse solus, ut supra creatures into being from all eternity.
ostensum est. Necessarium igitur
videtur quod ab aeterno creaturam
in esse produxerit.
Praeterea. Agens per intellectum [7] Moreover, an intellectual agent

non praeeligit unum alteri nisi chooses one thing in preference to
propter eminentiam unius ad another only because of the superiority

alterum. Sed ubi nulla est of the one over the other. But, where
differentia, non potest, esse there is no difference, there can be no
praeeminentia. Ubi igitur nulla est superiority, so that in the absence of
differentia, non fit praeelectio unius difference there is no choice of the one
ad alterum. Et propter hoc ab rather than of the other. And on this
agente ad utrumlibet se habente account, no action will proceed from an
aequaliter nulla erit actio, sicut nec agent equally indifferent to each of two
a materia: talis enim potentia alternatives, any more than from matter;
similatur potentiae materiae. Non for a potentiality of this kind is like that of
entis autem ad non ens nulla potest matter. Now, there can be no difference
esse differentia. Unum igitur non between nonbeing and nonbeing.
ens non est alteri praeeligibile. Sed Therefore, one nonbeing is not
praeter totam universitatem preferable to another nonbeing. But
creaturarum nihil est nisi aeternitas outside the total universe of created
Dei. In nihilo autem non possunt things nothing whatever exists except
assignari aliquae differentiae the divine eternity. In nothingness,
momentorum, ut in uno magis however, no difference of moments can
oporteat aliquid fieri quam in alio. possibly be assigned, so that a thing
Similiter nec in aeternitate, quae should be made in one moment rather
tota est uniformis et simplex, ut in than in another. Nor is there any
primo ostensum est. Relinquitur difference of moments in eternity, the
igitur quod voluntas Dei aequaliter whole of which is, as was shown in Book
se habet ad producendum I, uniform and simple. It therefore follows
creaturam per totam aeternitatem. that God’s will is indifferent as concerns
Aut igitur voluntas sua est de hoc the production of the creature throughout
quod nunquam creatura sub all eternity. Accordingly, His will is either
aeternitate eius constituatur: aut that the creature should never be
quod semper. Constat autem quod established within His eternity, or that it
non est voluntas eius de hoc quod should always have been so. The former
nunquam creatura sub esse eius clearly is not the case, for it is evident
aeterno constituatur: cum pateat that creatures were originated and
creaturas voluntate eius esse established by His will. It follows with
institutas. Relinquitur igitur de apparent necessity that the creature has
necessitate, ut videtur, quod always existed.
creatura semper fuit.
Adhuc. Ea quae sunt ad finem, [8] Furthermore, things directed to an
necessitatem habent ex fine: et end receive their necessity from that
maxime in his quae voluntate end; especially is this true of things done
aguntur. Oportet igitur quod, fine voluntarily. Therefore, if the end remains
eodem modo se habente, ea quae the same, it follows that the things
sunt ad finem eodem modo se ordered to it remain the same or are
habeant vel producantur, nisi produced in the same way, unless there
adveniat nova habitudo eorum ad arises a new relation between them and
finem. Finis autem creaturarum ex the end. Now, the end of creatures
divina voluntate prodeuntium est issuing forth from the divine will is the
divina bonitas, quae sola potest divine goodness, which alone can be the
esse divinae voluntatis finis. Cum end of the divine will. From the fact that
igitur bonitas divina in tota the divine goodness, throughout all
aeternitate eodem modo se habeat eternity, is unchangeable in itself and in

in se et in comparatione ad divinam relation to the divine will, it would seem
voluntatem videtur quod eodem to follow that creatures are in the same
modo creaturae in esse manner brought into being by God’s will
producantur a divina voluntate in throughout all eternity. For it cannot be
tota aeternitate: non enim potest said that some new relation to the end
dici quod aliqua nova relatio eis accrued to them, if they are held to have
advenerit ad finem, si penitus been absolutely nonexistent prior to a
ponantur non fuisse ante aliquod particular time from which they are
determinatum tempus, a quo supposed to have begun to be.
incoepisse ponuntur.
Adhuc. Cum bonitas divina [9] Since the divine goodness is

perfectissima sit, non hoc modo maximally perfect, it is said that all things
dicitur quod omnia a Deo issued from God on account of His
processerunt propter bonitatem goodness, but not in such a way that
eius, ut ei aliquid ex creaturis something accrued to Him from
accresceret: sed quia bonitatis est creatures; rather, this is said because it
ut seipsam communicet prout is of the essence of goodness to
possibile est, in quo ipsa bonitas communicate itself as far as possible,
manifestatur. Cum autem omnia and by so doing goodness itself is
bonitatem Dei participent manifested. Now, since all things partake
inquantum habent esse, secundum of God’s goodness so far as they have
quod diuturniora sunt, magis Dei being, the more enduring they are, so
bonitatem participant; unde et esse much the more do they participate in His
perpetuum speciei dicitur divinum goodness. This is why the perpetual
esse. Bonitas autem divina infinita being of a species is called a divine
est. Eius igitur est ut se in infinitum being. The divine goodness, however, is
communicet, non aliquo infinite, so that it is proper to it to
determinato tempore tantum. Hoc communicate itself in an infinite manner,
igitur videtur ad divinam bonitatem not in some limited time only. Therefore,
pertinere, ut creaturae aliquae ab it seems to belong to the divine
aeterno fuerint. goodness that some created things
should have existed from eternity.
Haec igitur sunt ex parte Dei [10] These, then, are the arguments,
accepta per quae videtur quod taken from God’s side of the question,
creaturae semper fuerint. which seem to show that creatures have
existed always.
Caput 33 Chapter 33
Rationes volentium probare ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH
aeternitatem mundi sumptae ex TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE
parte creaturarum WORLD FROM THE STANDPOINT OF
CREATURES
Sunt autem et alia, ex parte [1] There are also the following
creaturarum accepta, quae idem arguments, taken from the point of view
ostendere videntur. of creatures, which seemingly arrive at
the same conclusion.
Quae enim non habent potentiam [2] Things having no potentiality to non

ad non esse, impossibile est ea being cannot possibly fail to exist. Now,
non esse. Quaedam autem sunt in in certain created things there is no
creaturis in quibus non est potentia potentiality to nonbeing. For there can
ad non esse. Non enim potest esse be potentiality to nonbeing only in those
potentia ad non esse nisi in illis things which possess matter subject to
quae habent materiam contrarietati contrariety; for potentiality to being and
subiectam: potentia enim ad esse nonbeing is potentiality to privation and
et non esse est potentia ad form, the subject of which is matter; and
privationem et formam, quorum privation is always connected with the
subiectum est materia; privatio vero contrary form, since matter cannot
semper adiungitur formae possibly exist without any form at all. But
contrariae, cum impossibile sit some creatures, wherein there is no
materiam esse absque omni forma. matter subject to contrariety, do exist,
Sed quaedam creaturae sunt in either because they are completely
quibus non est materia contrarietati without matter, as intellectual
subiecta: vel quia omnino non substances are—this we will show later
habent materiam, sicut substantiae —or because they have no contrary
intellectuales, ut infra ostendetur; opposite, as with the heavenly bodies—
vel non habent contrarium, sicut and this is proved by their movement,
corpora caelestia; quod eorum which has no contrary. It is, then,
motus ostendit, qui contrarium non impossible for certain creatures not to
habet. Quasdam igitur creaturas exist; therefore, they must always exist.
impossibile est non esse. Ergo eas
necesse est semper esse.
Item. Unaquaeque res tantum durat [3] Moreover, each and every thing

in esse quanta est sua virtus continues in being in proportion to its
essendi: nisi per accidens, sicut in power of being—except by accident, as
his quae violenter corrumpuntur. in things caused to perish by violence.
Sed quaedam creaturae sunt But there are some creatures endowed
quibus inest virtus essendi non ad with the power of existing, not for any
aliquod determinatum tempus, sed limited time, but forever; the heavenly
ad semper essendum: sicut bodies, for instance, and intellectual
corpora caelestia et intellectuales substances, which are imperishable
substantiae; incorruptibilia enim because they have no contrary. It is
sunt, cum contrarium non habeant. therefore proper to these things to exist
Relinquitur igitur quod eis competit always. On the other hand, that which
semper esse. Quod autem incipit begins to be does not exist always.
esse, non semper est. Eis ergo non Therefore, an existential beginning does
competit ut esse incipiant. not pertain to imperishable or
incorruptible things.
Adhuc. Quandocumque aliquid de [4] Furthermore, whenever something

novo incipit moveri, oportet quod begins to be moved for the first time,
movens, vel motum, vel utrumque, either the mover, or the moved, or both,
aliter se habeat nunc quando est must needs exist in a different state now,
motus, quam prius quando non erat while there is movement, than before,
motus: est enim habitudo vel relatio when no movement existed. For there is
quaedam moventis ad motum a certain condition or relation in the
secundum quod est movens actu; mover to the thing moved, as a result of
relatio autem nova non incipit sine which it moves actually; and the new
mutatione utriusque vel alterius relation does not arise without a change
saltem extremorum. Quod autem either in both or at least in one or other
se aliter habet nunc et prius, of the extremes related. But that thing is
movetur. Ergo oportet, ante motum moved whose condition of existence is
qui de novo incipit, alium motum different now than it was before.
praecedere in mobili vel in Therefore, prior to the newly initiated
movente. Oportet igitur quod movement, another movement must
quilibet motus vel sit aeternus, vel take place either in the movable thing or
habeat alium motum ante se. in the mover; so that every movement is
Motus igitur semper fuit. Ergo et either eternal or is preceded by another
mobilia. Et sic creaturae semper movement. Therefore, motion has
fuerunt. Deus enim omnino always existed, and so, also, have
immobilis est, ut in primo ostensum things movable. Hence, creatures have
est. always existed. For God is wholly
immutable, as we proved in Book I of
this work.
Praeterea. Omne agens, quod [5] Again, every agent which engenders

generat sibi simile, intendit its like intends to preserve perpetual
conservare esse perpetuum in being in the species, for existence
specie, quod non potest perpetuo cannot be so maintained in the
conservari in individuo. Impossibile individual. Now, it is impossible that
est autem naturae appetitum natural desire should be futile. The
vanum esse. Oportet igitur quod species of generable things, therefore,
rerum generabilium species sint must be perpetual.
perpetuae.
Adhuc. Si tempus est perpetuum, [6] And again, if time is everlasting, so
oportet motum esse perpetuum: also must motion be; for time “is the
cum sit numerus motus. Et per number of motion.” And, consequently,
consequens mobilia esse perpetua: things movable must be perpetual, since
cum motus sit actus mobilis. Sed motion is the “act of the movable.” But
tempus oportet esse perpetuum. time must be everlasting. For time
Non enim potest intelligi esse cannot be known to exist without the
tempus quin sit nunc: sicut nec now, any more than a line without a
linea potest intelligi sine puncto. point. But the now is always “the end of
Nunc autem semper est finis the past and the beginning of the future,”
praeteriti et principium futuri: haec for this is the definition of the now. Thus,
enim est definitio ipsius nunc. Et sic every given now has time preceding it
quodlibet nunc datum habet ante and following it, so that no now can be
se tempus prius et posterius. Et ita either first or last. It remains that mobile
nullum potest esse primum neque things, which created substances are,
ultimum. Relinquitur igitur quod exist from eternity.
mobilia, quae sunt substantiae
creatae, sint ab aeterno.
Item. Oportet vel affirmare vel [7] Also, it is necessary either to affirm or

negare. Si igitur ad negationem to deny. If, therefore, a thing’s existence
alicuius sequitur eius positio, is affirmed as a result of denying it, then
oportet illud esse semper. Tempus that thing must exist always. Now, time
autem est huiusmodi. Nam, si is such a thing. For to suppose that time
tempus non semper fuit, est did not always exist is to think of it as
accipere prius non esse ipsius not existing prior to existing; and,
quam esse; et similiter, si non sit similarly, if time will not exist always, its
semper futurum, oportet quod non nonexistence must succeed its
esse eius sit posterius ad esse existence. But if time does not exist,
eius. Prius autem et posterius non there can be no before and after in
potest esse secundum durationem duration; for “the number of before and
nisi tempus sit: nam numerus after is time.” And thus, time must have
prioris et posterioris tempus est. Et existed before it began to be and will
sic oportebit tempus fuisse continue to exist after it has ceased to
antequam inciperet, et futurum be. Time is, therefore, necessarily
esse postquam desinet. Oportet eternal. But time is an accident, and an
igitur tempus esse aeternum. accident cannot be without a subject.
Tempus autem est accidens: quod Now, God, who is above time, is not the
sine subiecto esse non potest. subject of this accident, for He is
Subiectum autem eius non est altogether immutable, as we proved in
Deus, qui est supra tempus: cum Book I of this work. It remains that some
sit omnino immobilis, ut in primo created substance is eternal.
probatum est. Relinquitur igitur
aliquam substantiam creatam
aeternam esse.
Amplius. Multae propositiones sic [8] Many propositions, moreover, are of

se habent quod qui eas negat, such nature that he who denies them
oportet quod eas ponat: sicut qui must posit them; for example, whoever
negat veritatem esse, ponit denies that truth exists posits the
veritatem esse: ponit enim suam existence of truth, for the denial which
negativam esse veram quam he puts forward he posits as true. The
profert. Et simile est de eo qui same is true of one who denies the
negat hoc principium, principle that contradictories are not
contradictionem non esse simul: simultaneous; for, by denying this, he
negans enim hoc dicit negationem asserts that the negation which he
quam ponit esse veram, oppositam posits is true and that the opposite
autem affirmationem falsam, et sic affirmation is false, and thus that both
non de eodem utrumque verificari. are not true of the same thing.
Si igitur id ad cuius remotionem Therefore, if a thing that is affirmed by
sequitur sua positio, oportet esse being denied must, as we have just
semper, ut probatum est, sequitur shown, exist always, then the aforesaid
quod praedictae propositiones, et propositions, and all that follow from
omnes quae ex eis sequuntur, sint them, are everlasting. But these
sempiternae. Hae autem propositions are not God. It is, therefore,
propositiones non sunt Deus. Ergo necessary that something besides God
oportet aliquid praeter Deum esse be eternal.
aeternum.
Hae igitur et huiusmodi rationes [9] These arguments, then, and others
sumi possunt ex parte creaturarum of like nature, can be taken from the
quod creaturae fuerint semper. standpoint of created things in order to
prove that the latter have existed
always.
Caput 34 Chapter 34
Rationes ad probandum ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE
aeternitatem mundi ex parte ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM
factionis THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE
MAKING [OF THINGS]
Possunt etiam sumi aliae rationes, [1] In order to establish the same
ex parte ipsius factionis, ad idem conclusion, this time from the side of the
ostendendum. making itself, other arguments also can
be adduced, such as the following.
Quod enim ab omnibus communiter [2] That which is asserted universally,

dicitur, impossibile est totaliter esse by everyone, cannot possibly be totally
falsum. Falsa enim opinio infirmitas false. For a false opinion is a kind of
quaedam intellectus est: sicut et infirmity of the understanding, just as a
falsum iudicium de sensibili proprio false judgment concerning a proper
ex infirmitate sensus accidit. sensible happens as the result of a
Defectus autem per accidens sunt: weakness of the sense power involved.
quia praeter naturae intentionem. But defects, being outside the intention
Quod autem est per accidens, non of nature, are accidental. And nothing
potest esse semper et in omnibus: accidental can be always and in all
sicut iudicium quod de saporibus ab things; the judgment about savors given
omni gustu datur, non potest esse by every tasting cannot be false. Thus,
falsum. Ita iudicium quod ab the judgment uttered by everyone
omnibus de veritate datur, non concerning truth cannot be erroneous.
potest esse erroneum. Communis “Now, it is the common opinion of all the
autem sententia est omnium philosophers that nothing arises from
philosophorum ex nihilo nihil fieri. what is not.
Oportet igitur hoc esse verum. Si This opinion, therefore, must be true; so
igitur aliquid sit factum, oportet ex that if a thing is made it must needs be
aliquo esse factum. Quod si etiam made from something; and if the latter,
factum sit, oportet etiam et hoc ex also, is made, then it, too, must be
alio fieri. Non potest autem hoc in made from something else. But this
infinitum procedere: quia sic nulla process cannot go on to infinity, since in
generatio compleretur, cum non sit that case no generation of anything
possibile infinita transire. Oportet would be completed; it is impossible to
igitur devenire ad aliquod primum pass through an infinite number of
quod non sit factum. Omne autem things. It is therefore necessary to arrive
ens quod non semper fuit, oportet at a first thing that was not made. But
esse factum. Ergo oportet illud ex any and every thing which has not
quo primo omnia fiunt, esse always existed must be made.
sempiternum. Hoc autem non est Consequently, that being from which all
Deus: quia ipse non potest esse things were first made, must be
materia alicuius rei, ut in primo everlasting. Yet this is not God, because
probatum est. Relinquitur igitur He cannot be the matter of anything, as
quod aliquid extra Deum sit we proved in Book I of this work. Thus,
aeternum, scilicet prima materia. it follows that something besides God is
eternal, namely, prime matter.
Amplius. Si aliquid non se habet [3] Moreover, if a thing does not exist in

eodem modo nunc et prius, oportet the same way now as it did before, then
illud esse aliqualiter mutatum: hoc in some respect it must be changed, for
enim est moveri, non eodem modo to be moved [or changed] is not to exist
se nunc et prius habere. Omne in the same state now as before. But
autem quod de novo incipit esse, everything that begins to exist anew is
non eodem modo se habet nunc et not now as it was before; hence, the
prius. Oportet igitur hoc per aliquem reason for this must be that some
motum accidere vel mutationem. motion or change has occurred. But
Omnis autem motus vel mutatio in every motion or change is in a subject,
aliquo subiecto est: est enim actus for it is “the act of the movable.” Now,
mobilis. Cum autem motus sit prius since motion precedes that which is
eo quod fit per motum, cum ad hoc made by it, for it terminates in the latter,
terminetur motus, oportet ante it follows that a movable subject must
quodlibet factum praeexistere exist prior to anything made. And since
aliquod subiectum mobile. Et cum to proceed to infinity in this matter is
hoc non sit possibile in infinitum impossible, we must come to a first
procedere, oportet devenire ad subject not newly originated but always
aliquod primum subiectum non de existent.
novo incipiens sed semper
existens.
Adhuc. Omne quod de novo esse [4] Then, too, in the case of a thing that

incipit, antequam esset, possibile begins to be anew, it was possible,
erat ipsum esse: si enim non, before it existed, that it would exist;
impossibile erat ipsum esse, et otherwise, it was impossible for it to be,
necesse non esse; et sic semper and necessary for it not to be; so that it
fuisset non ens et nunquam esse would always have been a nonentity
incoepisset. Sed quod est possibile and would never have begun to be. But
esse, est subiectum potentia ens. that which is possibly existent is
Oportet igitur ante quodlibet de potentially a subject of being. Therefore,
novo incipiens praeexistere antecedently to everything which begins
subiectum potentia ens. Et cum hoc to exist de novo, there must be a
in infinitum procedere non possit, subject which is potentially a being. And
oportet ponere aliquod primum since an infinite regress is here
subiectum quod non incoepit esse impossible, we must affirm the
de novo. existence of a primary subject which did
not begin to be de novo.
Item. Nulla substantia permanens [5] Furthermore, no permanent

est dum fit: ad hoc enim fit ut sit; substance exists while it is being made,
non igitur fieret, si iam esset. Sed for it is made in order that it may be; so,
dum fit, oportet aliquid esse quod sit it would not be made if it existed
factionis subiectum: non enim already. But, while it is being made,
factio, cum sit accidens, sine something must exist which is the
subiecto esse potest. Omne igitur subject of the making; for, since making
quod fit, habet aliquod subiectum is an accident, there can be no making
praeexistens. Et cum hoc in without a subject. Thus, whatever is
infinitum ire non possit, sequetur made has some preexisting subject.
primum subiectum non esse factum, And since this cannot go on indefinitely,
sed sempiternum. Ex quo ulterius it follows that the first subject was not
sequitur aliquid praeter Deum esse made, but is everlasting; and it follows,
aeternum: cum ipse subiectum also, that something besides God is
factionis aut motus esse non possit. eternal, because He cannot be the
subject of making or of movement.
Hae igitur rationes sunt quibus [6] These, then, are the arguments
aliqui tanquam demonstrationibus through adhering to which, as though
inhaerentes, dicunt necessarium they were demonstrations, some people
res creatas semper fuisse. In quo say that created things must always
fidei Catholicae contradicunt, quae have existed; in so saying they
ponit nihil praeter Deum semper contradict the Catholic faith, which
fuisse, sed omnia esse coepisse affirms that nothing besides God has
praeter unum Deum aeternum always existed, but that all things, save
the one eternal God, have had a
beginning.
Caput 35 Chapter 35
Solutio rationum supra positarum SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING
et primo earum quae sumebantur ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE
ex parte Dei TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF
GOD
Oportet igitur ostendere [1] It remains for us to show that the
praemissas rationes non ex arguments proposed above issue in no
necessitate concludere. Et primo, necessary conclusions. First, let us
illas quae ex parte agentis consider those taken from the agent’s
sumuntur. point of view.
Non enim oportet quod per se vel [2] God need not be moved either

per accidens Deus moveatur si essentially or accidentally if His effects
effectus eius de novo esse begin to exist anew, as the first argument
incipiunt: ut prima ratio would have it. For the newness of an
procedebat. Novitas enim effectus effect can indicate change on the agent’s
indicare potest mutationem part inasmuch as it does manifest
agentis inquantum demonstrat newness of action; a new action cannot
novitatem actionis: non enim possibly be in the agent unless the latter
potest esse quod in agente sit is in some way moved, at least from
nova actio nisi aliquo modo inaction to action. But the newness of an
moveatur, saltem de otio in actum. effect produced by God does not
Novitas autem divini effectus non demonstrate newness of action in Him,
demonstrat novitatem actionis in since His action is His essence, as we
Deo: cum actio sua sit sua have proved above. Neither, therefore,
essentia, ut supra ostensum est. can newness of effect prove change in
Unde neque novitas effectus God the agent.
mutationem Dei agentis
demonstrare potest.
Nec tamen oportet quod, si primo [3] Nor, if the action of the first agent is
agentis actio sit aeterna, quod eternal, does it follow that His effect is
eius effectus sit aeternus: ut eternal, as the second argument
secunda ratio concludebat. concludes. For we have already shown in
Ostensum est enim supra quod this Book that God acts voluntarily in the
Deus agit voluntate in rerum production of things, but not in such
productione. Non autem ita quod fashion that there be some other
sit aliqua alia ipsius actio media, intermediate action of His, as in us the
sicut in nobis actio virtutis motivae action of the motive power intervenes
est media inter actum voluntatis et between the act of the will and the effect,
effectum, ut in praecedentibus as we have also previously shown. On the
ostensum est: sed oportet quod contrary, God’s act of understanding and
suum intelligere et velle sit suum willing is, necessarily, His act of making.
facere. Effectus autem ab Now, an effect follows from the intellect
intellectu et voluntate sequitur and the will according to the
secundum determinationem determination of the intellect and the
intellectus et imperium voluntatis. command of the will. Moreover, just as the
Sicut autem per intellectum intellect determines every other condition
determinatur rei factae of the thing made, so does it prescribe the
quaecumque alia conditio, ita et time of its making; for art determines not
praescribitur ei tempus: non enim only that this thing is to be such and such,
solum ars determinat ut hoc tale but that it is to be at this particular time,
sit, sed ut tunc sit; sicut medicus even as a physician determines that a
ut tunc potio detur. Unde, si eius dose of medicine is to be drunk at such
velle per se esset efficax ad and such a particular time, so that, if his
effectum producendum, act of will were of itself sufficient to
sequeretur de novo effectus ab produce the effect, the effect would follow
antiqua voluntate, nulla actione de anew from his previous decision, without
novo existente. Nihil igitur any new action on his part. Nothing,
prohibet dicere actionem Dei ab therefore, prevents our saying that God’s
aeterno fuisse, effectum autem action existed from all eternity, whereas
non ab aeterno, sed tunc cum ab its effect was not present from eternity,
aeterno disposuit. but existed at that time when, from all
eternity, He ordained it.
Ex quo etiam patet quod, etsi [4] From this we see also that, although
Deus sit sufficiens causa God is the sufficient cause of bringing
productionis rerum in esse, non things into being, it is not necessary to
tamen oportet quod eius effectus hold that because He is eternal His effect
aeternus ponatur, eo existente is eternal, as the third argument
aeterno: ut tertia ratio maintained. Given a sufficient cause, its
concludebat. Posita enim causa effect is given, too, but not an effect that
sufficienti, ponitur eius effectus, does not belong to the cause; for this
non autem effectus extraneus a would result from the insufficiency of the
causa: hoc enim esset ex cause, as if a hot thing, for example,
insufficientia causae, ac si failed to give heat. Now, the will’s proper
calidum non calefaceret. Proprius effect is the being of that which it wills;
autem effectus voluntatis est ut sit and if something else were to be than
hoc quod voluntas vult: si autem what the will determines, this would be an
aliquid aliud esset quam voluntas effect not proper to the cause but foreign
velit, non poneretur effectus to it. But, as we have said, just as the will
proprius causae, sed alienus ab wills this thing to be such and such, so
ea. Voluntas autem, ut dictum est, does it will it to be at such and such a
sicut vult hoc esse tale, ita vult time. Hence, for the will to be a sufficient
hoc esse tunc. Unde non oportet, cause it is not necessary that the effect
ad hoc quod voluntas sit sufficiens should exist when the will exists, but at
causa, quod effectus sit quando that time when the will has ordained its
voluntas est, sed quando voluntas existence. But with things that proceed
effectum esse disponit. In his from a cause acting naturally, the case is
autem quae a causa naturaliter different. For, as nature is, so is its action;
agente procedunt, secus est: quia hence, given the existence of the cause,
actio naturae est secundum quod the effect must necessarily follow. On the
ipsa est; unde ad esse causae other hand, the will acts in keeping not
sequi oportet effectum. Voluntas with the manner of its being, but of its
autem agit, non secundum intention. So, then, just as the effect of a
modum sui esse, sed secundum natural agent follows the being of the
modum sui propositi. Et ideo, sicut agent, if the latter is sufficient, so the
effectus naturalis agentis sequitur effect of a voluntary agent follows the
esse agentis, si sit sufficiens, ita mode of his purpose.
effectus agentis per voluntatem
sequitur modum propositi.
Ex his etiam patet quod divinae [5] Moreover, what has been said makes
voluntatis non retardatur effectus, it clear that, contrary to the fourth
quamvis non semper fuerit, argument, the effect of God’s will was not
voluntate existente: ut quarta ratio delayed, although having been always
supponebat. Nam sub voluntate willed, the effect was not itself always
divina cadit non solum quod eius existent. For within the scope of God’s will
effectus sit, sed quod tunc sit. Hoc fall not only the existence of His effect but
igitur volitum quod est tunc also the time of its existence. Therefore,
creaturam esse, non retardatur: this thing willed, namely, that a creature
quia tunc incoepit creatura esse should exist at a certain time, is not
quando Deus ab aeterno delayed, for the creature began to exist at
disposuit. that time which God appointed from all
eternity.
Non est autem ante totius [6] Prior to the initial existence of the
creaturae inchoationem totality of created being there is no
diversitatem aliquam partium diversity of parts of any duration, as was
alicuius durationis accipere: ut in supposed in the fifth argument. For
quinta ratione supponebatur. Nam nothingness has neither measure nor
nihil mensuram non habet nec duration. Now, God’s duration, which is
durationem. Dei autem duratio, eternity, does not have parts, but is utterly
quae est aeternitas, non habet simple, without before or after; since God
partes, sed est simplex omnino, is immovable, as we have shown in Book
non habens prius et posterius, I of this work. Therefore, the beginning of
cum Deus sit immobilis: ut in the whole of creation is not to be thought
primo ostensum est. Non est igitur of in comparison to any diverse parts
comparare inchoationem totius designated in some preexisting measure,
creaturae ad aliqua diversa to which parts the beginning of creatures
signata in aliqua praeexistente can stand in similar or dissimilar relations,
mensura, ad quae initium so that there would have to be a reason in
creaturarum similiter vel the agent why he brought the creature
dissimiliter se possit habere, ut into being in this designated part of that
oporteat rationem esse apud duration rather than at some other
agentem quare in hoc signato preceding or subsequent point. Such a
illius durationis creaturam in esse reason would be required if, beside the
produxerit, et non in alio totality of created being, there existed
praecedenti vel sequenti. Quae some duration divisible into parts, as is
quidem ratio requireretur si aliqua the case in particular agents, which
duratio in partes divisibilis esset produce their effects in time, but do not
praeter totam creaturam produce time itself. God, however,
productam: sicut accidit in brought into being both the creature and
particularibus agentibus, a quibus time together. In this case, therefore, the
producitur effectus in tempore, reason why He produced them now and
non autem ipsum tempus. Deus not before does not have to be
autem simul in esse produxit et considered, but only why He did not
creaturam et tempus. Non est produce them always. A comparison with
igitur ratio quare nunc et non prius place will make this point clear. Particular
in hoc consideranda: sed solum bodies are brought into being not only at a
quare non semper. Sicut per definite time, but also in a definite place;
simile in loco apparet. Particularia and since the time and the place in which
enim corpora, sicut in tempore they are involved are extrinsic to them,
determinato, ita et in loco there must be a reason why they are
determinato producuntur; et quia produced in this place and time rather
habent extra se tempus et locum, than in another. On the other hand,
a quibus continentur, oportet esse outside the entire heaven there is no
rationem quare magis in hoc loco place, the universal place of all things
et in hoc tempore producuntur being produced together with it; so that
quam in alio: in toto autem caelo, there is no reason for considering why the
extra quod non est locus, et cum heaven was established in being here and

quo universalis locus omnium not there. And because they thought that
producitur, non est ratio such a reason ought to be sought for,
consideranda quare hic et non ibi some have fallen into the error of
constitutum est; quam rationem attributing infinity to bodily things.
quia quidam considerandam Similarly, outside the entire universe of
putabant, deciderunt in errorem, creatures there is no time, time having
ut ponerent infinitum in been produced simultaneously with that
corporibus. Et similiter in universe; hence, we do not have to look
productione totius creaturae, extra for the reason why it was produced now
quam non est tempus, et cum qua and not before, so as to be led to concede
simul tempus producitur, non est the infinity of time; we have only to ask
attendenda ratio quare nunc et why it was not always produced, or why it
non prius, ut per hoc ducamur ad was produced after not being or with
concedendam temporis some beginning.
infinitatem: sed solum quare non
semper, vel quare post non esse,
vel cum aliquo principio.
Ad hoc autem inquirendum, sexta [7] Now, in order to inquire into this

ratio inducebatur ex parte finis, matter, the sixth argument was adduced
qui solus inducere potest from the point of view of the end, which
necessitatem in his quae alone can introduce necessity into things
voluntate aguntur. Finis autem done voluntarily. But the only possible end
divinae voluntatis non potest esse of God’s will is His own goodness; and He
nisi eius bonitas. Non autem agit does not act for the sake of bringing this
propter hunc finem producendum end into being, as the craftsman acts in
in esse, sicut artifex agit propter order to produce his handiwork. For God’s
constitutionem artificiati: cum goodness is eternal and immutable, so
bonitas eius sit aeterna et that nothing can accrue to Him. Nor can it
immutabilis, ita quod ei nihil be said that God acts for His own
accrescere potest. Nec etiam betterment. Nor does He act in order to
posset dici quod propter eius obtain this end for Himself, as a king
meliorationem Deus agat. Nec fights in order to gain possession of a city;
etiam agit propter hunc finem for God is His own goodness. We
acquirendum sibi, sicut rex pugnat therefore conclude that God acts for an
ut acquirat civitatem: ipse enim end inasmuch as He produces an effect
est sua bonitas. Restat igitur quod so that it may participate in His end.
agat propter finem inquantum Therefore, in producing a thing for the
effectum producit ad sake of an end, in this sense, the uniform
participationem finis. In relation of the end to the agent is not to
producendo igitur res sic propter be thought of as the reason for His work
finem, uniformis habitudo finis ad being eternal; on the contrary, the thing to
agentem non est consideranda ut be attended to is the relation of the end to
ratio operis sempiterni: sed magis the effect brought forth on account of the
est attendenda habitudo finis ad end in order that the effect be produced in
effectum qui fit propter finem; ut such a manner as to be most fittingly
taliter producatur effectus qualiter ordained to that end. Hence, from the fact
convenientius ordinetur ad finem. that the relation of the end to the agent is
Unde per hoc quod finis uniform, we cannot conclude that the
uniformiter se habet ad agentem, effect is eternal.

non potest concludi quod effectus
sit sempiternus.
Nec est necessarium effectum [8] Nor, as the seventh argument seemed

divinum semper fuisse, propter to imply, is it necessary that God’s effect
hoc quod sic convenientius should have always existed because it
ordinetur ad finem, ut septima would then be more fittingly directed to its
ratio procedere videbatur: sed end. On the contrary, by not having
convenientius ordinatur ad finem existed always, it is more fittingly directed
per hoc quod est non semper to its end. For every agent that produces
fuisse. Omne enim agens an effect in participation of its own form
producens effectum in intends to produce its own likeness in that
participationem suae formae, effect. Thus, to produce the creature in
intendit in eo inducere suam participation of His own goodness was
similitudinem. Sic igitur divinae becoming to God’s will, for by its likeness
voluntati conveniens fuit in suae to Him the creature might show forth His
bonitatis participationem goodness. But this representation cannot
creaturam producere, ut sua be in terms of equality, in the manner in
similitudine divinam bonitatem which a univocal effect represents its
repraesentaret. Non autem potest cause—so that eternal effects would have
esse talis repraesentatio per to be produced by the divine goodness.
modum aequalitatis, sicut effectus Rather, this representation is in keeping
univocus suam causam with the way in which the transcendent is
repraesentat, ut sic oporteat ab manifested by that which is transcended.
infinita bonitate aeternos effectus Now, the transcendence of God’s
produci: sed sicut excedens goodness over the creature is shown
repraesentatur ab eo quod most of all by the fact that creatures have
exceditur. Excessus autem not always existed. For this makes it
divinae bonitatis supra creaturam perfectly clear that all things other than
per hoc maxime exprimitur quod God have Him as the author of their
creaturae non semper fuerunt. Ex being; and that His power is not fettered
hoc enim apparet expresse quod to the production of those effects, as
omnia alia praeter ipsum eum nature is to natural effects; and,
habent sui esse auctorem; et consequently, that He is a voluntary and
quod virtus eius non obligatur ad intelligent agent. (Some, assuming the
huiusmodi effectus producendos, eternity of creatures, have asserted views
sicut natura ad effectus naturales; contrary to these.)
et per consequens quod est
voluntate agens et intelligens.
Quorum contraria quidam
posuerunt, aeternitatem
creaturarum supponentes.
Sic igitur ex parte agentis nihil est [9] There is, then, nothing from the

quod aeternitatem creaturarum agent’s side of the question that compels
nos ponere cogat. us to maintain the eternity of creatures.
Caput 36 Chapter 36
Solutio rationum quae sumuntur ex SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
parte rerum factarum PROPOSED FROM THE POINT OF
VIEW OF THE THINGS MADE
Similiter etiam nec ex parte [1] Likewise, there is nothing on the part

creaturae est aliquid quod nos ad of creatures that induces us necessarily
eius aeternitatem ponendam de to affirm their eternity.
necessitate inducat.
Necessitas enim essendi quae in [2] The necessity of being that we find in

creaturis invenitur, ex quo prima creatures, whence the first argument
ratio ad hoc sumitur, est necessitas about this question is drawn, is a
ordinis, ut in praecedentibus est necessity of order, as we have previously
ostensum. Necessitas autem shown. But, as we proved above, a
ordinis non cogit ipsum cui talis necessity of order does not compel the
inest necessitas, semper fuisse, ut subject in which a necessity of this kind
supra ostensum est. Licet enim is present to exist always. For, although
substantia caeli, per hoc quod the substance of the heaven has
caret potentia ad non esse, habeat necessity with respect to being, in virtue
necessitatem ad esse, haec tamen of the fact that it lacks potentiality to non
necessitas sequitur eius being, this necessity nevertheless is
substantiam. Unde, substantia eius consequent upon its substance. Hence,
iam in esse instituta, talis once its substance has been established
necessitas impossibilitatem non in being, this necessity entails the
essendi inducit: non autem facit impossibility of notbeing; but if we
esse impossibile caelum non esse, consider the production of its very
in consideratione qua agitur de substance, it does not entail the
productione substantiae ipsius. impossibility of the heaven’s not being at
all.
Similiter etiam virtus essendi [3] Likewise, the power of existing
semper, ex qua procedebat always, whereon the second argument is
secunda ratio, praesupponit based, presupposes the production of
substantiae productionem. Unde, the substance; so that, where the point
cum de productione substantiae at issue is the production of the
caeli agitur, talis virtus substance of the heaven, this power
sempiternitatis argumentum cannot be a sufficient proof of the
sufficiens esse non potest. eternity of that substance.
Motus etiam sempiternitatem non [4] Nor does the argument brought up
cogit nos ponere ratio next compel us to assert the eternity of
consequenter inducta. Iam enim motion. For what we have said already
patet quod absque mutatione Dei makes it clear that, without any change
agentis potest esse quod novum in God the agent, He can enact
agat non sempiternum. Si autem something new that is not eternal. But, if
possibile est aliquid ab eo agi de something can be done by Him anew, it
novo, patet quod et moveri: nam is evidently possible, also, for something
novitas motus dispositionem to be moved by Him anew. For newness
voluntatis aeternae sequitur de of motion follows upon the decision of
motu non semper essendo. the eternal will of God, that motion be not
always in existence.
Similiter etiam intentio naturalium [5] Then, too, the intention of natural
agentium ad specierum agents to perpetuate the species—this
perpetuitatem, ex quo quarta ratio was the starting point of the fourth
procedebat, praesupponit naturalia argument—presupposes that natural
agentia iam producta. Unde locum agents already exist. Hence, this
non habet haec ratio nisi in rebus argument is relevant only to natural
naturalibus iam in esse productis, things already brought into being; where
non autem cum de rerum it is a question of the production of
productione agitur. Utrum autem things, it has no place. But the question,
necesse sit ponere generationem whether it is necessary to hold that the
perpetuo duraturam, in engendering of things will go on for ever,
sequentibus ostendetur. will be dealt with later.
Ratio etiam quinta, ex tempore [6] Furthermore, the fifth argument,
inducta, aeternitatem motus magis drawn from a consideration of time,
supponit quam probet. Cum enim supposes the eternity of motion rather
prius et posterius et continuitas than proves it. For, as Aristotle teaches,
temporis sequatur prius et the before and after and the continuity of
posterius et continuitatem motus, time follow upon the before and after and
secundum Aristotelis doctrinam, the continuity of motion. Clearly, then,
patet quod idem instans est the same instant is the beginning of the
principium futuri et finis praeteriti future and the end of the past because
quia aliquid signatum in motu est some assigned point in motion is the
principium et finis diversarum beginning and the end of the diverse
partium motus. Non oportebit igitur parts of motion. So, not every instant
omne instans huiusmodi esse, nisi need be of this kind unless we think of
omne signum in tempore acceptum every assignable point in time as existing
sit medium inter prius et posterius between a before and an after in
in motu, quod est ponere motum movement; and this is to suppose that
sempiternum. Ponens autem movement is eternal. On the other hand,
motum non esse sempiternum, if we held that motion is not eternal, we
potest dicere primum instans can say that the first instant of time is the
temporis esse principium futuri et beginning of the future and the terminus
nullius praeteriti finem. Nec of no time past. Nor, simply because a
repugnat successioni temporis line, wherein some point is a beginning
quod ponatur in ipso aliquod nunc and not an end, is fixed and not flowing,
principium et non finis propter hoc is it incompatible with time’s
quod linea, in qua ponitur punctus successiveness if we suppose a now
aliquis principium et non finis, est that is a beginning and not an end; for
stans, et non fluens: quia etiam in even in some particular movement,
motu aliquo particulari, qui etiam which is not stationary either, but
non est stans sed fluens, signari transitory, it is possible to designate a
aliquid potest ut principium motus point which is a beginning only and not
tantum et non ut finis: aliter enim an end; otherwise, all movement would
omnis motus esset perpetuus, be perpetual; and this is impossible.
quod est impossibile.
Quod autem prius ponitur non esse [7] True, if time had a beginning, we are
temporis quam eius esse si tempus supposing its nonexistence to precede
incoepit, non cogit nos dicere quod its existence. But the supposition of
ponitur tempus esse si ponatur non time’s nonexistence does not compel us
esse, ut sexta ratio concludebat. to assert its existence, as the sixth
Nam prius quod dicimus antequam argument would have it. For the before
tempus esset, non ponit aliquam that we speak of as preceding time
temporis partem in re, sed solum in implies nothing temporal in reality, but
imaginatione. Cum enim dicimus only in our imagination. Indeed, when we
quod tempus habet esse post non say that time exists after not existing, we
esse, intelligimus quod non fuit mean that there was no time at all prior
aliqua pars temporis ante hoc nunc to this designated now; even so, when
signatum: sicut, cum dicimus quod we declare that above the heaven there
supra caelum nihil est, non is nothing, we are not implying the
intelligimus quod aliquis locus sit existence of a place outside the heaven
extra caelum qui possit dici supra which can be said to be above in relation
respectu caeli, sed quod non est to it, but that there is no place at all
locus eo superior. Utrobique autem above it. In either case, the imagination
imaginatio potest mensuram can add a certain dimension to the
aliquam rei existenti apponere: already existing thing; and just as this is
ratione cuius, sicut non est no reason for attributing infinite quantity
ponenda quantitas corporis infinita, to a body, as is said in Physics III [6], so
ut dicitur in III Phys., ita nec neither does it justify the supposition that
tempus aeternum. time is eternal.
Veritas autem propositionum quam [8] The truth of propositions whose

oportet concedere etiam denial entails their affirmation—and this
propositiones negantem, ex qua was the starting point of the seventh
septima ratio procedebat, habet argument—possesses the necessity of
necessitatem ordinis qui est that order which obtains between
praedicati ad subiectum. Unde non predicate and subject. By such
cogit aliquam rem esse semper: necessity, therefore, a thing is not
nisi forte intellectum divinum, in compelled to exist everlastingly, except
quo est radix omnis veritatis, ut in perhaps the divine intellect, in whom all
primo ostensum est. truth is rooted, as was shown in Book I of
this work.
Patet igitur quod rationes ex [9] It is therefore clear that the
creaturis inductae non cogunt ad arguments adduced from the point of
mundi aeternitatem ponendam. view of creatures do not oblige us to
maintain that the world is eternal.
Caput 37 Chapter 37
Solutio rationum quae SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
sumebantur ex parte factionis TAKEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
rerum THE MAKING OF THINGS
Restat autem ostendere quod [1] Lastly, we must show that no argument

nec ex parte productionis rerum drawn from the standpoint of the making of
aliqua ratio sumpta cogere things can necessitate that same
possit ad idem. conclusion.
Communis enim philosophorum [2.] The common opinion of the

positio ponentium ex nihilo nihil philosophers, on which the first argument
fieri, ex quo prima ratio was based, namely, that from nothing
procedebat, veritatem habet comes nothing, is true as regards that
secundum illud fieri quod ipsi particular making which they had in mind.
considerabant. Quia enim omnis Since our knowledge originates in sense
nostra cognitio a sensu incipit, perception, which is concerned with
qui singularium est, a singular things, the progress of human
particularibus considerationibus thought has been from particular to
ad universales consideratio universal considerations. That is why those
humana profecit. Unde who sought the principle of things
principium rerum perquirentes considered only particular makings of
particulares factiones entium things, inquiring how this particular fire or
tantum consideraverunt, stone comes to be. And so those who
inquirentes qualiter vel hic ignis came first, considering the making of things
vel hic lapis fiat. Et ideo primi, in a more extrinsic fashion than they
magis extrinsece quam oporteret needed to, claimed that a thing is made
fieri rerum considerantes, only as concerns certain accidental
posuerunt rem fieri solum dispositions, such as rarity, density, and the
secundum quasdam like, and consequently they said that to be
accidentales dispositiones, ut made was nothing else than to be altered;
rarum, densum, et huiusmodi, and this they held because it was their
dicentes per consequens fieri understanding that each and every thing
nihil esse nisi alterari, propter was made from a being actually existing.
hoc quod ex ente in actu But later thinkers, considering the making
unumquodque fieri intelligebant. of things from a more intrinsic point of view,
Posteriores vero, magis advanced to the problem of the making of
intrinsece, rerum factionem things in terms of their substance; and they
considerantes, ad fieri rerum maintained that from an actually existing
secundum substantiam being a thing need be made only in an
processerunt, ponentes quod accidental respect, but that from a being
non oportet aliquid fieri ex ente potentially existent it is made in essential
in actu nisi per accidens, sed per fashion. But this making, namely, of a being
se ex ente in potentia. Hoc from any being whatever, is that of a
autem fieri, quod est entis ex particular being—one that is made
qualicumque ente, est factio inasmuch as it is this being, a man or a fire,
entis particularis: quod quidem for example, but not inasmuch as it is,
fit inquantum est hoc ens, ut universally, because there was previously
homo vel ignis, non autem existent being that is transformed into this
inquantum est universaliter; ens being. Entering more deeply into the
enim prius erat, quod in hoc ens problem of the origin of things,
transmutatur. Profundius autem philosophers came at last to consider the
ad rerum originem ingredientes, procession of all created being from one
consideraverunt ad ultimum first cause: a truth made evident by
totius entis creati ab una prima arguments previously proposed. Now, in
causa processionem: ut ex this procession of all being from God it is
rationibus hoc ostendentibus impossible for anything to be made from
supra positis patet. In hac autem some other preexisting thing; otherwise,
processione totius entis a Deo this procession would not consist in the
non est possibile fieri aliquid ex making of all created being.
aliquo alio praeiacente: non [3] Now, the first philosophers of nature,
enim esset totius entis creati who shared the commonly received opinion
factio. that nothing is made from nothing, did not
Et hanc quidem factionem non attain to the idea of such a making as this.
attigerunt primi naturales, Or, if any of them conceived of it, they did
quorum erat communis sententia not consider it making properly speaking,
ex nihilo nihil fieri. Vel, si qui since the word making implies motion or
eam attigerunt, non proprie change, whereas in the origination of all
nomen factionis ei competere being from one first being, the
consideraverunt, cum nomen transmutation of one being into another is,
factionis motum vel mutationem as we have shown, inconceivable. And on
importet, in hac autem totius this account it is the business not of the
entis origine ab uno primo ente philosopher of nature to consider that
intelligi non potest transmutatio origination, but of the metaphysician, who
unius entis in aliud, ut ostensum considers universal being and things
est. Propter quod nec ad existing apart from motion. Nevertheless, in
naturalem philosophum pertinet virtue of a certain likeness we transfer the
huiusmodi rerum originem word making even to that origination of
considerare: sed ad things, saying that anything at all whose
philosophum primum, qui essence or nature originates from
considerat ens commune et ea something else is made.
quae sunt separata a motu. Nos
tamen sub quadam similitudine
etiam ad illam originem nomen
factionis transferimus, ut
dicamus ea facta
quorumcumque essentia vel
natura ab aliis originem habet.
Ex quo patet quod nec secunda [4] From this we see that the second

ratio de necessitate concludit, argument, based on the concept of motion,
quae ex ratione motus is also inconclusive. For creation can be
sumebatur. Nam creatio mutatio called a change only in a metaphorical
dici non potest nisi secundum sense, that is, only so far as the created
metaphoram, prout creatum thing is thought of as having being after not
consideratur habere esse post being, even as with things not mutually
non esse: ratione cuius aliquid transformed we say that one comes to be
ex alio fieri dicitur etiam eorum from another simply because one succeeds
quae invicem transmutationem the other; for instance, that day comes from
non habent, ex hoc solo quod night. Now, since that which in no way
unum eorum est post alterum, exists is not in any particular state, the idea
sicut dies ex nocte. Nec ratio of motion used in the argument does not
motus inducta ad hoc aliquid warrant the conclusion that, when a thing
facere potest: nam quod nullo begins to be, it is in another state now than
modo est, non se habet aliquo it was before.
modo; ut possit concludi quod,
quando incipit esse, alio modo
se habeat nunc et prius.
Ex hoc etiam patet quod non [5] Whence it is also clear that, contrary to

oportet aliquam potentiam the third argument, no passive potentiality
passivam praecedere esse need precede the existence of all created
totius entis creati, ut tertia ratio being. Such a necessity obtains in the case
concludebat. Hoc enim est of things that come into being by way of
necessarium in illis quae per motion, for motion is the act of a thing
motum essendi principium existing potentially. But before a created
sumunt: eo quod motus est thing misted, its existence was possible, in
actus existentis in potentia. virtue of the power of its agent, by which
Possibile autem fuit ens creatum also it began to be. Or that thing was
esse, antequam esset, per possible on account of the relationship
potentiam agentis, per quam et between the terms involved, wherein no
esse incoepit. Vel propter incompatibility is found; and this is
habitudinem terminorum, in possibility “according to no potentiality,” as
quibus nulla repugnantia Aristotle states in Metaphysics V [12]. For
invenitur: quod quidem possibile the predicate, act of being, is not
secundum nullam potentiam incompatible with the subject, world or
dicitur, ut patet per philosophum, man, as commensurable is incompatible
in V Metaph. Hoc enim with diameter. It therefore follows that the
praedicatum quod est esse, non existence of the world or of man is not
repugnat huic subiecto quod est impossible, and, consequently, that before
mundus vel homo, sicut they actually existed their existence was
commensurabile repugnat possible, even in the absence of all
diametro: et sic sequitur quod potentiality. On the other hand, things
non sit impossibile esse, et per produced by way of motion must be
consequens quod sit possibile previously possible by virtue of a passive
esse antequam esset, etiam potentiality; and when Aristotle uses this
nulla potentia existente. In his argument in Metaphysics VII [7] it is to
autem quae per motum fiunt, these things that he refers.
oportet prius fuisse possibile per
aliquam passivam potentiam: in
quibus philosophus, in VII
Metaphys., hac utitur ratione.
Patet etiam ex hoc quod nec [6] Moreover, from what has been said it is

quarta ratio ad propositum clear that the fourth argument likewise
concludit. Nam fieri non simul misses the mark. For, in things made by
est cum esse rei in his quae per way of motion, to be made and to be are
motum fiunt, in quorum fieri not simultaneous, because the production
successio invenitur. In his autem of such things involves succession. But in
quae non fiunt per motum, non things that are not made by way of motion,

est prius fieri quam esse. the making does not precede the being.
Sic igitur evidenter apparet quod [7] In the light of all this, then, it is clear that
nihil prohibet ponere mundum nothing stands in the way of one’s holding
non semper fuisse. Quod fides that the world has not always existed—a
Catholica ponit: Gen. 11: in truth which the Catholic faith affirms: “In the
principio creavit Deus caelum et beginning God created heaven and earth”
terram. Et Prov. 812 de Deo (Gen. 1:1); and in the Book of Proverbs
dicitur: antequam quicquam (8:22) it is said of God: “Before He made
faceret a principio et cetera. anything from the beginning,” etc.
Caput 38 Chapter 38
Rationes quibus quidam ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME TRY TO
conantur ostendere mundum SHOW THAT THE WORLD IS NOT
non esse aeternum ETERNAL
Sunt autem quaedam rationes [1] We now note a number of arguments
a quibusdam inductae ad introduced by certain persons with the
probandum mundum non intention of proving that the world did not
semper fuisse, sumptae ex his. always exist.
Deum enim esse omnium [2] It has been demonstrated that God is the

rerum causam est cause of all things. But a cause must
demonstratum. Causam autem precede in duration the things produced by
oportet duratione praecedere its action.
ea quae per actionem causae
fiunt.
Item. Cum totum ens a Deo sit [3] Moreover, since all being is created by

creatum, non potest dici God, it cannot be said to be made from some
factum esse ex aliquo ente, et being. It follows that it is made from nothing
sic relinquitur quod sit factum and, consequently, that it has being after not
ex nihilo. Et per consequens being.
quod habeat esse post non
esse.
Adhuc. Quia infinita non est [4] Also, an infinite number of things cannot
transire. Si autem mundus be traversed. But, if the world had always
semper fuisset, essent iam existed, an infinite number of things would
infinita pertransita: quia quod have now been traversed, for what is past is
praeteritum est, pertransitum passed by; and if the world always existed,
est; sunt autem infiniti dies vel then there are an infinite number of past days
circulationes solis praeteritae, or revolutions of the sun.
si mundus semper fuit.
Praeterea. Sequitur quod [5] Moreover, in that case it follows that an
infinito fiat additio: cum ad dies addition is made to the infinite; to the [infinite
vel circulationes praeteritas number of past days or revolutions every day
quotidie de novo addatur. brings another addition.
Amplius. Sequitur quod in [6] Then, too, it follows that it is possible to
causis efficientibus sit proceed to infinity in the line of efficient
procedere in infinitum, si causes, if the engendering of things has
generatio fuit semper, quod gone on perpetually—and this in turn follows
oportet dicere mundo semper necessarily on the hypothesis that the world
existente: nam filii causa est always existed; the father is the cause of his
pater, et huius alius, et sic in son, and another person the cause of that
infinitum. father, and so on endlessly.
Rursus. Sequetur quod sint [7] Furthermore, if the world always existed, it

infinita: scilicet infinitorum will follow that there exists an infinite number
hominum praeteritorum of things, namely, the immortal souls of an
animae immortales. infinite number of human beings who died in
the past.
Hae autem rationes quia non [8] Now, these arguments, though not devoid

usquequaque de necessitate of probability, lack absolute and necessary
concludunt, licet probabilitatem conclusiveness. Hence it is sufficient to deal
habeant, sufficit tangere with them quite briefly, lest the Catholic faith
solum, ne videatur fides might appear to be founded on ineffectual
Catholica in vanis rationibus reasonings, and not, as it is, on the most
constituta, et non potius in solid teaching of God. It would seem fitting,
solidissima Dei doctrina. Et then, to state how these arguments are
ideo conveniens videtur countered by the partisans of the doctrine of
ponere qualiter obvietur eis per the world’s eternity.
eos qui aeternitatem mundi
posuerunt.
Quod enim primo dicitur, [9] The first statement, that the agent
agens de necessitate necessarily precedes the effect resulting from
praecedere effectum qui per its operation, is true of things which produce
suam operationem fit, verum something by way of motion, because the
est in his quae agunt aliquid effect does mot exist until the motion is
per motum: quia effectus non ended, but the agent must exist even when
est nisi in termino motus; the motion begins. No such necessity
agens autem necesse est esse obtains, however, in the case of things that
etiam cum motus incipit. In his act instantaneously. For instance, when the
autem quae in instanti agunt, sun is at the point of the east, it immediately
hoc non est necesse: sicut illuminates our hemisphere.
simul dum sol est in puncto
orientis, illuminat nostrum
hemisphaerium.
Quod etiam secundo dicitur, [10] The second argument also is ineffectual.

non est efficax. Ei enim quod If the proposition (a) something is made from
est ex aliquo aliquid fieri, something be not admitted, then the
contradictorium quod oportet contradictory of it which must be given is: (b)
dare si hoc non detur, est non something is not made from something, and
ex aliquo fieri: non autem hoc not (c) something is made from nothing,
quod est ex nihilo, nisi sub except in the sense of proposition (b). And
sensu primi; ex quo concludi from this it cannot be concluded that
non potest quod fiat post non something is made after notbeing.
esse.
Quod etiam tertio ponitur, non [11] Nor is the third argument cogent. For,
est cogens. Nam infinitum, etsi although the infinite does not exist actually
non sit simul in actu, potest and all at once, it can exist successively. For,
tamen esse in successione: so considered, any infinite is finite. Therefore,
quia sic quodlibet infinitum being finite, any single one of the preceding
acceptum finitum est. solar revolutions could be completed; but if,
Quaelibet igitur circulatio on the assumption of the world’s eternity, all
praecedentium transiri potuit: of them are thought of as existing
quia finita fuit. In omnibus simultaneously, then there would be no
autem simul, si mundus question of a first one, am, therefore, of a
semper fuisset, non esset passing through them, for, unless there we
accipere primam. Et ita nec two extremes, no transition is possible.
transitum, qui semper exigit
duo extrema.
Quod etiam quarto proponitur, [12] The fourth argument is weak. For there
debile est. Nam nihil prohibet is no reason why an addition should not be
infinito ex ea parte additionem made to the infinite on that side of it which is
fieri qua est finitum. Ex hoc finite. Now, from the supposition of the
autem quod ponitur tempus eternity of time it follows that time is infinite in
aeternum, sequitur quod sit relation to the prior but finite in relation to the
infinitum ex parte ante, sed posterior; for the present is the terminal point
finitum ex parte post: nam of the past.
praesens est terminus
praeteriti.
Quod etiam quinto obiicitur, [13] Nor does the objection to the theory of
non cogit. Quia causas the world’s eternity that is raised in the fifth
agentes in infinitum procedere argument have compelling force. For,
est impossibile, secundum according to the philosophers, it is impossible
philosophos, in causis simul to proceed to infinity in the order of efficient
agentibus: quia oporteret causes which act together at the same time,
effectum dependere ex because in that case the effect would have to
actionibus infinitis simul depend on an infinite number of actions
existentibus. Et huiusmodi sunt simultaneously existing. And such causes
causae per se infinitae: quia are essentially infinite, because their infinity
earum infinitas ad causatum is required for the effect caused by them. On
requiritur. In causis autem non the other hand, in the sphere of non
simul agentibus, hoc non est simultaneously acting causes, it is not,
impossibile, secundum eos qui according to the partisans of the perpetual
ponunt generationem generation theory, impossible to proceed to
perpetuam. Haec autem infinity. And the infinity here is accidental to
infinitas accidit causis: accidit the causes; thus, it is accidental to Socrates’
enim patri Socratis quod sit father that he is another man’s son or not.
alterius filius vel non filius. Non But it is not accidental to the stick, in moving
autem accidit baculo, the stone, that it be moved by the hand; for
inquantum movet lapidem, the stick moves just so far as it is moved.
quod sit motus a manu: movet
enim inquantum est motus.
Quod autem de animabus [14] The objection concerning the souls,
obiicitur difficilius est. Sed however, is more difficult. Yet the argument is
tamen ratio non est multum not very useful, because it supposes many
utilis: quia multa supponit. things. For those who maintained that the
Quidam namque aeternitatem world is eternal also held that human souls
mundi ponentium posuerunt do not survive the body; and it was asserted
etiam humanas animas non that of all souls there remains only the
esse post corpus. Quidam separated intellect—either the agent intellect,
vero quod ex omnibus according to some, or also the possible
animabus non manet nisi intellect, according to others. On the other
intellectus separatus: vel hand, some have supposed a sort of circular
agens, secundum quosdam; movement in souls, saying that, after several
vel etiam possibilis, secundum ages have passed, the same souls return to
alios. Quidam autem bodies. And indeed there are those who do
posuerunt circulationem in not consider it incongruous that, in the realm
animabus, dicentes quod of things devoid of order, actual infinities
eaedem animae post aliqua should be found.
saecula in corpora revertuntur.
Quidam vero pro inconvenienti
non habent quod sint aliqua
infinita actu in his quae
ordinem non habent.
Potest autem efficacius [15] However, a more effective approach

procedi ad hoc ostendendum toward proving the noneternity of the world
ex fine divinae voluntatis, ut can be made from the point of view of the
supra tactum est. Finis enim end of the divine will, as we have previously
divinae voluntatis in rerum indicated. For in the production of things the
productione est eius bonitas end of God’s will is His own goodness as it is
inquantum per causata manifested in His effects. Now, His power
manifestatur. Potissime autem and goodness are made manifest above all
manifestatur divina virtus et by the fact that things other than Himself
bonitas per hoc quod res aliae were not always in existence. For this fact
praeter ipsum non semper shows clearly that these things owe their
fuerunt. Ex hoc enim existence to Him, and also is proof that God
ostenditur manifeste quod res does not act by a necessity of His nature,
aliae praeter ipsum ab ipso and that His power of acting is infinite.
esse habent, quia non semper Respecting the divine goodness, therefore, it
fuerunt. Ostenditur etiam quod was entirely fitting that God should have
non agit per necessitatem given created things a temporal beginning.
naturae; et quod virtus sua est
infinita in agendo. Hoc igitur
convenientissimum fuit divinae
bonitati, ut rebus creatis
principium durationis daret.
Ex his autem quae praedicta [16] The preceding considerations enable us

sunt, vitare possumus diversos to avoid various errors made by the pagan
errores gentilium philosophers: the assertion of the world’s
philosophorum. Quorum eternity; the assertion of the eternity of the
quidam posuerunt mundum world’s matter, out of which at a certain time
aeternum. Quidam materiam the world began to be formed, either by
mundi aeternam, ex qua ex chance, or by some intellect, or even by love
aliquo tempore mundus coepit or by strive. For in all these cases something
generari: vel a casu; vel ab beside God is claimed to be eternal; and this
aliquo intellectu; aut etiam is incompatible with the Catholic faith.
amore aut lite. Ab omnibus
enim his ponitur aliquid praeter
Deum aeternum. Quod fidei
Catholicae repugnat.
Caput 39 Chapter 39
Quod distinctio rerum non est a THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS
casu NOT THE RESULT OF CHANCE
Expeditis autem his quae ad [1] Having settled the problems concerning

rerum productionem pertinent, the production of things, it remains for us to
restat prosequi ea quae sunt deal with those that need to be taken into
consideranda in rerum account as regards the distinction of things.
distinctione. In quibus primo And in this connection what we must do
oportet ostendere quod rerum first is show that the distinction of things is
distinctio non est a casu. not fortuitous.
Casus enim non contingit nisi in [2] For chance occurs only in things which

possibilibus aliter se habere: can be otherwise; we do not say that things
quae enim sunt ex necessitate et that exist necessarily and always are the
semper, non dicimus esse a result of chance. Now, it was shown above
casu. Ostensum est autem that certain things have been created in
supra quasdam res creatas esse whose nature there is no possibility of not
in quarum natura non est being; in this category belong immaterial
possibilitas ad non esse: sicut substances and those in which no
sunt substantiae immateriales, et contrariety is found. It is therefore

absque contrarietate. impossible that their substances be from
Substantias igitur eorum chance. But it is by their substance that
impossibile est esse a casu. they are distinct from one another.
Sunt autem per suam Consequently, their distinction is not the
substantiam ab invicem result of chance.
distinctae. Earum igitur distinctio
non est a casu.
Amplius. Cum casus sit tantum [3] Moreover, chance is found only in things

in possibilibus aliter se habere; that are possibly otherwise; and the source
principium autem huiusmodi of this possibility is matter and not the form,
possibilitatis est materia, non which indeed determines the matter,
autem forma, quae magis reservoir of multiple possibilities, to one. It
determinat possibilitatem follows that those things whose distinction
materiae ad unum; ea quorum from one another is derived from their
distinctio est a forma, non forms are not distinct by chance, although
distinguuntur casu: sed forte ea this is perhaps the case with things whose
quorum distinctio est a materia. distinction stems from matter. Now, the
Specierum autem distinctio est a distinction of species is derived from the
forma: singularium autem form, and the distinction of singulars of the
eiusdem speciei a materia. same species is from matter. Therefore, the
Distinctio igitur rerum secundum distinction of things in terms of species
speciem non potest esse a casu: cannot be the result of chance; but perhaps
sed forte aliquorum individuorum the distinction of certain individuals can be
casus potest esse distinctivus. the result of chance.
Adhuc. Cum materia sit [4] Again, since matter is the principle and

principium et causa rerum cause of fortuitous things, as we have
casualium, ut ostensum est, in shown, in the making of things that are
eorum factione potest esse generated from matter there can be
casus quae ex materia chance. Now, we proved above that the
generantur. Ostensum est autem first production of things into being was not
supra quod prima rerum from matter. Therefore, chance can have
productio in esse non est ex had no place in it. Nevertheless, that
materia. In ea igitur casus locum production necessarily involved the
habere non potest. Oportet distinction of the things produced. For in
autem quod prima rerum the world of creation there are many things
productio cum distinctione fuerit: which are neither generated from one
cum multa inveniantur in rebus another nor from some one common
creatis quae neque ex invicem source, because they are not united in the
generantur, neque ex aliquo uno possession of a common matter. It is
communi, quia non conveniunt in impossible, therefore, that the distinction of
materia. Non est igitur possibile things should be the result of chance.
quod rerum distinctio sit a casu.
Item. Causa per se prior est ea [5] Then, too, a thing that is a cause
quae est per accidens. Si igitur through itself is prior to one that is by
posteriora sint a causa per se accident. If, therefore, posterior things are
determinata, inconveniens est from a cause determinate through itself, it

dicere priora esse a causa per would be incongruous to attribute things
accidens indeterminata. prior in nature to an indeterminate cause by
Distinctio autem rerum praecedit accident. But the distinction of things is
naturaliter motus et operationes naturally prior to their movements and
rerum: determinati enim motus operations, because determinate
et operationes sunt rerum movements and operations belong to
determinatarum et distinctarum. things determinate and distinct. Now, the
Motus autem et operationes movements and operations of things are
rerum sunt a causis per se et from causes that are determinate and are
determinatis: cum inveniantur causes through themselves, since they
aut semper aut in pluribus ex proceed from their causes in the same
suis causis eodem modo manner either always, it is found, or in most
procedere. Ergo et distinctio cases. Consequently, the distinction of
rerum est a causa per se et things is also the result of that kind of
determinata: non a casu, quae cause, and not of chance, which is an
est causa per accidens indeterminate cause by accident.
indeterminata.
Amplius. Cuiuslibet rei [6] And again, the form of any thing
procedentis ab agente per proceeding from an intellectual and
intellectum et voluntatem, forma voluntary agent is intended by that agent.
est ab agente intenta. Ipsa But, as we have already seen, the universe
autem universitas creaturarum of creatures has as its author God, who is a
Deum habet auctorem, qui est voluntary and intellectual agent. Nor can
agens per voluntatem et there be any defect in His power so that He
intellectum, ut ex praemissis might fail in accomplishing His intention;
patet. Nec in virtute sua defectus for, as we proved in Book I of this work, His
aliquis esse potest, ut sic deficiat power is infinite. It therefore follows of
a sua intentione: cum sua virtus necessity that the form of the universe is
sit infinita, ut supra ostensum intended and willed by God, and for that
est. Oportet igitur quod forma reason it is not the result of chance. For it
universi sit a Deo intenta et is things outside the scope of the agent’s
volita. Non est igitur a casu: intention that we say are fortuitous. Now,
casu enim esse dicimus quae the form of the universe consists in the
praeter intentionem agentis sunt. distinction and order of its parts. The
Forma autem universi consistit in distinction of things, therefore, is not the
distinctione et ordine partium result of chance.
eius. Non est igitur distinctio
rerum a casu.
Adhuc. Id quod est bonum et [7] That which is good and best in the
optimum in effectu, est finis effect, furthermore, is the final cause of its
productionis ipsius. Sed bonum production. But the good and the best in
et optimum universi consistit in the universe consists in the mutual order of
ordine partium eius ad invicem, its parts, which is impossible without their
qui sine distinctione esse non distinction from one another; for by this
potest: per hunc enim ordinem order the universe is established in its
universum in sua totalitate wholeness, and in this does its optimum
constituitur, quae est optimum good consist. Therefore, it is this very order
ipsius. Ipse igitur ordo partium of the parts of the universe and of their
universi et distinctio earum est distinction which is the end of the
finis productionis universi. Non production of the universe. It remains that
est igitur distinctio rerum a casu. the distinction of things is not fortuitous.
Hanc autem veritatem sacra [8] Sacred Scripture bears witness to this
Scriptura profitetur: ut patet Gen. truth, as the Book of Genesis (1:1) makes
1, ubi, cum primo dicatur, in clear; for, after the words, “In the beginning
principio creavit Deus caelum et God created heaven and earth” we read:
terram, subiungit, distinxit Deus “God divided the light from the darkness,”
lucem a tenebris, et sic de aliis: etc., so that not only the creation of things,
ut non solum rerum creatio, sed but also their distinction, is shown to be
etiam rerum distinctio a Deo from God, and not the result of chance; and
esse ostendatur, non a casu, as constituting the good and the highest
sed quasi bonum et optimum good of the universe. Hence, it is added:
universi. Unde subditur: vidit “God saw all the things that He had made,
Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et and they were very good” (Gen. 1:34).
erant valde bona.
Per haec autem excluditur opinio [9] Eliminated hereby is the opinion of the

antiquorum naturalium ancient natural philosophers who held that
ponentium causam materialem there was but one cause, a material one,
solum et unam, ex qua omnia from which all things were made by rarity
fiebant raritate et densitate. Hos and density. For these thinkers were
enim necesse est dicere obliged to say that the distinction of things
distinctionem rerum quas in which we observe in the universe resulted
universo videmus, non ex not from the ordering intention of some
alicuius ordinante intentione principle, but from the fortuitous movement
provenisse, sed ex materiae of matter.
fortuito motu. [10] Set aside, likewise, is the opinion of
Similiter etiam excluditur opinio Democritus and Leucippus, who posited an
Democriti et Leucippi ponentium infinite number of material principles,
infinita principia materialia, namely, indivisible bodies of the same
scilicet indivisibilia corpora nature but differing in shape, order, and
eiusdem naturae sed differentia position, whose coming together—which
figuris, ordine et positione, ex was necessarily fortuitous, since they
quorum concursu quem denied the existence of an efficient cause
oportebat esse fortuitum, cum —they attributed to the diversity in things,
causam agentem negarent by reason of the three differentiating
ponebant esse diversitatem in characters of the atoms just mentioned,
rebus, propter tres praedictas namely, figure, order, and position. Thus, it
atomorum differentias, scilicet followed that the distinction of things was
figurae, ordinis et positionis; the result of chance. And in the light of
unde sequebatur distinctionem what has been said this is clearly false.
rerum esse fortuitam. Quod ex
praemissis patet esse falsum.
Caput 40 Chapter 40
Quod materia non est prima THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST
causa distinctionis rerum CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF
THINGS
Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet [1] Moreover, it plainly follows that the
quod rerum distinctio non est distinction of things is not to be attributed
propter materiae diversitatem primarily to diversity of matter.
sicut propter primam causam.
Ex materia enim nihil [2] For it is only by chance that anything
determinatum provenire potest determinate can proceed from matter,
nisi casualiter: eo quod materia because matter is in potentiality to many
ad multa possibilis est; ex quibus things, of which, if but one were to issue
si unum tantum proveniat, hoc ut forth, this could not possibly happen
in paucioribus contingens except in the minority of instances; and
necesse est esse; huiusmodi such a thing it is that comes about by
autem est quod casualiter evenit, chance—and especially is this so in the
et praecipue sublata intentione absence of an agent’s intention. Now, we
agentis. Ostensum est autem have shown that the distinction of things is
quod rerum distinctio non est a not the result of chance. It therefore
casu. Relinquitur igitur quod non follows that the primary reason why things
sit propter materiae diversitatem are distinct from one another does not lie
sicut propter primam causam. in the diversity of their matter.
Adhuc. Ea quae sunt ex [3] Moreover, things that result from the
intentione agentis, non sunt intention of an agent do so not primarily
propter materiam sicut propter on account of matter. For an efficient
primam causam. Causa enim cause is prior in causal operation to
agens prior est in causando quam matter, because it is only so far as it is
materia: quia materia non fit actu moved by such a cause that matter itself
causa nisi secundum quod est becomes causally operative. Hence, if an
mota ab agente. Unde, si aliquis effect follows upon a disposition of matter
effectus consequitur and the intention of an agent, it does not
dispositionem materiae et result from matter as its first cause. And
intentionem agentis, non est ex on this account we observe that things
materia sicut ex causa prima. Et referred to matter as their primary cause
propter hoc videmus quod ea fall outside the intention of the agent
quae reducuntur in materiam sicut concerned—monsters, for instance, and
in causam primam, sunt praeter other failures of nature. The form,
intentionem agentis: sicut monstra however, results from the agent’s
et alia peccata naturae. Forma intention. This is evident from the fact that
autem est ex intentione agentis. the agent produces its like according to its
Quod ex hoc patet: agens enim form, and if it sometimes fails to do so, the
agit sibi simile secundum formam; failure is fortuitous and is due to the
et si aliquando hoc deficiat, hoc matter involved. Hence, forms are not
est a casu propter materiam. consequent upon the disposition of matter
Formae igitur non consequuntur as their first cause; on the contrary, the
dispositionem materiae sicut reason why matters are disposed in such
primam causam: sed magis e and such ways is that there might be
converso materiae sic forms of such and such kinds. Now, it is
disponuntur ut sint tales formae. by their forms that things are
Distinctio autem rerum secundum distinguished into species. Therefore, it is
speciem est per formas. Distinctio not in the diversity of matter that the first
igitur rerum non est propter cause of the distinction of things is to be
materiae diversitatem sicut found.
propter primam causam.
Amplius. Distinctio rerum non [4] Then, too, the distinction of things
potest provenire ex materia nisi in cannot result from matter except in the
illis quae ex materia praeexistente case of things made from preexisting
fiunt. Multa autem sunt ab invicem matter. But there are many things distinct
distincta in rebus quae non from one another that cannot be made
possunt ex praeexistente materia from preexisting matter: the celestial
fieri: sicut patet de corporibus bodies, for example, which have no
caelestibus, quae non habent contrary, as their motion shows. It follows
contrarium, ut eorum motus that the diversity of matter cannot be the
ostendit. Non igitur potest esse first cause of the distinction of things.
prima causa distinctionis rerum
diversitas materiae.
Item. Quaecumque habentia sui [5] Again. There is a cause of the
esse causam distinguuntur, distinction that obtains between all things
habent causam suae distinctionis: whose existence is caused and which,
unumquodque enim secundum therefore, are distinct from one another.
hoc fit ens secundum quod fit For each and every thing is made a being
unum in se indivisum et ab aliis according as it is made one, undivided in
distinctum. Sed si materia sui itself and distinct from others. But, if
diversitate est causa distinctionis matter is by virtue of its diversity the
rerum, oportet ponere materias in cause of the distinction of things, we shall
se esse distinctas. Constat autem then have to maintain that matters are in
quod materia quaelibet habet themselves distinct. It is, however, certain
esse ab alio, per hoc quod supra that every matter owes its existence to
ostensum est omne quod something else, for it was shown above
qualitercumque est, a Deo esse. that every thing which is in any way
Ergo aliud est causa distinctionis whatever owes its being to God. So the
in materiis. Non igitur prima causa cause of distinction in matters is
distinctionis rerum potest esse something other than matter itself.
diversitas materiae. Therefore, the first cause of the distinction
of things cannot be the diversity of matter.
Adhuc. Cum omnis intellectus [6] Furthermore, since every intellect acts

agat propter bonum, non agit for the sake of a good, it does not produce
melius propter vilius, sed e a better thing for the sake of a thing of
converso: et simile est de natura. less worth, but vice versa; and the same
Omnes autem res procedunt a is true of nature. Now, as we see from
Deo per intellectum agente, ut ex what has been said above, all things
supra dictis patet. Sunt igitur a proceed from God acting by His intellect.
Deo viliora propter meliora, et non Inferior things, therefore, proceed from

e converso. Forma autem nobilior God for the sake of better things, and not
est materia: cum sit perfectio et vice versa. Form, however, is nobler than
actus eius. Ergo non producit matter, since it is its perfection and act.
tales formas rerum propter tales Hence, God does not produce such and
materias, sed magis tales such forms of things for the sake of such
materias produxit ut sint tales and such matters; rather, He produced
formae. Non igitur distinctio such and such matters that there might be
specierum in rebus, quae est such and such forms. Therefore, the
secundum formam, est propter distinction of species in things, following
materiam: sed magis materiae as it does upon their form, is not on
sunt creatae diversae ut diversis account of their matter. On the contrary,
formis conveniant. diverse matters were created in order that
they might befit diverse forms.
Per hoc autem excluditur opinio [7] Excluded hereby is the opinion of
Anaxagorae ponentis infinita Anaxagoras, who asserted that there
principia materialia, a principio were an infinite number of material
quidem commixta in uno confuso, principles which in the beginning were
quae postmodum intellectus mixed together in one confused whole,
separando rerum distinctionem but which an intellect later separated, thus
constituit: et quorumcumque establishing the distinction of things from
aliorum ponentium diversa one another. Eliminated, likewise, is the
principia materialia ad opinion of any other thinkers who
distinctionem rerum causandam. postulate various material principles as
the cause of the distinction of things.
Caput 41 Chapter 41
Quod distinctio rerum non est THAT A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS
propter contrarietatem agentium DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR THE
DISTINCTION OF THINGS
Ex praemissis etiam ostendi potest [1] From what has been said it can be

quod causa distinctionis rerum non shown, also, that the cause of the
est diversitas, aut etiam distinction of things is not a diversity or
contrarietas agentium. even a contrariety of agents.
Si enim diversi agentes ex quibus [2] For, if the diverse agents that cause
procedit rerum diversitas, sunt the diversity of things are ordered to one
ordinati ad invicem, oportet quod another, there must be some single
huius ordinis sit aliqua una causa: cause of this order; for many things are
nam multa non uniuntur nisi per not united save by some one thing. And
aliquod unum. Et sic illud ordinans thus the ordering principle of this unity is
est prima causa et una distinctionis the first and sole cause of the distinction
rerum. Si vero diversi agentes non of things. But, if these diverse agents
sint ad invicem ordinati, concursus are not ordered to one another, their
eorum ad diversitatem rerum unified action in producing the diversity
producendam erit per accidens. of things will be accidental. The
Distinctio igitur rerum erit casualis. distinction of things, therefore, will be
Cuius contrarium supra ostensum fortuitous. But we have already proved
est. that the contrary is true.
Item. A diversis causis non [3] Ordered effects, moreover, do not
ordinatis non procedunt effectus proceed from diverse causes devoid of
ordinati, nisi forte per accidens: order, except perhaps accidentally; for
diversa enim, inquantum the diverse, as such, do not produce the
huiusmodi, non faciunt unum. Res one. Now, things mutually distinct are
autem distinctae inveniuntur habere found to have a mutual order, and not
ordinem ad invicem non casualiter: fortuitously, since in the majority of
cum ut in pluribus unum ab alio cases one is served by another. Hence,
iuvetur. Impossibile est igitur quod the distinction of things thus ordered
distinctio rerum sic ordinatarum sit cannot possibly be accounted for by a
propter diversitatem agentium non diversity of agents without order.
ordinatorum.
Amplius. Quaecumque habent [4] And let us add that the first cause of

causam suae distinctionis, non the distinction of things cannot be things
possunt esse prima causa whose distinction from one another itself
distinctionis rerum. Sed si plura is caused. Yet, if we consider several
agentia ex aequo accipiantur, agents of the same order, their
necesse est quod habeant causam distinction from one another must
suae distinctionis: habent enim necessarily have a cause; for their being
causam essendi, cum omnia entia itself is caused, since, as we have
sint ab uno primo ente, ut supra shown, all beings are from one first
ostensum est; idem autem est being. But we have just proved that the
causa essendi alicui et distinctionis cause of a thing’s being, and of its
eius ab aliis, sicut ostensum est. distinction from other things, is the
Non potest igitur esse prima causa same. Diversity of agents, therefore,
distinctionis rerum diversitas cannot possibly be the first cause of the
agentium. distinction among things.
Item. Si diversitas rerum procedat a [5] Furthermore, if the diversity of things
diversitate vel contrarietate results from the diversity or contrariety of
diversorum agentium, maxime hoc diverse agents, this would seem
videtur, quod et plures ponunt, de especially true, as many say, of the
contrarietate boni et mali, ita quod contrariety of good and evil, such that all
omnia bona procedant a bono good things proceed from a good
principio, mala autem a malo: principle and evils from an evil principle
bonum enim et malum sunt in —good and evil being found in every
omnibus generibus. Non potest genus. It is, however, impossible that
autem esse unum primum there should be one first principle of all
principium omnium malorum. Cum evils. For, since things that exist through
enim ea quae sunt per aliud, another are referred to those that exist
reducantur ad ea quae sunt per se, of themselves, the first active cause of
oportebit primum activum malorum evils would necessarily be evil of itself.
esse per se malum. Per se autem Now, we say that a thing is such of itself

dicimus tale quod per essentiam which is such by its essence. Therefore,
suam tale est. Eius igitur essentia the essence of a thing evil of itself will
non erit bona. Hoc autem est not be good. But this is impossible. For
impossibile. Omne enim quod est, every thing that is must necessarily be
inquantum est ens, necesse est good so far as it is being. For every
esse bonum: esse namque suum thing loves its own being and desires its
unumquodque amat et conservari preservation, an indication of which is
appetit; signum autem est, quia the fact that every thing resists its own
contra pugnat unumquodque suae dissolution; and the good is that which
corruptioni; bonum autem est quod all things desire. It is, therefore,
omnia appetunt. Non potest igitur impossible for the distinction among
distinctio in rebus procedere a things to proceed from two contrary
duobus contrariis principiis quorum principles, the one good, the other evil.
unum sit bonum et aliud malum.
Adhuc. Omne agens agit [6] Again, every agent acts so far as it is

inquantum est actu. Inquantum in act; and so far as it is in act, each and
vero est actu, unumquodque every thing is perfect; while every thing
perfectum est. Perfectum vero that is perfect, as such, is said to be
omne, inquantum huiusmodi, good. It follows that every agent, as
bonum dicimus. Omne igitur agens, such, is good. If, then, a thing were evil
inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est. of itself, it could not be an agent. But, if
Si quid igitur per se malum est, non a thing is the first principle of evils, it
poterit esse agens. Si autem est must of necessity be evil of itself, as we
malorum principium primum, have just shown. Therefore, the
oportet esse per se malum, ut distinction in things cannot possibly
ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur proceed from two principles, one good,
distinctionem in rebus procedere a the other evil.
duobus principiis, bono et malo.
Amplius. Si omne ens, inquantum [7] What is more, if every being, as such,

huiusmodi, bonum est, malum is good, then evil, as such, is a non
igitur, inquantum est malum, est being. But there can be no efficient
non ens. Non entis autem, cause of nonbeing as such. For every
inquantum huiusmodi, non est agent acts so far as it is a being in act;
ponere causam agentem: cum and every agent produces its like.
omne agens agat inquantum est Therefore, no cause that is of itself
ens actu: agit autem unumquodque active in character can be assigned to
sibi simile. Mali igitur, inquantum evil as such. Evils cannot, then, be
est huiusmodi, non est ponere referred to one first cause that is of itself
causam per se agentem. Non est the cause of all evils.
igitur fieri reductionem malorum in
unam primam causam quae per se
sit causa omnium malorum.
Adhuc. Quod educitur praeter [8] Consider, too, that anything brought
intentionem agentis, non habet into being outside the scope of the
causam per se, sed incidit per agent’s intention has no essential cause,

accidens: sicut cum quis invenit but happens accidentally, as when a
thesaurum fodiens ad plantandum. person finds a treasure while digging
Sed malum in effectu aliquo non with the object of planting things. But
potest provenire nisi praeter evil in an effect cannot arise except
intentionem agentis: cum omne beside the agent’s intention; every agent
agens ad bonum intendat; bonum intends good, for good is “that which all
enim est quod omnia appetunt. desire.” Evil, therefore, has no essential
Malum igitur non habet causam per cause, but occurs accidentally in the
se, sed per accidens incidit in effects of causes. Hence, there is no
effectibus causarum. Non igitur est question of maintaining the existence of
ponere unum primum principium one first principle of all evils.
omnium malorum.
Praeterea. Contrariorum agentium [9] Bear in mind, also, that contrary
sunt contrariae actiones. Eorum agents have contrary actions, so that
igitur quae per unam actionem contrary principles are not to be
producuntur, non sunt ponenda attributed to things produced by one
principia contraria. Bonum autem et action. Now, good and evil are produced
malum eadem actione producuntur: by the same action; for instance, by one
eadem enim actione aqua and the same action water is corrupted
corrumpitur et aer generatur. Non and air generated. Hence, there is no
sunt igitur, propter differentiam boni reason for postulating contrary principles
et mali in rebus inventam, ponenda in order to explain the difference of good
principia contraria. and evil that we find in things.
Amplius. Quod omnino non est, nec [10] Another argument is this. That

bonum nec malum est. Quod which has no being at all is neither good
autem est, inquantum est, bonum nor evil. And, as we have shown,
est, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur whatever is, so far as it is, is good.
malum esse aliquid inquantum est Hence, a thing must be evil so far as it is
non ens. Hoc autem est ens a nonbeing. But this is a being deprived
privatum. Malum igitur, inquantum of being; so that evil, as such, is a being
huiusmodi, est ens privatum; et deprived of being; indeed, evil is itself
ipsum malum est ipsa privatio. this very privation. Now, privation has no
Privatio autem non habet causam efficient cause that is such through itself.
per se agentem: quia omne agens For every agent acts so far as it has
agit inquantum habet formam; et form; that which is through itself the
sic oportet per se effectum agentis effect of an agent, then, must be
esse habens formam, cum agens something having form, since an agent
agat sibi simile, nisi per accidens. produces its like, except by accident. It
Relinquitur igitur quod malum non remains, therefore, that evil has no
habet causam per se agentem, sed cause efficient through itself, but occurs
incidit per accidens in effectibus by accident in the effects of such
causarum per se agentium. causes.
Non est igitur unum primum et per [11] There is, then, no single primary
se malorum principium: sed primum and essential principle of evils; rather,
omnium principium est unum the first principle of all things is the one
primum bonum, in cuius effectibus first good, in whose effects evil results
consequitur malum per accidens. accidentally.
Hinc est quod Isaiae 45 dicitur: ego [12] Hence, in the Book of Isaiah (45:6
dominus, et non est alter Deus: 7) it is said: “I am the Lord and there is
formans lucem et creans tenebras, none other God: I form the light and
faciens pacem et creans malum. create darkness, I make peace and
Ego dominus faciens omnia haec. create evil: I am the Lord that do all
Et Eccli. 1114: bona et mala, vita these things”; and we read also that
et mors, paupertas et honestas, a “Good things and evil, life and death,
Deo sunt. Et eodem 3315: contra poverty and riches, are from God,” and
malum bonum est. Sic et contra that “Good is set against evil. So also is
virum iustum peccator. Et sic the sinner against a just man. And so
intuere in omnia opera altissimi duo look upon all the works of the Most High.
contra duo, unum contra unum. Two and two, and one against another”
Dicitur autem Deus facere mala, vel (Eccli. 11:14; 33:15).
creare, inquantum creat ea quae [13] Now, God is said to make or create
secundum se bona sunt, et tamen evils, so far as He creates things which
aliis sunt nociva: sicut lupus, in themselves are good, yet are injurious
quamvis in sua specie quoddam to others; the wolf, though in its own
bonum naturae sit, tamen ovi est kind a good of nature, is nevertheless
malus; et similiter ignis aquae, evil to the sheep; so, too, is fire in
inquantum est eius corruptivus. Et relation to water, being dissolutive of the
per similem modum est causa latter. And, likewise, God is the cause of
malorum in hominibus quae those evils among men which are called
poenae dicuntur. Unde dicitur Amos penal. That is why it is said: “Shall there
36: si est malum in civitate quod be evil in a city, which the Lord has not
dominus non fecerit? Et hoc est done?” (Amos 3:6). And in this
quod Gregorius dicit: etiam mala, connection Gregory remarks: “Even
quae nulla sua natura subsistunt, evils, which have no subsistent nature of
creantur a domino: sed creare mala their own, are created by the Lord: but
dicitur cum res in se bonas creatas He is said to create evils when He uses
nobis male agentibus in flagellum created things, which in themselves are
format. good, to punish us for our evil doings.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [14] This cancels the error of those who

ponentium prima principia postulated contrary first principles—an
contraria. Qui error primo incoepit error originated by Empedocles, who
ab Empedocle. Posuit enim duo laid down two primary efficient
prima principia agentia, amicitiam principles, friendship and strife,
et litem, quorum amicitiam dixit declaring the former to be the cause of
esse causam generationis, litem generation, the latter of corruption, so
vero corruptionis: ex quo videtur, ut that, as Aristotle remarks in Metaphysics
Aristoteles dicit, in I Metaphys., hic I [4], it would appear that Empedocles
duo, bonum et malum, primus was the first to posit two contrary
principia contraria posuisse. principles, good and evil.
Posuit autem et Pythagoras duo [15] Pythagoras also postulated two
prima, bonum et malum: sed non primary principles, good and evil, not as
per modum principiorum agentium, efficient principles, however, but as

sed per modum formalium formal ones. For, as Aristotle points out,
principiorum. Ponebat enim haec Pythagoras held that these two are the
duo esse genera sub quibus omnia genera under which all other things are
alia comprehenderentur: ut patet contained.
per philosophum, in I
metaphysicae.
Hos autem antiquissimorum [16] Now, although these errors of the
philosophorum errores, qui etiam earliest philosophers were sufficiently
per posteriores philosophos sunt disposed of by thinkers of later times,
sufficienter exclusi, quidam perversi certain men of perverse mind have
sensus homines doctrinae presumed to link them up with Christian
Christianae adiungere doctrine. The first of these was Marchius
praesumpserunt. Quorum primus —from whom the Marchians are named,
fuit Marchius, a quo Marchiani sunt who under the Christian label founded a
dicti, qui sub nomine Christiano heresy, holding the existence of two
haeresim condidit, opinatus duo opposing principles. Following after him
sibi adversa principia, quem secuti were the Cerdonians, then later the
sunt Cerdoniani; et postmodum Marchianists, and at last came the
Marchianistae; et ultimo Manichaei, Manicheans, who spread this error
qui hunc errorem maxime abroad most of all.
diffuderunt.
Caput 42 Chapter 42
Quod causa prima distinctionis THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE
rerum non est secundorum DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE
agentium ordo WORLD OF SECONDARY AGENTS
Ex eisdem etiam ostendi potest [1] From the same principles it can be
quod rerum distinctio non shown, also, that the distinction of things
causatur ex ordine secundorum is not caused by the order of secondary
agentium: sicut quidam dicere agents. And this contrary to the opinion of
voluerunt quod Deus, cum sit those who supposed that since God is one
unus et simplex, facit tantum and simple He produces but one effect,
unum effectum, quae est which is the first caused substance, and
substantia primo causata; quae, that this effect, since it cannot possibly be
quia simplicitati primae causae on a par with the simplicity of the first
adaequari non potest, cum non cause ( not being pure act, it contains
sit actus purus sed habeat aliquid some admixture of potentiality), possesses
de potentia admixtum, habet a certain multiple character, making it
aliquam multiplicitatem, ut ex ea possible for some kind of plurality to issue
iam pluralitas aliqua possit from it; so that, with the effects perpetually
prodire; et sic semper effectibus a falling short of the simplicity of their
simplicitate causarum causes, the diversity of the things of which
deficientibus, dum multiplicantur the universe consists is being established
effectus, diversitas rerum while the effects are being multiplied.

constituitur, ex quibus universum
consistit.
Haec igitur positio toti rerum [2] This position, then, does not assign
diversitati non unam causam one cause to the entire diversity of things,
assignat, sed singulas causas but different causes to different effects,
determinatis effectibus: totam while maintaining that the total diversity of
autem diversitatem rerum ex things results from the concurrence of all
concursu omnium causarum causes. Now, we say that those things
procedere ponit. Ea autem a happen fortuitously which result from the
casu esse dicimus quae ex concurrence of diverse causes, and not
concursu diversarum causarum from one determinate cause. So, it will
proveniunt et non ex aliqua una follow that the distinction of things and the
causa determinata. Distinctio order of the universe are the products of
igitur rerum et ordo universi erit a chance.
casu.
Amplius. Id quod est optimum in [3] Moreover, that which is best in things
rebus causatis, reducitur ut in caused is referred, as to its first cause, to
primam causam in id quod est that which is best in causes; for effects
optimum in causis: oportet enim must be proportionate to their causes.
effectus proportionales esse Now, among all caused beings what is
causis. Optimum autem in best is the order of the universe, and in
omnibus entibus causatis est this does its good consist; even as in
ordo universi, in quo bonum human affairs “the good of a people is
universi consistit: sicut et in rebus more godlike than the good of one
humanis bonum gentis est individual.” Therefore, the order of the
divinius quam bonum unius. universe must be referred to god as its
Oportet igitur ordinem universi proper cause, whom we have proved
sicut in causam propriam above to be the highest good. Therefore,
reducere in Deum, quem supra the distinction of things, wherein the order
ostendimus esse summum of the universe consists, proceeds not
bonum. Non igitur rerum from secondary causes, but from the
distinctio, in qua ordo consistit intention of the first cause.
universi, causatur ex causis
secundis, sed magis ex
intentione causae primae.
Adhuc. Absurdum videtur id quod [4] Then, too, it seems absurd to assign a
est optimum in rebus reducere defect in things as the cause of what is
sicut in causam in rerum best in them. But, as we have just now
defectum. Optimum autem in shown, the best in things caused is their
rebus causatis est distinctio et distinction and order. So, it would be
ordo ipsarum, ut ostensum est. incongruous to say that this distinction of
Inconveniens igitur est dicere things is the result of secondary causes
quod talis distinctio ex hoc falling short of the simplicity of the first
causetur quod secundae causae cause.
deficiunt a simplicitate causae
primae.
Item. In omnibus causis [5] Moreover, in all ordered efficient
agentibus ordinatis, ubi agitur causes, where action is done for the sake
propter finem, oportet quod fines of an end, the ends of the secondary
causarum secundarum sint causes must be pursued for the sake of
propter finem causae primae: the end of the first cause; the ends of the
sicut finis militaris et equestris et art of war, of horsemanship, and of bridle
frenifactricis est propter finem making, for example, are ordained to the
civilis. Processus autem entium a end of the political art. Now, the issuance
primo ente est per actionem of beings from the first being is brought
ordinatam ad finem: cum sit per about by an action ordained to an end,
intellectum, ut ostensum est; since, as we have shown, it is
intellectus autem omnis propter accomplished by the causality of an
finem agit. Si igitur in productione intellect; and every intellect acts for an
rerum sunt aliquae causae end. So, if there are secondary causes at
secundae, oportet quod fines work in the production of things, the ends
earum et actiones sint propter and actions of those causes are
finem causae primae, qui est necessarily directed to the end of the first
ultimus finis in rebus causatis. cause, which is the last end in things
Hoc autem est distinctio et ordo caused. Now, this is the distinction and
partium universi, qui est quasi order of the parts of the universe, which,
ultima forma. Non igitur est as it were, constitute its ultimate form.
distinctio in rebus et ordo propter Therefore, it is not on account of the
actiones secundarum causarum: actions of secondary agents that the
sed magis actiones secundarum distinction of things and their order exist;
causarum sunt propter ordinem on the contrary, the actions of secondary
et distinctionem in rebus causes are for the sake of the order and
constituendam. distinction to be established in things.
Adhuc. Si distinctio partium [6] If the distinction of the parts of the
universi et ordo earum est universe and their order, furthermore, is
proprius effectus causae primae, the proper effect of the first cause, being
quasi ultima forma et optimum in the ultimate form and greatest good in the
universo, oportet rerum universe, then the distinction and order of
distinctionem et ordinem esse in things must needs be in the intellect of the
intellectu causae primae: in rebus first cause; for in things brought into being
enim quae per intellectum through the causality of an intellect, the
aguntur, forma quae in rebus form engendered in the things made
factis producitur, provenit a forma proceeds from a like form in that intellect;
simili quae est in intellectu; sicut the house existing in matter proceeds from
domus quae est in materia, a the house existing in an intellect. But the
domo quae est in intellectu. form of distinction and order cannot exist
Forma autem distinctionis et in an agent intellect unless the forms of
ordinis non potest esse in the distinct and ordered things are present
intellectu agente nisi sint ibi there. Present in God’s intellect, therefore,
formae distinctorum et are the forms of diverse things mutually
ordinatorum. Sunt igitur in distinct and ordered. Nor, as we have
intellectu divino formae shown above, is this multiplicity
diversarum rerum distinctarum et incompatible with God’s simplicity. Hence,

ordinatarum: nec hoc simplicitati if things outside the mind proceed from
ipsius repugnat, ut supra forms that are in it, it will be possible, in
ostensum est. Si igitur ex formis the case of things brought about by
quae sunt in intellectu proveniant intellectual causation, for many and
res extra animam, in his quae per diverse things to be produced immediately
intellectum aguntur, poterunt a by the first cause without detriment to the
prima causa immediate causari divine simplicity, on whose account some
plura et diversa, non obstante fell into the position referred to above.
divina simplicitate, propter quam
quidam in praedictam positionem
inciderunt.
Item. Actio agentis per [7] Also, the action of an intellectual agent

intellectum terminatur ad formam terminates in the form which the agent
quam intelligit, non ad aliam, nisi apprehends, and in no other, except
per accidens et a casu. Deus accidentally and by chance. But, as we
autem est agens per intellectum, have shown, God is such an agent. Nor
ut ostensum est: nec potest eius can His action be of a fortuitous character,
actio esse casualis, cum non since He cannot fail in its performance. It
possit in sua actione deficere. therefore necessarily follows that He
Oportet igitur quod producat produces His effect by the very fact that
effectum suum ex hoc quod He knows it and intends it. But through the
ipsum effectum intelligit et same idea whereby He apprehends one
intendit. Sed per quam rationem effect, He can grasp many effects other
intelligit unum effectum, potest et than Himself. Accordingly, without any
multos effectus alios a se intermediary He can cause many things all
intelligere. Potest igitur statim at once.
multa causare absque medio.
Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum [8] Moreover, as we have previously
est, virtus divina non limitatur ad shown, the power of God is not limited to
unum effectum: et hoc eius the production of one effect; and this
simplicitati convenit; quia quanto accords with His simplicity, because, the
aliqua virtus est magis unita, more unified a power is, the more
tanto est magis infinita, ad plura unlimited is its scope since it is able to
se potens extendere. Quod extend itself to so many more things. But,
autem ex uno non fiat nisi unum, except in the case of the agent’s being
non oportet nisi quando agens ad determined to one effect, there is no
unum effectum determinatur. Non necessary reason why only one thing
oportet igitur dicere quod, quia should be made by one cause. Therefore,
Deus est unus et omnino it is not necessary to say that, because
simplex, ex ipso multitudo God is one and absolutely simple, no
provenire non possit nisi multiplicity can proceed from Him unless it
mediantibus aliquibus ab eius be through the mediation of certain things
simplicitate deficientibus. lacking in the simplicity proper to Himself.
Praeterea. Ostensum est supra [9] Then, too, it was shown above that
quod solus Deus potest creare. God alone can create. Now, there are
Multa autem sunt rerum quae numerous things that can come into being
non possunt procedere in esse only by creation, such as all those which
nisi per creationem: sicut omnia are not composed of form and matter
quae non sunt composita ex subject to contrariety; for things of this
forma et materia contrarietati kind are necessarily incapable of being
subiecta; huiusmodi enim generated, since it is from a contrary and
ingenerabilia oportet esse, cum from matter that every process of
omnis generatio sit ex contrario generation takes place. Now, in this
et ex materia. Talia autem sunt category belong all intellectual
omnes intellectuales substantiae, substances, and all heavenly bodies, and
et omnia corpora caelestia, et even prime matter itself. It must therefore
etiam ipsa materia prima. Oportet be maintained that all such things
igitur ponere omnia huiusmodi originated immediately from God.
immediate a Deo sumpsisse sui
esse principium.
Hinc est quod dicitur Gen. 11: in [10] Hence it is said: “In the beginning God
principio creavit Deus caelum et created heaven and earth” (Gen. 1:1);
terram; Iob 3718: tu forsitan and, in the Book of Job (37:18): “Can you,
fabricatus es caelos, qui like Him, spread out the skies, hard as a
solidissimi quasi aere fundati molten mirror?”
sunt?
Excluditur autem ex praedictis [11] Excluded by the preceding

opinio Avicennae, qui dicit quod considerations is the opinion of Avicenna,”
Deus, intelligens se, produxit who says that God, by knowing Himself,
unam intelligentiam primam, in produced one first intelligence, wherein
qua iam est potentia et actus; there already exist potentiality and act;
quae, inquantum intelligit Deum, that this intelligence, by knowing God,
producit intelligentiam secundam; produces the second intelligence; by
inquantum vero intelligit se knowing itself as it is in act, produces the
secundum quod est in actu, soul of the sphere; and by knowing itself
producit animam orbis; as being in potentiality, produces the
inquantum vero intelligit se substance of the first sphere. And thus,
secundum quod est in potentia, proceeding from this point, he teaches that
producit substantiam orbis primi. the diversity of things is the effect of
Et sic inde procedens secondary causes.
diversitatem rerum causari
instituit per causas secundas.
Excluditur etiam opinio [12] Excluded, also, is the opinion of

quorundam antiquorum certain heretics of early times who said
haereticorum, qui dicebant Deum that the angels, and not God, created the
non creasse mundum, sed world. It is said that Simon Magus was the
Angelos. Cuius erroris dicitur originator of this error.
primo Simon magus fuisse
inventor.
Caput 43 Chapter 43
Quod rerum distinctio non est per THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS
aliquem de secundis agentibus NOT CAUSED BY SOME SECONDARY
inducentem in materiam diversas AGENT INTRODUCING DIVERSE
formas FORMS INTO MATTER
Sunt autem quidam moderni [1] Certain modern heretics say that God
haeretici qui dicunt Deum created the matter of all visible things, but
omnium visibilium creasse that an angel diversified it by various
materiam, sed per aliquem forms. This opinion is clearly false.
Angelum diversis formis fuisse
distinctam. Cuius opinionis
falsitas manifeste apparet.
Non enim caelestia corpora, in [2] For the heavenly bodies, in which no
quibus nulla contrarietas contrariety is found, cannot have been
invenitur, ex aliqua materia formed from any matter, because
possunt esse formata: omne whatever is made from preexisting matter
enim quod fit ex materia must be made from a contrary. Therefore,
praeexistenti, oportet ex contrario no angel could possibly have formed the
fieri. Impossibile est igitur quod heavenly bodies from matter antecedently
ex aliqua materia prius a Deo created by God.
creata Angelus aliquis caelestia
corpora formaverit.
Amplius. Caelestia corpora aut in [3] The heavenly bodies, moreover, either

nulla materia conveniunt cum have no matter in common with the lower
corporibus inferioribus, aut non bodies, or they have only prime matter in
conveniunt in aliqua materia nisi common with them; for the heaven neither
prima: non enim caelum est ex is composed of elements nor is of an
elementis compositum, nec elemental nature—a fact shown by its
naturae elementaris; quod eius motion, which is of another kind than that
motus ostendit, a motibus of all the elements. And prime matter
omnium elementorum diversus. could not have existed by itself prior to all
Materia autem prima non potest formed bodies, since its being is purely
praefuisse per seipsam ante potential, whereas everything actually
omnia corpora formata: cum non existent is from some form. There is, then,
sit nisi potentia tantum; omne no possibility of an angel’s having formed
enim esse in actu est ab aliqua all visible bodies from matter antecedently
forma. Impossibile est igitur quod created by God.
ex materia prius a Deo creata
aliquis Angelus omnia visibilia
corpora formaverit.
Adhuc. Omne quod fit, ad hoc fit [4] Again, everything made is made in
quod sit: est enim fieri via in order that it may be, for making is the way

esse. Sic igitur unicuique causato to being. It befits every caused thing to be
convenit fieri sicut sibi convenit made, even as it befits it to be. The act of
esse. Esse autem non convenit being, however, does not belong to the
formae tantum nec materiae form only, nor to the matter only, but to the
tantum, sed composito: materia composite. For matter exists only in
enim non est nisi in potentia; potency, while form is that by which
forma vero est qua aliquid est, something is, since it is act. It remains,
est enim actus. Unde restat quod therefore, that it is the composite which,
compositum proprie sit. Eius properly speaking, is. Hence, it belongs to
igitur solius est fieri, non materiae the composite alone to be made, and not
praeter formam. Non est igitur to matter without form. So, there is not one
aliud agens creans materiam agent that creates the matter alone and
solam, et aliud inducens formam. another that introduces the form.
Item. Prima inductio formarum in [5] And again, the first induction of forms
materia non potest esse ab into matter cannot have originated from an
aliquo agente per motum tantum: agent acting by means of movement only.
omnis enim motus ad formam est All motion directed to a form is from a
ex forma determinata in formam determinate form toward a determinate
determinatam; quia materia non form, for matter cannot exist in the
potest esse absque omni forma, absence of all form; the existence of some
et sic praesupponitur aliqua form in matter is presupposed. But every
forma in materia. Sed omne agent whose action is directed only toward
agens ad formam solam material forms is necessarily an agent that
materialem oportet quod sit acts by means of motion. For, since
agens per motum: cum enim material forms are not selfsubsistent, and
formae materiales non sint per se since, in their case, to be is to be in
subsistentes, sed earum esse sit matter, there are but two possible ways in
inesse materiae, non possunt which they can be brought into being:
produci in esse nisi vel per either by the creation of the whole
creationem totius compositi, vel composite, or by the transmutation of
per transmutationem materiae ad matter to this or that form. The first
talem vel talem formam. induction of forms into matter, therefore,
Impossibile est igitur quod prima cannot possibly be from an agent that
inductio formarum in materia sit creates the form alone; rather, this is the
ab aliquo creante formam tantum: work of Him who is the Creator of the
sed ab eo qui est creator totius whole composite.
compositi.
Adhuc. Motus ad formam est [6] Then, too, motion in respect of form is

posterior naturaliter motu naturally posterior to local motion, since
secundum locum: cum sit actus the former is the act of that which is more
magis imperfecti, ut probat imperfect, as Aristotle proves [Physics,
philosophus. Posteriora autem in VIII, 7]. Now, in the natural order, things
entibus naturali ordine causantur posterior are caused by things prior.
a prioribus. Motus igitur ad Therefore, motion with respect to form is
formam causatur a motu caused by local motion. The first local
secundum locum. Primus autem motion, however, is that of the heaven.
motus secundum locum est Hence, all motion toward form is brought
motus caelestis. Omnis igitur about through the mediation of the
motus ad formam fit mediante heavenly motion. Consequently, things
motu caelesti. Ea igitur quae non that cannot be produced in that way
possunt fieri mediante motu cannot be made by an agent capable of
caelesti, non possunt fieri ab acting only by means of movement; and,
aliquo agente qui non potest as we have just shown, the agent that can
agere nisi per motum: qualem act only by inducing form into matter must
oportet esse agentem qui non be that kind of agent. There are, however,
potest agere nisi inducere many sensible forms which cannot be
formam in materia, ut ostensum produced by the motion of the heaven
est. Per motum autem caelestem except through the intermediate agency of
non possunt produci multae certain determinate principles pre
formae sensibiles nisi supposed to their production; certain
mediantibus determinatis animals, for example, are generated only
principiis suppositis: sicut from seed. Therefore, the primary
animalia quaedam non fiunt nisi establishment of these forms, for
ex semine. Prima igitur institutio producing which the motion of the heaven
harum formarum, ad quarum does not suffice without their preexistence
productionem non sufficit motus in the species, must of necessity proceed
caelestis sine praeexistentia from the Creator alone.
similium formarum in specie,
oportet quod sit a solo creante.
Item. Sicut idem est motus localis [7] Furthermore, just as the local motion of
partis et totius, ut totius terrae et part and whole is the same—the motion of
unius glebae, ita mutatio the whole earth and of one piece of it, for
generationis est eadem totius et example—so the change in which
partis. Partes autem horum generation consists is the same in the part
generabilium et corruptibilium and in the whole. Now, the parts of
generantur acquirentes formas in generable and corruptible things are
actu a formis quae sunt in generated by acquiring actual forms from
materia, non autem a formis extra forms present in matter, and not from
materiam existentibus, cum forms existing outside matter, since the
oporteat generans esse simile generator must be like the generated, as
generato: ut probat philosophus Aristotle proves in Metaphysics VII [8].
in VII metaphysicae. Neque igitur Neither, then, is it possible that the total
totalis acquisitio formarum in acquisition of forms by matter should be
materia potest fieri per motum ab brought about through motion proceeding
aliqua substantia separata, from some separate substance such as an
cuiusmodi est Angelus: sed vel angel; rather, this must be effected either
oportet quod hoc fiat mediante by the intermediation of a corporeal agent,
agente corporeo; vel a creante, or by the Creator, who acts without
qui agit sine motu. motion.
Adhuc. Sicut esse est primum in [8] Also, just as the act of being is first
effectibus, ita respondet primae among effects, so, correspondingly, is it
causae ut proprius effectus. Esse the proper effect of the first cause. But it is
autem est per formam, et non per by virtue of form and not of matter that this
materiam. Prima igitur causalitas act exists. Therefore, the first causation of

formarum maxime est primae forms is to be attributed above all to the
causae attribuenda. first cause.
Amplius. Cum omne agens agat [9] Furthermore, since every agent
sibi simile, ab illo acquirit effectus produces its like, the effect obtains its form
formam cui per formam from that reality to which it is made like
acquisitam similatur: sicut domus through the form acquired by it; the
in materia ab arte, quae est material house acquires its form from the
species domus in anima. Sed art which is the likeness of the house
omnia similantur Deo qui est present in the mind. But all things are like
actus purus, inquantum habent God, who is pure act, so far as they have
formas, per quas fiunt in actu: et forms, through which they become actual;
inquantum formas appetunt, and so far as they desire forms, they are
divinam similitudinem appetere said to desire the divine likeness. It is
dicuntur. Absurdum est igitur therefore absurd to say that the formation
dicere quod rerum formatio ad of things is the work of anything other than
alium pertineat quam ad God the Creator of all.
creatorem omnium Deum.
Et inde est quod, ad [10] So it is that in order to cast out this
excludendum istum errorem, error, Moses, after saying that God “in the
Gen. 1, Moyses, postquam beginning created heaven and earth”
dixerat Deum in principio caelum (Gen. 1:1), went on to explain how God
et terram creasse, subdidit distinguished all things by forming them in
quomodo omnia in proprias their proper species. And St. Paul says
species formando distinxerit. Et that “in Christ were all things created in
apostolus dicit, Coloss. 116, heaven and on earth, visible and invisible”
quod in Christo condita sunt (Col. 1:16).
universa: sive quae in caelis sunt
sive quae in terris, sive visibilia
sive invisibilia.
Caput 44 Chapter 44
Quod distinctio rerum non processit THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS
ex meritorum vel demeritorum DOES NOT HAVE ITS SOURCE IN
diversitate THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR
DEMERITS
Nunc superest ostendere quod [1] We now have to show that the
rerum distinctio non processit ex distinction among things did not result
diversis motibus liberi arbitrii from diverse movements of free choice
rationalium creaturarum: ut posuit in rational creatures, as Origen
Origenes, in libro periarchon. Volens maintained in his Peri Archon. For he
enim resistere antiquorum wished to oppose the objections and
haereticorum obiectionibus et errors of the early heretics who
erroribus, qui ostendere nitebantur endeavored to prove that the

diversam naturam boni et mali esse heterogeneous character of good and
in rebus ex contrariis actoribus, evil in things has its origin in contrary
propter multam distantiam inventam agents. Now, there are, as Origen saw,
tam in rebus naturalibus quam in great differences in natural as well as
rebus humanis, quam nulla merita human things which seemingly are not
praecessisse videntur, scilicet quod preceded by any merits; some bodies
quaedam corpora sunt lucida, are luminous, some dark, some men
quaedam obscura, quidam homines are born of pagans, others of
ex barbaris, quidam ex Christianis Christians, etc. And having observed
nascuntur; coactus est ponere this fact, Origen was impelled to assert
omnem diversitatem in rebus that all diversity found in things
inventam ex diversitate meritorum, resulted from a diversity of merits, in
secundum Dei iustitiam, processisse. accordance with the justice of God. For
Dicit enim quod Deus ex sola sua he says that God, of His goodness
bonitate primo omnes creaturas alone, first made all creatures equal,
aequales produxit, et omnes and all of them spiritual and rational;
spirituales et rationales; quae per and these by their free choice were
liberum arbitrium diversimode sunt moved in various ways, some adhering
motae, quaedam adhaerentes Deo to God more, and some less, some
plus vel minus, quaedam ab eo withdrawing from Him more, and some
recedentes vel magis vel minus; et less; and as a result of this, diverse
secundum hoc diversi gradus in grades in spiritual substances were
substantiis spiritualibus ex divina established by the divine justice, so
iustitia sunt subsecuti, ut quidam that some were angels of diverse
essent Angeli secundum diversos orders, some human souls in various
ordines, quidam animae humanae conditions, some demons in their
etiam secundum diversos status, differing states. And because of the
quidam etiam Daemones in statibus diversity among rational creatures,
diversis; et propter diversitatem Origen stated that Cod had instituted
rationalium creaturarum dicebat diversity in the realm of corporeal
diversitatem corporalium creaturarum creatures so that the higher spiritual
Deum instituisse, ut nobilioribus substances were united to the higher
corporibus nobiliores spirituales bodies, and thus the bodily creature
substantiae adiungerentur, ut would subserve, in whatever other
diversimode corporalis creatura various ways, the diversity of spiritual
spiritualium substantiarum diversitati substances.
quibuslibet modis aliis deserviret.
Haec autem opinio falsa esse [2] This opinion, however, is

manifeste convincitur. Quanto enim demonstrably false. For in the order of
aliquid est melius in effectibus, tanto effects, the better a thing is, so much
est prius in intentione agentis. the more is it prior in the intention of
Optimum autem in rebus creatis est the agent. But the greatest good in
perfectio universi, quae consistit in things created is the perfection of the
ordine distinctarum rerum: in universe, consisting in the order of
omnibus enim perfectio totius distinct things; for always the
praeminet perfectioni singularium perfection of the whole has
partium. Igitur diversitas rerum ex precedence of the perfection of the
principali intentione primi agentis individual parts. Therefore, the
provenit, non ex diversitate diversity of things results from the
meritorum. original intention of the first agent, not
from a diversity of merits.
Adhuc. Si omnes creaturae [3] Then, too, if all rational creatures
rationales a principio fuerunt were created equal from the beginning,
aequales creatae, oportet dicere it must be said that one of them would
quod una earum in sua operatione not depend, in its action, upon another.
ab alia non dependeret. Quod autem But that which results from the
provenit ex concursu diversarum concurrence of diverse causes, one of
causarum quarum una ab alia non which does not depend on another, is
dependet, est casuale. Igitur, fortuitous. In accordance with the
secundum praedictam positionem, opinion just cited, therefore, this
talis distinctio et ordo rerum est distinction and order of things is
casualis. Quod est impossibile, ut fortuitous. Yet this, as we have proved
supra ostensum est. above, is impossible.
Amplius. Quod est alicui naturale, [4] Moreover, what is natural to a
non acquiritur ab eo per voluntatem: person is not acquired by him through
motus enim voluntatis, sive liberi the exercise of his will; for the
arbitrii, praesupponit existentiam movement of the will, or of free choice,
volentis, ad quam eius naturalia presupposes the existence of the
exiguntur. Si igitur per motum liberi willer, and his existence presupposes
arbitrii acquisitus est diversus gradus the things proper to his nature. If the
rationalium creaturarum, nulli diverse grades of rational creatures
creaturae rationali erit suus gradus result from a movement of free choice,
naturalis, sed accidentalis. Hoc then the grade of none of them will be
autem est impossibile. Cum enim natural, but every grade will be
differentia specifica sit unicuique accidental. Now, this is impossible.
naturalis, sequetur quod omnes For, since the specific difference is
substantiae rationales creatae sint natural to each thing, it would follow,
unius speciei, scilicet Angeli, on that theory, that all created rational
Daemones, et animae humanae, et substances—angels, demons, human
animae caelestium corporum (quae souls, the souls of the heavenly bodies
Origenes animata ponebat). Et hoc (Origen attributed animation to these
esse falsum diversitas actionum bodies)—are of one species. The
naturalium declarat: non enim est diversity of natural actions proves the
idem modus quo naturaliter intelligit falsity of this position. For the natural
intellectus humanus, qui sensu et mode of understanding proper to the
phantasia indiget, et intellectus human intellect is not the same as that
angelicus et anima solis; nisi forte which sense and imagination, the
fingamus Angelos et caelestia angelic intellect, and the soul of the
corpora habere carnes et ossa et sun, require—unless, perhaps, we
alias huiusmodi partes, ad hoc quod picture the angels and heavenly bodies
possint organa sensuum habere, with flesh and bones and like parts, so
quod est absurdum. Relinquitur igitur that they may be endowed with organs
quod diversitas substantiarum of sense; which is absurd. It therefore
intellectualium non consequitur remains that the diversity of intellectual
diversitatem meritorum, quae sunt substances is not the consequence of
secundum motus liberi arbitrii. a diversity of merits, resulting from
movements of free choice.
Adhuc. Si ea quae sunt naturalia non [5] Again, if natural things are not

acquiruntur per motum liberi arbitrii; acquired by a movement of free
animam autem rationalem tali corpori choice, whereas a rational soul owes
uniri acquiritur ei propter praecedens its union with a certain body to
meritum vel demeritum secundum preceding merit or demerit in keeping
motum liberi arbitrii: sequetur quod with the movement of free choice, then
coniunctio huius animae ad hoc it would follow that the union of this
corpus non sit naturalis. Ergo nec soul with this body is not natural.
compositum est naturale. Homo Neither, then, is the resulting
autem, et sol, secundum Origenem, composite natural. Nevertheless,
et astra, sunt composita ex according to Origen, man and the sun
substantiis rationalibus et corporibus and the stars are composed of rational
talibus. Ergo omnia huiusmodi, quae substances and such and such bodies.
sunt nobilissima inter corporeas Therefore, all these things—which are
substantias, sunt innaturalia. the noblest among corporeal
substances— are unnatural.
Item. Si huic substantiae rationali [6] Moreover, if the union of a particular

non convenit inquantum est talis rational substance with a particular
substantia huic corpori uniri, sed body befits that substance, not so far
magis inquantum est sic merita, huic as it is such a substance, but so far as
corpori uniri non est ei per se, sed it has merited that union, then it is not
per accidens. Ex his autem quae per united to that body through itself, but
accidens uniuntur non resultat aliqua by accident. Now, no species results
species, quia non fit ex eis unum per from the accidental union of things; for
se: non enim est aliqua species from such a union there does not arise
homo albus vel homo vestitus. a thing one through itself; thus, white
Relinquitur igitur quod homo non sit man is not a species, nor is clothed
aliqua species: nec sol, nec luna, man. From the hypothesis in question,
nec aliquid huiusmodi. therefore, it would follow that man is
not a species, nor is the sun a species,
nor the moon, nor anything of the kind.
Amplius. Ea quae ad merita [7] Again, things resulting from merit
consequuntur, possunt in melius vel may be changed for better or for
in peius mutari: merita enim et worse; for merits and demerits may
demerita possunt augeri vel minui; et increase and diminish—a point
praecipue secundum Origenem, qui particularly stressed by Origen, who
dicebat liberum arbitrium cuiuslibet said that the free choice of every
creaturae semper esse in utramque creature can always be turned to either
partem flexibile. Si igitur anima side. Hence, if a rational soul has
rationalis hoc corpus consecuta est obtained this body on account of
propter praecedens meritum vel preceding merit or demerit, then it is
demeritum, sequetur quod possit possible for it to be united again to
iterum coniungi alteri corpori: et non another body; and it will follow not only
solum quod anima humana assumat that the human soul may take to itself
aliud corpus humanum, sed etiam another human body, but also that it
quod assumat quandoque corpus may sometimes assume a sidereal
sidereum; quod est secundum body—a notion “in keeping with the
Pythagoricas fabulas, quamlibet Pythagorean fables according to which
animam quodlibet corpus ingredi. any soul could enter any body.”
Hoc autem et secundum Obviously, this idea is both erroneous
philosophiam apparet esse as regards philosophy, according to
erroneum, secundum quam which determinate matters and
determinatis formis et motoribus determinate movable things are
assignantur determinatae materiae assigned to determinate forms and
et determinata mobilia: et secundum determinate movers, and heretical
fidem haereticum, quae animam in according to faith, which declares that
resurrectione idem corpus resumere in the resurrection the soul resumes
praedicat quod deponit. the same body that it has left.
Praeterea. Cum multitudo sine [8] Also, since multitude without

diversitate esse non possit, si fuerunt diversity cannot exist, if from the
a principio creaturae rationales in beginning any multitude at all of
quadam multitudine constitutae, rational creatures existed, then there
oportuit eis aliquam diversitatem must have been some diversity among
fuisse. Aliquid ergo habuit una earum them. And this means that one of
quod non habuit altera. Et sic hoc ex those creatures had something which
diversitate meriti non procedat, pari another had not. And if this was not the
ratione nec fuit necesse ut gradus consequence of a diversity in merit, for
diversitas ex meritorum diversitate the same reason neither was it
proveniret. necessary that the diversity of grades
should result from a diversity of merits.
Item. Omnis distinctio est aut [9] Every distinction, furthermore, is

secundum divisionem quantitatis, either in terms of a division of quantity,
quae in solis corporibus est, unde in which exists only in bodies—so that,
substantiis primo creatis, secundum according to Origen, such distinctness
Origenem, esse non potuit: aut could not exist in the substances first
secundum divisionem formalem. created; or in terms of formal division.
Quae sine graduum diversitate esse But without a diversity of grades there
non potest: cum talis divisio can be no formal division, since
reducatur ad privationem et formam; division of this kind is reduced to
et sic oportet quod altera formarum privation and form. Necessarily, then,
condivisarum sit melior et altera one of the reciprocally divided forms is
vilior. Unde, secundum philosophum, better and the other less good. Hence,
species rerum sunt sicut numeri, as Aristotle remarks, the species of
quorum unus alteri addit aut minuit. things are like numbers, one number
Sic igitur, si fuerunt a principio multae being in addition to or in subtraction
substantiae rationales creatae, from the other. Therefore, if there were
oportet quod fuerit in eis gradus many rational substances created from
diversitas. the beginning, there must have been a
diversity of grades among them.
Item. Si creaturae rationales sine [10] Then, too, if rational creatures can

corporibus subsistere possunt, non subsist without bodies, there was no

fuit necessarium propter diversa need to have introduced distinctness in
merita rationalium creaturarum the realm of corporeal nature on
diversitatem in natura corporali account of the different merits of
institui: quia et sine diversitate rational creatures; because, even in
corporum poterat diversus gradus in the absence of a diversity of bodies,
substantiis rationalibus inveniri. Si diverse grades in rational substances
autem creaturae rationales sine could be found. If, however, rational
corporibus subsistere non possunt, creatures cannot subsist without
ergo a principio simul cum creatura bodies, then the corporeal creature
rationali est etiam creatura corporalis also was produced from the beginning
instituta. Maior est autem distantia simultaneously with the rational
corporalis creaturae ad spiritualem creature. Now, the corporeal creature
quam spiritualium creaturarum ad is more remote from the spiritual than
invicem. Si igitur a principio Deus spiritual creatures are from one
tam magnam distantiam in suis another. So, if God from the beginning
creaturis instituit absque aliquibus established such a great distance
meritis praecedentibus, non oportuit among His creatures without any
merita diversa praecedere ad hoc antecedent merits, it was unnecessary
quod in diversis gradibus creaturae for a diversity of merits to have been
rationales instituerentur. acquired previously in order that
rational creatures might be constituted
in diverse grades.
Adhuc. Si diversitas creaturae [11] Again, if, corresponding to the
corporalis respondet diversitati multiformity of rational creatures there
creaturae rationalis, pari ratione et is multiformity in corporeal creatures,
uniformitati rationalium creaturarum then, for the same reason,
responderet uniformitas naturae corresponding to the uniformity of
corporalis. Fuisset ergo natura rational creatures, there would be
corporalis creata etiam si diversa uniformity in the corporeal nature.
merita rationalis creaturae non Consequently the corporeal nature
praecessissent, sed uniformis. would have been created, even if
Fuisset igitur creata materia prima, multifarious merits of rational creatures
quae est omnibus corporibus had not preceded, but a corporeal
communis, sed sub una tantum nature uniform in character. Hence,
forma. Sunt autem in ipsa plures prime matter would have been created
formae in potentia. Remansisset —a principle common to all bodies—
igitur imperfecta, sola una eius forma but it would have been created under
reducta in actum. Quod non est one form only. But prime matter
conveniens divinae bonitati. contains potentially a multiplicity of
forms. On the hypothesis under
consideration, prime matter would
therefore have remained unfulfilled, its
one form alone being actualized; and
this is at variance with the divine
goodness.
Item. Si diversitas corporalis [12] Moreover, if the heterogeneity of

creaturae sequitur diversos motus corporeal creatures arises from the
liberi arbitrii rationalis creaturae, various movements of the rational

oportebit dicere quod causa quare creature’s free choice, it will have to be
est tantum unus sol in mundo, sit said that the reason why there is only
quia una tantum rationalis creatura one sun in the world is that only one
sic mota est per liberum arbitrium ut rational creature was moved by its free
tali corpori mereretur adiungi. Hoc choice in such a way as to deserve
autem fuit a casu, quod una tantum being joined to such a body as the sun.
sic peccaret. Est igitur a casu quod But, that only one rational creature
sit unus sol in mundo, et non ad sinned in this way was a matter of
necessitatem corporalis naturae. chance. Therefore, the existence of
only one sun in the world is the result
of chance; it does not answer to a
need of corporeal nature.
Praeterea. Cum creatura spiritualis [13] The spiritual creature, furthermore,

non mereatur descendere nisi per does not deserve reduction to a lower
peccatum; descendit autem a sua status except for sin; and yet, by being
sublimitate, in qua indivisibilis est, united to visible bodies, it is brought
per hoc quod visibilibus corporibus down from its lofty state of being,
unitur: videtur sequi quod visibilia wherein it is invisible. Now, from this it
corpora sint eis adiuncta propter would seem to follow that visible
peccatum. Quod videtur propinquum bodies are joined to spiritual creatures
errori Manichaeorum ponentium because of sin—a notion seemingly
haec visibilia ex malo principio akin to the error of the Manicheans
processisse. who asserted that these visible things
originated from the evil principle.
Huic etiam opinioni auctoritas sacrae [14] This opinion is clearly contradicted
Scripturae manifeste contradicit. by the authority of sacred Scripture, for
Quia in singulis operibus visibilium in regard to each production of visible
creaturarum tali modo loquendi utitur creatures, Moses says: “God saw that
Moyses, videns Deus quod esset it was good,” etc. (Gen. 1); and
bonum, etc.; et postmodum de afterwards, concerning the totality of
cunctis simul subiungit: vidit Deus His creatures, Moses adds: “God saw
cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde all the things that He had made, and
bona. Ex quo manifeste datur intelligi they were very good.” By this we are
quod creaturae corporales et clearly given to understand that the
visibiles ideo sunt factae quia bonum corporeal and visible creatures were
est eas esse, quod est consonum made because it is good for them to
divinae bonitati: et non propter aliqua be; and that this is in keeping with
creaturarum rationalium merita vel God’s goodness, and not because of
peccata. any merits or sins of rational creatures.
Videtur autem Origenes non [25] Now, Origen seems not to have
perpendisse quod, cum aliquid non taken into consideration the fact that
ex debito, sed liberaliter damus, non when we give something, not in
est contra iustitiam si inaequalia payment of a debt, but as a free gift, it
damus, nulla diversitate meritorum is not contrary to justice if we give
pensata: cum retributio merentibus unequal things, without having
debeatur. Deus autem, ut supra weighed the difference of merits;
ostensum est, ex nullo debito, sed ex although payment is due to those who
mera liberalitate res in esse produxit. merit. But, as we have shown above,
Unde diversitas creaturarum God brought things into being, not
diversitatem meritorum non because He was in any way obliged to
praesupponit. do so, but out of pure generosity.
Therefore, the diversity of creatures
does not presuppose a diversity of
merits.
Item, cum bonum totius sit melius [16] And again, since the good of the
quam bonum partium singularium, whole is better than the good of each
non est optimi factoris diminuere part, the best maker is not he who
bonum totius ut aliquarum partium diminishes the good of the whole in
augeat bonitatem: non enim order to increase the goodness of
aedificator fundamento tribuit eam some of the parts; a builder does not
bonitatem quam tribuit tecto, ne give the same relative value to the
domum faciat ruinosam. Factor igitur foundation that he gives to the roof,
omnium, Deus, non faceret totum lest he ruin the house. Therefore, God,
universum in suo genere optimum, si the maker of all things, would not make
faceret omnes partes aequales: quia the whole universe the best of its kind,
multi gradus bonitatis in universo if He made all the parts equal, because
deessent, et sic esset imperfectum. many grades of goodness would then
be lacking in the universe, and thus it
would be imperfect.
Caput 45 Chapter 45
Quae sit prima causa distinctionis THE TRUE FIRST CAUSE OF THE
rerum secundum veritatem DISTINCTION OF THINGS
Ostendi autem ex praedictis potest [1] From the foregoing it can be shown

quae sit vere prima distinctionis what is truly the first cause of the
rerum causa. distinction of things.
Cum enim omne agens intendat [2] Since every agent intends to
suam similitudinem in effectum introduce its likeness into its effect, in
inducere secundum quod effectus the measure that its effect can receive
capere potest, tanto hoc agit it, the agent does this the more
perfectius quanto agens perfectius perfectly as it is the more perfect itself;
est: patet enim quod quanto aliquid obviously, the hotter a thing is, the
est calidius, tanto facit magis hotter its effect, and the better the
calidum; et quanto est aliquis melior craftsman, the more perfectly does he
artifex, formam artis perfectius put into matter the form of his art. Now,
inducit in materiam. Deus autem est God is the most perfect agent. It was
perfectissimum agens. Suam igitur His prerogative, therefore, to induce His
similitudinem in rebus creatis ad likeness into created things most
Deum pertinebat inducere perfectly, to a degree consonant with

perfectissime, quantum naturae the nature of created being. But created
creatae convenit. Sed perfectam Dei things cannot attain to a perfect
similitudinem non possunt consequi likeness to God according to only one
res creatae secundum unam solam species of creature. For, since the
speciem creaturae: quia, cum causa cause transcends the effect, that which
excedat effectum, quod est in causa is in the cause, simply and unitedly,
simpliciter et unite, in effectu exists in the effect in composite and
invenitur composite et multipliciter, multiple fashion—unless the effect
nisi effectus pertingat ad speciem attain to the species of the cause;
causae; quod in proposito dici non which cannot be said in this case,
potest, non enim creatura potest because no creature can be equal to
esse Deo aequalis. Oportuit igitur God. The presence of multiplicity and
esse multiplicitatem et varietatem in variety among created things was
rebus creatis, ad hoc quod therefore necessary that a perfect
inveniretur in eis Dei similitudo likeness to God be found in them
perfecta secundum modum suum. according to their manner of being.
Amplius. Sicut quae fiunt ex materia [3] Moreover, just as things made from

sunt in potentia materiae passiva, ita matter lie in the passive potentiality of
quae fiunt ab agente oportet esse in matter, so things made by an agent
potentia activa agentis. Non autem must exist in the active power of the
potentia passiva materiae perfecte agent. The passive potentiality of
reduceretur in actum si ex materia matter, however, would not be
fieret unum tantum eorum ad quae completely actualized if only one of the
materia est in potentia. Ergo, si things to which matter is in potentiality
aliquis agens cuius potentia est ad were made from it. Therefore, if an
plures effectus, faceret unum illorum agent whose power extends to a
tantum, potentia eius non ita number of effects were to produce only
complete reduceretur in actum sicut one of them, its power would not be as
cum facit plura. Per hoc autem quod fully actualized as when it produces
potentia activa reducitur in actum, several. Now, by the fact that the active
effectus consequitur similitudinem power is actualized the effect receives
agentis. Ergo non esset perfecta Dei the likeness of the agent. Hence, there
similitudo in universo si esset unus would not be a perfect likeness of God
tantum gradus omnium entium. in the universe if all things were of one
Propter hoc igitur est distinctio in grade of being. For this reason, then, is
rebus creatis, ut perfectius Dei there distinction among created things:
similitudinem consequantur per that, by being many, they may receive
multa quam per unum. God’s likeness more perfectly than by
being one.
Adhuc. Quanto aliquid in pluribus [4] Then, too, a thing approaches to
est Deo simile, tanto perfectius ad God’s likeness the more perfectly as it
eius similitudinem accedit. In Deo resembles Him in more things. Now,
autem est bonitas, et diffusio goodness is in God, and the outpouring
bonitatis in alia. Perfectius igitur of goodness into other things. Hence,
accedit res creata ad Dei the creature approaches more perfectly
similitudinem si non solum bona est to God’s likeness if it is not only good,
sed etiam ad bonitatem aliorum but can also act for the good of other
agere potest, quam si solum in se things, than if it were good only in itself;
bona esset: sicut similius est soli that which both shines and casts light is
quod lucet et illuminat quam quod more like the sun than that which only
lucet tantum. Non autem posset shines. But no creature could act for the
creatura ad bonitatem alterius benefit of another creature unless
creaturae agere nisi esset in rebus Plurality and inequality existed in
creatis pluralitas et inaequalitas: created things. For the agent is distinct
quia agens est aliud a patiente, et from the patient and superior to it. In
honorabilius eo. Oportuit igitur, ad order that there might be in created
hoc quod in creaturis esset perfecta things a perfect representation of God,
Dei imitatio, quod diversi gradus in the existence of diverse grades among
creaturis invenirentur. them was therefore necessary.
Item. Plura bona uno bono finito [5] Furthermore, a plurality of goods is
sunt meliora: habent enim hoc et better than a single finite good, since
adhuc amplius. Omnis autem they contain the latter and more
creaturae bonitas finita est: est enim besides. But all goodness possessed
deficiens ab infinita Dei bonitate. by creatures is finite, falling short of the
Perfectius est igitur universum infinite goodness of God. Hence, the
creaturarum si sunt plures, quam si universe of creatures is more perfect if
esset unus tantum gradus rerum. there are many grades of things than if
Summo autem bono competit facere there were but one. Now, it befits the
quod melius est. Ergo conveniens ei supreme good to make what is best. It
fuit ut plures faceret creaturarum was therefore fitting that God should
gradus. make many grades of creatures.
Adhuc. Bonitas speciei excedit [6] Again, the good of the species is
bonitatem individui, sicut formale id greater than the good of the individual,
quod est materiale. Magis igitur just as the formal exceeds that which is
addit ad bonitatem universi material. Hence, a multiplicity of
multitudo specierum quam multitudo species adds more to the goodness of
individuorum in una specie. Est the universe than a multiplicity of
igitur ad perfectionem universi individuals in one species. It therefore
pertinens non solum quod multa sint pertains to the perfection of the
individua, sed quod sint etiam universe that there be not only many
diversae rerum species; et per individuals, but that there be also
consequens diversi gradus in rebus. diverse species of things, and,
consequently, diverse grades in things.
Item. Omne quod agit per [7] Whatever acts by intellect,
intellectum, repraesentat speciem moreover, represents in the thing made
sui intellectus in re facta: sic enim the species present in its intellect, for
agens per artem sibi facit simile. thus does an agent that causes things
Deus autem fecit creaturam ut by art produce his like. Now, as we
agens per intellectum, et non per have already shown, God, acting as an
necessitatem naturae, ut supra intellectual agent and not by natural
ostensum est. Species igitur necessity, made the creature. Hence,
intellectus divini repraesentatur in the species present in God’s intellect is

creatura per ipsum facta. Intellectus represented in the creature made by
autem multa intelligens non Him. But an intellect which understands
sufficienter repraesentatur in uno many things is not adequately
tantum. Cum igitur intellectus represented in only one thing.
divinus multa intelligat, ut in primo Therefore, since the divine intellect
probatum est, perfectius seipsum knows many things, as was proved in
repraesentat si plures universorum Book I, it represents itself more
graduum creaturas producat quam perfectly if it produces many creatures
si unum tantum produxisset. of all grades than if it had produced
only one.
Amplius. Operi a summe bono [8] But there is more. The highest
artifice facto non debuit deesse degree of perfection should not be
summa perfectio. Sed bonum lacking in a work made by the
ordinis diversorum est melius supremely good workman. But the good
quolibet illorum ordinatorum per se of order among diverse things is better
sumpto: est enim formale respectu than any of the members of an order,
singularium, sicut perfectio totius taken by itself. For the good of order is
respectu partium. Non debuit ergo formal in respect to each member of it,
bonum ordinis operi Dei deesse. as the perfection of the whole in relation
Hoc autem bonum esse non posset, to the parts. It was not fitting, therefore,
si diversitas et inaequalitas that God’s work should lack the good of
creaturarum non fuisset. order. And yet, without the diversity and
inequality of created things, this good
could not exist.
Est igitur diversitas et inaequalitas in [9] To sum up: The diversity and

rebus creatis non a casu; non ex inequality in created things are not the
materiae diversitate; non propter result of chance, nor of a diversity of
interventum aliquarum causarum, matter, nor of the intervention of certain
vel meritorum; sed ex propria Dei causes or merits, but of the intention of
intentione perfectionem creaturae God Himself, who wills to give the
dare volentis qualem possibile erat creature such perfection as it is
eam habere. possible for it to have.
Hinc est quod dicitur Gen. 131: vidit [10] Accordingly, in the Book of Genesis
Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant (1:31) it is said: “God saw all the things
valde bona: cum de singulis dixisset that He had made, and they were very
quod sunt bona. Quia singula good,” each one of them having been
quidem sunt in suis naturis bona: previously said to be good. For each
simul autem omnia valde bona, thing in its nature is good, but all things
propter ordinem universi, quae est together are very good, by reason of
ultima et nobilissima perfectio in the order of the universe, which is the
rebus. ultimate and noblest perfection in
things.
Caput 46 Chapter 46
Quod oportuit ad perfectionem THAT THE PERFECTION OF THE
universi aliquas creaturas UNIVERSE REQUIRED THE
intellectuales esse EXISTENCE OF SOME INTELLECTUAL
CREATURES
Hac igitur existente causa [1] Having determined the actual cause
diversitatis in rebus, restat nunc de of the diversity among things, it remains
rebus distinctis prosequi, quantum for us to tackle the third problem that we
ad fidei veritatem pertinet: quod proposed, namely, to inquire into those
erat tertium a nobis propositorum. things themselves, as far as this
Et ostendemus primo, quod ex concerns the truth of faith. And first we
divina dispositione perfectionem shall show that, as a result of the order
rebus creatis secundum suum established by God’s assigning to
modum optimam assignante, creatures the optimum perfection
consequens fuit quod quaedam consonant with their manner of being,
creaturae intellectuales fierent, in certain creatures were endowed with an
summo rerum vertice constitutae. intellectual nature, thus being given the
highest rank in the universe.
Tunc enim effectus maxime [2] An effect is most perfect when it
perfectus est quando in suum redit returns to its source; thus, the circle is
principium: unde et circulus inter the most perfect of all figures, and
omnes figuras, et motus circularis circular motion the most perfect of all
inter omnes motus, est maxime motions, because in their case a return is
perfectus, quia in eis ad principium made to the starting point. It is therefore
reditur. Ad hoc igitur quod necessary that creatures return to their
universum creaturarum ultimam principle in order that the universe of
perfectionem consequatur, oportet creatures may attain its ultimate
creaturas ad suum redire perfection. Now, each and every creature
principium. Redeunt autem ad returns to its source so far as it bears a
suum principium singulae et likeness to its source, according to its
omnes creaturae inquantum sui being and its nature, wherein it enjoys a
principii similitudinem gerunt certain perfection. Indeed, all effects are
secundum suum esse et suam most perfect when they are most like
naturam, in quibus quandam their efficient causes—a house when it
perfectionem habent: sicut et most closely resembles the art by which
omnes effectus tunc maxime it was produced, and fire when its
perfecti sunt quando maxime intensity most fully approximates that of
similantur causae agenti, ut domus its generator. Since God’s intellect is the
quando maxime similatur arti, et principle of the production of creatures,
ignis quando maxime similatur as we have shown above, the existence
generanti. Cum igitur intellectus of some creatures endowed with
Dei creaturarum productionis intelligence was necessary in order that
principium sit, ut supra ostensum the universe of created things might be
est, necesse fuit ad creaturarum perfect.
perfectionem quod aliquae
creaturae essent intelligentes.
Amplius. Perfectio secunda in [3] A thing’s second perfection, moreover,

rebus addit supra primam. Sicut constitutes an addition to its first
autem esse et natura rei perfection. Now, just as the act of being
consideratur secundum primam and the nature of a thing are considered
perfectionem, ita operatio as belonging to its first perfection, so
secundum perfectionem operation is referred to its second
secundam. Oportuit igitur, ad perfection. Hence, the complete
consummatam universi perfection of the universe required the
perfectionem, esse aliquas existence of some creatures which return
creaturas quae in Deum redirent to God not only as regards likeness of
non solum secundum naturae nature, but also by their action. And such
similitudinem, sed etiam per a return to God cannot be made except
operationem. Quae quidem non by the act of the intellect and will,
potest esse nisi per actum because God Himself has no other
intellectus et voluntatis: quia nec operation in His own regard than these.
ipse Deus aliter erga seipsum The greatest perfection of the universe
operationem habet. Oportuit igitur, therefore demanded the existence of
ad perfectionem optimam universi, some intellectual creatures.
esse aliquas creaturas
intellectuales.
Adhuc. Ad hoc quod perfecte [4] Moreover, in order that creatures
divinae bonitatis repraesentatio might perfectly represent the divine
per creaturas fieret, oportuit, ut goodness, it was necessary, as we have
supra ostensum est, non solum shown, not only that good things should
quod res bonae fierent, sed etiam be made, but also that they should by
quod ad aliorum bonitatem their actions contribute to the goodness
agerent. Assimilatur autem of other things. But a thing is perfectly
perfecte aliquid alteri in agendo likened to another in its operation when
quando non solum est eadem not only the action is of the same specific
species actionis, sed etiam idem nature, but also the mode of acting is the
modus agendi. Oportuit igitur, ad same. Consequently, the highest
summam rerum perfectionem, perfection of things required the
quod essent aliquae creaturae existence of some creatures that act in
quae agerent hoc modo quo Deus the same way as God. But it has already
agit. Ostensum est autem supra been shown that God acts by intellect
quod Deus agit per intellectum et and will. It was therefore necessary for
voluntatem. Oportuit igitur aliquas some creatures to have intellect and will.
creaturas esse intelligentes et
volentes.
Amplius. Similitudo effectus ad [5] Again. It is according to the form of
causam agentem attenditur the effect preexisting in the agent that
secundum formam effectus quae the effect attains likeness to the agent,
praeexistit in agente: agens enim for an agent produces its like with respect
agit sibi simile in forma secundum to the form by which it acts. Now, in some
quam agit. Forma autem agentis cases the form of the agent is received in
recipitur quidem in effectu the effect according to the same mode of
quandoque secundum eundem being that it has in the agent; the form of

modum essendi quo est in agente, the fire generated has the same mode of
sicut forma ignis generati eundem being as the form of the generating fire.
essendi habet modum cum forma But in other cases the form of the agent
ignis generantis; quandoque vero is received in the effect according to
secundum alium modum essendi, another mode of being; the form of the
sicut forma domus quae est house that exists in an intelligible manner
intelligibiliter in mente artificis, in the builder’s mind is received, in a
recipitur materialiter in domo quae material mode, in the house that exists
est extra animam. Patet autem outside the mind. And the former likeness
perfectiorem esse primam clearly is more perfect than the latter.
similitudinem quam secundam. Now, the perfection of the universe of
Perfectio autem universitatis creatures consists in its likeness to God,
creaturarum consistit in just as the perfection of any effect
similitudine ad Deum: sicut etiam whatever consists in its likeness to its
perfectio cuiuslibet effectus in efficient cause. Therefore, the highest
similitudine ad causam agentem. perfection of the universe requires not
Requirit igitur summa universi only the second mode in which the
perfectio non solum secundam creature is likened to God, but also the
assimilationem creaturae ad first, as far as possible. But the form
Deum, sed primam, quantum through which God produces the creature
possibile est. Forma autem per is an intelligible form in Him, since, as we
quam Deus agit creaturam, est have shown above, God is an intellectual
forma intelligibilis in ipso: est enim agent. Therefore, the highest perfection
agens per intellectum, ut supra of the universe demands the existence of
ostensum est. Oportet igitur ad some creatures in which the form of the
summam perfectionem universi divine intellect is represented according
esse aliquas creaturas in quibus to intelligible being; that is to say, it
secundum esse intelligibile forma requires the existence of creatures of an
divini intellectus exprimatur. Et hoc intellectual nature.
est esse creaturas secundum
suam naturam intellectuales.
Item. Ad productionem [6] Likewise, the only thing that moves
creaturarum nihil aliud movet God to produce creatures is His own
Deum nisi sua bonitas, quam goodness, which He wished to
rebus aliis communicare voluit communicate to other things by likening
secundum modum assimilationis them to Himself, as was shown in Book I
ad ipsum, ut ex dictis patet. of this work. Now, the likeness of one
Similitudo autem unius invenitur in thing is found in another thing in two
altero dupliciter: uno modo, ways: first, as regards natural being—the
quantum ad esse naturae, sicut likeness of heat produced by fire is in the
similitudo caloris ignei est in re thing heated by fire; second, cognitively,
calefacta per ignem; alio modo, as the likeness of fire is in sight or touch.
secundum cognitionem, sicut Hence, that the likeness of God might
similitudo ignis est in visu vel exist in things perfectly, in the ways
tactu. Ad hoc igitur quod similitudo possible, it was necessary that the divine
Dei perfecte esset in rebus modis goodness be communicated to things by
possibilibus, oportuit quod divina likeness not only in existing, but also in
bonitas rebus per similitudinem knowing. But only an intellect is capable
communicaretur non solum in of knowing the divine goodness.

essendo, sed cognoscendo. Accordingly, it was necessary that there
Cognoscere autem divinam should be intellectual creatures.
bonitatem solus intellectus potest.
Oportuit igitur esse creaturas
intellectuales.
Adhuc. In omnibus decenter [7] Again, in all things becomingly
ordinatis habitudo secundorum ad ordered, the relation to the last term of
ultima imitatur habitudinem primi the things intermediate between it and
ad omnia secunda et ultima, licet the first imitates the relation of the first to
quandoque deficienter. Ostensum all the others, both intermediate and last,
est autem quod Deus in se omnes though sometimes deficiently. Now, it has
creaturas comprehendit. Et hoc been shown in Book I that God embraces
repraesentatur in corporalibus in Himself all creatures. And in corporeal
creaturis, licet per alium modum: creatures there is a representation of
semper enim invenitur superius this, although in an other mode. For we
corpus comprehendens et find that the higher body always
continens inferius; tamen comprises and contains the lower, yet
secundum extensionem according to quantitative extension,
quantitatis; cum Deus omnes whereas God contains all creatures in a
creaturas simplici modo, et non simple mode, and not by extension of
quantitatis extensione, contineat. quantity. Hence, in order that the imitation
Ut igitur nec in hoc modo of God, in this mode of containing, might
continendi Dei imitatio creaturis not be lacking to creatures, intellectual
deesset, factae sunt creaturae creatures were made which contain
intellectuales, quae creaturas corporeal creatures, not by quantitative
corporales continerent, non extension, but in simple fashion,
extensione quantitatis, sed intelligibly; for what is intellectually known
simpliciter per modum exists in the knowing subject, and is
intelligibilem: nam quod intelligitur contained by his intellectual operation.
est in intelligente, et eius
intellectuali operatione
comprehenditur.
Caput 47 Chapter 47
Quod substantiae intellectuales THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES
sunt volentes ARE ENDOWED WITH WILL
Has autem substantias [1] Now, these intellectual substances

intellectuales necesse est esse must be capable of willing.
volentes.
Inest enim omnibus appetitus boni: [2] There is in all things appetite for the
cum bonum sit quod omnia good, since, as the philosophers teach,
appetunt, ut philosophi tradunt. the good is what all desire. In things
Huiusmodi autem appetitus in his devoid of knowledge this desire is called

quidem quae cognitione carent, natural appetite; thus it is said that a
dicitur naturalis appetitus: sicut stone desires to be below. In things
dicitur quod lapis appetit esse having sense knowledge this desire is
deorsum. In his autem quae called animal appetite, which is divided
cognitionem sensitivam habent, into concupiscible and irascible. In things
dicitur appetitus animalis, qui possessed of understanding it is called
dividitur in concupiscibilem et intellectual or rational appetite, and this is
irascibilem. In his vero quae will. Created intellectual substances,
intelligunt, dicitur appetitus therefore, are endowed with will.
intellectualis seu rationalis, qui est
voluntas. Substantiae igitur
intellectuales creatae habent
voluntatem.
Adhuc. Quod est per aliud, [3] Moreover, that which exists through
reducitur in id quod est per se another is referred to that which exists
tanquam in prius: unde et, through itself, as being prior to the
secundum philosophum, in VIII former. That is why, according to Aristotle
Phys., mota ab alio reducuntur in [Ethics I, 1], things moved by another are
prima moventia seipsa; in referred to the first selfmovers. Likewise,
syllogismis etiam conclusiones, in syllogisms, the conclusions, which are
quae sunt notae ex aliis, known from other things, are referred to
reducuntur in prima principia, quae first principles, which are known through
sunt nota per seipsa. Inveniuntur themselves. Now, there are some
autem in substantiis creatis created substances that do not activate
quaedam quae non agunt seipsa themselves, but are by force of nature
ad operandum, sed aguntur vi moved to act; such is the case with
naturae, sicut inanimata, plantae inanimate things, plants, and brute
et animalia bruta: non enim est in animals; for to act or not to act does not
eis agere et non agere. Oportet lie in their power. It is therefore
ergo quod fiat reductio in aliqua necessary to go back to some first things
prima quae seipsa agant ad that move themselves to action. But, as
operandum. Prima autem in rebus we have just shown, intellectual
creatis sunt substantiae substances hold the first rank in created
intellectuales, ut supra ostensum things. These substances, then, are self
est. Hae igitur substantiae se activating. Now, to move itself to act is
agunt ad operandum. Hoc autem the property of the will, and by the will a
est proprium voluntatis, per quam substance is master of its action, since
substantia aliqua est domina sui within such a substance lies the power of
actus, utpote in ipsa existens acting or not acting. Hence, created
agere et non agere. Substantiae intellectual substances are possessed of
igitur intellectuales creatae habent will.
voluntatem.
Amplius. Principium cuiuslibet [4] The principle of every operation,

operationis est forma per quam furthermore, is the form by which a thing
aliquid est actu: cum omne agens is in act, since every agent acts so far as
agat inquantum est actu. Oportet it is in act. So, the mode of operation
igitur quod secundum modum consequent upon a form must be in
formae sit modus operationis accordance with the mode of that form.
consequentis formam. Forma igitur Hence, a form not proceeding from the
quae non est ab ipso agente per agent that acts by it causes an operation
formam, causat operationem cuius of which that agent is not master. But, if
agens non est dominus. Si qua there be a form which proceeds from the
vero fuerit forma quae sit ab eo qui agent acting by it, then the consequent
per ipsam operatur, operationis operation also will be in the power of that
etiam consequentis operans agent. Now, natural forms, from which
dominium habebit. Formae autem natural motions and operations derive,
naturales, ex quibus sequuntur do not proceed from the things whose
motus et operationes naturales, forms they are, but wholly from extrinsic
non sunt ab his quorum sunt agents. For by a natural form each thing
formae, sed ab exterioribus has being in its own nature, and nothing
agentibus totaliter: cum per can be the cause of its own act of being.
formam naturalem unumquodque So it is that things which are moved
esse habeat in sua natura; nihil naturally do not move themselves; a
autem potest esse sibi causa heavy body does not move itself
essendi. Et ideo quae moventur downwards; its generator, which gave it
naturaliter, non movent seipsa: its form, does so. Likewise, in brute
non enim grave movet seipsum animals the forms sensed or imagined,
deorsum, sed generans, quod which move them, are not discovered by
dedit ei formam. In animalibus them, but are received by them from
etiam brutis formae sensatae vel extrinsic sensible things, which act upon
imaginatae moventes non sunt their senses and are judged of by their
adinventae ab ipsis animalibus natural estimative faculty. Hence, though
brutis, sed sunt receptae in eis ab brutes are in a sense said to move
exterioribus sensibilibus, quae themselves, inasmuch as one part of
agunt in sensum, et diiudicatae per them moves and another is moved, yet
naturale aestimatorium. Unde, licet they are not themselves the source of the
quodammodo dicantur movere actual moving, which, rather, derives
seipsa, inquantum eorum una pars partly from external things sensed and
est movens et alia est mota, tamen partly from nature. For, so far as their
ipsum movere non est eis ex appetite moves their members, they are
seipsis, sed partim ex exterioribus said to move themselves, and in this they
sensatis et partim a natura. surpass inanimate things and plants; but,
Inquantum enim appetitus movet so far as appetition in them follows
membra, dicuntur seipsa movere, necessarily upon the reception of forms
quod habent supra inanimata et through their senses and from the
plantas; inquantum vero ipsum judgment of their natural estimative
appetere de necessitate sequitur power, they are not the cause of their
in eis ex formis acceptis per own movement; and so they are not
sensum et iudicium naturalis master of their own action. On the other
aestimationis, non sibi sunt causa hand, the form understood, through
quod moveant. Unde non habent which the intellectual substance acts,
dominium sui actus. Forma autem proceeds from the intellect itself as a
intellecta, per quam substantia thing conceived, and in a way contrived
intellectualis operatur, est ab ipso by it; as we see in the case of the artistic
intellectu, utpote per ipsum form, which the artificer conceives and
concepta et quodammodo contrives, and through which he performs
excogitata: ut patet de forma artis, his works. Intellectual substances, then,
quam artifex concipit et excogitat move themselves to act, as having
et per eam operatur. Substantiae mastery of their own action. It therefore
igitur intellectuales seipsas agunt follows that they are endowed with will.
ad operandum, ut habentes suae
operationis dominium. Habent
igitur voluntatem.
Item. Activum oportet esse [5] The active, moreover, should be

proportionatum passivo, et proportionate to the passive, and the
motivum mobili. Sed in habentibus moving to the movable. But in things
cognitionem vis apprehensiva se having cognition the apprehending power
habet ad appetitivam sicut is related to the appetitive power as
motivum ad mobile: nam mover to movable, for that which is
apprehensum per sensum vel apprehended by sense or imagination or
imaginationem vel intellectum, intellect moves the intellectual or the
movet appetitum intellectualem vel animal appetite. Intellectual
animalem. Apprehensio autem apprehension, however, is not limited to
intellectiva non determinatur ad certain things, but reaches out to them
quaedam, sed est omnium: unde all. And this is why Aristotle, in De anima
et de intellectu possibili III [5], says of the possible intellect that it
philosophus dicit, in III de anima, is “that by which we become all things.
quod est quo est omnia fieri. Hence, the appetite of an intellectual
Appetitus igitur intellectualis substance has relationship to all things;
substantiae est ad omnia se wherefore Aristotle remarks, in Ethics III
habens. Hoc autem est proprium [2], that appetite extends to both possible
voluntatis, ut ad omnia se habeat: and impossible things. Intellectual
unde in III Ethicorum philosophus substances, then, are possessed of will.
dicit quod est et possibilium et
impossibilium. Substantiae igitur
intellectuales habent voluntatem.
Caput 48 Chapter 48
sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo HAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN
ACTING
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] It is therefore clear that the aforesaid
praedictae substantiae sunt liberi substances are endowed with freedom of
arbitrii in operando. choice in acting.
Quod enim arbitrio agant, [2] That they act by judgment is evident
manifestum est: eo quod per from the fact that through their intellectual
cognitionem intellectivam iudicium cognition they judge of things to be done.
habent de operandis. Libertatem And they must have freedom, if, as just
autem necesse est eas habere, si shown, they have control over their own
habent dominium sui actus, ut action. Therefore, these substances in
ostensum est. Sunt igitur acting have freedom of choice.

praedictae substantiae liberi
arbitrii in agendo.
Item. Liberum est quod sui causa [3] Also, “the free is that which is its own

est. Quod ergo non est sibi causa cause.” Hence, that which is not the
agendi, non est liberum in cause of its own acting is not free in
agendo. Quaecumque autem non acting. But things that do not move nor
moventur neque agunt nisi ab aliis act unless they are moved by other things
mota, non sunt sibi ipsis causa are not the cause of their own acting. So,
agendi. Sola ergo moventia se only things that move themselves act
ipsa libertatem in agendo habent. freely. And these alone act by judgment.
Et haec sola iudicio agunt: nam For the thing that moves itself is divided
movens seipsum dividitur in into mover and moved; and the mover is
movens et motum; movens autem the appetite moved by intellect,
est appetitus ab intellectu vel imagination, or sense, to which faculties
phantasia aut sensu motus, judgment belongs. Among these things,
quorum est iudicare. Horum igitur therefore, those alone judge freely which
haec sola libere iudicant in judging move themselves. But no
quaecumque in iudicando seipsa judging power moves itself to judge
movent. Nulla autem potentia unless it reflects on its own action; for, if it
iudicans seipsam ad iudicandum moves itself to judge, it must know its own
movet nisi supra actum suum judgment; and this only an intellect can
reflectatur: oportet enim, si se ad do. Thus, irrational animals have in a
iudicandum agit, quod suum certain way freedom of movement or
iudicium cognoscat. Quod quidem action, but not of judgment, whereas
solius intellectus est. Sunt igitur inanimate things, which are moved only
animalia irrationalia quodammodo by other things, have not even free action
liberi quidem motus sive actionis, or movement. Intellectual beings, on the
non autem liberi iudicii; inanimata other hand, enjoy freedom not only of
autem, quae solum ab aliis action, but also of judgment; and this is to
moventur, neque etiam liberae have free choice.
actionis aut motus; intellectualia
vero non solum actionis, sed
etiam liberi iudicii, quod est
liberum arbitrium habere.
Adhuc. Forma apprehensa est [4] Then, too, the apprehended form is a
principium movens secundum moving principle according as it is
quod apprehenditur sub ratione apprehended under the aspect of the
boni vel convenientis: actio enim good or the fitting; for the outward action
exterior in moventibus seipsa in things that move themselves proceeds
procedit ex iudicio quo iudicatur from the judgment, made through that
aliquid esse bonum vel form, that something is good or fitting.
conveniens per formam Hence, if he who judges moves himself to
praedictam. Si igitur iudicans ad judge, he must do so in the light of a
iudicandum seipsum moveat, higher form apprehended by him. And this
oportet quod per aliquam altiorem form can be none other than the very
formam apprehensam se moveat intelligible essence of the good or the
ad iudicandum. Quae quidem fitting, in the light of which judgment is
esse non potest nisi ipsa ratio made of any determinate good or fitting
boni vel convenientis, per quam thing; so that only those beings move
de quolibet determinato bono vel themselves to judge which apprehend the
convenienti iudicatur. Illa igitur allembracing essence of the good or the
sola se ad iudicandum movent fitting. And these are intellectual beings
quae communem boni vel alone. Hence, none but intellectual beings
convenientis rationem move themselves not only to act, but also
apprehendunt. Haec autem sunt to judge. They alone, therefore, are free
sola intellectualia. Sola igitur in judging; and this is to have free choice.
intellectualia se non solum ad
agendum, sed etiam ad
iudicandum movent. Sola igitur
ipsa sunt libera in iudicando, quod
est liberum arbitrium habere.
Amplius. A conceptione universali [5] Movement and action, moreover, issue

non sequitur motus et actio nisi from a universal conception only through
mediante particulari the intermediation of a particular
apprehensione: eo quod motus et apprehension. For movement and action
actio circa particularia est. have to do with particular things, whereas
Intellectus autem est naturaliter it is the nature of the intellect to grasp
universalium apprehensivus. Ad universals. Hence, for movement and
hoc igitur quod ex apprehensione action of any kind to result from the
intellectus sequatur motus aut intellect’s grasp of something, the
quaecumque actio, oportet quod universal conception formed by it must be
universalis intellectus conceptio applied to particulars. But the universal
applicetur ad particularia. Sed contains many particulars potentially; so
universale continet in potentia that the universal conception can be
multa particularia. Potest igitur applied to many and diverse things. For
applicatio conceptionis this reason the judgment of the intellect
intellectualis fieri ad plura et concerning things to be done is not
diversa. Iudicium igitur intellectus determined to one thing only. It follows, in
de agibilibus non est short, that all intellectual beings have
determinatum ad unum tantum. freedom of choice.
Habent igitur omnia intellectualia
liberum arbitrium.
Praeterea. Iudicii libertate carent [6] Furthermore, certain things lack liberty

aliqua vel propter hoc quod nullum of judgment, either because they have no
habent iudicium, sicut quae judgment at all, as plants and stones, or
cognitione carent, ut lapides et because they have a judgment
plantae: vel quia habent iudicium determined by nature to one thing, as do
a natura determinatum ad unum, irrational animals; the sheep, by natural
sicut irrationalia animalia; naturali estimation, judges the wolf to be harmful
enim existimatione iudicat ovis to it, and in consequence of this judgment
lupum sibi nocivum, et ex hoc flees from the wolf; and so it is in other
iudicio fugit ipsum; similiter autem cases. Hence, so far as matters of action
in aliis. Quaecumque igitur habent are concerned, whatever things possess
iudicium de agendis non judgment that is not determined to one
determinatum a natura ad unum, thing by nature are of necessity endowed
necesse est liberi arbitrii esse. with freedom of choice. And such are all
Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia intellectual beings. For the intellect
intellectualia. Intellectus enim apprehends not only this or that good, but
apprehendit non solum hoc vel good itself, as common to all things. Now,
illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum the intellect, through the form
commune. Unde, cum intellectus apprehended, moves the will; and in all
per formam apprehensam moveat things mover and moved must be
voluntatem; in omnibus autem proportionate to one another. It follows
movens et motum oporteat esse that the will of an intellectual substance
proportionata; voluntas will not be determined by nature to
substantiae intellectualis non erit anything except the good as common to
determinata a natura nisi ad all things. So it is possible for the will to
bonum commune. Quicquid igitur be inclined toward anything whatever that
offeretur sibi sub ratione boni, is presented to it under the aspect of
poterit voluntas inclinari in illud, good, there being no natural
nulla determinatione naturali in determination to the contrary to prevent it.
contrarium prohibente. Omnia Therefore, all intellectual beings have a
igitur intellectualia liberam free will, resulting from the judgment of
voluntatem habent ex iudicio the intellect. And this means that they
intellectus venientem. Quod est have freedom of choice, which is defined
liberum arbitrium habere, quod as the free judgment of reason.
definitur esse liberum de ratione
iudicium.
Caput 49 Chapter 49
Quod substantia intellectualis non THAT THE INTELLECTUAL
sit corpus SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY
Ex praemissis autem ostenditur [1] From the foregoing we proceed to
quod nulla substantia show that no intellectual substance is a
intellectualis est corpus. body.
Nullum enim corpus invenitur [2] For it is only by quantitative
aliquid continere nisi per commensuration that a body contains
commensurationem quantitatis: anything at all; so, too, if a thing contains
unde et, si se toto totum aliquid a whole thing in the whole of itself, it
continet, et partem parte continet, contains also a part in a part of itself, a
maiorem quidem maiore, greater part in a greater part, a lesser part
minorem autem minore. in a lesser part. But an intellect does not,
Intellectus autem non in terms of any quantitative
comprehendit rem aliquam commensuration, comprehend a thing
intellectam per aliquam quantitatis understood, since by its whole self it
commensurationem: cum se toto understands and encompasses both
intelligat et comprehendat totum whole and part, things great in quantity
et partem, maiora in quantitate et and things small. Therefore, no intelligent
minora. Nulla igitur substantia substance is a body.
intelligens est corpus.
Amplius. Nullum corpus potest [3] Then, too, no body can receive the
alterius corporis formam substantial form of another body, unless
substantialem recipere nisi per by corruption it lose its own form. But the
corruptionem suam formam intellect is not corrupted; rather, it is
amittat. Intellectus autem non perfected by receiving the forms of all
corrumpitur, sed magis perficitur bodies; for it is perfected by
per hoc quod recipit formas understanding, and it understands by
omnium corporum: perficitur enim having in itself the forms of the things
in intelligendo; intelligit autem understood. Hence, no intellectual
secundum quod habet in se substance is a body.
formas intellectorum. Nulla igitur
substantia intellectualis est
corpus.
Adhuc. Principium diversitatis [4] Again, the principle of diversity among

individuorum eiusdem speciei est individuals of the same species is the
divisio materiae secundum division of matter according to quantity;
quantitatem: forma enim huius the form of this fire does not differ from
ignis a forma illius ignis non differt the form of that fire, except by the fact of
nisi per hoc quod est in diversis its presence in different parts into which
partibus in quas materia dividitur; the matter is divided; nor is this brought
nec aliter quam divisione about in any other way than by the
quantitatis, sine qua substantia division of quantity—without which
est indivisibilis. Quod autem substance is indivisible. Now, that which is
recipitur in corpore, recipitur in eo received into a body is received into it
secundum quantitatis divisionem. according to the division of quantity.
Ergo forma non recipitur in Therefore, it is only as individuated that a
corpore nisi ut individuata. Si form is received into a body. If, then, the
igitur intellectus esset corpus, intellect were a body, the intelligible forms
formae rerum intelligibiles non of things would not be received into it
reciperentur in eo nisi ut except as individuated. But the intellect
individuatae. Intelligit autem understands things by those forms of
intellectus res per formas earum theirs which it has in its possession. So, if
quas penes se habet. Non ergo it were a body, it would not be cognizant
intellectus intelligit universalia, of universals but only of particulars. But
sed solum particularia. Quod this is patently false. Therefore, no
patet esse falsum. Nullus igitur intellect is a body.
intellectus est corpus.
Item. Nihil agit nisi secundum [5] Likewise, nothing acts except in
suam speciem: eo quod forma est keeping with its species, because in each
principium agendi in unoquoque. and every thing the form is the principle of
Si igitur intellectus sit corpus, action; so that, if the intellect is a body, its
actio eius ordinem corporum non action will not go beyond the order of
excedet. Non igitur intelligeret nisi bodies. It would then have no knowledge
corpora. Hoc autem patet esse of anything except bodies. But this is
falsum: intelligimus enim multa clearly false, because we know many
quae non sunt corpora. Intellectus things that are not bodies. Therefore, the

igitur non est corpus. intellect is not a body.
Adhuc. Si substantia intelligens [6] Moreover, if an intelligent substance is

est corpus, aut est finitum, aut a body, it is either finite or infinite. Now, it
infinitum. Corpus autem esse is impossible for a body to be actually
infinitum actu est impossibile, ut infinite, as is proved in the Physics [III, 5].
in physicis probatur. Est igitur Therefore, if we suppose that such a
finitum corpus, si corpus esse substance is a body at all, it is a finite one.
ponatur. Hoc autem est But this also is impossible, since, as was
impossibile. In nullo enim corpore shown in Book I of this work, infinite
finito potest esse potentia infinita, power can exist in no finite body. And yet
ut supra probatum est. Potentia the cognitive power of the intellect is in a
autem intellectus est certain way infinite; for by adding number
quodammodo infinita in to number its knowledge of the species of
intelligendo: in infinitum enim numbers is infinitely extended; and the
intelligit species numerorum same applies to its knowledge of the
augendo, et similiter species species of figures and proportions.
figurarum et proportionum; Moreover, the intellect grasps the
cognoscit etiam universale, quod universal, which is virtually infinite in its
est virtute infinitum secundum scope, because it contains individuals
suum ambitum, continet enim which are potentially infinite. Therefore,
individua quae sunt potentia the intellect is not a body.
infinita. Intellectus igitur non est
corpus.
Amplius. Impossibile est duo [7] It is impossible, furthermore, for two
corpora se invicem continere: bodies to contain one another, since the
cum continens excedat container exceeds the contained. Yet,
contentum. Duo autem intellectus when one intellect has knowledge of
se invicem continent et another, the two intellects contain and
comprehendunt, dum unus alium encompass one another. Therefore, the
intelligit. Non est igitur intellectus intellect is not a body.
corpus.
Item. Nullius corporis actio [8] Also, the action of no body is self
reflectitur super agentem: reflexive. For it is proved in the Physics
ostensum est enim in physicis that no body is moved by itself except with
quod nullum corpus a seipso respect to a part, so that one part of it is
movetur nisi secundum partem, the mover and the other the moved. But in
ita scilicet quod una pars eius sit acting the intellect reflects on itself, not
movens et alia mota. Intellectus only as to a part, but as to the whole of
autem supra seipsum agendo itself. Therefore, it is not a body.
reflectitur: intelligit enim seipsum
non solum secundum partem, sed
secundum totum. Non est igitur
corpus.
Adhuc. Actio corporis ad [9] A body’s action, moreover, is not

actionem non terminatur, nec terminated in action, nor movement in
motus ad motum: ut in physicis movement—a point proved in the Physics
est probatum. Actio autem [V, 2]. But the action of an intelligent
substantiae intelligentis ad substance is terminated in action; for just
actionem terminatur: intellectus as the intellect knows a thing, so does it
enim, sicut intelligit rem, ita know that it knows; and so on indefinitely.
intelligit se intelligere, et sic in An intelligent substance, therefore, is not
infinitum. Substantia igitur a body.
intelligens non est corpus.
Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura [10] Hence it is that sacred Scripture calls

substantias intellectuales spiritus intellectual substances spirits; and this
nominat: per quem modum term it customarily employs in reference to
consuevit Deum incorporeum the incorporeal God; as St. John says:
nominare, secundum illud Ioan. 4 “God is a spirit” (John 4:24); and in the
24, Deus spiritus est. Dicitur Book of Wisdom (7:2223) we read: “for in
autem Sap. 722 est autem in illa, her” namely, divine Wisdom, “is the spirit
scilicet divina sapientia, spiritus of understanding, containing all intelligible
intelligentiae, qui capiat omnes spirits.”
spiritus intelligibiles.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [11] This, then, does away with the error
antiquorum naturalium, qui nullam of the early natural philosophers, who
substantiam nisi corpoream esse supposed that no substance exists except
ponebant: unde et animam the corporeal, and who therefore said that
dicebant esse corpus, vel ignem the soul is a body, either fire or air or
vel aerem vel aquam, vel aliud water, or something of the kind
huiusmodi.
Quam quidem opinionem in fidem —an opinion which some have

Christianam quidam inducere endeavored to introduce into the Christian
sunt conati, dicentes animam faith by saying that the soul is the effigy of
esse corpus effigiatum, sicut the body, like a body externally
corpus exterius figuratur. represented.
Caput 50 Chapter 50
sunt immateriales ARE IMMATERIAL
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] It clearly follows that intellectual
substantiae intellectuales sunt substances are immaterial.
immateriales.
Unumquodque enim ex materia et [2] For everything composed of matter
forma compositum est corpus. and form is a body, since matter cannot
Diversas enim formas materia non receive diverse forms except with
nisi secundum diversas partes respect to its various parts. And this
recipere potest. Quae quidem diversity of parts can exist in matter only
diversitas partium esse in materia so far as one common matter is divided
non potest nisi secundum quod per into several by dimensions existing in
dimensiones in materia existentes matter; for, without quantity, substance is
una communis materia in plures indivisible. But it has just been shown,
dividitur: subtracta enim quantitate, that no intelligent substance is a body. It
substantia indivisibilis est. remains, therefore, that such a
Ostensum est autem quod nulla substance is not composed of matter and
substantia intelligens est corpus. form.
Relinquitur igitur quod non sit ex
materia et forma composita.
Amplius. Sicut homo non est sine [3] Furthermore, just as man does not
hoc homine, ita materia non est exist apart from this man, so matter does
sine hac materia. Quicquid igitur in not exist apart from this matter. Any
rebus est subsistens ex materia et subsistent thing that is composed of
forma compositum, est matter and form is, then, composed of
compositum ex forma et materia individual form and individual matter. But
individuali. Intellectus autem non the intellect cannot be composed of
potest esse compositus ex materia individual matter and form, because the
et forma individuali. Species enim species of things understood are made
rerum intellectarum fiunt actually intelligible by being abstracted
intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a from individual matter. And as a result of
materia individuali abstrahuntur. being actually intelligible they become
Secundum autem quod sunt one with the intellect. That is why the
intelligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellect also must be without individual
intellectu. Unde et intellectum matter. Therefore, a substance endowed
oportet esse absque materia with intelligence is not composed of
individuali. Non est igitur matter and form.
substantia intelligens ex materia et
forma composita.
Adhuc. Actio cuiuslibet ex materia [4] Then, too, the action of anything
et forma compositi non est tantum composed of matter and form belongs
formae, nec tantum materiae, sed not to the form alone, nor to the matter
compositi: eius enim est agere alone, but to the composite; for to act
cuius est esse; esse autem est belongs to that which exists, and
compositi per formam; unde et existence belongs to the composite
compositum per formam agit. Si through its form, so that the composite
igitur substantia intelligens sit also acts through its form. So, if the
composita ex materia et forma, intelligent substance is composed of
intelligere erit ipsius compositi. matter and form, its act of understanding
Actus autem terminatur ad aliquid will be the act of the composite. Now,
simile agenti: unde et compositum action terminates in a thing like the agent
generans non generat formam, sed that produces it; that is why the
compositum. Si igitur intelligere sit composite, in generating, produces not a
actio compositi, non intelligetur nec form but a composite. Hence, if the act of
forma nec materia, sed tantum understanding is an action of the
compositum. Hoc autem patet composite, neither the form nor the
esse falsum. Non est igitur matter would be known, but only the
substantia intelligens composita ex composite. But this is patently false.
materia et forma. Therefore, the intelligent substance is not
composed of matter and form.
Item. Formae rerum sensibilium [5] Again. The forms of sensible things
perfectius esse habent in intellectu have a more perfect mode of existence
quam in rebus sensibilibus: sunt in the intellect than in sensible things, for
enim simpliciores et ad plura se in the intellect they are simpler and
extendentes; per unam enim extend to more things; thus, through the
formam hominis intelligibilem, one intelligible form of man, the intellect
omnes homines intellectus knows all men. Now, a form existing
cognoscit. Forma autem perfecte perfectly in matter makes a thing to be
in materia existens facit esse actu actually such—to be fire or to be colored,
tale, scilicet vel ignem, vel for example— and if the form does not
coloratum: si autem non faciat have that effect, then the form is in that
aliquid esse tale, est imperfecte in thing imperfectly, as the form of heat in
illo, sicut forma coloris in aere ut in the air carrying it, and the power of the
deferente, et sicut virtus primi first agent in its instrument. So, if the
agentis in instrumento. Si igitur intellect were composed of matter and
intellectus sit ex materia et forma form, the forms of the things known
compositus, formae rerum would make the intellect to be actually of
intellectarum facient intellectum the same nature as that which is known.
esse actu talis naturae quale est And the consequence of this is the error
quod intelligitur. Et sic sequitur of Empedocles, who said that “the soul
error Empedoclis, qui dicebat quod knows fire by fire, and earth by earth”;
ignem igne cognoscit anima, et and so with other things. But this is
terra terram, et sic de aliis. Quod clearly incongruous. Therefore, the
patet esse inconveniens. Non est intelligent substance is not composed of
igitur intelligens substantia matter and form.
composita ex materia et forma.
Praeterea. Omne quod est in [6] And since a thing’s mode of presence

aliquo est in eo per modum in its recipient accords with the latter’s
recipientis. Si igitur intellectus sit mode of being, it would follow, were the
compositus ex materia et forma, intellect composed of matter and form,
formae rerum erunt in intellectu that the forms of things would exist in it
materialiter, sicut sunt extra materially, just as they exist outside the
animam. Sicut igitur extra animam mind. Therefore, just as they are not
non sunt intelligibiles actu, ita nec actually intelligible outside the mind, so
existentes in intellectu. they would not be actually intelligible
when present in the intellect.
Item. Formae contrariorum, [7] Moreover, the forms of contraries, as

secundum esse quod habent in they exist in matter, are contrary; hence,
materia, sunt contrariae: unde et they exclude one another. But as they
se invicem expellunt. Secundum exist in the intellect the forms of
autem quod sunt in intellectu, non contraries are not contrary; rather, one
sunt contrariae: sed unum contrary is the intelligible ground of
contrariorum est ratio intelligibilis another, since one is understood through
alterius, quia unum per aliud the other. They have, then, no material
cognoscitur. Non igitur habent esse being in the intellect. Therefore, the
materiale in intellectu. Ergo intellect is not composed of matter and
intellectus non est compositus ex form.
materia et forma.
Adhuc. Materia non recipit aliquam [8] And again, matter does not receive a
formam de novo nisi per motum vel fresh form except through motion or
mutationem. Intellectus autem non change. But the intellect is not moved
movetur per hoc quod recipit through receiving forms; rather, it is
formas, sed magis perficitur et perfected and at rest while
quiescens intelligit, impeditur understanding, whereas movement is a
autem in intelligendo per motum. hindrance to understanding. Hence,
Non igitur recipiuntur formae in forms are not received in the intellect as
intellectu sicut in materia vel in re in matter or a material thing. Clearly,
materiali. Unde patet quod then, intelligent substances are
substantiae intelligentes immaterial, even as they are incorporeal,
immateriales sunt, sicut et too.
incorporeae.
Hinc est quod Dionysius dicit, III [9] Hence, Dionysius says: “On account
cap. de Div. Nom.: propter divinae of the rays of God’s goodness all
bonitatis radios substiterunt intellectual substances, which are known
intellectuales omnes substantiae, to be incorporeal and immaterial, have
quae sicut incorporales et remained immutably in existence [De div.
immateriales intelliguntur. nom. IV].
Caput 51 Chapter 51
Quod substantia intellectualis non sit THAT THE INTELLECTUAL
forma materialis SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL
FORM
Per eadem autem ostenditur quod [1] From the same principles we
naturae intellectuales sunt formae proceed to show that intellectual
subsistentes, non autem existentes in natures are subsistent forms, and are
materia quasi esse earum a materia not in matter as though their being
dependeat. depends on matter.
Formae enim secundum esse a [2] Forms dependent in being upon
materia dependentes non ipsae matter do not themselves have being
proprie habent esse, sed composita properly, but being properly belongs to
per ipsas. Si igitur naturae the composites through their forms.
intellectuales essent huiusmodi Consequently, if intellectual
formae, sequeretur quod haberent substances were forms of this kind, it

esse materiale, sicut et si essent ex would follow that they have material
materia et forma compositae. being, just as they would if they were
composed of matter and form.
Adhuc. Formae quae per se non [3] Moreover, forms that do not
subsistunt, non possunt per se agere, subsist through themselves cannot
agunt autem composita per eas. Si act through themselves; rather, the
igitur naturae intellectuales huiusmodi composites act through them. Hence,
formae essent, sequeretur quod ipsae if intellectual natures were forms of
non intelligerent, sed composita ex this sort, it would follow that they do
eis et materia. Et sic intelligens esset not themselves understand, but that it
compositum ex materia et forma. is the things composed of them and
Quod est impossibile, ut ostensum matter which understand. And thus,
est. an intelligent being would be
composed of matter and form; which
is impossible, as we have just shown.
Amplius. Si intellectus esset forma in [4] Also, if the intellect were a form in

materia et non per se subsistens, matter and not selfsubsistent, it
sequeretur quod id quod recipitur in would follow that what is received into
intellectu reciperetur in materia: the intellect would be received into
huiusmodi enim formae quae habent matter, since forms whose being is
esse materiae obligatum, non bound to matter receive nothing that
recipiunt aliquid quod in materia non is not received into the matter. But the
recipiatur. Cum igitur receptio reception of forms into the intellect is
formarum in intellectu non sit receptio not a reception of forms into matter.
formarum in materia, impossibile est Therefore, the intellect cannot
quod intellectus sit forma materialis. possibly be a material form.
Praeterea. Dicere quod intellectus sit [5] Moreover, to say that the intellect
forma non subsistens sed materiae is not a subsistent form, but a form
immersa, idem est secundum rem et embedded in matter, is the same in
si dicatur quod intellectus sit reality as to say that the intellect is
compositus ex materia et forma, composed of matter and form. The
differt autem solum secundum difference is purely nominal, for in the
nomen: nam primo modo, dicetur first way the intellect will be called the
intellectus ipsa forma compositi; form itself of the composite; in the
secundo vero modo, dicetur second way, the composite itself. So,
intellectus ipsum compositum. Si if it is false that the intellect is
igitur falsum est intellectum esse composed of matter and form, it will
compositum ex materia et forma, be false that it is a form which does
falsum erit quod sit forma non not subsist, but is material.
subsistens sed materialis.
Caput 52 Chapter 52
Quod in substantiis intellectualibus THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL
creatis differt esse et quod est SUBSTANCES, BEING AND WHAT
IS DIFFER
Non est autem opinandum quod, Although intellectual substances are

quamvis substantiae intellectuales not corporeal, nor composed of matter
non sint corporeae, nec ex materia et and form, nor existing in matter as
forma compositae, nec in materia material forms, it is not to be
existentes sicut formae materiales, supposed that they therefore equal
quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati the divine simplicity. For a certain
adaequentur. Invenitur enim in eis composition is found in them by the
aliqua compositio ex eo quod non est fact that in them being is not the same
idem in eis esse et quod est. as what is.
Si enim esse est subsistens, nihil [2] For, if being is subsisting, nothing
praeter ipsum esse ei adiungitur. Quia besides this act itself is added to it.
etiam in his quorum esse non est Because, even In things whose being
subsistens, quod inest existenti is not subsistent, that which is in the
praeter esse eius, est quidem existing thing in addition to its being is
existenti unitum, non autem est unum indeed united to the thing, but is not
cum esse eius, nisi per accidens, one with the thing’s being, except by
inquantum est unum subiectum accident, so far as the thing is one
habens esse et id quod est praeter subject having being and that which is
esse: sicut patet quod Socrati, praeter other than being. Thus it is clear that
suum esse substantiale, inest album, in Socrates, beside his substantial
quod quidem diversum est ab eius being, there is white, which, indeed, is
esse substantiali; non enim idem est other than his substantial being; for to
esse Socratem et esse album, nisi be Socrates and to be white are not
per accidens. Si igitur non sit esse in the same except by accident. If, then,
aliquo subiecto, non remanebit aliquis being is not in a subject, there will
modus quo possit ei uniri illud quod remain no way in which that which is
est praeter esse. Esse autem, other than being can be united to it.
inquantum est esse, non potest esse Now, being, as being, cannot be
diversum: potest autem diversificari diverse; but it can be diversified by
per aliquid quod est praeter esse; something beside itself; thus, the
sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse being of a stone is other than that of a
hominis. Illud ergo quod est esse man. Hence, that which is subsisting
subsistens, non potest esse nisi being can be one only. Now, we have
unum tantum. Ostensum est autem shown in Book I that God is His own
quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. subsisting being. Hence, nothing
Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest beside Him can be its own being. Of
esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in necessity, therefore, in every
omni substantia quae est praeter substance beside Him the substance
ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam itself is other than its being.
et esse eius.
Amplius. Natura communis, si [3] Moreover, a common nature, if

separata intelligatur, non potest esse considered in separation from things,
nisi una: quamvis habentes naturam can be only one, although there can
illam plures possint inveniri. Si enim be a plurality of things possessing that
natura animalis per se separata nature. For, if the nature of animal
subsisteret, non haberet ea quae sunt subsisted as separate through itself, it
hominis vel quae sunt bovis: iam would not have those things that are
enim non esset animal tantum, sed proper to a man or an ox; if it did have
homo vel bos. Remotis autem them, it would not be animal alone,
differentiis constitutivis specierum, but man or ox. Now, if the differences
remanet natura generis indivisa: quia constitutive of species be removed,
eaedem differentiae quae sunt there remains the undivided nature of
constitutivae specierum sunt divisivae the genus, because the same
generis. Sic igitur, si hoc ipsum quod differences which constitute the
est esse sit commune sicut genus, species divide the genus.
esse separatum per se subsistens Consequently, if this itself which is
non potest esse nisi unum. Si vero being is common as a genus,
non dividatur differentiis, sicut genus, separate, selfsubsisting being can be
sed per hoc quod est huius vel illius one only. But, if being is not divided by
esse, ut veritas habet; magis est differences, as a genus is, but, as it is
manifestum quod non potest esse per in truth, by the fact that it is the being
se existens nisi unum. Relinquitur of this or that, then it is all the more
igitur quod, cum Deus sit esse manifest that being existing through
subsistens, nihil aliud praeter ipsum itself can only be one. Since God is
est suum esse. subsisting being, it therefore remains
that nothing other than He is its own
being.
Adhuc. Impossibile est quod sit [4] Again, absolutely infinite being
duplex esse omnino infinitum: esse cannot be twofold, for being that is
enim quod omnino est infinitum, absolutely infinite comprises every
omnem perfectionem essendi perfection of being; hence, if infinity
comprehendit; et sic, si duobus talis were present in two such things, in no
adesset infinitas, non inveniretur quo respect would they be found to differ.
unum ab altero differret. Esse autem Now, subsisting being must be infinite,
subsistens oportet esse infinitum: because it is not terminated in some
quia non terminatur aliquo recipiente. recipient. Therefore, there cannot be a
Impossibile est igitur esse aliquod subsisting being besides the first.
esse subsistens praeter primum.
Item. Si sit aliquod esse per se [5] Then, too, if there is a self
subsistens, nihil competit ei nisi quod subsisting being, nothing belongs to it
est entis inquantum est ens: quod except that which is proper to a being
enim dicitur de aliquo non inquantum inasmuch as it is a being, since what
huiusmodi, non convenit ei nisi per is said of a thing, not as such,
accidens, ratione subiecti; unde, si appertains to it only accidentally, by
separatum a subiecto ponatur, nullo reason of the subject. Consequently, if
modo ei competit. Esse autem ab alio the thing so spoken of is held to be
causatum non competit enti separated from the subject, it in no
inquantum est ens: alias omne ens way belongs to it. Now, to be caused
esset ab alio causatum; et sic by another does not appertain to a
oporteret procedere in infinitum in being inasmuch as it is being;
causis, quod est impossibile, ut supra otherwise, every being would be

ostensum est. Illud igitur esse quod caused by another, so that we should
est subsistens, oportet quod sit non have to proceed to infinity in causes—
causatum. Nullum igitur ens an impossibility, as was shown in
causatum est suum esse. Book I of this work. Therefore, that
being which is subsisting must be
uncaused. Therefore, no caused
being is its own being.
Amplius. Substantia uniuscuiusque [6] The substance of each and every
est ei per se et non per aliud: unde thing, furthermore, belongs to it
esse lucidum actu non est de through itself and not through another;
substantia aeris, quia est ei per aliud. thus, it does not pertain to the
Sed cuilibet rei creatae suum esse substance of air to be actually
est ei per aliud: alias non esset luminous, since this quality it acquires
causatum. Nullius igitur substantiae through something else. But every
creatae suum esse est sua created thing has its being through
substantia. another; otherwise, it would not be
caused. Therefore, the being of no
created substance is that substance.
Item. Cum omne agens agat [7] Also, since every agent acts so far

inquantum est actu, primo agenti, as it is in act, it belongs to the first
quod est perfectissimum, competit agent, which is most perfect, to be
esse in actu perfectissimo modo. most perfectly in act. Now, a thing is
Tanto autem aliquid est perfectius in the more perfectly in act the more its
actu quanto talis actus est in via act is posterior in the way of
generationis posterior: actus enim est generation, for act is posterior in time
tempore potentia posterior in uno et to potentiality in one and the same
eodem quod de potentia ad actum thing that passes from potentiality to
procedit. Perfectius quoque est in act. Further, act itself is more perfectly
actu quod est ipse actus quam quod in act than that which has act, since
est habens actum: hoc enim propter the latter is in act because of the
illud actu est. His igitur sic positis, former. These things being posited,
constat ex supra ostensis quod Deus then, it is clear from what has been
solus est primum agens. Sibi ergo soli shown in Book I of this work that God
competit esse in actu perfectissimo alone is the first agent. Therefore, it
modo, ut scilicet sit ipse actus belongs to Him alone to be in act in
perfectissimus. Hic autem est esse, the most perfect way, that is, to be
ad quod generatio et omnis motus Himself the most perfect act. Now, this
terminatur: omnis enim forma et actus act is being, wherein generation and
est in potentia antequam esse all movement terminate, since every
acquirat. Soli igitur Deo competit form and act is in potentiality before it
quod sit ipsum esse: sicut soli acquires being. Therefore, it belongs
competit quod sit primum agens. to God alone to be His own being, just
as it pertains to Him only to be the first
agent.
Amplius. Ipsum esse competit primo [8] Moreover, being itself belongs to
agenti secundum propriam naturam: the first agent according to His proper

esse enim Dei est eius substantia ut nature, for God’s being is His
supra ostensum est. Quod autem substance, as was shown in Book I.
competit alicui secundum propriam Now, that which belongs to a thing
naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi according to its proper nature does
per modum participationis: sicut calor not belong to other things except by
aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum igitur way of participation, as heat is in other
esse competit omnibus aliis a primo bodies from fire. Therefore, being
agente per participationem quandam. itself belongs to all other things from
Quod autem competit alicui per the first agent by a certain
participationem, non est substantia participation. That which belongs to a
eius. Impossibile est igitur quod thing by participation, however, is not
substantia alterius entis praeter that thing’s substance. Therefore, it is
agens primum sit ipsum esse. impossible that the substance of a
thing other than the first agent should
be being itself.
Hinc est quod Exodi 314 proprium [9] Wherefore in Exodus (3:14) the
nomen Dei ponitur esse qui est: quia proper name of God is stated to be
eius solius proprium est quod sua “HE WHO IS,” because it is proper to
substantia non sit aliud quam suum Him alone that His substance is not
esse. other than His being.
Caput 53 Chapter 53
Quod in substantiis intellectualibus THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL
creatis est actus et potentia SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND
POTENTIALITY
Ex hoc autem evidenter apparet [1] Now, from the foregoing it is evident

quod in substantiis intellectualibus that in created intellectual substances
creatis est compositio actus et there is composition of act and
potentiae. potentiality.
In quocumque enim inveniuntur [2] For in whatever thing we find two,
aliqua duo quorum unum est one of which is the complement of the
complementum alterius, proportio other, the proportion of one of them to
unius eorum ad alterum est sicut the other is as the proportion of
proportio potentiae ad actum: nihil potentiality to act; for nothing is
enim completur nisi per proprium completed except by its proper act.
actum. In substantia autem Now, in the created intellectual
intellectuali creata inveniuntur duo: substance two principles are found: the
scilicet substantia ipsa; et esse eius, substance itself and its being, which, as
quod non est ipsa substantia, ut we have just shown, is not the
ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse est substance itself. Now, being itself is the
complementum substantiae complement of the existing substance,
existentis: unumquodque enim actu for each and every thing is in act
est per hoc quod esse habet. through having being. It therefore
Relinquitur igitur quod in qualibet remains that in each of the aforesaid
praedictarum substantiarum sit substances there is composition of act
compositio actus et potentiae. and potentiality.
Amplius. Quod inest alicui ab [3] There is also the consideration that
agente, oportet esse actum: agentis what ever is present in a thing from an
enim est facere aliquid actu. agent must be act, for it belongs to an
Ostensum est autem supra quod agent to make something in act. Now, it
omnes aliae substantiae habent was shown above that all other
esse a primo agente: et per hoc substances have being from the first
ipsae substantiae causatae sunt agent; and the substances themselves
quod esse ab alio habent. Ipsum are caused by the fact that they have
igitur esse inest substantiis causatis being from another. Therefore, being is
ut quidam actus ipsarum. Id autem present in caused substances as a
cui actus inest, potentia est: nam certain act of their own. But that in
actus, inquantum huiusmodi, ad which act is present is a potentiality,
potentiam refertur. In qualibet igitur since act, as such, is referred to
substantia creata est potentia et potentiality. Therefore, in every created
actus. substance there is potentiality and act.
Item. Omne participans aliquid [4] Likewise, whatever participates in a

comparatur ad ipsum quod thing is compared to the thing
participatur ut potentia ad actum: per participated in as act to potentiality,
id enim quod participatur fit since by that which is participated the
participans actu tale. Ostensum participator is actualized in such and
autem est supra quod solus Deus such a way. But it was shown above
est essentialiter ens, omnia autem that God alone is essentially a being,
alia participant ipsum esse. whereas all other things participate in
Comparatur igitur substantia omnis being. Therefore, every created
creata ad suum esse sicut potentia substance is compared to its own being
ad actum. as potentiality to act.
Praeterea. Assimilatio alicuius ad [5] Furthermore, it is by act that a thing

causam agentem fit per actum: is made like its efficient cause, for the
agens enim agit sibi simile agent produces its like so far as it is in
inquantum est actu. Assimilatio act. Now, as shown above it is through
autem cuiuslibet substantiae creatae being itself that every created
ad Deum est per ipsum esse, ut substance is likened to God. Therefore,
supra ostensum est. Ipsum igitur being itself is compared to all created
esse comparatur ad omnes substances as their act. Whence it
substantias creatas sicut actus follows that in every created substance
earum. Ex quo relinquitur quod in there is composition of act and
qualibet substantia creata sit potentiality.
compositio actus et potentiae.
Caput 54 Chapter 54
Quod non est idem componi ex THAT THE COMPOSITION OF
substantia et esse, et materia et forma SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT
THE SAME AS THE COMPOSITION
OF MATTER AND FORM
Non est autem eiusdem rationis [1] Now, these compositions are not
compositio ex materia et forma, et ex of the same nature, although both
substantia et esse: quamvis utraque sit are compositions of potentiality and
ex potentia et actu. act.
Primo quidem, quia materia non est [2] First, this is so because matter is

ipsa substantia rei, nam sequeretur not the very substance of a thing; for,
omnes formas esse accidentia, sicut if that were true, it would follow that
antiqui naturales opinabantur: sed all forms are accidents, as the early
materia est pars substantiae. natural philosophers supposed. But
matter is not the substance; it is only
part of the substance.
Secundo autem quia ipsum esse non [3] Secondly, because being itself is
est proprius actus materiae, sed the proper act, not of the matter, but
substantiae totius. Eius enim actus est of the whole substance; for being is
esse de quo possumus dicere quod sit. the act of that whereof we can say
Esse autem non dicitur de materia, sed that it is. Now, this act is predicated
de toto. Unde materia non potest dici not of the matter, but of the whole.
quod est, sed ipsa substantia est id Hence, matter cannot be called that
quod est. which is; rather, the substance itself
is that which is.
Tertio, quia nec forma est ipsum esse, [4] Thirdly, because neither is the

sed se habent secundum ordinem: form the being itself, but between
comparatur enim forma ad ipsum esse them there is a relation of order,
sicut lux ad lucere, vel albedo ad because form is compared to being
album esse. itself as light to illuminating, or
whiteness to being white.
Deinde quia ad ipsam etiam formam [5] Then, too, because being is
comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per compared even to the form itself as
hoc enim in compositis ex materia et act. For in things composed of
forma dicitur forma esse principium matter and form, the form is said to
essendi, quia est complementum be the principle of being, for this
substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum reason: that it is the complement of
esse: sicut diaphanum est aeri the substance, whose act is being.
principium lucendi quia facit eum Thus, transparency is in relation to
proprium subiectum luminis. the air the principle of illumination, in
that it makes the air the proper
subject of light.
Unde in compositis ex materia et forma [6] Accordingly, in things composed

nec materia nec forma potest dici of matter and form, neither the
ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. matter nor the form nor even being
Forma tamen potest dici quo est, itself can be termed that which is. Yet
secundum quod est essendi the form can be called that by which
principium; ipsa autem tota substantia it is, inasmuch as it is the principle of
est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est being; the whole substance itself,
quo substantia denominatur ens. however, is that which is. And being
itself is that by which the substance
is called a being.
In substantiis autem intellectualibus, [7] But, as we have shown,
quae non sunt ex materia et forma intellectual substances are not
compositae, ut ostensum est, sed in composed of matter and form; rather,
eis ipsa forma est substantia in them the form itself is a subsisting
subsistens, forma est quod est, ipsum substance; so that form here is that
autem esse est actus et quo est. which is and being itself is act and
that by which the substance is.
Et propter hoc in eis est unica tantum [8] And on this account there is in
compositio actus et potentiae, quae such substances but one
scilicet est ex substantia et esse, quae composition of act and potentiality,
a quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et namely, the composition of
esse; vel ex quod est et quo est. substance and being, which by some
is said to be of that which is and
being, or of that which is and that by
which a thing is.
In substantiis autem compositis ex [9] On the other hand, in substances

materia et forma est duplex compositio composed of matter and form there
actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius is a twofold composition of act and
substantiae, quae componitur ex potentiality: the first, of the
materia et forma; secunda vero ex ipsa substance itself which is composed
substantia iam composita et esse, of matter and form; the second, of
quae etiam potest dici ex quod est et the substance thus composed, and
esse; vel ex quod est et quo est. being; and this composition also can
be said to be of that which is and
being, or of that which is and that by
which a thing is.
Sic igitur patet quod compositio actus [10] It is therefore clear that
et potentiae est in plus quam composition of act and potentiality
compositio formae et materiae. Unde has greater extension than that of
materia et forma dividunt substantiam form and matter. Thus, matter and
naturalem: potentia autem et actus form divide natural substance, while
dividunt ens commune. Et propter hoc potentiality and act divide common
quaecumque quidem consequuntur being. Accordingly, whatever follows
potentiam et actum inquantum upon potentiality and act, as such, is
huiusmodi, sunt communia substantiis common to both material and

materialibus et immaterialibus creatis: immaterial created substances, as to
sicut recipere et recipi, perficere et receive and to be received, to perfect
perfici. Quaecumque vero sunt propria and to be perfected. Yet all that is
materiae et formae inquantum proper to matter and form, as such,
huiusmodi, sicut generari et corrumpi as to be generated and to be
et alia huiusmodi, haec sunt propria corrupted, and the like, are proper to
substantiarum materialium, et nullo material substances, and in no way
modo conveniunt substantiis belong to immaterial created
immaterialibus creatis. substances.
Caput 55 Chapter 55
sunt incorruptibiles ARE INCORRUPTIBLE
Ex hoc autem aperte ostenditur [1] Now, from what has just been said it

quod omnis substantia intellectualis is clearly shown that every intellectual
est incorruptibilis. substance is incorruptible.
Omnis enim corruptio est per [2] For all corruption occurs through the

separationem formae a materia: separation of form from matter; absolute
simplex quidem corruptio per corruption, through the separation of the
separationem formae substantialis; substantial form; relative corruption,
corruptio autem secundum quid per through the separation of an accidental
separationem formae accidentalis. form. For, so long as the form remains,
Forma enim manente, oportet rem the thing must exist, since by the form
esse: per formam enim substantia the substance is made the proper
fit proprium susceptivum eius quod recipient of the act of being. Now, where
est esse. Ubi autem non est there is no composition of matter and
compositio formae et materiae, ibi form, there can be no separation of
non potest esse separatio them; neither, then, can there be
earundem. Igitur nec corruptio. corruption. It has been shown, however,
Ostensum est autem quod nulla that no intellectual substance is
substantia intellectualis est composed of matter and form.
composita ex materia et forma. Therefore, no intellectual substance is
Nulla igitur substantia intellectualis corruptible.
est corruptibilis.
Amplius. Quod per se alicui [3] Moreover, that which belongs to a
competit, de necessitate et semper thing through itself is necessarily in it
et inseparabiliter ei inest: sicut always and inseparably—thus,
rotundum per se quidem inest roundness is in a circle through itself,
circulo, per accidens autem aeri; but is by accident in a coin; so that the
unde aes quidem fieri non existence of a nonround coin is
rotundum est possibile, circulum possible; whereas it is impossible for a
autem non esse rotundum est circle not to be round. Now, being is
impossibile. Esse autem per se consequent upon form through itself; for

consequitur ad formam: per se by through itself we mean according as
enim dicimus secundum quod that thing is such; and each and every
ipsum; unumquodque autem habet thing has being according as it has
esse secundum quod habet form. Therefore, substances which are
formam. Substantiae igitur quae not themselves forms can be deprived
non sunt ipsae formae, possunt of being, so far as they lose form, even
privari esse, secundum quod as a coin is deprived of roundness as a
amittunt formam: sicut aes privatur result of ceasing to be circular. But
rotunditate secundum quod desinit substances which are themselves forms
esse circulare. Substantiae vero can never be deprived of being; thus, if
quae sunt ipsae formae, nunquam a substance were a circle, it could never
possunt privari esse: sicut, si aliqua be nonround. Now, we have already
substantia esset circulus, nunquam shown that intellectual substances are
posset fieri non rotunda. Ostensum themselves subsisting forms. Hence,
est autem supra quod substantiae they cannot possibly cease to be, and
intellectuales sunt ipsae formae therefore they are incorruptible.
subsistentes. Impossibile est igitur
quod esse desinant. Sunt igitur
incorruptibiles.
Adhuc. In omni corruptione, remoto [4] In every instance of corruption,

actu, manet potentia: non enim furthermore, potentiality remains after
corrumpitur aliquid in omnino non the removal of act. For when a thing is
ens, sicut nec generatur aliquid ex corrupted it does not dissolve into
omnino non ente. In substantiis absolute nonentity, any more than a
autem intellectualibus, ut ostensum thing is generated from absolute non
est, actus est ipsum esse, ipsa entity. But, as we have proved, in
autem substantia est sicut potentia. intellectual substances the act is being
Si igitur substantia intellectualis itself, while the substance is as
corrumpatur, remanebit post suam potentiality. Therefore, if an intellectual
corruptionem. Quod est omnino substance is corrupted, it will remain
impossibile. Omnis igitur substantia after its corruption; which is simply
intellectualis est incorruptibilis. impossibility. Therefore, every
intellectual substance is incorruptible.
Item. In omni quod corrumpitur, [5] Likewise, in every thing which is
oportet quod sit potentia ad non corrupted there must be potentiality to
esse. Si quid igitur est in quo non nonbeing. Hence, if there be a thing in
est potentia ad non esse, hoc non which there is no potentiality to non
potest esse corruptibile. In being, such a thing cannot be
substantia autem intellectuali non corruptible. Now, in the intellectual
est potentia ad non esse. substance there is no potentiality to
Manifestum est enim ex dictis quod nonbeing. For it is clear from what we
substantia completa est proprium have said that the complete substance
susceptivum ipsius esse. Proprium is the proper recipient of being itself. But
autem susceptivum alicuius actus the proper recipient of an act is related
ita comparatur ut potentia ad actum to that act as potentiality, in such fashion
illum quod nullo modo est in that it is in no way in potentiality to the
potentia ad oppositum: sicut ignis opposite; thus, the relationship of fire to

ita comparatur ad calorem ut heat is such that fire is in no way in
potentia ad actum quod nullo modo potentiality to cold. Hence, neither in the
est in potentia ad frigus. Unde nec case of corruptible substances is there
in ipsis substantiis corruptibilibus potentiality to nonbeing in the complete
est potentia ad non esse in ipsa substance itself, except by reason of the
substantia completa nisi ratione matter. But there is no matter in
materiae. In substantiis autem intellectual substances, for they are
intellectualibus non est materia, sed themselves complete simple
ipsae sunt substantiae completae substances. Consequently, there is no
simplices. Igitur in eis non est potentiality to notbeing in them.
potentia ad non esse. Sunt igitur Therefore, they are incorruptible.
incorruptibiles.
Praeterea. In quibuscumque est [6] Then, too, in whatever things there is

compositio potentiae et actus, id composition of potentiality and act, that
quod tenet locum primae potentiae, which holds the place of first potentiality,
sive primi subiecti, est or of first subject, is incorruptible; so that
incorruptibile: unde etiam in even in corruptible substances prime
substantiis corruptibilibus materia matter is incorruptible. But, with
prima est incorruptibilis. Sed in intellectual substances, that which holds
substantiis intellectualibus id quod the place of first potentiality and subject
tenet locum primae potentiae et is itself the complete substance of those
subiecti, est ipsa earum substantia things. Hence, the substance itself is
completa. Igitur substantia ipsa est incorruptible. But nothing is corruptible
incorruptibilis. Nihil autem est except by the fact that its substance is
corruptibile nisi per hoc quod sua corruptible. Therefore, all intellectual
substantia corrumpitur. Igitur omnes natures are incorruptible.
intellectuales naturae sunt
incorruptibiles.
Amplius. Omne quod corrumpitur [7] Moreover, whatever is corrupted is

vel corrumpitur per se, vel corrupted either through itself or by
corrumpitur per accidens. accident. Now, intellectual substances
Substantiae autem intellectuales cannot be corrupted through
non possunt per se corrumpi. themselves, because all corruption is by
Omnis enim corruptio est a a contrary. For the agent, since it acts
contrario. Agens enim, cum agat according as it is a being in act, always
secundum quod est ens actu, by its acting brings something into
semper agendo ducit ad aliquid actual being, so that if a thing is
esse actu. Unde, si per huiusmodi corrupted by its ceasing to be in act, this
esse actu aliquid corrumpatur must result from the mutual contrariety
desinens esse actu, oportet quod of the terms involved; since things are
hoc contingat per contrarietatem contrary which exclude one another.
eorum ad invicem: nam contraria And on this account whatever is
sunt quae mutuo se expellunt. Et corrupted through itself must either have
propter hoc oportet omne quod a contrary or be composed of
corrumpitur per se, vel habere contraries. Yet neither the one nor the
contrarium, vel esse ex contrariis other is true of intellectual substances;
compositum. Neutrum autem horum and a sign of this is that in the intellect
substantiis intellectualibus convenit. things even of contrary nature cease to
Cuius signum est, quia in intellectu be contraries. Thus, white and black are
ea etiam quae secundum suam not contraries in the intellect, since they
naturam sunt contraria, desinunt do not exclude one another; rather, they
esse contraria: album enim et are coimplicative, since by grasping the
nigrum in intellectu non sunt one we understand the other. Therefore,
contraria; non enim se expellunt, intellectual substances are not
immo magis se consequuntur, per corruptible through themselves.
intellectum enim unius eorum Likewise, neither are they corruptible by
intelligitur aliud. Substantiae igitur accident, for in this manner are
intellectuales non sunt corruptibiles accidents and nonsubsistent forms
per se. Similiter autem neque per corrupted. Now, it was shown above
accidens. Sic enim corrumpuntur that intellectual substances are
accidentia et formae non subsistent. Therefore, they are
subsistentes. Ostensum autem est altogether incorruptible.
supra quod substantiae
intellectuales sunt subsistentes.
Sunt igitur omnino incorruptibiles.
Adhuc. Corruptio est mutatio [8] Again, corruption is a kind of change,

quaedam. Quam oportet esse and change must be the terminal point
terminum motus, ut in physicis est of a movement, as is proved in the
probatum. Unde oportet quod omne Physics [V, 1]. Hence, whatever is
quod corrumpitur moveatur. corrupted must be moved. Now, it is
Ostensum est autem in naturalibus shown in natural philosophy that
quod omne quod movetur est whatever is moved is a body. Hence,
corpus. Oportet igitur omne quod whatever is corrupted must be a body, if
corrumpitur esse corpus, si per se it is corrupted through itself, or a form or
corrumpatur: vel aliquam formam power of a body depending thereon, if it
seu virtutem corporis a corpore be corrupted by accident. Now,
dependentem, si corrumpatur per intellectual substances are not bodies,
accidens. Substantiae autem nor powers or forms dependent on a
intellectuales non sunt corpora, body. Consequently, they are corrupted
neque virtutes seu formae a neither through themselves nor by
corpore dependentes. Ergo neque accident. They are, then, utterly
per se neque per accidens incorruptible.
corrumpuntur. Sunt igitur omnino
incorruptibiles.
Item. Omne quod corrumpitur, [9] And again. Whatever is corrupted is

corrumpitur per hoc quod aliquid corrupted through being passive to
patitur: nam et ipsum corrumpi est something, for to be corrupted is itself to
quoddam pati. Nulla autem be passive in a certain way. Now, no
substantia intellectualis potest pati intellectual substance can be passive in
tali passione quae ducat ad such a way as will lead to its corruption.
corruptionem. Nam pati recipere For passivity is a kind of receptivity, and
quoddam est. Quod autem recipitur what is received into an intellectual
in substantia intellectuali, oportet substance must be received in it in a
quod recipiatur in ea per modum manner consonant with its mode,
ipsius, scilicet intelligibiliter. Quod namely, intelligibly. What is thus

vero sic in substantia intellectuali received into an intellectual substance,
recipitur, est perficiens substantiam however, perfects that substance and
intellectualem, et non corrumpens does not corrupt it, for the intelligible is
eam: intelligibile enim est perfectio the perfection of the intelligent.
intelligentis. Substantia igitur Therefore, an intelligent substance is
intelligens est incorruptibilis. incorruptible.
Praeterea. Sicut sensibile est [10] Furthermore, just as the sensible is

obiectum sensus, ita intelligibile est the object of sense, so the intelligible is
obiectum intellectus. Sensus autem the object of intellect. But sense is not
propria corruptione non corrumpitur corrupted by a corruption proper to itself
nisi propter excellentiam sui obiecti: except on account of the exceedingly
sicut visus a valde fulgidis, et high intensity of its object; thus, is sight
auditus a fortibus sonis, et sic de corrupted by very brilliant objects,
aliis. Dico autem propria hearing by very loud sounds, etc. Now, I
corruptione: quia sensus say by corruption proper to the thing
corrumpitur etiam per accidens itself because the sense is corrupted
propter corruptionem subiecti. Qui also accidentally through its subject
tamen modus corruptionis non being corrupted. But this mode of
potest accidere intellectui: cum non corruption cannot happen to the
sit actus corporis ullius quasi a intellect, since it is not the act of any
corpore dependens, ut supra body, as depending thereon, as we
ostensum est. Patet autem quod have shown above. And clearly it is not
nec corrumpitur per excellentiam corrupted by the exceeding loftiness of
sui obiecti: quia qui intelligit valde its object, because he who understands
intelligibilia, non minus intelligit very intelligible things understands
minus intelligibilia, sed magis. things less intelligible not less but more.
Intellectus igitur nullo modo est Therefore, the intellect is in no way
corruptibilis. corruptible.
Amplius. Intelligibile est propria [11] Also, the intelligible is the proper
perfectio intellectus: unde perfection of the intellect; so that “the
intellectus in actu et intelligibile in intellect in act and the intelligible in act
actu sunt unum. Quod igitur are one. Hence, whatever appertains to
convenit intelligibili inquantum est the intelligible, as such, must appertain
intelligibile, oportet convenire to the intellect, as such, because
intellectui inquantum huiusmodi: perfection and the perfectible are of one
quia perfectio et perfectibile sunt genus. Now, the intelligible, as such, is
unius generis. Intelligibile autem, necessary and incorruptible; for
inquantum est intelligibile, est necessary things are perfectly knowable
necessarium et incorruptibile: by the intellect, whereas contingent
necessaria enim perfecte sunt things, as such, are only deficiently
intellectu cognoscibilia; contingentia knowable, for concerning them we have
vero, inquantum huiusmodi, non not science but opinion. So it is that the
nisi deficienter; habetur enim de eis intellect has scientific knowledge of
non scientia, sed opinio; unde et corruptible things so far as they are
corruptibilium intellectus scientiam incorruptible, that is, inasmuch as they
habet secundum quod sunt are universal. The intellect, therefore,
incorruptibilia, inquantum scilicet must be incorruptible.

sunt universalia. Oportet igitur
intellectum esse incorruptibilem.
Adhuc. Unumquodque perficitur [12] Moreover, a thing is perfected

secundum modum suae according to the mode of its substance.
substantiae. Ex modo igitur Hence, the mode of a thing’s substance
perfectionis alicuius rei potest accipi can be learned from the mode of its
modus substantiae ipsius. perfection. Now, the intellect is not
Intellectus autem non perficitur per perfected by movement, but by the fact
motum, sed per hoc quod est extra of its being outside movement; for, as
motum existens: perficimur enim concerns the intellective soul, we are
secundum intellectivam animam perfected by science and prudence
scientia et prudentia, sedatis when bodily changes and alterations of
permutationibus et corporalibus et the soul’s passions are put at rest, as
animae passionum; ut patet per Aristotle points out in Physics VII [3].
philosophum, in VII physicorum. Hence, the mode of an intelligent
Modus igitur substantiae substance consists in the fact that its
intelligentis est quod esse suum sit being is above movement and
supra motum, et per consequens consequently above time; whereas the
supra tempus. Esse autem being of every corruptible thing is
cuiuslibet rei corruptibilis subiacet subject to motion and time. Therefore,
motui et tempori. Impossibile est an intelligent substance cannot possibly
igitur substantiam intelligentem be corruptible.
esse corruptibilem.
Praeterea. Impossibile est naturale [13] A further argument. It is impossible

desiderium esse inane: natura enim for natural desire to be in vain, “since
nihil facit frustra. Sed quilibet nature does nothing in vain.” But every
intelligens naturaliter desiderat esse intelligent being naturally desires to be
perpetuum: non solum ut forever; and to be forever not only in its
perpetuetur esse secundum species but also in the individual. This
speciem, sed etiam individuum. point is made clear as follows. Natural
Quod sic patet. Naturalis enim appetite is present in some things as the
appetitus quibusdam quidem inest result of apprehension; the wolf
ex apprehensione: sicut lupus naturally desires the killing of the
naturaliter desiderat occisionem animals on which it feeds, and man
animalium ex quibus pascitur, et naturally desires happiness. But in
homo naturaliter desiderat some other things natural desires
felicitatem. Quibusdam vero absque results without apprehension from the
apprehensione, ex sola inclinatione sole inclination of natural principles, and
naturalium principiorum, quae this inclination, in some, is called natural
naturalis appetitus in quibusdam appetite; thus, a heavy body desires to
dicitur: sicut grave appetit esse be down. Now, in both ways there is in
deorsum. Utroque autem modo things a natural desire for being; and a
inest rebus naturale desiderium sign of this is that not only things devoid
essendi: cuius signum est quia et of knowledge resist, according to the
ea quae cognitione carent, resistunt power of their natural principles,
corrumpentibus secundum virtutem whatever is corruptive of them, but also
suorum principiorum naturalium; et things possessed of knowledge resist
ea quae cognitionem habent, the same according to the mode of their

resistunt eisdem secundum modum knowledge. Hence, those things lacking
suae cognitionis. Illa igitur knowledge, in whose principles there is
cognitione carentia quorum a power of keeping themselves in
principiis inest virtus ad existence forever so that they remain
conservandum esse perpetuum ita always the same numerically, naturally
quod maneant semper eadem desire to exist everlastingly even in their
secundum numerum, naturaliter numerical selfidentity. But things whose
appetunt esse perpetuum etiam principles have not the power to do this,
secundum idem numero. Quorum but only the power of perpetuating their
autem principia non habent ad hoc existence in the same species, also
virtutem, sed solum ad naturally desire to be perpetuated in this
conservandum esse perpetuum manner. Hence, this same difference
secundum idem specie, etiam sic must be found also in those things in
naturaliter appetunt perpetuitatem. which there is desire for being, together
Hanc igitur differentiam oportet et in with knowledge, so that those things
his inveniri quibus desiderium which have no knowledge of being
essendi cum cognitione inest: ut except as now desire to be as now, but
scilicet illa quae non cognoscunt not to be always, because they do not
esse nisi ut nunc, desiderant esse apprehend everlasting being. Yet they
ut nunc; non autem semper, quia desire the perpetual existence of the
esse sempiternum non species, though without knowledge,
apprehendunt. Desiderant tamen because the generative power, which
esse perpetuum speciei: tamen conduces to this effect, is a forerunner
absque cognitione; quia virtus and not a subject of knowledge. Hence,
generativa, quae ad hoc deservit, those things which know and apprehend
praeambula est, et non subiacens perpetual being desire it with natural
cognitioni. Illa igitur quae ipsum desire. And this is true of all intelligent
esse perpetuum cognoscunt et substances. Consequently, all intelligent
apprehendunt, desiderant ipsum substances, by their natural appetite,
naturali desiderio. Hoc autem desire to be always. That they should
convenit omnibus substantiis cease to be is, therefore, impossible.
intelligentibus. Omnes igitur
substantiae intelligentes naturali
desiderio appetunt esse semper.
Ergo impossibile est quod esse
deficiant.
Adhuc. Quaecumque incipiunt esse [14] Furthermore, all things that begin to
et desinunt, per eandem potentiam be and cease to be do so in virtue of the
habent utrumque: eadem enim est same potency, for the same potency
potentia ad esse et ad non esse. regards being and nonbeing. Now,
Sed substantiae intelligentes non intelligent substances could not begin to
potuerunt incipere esse nisi per be except by the potency of the first
potentiam primi agentis: non enim agent, since, as we have shown, they
sunt ex materia, quae potuerit are not made out of a matter that could
praefuisse, ut ostensum est. Igitur have existed antecedently to them.
nec est aliqua potentia ad non esse Hence, there is no potency with respect
earum nisi in primo agente, to their nonbeing except in the first
secundum quod potest non influere agent, inasmuch as it lies within His

eis esse. Sed ex hac sola potentia power not to pour being into them. But
nihil potest dici corruptibile. Tum nothing can be said to be corruptible
quia res dicuntur necessariae et with respect to this potency alone; and
contingentes secundum potentiam for two reasons: because things are
quae est in eis, et non secundum said to be necessary and contingent
potentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum according to a potentiality that is in
est. Tum etiam quia Deus, qui est them, and not according to the power of
institutor naturae, non subtrahit God, as we have already shown, and
rebus id quod est proprium naturis also because God, who is the Author of
earum; ostensum est autem quod nature, does not take from things that
proprium naturis intellectualibus est which is proper to their natures; and we
quod sint perpetuae; unde hoc eis a have just shown that it is proper to
Deo non subtrahetur. Sunt igitur intellectual natures to exist forever, and
substantiae intellectuales ex omni that is why God will not take this
parte incorruptibiles. property from them. Therefore,
intellectual substances are in every way
incorruptible.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo: laudate [15] So it is that in the Psalm (148:1, 6):

dominum de caelis, connumeratis “Praise the Lord from the heavens,”
Angelis et caelestibus corporibus, after speaking of the angels and the
subiungitur: statuit ea in aeternum heavenly bodies together, it is added:
et in saeculum saeculi, per quod “He established them for ever and for
praedictorum perpetuitas ages of ages,” thus designating the
designatur. everlastingness of those things.
Dionysius etiam, in IV cap. de Div. [16] Dionysius also, in his work On the
Nom., dicit quod propter divinae Divine Names [4], says that “it is
bonitatis radios substiterunt because of the rays of God’s goodness
intelligibiles et intellectuales that intelligible and intellectual
substantiae, et sunt et vivunt, et substances subsist and are and live;
habent vitam indeficientem et and they have life unfailing and
imminorabilem, ab universa undiminishable, being free from
corruptione et generatione et morte universal corruption, free from
mundae existentes, et elevatae ab generation and death, lifted above the
instabili et fluxa variatione. instability of this world in flux.”
Caput 56 Chapter 56
Per quem modum substantia IN WHAT WAY AN INTELLECTUAL
intellectualis possit corpori uniri SUBSTANCE CAN BE UNITED TO THE
BODY
Cum autem supra ostensum sit [1] Having shown that an intellectual
substantiam intellectualem non substance is not a body or a power
esse corpus neque virtutem dependent on a body, it remains for us to
aliquam a corpore dependentem, inquire whether an intellectual substance

restat investigandum utrum aliqua can be united to a body.
substantia intellectualis corpori
possit uniri.
Est autem primo manifestum [2] In the first place, it is evident that an
quod substantia intellectualis non intellectual substance cannot be united to
potest corpori uniri per modum a body by way of mixture.
mixtionis. [3] For things mixed together are
Quae enim miscentur, oportet ad necessarily altered in relation to one
invicem alterata esse. Quod non another. But such alteration occurs only in
contingit nisi in his quorum est things whose matter is the same, and
materia eadem, quae possunt which can be active and passive in
esse activa et passiva ad invicem. relation to one another. But intellectual
Substantiae autem intellectuales substances have no matter in common
non communicant in materia cum with bodies, since, as shown above, they
corporalibus: sunt enim are immaterial. Hence, they are not
immateriales, ut supra ostensum combinable with bodies.
est. Non sunt igitur corpori
miscibiles.
Adhuc. Quae miscentur, mixtione [4] Moreover, the things that are combined

iam facta, non manent actu, sed with one another do not themselves,
virtute tantum: nam si actu having been combined, remain actually,
manerent, non esset mixtio, sed but only virtually; for, were they to remain
confusio tantum; unde corpus actually, it would be not a mixture, but
mixtum ex elementis nullum only a collection; that is why a body
eorum est. Hoc autem impossibile constituted by a mixture of elements is
est accidere substantiis none of those elements. But this cannot
intellectualibus: sunt enim possibly occur in the case of intellectual
incorruptibiles, ut supra ostensum substances, since, as we have just
est. shown, they are incorruptible.
Non igitur potest substantia [5] Therefore, an intellectual substance
intellectualis uniri corpori per cannot be united to a body by way of
modum mixtionis. mixture.
Similiter autem patet quod [6] It is likewise evident that an intellectual

substantia intellectualis non substance cannot be united to a body by
potest uniri corpori per modum way of contact properly so called. For
contactus proprie sumpti. Tactus there is contact only between bodies,
enim non nisi corporum est: sunt since things are in contact when they
enim tangentia quorum sunt come together at their extremities, as the
ultima simul, ut puncta aut lineae points or lines or surfaces which are the
aut superficies, quae sunt extremities of bodies. It is, therefore,
corporum ultima. Non igitur per impossible for an intellectual substance to
modum contactus substantia be united to a body by way of contact.
intellectualis corpori uniri potest.
Ex hoc autem relinquitur quod [7] And from this it follows that neither by

neque continuatione, neque continuation nor composition or colligation

compositione aut colligatione, ex can union of an intellectual substance with
substantia intellectuali et corpore a body be effected. For without contact
unum fieri possit. Omnia enim none of these is possible.
haec sine contactu esse non
possunt.
Est tamen quidam modus [8] There is, however, a certain kind of
contactus quo substantia contact whereby an intellectual substance
intellectualis corpori uniri potest. can be united to a body. For, when they
Corpora enim naturalia tangendo are in contact, natural bodies alter one
se alterant: et sic ad invicem another, thus being mutually united not
uniuntur non solum secundum only by way of their quantitative
ultima quantitatis, sed etiam extremities, but also by way of likeness in
secundum similitudinem qualitatis quality or form, as long as the altering
aut formae, dum alterans formam body impresses its form upon the body
suam imprimit in alteratum. Et altered. Now, if the quantitative
quamvis, si considerentur solum extremities alone be considered, then in
ultima quantitatis, oporteat in all cases contact must of necessity be
omnibus mutuum esse tactum, mutual. On the other hand, if attention is
tamen, si attendatur ad actionem given to activity and passivity, it will be
et passionem, invenientur aliqua found that certain things touch others and
esse tangentia tantum et aliqua are not themselves touched, while certain
tacta tantum: corpora enim things are themselves touched and touch
caelestia tangunt quidem hoc nothing else. For, indeed, the heavenly
modo elementaria corpora, bodies touch elemental bodies in this way,
inquantum ea alterant: non autem inasmuch as they alter them, but they are
tanguntur ab eis, quia ab eis non not touched by the elemental bodies,
patiuntur. Si igitur sint aliqua since they are not acted upon by them.
agentia quae quantitatis ultimis Consequently, if there are any agents not
non tangant, dicentur nihilominus in contact by their quantitative extremities,
tangere, inquantum agunt: they nevertheless will be said to touch, so
secundum quem modum dicimus far as they act; and in this sense we say
quod contristans nos tangit. Hoc that a person in sorrow touches us.
igitur modo tangendi possibile est Hence, it is possible for an intellectual
uniri substantiam intellectualem substance to be united to a body by
corpori per contactum. Agunt contact, by touching it in this way. For
enim substantiae intellectuales in intellectual substances, being immaterial
corpora et movent ea, cum sint and enjoying a higher degree of actuality
immateriales et magis in actu than bodies, act on the latter and move
existentes. them.
Hic autem tactus non est [9] This, however, is not contact of
quantitatis, sed virtutis. Unde quantity, but of power. It therefore differs
differt hic tactus a tactu corporeo from bodily contact in three ways. First,
in tribus. Primo quidem, quia hoc because by this contact the indivisible can
tactu id quod est indivisibile potest touch the divisible. Now, in bodily contact
tangere divisibile. Quod in tactu this cannot occur, since only an indivisible
corporeo non potest accidere: thing can be touched by a point. But an
nam puncto non potest tangi nisi intellectual substance, though it is
indivisibile aliquid. Substantia indivisible, can touch divisible quantity, so
autem intellectualis, quamvis sit far as it acts upon it. For, indeed, a point
indivisibilis, potest tangere is indivisible in one way and an intellectual
quantitatem divisibilem, substance in another. A point is indivisible
inquantum agit in ipsam. Alio as being the terminus of a quantity, and
enim modo est indivisibile for this reason it occupies a determinate
punctum, et substantia position in a continuous quantity, beyond
intellectualis. Punctum quidem which it cannot extend. But an intellectual
sicut quantitatis terminus: et ideo substance is indivisible, as being outside
habet situm determinatum in the genus of quantity, and that is why no
continuo, ultra quem porrigi non quantitative indivisible entity with which it
potest. Substantia autem can make contact is assigned to it.
intellectualis est indivisibilis quasi Contact of quantity differs from quantity of
extra genus quantitatis existens. power, secondly, because the former
Unde non determinatur ei obtains only with respect to the
indivisibile aliquid quantitatis ad extremities, whereas the latter regards the
tangendum. Secundo, quia tactus whole thing touched. For by contact of
quantitatis est solum secundum power a thing is touched according as it is
ultima: tactus autem virtutis est ad acted upon and is moved. And this comes
totum quod tangitur. Sic enim about inasmuch as the thing is in
tangitur secundum quod patitur et potentiality. Now, potentiality regards the
movetur. Hoc autem fit secundum whole and not the extremities of the
quod est in potentia. Potentia vero whole; so that it is the whole that is
est secundum totum, non touched. And from this the third difference
secundum ultima totius. Unde emerges, because in contact of quantity,
totum tangitur. Ex quo patet tertia which takes place in respect of
differentia. Quia in tactu extremities, that which touches must be
quantitatis, qui fit secundum extrinsic to that which is touched; and it
extrema, oportet esse tangens cannot penetrate the thing touched, but is
extrinsecum ei quod tangitur; et obstructed by it. But, since contact of
non potest incedere per ipsum, power, which appertains to intellectual
sed impeditur ab eo. Tactus substances, extends to the innermost
autem virtutis, qui competit things, it makes the touching substance to
substantiis intellectualibus, cum be within the thing touched, and to
sit ad intima, facit substantiam penetrate it without hindrance.
tangentem esse intra id quod
tangitur, et incedentem per ipsum
absque impedimento.
Sic igitur substantia intellectualis [10] The intellectual substance, then, can

potest corpori uniri per contactum be united to a body by contact of power.
virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur Now, things united by contact of this kind
secundum talem contactum, non are not unqualifiedly one. For they are
sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim one with respect to acting and being acted
unum in agendo et patiendo: quod upon, but this is not to be unqualifiedly
non est esse unum simpliciter. Sic one. Thus, indeed, one is predicated in
enim dicitur unum quomodo et the same mode as being. But to be acting
ens. Esse autem agens non does not mean to be, without qualification,
significat esse simpliciter. Unde so that neither is to be one in action to be
nec esse unum in agendo est one without qualification.

esse unum simpliciter. [11] Now, one, in the unqualified sense of
Unum autem simpliciter tripliciter the term, has a threefold reference: to the
dicitur: vel sicut indivisibile; vel indivisible, to the continuous, and to the
sicut continuum; vel sicut quod one in reason. Now, from the union of an
est ratione unum. Ex substantia intellectual substance and a body there
autem intellectuali et corpore non cannot result a thing indivisibly one,
potest fieri unum quod sit because such a union must consist in a
indivisibile: oportet enim illud esse composite of two things; nor a thing
compositum ex duobus. Neque continuously one, because the parts of
iterum quod sit continuum: quia the continuous are parts of quantity. It
partes continui quantae sunt. therefore remains for us to inquire
Relinquitur igitur inquirendum whether from an intellectual substance
utrum ex substantia intellectuali et and a body there can be formed a thing
corpore possit sic fieri unum sicut one in reason.
quod est ratione unum. [12] Now, from two permanent entities a
Ex duobus autem permanentibus thing one in reason does not result unless
non fit aliquid ratione unum nisi one of them has the character of
sicut ex forma substantiali et substantial form and the other of matter.
materia: ex subiecto enim et For the joining of subject and accident
accidente non fit ratione unum; does not constitute a unity of this kind; the
non enim est eadem ratio hominis idea of man, for example, is not the same
et albi. Hoc igitur inquirendum as the idea of white. So, it must be asked
relinquitur, utrum substantia whether an intellectual substance can be
intellectualis corporis alicuius the substantial form of a body.
forma substantialis esse possit.
Videtur autem rationabiliter [13] Now, to those who consider the
considerantibus hoc esse question reasonably, such a union would
impossibile. seem to be impossible.
Ex duabus enim substantiis actu [14] From two actually existing
existentibus non potest fieri substances one thing cannot be made,
aliquid unum: actus enim because the act of each thing is that by
cuiuslibet est id quo ab altero which it is distinguished from another.
distinguitur. Substantia autem Now, an intellectual substance n an
intellectualis est substantia actu actually existing substance, as is clear
existens, ut ex praemissis from what has been said. And so, too, is a
apparet. Similiter autem et body. It therefore seems that from an
corpus. Non igitur potest aliquid intellectual substance and a body
unum fieri, ut videtur, ex something one cannot be made.
substantia intellectuali et corpore.
Adhuc. Forma et materia in [15] Also, form and matter are contained
eodem genere continentur: omne in the same genus, for every genus is
enim genus per actum et divided by act and potentiality. But
potentiam dividitur. Substantia intellectual substance and body are
autem intellectualis et corpus sunt diverse genera. Hence, it does not seem
diversa genera. Non igitur videtur possible for one to be the form of the
possibile unum esse formam other.

alterius.
Amplius. Omne illud cuius esse [16] Moreover, every thing whose being is

est in materia, oportet esse in matter must be material. Now, if an
materiale. Sed si substantia intellectual substance is the form of a
intellectualis est forma corporis, body, it must have its being in corporeal
oportet quod esse eius sit in matter. For the form’s act of being is not
materia corporali: non enim esse outside that of the matter. Hence, it will
formae est praeter esse materiae. follow that an intellectual substance is not
Sequetur igitur quod substantia immaterial, as it was shown to be above.
intellectualis non sit immaterialis,
ut supra ostensum est.
Item. Impossibile est illud cuius [17] Likewise, it is impossible for a thing
esse est in corpore, esse a that has its being in a body to be separate
corpore separatum. Intellectus from the body, It is, however, proved by
autem ostenditur a philosophis philosophers that the intellect is separate
esse separatus a corpore, et quod from the body, and that it is neither a body
neque est corpus neque virtus in nor a power in a body. Therefore, an
corpore. Non est igitur intellectual substance is not the form of a
intellectualis substantia forma body; if it were, it would have its being in a
corporis: sic enim esse eius esset body.
in corpore.
Adhuc. Cuius esse est commune [18] Again a thing having its being in
corpori, oportet et operationem common with a body must have its
corpori communem esse: operation in common with a body, for
unumquodque enim agit every thing acts in keeping with its being.
secundum quod est ens; nec Nor can the operative power of a thing be
virtus operativa rei potest esse superior to its essence, since power is
sublimior quam eius essentia, consequent upon principles of the
cum virtus essentiae principia essence of a thing. Now, if an intellectual
consequatur. Si autem substantia substance is the form of a body, its being
intellectualis sit forma corporis, must be common to it and the body, since
oportet quod esse eius sit sibi et from form and matter there results a thing
corpori commune: ex forma enim unqualifiedly one, which exists by one act
et materia fit aliquid unum of being. Therefore, an intellectual
simpliciter, quod est secundum substance not only will have its operation
esse unum. Erit igitur et operatio in common with the body, but also its
substantiae intellectualis power will be a power in a body—a
communis corpori, et virtus eius conclusion evidently impossible in the
virtus in corpore. Quod ex light of what has already been said.
praemissis patet esse impossibile.
Caput 57 Chapter 57
Positio Platonis de unione animae TIRE POSITION OF PLATO
intellectualis ad corpus CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE
INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE
BODY
Ex his autem et similibus rationibus [1] Moved by these and like reasons,
aliqui moti, dixerunt quod nulla some have said that no intellectual
substantia intellectualis potest esse substance can be the form of a body.
forma corporis. Sed quia huic But, since the very nature of man
positioni ipsa hominis natura seemed to contradict this position, in
contradicere videbatur, qui ex anima that he appears to be composed of an
intellectuali et corpore videtur esse intellectual soul and a body, they sought
compositus, excogitaverunt to save the nature of man by devising
quasdam vias per quas naturam certain solutions.
hominis salvarent.
Plato igitur posuit, et eius sequaces, [2] Accordingly, Plato and his followers

quod anima intellectualis non unitur asserted that the intellectual soul is not
corpori sicut forma materiae, sed united to the body as form to matter, but
solum sicut motor mobili, dicens only as mover to movable, for Plato said
animam esse in corpore sicut that the soul is in the body “as a sailor
nautam in navi. Et sic unio animae in a ship.” Thus, the union of soul and
et corporis non esset nisi per body would only be by contact of power
contactum virtutis, de quo supra —which we have spoken of above.
dictum est.
Hoc autem videtur inconveniens. [3] But this doctrine seems not to fit the

Secundum praedictum enim facts. For, as a result of contact of
contactum non fit aliquid unum power, a thing unqualifiedly one does
simpliciter, ut ostensum est. Ex not arise, as we have shown; whereas
unione autem animae et corporis fit from the union of soul and body there
homo. Relinquitur igitur quod homo results a man. On Plato’s theory, then, a
non sit unum simpliciter: et per man is not one unqualifiedly speaking,
consequens nec ens simpliciter, sed nor, consequently, is he a being
ens per accidens. unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by
accident.
Ad hoc autem evitandum, Plato [4] In order to avoid this, Plato asserted

posuit quod homo non sit aliquid that man is not a being composed of
compositum ex anima et corpore: body and soul, but that the soul itself
sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore using the body is man; just as Peter is
sit homo; sicut Petrus non est not a thing composed of man and
aliquid compositum ex homine et clothes, but a man using clothes.
indumento, sed homo utens
indumento.
Hoc autem esse impossibile [5] This, however, is shown to be
ostenditur. Animal enim et homo impossible. For animal and man are
sunt quaedam sensibilia et sensible and natural realities. But this
naturalia. Hoc autem non esset si would not be the case if the body and
corpus et eius partes non essent de its parts were not of the essence of man
essentia hominis et animalis, sed and animal; rather, the soul would be
tota essentia utriusque esset anima, the entire essence of both, according to
secundum positionem praedictam: the aforesaid position; for the soul is
anima enim non est aliquid sensibile neither a sensible nor a material thing. It
neque materiale. Impossibile est is, therefore, impossible that man and
igitur hominem et animal esse animal should be a soul using a body,
animam utentem corpore, non and not a thing composed of body and
autem aliquid ex corpore et anima soul.
compositum.
Item. Impossibile est quod eorum [6] It is, moreover, impossible that
quae sunt diversa secundum esse, things diverse in being should have one
sit operatio una. Dico autem operation. Now, I speak of an operation
operationem unam, non ex parte being one, not with reference to that in
eius in quod terminatur actio, sed which the action terminates, but to the
secundum quod egreditur ab manner of its issuance from the agent.
agente: multi enim trahentes navim For many men pulling a boat make one
unam actionem faciunt ex parte action on the part of the thing done,
operati, quod est unum, sed tamen which is one, yet on the part of the
ex parte trahentium sunt multae haulers there are many actions, since
actiones, quia sunt diversi impulsus there are many acts of hauling. For,
ad trahendum, cum enim actio since action is consequent upon form
consequatur formam et virtutem, and power, things having diverse forms
oportet quorum sunt diversae and powers must likewise have diverse
formae et virtutes, esse et actiones actions. Now, though the soul has an
diversas. Quamvis autem animae sit operation proper to itself, in which the
aliqua operatio propria, in qua non body does not share, namely,
communicat corpus, sicut intelligere; understanding, there are nevertheless
sunt tamen aliquae operationes some operations common to it and the
communes sibi et corpori, ut timere body, as fear, anger, sensation, and the
et irasci et sentire et huiusmodi: like; for these operations occur through
haec enim accidunt secundum some transmutation in a determinate
aliquam transmutationem alicuius part of the body, and, therefore,
determinatae partis corporis, ex quo obviously are operations of soul and
patet quod simul sunt animae et body together. It necessarily follows that
corporis operationes. Oportet igitur the soul and the body make up one
ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et single being, and that they have not
quod non sint secundum esse each a distinct being.
diversa.
Huic autem rationi secundum [7] Now, according to the opinion of
Platonis sententiam obviatur. Nihil Plato, this argument may be obviated
enim inconveniens est moventis et by pointing out that there is nothing
moti, quamvis secundum esse contradictory in the action of mover and
diversorum, esse eundem actum: moved being the same, though of things
nam motus est idem actus moventis diverse in being; since the same act

sicut a quo est, moti autem sicut in belongs to the mover as that from which
quo est. Sic igitur Plato posuit it is and to the moved as that in which it
praemissas operationes esse is. Accordingly, Plato asserted that the
animae corporique communes: ut aforesaid operations were common to
videlicet sint animae sicut moventis soul and body, being operations of the
et corporis sicut moti. soul as mover and of the body as
moved.
Sed hoc esse non potest. Quia, ut [8] But this cannot be, because, as
probat philosophus in II de anima, Aristotle proves in De anima II [5],
sentire accidit in ipso moveri a “sensation occurs as the result of one’s
sensibilibus exterioribus. Unde non being moved by external objects of
potest homo sentire absque sense.” Hence, man cannot sense
exteriori sensibili: sicut non potest without an external sensible object, any
aliquid moveri absque movente. more than a thing can be moved without
Organum igitur sensus movetur et a mover. Therefore, the sense organ is
patitur in sentiendo, sed ab exteriori moved and is passive in sensing—but
sensibili. Illud autem quo patitur est in relation to an external sensible
sensus; quod ex hoc patet, quia object. And that whereby it is passive
carentia sensu non patiuntur a [suffers] is the sense, for it is obviously
sensibilibus tali modo passionis. the fact that things devoid of sense are
Sensus igitur est virtus passiva not passive in relation to sensibles by
ipsius organi. Anima igitur sensitiva the same kind of passivity. Therefore,
non se habet in sentiendo sicut sense is the passive power of the organ
movens et agens, sed sicut id quo itself. Hence, the sensitive soul has not
patiens patitur. Quod impossibile est the function of mover and agent in
esse diversum secundum esse a sensing, but of that whereby the patient
patiente. Non est igitur anima is passive; and this cannot possibly be
sensibilis secundum esse diversa a diverse in being from the patient.
corpore animato. Therefore, the sensible soul is not, in
being, diverse from the animate body.
Praeterea. Licet motus sit [9] Furthermore, although motion is the
communis actus moventis et moti, common act of the mover and the
tamen alia operatio est facere moved, nevertheless to cause motion is
motum et recipere motum: unde et one thing, to receive motion is another;
duo praedicamenta ponuntur facere that is why there are two categories,
et pati. Si igitur in sentiendo anima action and passion. If, then, in sensing
sensitiva se habet ut agens et the sensitive soul plays the role of agent
corpus ut patiens, alia erit operatio and the body of patient, the operation of
animae et alia corporis. Anima igitur the soul will be one thing and that of the
sensitiva habebit aliquam body another. Therefore, the sensitive
operationem propriam. Habebit soul will have an operation proper to
igitur et subsistentiam propriam. itself, and, consequently, will enjoy a
Non igitur, destructo corpore, esse subsistence of its own. It will therefore
desinet. Animae igitur sensitivae, follow that, when the body is destroyed,
etiam irrationabilium animalium, the soul will not cease to be. Thus, the
erunt immortales. Quod quidem sensitive souls, even of irrational
improbabile videtur. Tamen a animals, will be immortal; which indeed

Platonis opinione non discordat, sed seems improbable, though it is not
de hoc infra erit locus quaerendi. inconsistent with Plato’s opinion. But
there will be an occasion later on to
inquire into this matter.
Amplius. Mobile non sortitur [10] Then, too, the movable does not
speciem a suo motore. Si igitur derive its species from its mover.
anima non coniungitur corpori nisi Therefore, if the soul is united to the
sicut motor mobili, corpus et partes body only as mover to thing movable,
eius non consequuntur speciem ab then the body and its parts do not owe
anima. Abeunte igitur anima, to the soul that which they specifically
remanebit corpus et partes eius are; so that, with the passing of the
eiusdem speciei. Hoc autem est soul, the body and its parts will remain
manifeste falsum: nam caro et os et of the same species. But this is clearly
manus et huiusmodi partes post false; for flesh and bones and hands,
abscessum animae non dicuntur and like parts, after the soul’s
nisi aequivoce; cum nulli harum departure, are so called only in an
partium propria operatio adsit, quae equivocal sense, because none of
speciem consequitur. Non igitur these parts is then possessed of its
unitur anima corpori solum sicut proper operation, which stems from the
motor mobili, vel sicut homo specific nature of the thing whose parts
vestimento. they are. It remains that the soul is not
united to the body only as mover to
movable, or as a man to his clothes.
Adhuc. Mobile non habet esse per [11] Again, the movable does not owe
suum motorem, sed solummodo its being to its mover, but only its
motum. Si igitur anima uniatur movement. If, then, the soul were united
corpori solummodo ut motor, corpus to the body merely as its mover, the
movebitur quidem ab anima, sed body would indeed be moved by the
non habebit esse per eam. Vivere soul, but it would not owe its being to
autem est quoddam esse viventis. the soul. Now, in the living thing living is
Non igitur corpus vivet per animam. a certain being. Therefore, the body
would not live in virtue of the soul.
Item. Mobile neque generatur per [12] Likewise, the movable is neither
applicationem motoris ad ipsum, generated by the mover’s being joined
neque per eius separationem to it nor corrupted by its separation from
corrumpitur: cum non dependeat it, because the movable does not
mobile a motore secundum esse, depend on the mover for its being, but
sed secundum moveri tantum. Si only for its being moved. Therefore, if
igitur anima uniatur corpori solum ut the soul were united to the body only as
motor, sequetur quod in unione its mover, it will follow that in the union
animae et corporis non erit aliqua of soul and body there will be no
generatio, neque in separatione generation, nor will their separation
corruptio. Et sic mors, quae consistit mean corruption. And thus death, which
in separatione animae et corporis, consists in the separation of soul and
non erit corruptio animalis. Quod est body, will not be the corruption of the
manifeste falsum. animal. And this is manifestly false.
Praeterea. Omne movens seipsum [13] Furthermore, to be moved and not
ita se habet quod in ipso est moveri to be moved, to move and not to move,
et non moveri, et movere et non lie within the power of every selfmover.
movere. Sed anima, secundum But the soul, according to the Platonic
Platonis opinionem, movet corpus opinion, moves the body in the capacity
sicut movens seipsum. Est ergo in of selfmover. It is, therefore, in the
potestate animae movere corpus vel soul’s power to move the body and not
non movere. Si igitur non unitur ei to move it. Accordingly, if the soul is
nisi sicut motor mobili, erit in united to the body merely as mover to
potestate animae separari a corpore movable, it will be in the soul’s power to
cum voluerit, et iterum uniri ei cum be separated from the body at will and
voluerit. Quod patet esse falsum. to be reunited to it at will. And this
clearly is false.
Quod autem ut forma propria anima [14] Now, that the soul is united to the
corpori uniatur, sic probatur. Illud body as its proper form is proved as
quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu follows. That by which something
ens, est forma et actus ipsius. becomes a being in act from a being in
Corpus autem per animam fit actu potency is its form and act. But it is
ens de potentia existente: vivere through the soul that the body becomes
enim est esse viventis; semen a being in act from being potentially
autem ante animationem est vivens existent, for living is the being of the
solum in potentia, per animam living thing. Now, the seed before
autem fit vivens actu. Est igitur animation is living only in potency, and,
anima forma corporis animati. through the soul, becomes living in act.
Therefore, the soul is the form of the
animated body.
Amplius. Quia tam esse quam etiam [15] In addition, since being as well as

operari non est solum formae neque operating belong neither to the form
solum materiae, sed coniuncti, esse alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the
et agere duobus attribuitur, quorum composite, to be and to act are
unum se habet ad alterum sicut attributed to two things, one of which is
forma ad materiam: dicimus enim to the other as form to matter. For we
quod homo est sanus corpore et say that a man is healthy in body and in
sanitate, et quod est sciens scientia health, and that he is knowing in
et anima, quorum scientia est forma knowledge and in his soul, knowledge
animae scientis, et sanitas corporis being a form of the knower’s soul and
sani. Vivere autem et sentire health a form of the healthy body. Now,
attribuitur animae et corpori: dicimur life and sensation are ascribed to both
enim et vivere et sentire anima et soul and body, for we are said to live
corpore. Sed anima tamen sicut and to sense both in soul and body. But
principio vitae et sensus. Est igitur we live and sense by the soul as the
anima forma corporis. principle of life and sensation. The soul
is, therefore, the form of the body.
Adhuc. Similiter se habet tota anima [16] The whole sensitive soul,

sensitiva ad totum corpus sicut pars moreover, is related to the whole body

ad partem. Pars autem ita se habet as a part to a part. And part is to part in
ad partem quod est forma et actus such fashion that it is its form and act,
eius: visus enim est forma et actus for sight is the form and act of the eye.
oculi. Ergo anima est forma et actus Therefore, the soul is the form and act
corporis. of the body.
Caput 58 Chapter 58
Quod nutritiva, sensitiva et THAT IN MAN THERE ARE NOT
intellectiva non sunt in homine tres THREE SOULS, NUTRITIVE,
animae SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE
Potest autem praedictis rationibus [1] Now, according to Plato’s theory, the
secundum opinionem Platonis arguments proposed above can be met,
obviari quantum ad praesentem so far as the present question is
intentionem pertinet. Ponit enim concerned. For Plato maintains that in us
Plato non esse eandem animam in the same soul is not intellective, nutritive,
nobis intellectivam, nutritivam et and sensitive. That is why, even if the
sensitivam. Unde, etsi anima sensitive soul were the form of the body,
sensitiva sit forma corporis, non it would not be necessary to conclude
oportebit propter hoc dicere quod that some intellectual substance can be
aliqua intellectualis substantia the form of a body.
forma corporis esse possit.
Quod autem hoc sit impossibile, sic [2] That this opinion is impossible we

ostendendum est. must now show by the following
arguments.
Quae attribuuntur alicui eidem [3] Things attributed to the same thing
secundum diversas formas, according to diverse forms are
praedicantur de invicem per predicated of one another by accident; a
accidens: album enim dicitur esse white thing is said to be musical by
musicum per accidens, quia accident, because whiteness and music
Socrati accidit albedo et musica. Si are accidental to Socrates, for example.
igitur anima intellectiva, sensitiva et Accordingly, if in us the intellective,
nutritiva sunt diversae virtutes aut sensitive, and nutritive soul are diverse
formae in nobis, ea quae powers or forms, then the things that
secundum has formas nobis appertain to us according to those forms
conveniunt, de invicem will be predicated of one another by
praedicabuntur per accidens. Sed accident. Now, it is with respect to the
secundum animam intellectivam intellective soul that we are said to be
dicimur homines, secundum men; to the sensitive soul, animals; to
sensitivam animalia, secundum the nutritive soul, living beings. It follows
nutritivam viventia. Erit igitur haec that the predication, man is an animal, or
praedicatio per accidens, homo est an animal is a living thing, will be by
animal; vel, animal est vivum. Est accident. But this predication is through
autem per se: nam homo itself, since man, as such, is an animal,
secundum quod est homo, animal and animal, as such, is a living thing. It is
est; et animal secundum quod est by the same principle, therefore, that one
animal, vivum est. Est igitur aliquis is a man, an animal, and a living thing.
ab eodem principio homo, animal
et vivum.
Si autem dicatur quod, etiam [4] Now, it may be said that even if the
praedictis animabus diversis aforesaid souls are diverse, it does not
existentibus, non sequitur follow that the predications in question
praedictae praedicationes fore per will be by accident, because these souls
accidens, eo quod animae illae ad are mutually subordinate. But this, again,
invicem ordinem habent: hoc is ruled out. For the sensitive is
iterum removetur. Nam ordo subordinate to the intellective and the
sensitivi ad intellectivum, et nutritivi nutritive to the sensitive, as potency is
ad sensitivum, est sicut ordo subordinate to act, since in the order of
potentiae ad actum: nam generation the intellective comes after
intellectivum sensitivo, et the sensitive and the sensitive after the
sensitivum nutritivo posterius nutritive; thus, animal is prior to man in
secundum generationem est; prius that line. Therefore, if this order makes
enim in generatione fit animal the above mentioned predications to be
quam homo. Si igitur iste ordo facit through themselves, they will be so, not
praedicationes praedictas esse per in that mode of predication through itself
se, hoc non erit secundum illum which arises from the form, but in that
modum dicendi per se qui accipitur mode which arises from the matter and
secundum formam, sed secundum the subject; as a surface, for example, is
illum qui accipitur secundum said to be colored. But this is impossible,
materiam et subiectum, sicut dicitur because in this latter mode of predication
superficies colorata. Hoc autem est through itself that which is formal is
impossibile. Quia in isto modo predicated through itself of the subject,
dicendi per se, id quod est formale as when we say: The surface is white or
praedicatur per se de subiecto: ut the number is even. And again, in this
cum dicimus, superficies est alba, kind of predication through itself the
vel, numerus est par. Et iterum in subject is placed in the definition of the
hoc modo dicendi per se predicate, as number in the definition of
subiectum ponitur in definitione even. But, in the previous case, the
praedicati: sicut numerus in contrary is true; for man is not predicated
definitione paris. Ibi autem e of animal through itself, but vice versa;
contrario accidit. Non enim homo nor is the subject placed in the definition
per se praedicatur de animali, sed of the predicate, but vice versa.
e converso: et iterum non ponitur Therefore, such things are not
subiectum in definitione praedicati, predicated through themselves by
sed e converso. Non igitur reason of the order in question.
praedictae praedicationes dicuntur
per se ratione dicti ordinis.
Praeterea. Ab eodem aliquid habet [5] Moreover, the principle of a thing’s

esse et unitatem: unum enim unity is the same as that of its being; for
consequitur ad ens. Cum igitur a one is consequent upon being.
forma unaquaeque res habeat Therefore, since each and every thing
esse, a forma etiam habebit has being from its form, it will also have
unitatem. Si igitur ponantur in unity from its form. Consequently, if
homine plures animae sicut several souls, as so many distinct forms,
diversae formae, homo non erit are ascribed to man, he will not be one
unum ens, sed plura. Nec ad being, but several. Nor will an order
unitatem hominis ordo formarum among forms suffice to give man unity,
sufficiet. Quia esse unum because to be one in respect of order is
secundum ordinem non est esse not to be one unqualifiedly speaking;
unum simpliciter: cum unitas since unity of order is the least of unities.
ordinis sit minima unitatum.
Item. Adhuc redibit praedictum [6] Also, the impossibility noted above
inconveniens, ut scilicet ex anima will again arise, namely, that from the
intellectiva et corpore non fiat intellective soul and the body there
unum simpliciter, sed secundum results a thing that is one not
accidens tantum. Omne enim quod unqualifiedly speaking but only
advenit alicui post esse accidentally. For whatever comes to a
completum, advenit ei thing after it is complete in its being,
accidentaliter: cum sit extra comes to it accidentally, since it is
essentiam eius. Quaelibet autem outside that thing’s essence. Now, every
forma substantialis facit ens substantial form makes a being complete
completum in genere substantiae: in the genus of substance, for it makes a
facit enim ens actu et hoc aliquid. being in act, and this particular thing.
Quicquid igitur post primam Therefore, whatever accrues to a thing
formam substantialem advenit rei, after its first substantial form will accrue
accidentaliter adveniet. Cum igitur to it accidentally. Now, the nutritive soul
anima nutritiva sit forma is a substantial form, for the living is
substantialis, vivum enim predicated substantially of man and
substantialiter de homine animal. It will then follow that the
praedicatur et de animali; sequetur sensitive soul accrues to man
quod anima sensitiva adveniat accidentally, and likewise the intellective
accidentaliter, et similiter soul. Thus, neither animal nor man will
intellectiva. Et sic neque animal signify one thing unqualifiedly speaking,
neque homo significant unum nor will they denote a genus or a species
simpliciter, neque aliquod genus in the category of substance.
aut speciem in praedicamento
substantiae.
Amplius. Si homo, secundum [7] Again, if man, in Plato’s theory, is not

Platonis sententiam, non est a thing composed of body and soul, but
aliquid ex anima et corpore a soul using a body, this is to he
compositum, sed est anima utens understood either of the intellective soul
corpore, aut hoc intelligitur solum only, or of the three souls, if there are
de anima intellectiva, aut de tribus three, or of two of them. If of three or
animabus, si tres sunt, sive de two, it follows that man is not one being,
duabus earum. Si autem de tribus but two or three, since he is then three
vel duabus, sequitur quod homo souls or at least two. And if this is
non sit unum, sed sit duo vel tria: understood of the intellective soul only,
est enim tres animae, vel saltem so that the sensitive soul is thought to be
duae. Si autem hoc intelligatur de the body’s form, and the intellective soul,

anima intellectiva tantum, ita using the animated and senseendowed
scilicet quod intelligatur anima body, to be the man, then this, again, will
sensitiva esse forma corporis, et lead to absurd consequences, namely,
anima intellectiva utens corpore that man is not an animal, but uses an
animato et sensificato sit homo, animal (for through the sensitive soul a
sequentur adhuc inconvenientia: thing is an animal), and that man does
scilicet quod homo non sit animal, not sense, but uses a sentient thing.
sed utatur animali, nam per These statements being contrary to the
animam sensitivam aliquid est facts, it is impossible that there should
animal; et quod homo non sentiat, be in us three souls differing in
sed utatur re sentiente. Quae cum substance, the intellective, the sensitive,
sint inconvenientia, impossibile est and the nutritive.
tres animas substantia differentes
esse in nobis, intellectivum,
sensitivum et nutritivum.
Adhuc. Ex duobus aut pluribus non [8] And again, the one cannot be made

potest fieri unum si non sit aliquid from two or more, without something to
uniens, nisi unum eorum se habeat unite them, unless one of them be
ad alterum ut actus ad potentiam: related to the other as act to potentiality;
sic enim ex materia et forma fit for thus matter and form become one,
unum, nullo vinculo extraneo eos without anything outside uniting them.
colligante. Si autem in homine sint Now, if there are several souls in man,
plures animae, non se habent ad they are not related to one another as
invicem ut materia et forma, sed matter and form, but they are all by
omnes ponuntur ut actus quidam et hypothesis acts and principles of actions.
principia actionum. Oportet igitur, si So, if they are united in order to form one
uniantur ad faciendum aliquid thing, say, a man or an animal, there
unum, puta hominem vel animal, must be something to unite them. But
quod sit aliquid uniens. Hoc autem this cannot be the body, since it is
non potest esse corpus: cum precisely the body which is united
magis corpus uniatur per animam; together by the soul; a sign of which is
cuius signum est quod discedente the fact that, when the soul departs, the
anima, corpus dissolvitur. body is dissolved. It therefore remains
Relinquitur igitur quod oportet that there must be some thing of a more
aliquid formalius esse quod facit ex formal character to make these several
illis pluribus unum. Et hoc magis entities into one. And this will be the soul
erit anima quam illa plura quae per rather than those several entities which
ipsum uniuntur. Si igitur hoc iterum are united by this thing. Hence, if this
est habens partes diversas, et non latter, again, has diverse parts and is not
est unum secundum se, oportet one thing in itself, there will still be need
adhuc esse aliquid uniens. Cum of something to unite them. Since, then,
igitur non sit abire in infinitum, it is impossible to go on to infinity, it is
oportet devenire ad aliquid quod sit necessary to come to a thing that is one
secundum se unum. Et hoc in itself. And the soul, especially, is such
maxime est anima. Oportet igitur in a thing. Therefore, there must be but one
uno homine vel animali unam soul in one man or in one animal.
tantum animam esse.
Item. Si id quod est ex parte [9] Then, too, if that which belongs to the

animae in homine, est ex pluribus soul in man is an aggregate of several
congregatum, oportet quod sicut things, it follows that, as the totality of
totum congregatum se habet ad them is to the whole body, so each of
totum corpus, ita singula ad them is to each part of the body. Nor
singulas partes corporis. Quod does this idea conflict with Plato’s
etiam a positione Platonis non position, for he located the rational soul
discordat: ponebat enim animam in the brain, the nutritive in the liver, and
rationalem in cerebro, nutritivam in the appetitive in the heart. But this
hepate, concupiscibilem in corde. doctrine is evidently false, for two
Hoc autem apparet esse falsum, reasons. First, because there is a part of
dupliciter. Primo quidem quia the soul which cannot be allocated to
aliqua pars animae est quae non any part of the body, namely, the
potest attribui alicui parti corporis, intellect; as we have already proved, the
scilicet intellectus, de quo supra intellect is not the act of some part of the
ostensum est quod non est actus body. Secondly, because it is manifest
alicuius partis corporis. Secundo, that the operations of different parts of
quia manifestum est quod in the soul appear in the same part of the
eadem parte corporis apparent body, as we see in the case of animals
diversarum partium animae that live after being cut in two, since the
operationes: sicut patet in same part has the movement, sensation,
animalibus quae decisa vivunt, and appetite by which it is moved; so
quia eadem pars habet motum et too, the same part of a plant, after being
sensum et appetitum quo movetur; cut off, is nourished, grows, and
et similiter eadem pars plantae blossoms. And from this it is clear that
decisa nutritur, augetur et the diverse parts of the soul are in one
germinat; ex quo apparet quod and the same part of the body.
diversae partes animae in una et Therefore, there are not distinct souls in
eadem parte corporis sint. Non us which are allocated to various parts of
igitur sunt diversae animae in the body.
nobis, diversis partibus corporis
attributae.
Amplius. Diversae vires quae non [10] Furthermore, diverse powers that
radicantur in uno principio, non are not rooted in one principle do not
impediunt se invicem in agendo, hinder one another in acting, unless,
nisi forte earum actiones essent perhaps, their action be contrary; and
contrariae: quod in proposito non this is not so in the present case. Now,
contingit. Videmus autem quod we observe that the diverse actions of
diversae actiones animae the soul hinder one another, for when
impediunt se: cum enim una est one is intense another is remiss.
intensa, altera remittitur. Oportet Therefore, these actions and the powers
igitur quod istae actiones, et vires that are their proximate principles must
quae sunt earum proxima principia, be referred to one principle. But this
reducantur in unum principium. principle cannot be the body, both
Hoc autem principium non potest because there is an action in which the
esse corpus: tum quia aliqua actio body does not share, namely,
est in qua non communicat corpus, understanding, and because, if the body,
scilicet intelligere; tum quia, si as such, were the principle of these
principium harum virium et powers and actions, they would be found

actionum esset corpus inquantum in all bodies; which is clearly false. It
huiusmodi, invenirentur in omnibus therefore remains that their principle is
corporibus, quod patet esse some one form, by which this body is
falsum. Et sic relinquitur quod sit such a body. And this principle is the
principium earum forma aliqua una, soul. It follows, then, that all the actions
per quam hoc corpus est tale of the soul which are in us proceed from
corpus. Quae est anima. the one soul. Thus, there are not several
Relinquitur igitur quod omnes souls in us.
actiones animae quae sunt in
nobis, ab anima una procedunt. Et
sic non sunt in nobis plures
animae.
Huic autem consonat quod dicitur [11] Now, this conclusion accords with
in libro de Ecclesiast. dogmatibus: what is said in the book On the
neque duas animas esse credimus Teachings of the Church [Gennadius, De
in uno homine, sicut Iacobus et alii ecclesiasticis dogmatibus] “Nor do we
Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem, believe that there are two souls in one
qua animatur corpus, et immixta sit man, as James and other Syrians write:
sanguini, et alteram spiritualem, one being the animal soul by which the
quae rationem ministret: sed body is animated and which is mingled
dicimus unam eandemque esse with the blood; the other, a spiritual soul,
animam in homine quae et corpus which provides the reason. On the
sua societate vivificat, et contrary, we say that it is one and the
semetipsam sua ratione disponat. same soul in man which both gives life to
the body by its union with it, and orders
itself by its own reason.”
Caput 59 Chapter 59
Quod intellectus possibilis hominis THAT MAN’S POSSIBLE INTELLECT
non est substantia separata IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
Fuerunt autem et alii alia [1] There have been others who
adinventione utentes in sustinendo discovered an additional reason for
quod substantia intellectualis non holding that the intellectual soul cannot
possit uniri corpori ut forma. Dicunt be united to the body as its form. For
enim quod intellectus, etiam quem they say that the intellect, which Aristotle
Aristoteles possibilem vocat, est calls possible, is a separate substance
quaedam substantia separata non not united to us as a form.
coniuncta nobis ut forma.
Et hoc confirmare nituntur, primo, [2] First, they endeavor to prove this
ex verbis Aristotelis qui dicit, de hoc from the words of Aristotle, who says
intellectu loquens, quod est that this intellect is “separate, not mixed
separatus, et immixtus corpori, et with the body, simple, impassible”—
simplex, et impassibilis: quae non things that could not be said of the
possent dici de eo si esset forma intellect if it were the body’s form.
corporis.
Item, per demonstrationem [3] Also, they try to prove this from the
eiusdem qua probat quod, quia demonstration by which Aristotle shows
intellectus possibilis recipit omnes that, since the possible intellect receives
species rerum sensibilium ut in all the species of sensible things through
potentia ad ea existens, oportet being in potentiality to them, it must be
quod omnibus careat. Sicut pupilla, devoid of them all. Likewise, the pupil,
quae recipit omnes species which receives all the species of colors,
colorum, caret omni colore: si enim lacks all color. For, if of itself it had any
haberet de se aliquem colorem, ille color, the latter would prevent it from
color prohiberet videri alios colores; seeing other colors; indeed, it would see
quinimmo nihil videretur nisi sub illo nothing except under that color. And the
colore. Et simile contingeret de same would be true of the possible
intellectu possibili, si haberet de se intellect, if by itself it possessed any
aliquam formam seu naturam de form or nature of sensible things. But
rebus sensibilibus. Hoc autem this would necessarily be the case if the
oporteret esse, si esset mixtus possible intellect were combined with
alicui corpori. Et similiter si esset the body, or if it were a form of some
forma alicuius corporis: quia, cum body. For, since one thing is made from
ex forma et materia fiat unum, form and matter, the form must share
oportet quod forma participet something of the nature of which it is the
aliquid de natura eius cuius est form. Therefore, the possible intellect
forma. Impossibile est igitur cannot be combined with the body, or be
intellectum possibilem esse mixtum the act or form of a body.
corpori, aut esse actum seu
formam alicuius corporis.
Adhuc. Si esset forma alicuius [4] If, moreover, the possible intellect
corporis materialis, esset eiusdem were the form of a material body, its
generis receptio huius intellectus, receptivity would be of the same kind as
et receptio materiae primae. Id that of prime matter. For that which is
enim quod est alicuius corporis the form of a body receives nothing
forma, non recipit aliquid absque without its matter. Now, prime matter
sua materia. Materia autem prima receives individual forms, which in fact
recipit formas individuales: immo are individuated through being in matter.
per hoc individuantur quod sunt in Hence, the possible intellect would
materia. Intellectus igitur possibilis receive forms as they are individual. And
reciperet formas ut sunt thus it would not be cognizant of
individuales. Et sic non universals; which is clearly false.
cognosceret universalia. Quod
patet esse falsum.
Praeterea. Materia prima non est [5] Then, too, prime matter is not
cognoscitiva formarum quas recipit. cognizant of the forms which it receives.
Si ergo eadem esset receptio If, then, the receptivity of the possible
intellectus possibilis et materiae intellect were the same as that of prime
primae, nec intellectus possibilis matter, the possible intellect would not
cognosceret formas receptas. be cognizant of the forms received. And
Quod est falsum. this is false.
Amplius. Impossibile est in corpore [6] Again, as Aristotle proves in Physics

esse virtutem infinitam: ut probatur VIII [10] an infinite power cannot
ab Aristotele in VIII Physicor. possibly exist in a body. But the possible
Intellectus autem possibilis est intellect is endowed with a certain
quodammodo virtutis infinitae: infinite power, since by it we judge of
iudicamus enim per ipsum res things infinite in number, inasmuch as by
infinitas secundum numerum, it we know universals, under which
inquantum per ipsum cognoscimus potentially infinite particulars are
universalia, sub quibus contained. Therefore, the possible
comprehenduntur particularia intellect is not a power in a body.
infinita in potentia. Non est igitur
intellectus possibilis virtus in
corpore.
Ex his autem motus est Averroes et [7] Now, for these reasons Averroes was
quidam antiqui, ut ipse dicit, ad moved, and, as he himself says, some
ponendum intellectum possibilem, of the ancients, to hold that the possible
quo intelligit anima, esse intellect, by which the soul understands,
separatum secundum esse a has a separate existence from the body,
corpore, et non esse formam and is not the form of the body.
corporis.
Sed quia hic intellectus nihil ad nos [8] However, since such an intellect

pertineret, nec per ipsum would in no way belong to us, nor would
intelligeremus, nisi nobiscum aliquo we understand by it, unless it were
modo coniungeretur; determinat united to us in some manner, Averroes
etiam modum quo continuatur determines how it is brought into contact
nobiscum, dicens quod species with us, saying that the species
intellecta in actu est forma understood in act is the form of the
intellectus possibilis, sicut visibile in possible intellect, just as the visible in
actu est forma potentiae visivae. act is the form of the power of sight.
Unde ex intellectu possibili et forma Thus there arises one thing from the
intellecta in actu fit unum. possible intellect and the form
Cuicumque igitur coniungitur forma understood in act. The possible intellect,
intellecta praedicta, coniungitur then, is united to anyone to whom that
intellectus possibilis. Coniungitur form is united. Now, it is united to us by
autem nobis mediante means of the phantasm, which is a kind
phantasmate, quod est subiectum of subject of that understood form; and
quoddam illius formae intellectae. in this way the possible intellect also is
Per hunc igitur modum etiam brought into connection with us.
intellectus possibilis nobiscum
continuatur.
Quod autem haec frivola sint et [9] But it is easy to see that these
impossibilia facile est videre. notions are worthless and impossible.
Habens enim intellectum est For the one who understands is the one

intelligens. Intelligitur autem id who has intellect. Now, the thing
cuius species intelligibilis intellectui understood is the thing whose intelligible
unitur. Per hoc igitur quod species species is united to the intellect. Hence,
intelligibilis intellectui unita est in simply because the intelligible species
homine per aliquem modum, non united to the intellect is present in a man
habebit homo quod sit intelligens, in some way, it does not follow that it is
sed solum quod intelligatur ab the man who understands, but only that
intellectu separato. he is understood by [Averroes’] separate
intellect.
Praeterea. Sic species intellecta in [10] Moreover, the actually understood

actu est forma intellectus possibilis, species is the form of the intellect, just
sicut species visibilis in actu est as the actually visible species is the form
forma potentiae visivae, sive ipsius of the power of sight, or of the eye itself.
oculi. Species autem intellecta Now, the species understood is
comparatur ad phantasma sicut compared to the phantasm as the
species visibilis in actu ad actually visible species to the colored
coloratum quod est extra animam: thing outside the mind; indeed, Averroes
et hac similitudine ipse utitur, et himself uses this comparison, as does
etiam Aristoteles. Similis igitur Aristotle. Through the intelligible form,
continuatio est intellectus possibilis therefore, the possible intellect is in
per formam intelligibilem ad touch with the phantasm in us, even as
phantasma quod in nobis est, et the power of sight is in touch with the
potentiae visivae ad colorem qui color present in the stone. But this
est in lapide. Haec autem contact does not make the stone to see,
continuatio non facit lapidem but only to be seen. So, too, the
videre, sed solum videri. Ergo et aforesaid contact of the possible intellect
praedicta continuatio intellectus with us does not make us to understand,
possibilis nobiscum non facit nos but only to be understood. Now, of
intelligere, sed intelligi solum. course, it is properly and truly said that
Planum autem est quod proprie et man understands, for we would not
vere dicitur quod homo intelligit: inquire into the nature of the intellect
non enim intellectus naturam were it not for the fact that we
investigaremus nisi per hoc quod understand ourselves. Therefore, the
nos intelligimus. Non igitur manner of contact in question is not
sufficiens est praedictus sufficient.
continuationis modus.
Adhuc. Omne cognoscens per [11] Furthermore, every knower by its
virtutem cognoscitivam coniungitur cognitive power is united to its object,
obiecto, et non e converso: sicut et and not vice versa, just as every
operans omne per virtutem operator by its operative power is united
operativam coniungitur operato. to the thing operated. But man is
Homo autem est intelligens per intelligent by his intellect as by his
intellectum sicut per virtutem cognitive power. Hence, he is not united
cognoscitivam. Non igitur to the intellect by the intelligible form; on
coniungitur per formam the contrary, it is by the intellect that he
intelligibilem intellectui, sed magis is united to the intelligible.
per intellectum intelligibili.
Amplius. Id quo aliquid operatur, [12] Then, too, that by which a thing
oportet esse formam eius: nihil operates must be its form. For nothing
enim agit nisi secundum quod est acts except so far as it is in act; and
actu; actu autem non est aliquid nothing is in act except by its form. And
nisi per id quod est forma eius; that is why Aristotle proves that the soul
unde et Aristoteles probat animam is a form, from the fact that an animal
esse formam, per hoc quod animal lives and senses through its soul. Now,
per animam vivit et sentit. Homo man understands, and this by his
autem intelligit, et non nisi per intellect alone; and therefore Aristotle,
intellectum: unde et Aristoteles, when inquiring into the principle by
inquirens de principio quo which we understand, explains to us the
intelligimus, tradit nobis naturam nature of the possible intellect.
intellectus possibilis. Oportet igitur Consequently, the possible intellect must
intellectum possibilem formaliter be united to us formally, and not merely
uniri nobis, et non solum per suum by its object.
obiectum.
Praeterea. Intellectus in actu et [13] Again. “The intellect in act and the
intelligibile in actu sunt unum: sicut intelligible in act are one... just as the
sensus in actu et sensibile in actu. sense in act and the sensible in act.” But
Non autem intellectus in potentia et the intellect in potentiality and the
intelligibile in potentia: sicut nec intelligible in potentiality are not one, any
sensus in potentia et sensibile in more than the sense in potentiality and
potentia. Species igitur rei, the sensible in potentiality. Hence, the
secundum quod est in species of a thing, as present in
phantasmatibus, non est phantasms, is not actually intelligible,
intelligibilis actu: non enim sic est since in this state it is not one with the
unum cum intellectu in actu sed intellect in act, but is one with it
secundum quod est a according as the species is abstracted
phantasmatibus abstracta; sicut from the phantasms. just so, the species
nec species coloris est sensata in of color is not actually perceived as it
actu secundum quod est in lapide, exists in the stone, but only as it exists
sed solum secundum quod est in in the pupil. Now, according to the
pupilla. Sic autem solum [Averroistic] doctrine stated above, the
continuatur nobiscum species intelligible species is in contact with us
intelligibilis secundum quod est in only in respect of its existence in the
phantasmatibus, secundum phantasms; it is not, then, in contact with
positionem praedictam. Non igitur us according as it is one with the
continuatur nobiscum secundum possible intellect as its form. Therefore,
quod est unum cum intellectu the intelligible species cannot be the
possibili ut forma eius. Igitur non means of bringing the possible intellect
potest esse medium quo into contact with us; because, according
continuetur intellectus possibilis as it is in contact with the possible
nobiscum: quia secundum quod intellect, it is not in contact with us, or
continuatur cum intellectu possibili, vice versa.
non continuatur nobiscum, nec e
converso.
Patet autem eum qui hanc [14] Now, he who invented this doctrine
positionem induxit, aequivocatione was evidently deceived by an
deceptum fuisse. Colores enim equivocation. For colors existing outside
extra animam existentes, praesente the soul are in the presence of light
lumine, sunt visibiles actu ut actually visible, as having the power to
potentes movere visum: non autem move the sight; but are not actually
ut actu sensata, secundum quod visible in the sense of being actually
sunt unum cum sensu in actu. Et perceived as the result of becoming one
similiter phantasmata per lumen with the sense power in act. And
intellectus agentis fiunt actu similarly, phantasms are made actually
intelligibilia, ut possint movere intelligible by the light of the agent
intellectum possibilem: non autem intellect, so that they are able to move
ut sint intellecta actu, secundum the possible intellect; but not so as to be
quod sunt unum cum intellectu actually understood, through union with
possibili facto in actu. the possible intellect actualized.
Item. Ubi invenitur altior operatio [15] Likewise, where the living thing has

viventis, ibi invenitur altior species a higher operation, there is a higher kind
vitae, correspondens illi actioni. In of life corresponding to that operation.
plantis enim invenitur sola actio ad For in plants the only action we find is
nutritionem pertinens. In animalibus that which has to do with nutrition. But in
autem invenitur altior actio, scilicet animals we find a higher action, namely,
sentire et moveri secundum locum: sensation and locomotion; and that is
unde et animal vivit altiori specie why the animal lives by a higher kind of
vitae. Sed adhuc in homine life. Now, in man we find a still higher
invenitur altior operatio ad vitam vital operation than in the animal,
pertinens quam in animali, scilicet namely, understanding. Therefore, man
intelligere. Ergo homo habebit will have a higher kind of life. Now, life is
altiorem speciem vitae. Sed vita est through the soul. Therefore, the soul by
per animam. Habebit igitur homo which man lives will be of a higher sort
altiorem animam, qua vivit, quam than the sensible soul. But none is
sit anima sensibilis. Nulla autem est higher than the intellect. Therefore, the
altior quam intellectus. Est igitur intellect is man’s soul, and,
intellectus anima hominis. Et per consequently, his form.
consequens forma ipsius.
Adhuc. Quod consequitur ad [16] And again. That which follows upon

operationem alicuius rei, non the operation of a thing does not give a
largitur alicui speciem: quia thing its species, because operation is
operatio est actus secundus; forma second act, whereas the form to which a
autem per quam aliquid habet thing owes its species is first act. But,
speciem, est actus primus. Unio according to the doctrine under
autem intellectus possibilis ad consideration, the union of the possible
hominem, secundum positionem intellect with man is the result of an
praedictam, consequitur hominis operation of man, for it takes place by
operationem: fit enim mediante means of the imagination which,
phantasia, quae, secundum according to Aristotle, is “a movement
philosophum, est motus factus a resulting from the exercise of a sense
sensu secundum actum. Ex tali power.” Therefore, man does not derive
igitur unione non consequitur homo his species from that union. So it is not
speciem. Non igitur differt homo because of having an intellect that man
specie a brutis animalibus per hoc differs specifically from brute animals.
quod est intellectum habens.
Amplius. Si homo speciem sortitur [17] Furthermore, if man derives his
per hoc quod est rationalis et species in virtue of his being rational
intellectum habens, quicumque est and having an intellect, then whoever
in specie humana, est rationalis et belongs to the human species is rational
intellectum habens. Sed puer, and endowed with an intellect. But a
etiam antequam ex utero child, even before leaving the womb, is
egrediatur, est in specie humana: in specifically human, although there are
quo tamen nondum sunt as yet no actually intelligible phantasms
phantasmata, quae sint intelligibilia present in it. Therefore, a man has not
actu. Non igitur est homo an intellect as the result of its being
intellectum habens per hoc quod united to him by means of an intelligible
intellectus continuatur homini species whose subject is a phantasm.
mediante specie intelligibili cuius
subiectum est phantasma.
Caput 60 Chapter 60
Quod homo non sortitur speciem per THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIFIC
intellectum passivum, NATURE, NOT FROM THE PASSIVE,
sed per intellectum possibilem BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE,
INTELLECT
His autem rationibus obviatur [1] These arguments are countered by

secundum praedictam positionem. others in keeping with the doctrine
Dicit enim praedictus Averroes quod considered above. For Averroes says
homo differt specie a brutis per that man differs specifically from the
intellectum quem Aristoteles vocat brutes by the intellect which Aristotle
passivum, qui est ipsa vis cogitativa, calls passive and which is the same
quae est propria homini, loco cuius as the cogitative power that is proper
alia animalia habent quandam to man, in place of which the other
aestimativam naturalem. Huius autem animals have a certain natural
cogitativae virtutis est distinguere estimative power. Now, it is the
intentiones individuales, et comparare function of this cogitative power to
eas ad invicem: sicut intellectus qui distinguish individual intentions and to
est separatus et immixtus, comparat compare them with one another, even
et distinguit inter intentiones as the intellect which is separate and
universales. Et quia per hanc unmixed compares and distinguishes
virtutem, simul cum imaginativa et universal intentions. And by this
memorativa, praeparantur cogitative power, together with the
phantasmata ut recipiant actionem imagination and memory, the
intellectus agentis, a quo fiunt phantasms are prepared to receive
intelligibilia actu, sicut sunt aliquae the action of the agent intellect,
artes praeparantes materiam artifici whereby they are made intelligible in
principali; ideo praedicta virtus act, just as there are certain arts which
vocatur nomine intellectus et rationis, prepare the matter for the master

de qua medici dicunt quod habet artificer. Accordingly, this power is
sedem in media cellula capitis. Et given the name of intellect or reason,
secundum dispositionem huius which physicians declare to be seated
virtutis differt homo unus ab alio in in the middle cell of the head. And
ingenio et in aliis quae pertinent ad according to the disposition of this
intelligendum. Et per usum huius et power, one man differs from another in
exercitium acquirit homo habitum genius and in other qualities pertaining
scientiae. Unde habitus scientiarum to understanding. And by the use and
sunt in hoc intellectu passivo sicut in exercise of this power a man acquires
subiecto. Et hic intellectus passivus a the habit [habitus] of science. Hence,
principio adest puero, per quem the habits of the sciences are in this
sortitur speciem humanam, antequam passive intellect as their subject.
actu intelligat. Moreover, this passive intellect is in
the child from the beginning, and
through it the child receives its specific
nature as a human being, before it
actually understands.
Quod autem haec sint falsa, et [2] But it is quite obvious that these
abusive dicta, evidenter apparet. notions are false and involve an abuse
Operationes enim vitae comparantur of terms. For the vital operations are
ad animam ut actus secundi ad compared to the soul as second acts
primum: ut patet per Aristotelem, in II to the first act, as Aristotle makes
de anima. Actus autem primus in clear in De anima II [1]. Now, in the
eodem praecedit tempore actum same thing first act precedes the
secundum: sicut scientia est ante second in time, just as knowledge
considerare. In quocumque igitur precedes reflection, Consequently, in
invenitur aliqua operatio vitae, oportet whatever thing we find a vital
in eo ponere aliquam partem animae operation we must place a part of the
quae comparetur ad illam soul which will be related to that
operationem sicut actus primus ad operation as first act to second act.
secundum. Sed homo habet propriam But man has a proper operation higher
operationem supra alia animalia, than the other animals, namely,
scilicet intelligere et ratiocinari, quae understanding and reasoning, which is
est operatio hominis inquantum est the operation of man as man, as
homo, ut Aristoteles dicit, in I Aristotle says in Ethics I [7]. Hence,
Ethicorum. Ergo oportet in homine we must attribute to man a principle
ponere aliquod principium quod that properly gives him his specific
proprie dat speciem homini, quod se nature and is related to the act of
habeat ad intelligere sicut actus understanding as first act to second
primus ad secundum. Hoc autem non act. Now, this principle cannot be the
potest esse intellectus passivus aforesaid passive intellect, because
praedictus: quia principium the principle of man’s proper operation
praedictae operationis oportet esse must be impassible and not mixed
impassibile et non mixtum corpori, ut with the body, as Aristotle proves [De
philosophus probat; cuius contrarium anima III, 4]; whereas, the contrary is
apparet de intellectu passivo. Non clearly true of the passive intellect.
igitur est possibile quod per virtutem Therefore, it is impossible that man’s
cogitativam, quae dicitur intellectus specific nature, whereby he is
passivus, homo speciem sortiatur, per distinguished from the other animals,

quam ab aliis animalibus differat. should be given him by the cogitative
power, which is called the passive
intellect.
Adhuc. Quod est passio partis [3] Furthermore, an affection of the
sensitivae, non potest ponere in altiori sensitive part of a thing cannot place it
genere vitae quam sit vita sensitiva: in a higher kind of life than the
sicut quod est passio animae sensitive, just as an affection of the
nutritivae, non ponit in altiori genere nutritive soul does not place it in a
vitae quam sit vita nutritiva. Constat higher kind of life than the nutritive.
autem quod phantasia, et huiusmodi Now, it is clear that the imagination,
potentiae quae ad ipsam and like powers consequent upon it,
consequuntur, ut memorativa et such as the memory and so on, are
consimiles, sunt passiones partis affections of the sensitive part, as
sensitivae: ut philosophus probat in Aristotle proves in the De memoria [I].
libro de memoria. Non igitur per Hence, an animal cannot be placed by
praedictas virtutes, vel aliquam these powers or by any one of them in
earum, aliquod animal potest poni in a higher category of life than the
altiori genere vitae quam sit vita sensitive. But man’s life is of a higher
sensitiva. Homo autem est in altiori kind—a point clearly explained in De
genere vitae: quod patet per anima II [2], where Aristotle, in
philosophum, in II de anima, qui, distinguishing the kinds of life, places
distinguens genera vitae, superaddit the intellective, which he attributes to
intellectivum, quod homini attribuit, man, above the sensitive, which he
sensitivo, quod attribuit communiter ascribes to all animals in general.
omni animali. Non igitur homo est Therefore, it is not by virtue of the
vivens vita sibi propria per virtutem aforesaid cogitative power that man is
cogitativam praedictam. a living being with a life proper to
himself.
Amplius. Omne movens seipsum, [4] Then, too, every selfmover is

secundum quod probat philosophus, composed of mover and moved, as
in VIII Physic., componitur ex Aristotle proves in Physics VIII [5].
movente et moto. Homo autem, sicut Now, man, in common with the other
et alia animalia, est movens seipsum. animals, is a selfmover. Therefore,
Ergo movens et motum sunt partes mover and moved are parts of him.
ipsius. Primum autem movens in And the first mover in man is the
homine est intellectus: nam intellect, since the intellect by its
intellectus suo intelligibili movet intelligible object moves the will. Nor
voluntatem. Nec potest dici quod can it be said that the passive intellect
solus intellectus passivus sit movens: alone is the mover, because the
quia intellectus passivus est solum passive intellect has to do with
particularium; in movendo autem particulars only, whereas, actual
accipitur et universalis opinio, quae movement involves both the universal
est intellectus possibilis, et judgment, which belongs to the
particularis, quae potest esse possible intellect, and the particular
intellectus passivi; ut patet per judgment, which can belong to the
Aristotelem, in III de anima et in VII passive intellect, as Aristotle explains
Eth. Ergo intellectus possibilis est in De anima III [11], and in Ethics VII
aliqua pars hominis. Et est [3]. Therefore, the possible intellect is
dignissimum et formalissimum in a part of man. And it is the most noble
ipso. Igitur ab eo speciem sortitur, et and most formal thing in him. Hence,
non ab intellectu passivo. man derives his specific nature from it,
and not from the passive intellect.
Adhuc. Intellectus possibilis probatur [5] The possible intellect, moreover, is

non esse actus corporis alicuius demonstrably not the act of any body,
propter hoc quod est cognoscitivus because it is cognizant of all sensible
omnium formarum sensibilium in forms universally. Therefore, no power
universali. Nulla igitur virtus cuius whose operation can extend to the
operatio se extendere potest ad universals of all sensible forms can be
universalia omnium formarum the act of a body. Now, such a power
sensibilium, potest esse actus is the will, for our will can reach out to
alicuius corporis. Voluntas autem est all the things that we can understand,
huiusmodi: omnium enim eorum quae at least our will to know them. And the
intelligimus possumus habere act of the will is clearly directed to the
voluntatem, saltem ea cognoscendi. universal; as Aristotle says in the
Apparet etiam actus voluntatis in Rhetoric [II, 4], “we hate robbers in
universali: odimus enim, ut dicit general, but are angry only with
Aristoteles in sua rhetorica, in individual ones.” Therefore, the will
universali latronum genus, irascimur cannot be the act of any part of the
autem particularibus tantum. Voluntas body, nor can it follow upon a power
igitur non potest esse actus alicuius that is an act of the body. Now, every
partis corporis, nec consequi aliquam part of the soul is an act of the body,
potentiam quae sit actus corporis. with the single exception of the
Omnis autem pars animae est actus intellect properly so called. Therefore,
alicuius corporis praeter solum the will is in the intellective part; and
intellectum proprie dictum. Igitur that is why Aristotle says in De anima
voluntas in intellectiva parte est: unde in: “Will is in the reason, but the
et Aristoteles dicit, in III de anima, irascible and concupiscible appetite
quod voluntas in ratione est, are in the sensitive part.” So it is that
irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis in acts of concupiscence and irascibility
parte sensitiva. Propter quod et actus involve passion, but not the act of the
concupiscibilis et irascibilis cum will, which involves choice. Now,
passione sunt: non autem actus man’s will is not outside him, as
voluntatis, sed cum electione. though it resided in some separate
Voluntas autem hominis non est substance, but is within him.
extrinseca ab homine, quasi in Otherwise, man would not be master
quadam substantia separata fundata, of his own actions, since he would
sed est in ipso homine. Aliter enim then be acted upon by the will of a
non esset dominus suarum actionum, separate substance, and in him there
quia ageretur voluntate cuiusdam would be only the appetitive powers
substantiae separatae; et in ipso functioning in association with
essent tantum potentiae appetitivae passion, namely, the irascible and
cum passione operantes, scilicet concupiscible powers, which are in the
irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae sunt sensitive part, as in other animals that
in parte sensitiva, sicut et in ceteris are acted upon rather than act
animalibus, quae magis aguntur themselves. But this is impossible and
quam agant. Hoc autem est would destroy all moral philosophy
impossibile, et destructivum totius and sociality. It follows that there must
moralis philosophiae et politicae exist in us the possible intellect, so
conversationis. Oportet igitur that by it we differ from brute animals,
intellectum possibilem in nobis esse, and not only in terms of the passive
per quem a brutis differamus, et non intellect.
solum secundum intellectum
passivum.
Item. Sicut nihil est potens agere nisi [6] Likewise, just as nothing is able to
per potentiam activam in ipso act except through an active
existentem, ita nihil potens est pati potentiality in it, so nothing can be
nisi per potentiam passivam quae in passive save through an inherent
ipso est: combustibile enim est passive potentiality; the combustible is
potens comburi non solum quia est able to be burned not only because
aliquid potens comburere ipsum, sed there is a thing capable of burning it,
etiam quia habet in se potentiam ut but also because it has in itself a
comburatur. Intelligere autem potentiality to be burned. Now,
quoddam pati est ut dicitur in III de understanding is a kind of undergoing,
anima. Cum igitur puer sit potentia as is stated in De anima III [4].
intelligens, etsi non actu intelligat, Therefore, since the child is potentially
oportet quod sit in eo aliqua potentia understanding, even though he is not
qua sit potens intelligere. Haec autem actually understanding, there must be
potentia est intellectus possibilis. in him a potentiality whereby he is
Oportet igitur quod puero iam sit able to understand. And this
coniunctus intellectus possibilis potentiality is the possible intellect.
antequam actu intelligat. Non est Hence, there must already be a union
igitur continuatio intellectus possibilis of the possible intellect to the child
cum homine per formam intellectam before he understands actually.
in actu, sed ipse intellectus possibilis Therefore, it is not through the actually
inest homini a principio sicut aliquid understood form that the possible
eius. intellect is brought into connection with
man; rather, the possible intellect itself
is in man from the beginning as part of
himself.
Huic autem rationi respondet [7] Averroes, however, has an answer

Averroes praedictus. Dicit enim quod to this argument. For he avers that a
puer dicitur potentia intelligens duplici child is said to be understanding
ratione. Uno modo, quia phantasmata potentially for two reasons: first,
quae sunt in ipso, sunt intelligibilia in because the phantasms in him are
potentia. Alio modo, quia intellectus potentially intelligible; second,
possibilis est potens continuari cum because the possible intellect is able
ipso: et non quia intellectus sit iam to come in contact with him, and not
unitus ei. because the intellect is already united
to him.
Ostendendum est autem quod [8] Now we have to show that neither

uterque modus sit insufficiens. Alia of these reasons suffices. Thus, the
enim est potentia qua agens potest potentiality that enables the agent to
agere, et alia potentia qua patiens act is distinct from the potentiality that
potest pati, et ex opposito dividuntur. enables the patient to receive action;
Ex eo igitur quod convenit alicui quod and they differ as opposites. So, just
possit agere, non competit ei quod because a thing is able to act, it does
possit pati. Posse autem intelligere not follow that it is capable of receiving
est posse pati: cum intelligere action. But ability to understand is
quoddam pati sit, secundum ability to be passive; for as Aristotle
philosophum. Non igitur dicitur puer remarks, “understanding is a kind of
potens intelligere ex eo quod undergoing.” The child, therefore, is
phantasmata in eo possunt esse not said to be able to understand
intellecta in actu: cum hoc pertineat simply because the phantasms in him
ad posse agere; phantasmata enim can be actually understood; this has to
movent intellectum possibilem. do with the ability to act, since the
phantasms move the possible
intellect.
Adhuc. Potentia consequens speciem [9] Moreover, a potentiality derivative

alicuius non competit ei secundum id from the specific nature of a thing
quod speciem non largitur. Posse does not belong to it as a result of that
autem intelligere consequitur speciem which does not confer upon the thing
humanam: est enim intelligere its specific nature. Now, ability to
operatio hominis inquantum understand is a consequence of the
huiusmodi. Phantasmata autem non specific nature of man, for
dant speciem humanam, sed magis understanding is an operation of man
consequuntur operationem hominis. as man. But phantasms do not give
Non ergo ratione phantasmatum man his specific nature; rather, they
potest dici puer potentia intelligens. are consequent upon his operation.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the
child is potentially understanding
because of the phantasms.
Similiter autem neque potest dici puer [10] And it is likewise impossible to

posse intelligere quia intellectus say that a child is potentially
possibilis potest continuari cum ipso. understanding because the possible
Sic enim aliquis dicitur potens agere intellect can be in touch with him. For
vel pati per potentiam activam vel a person is said to be able to act or to
passivam, sicut dicitur albus per be passive by active or passive
albedinem. Non autem dicitur aliquis potentiality, just as he is said to be
albus antequam albedo sit ei white by whiteness. But he is not said
coniuncta. Ergo neque dicitur aliquis to be white before whiteness is united
potens agere vel pati antequam to him. Therefore, neither is a person
potentia activa vel passiva ei adsit. said to be able to act or to be passive
Non ergo de puero posset dici quod before active or passive potentiality is
est potens intelligere antequam present in him. Consequently, it
intellectus possibilis, qui est potentia cannot be said that a child is able to
intelligendi, sit ei continuatus. understand before the possible
intellect, which is the power of
understanding, is in contact with him.
Praeterea. Aliter dicitur aliquis potens [11] Furthermore, a person is said in

operari antequam habeat naturam one way to be able to act before
qua operetur, et aliter postquam iam having the nature by which he acts,
habet naturam sed impeditur per and in another way after he already
accidens ab operando: sicut aliter has that nature, but is accidentally
dicitur corpus potens ferri sursum prevented from acting; thus, a body is
antequam sit leve, et aliter postquam in one sense said to be capable of
iam est generatum leve sed impeditur being lifted upwards before it is light,
in suo motu. Puer autem est in and in another, after it is made light
potentia intelligens non quasi nondum but is impeded in its movement. Now,
habens naturam intelligendi, sed a child is potentially understanding,
habens impedimentum ut non not as though he has not yet the
intelligat: impeditur enim ab nature enabling him to understand, but
intelligendo propter multimodos as having an obstacle to
motus in ipso existentes, ut dicitur in understanding, since he is prevented
VII physicorum. Non igitur propter hoc from understanding “because of the
dicitur potens intelligere quia multiform movements in him,” as is
intellectus possibilis, qui est said in Physics VII [3]. Hence, he is
intelligendi principium, potest not said to have the power of
continuari sibi: sed quia iam est understanding because the possible
continuatus et impeditur ab actione intellect, which is the principle of
propria; unde, impedimento remoto, understanding, can be joined to him,
statim intelligit. but because it is already in contact
with him and is prevented from
exercising its proper action; so that,
upon the removal of the obstacle, he
immediately understands.
Item. Habitus est quo quis operatur [12] Likewise, “a habit is that by which

cum voluerit. Oportet igitur eiusdem one acts when he wills.” Therefore, a
esse habitum, et operationem quae habit and the operation in keeping with
est secundum habitum. Sed it must exist in the same subject.
considerare intelligendo, quod est Intellectual consideration, which is the
actus huius habitus qui est scientiae, act of the habit of science, cannot,
non potest esse intellectus passivi, however, be the function of the
sed est ipsius intellectus possibilis: ad passive intellect, but belongs to the
hoc enim quod aliqua potentia possible intellect itself; for a power
intelligat, oportet quod non sit actus must not be the act of a body if it is to
corporis alicuius. Ergo et habitus be capable of understanding. Thus,
scientiae non est in intellectu passivo the habit of science is not in the
sed in intellectu possibili. Scientia passive but in the possible intellect.
autem in nobis est, secundum quam Now, science is in us, and it is in
dicimur scientes. Ergo et intellectus accordance with this science that we
possibilis est in nobis, et non are said to know scientifically.
secundum esse a nobis separatus. Therefore, the possible intellect also is
in us, and has no being apart from us.
Adhuc. Scientiae assimilatio est [13] Scientific knowledge, moreover,

scientis ad rem scitam. Rei autem consists in the assimilation of the
scitae, inquantum est scita, non knower to the thing known. Now, the
assimilatur sciens nisi secundum knower is assimilated to the thing
species universales: scientia enim de known, as such, only with respect to
huiusmodi est. Species autem universal species; for such are the
universales non possunt esse in objects of science. Now, universal
intellectu passivo, cum sit potentia species cannot be in the passive
utens organo, sed solum in intellectu intellect, since it is a power using an
possibili. Scientia igitur non est in organ, but only in the possible
intellectu passivo, sed solum in intellect. Therefore, scientific
intellectu possibili. knowledge cannot reside in the
passive intellect, but only in the
possible intellect.
Amplius. Intellectus in habitu, ut [14] Also, the intellect in the state of
adversarius confitetur, est effectus habit is, as the opponent admits, the
intellectus agentis. Intellectus autem effect of the agent intellect. But it is
agentis effectus sunt intelligibilia actu, the agent intellect which causes things
quorum proprium recipiens est to be actually intelligible, and the
intellectus possibilis, ad quem proper recipient of these things is the
comparatur agens sicut ars ad possible intellect, to which the agent
materiam, ut Aristoteles dicit, in III de intellect is compared as “art to its
anima. Oportet igitur intellectum in material,” in Aristotle’s phrase.
habitu, qui est habitus scientiae, esse Therefore, the intellect in habit, which
in intellectu possibili, non passivo. is the habit of science, must have its
locus in the possible, and not in the
passive intellect.
Praeterea. Impossibile est quod [15] Then, too, the perfection of a
perfectio superioris substantiae higher substance cannot possibly
dependeat ab inferiori. Perfectio depend upon a lower substance. Now,
autem intellectus possibilis dependet the perfection of the possible intellect
ab operatione hominis: dependet depends on the operation of man, for
enim a phantasmatibus, quae movent it depends on the phantasms, which
intellectum possibilem. Non est igitur move the possible intellect. Therefore,
intellectus possibilis aliqua substantia the possible intellect is not a higher
superior homine. Ergo oportet quod substance than man. Consequently, it
sit aliquid hominis ut actus et forma must be part of man as his act and
ipsius. form.
Adhuc. Quaecumque sunt separata [16] Again, things separate in being
secundum esse, habent etiam also have separate operations,
separatas operationes: nam res sunt because things are for the sake of
propter suas operationes, sicut actus their operations, as first act for the
primus propter secundum; unde sake of second act; that is why
Aristoteles dicit, in I de anima, quod, Aristotle says that, if any operation of
si aliqua operationum animae est sine the soul does not involve the body,
corpore, quod possibile est animam then “it is possible for the soul to have
separari. Operatio autem intellectus a separate existence.” But the

possibilis indiget corpore: dicit enim operation of the possible intellect
philosophus, in III de anima, quod requires the body, for Aristotle says in
intellectus potest agere per seipsum, De anima III [4] that the intellect can
scilicet intelligere, quando est factus act by itself, namely, it can
in actu per speciem a understand, when it has been
phantasmatibus abstractam, quae actuated by a species abstracted from
non sunt sine corpore. Igitur phantasms—which have no existence
intellectus possibilis non est omnino a apart from the body. Therefore, the
corpore separatus. possible intellect is not altogether
separate from the body.
Amplius. Cuicumque competit aliqua [17] And again, every thing naturally
operatio secundum naturam, sunt ei a endowed with a certain operation has
natura attributa ea sine quibus illa by nature those attributes without
operatio compleri non potest: sicut which that operation cannot be carried
Aristoteles probat, in II libro de caelo, out. Thus, Aristotle proves in De caelo
quod, si stellae moverentur motu II [8] that if the movement of the stars
progressivo ad modum animalium, were progressive, like that of animals,
quod natura dedisset eis organa nature would have given them organs
motus progressivi. Sed operatio of progressive movement. But the
intellectus possibilis completur per operation of the possible intellect is
organa corporea, in quibus necesse accomplished by bodily organs, in
est esse phantasmata. Natura igitur which there must be phantasms.
intellectum possibilem corporeis univit Therefore, nature has united the
organis. Non est igitur secundum possible intellect to bodily organs.
esse a corpore separatus. Consequently, it has no being
separate from the body.
Item. Si sit secundum esse a corpore [18] Furthermore, if the possible

separatus, magis intelliget intellect had being separate from the
substantias quae sunt a materia body, it would know substances that
separatae quam formas sensibiles: are separate from matter, rather than
quia sunt magis intelligibiles, et magis sensible forms, because such
ei conformes. Non potest autem substances are more intelligible and
intelligere substantias omnino a more conformed to the intellect. But it
materia separatas, quia eorum non cannot know substances that are
sunt aliqua phantasmata: hic autem altogether separate from matter,
intellectus nequaquam sine because there are not phantasms of
phantasmate intelligit, ut Aristoteles them; and this intellect “in no case
dicit, in III de anima; sunt enim ei understands without a phantasm,” as
phantasmata sicut sensibilia sensui, Aristotle says in De anima III [7],
sine quibus sensus non sentit. Non because the phantasms are to it “as
est igitur substantia a corpore sensible objects to the senses,”
separata secundum esse. without which objects the sense power
is inoperative. Therefore, the possible
intellect is not a substance separate
from the body in being.
Adhuc. In omni genere tantum se [19] In every genus, moreover, the
extendit potentia passiva quantum passive potentiality is equal in its
potentia activa illius generis: unde scope to that of the correlative active
non est aliqua potentia passiva in potentiality, and so there does not
natura cui non respondeat aliqua exist in nature a passive potentiality
potentia activa naturalis. Sed without a corresponding natural active
intellectus agens non facit intelligibilia potentiality. But the agent intellect
nisi phantasmata. Ergo nec makes only the phantasms to be
intellectus possibilis movetur ab aliis intelligible. Therefore, the possible
intelligibilibus nisi a speciebus a intellect is moved by no other
phantasmatibus abstractis. Et sic intelligible objects than the species
substantias separatas intelligere non abstracted from the phantasms. And
potest. thus, it is unable to understand
separate substances.
Amplius. In substantiis separatis sunt [20] Then, too, the species of sensible
species rerum sensibilium things exist in separate substances in
intelligibiliter, per quas de sensibilibus an intelligible mode, and it is through
scientiam habent. Si igitur intellectus those species that such substances
possibilis intelligit substantias have knowledge of sensible things. If,
separatas, in eis acciperet then, the possible intellect
sensibilium cognitionem. Non ergo understands separate substances, it
acciperet eam a phantasmatibus: would in knowing them receive
quia natura non abundat superfluis. knowledge of sensible things. It would
not, therefore, receive this knowledge
from phantasms, for nature does not
abound in superfluities.
Si autem dicatur quod substantiis [21] Yet, if it be said that separate
separatis non adest cognitio substances have no knowledge of
sensibilium, saltem oportebit dicere sensible things, at least it will have to
quod eis adsit altior cognitio. Quam said that they enjoy a higher kind of
oportet non deesse intellectui knowledge: a knowledge which the
possibili, si praedictas substantias possible intellect must not lack if it
intelligit. Habebit igitur duplicem understands those substances.
scientiam: unam per modum Accordingly, the possible intellect will
substantiarum separatarum, aliam a have a twofold science: one, in the
sensibus acceptam. Quarum altera manner of separate substances; the
superflueret. other, received from the senses. And
one of these would be superfluous.
Praeterea. Intellectus possibilis est [22] The possible intellect,

quo intelligit anima, ut dicitur in III de furthermore, is that “by which the soul
anima. Si igitur intellectus possibilis understands,” as is said in De anima
intelligit substantias separatas, et nos III [4]. Therefore, if the possible
intelligimus eas. Quod patet esse intellect understands separate
falsum: habemus enim nos ad eas substances, then we also understand
sicut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut them. And this is clearly false,
Aristoteles dicit. because in relation to them we are “as
the eye of the owl to the sun,” as

Aristotle remarks [Metaph. II, 1].
His autem respondetur, secundum [23] Now, these arguments are

positionem praedictam. Intellectus answered as follows, along the lines of
enim possibilis, secundum quod est the doctrine we have been dealing
in se subsistens, intelligit substantias with. The possible intellect, as the
separatas: et est in potentia ad eas result of being selfsubsistent, knows
sicut diaphanum ad lucem. separate substances, and is in
Secundum autem quod continuatur potentiality to them as a transparent
nobis, a principio est in potentia ad body to the light. But, so far as the
formas a phantasmatibus abstractas. possible intellect is in contact with us,
Unde nos a principio non intelligimus it is from the beginning in potentiality
per eum substantias separatas. to forms abstracted from phantasms.
That is why we do not from the
beginning know separate substances
by its means.
Sed hoc stare non potest. Intellectus [24] This answer, however, cannot
enim possibilis ex hoc dicitur, stand. For the possible intellect,
secundum eos, continuari nobis, according to them, is said to be in
quod perficitur per species contact with us as a result of being
intelligibiles a phantasmatibus perfected by intelligible species
abstractas. Prius igitur est abstracted from phantasms. Prior to
considerare intellectum ut in potentia its contact with us, therefore, the
ad huiusmodi species quam ut intellect is to be thought of as being in
continuetur nobis. Non igitur per hoc potentiality to these species; so that it
quod continuatur nobis, est in is not in potentiality to them by its
potentia ad huiusmodi species. being in contact with us.
Praeterea. Secundum hoc, esse in [25] Moreover, according to this view
potentia ad praedictas species non the possible intellect would owe not to
esset ei secundum se conveniens, itself, but to something else, the fact of
sed per aliud. Per ea autem quae non its being in potentiality to the
conveniunt alicui secundum se, non intelligible species in question. But a
debet aliquid definiri. Non igitur ratio thing ought not to be defined in terms
intellectus possibilis est ex hoc quod of things not belonging to it in itself.
possibilis est ad praedictas species, Therefore, the definition of the
ut definit ipsum Aristoteles in III de possible intellect is not derived from its
anima. being in potentiality to those species,
as Aristotle defines it in De anima III
[4].
Adhuc. Impossibile est intellectum [26] Again, the possible intellect

possibilem simul multa intelligere nisi cannot understand several things at
unum per aliud intelligat: non enim the same time unless it understands
una potentia pluribus actibus simul one through another, for a single
perficitur nisi secundum ordinem. Si power is not perfected by several acts
igitur intellectus possibilis intelligat at the same time except in keeping
substantias separatas et species a with a certain order. Consequently, if
phantasmatibus separatas, oportet the possible intellect understands
quod vel intelligat per species separate substances, and species
huiusmodi substantias separatas, vel abstracted from phantasms, it must
e converso. Quodcumque autem either understand the substances
detur, sequitur quod nos intelligamus through the species or the species
substantias separatas. Quia si nos through the substances. Now, in either
intelligimus naturas sensibilium case it follows that we do not
inquantum intelligit eas intellectus understand separate substances. For,
possibilis; intellectus autem possibilis if we understand the natures of
intelligit eas per hoc quod intelligit sensible things so far as the possible
substantias separatas; et similiter nos intellect understands them, and the
intelligemus. Et similiter si sit e possible intellect knows them through
converso. Hoc autem est manifeste understanding separate substances,
falsum. Non igitur intellectus then we will understand them in the
possibilis intelligit substantias same way. And this also follows if the
separatas. Non est igitur substantia converse is true. But this is manifestly
separata. false. It remains that the possible
intellect does not understand separate
substances, and, therefore, it is not a
separate substance.
Caput 61 Chapter 61
Quod praedicta positio est contra THAT THIS THEORY IS CONTRARY
sententiam Aristotelis TO THE TEACHING OF ARISTOTLE
Sed quia huic positioni Averroes [1] Averroes, however, attempts to

praestare robur auctoritatis nititur strengthen his position by appealing to
propter hoc quod dicit Aristotelem authority, saying, therefore, that Aristotle
ita sensisse, ostendemus was of the same opinion. We shall, then,
manifeste quod praedicta opinio show clearly that Averroes’ doctrine is
est contra sententiam Aristotelis. contrary to that of Aristotle.
Primo quidem, quia Aristoteles in II [2] First, because Aristotle in De anima II
de anima, definit animam dicens [1] defines the soul as “the first act of an
quod est actus primus physici organic physical body having life
corporis organici potentia vitam potentially”; and he adds that this
habentis: definition “applies universally to every
et postea subiungit quod haec est kind of soul”; nor, as Averroes imagines,
definitio universaliter dicta de omni does Aristotle express any doubt
anima; non sicut praedictus concerning this definition. The Greek
Averroes fingit, sub dubitatione hoc texts, as well as Boethius’ translation,
proferens; ut patet ex exemplaribus give clear proof of this.
Graecis et translatione Boetii. [3] And afterwards in the same chapter,
Aristotle remarks that “certain parts of
the soul are separable.” But these are no
other than intellective parts. Hence, it

remains that these parts are acts of the
body.
Postmodum autem, in eodem [4] Nor is this point contradicted by what

capitulo, subiungit esse quasdam Aristotle says later on, namely: “Nothing
partes animae separabiles. Quae is clear as yet about the intellect and the
non sunt nisi intellectivae. power of insight, but it seems to be
Relinquitur igitur quod illae partes another kind of soul” [II, 1] For Aristotle
sunt actus corporis. Nec est contra does not mean by this to exclude the
hoc quod postea subiungit: de intellect from the common definition of
intellectu autem et perspectiva soul, but from the nature proper to the
potentia nihil est adhuc other parts of the soul; thus, he who
manifestum, sed videtur animae says that “the flying animal is of another
alterum genus esse. Non enim per kind than the walking” does not exclude
hoc vult intellectum alienare a the former from the common definition of
communi definitione animae, sed a animal. So, in order to explain what he
propriis naturis aliarum partium: meant by saying another, Aristotle
sicut qui dicit quod alterum genus immediately adds: “And this alone is
animalis est volatile a gressibili, capable of separate existence, as the
non aufert a volatili communem everlasting apart from the perishable.”
definitionem animalis. Unde, ut Nor is it Aristotle’s intention, as Averroes
ostenderet in quo dixerit alterum, imagines, to say that, in contrast with the
subiungit: et hoc solum contingit clear knowledge which we have
separari sicut perpetuum a concerning the other parts of the soul, it
corruptibili. Nec est intentio is not yet clear whether the intellect is
Aristotelis ut Commentator the soul. The genuine text does not read,
praedictus fingit, dicere quod nothing has been declared, or nothing
nondum est manifestum de has been said, but nothing is clear; and
intellectu utrum intellectus sit this must be taken to refer to that which
anima, sicut de aliis principiis. Non is proper to the intellective soul, and not
enim textus verus habet, nihil est to the common definition. But if, as
declaratum sive, nihil est dictum, Averroes says, soul is predicated
sed, nihil est manifestum: quod equivocally of the intellect and of other
intelligendum est quantum ad id souls, then Aristotle would first have
quod est proprium ei, non quantum pointed out the equivocation, and given
ad communem definitionem. Si the definition afterwards, in keeping with
autem, ut ipse dicit, anima his usual procedure. Otherwise, his
aequivoce dicitur de intellectu et argument would have been based on an
aliis, primo distinxisset equivocation, and in demonstrative
aequivocationem, postea science there is no room for that sort of
definivisset, sicut est consuetudo thing.
sua. Alias procederet in aequivoco.
Quod non est in scientiis
demonstrativis.
Item. In II de anima intellectum [5] Moreover, Aristotle in De anima II [3]
numerat inter potentias animae. Et reckons the intellect among the powers
in auctoritate etiam praedicta of the soul; and in the text previously
nominat perspectivam potentiam. quoted” he calls it the power of insight.
Non est igitur intellectus extra Therefore, the intellect is not outside the
animam humanam, sed est human soul, but is one of its powers.
quaedam potentia eius.
Item. In III de anima, incipiens loqui [6] And when in that same work Aristotle
de intellectu possibili, nominat eum begins his discussion of the possible
partem animae, dicens: de parte intellect by speaking of it as “the part of
autem animae qua cognoscit the soul with which the soul has
anima et sapit. In quo manifeste knowledge and wisdom” [III, 4], he thus
ostendit quod intellectus possibilis plainly indicates that the possible
sit aliquid animae. intellect is a part of the soul.
Adhuc autem manifestius per id [7] Aristotle indeed makes this point still
quod postea subiungit, declarans more explicit when he explains later on
naturam intellectus possibilis, what the nature of the possible intellect
dicens: dico autem intellectum quo is: “By the intellect,” he says, “I mean
opinatur et intelligit anima. In quo that by which the soul judges and
manifeste ostenditur intellectum understands” [III, 4]. This makes it
esse aliquid animae humanae, quo perfectly clear that the intellect is that
anima humana intelligit. part of the human soul by which it
understands.
Est igitur praedicta positio contra [8] The Averroistic position in question is,

sententiam Aristotelis, et contra then, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle
veritatem. Unde tanquam fictitia and to the truth, and is to be rejected
repudianda est. therefore as sheer fiction.
Caput 62 Chapter 62
Contra opinionem Alexandri de AGAINST ALEXANDER’S OPINION
intellectu possibili CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE
INTELLECT
His igitur verbis Aristotelis [1] Having considered these sayings of

consideratis, Alexander posuit Aristotle, Alexander asserted that the
intellectum possibilem esse aliquam possible intellect is a power in us, so
virtutem in nobis, ut sic definitio that the common definition of soul
communis de anima assignata ab given by Aristotle in De anima might
Aristotele in II de anima, possit sibi apply to that intellect. But because he
convenire. Quia vero intelligere non was unable to understand how an
poterat aliquam substantiam intellectual substance could be the
intellectualem esse corporis formam, form of a body, be held that the power
posuit praedictam virtutem non esse of which we speak does not have its
fundatam in aliqua intellectuali foundation in an intellectual substance,
substantia; et consequentem but that it is consequent upon a
commixtionem elementorum in blending of elements in the human
corpore humano. Determinatus enim body. For the particular kind of blending
mixtionis humani corporis modus found in the human body makes man
facit hominem esse in potentia ad to be in potentiality to receive the influx
recipiendum influentiam intellectus of the agent intellect, which is always in
agentis, qui semper est in actu, et act, and according to him is a separate
secundum ipsum est quaedam substance, the effect of that influx
substantia separata, ex qua being that man is made to understand
influentia homo fit intelligens actu. Id actually. Now, that which enables man
autem in homine per quod est to understand is the possible intellect.
potentia intelligens, est intellectus And thus, it seemed to follow that the
possibilis. Et sic videbatur sequi possible intellect is in us the result of a
quod ex commixtione determinata in particular blending.
nobis sit intellectus possibilis.
Videtur autem in primo aspectu haec [2] But this position seems at first

positio verbis et demonstrationi glance to be contrary to both the words
Aristotelis esse contraria. Ostendit and the proof of Aristotle. For, as we
enim Aristoteles in III de anima, ut have already pointed out, Aristotle
dictum est, quod intellectus proves in De anima in that the possible
possibilis est immixtus corpori. Hoc intellect is “free from all admixture with,
autem est impossibile dici de aliqua the body” [III, 4]. And this could not
virtute consequente mixtionem possibly be said of a power resulting
elementorum: quod enim huiusmodi from a blending of elements, since
est, oportet quod in ipsa such a power must be rooted in that
elementorum commixtione fundetur, very blending of elements, as we see in
sicut videmus de sapore et odore et the case of taste, smell, and the like.
aliis huiusmodi. Non igitur positio Seemingly, then, this notion of
praedicta Alexandri potest stare cum Alexander’s is incompatible with the
verbis et demonstratione Aristotelis, words and the proof of Aristotle.
ut videtur.
Ad hoc autem Alexander dicit quod [3] To this, however, Alexander replies
intellectus possibilis est ipsa that the possible intellect is the very
praeparatio in natura humana ad preparedness in human nature to
recipiendum influentiam intellectus receive the influx of the agent intellect.
agentis. Praeparatio autem ipsa non And preparedness is not itself a
est aliqua natura sensibilis particular sensible nature, nor is it
determinata, neque est mixta intermixed with the body, rather,
corpori. Est enim relatio quaedam, et preparedness is a certain relation, and
ordo unius ad aliud. the order of one thing to another.
Sed hoc manifeste discordat ab [4] But this notion also clearly clashes
intentione Aristotelis. Probat enim with Aristotle’s meaning. For Aristotle
Aristoteles ex hoc intellectum proves that the reason why the
possibilem non habere determinate possible intellect does not itself have
aliquam naturam sensibilium, et per the nature of any particular sensible
consequens non esse mixtum thing, and consequently is free from
corpori, quia est receptivus omnium any admixture with the body, is
formarum sensibilium et because it is receptive of all the forms
cognoscitivus earum. Quod de of sensible things, and cognizant of

praeparatione non potest intelligi: them. Now, preparedness cannot be
quia eius non est recipere, sed thought of in such terms, for it does not
magis praeparari. Non igitur mean to receive, but to be prepared to
demonstratio Aristotelis procedit de receive. So it is that Aristotle’s
praeparatione, sed de aliquo demonstration proceeds not from
recipiente praeparato. preparedness, but from a prepared
recipient.
Amplius. Si ea quae dicit Aristoteles [5] Moreover, if what Aristotle says

de intellectu possibili, conveniunt ei about the possible intellect applies to it
inquantum est praeparatio, et non ex as a preparedness, and not by reason
natura subiecti praeparati, sequetur of the nature of the subject prepared, it
quod omni praeparationi conveniant. will follow that it applies to every
In sensu autem est praeparatio preparedness. Now, in the senses
quaedam ad sensibilia in actu there is a certain preparedness to
recipienda. Ergo et idem dicendum receive sensibles in act. And so, the
est de sensu et intellectu possibili. same thing must be said of the senses
Cuius contrarium manifeste as of the possible intellect. But Aristotle
subiungit Aristoteles, ostendens clearly says the contrary in explaining
differentiam inter receptionem the difference between the receptivity
sensus et intellectus ex hoc quod of the senses and of the intellect, from
sensus corrumpitur ex excellentia the fact that the sense is corrupted by
obiectorum, non autem intellectus. objects exceedingly high or intense, but
not the intellect.
Item. Aristoteles attribuit possibili [6] Likewise, Aristotle says that the
intellectui pati ab intelligibili, possible intellect is passive to the
suscipere species intelligibiles, esse intelligible, receives intelligible species,
in potentia ad eas. Comparat etiam is in potentiality to them. He even
eum tabulae in qua nihil est compares it to “a tablet on which
scriptum. Quae quidem omnia non nothing is written.” Now, none of these
possunt dici de praeparatione, sed things can be said of preparedness, but
de subiecto praeparato. Est igitur they all apply to the subject prepared.
contra intentionem Aristotelis quod The notion that the possible intellect is
intellectus possibilis sit praeparatio a mere preparedness is, therefore,
ipsa. contrary to Aristotle’s meaning.
Adhuc. Agens est nobilius patiente [7] “The agent is superior to the patient,

et faciens facto, sicut actus potentia. and the maker to the thing made,” as
Quanto autem aliquid est act to potentiality. Now, the more
immaterialius, tanto est nobilius. Non immaterial a thing is, the higher its level
potest igitur effectus esse of being. Therefore, the effect cannot
immaterialior sua causa. Omnis be more immaterial than its cause. But
autem virtus cognoscitiva, every cognitive power, as such, is
inquantum huiusmodi, est immaterial. Thus, Aristotle says that the
immaterialis: unde et de sensu, qui power of sense, which occupies the
est infimus in ordine virtutum lowest place in the order of cognitive
cognoscitivarum, dicit Aristoteles, in powers, is “receptive of sensible
II de anima, quod est susceptivus species without matter.” It is therefore
sensibilium specierum sine materia. impossible for a cognitive power to be
Impossibile est igitur a commixtione caused by a commingling of elements.
elementorum causari aliquam Now, the possible intellect is the
virtutem cognoscitivam. Intellectus highest cognitive power in us; for
autem possibilis est suprema virtus Aristotle says that the possible intellect
cognoscitiva in nobis: dicit enim is “that by which the soul knows and
Aristoteles, in III de anima, quod understands.”“ Therefore, the possible
intellectus possibilis est quo intellect is not caused by a mixture of
cognoscit et intelligit anima. elements.
Intellectus igitur possibilis non
causatur ex commixtione
elementorum.
Amplius. Si principium alicuius [8] If the principle of an operation
operationis ab aliquibus causis proceeds from certain causes, that
procedit, oportet operationem illam operation must not go beyond those
non excedere causas illas: cum causes, for the second cause acts by
causa secunda agat virtute primae. virtue of the first. But even the
Operatio autem animae nutritivae operation of the nutritive soul exceeds
etiam excedit virtutem qualitatum the power of the elemental qualities;
elementarium: probat enim for, in De anima II [4], Aristotle proves
Aristoteles, in II de anima, quod ignis that “fire is not the cause of growth, but
non est causa augmenti, sed in a sense its concurrent cause, the
concausa aliquo modo, principalis principal cause of growth being the
autem causa est anima, ad quam soul,” to which heat is compared as the
comparatur calor sicut instrumentum instrument to the craftsman. It follows
ad artificem. Non igitur potest anima that the vegetative soul cannot be
vegetabilis produci ex commixtione produced by an intermingling of the
elementorum. Multo igitur minus elements, and much less, therefore,
sensus et intellectus possibilis. the sense and possible intellect.
Item. Intelligere est quaedam [9] Understanding is an operation in

operatio in qua impossibile est which no bodily organ can possibly
communicare aliquod organum take part. Now, this operation is
corporeum. Haec autem operatio attributed to the soul, or even to the
attribuitur animae, vel etiam homini: man, for it is said that the soul
dicitur enim quod anima intelligit, vel, understands, or man, by the soul.
homo per animam. Oportet igitur Hence, there must be in man a
aliquod principium in homine esse, a principle, independent of the body,
corpore non dependens, quod sit which is the source of that operation.
principium talis operationis. However, the preparedness that results
Praeparatio autem sequens from a blending of the elements clearly
commixtionem elementorum a depends on the body; and,
corpore dependet manifeste. Non consequently, it is not this principle. But
est igitur praeparatio tale principium. the possible intellect is for Aristotle
Est autem intellectus possibilis: dicit says in De anima in that this intellect is
enim Aristoteles, in III de anima, “that by which the soul knows and
quod intellectus possibilis est quo understands.” Therefore, the possible
anima opinatur et intelligit. Non est intellect is not a preparedness.
igitur intellectus possibilis

praeparatio.
Si autem dicatur quod principium [10] Now, seemingly it is not enough to

praedictae operationis in nobis est say that the principle of the operation of
species intelligibilis facta in actu ab understanding in us is the intelligible
intellectu agente: hoc videtur non species brought into act by the agent
sufficere. Quia, cum homo de intellect. For man comes to understand
potentia intelligente fiat actu actually after understanding potentially.
intelligens, oportet quod non solum So, it follows that he understands not
intelligat per speciem intelligibilem, only by the intelligible species, whereby
per quam fit actu intelligens, sed per he is made to understand actually, but
aliquam potentiam intellectivam, also by an intellective power, which is
quae sit praedictae operationis the principle of this operation of
principium: sicut et in sensu accidit. understanding; and such is the case
Haec autem potentia ab Aristotele also with the senses. Now, Aristotle
ponitur intellectus possibilis. holds that this power is the possible
Intellectus igitur possibilis est non intellect. Therefore, the possible
dependens a corpore. intellect is independent of the body.
Praeterea. Species non est [11] Moreover, a species is intelligible in

intelligibilis actu nisi secundum quod act only so far as it is freed from its
est depurata ab esse materiali. Hoc presence in matter. But this cannot be
autem non potest accidere dum done so long as it remains in a material
fuerit in aliqua potentia materiali, power, namely, a power which is
quae scilicet sit causata ex principiis caused by material principles, or is the
materialibus, vel quae sit actus act of a material organ. The presence
materialis organi. Oportet igitur poni in us of an intellective power that is
aliquam potentiam intellectivam in immaterial must, therefore, be granted.
nobis immaterialem. Quae est And this power is the possible intellect.
intellectus possibilis.
Adhuc. Intellectus possibilis ab [12] Also, Aristotle speaks of the

Aristotele dicitur pars animae. Anima possible intellect as being part of the
autem non est praeparatio, sed soul. Now, the soul is not a
actus: praeparatio enim est ordo preparedness, but an act, since
potentiae ad actum. Sequitur tamen preparedness is the order of
ad actum aliqua praeparatio ad potentiality to act. And yet an act is
ulteriorem actum: sicut ad actum followed by a preparedness for a
diaphanitatis sequitur ordo ad actum further act; the act of transparency is
lucis. Intellectus igitur possibilis non followed by an order to the act of light.
est ipsa praeparatio, sed actus Therefore, the possible intellect is not a
quidam. preparedness itself, but is a certain act.
Amplius. Homo consequitur speciem [13] Man owes his specific essence

et naturam humanam secundum and his human nature to that part of the
partem animae sibi propriam, quae soul which is proper to him, namely, the
quidem est intellectus possibilis. possible intellect. Now, nothing
Nihil autem consequitur speciem et receives its species and its nature so
naturam secundum quod est in far as it is in potentiality, but so far as it
potentia, sed secundum quod est in is in act. And since preparedness
actu. Cum igitur praeparatio nihil sit simply consists in an order of
aliud quam ordo potentiae ad actum, potentiality to act, the possible intellect
impossibile est quod intellectus cannot be merely a preparedness
possibilis nihil sit aliud quam existing in human nature.
praeparatio quaedam in natura
humana existens.
Caput 63 Chapter 63
Quod anima non sit complexio, ut THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A
posuit Galenus TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN
MAINTAINED
Praedictae autem opinioni [1] The opinion of the physician Galen
Alexandri de intellectu possibili, about the soul is similar to the previously
propinqua est Galeni medici de discussed notion, of Alexander concerning
anima. Dicit enim animam esse the possible intellect. For Galen says that
complexionem. Ad hoc autem the soul is a temperament. Now, he was
dicendum motus est per hoc quod moved to say this because of our
videmus ex diversis observation that diverse passions,
complexionibus causari in nobis ascribed to the soul, result from various
diversas passiones quae temperaments in us: those possessed of a
attribuuntur animae: aliquam enim choleric temperament are easily angered;
complexionem habentes, ut melancholics easily grow sad. And so we
cholericam, de facili irascuntur; see that the same arguments which we
melancholici vero de facili used a moment ago against Alexander’s
tristantur. Unde et per easdem theory can serve to disprove this notion of
rationes haec opinio improbari Galen’s, as well as some arguments
potest per quas improbata est specifically relevant to that notion.
opinio Alexandri, et per aliquas
proprias.
Ostensum est enim supra quod [2] For it was shown above that the
operatio animae vegetabilis, et operation of the vegetative soul, sensitive
cognitio sensitiva, excedit knowledge, and, much more, the
virtutem qualitatum activarum et operation of the intellect transcend the
passivarum, et multo magis power of the active and passive qualities.
operatio intellectus. Complexio But temperament is caused by active and
autem causatur ex qualitatibus passive qualities. Therefore, it cannot be a
activis et passivis. Non potest principle of the soul’s operations. It is,
igitur complexio esse principium then, impossible for a soul to be a
operationum animae. Unde temperament.
impossibile est quod aliqua anima
sit complexio.
Adhuc. Complexio, cum sit [3] Moreover, temperament is something

quiddam constitutum ex contrariis constituted by contrary qualities, as a kind
qualitatibus quasi medium inter of mean between them, and therefore it
eas, impossibile est quod sit cannot possibly be a substantial form,
forma substantialis: nam since “substance has no contrary, and
substantiae nihil est contrarium, does not admit of variation of degree.” But
nec suscipit magis et minus. the soul is a substantial, not an accidental,
Anima autem est forma form; otherwise, a thing would not obtain
substantialis, et non accidentalis: genus or species through the soul. It
alias per animam non sortiretur follows that the soul is not a temperament.
aliquid genus vel speciem. Anima
igitur non est complexio.
Adhuc. Complexio non movet [4] Again, temperament is not responsible

corpus animalis motu locali: for the local movement of an animal’s
sequeretur enim motum body; if it were, then that body would
dominantis, et sic semper follow the movement of the preponderant
deorsum ferretur. Anima autem element, and thus would always be
movet animal in omnem partem. moved downwards. But the soul moves
Non est igitur anima complexio. the body in all directions; therefore, it is
not the temperament.
Amplius. Anima regit corpus et [5] Then, too, the soul rules the body and

repugnat passionibus, quae resists the passions, which follow the
complexionem sequuntur. Ex temperament. For by temperament some
complexione enim aliqui sunt are more prone than others to
magis aliis ad concupiscentias vel concupiscence or anger, yet refrain more
iras apti, qui tamen magis ab eis from these things because something
abstinent, propter aliquid keeps them in check, as we see in
refrenans: ut patet in continent persons. Now, it is not the
continentibus. Hoc autem non temperament that does this. Therefore,
facit complexio. Non est igitur the soul is not the temperament.
anima complexio.
Deceptus autem fuisse videtur ex [6] It would seem that Galen was misled

hoc quod non consideravit aliter through not having considered that
passiones attribui complexioni, et passions are attributed to the
aliter animae. Complexioni temperament in quite a different manner
namque attribuuntur sicut than to the soul. For passions are
disponenti, et quantum ad id quod ascribed to the temperament as a
est materiale in passionibus, sicut dispositive cause in their regard, and as
fervor sanguinis et huiusmodi: concerns that which is material in them,
animae autem tanquam principali such as the heat of the blood and the like.
causae, ex parte eius quod est in On the other hand, passions are ascribed
passionibus formale, sicut in ira to the soul as their principal cause, and as
appetitus vindictae. regards that which is formal in them; for
instance, the desire of vengeance in the
passion of anger.
Caput 64 Chapter 64
Quod anima non sit harmonia THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY
Similis autem praedictae positioni [1] Along the lines of the foregoing theory

est positio dicentium animam esse is the view of those who say that the soul
harmoniam. Non enim is a harmony. For these persons thought
intellexerunt animam esse of the soul not as a harmony of sounds,
harmoniam sonorum, sed but of the contraries of which they
contrariorum, ex quibus videbant observed animate bodies to be
componi corpora animata. Quae composed. In the De anima [I, 4] this
quidem opinio in libro de anima notion seems to be attributed to
videtur attribui Empedocli. Empedocles, although Gregory of Nyssa
Gregorius autem Nyssenus ascribes it to Dinarchus. And it is
attribuit eam Dinarcho. Unde et disproved in the same way as Galen’s
improbatur sicut et praecedens; et theory, as well as by arguments that
adhuc propriis rationibus. apply properly to itself.
Omne enim corpus mixtum [2] For every mixed body has harmony
harmoniam habet et and temperament. Nor can harmony
complexionem. Nec harmonia move a body or rule it or curb the
potest movere corpus aut regere passions, any more than can
ipsum, vel repugnare passionibus: temperament. Moreover, harmony is
sicut nec complexio. Intenditur subject to intensification and remission;
etiam et remittitur: sicut et and so, too, is temperament. All these
complexio. Ex quibus omnibus things show that the soul is not a
ostenditur quod anima non sit harmony, even as it is not a
harmonia, sicut nec complexio. temperament.
Adhuc. Ratio harmoniae magis [3] Furthermore, the nature of harmony
convenit qualitatibus corporis pertains to the qualities of the body rather
quam animae: nam sanitas est than to those of the soul; thus, health
harmonia quaedam humorum; consists in a kind of harmony of the
fortitudo, nervorum et ossium; humours; strength, in a certain harmony
pulchritudo, membrorum et of sinews and bones; beauty, in harmony
colorum. Non autem potest of limbs and colors. But it is impossible to
assignari qualium harmonia sit assign the things of which sense or
sensus aut intellectus, et cetera intellect or the other powers of the soul
quae ad animam pertinent. Non are the harmony. Therefore, the soul is
est igitur anima harmonia. not a harmony.
Amplius. Harmonia dicitur [4] Again, harmony has two senses; for it

dupliciter: uno modo, ipsa can be taken to signify the composition
compositio; alio modo, ratio itself, or the mode of composition. Now,
compositionis. Anima autem non the soul is not a composition, since each
est compositio: quia oporteret part of the soul would have to consist in
quod unaquaeque pars animae the composition of some of the parts of
esset compositio aliquarum the body; and such an allotting of psychic
partium corporis; quod non est part to corporeal part is impossible. Nor is
assignare. Similiter non est ratio the soul a mode of composition; for, since
compositionis: quia, cum in in the various parts of the body there are
diversis partibus corporis sint various modes or proportions of
diversae rationes seu proportiones composition, each part of the body would
compositionis, singulae partes have a distinct soul: since bone, flesh,
corporis haberent singulas and sinew are in each case composed
animas; aliam enim animam according to a different proportion, each
haberet os et caro et nervus, cum would possess a different soul. Now, this
sint secundum diversam is patently false. Therefore, the soul is not
proportionem composita. Quod a harmony.
patet esse falsum. Non est igitur
anima harmonia.
Caput 65 Chapter 65
Quod anima non sit corpus THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY
Fuerunt autem et alii magis [1] There were also others whose thinking

errantes, ponentes animam esse was even wider of the mark, since they
corpus. Quorum opiniones licet asserted that the soul is a body. Although
fuerint diversae et variae, sufficit they held divergent and various opinions, it
eas hic communiter reprobare. suffices to refute them here collectively.
Viventia enim, cum sint quaedam [2] For, since living things are physical

res naturales, sunt composita ex realities, they are composed of matter and
materia et forma. Componuntur form. Now, they are composed of a body
autem ex corpore et anima, quae and a soul, which makes them actually
facit viventia actu. Ergo oportet living. Therefore, one of these two must be
alterum istorum esse formam, et the form and the other matter. But the body
alterum materiam. Corpus autem cannot be the form, because the body is
non potest esse forma: quia not present in another thing as its matter
corpus non est in altero sicut in and subject. The soul, then, is the form,
materia et subiecto. Anima igitur and consequently is not a body, since no
est forma. Ergo non est corpus: body is a form.
cum nullum corpus sit forma.
Adhuc. Impossibile est duo [3] It is, moreover, impossible for two
corpora esse simul. Anima bodies to coincide. But, so long as the
autem non est seorsum a body lives, the soul is not apart from it.
corpore dum vivit. Non est igitur Therefore, the soul is not a body.
anima corpus.
Amplius. Omne corpus divisibile [4] Then, too, every body is divisible Now,

est. Omne autem divisibile whatever is divisible requires something to
indiget aliquo continente et keep together and unite its parts, so that, if

uniente partes eius. Si igitur the soul is a body, it will have something
anima sit corpus, habebit aliquid else to preserve its integrity, and this yet
aliud continens et illud magis erit more will be the soul; for we observe that,
anima: videmus enim, anima when the soul departs, the body
recedente, corpus dissolvi. Et si disintegrates. And if this integrating
hoc iterum sit divisibile, oportebit principle again be divisible, we must at last
vel devenire ad aliquod either arrive at something indivisible and
indivisibile et incorporeum, quod incorruptible, which will be the soul, or go
erit anima: vel erit procedere in on to infinity; which is impossible.
infinitum, quod est impossibile. Therefore, the soul is not a body.
Non est igitur anima corpus.
Item. Sicut supra probatum est, [5] Again. It has been proved in Book I of
et in VIII physicorum probatur, this work, and in Physics VIII [5], that every
omne movens seipsum selfmover is composed of two parts: one,
componitur ex duobus, quorum the part that moves and is not moved; the
alterum est movens et non other, the part that is moved. Now, the
motum, et alterum est motum. animal is a selfmover, and the mover in it
Sed animal est movens seipsum: is the soul, and the body is the moved.
movens autem in ipso est anima, Therefore, the soul is an unmoved mover.
motum autem est corpus. Anima But no body moves without being moved,
igitur est movens non motum. as was shown in that same Book.
Nullum autem corpus movet nisi Therefore, the soul is not a body.
motum, ut supra probatum est.
Anima igitur non est corpus.
Praeterea. Supra ostensum est [6] Furthermore, we have already shown
quod intelligere non potest esse that understanding cannot be the act of a
actio alicuius corporis. Est autem body. But it is the act of a soul.
actus animae. Anima igitur, ad Consequently, at least the intellective soul
minus intellectiva, non est is not a body.
corpus.
Ea autem quibus aliqui conati [7] Now the arguments by which some
sunt probare animam esse have tried to prove that the soul is a body
corpus, facile est solvere. are easily solved. They argue as follows:
Ostendunt enim animam esse that the son is like the father even in
corpus, per hoc quod filius accidents of the soul, despite the fact that
similatur patri etiam in the begetting of the one by the other
accidentibus animae: cum tamen involves the parting of body from body; that
filius generetur a patre per the soul suffers with the body; that the soul
decisionem corporalem. Et quia is separate from the body, and separation
anima compatitur corpori. Et quia is between mutually contacting bodies.
separatur a corpore: separari
autem est corporum se
tangentium.
Sed contra hoc iam dictum est [8] But against this argumentation it has
quod complexio corporis est already been pointed out that the bodily
aliqualiter causa animae temperament has a certain dispositive
passionum per modum causality with respect to the passions of
disponentis. Anima etiam non the soul. Moreover, it is only accidentally
compatitur corpori nisi per that the soul suffers with the body; for,
accidens: quia, cum sit forma since the soul is the form of the body, it is
corporis, movetur per accidens moved accidentally by the body’s being
moto corpore. Separatur etiam moved. Also, the soul is separate from the
anima a corpore, non sicut body, not as a thing touching from a thing
tangens a tacto, sed sicut forma touched, but as form from matter, although,
a materia. Quamvis et aliquis as we have shown, that which is
tactus sit incorporei ad corpus, ut incorporeal does have a certain contact
supra ostensum est. with the body.
Movit etiam ad hanc positionem [9] Indeed, what motivated many to adopt
multos quia crediderunt quod this position was their belief that there is
non est corpus, non esse, nothing that is not a body, for they were
imaginationem transcendere non unable to rise above the imagination,
valentes, quae solum circa which is exclusively concerned with
corpora versatur. bodies.
Unde haec opinio, Sap. 2, ex That is why this view is proposed in the
persona insipientium proponitur, person of the foolish, who say of the soul:
dicentium de anima: fumus et “The breath in our nostrils is smoke, and
flatus est in naribus nostris, et speech a spark to move our heart” (Wis.
sermo scintillae ad movendum 2:2).
cor.
Caput 66 Chapter 66
Contra ponentes intellectum et AGAINST THOSE WHO MAINTAIN
sensum esse idem THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE
THE SAME
His autem propinquum fuit quod [1] Thinking that there was no difference

quidam antiquorum philosophorum between intellect and sense, some of the
intellectum a sensu differre non early philosophers” were close to the
opinabantur. Quod quidem persons referred to above. But that
impossibile est. notion of theirs is impossible.
Sensus enim in omnibus [2] For sense is found in all animals,
animalibus invenitur. Alia autem whereas animals other than man have
animalia ab homine intellectum non no intellect. This is evident from the fact
habent. Quod ex hoc apparet, quia that the latter perform diverse and
non operantur diversa et opposita, opposite actions, not as though they
quasi intellectum habentia; sed, possessed intellect, but as moved by
sicut a natura mota, determinatas nature, carrying out certain determinate
quasdam operationes, et uniformes operations of uniform character within

in eadem specie, sicut omnis the same species; every swallow builds
hirundo similiter nidificat. Non est its nest in the same way. Therefore,
igitur idem intellectus et sensus. intellect is not the same as sense.
Adhuc. Sensus non est [3] Moreover, sense is cognizant only of

cognoscitivus nisi singularium: singulars; for every sense power knows
cognoscit enim omnis sensitiva through individual species, since it
potentia per species individuales, receives the species of things in bodily
cum recipiat species rerum in organs. But the intellect is cognizant of
organis corporalibus. Intellectus universals, as experience proves.
autem est cognoscitivus Therefore, intellect differs from sense.
universalium, ut per experimentum
patet. Differt igitur intellectus a
sensu.
Amplius. Cognitio sensus non se [4] Then, too, sensecognition is limited
extendit nisi ad corporalia. Quod ex to corporeal things. This is clear from the
hoc patet, quia qualitates fact that sensible qualities, which are the
sensibiles, quae sunt propria proper objects of the senses, exist only
obiecta sensuum, non sunt nisi in in such things; and without them the
corporalibus; sine eis autem senses know nothing. On the other
sensus nihil cognoscit. Intellectus hand, the intellect knows incorporeal
autem cognoscit incorporalia: sicut things, such as wisdom, truth, and the
sapientiam, veritatem, et relationes relations of things. Therefore, intellect
rerum. Non est igitur idem and sense are not the same.
intellectus et sensus.
Item. Nullus sensus seipsum [5] Likewise, a sense knows neither itself

cognoscit, nec suam operationem: nor its operation; for instance, sight
visus enim non videt seipsum, nec neither sees itself nor sees that it sees.
videt se videre, sed hoc superioris This selfreflexive power belongs to a
potentiae est, ut probatur in libro de higher faculty, as is proved in the De
anima. Intellectus autem cognoscit anima [III, 2]. But the intellect knows
seipsum, et cognoscit se itself, and knows that it knows.
intelligere. Non est igitur idem Therefore, intellect and sense are not
intellectus et sensus. the same.
Praeterea. Sensus corrumpitur ab [6] Sense, furthermore, is corrupted by

excellenti sensibili. Intellectus excess in the sensible object. But
autem non corrumpitur ab intellect is not corrupted by the
excellentia intelligibilis: quinimmo exceedingly high rank of an intelligible
qui intelligit maiora, potest melius object; for, indeed, he who understands
postmodum minora intelligere. Est greater things is more able afterwards to
igitur alia virtus sensitiva et understand lesser things. The sensitive
intellectiva. power therefore differs from the
intellective.
Caput 67 Chapter 67
Contra ponentes intellectum AGAINST THOSE WHO HOLD THAT
possibilem esse imaginationem THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE
IMAGINATION
Huic autem opinioni affine fuit [1] The opinion of those who asserted that

quod quidam posuerunt the possible intellect is not distinct from the
intellectum possibilem non esse imagination was akin to the notion just
aliud quam imaginationem. Quod discussed. And that opinion is evidently
quidem patet esse falsum. false.
Imaginatio enim est etiam in aliis [2] For imagination is present in non

animalibus. Cuius signum est human animals as well as in man. This is
quod, abeuntibus sensibilibus, indicated by the fact that in the absence of
fugiunt vel persequuntur ea; sensible things, such animals shun or seek
quod non esset nisi in eis them; which would not be the case unless
imaginaria apprehensio they retained an imaginative apprehension
sensibilium remaneret. of them. But nonhuman animals are
Intellectus autem in eis non est, devoid of intellect, since no work of intellect
cum nullum opus intellectus in is evident in them. Therefore imagination
eis appareat. Non est igitur idem and intellect are not the same.
imaginatio et intellectus.
Adhuc. Imaginatio non est nisi [3] Moreover, imagination has to do with
corporalium et singularium: cum bodily and singular things only; as is said in
phantasia sit motus factus a the De anima [3], imagination is a
sensu secundum actum, ut movement caused by actual sensation.
dicitur in libro de anima. The intellect, however, grasps objects
Intellectus autem universalium et universal and incorporeal. Therefore, the
incorporalium est. Non est igitur possible intellect is not the imagination.
intellectus possibilis imaginatio.
Amplius. Impossibile est idem [4] Again, it is impossible for the same
esse movens et motum. Sed thing to be mover and moved. But the
phantasmata movent intellectum phantasms move the possible intellect as
possibilem sicut sensibilia sensibles move the senses, as Aristotle
sensum: ut Aristoteles dicit, in III says in De anima III [7]. Therefore, the
de anima. Impossibile est igitur possible intellect cannot be the same as
quod sit idem intellectus the imagination.
possibilis et imaginatio.
Praeterea. Probatum est in III de [5] And again. It is proved in De anima III
anima quod intellectus non est [4] that the intellect is not the act of any
actus alicuius partis corporis. part of the body. Now the imagination has
Imaginatio autem habet organum a determinate bodily organ. Therefore, the
corporale determinatum. Non est imagination is not the same as the possible
igitur idem imaginatio et intellect.
Hinc est quod dicitur Iob 3511: [6] So it is that we read in the Book of Job

qui docet nos super iumenta (35:11): “Who teaches us more than the
terrae, et super volucres caeli beasts of the earth, and instructs us more
erudit nos. Per quod datur than the fowls of the air.” And by this we
intelligi quod hominis est aliqua are given to understand that man is
virtus cognoscitiva supra sensum possessed of a power of knowledge
et imaginationem, quae sunt in superior to sense and imagination, which
aliis animalibus. are shared by the other animals.
Caput 68 Chapter 68
Qualiter substantia intellectualis HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE
possit esse forma corporis CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY
Ex praemissis igitur rationibus [1] From the preceding arguments, then,
concludere possumus quod we can conclude that an intellectual
intellectualis substantia potest uniri substance can be united to the body as
corpori ut forma. its form.
Si enim substantia intellectualis [2] For, if an intellectual substance is not

non unitur corpori solum ut motor, united to the body merely as its mover,
ut Plato posuit, neque continuatur as Plato held that it is, nor is in contact
ei solum per phantasmata, ut dixit with it merely by phantasms, as Averroes
Averroes, sed ut forma; neque said, but as its form; and if the intellect
tamen intellectus quo homo whereby man understands is not a
intelligit, est praeparatio in preparedness in human nature, as
humana natura, ut dixit Alexander; Alexander supposed it to be, nor the
neque complexio, ut Galenus; temperament, according to Galen, nor a
neque harmonia, ut Empedocles; harmony, as Empedocles imagined, nor a
neque corpus, vel sensus, vel body, nor the senses or the imagination,
imaginatio, ut antiqui dixerunt: as the early philosophers maintained,
relinquitur quod anima humana sit then it remains that the human soul is an
intellectualis substantia corpori intellectual substance united to the body
unita ut forma. Quod quidem sic as its form. This conclusion can be made
potest fieri manifestum. evident as follows.
Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma [3] For one thing to be another’s

substantialis alterius, duo substantial form, two requirements must
requiruntur. Quorum unum est, ut be met. First, the form must be the
forma sit principium essendi principle of the substantial being of the
substantialiter ei cuius est forma: thing whose form it is; I speak not of the
principium autem dico, non productive but of the formal principle
factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid whereby a thing exists and is called a
est et denominatur ens. Unde being. The second requirement then
sequitur aliud, scilicet quod forma follows from this, namely, that the form
et materia conveniant in uno esse: and the matter be joined together in the
quod non contingit de principio unity of one act of being; which is not true
effectivo cum eo cui dat esse. Et of the union of the efficient cause with
hoc esse est in quo subsistit that to which it gives being. And this
substantia composita, quae est single act of being is that in which the
una secundum esse, ex materia et composite substance subsists: a thing
forma constans. Non autem one in being and made up of matter and
impeditur substantia intellectualis, form. Now, as we have shown, the fact
per hoc quod est subsistens, ut that an intellectual substance is
probatum est, esse formale subsistent does not stand in the way of
principium essendi materiae, quasi its being the formal principle of the being
esse suum communicans of the matter, as communicating its own
materiae. Non est enim being to the matter. For it is not unfitting
inconveniens quod idem sit esse that the composite and its form should
in quo subsistit compositum et subsist in the same act of being, since
forma ipsa: cum compositum non the composite exists only by the form,
sit nisi per formam, nec seorsum and neither of them subsists apart from
utrumque subsistat. the other.
Potest autem obiici quod [4] Nevertheless, it may be objected that

substantia intellectualis esse suum an intellectual substance cannot
materiae corporali communicare communicate its being to corporeal
non possit, ut sit unum esse matter in such fashion that the two will be
substantiae intellectualis et united in the same act of being, because
materiae corporalis: diversorum diverse genera have diverse modes of
enim generum est diversus modus being, and to the nobler substance
essendi; et nobilioris substantiae belongs a loftier being.
nobilius esse.
Hoc autem convenienter diceretur [5] Now, this argument would be relevant

si eodem modo illud esse materiae if that single act of being belonged in the
esset sicut est substantiae same way to the matter as to the
intellectualis. Non est autem ita. intellectual substance. But it does not.
Est enim materiae corporalis ut For that act of being appertains to the
recipientis et subiecti ad aliquid corporeal matter as its recipient and its
altius elevati: substantiae autem subject, raised to a higher level; it
intellectualis ut principii, et belongs to the intellectual substance as
secundum propriae naturae its principle, and in keeping with its very
congruentiam. Nihil igitur prohibet own nature. Nothing, therefore, prevents
substantiam intellectualem esse an intellectual substance from being the
formam corporis humani, quae est human body’s form, which is the human
anima humana. soul.
Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum [6] Thus are we able to contemplate the
connexio considerari potest. marvelous connection of things. For it is
Semper enim invenitur infimum always found that the lowest in the higher
supremi generis contingere genus touches the highest of the lower
supremum inferioris generis: sicut species. Some of the lowest members of
quaedam infima in genere the animal kingdom, for instance, enjoy a
animalium parum excedunt vitam form of life scarcely superior to that of
plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt plants; oysters, which are motionless,
immobilia, et solum tactum habent, have only the sense of touch and are
et terrae in modum plantarum fixed to the earth like plants. That is why
adstringuntur; unde et beatus Blessed Dionysius says in his work On
Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de Div. the Divine Names that “divine wisdom
Nom., quod divina sapientia has united the ends of higher things with
coniungit fines superiorum the beginnings of the lower.” We have,
principiis inferiorum. Est igitur therefore, to consider the existence of
accipere aliquid supremum in something supreme in the genus of
genere corporum, scilicet corpus bodies, namely, the human body
humanum aequaliter harmoniously tempered, which is in
complexionatum, quod attingit ad contact with the lowest of the higher
infimum superioris generis, scilicet genus, namely, the human soul, which
ad animam humanam, quae tenet holds the lowest rank in the genus of
ultimum gradum in genere intellectual substances, as can be seen
intellectualium substantiarum, ut from its mode of understanding; so that
ex modo intelligendi percipi potest. the intellectual soul is said to be on the
Et inde est quod anima horizon and confines of things corporeal
intellectualis dicitur esse quasi and incorporeal, in that it is an
quidam horizon et confinium incorporeal substance and yet the form of
corporeorum et incorporeorum, a body. Nor is a thing composed of an
inquantum est substantia intellectual substance and corporeal
incorporea, corporis tamen forma. matter less one than a thing made up of
Non autem minus est aliquid unum the form of fire and its matter, but
ex substantia intellectuali et perhaps it is more one; because the
materia corporali quam ex forma greater the mastery of form over matter,
ignis et eius materia, sed forte the greater is the unity of that which is
magis: quia quanto forma magis made from it and matter.
vincit materiam, ex ea et materia
efficitur magis unum.
Quamvis autem sit unum esse [7] But, though the form and the matter
formae et materiae, non tamen are united in the one act of being, the
oportet quod materia semper matter need not always be
adaequet esse formae. Immo, commensurate with the form. Indeed, the
quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in higher the form, the more it surpasses
suo esse superexcedit materiam. matter in its being. This fact is clearly
Quod patet inspicienti operationes apparent to one who observes the
formarum, ex quarum operations of forms, from the study of
consideratione earum naturas which we know their natures; for, as a
cognoscimus: unumquodque enim thing is, so does it act. That is why a form
operatur secundum quod est. whose operation transcends the
Unde forma cuius operatio condition of matter, itself also surpasses
superexcedit conditionem matter in the rank of its being.
materiae, et ipsa secundum
dignitatem sui esse superexcedit
materiam.
Invenimus enim aliquas infimas [8] For we find certain lowestgrade forms

formas, quae in nullam whose operations are limited to the class
operationem possunt nisi ad quam of those proper to the qualities which are
se extendunt qualitates quae sunt dispositions of matter; qualities such as
dispositiones materiae, ut calidum, heat, cold, moisture and dryness, rarity
frigidum, humidum et siccum, and density, gravity and levity, etc. And
rarum, densum, grave et leve, et those forms are the forms of the
his similia: sicut formae elements: forms which therefore are
elementorum. Unde istae sunt altogether material and wholly embedded
formae omnino materiales, et in matter.
totaliter immersae materiae.
Super has inveniuntur formae [9] Above these are found the forms of
mixtorum corporum, quae licet non mixed bodies. Although their operations
se extendant ad aliqua operata are no greater in scope than those which
quae non possunt compleri per can be effected through qualities of the
qualitates praedictas, interdum aforesaid variety, nevertheless they
tamen operantur illos effectus sometimes produce those same effects
altiori virtute, quam sortiuntur ex by a higher power which they receive
corporibus caelestibus, quae from the heavenly bodies, and which is
consequitur eorum speciem: sicut consequent upon the latter’s species. A
adamas trahit ferrum. case in point is that of the lodestone
attracting iron.
Super has iterum inveniuntur [10] One rung higher on the ladder of
aliquae formae quarum forms, we encounter those whose
operationes extenduntur ad aliqua operations include some which exceed
operata quae excedunt virtutem the power of the previously mentioned
qualitatum praedictarum, quamvis material qualities, although the latter
qualitates praedictae organice ad assist organically in the operations of
harum operationes deserviant: those forms. Such forms are the souls of
sicut sunt animae plantarum, quae plants, which likewise resemble not only
etiam assimilantur non solum the powers of the heavenly bodies, in
virtutibus corporum caelestium in surpassing the active and passive
excedendo qualitates activas et qualities, but also the movers of those
passivas, sed ipsis motoribus bodies, the souls of plants being
corporum caelestium, inquantum principles of movement in living things,
sunt principia motus rebus which move themselves.
viventibus, quae movent seipsas.
Supra has formas inveniuntur aliae [11] A step above, we find other forms

formae similes superioribus resembling the higher substances, not
substantiis non solum in movendo, only in moving, but even, somehow, in
sed etiam aliqualiter in knowing, so that they are capable of
cognoscendo; et sic sunt potentes operations to which the aforesaid
in operationes ad quas nec qualities are of no assistance, even
organice qualitates praedictae organically, although these operations

deserviunt, tamen operationes are performed only by means of a bodily
huiusmodi non complentur nisi organ. Such forms are the souls of brute
mediante organo corporali; sicut animals. For sensation and imagination
sunt animae brutorum animalium. are not brought about by heating and
Sentire enim et imaginari non cooling, although these are necessary for
completur calefaciendo et the due disposition of the organ involved.
infrigidando: licet haec sint
necessaria ad debitam organi
dispositionem.
Super omnes autem has formas [12] Above all these forms, however, is a

invenitur forma similis superioribus form like to the higher substances even
substantiis etiam quantum ad in respect of the kind of knowledge
genus cognitionis, quod est proper to it, namely, understanding. This
intelligere: et sic est potens in form, then, is capable of an operation
operationem quae completur which is accomplished without any bodily
absque organo corporali omnino. organ at all. And this form is the
Et haec est anima intellectiva: nam intellective soul; for understanding is not
intelligere non fit per aliquod effected through any bodily organ. That is
organum corporale. Unde oportet why this principle, the intellective soul by
quod illud principium quo homo which man understands and which
intelligit, quod est anima transcends the condition of corporeal
intellectiva, et excedit conditionem matter, must not be wholly encompassed
materiae corporalis, non sit by or imbedded in matter, as material
totaliter comprehensa a materia forms are. This is proved by its
aut ei immersa, sicut aliae formae intellectual operation, wherein corporeal
materiales. Quod eius operatio matter has no part. But since the human
intellectualis ostendit, in qua non soul’s act of understanding needs powers
communicat materia corporalis. —namely, imagination and sense—which
Quia tamen ipsum intelligere function through bodily organs, this itself
animae humanae indiget potentiis shows that the soul is naturally united to
quae per quaedam organa the body in order to complete the human
corporalia operantur, scilicet species.
imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso
declaratur quod naturaliter unitur
corpori ad complendam speciem
humanam.
Caput 69 Chapter 69
Solutio rationum quibus supra SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS
probatur quod substantia ADVANCED ABOVE IN ORDER TO
intellectualis non potest uniri SHOW THAT AN INTELLECTUAL
corpori ut forma SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO
THE BODY AS ITS FORM
His autem consideratis, non est [1] With the preceding points in mind, it is

difficile solvere quae contra not difficult to solve the arguments
praedictam unionem supra previously proposed against the union in
opposita sunt. question.
In prima enim ratione falsum [2] In the first argument a false supposition

supponitur. Non enim corpus et is made, because body and soul are not
anima sunt duae substantiae two actually existing substances; rather,
actu existentes, sed ex eis the two of them together constitute one
duobus fit una substantia actu actually existing substance. For man’s
existens: corpus enim hominis body is not actually the same while the
non est idem actu praesente soul is present and when it is absent; but
anima, et absente; sed anima the soul makes it to be actually.
facit ipsum actu esse.
Quod autem secundo obiicitur, [3] In the second argument the statement
formam et materiam in eodem that form and matter are contained in the
genere contineri, non sic verum same genus is true, not in the sense that
est quasi utrumque sit species they are both species of the same genus,
unius generis: sed quia sunt but in the sense that they are the
principia eiusdem speciei. Sic principles of the same species. So, if the
igitur substantia intellectualis et intellectual substance and the body
corpus, quae seorsum existentia existed apart from one another, they would
essent diversorum generum be species of diverse genera; but by being
species, prout uniuntur, sunt united, they are of one and the same
unius generis ut principia. genus as principles of it.
Non autem oportet substantiam [4] Nor is the third argument valid. For
intellectualem esse formam from the fact that the intellectual
materialem, quamvis esse eius substance is in matter it does not follow
sit in materia: ut tertia ratio that it is a material form, because that soul
procedebat. Non enim est in is not present in matter in the sense of
materia sicut materiae immersa, being embedded in it or wholly enveloped
vel a materia totaliter by it, but in another way, as we have
comprehensa, sed alio modo, ut pointed out.
dictum est.
Nec tamen per hoc quod [5] As to the fourth argument, the fact that

substantia intellectualis unitur an intellectual substance is united to the
corpori ut forma, removetur quod body as its form does not prevent the
a philosophis dicitur, intellectum intellect from being, as the philosophers
esse a corpore separatum. Est say, separate from the body. For in the
enim in anima considerare et soul two things must be taken into
ipsius essentiam, et potentiam consideration: its essence, and its power.
eius. Secundum essentiam Through its essence the soul gives being
quidem suam dat esse tali to such and such a body; by its power it
corpori: secundum potentiam performs its proper operations.
vero operationes proprias efficit. Accordingly, if a psychic operation is
Si igitur operatio animae per carried out by means of a bodily organ,
organum corporale completur, then the power of the soul which is the
oportet quod potentia animae principle of that operation must be the act
quae est illius operationis of that part of the body whereby such an
principium, sit actus illius partis operation is performed; thus, sight is the
corporis per quam operatio eius act of the eye. But, if the soul’s operation
completur: sicut visus est actus is not effected by means of a bodily organ,
oculi. Si autem operatio eius non then its power will not be the act of a body.
compleatur per organum And this is what is meant by saying that
corporale, potentia eius non erit the intellect is separate; nor does
actus alicuius corporis. Et per separateness in this sense prevent the
hoc dicitur intellectus esse substance of the soul of which the intellect
separatus: non quin substantia is a power (namely, the intellective soul)
animae cuius est potentia from being the act of the body, as the form
intellectus, sive anima which gives being to such a body.
intellectiva, sit corporis actus ut
forma dans tali corpori esse.
Non est autem necessarium, si [6] Concerning the fifth argument, let it be

anima secundum suam said that because the soul is in its
substantiam est forma corporis, substance the form of the body, it does not
quod omnis eius operatio fiat per follow that every operation of the soul
corpus, ac per hoc omnis eius must be performed by means of the body,
virtus sit alicuius corporis actus: so that every power of the soul will be the
ut quinta ratio procedebat. Iam act of a bodily thing. For we have already
enim ostensum est quod anima proved that the human soul is not a form
humana non sit talis forma quae wholly embedded in matter, but among all
sit totaliter immersa materiae, other forms occupies a most exalted place
sed est inter omnes alias formas above matter. That is why it can produce
maxime supra materiam elevata. an operation without the body, as being
Unde et operationem producere operationally independent of the body;
potest absque corpore, idest, since neither is it existentially dependent
quasi non dependens a corpore on the body.
in operando: quia nec etiam in
essendo dependet a corpore.
Eodem etiam modo patet quod [7] As for the arguments whereby Averroes

ea quibus Averroes suam endeavors to establish his theory, they
opinionem confirmare nititur, non clearly fail to prove that an intellectual
probant substantiam substance is not united to the body as its
intellectualem corpori non uniri ut form.
formam.
Verba enim Aristotelis quae dicit [8] For the terms which Aristotle applies to

de intellectu possibili, quod est the possible intellect, namely, that it is
impassibilis et immixtus et impassible, unmixed, and separate, do not
separatus, non cogunt confiteri compel us to admit that an intellective
quod substantia intellectiva non substance is not united to the body as a
sit unita corpori ut forma dans form giving being. For these expressions
esse. Verificantur enim etiam si are also true if we say that the intellective

dicatur quod intellectiva potentia, power, which Aristotle calls the power of
quam Aristoteles vocat potentiam insight, is not the act of an organ, as
perspectivam, non sit alicuius though it exercises its operation by it. This
organi actus quasi per ipsum point, too, ‘is made clear in his own
suam exercens operationem. Et demonstration, since he proves that this
hoc etiam sua demonstratio power is pure of all admixture, or is
declarat: ex operatione enim separate, because of the intellectual
intellectuali qua omnia intelligit, character of its operation, whereby it
ostendit ipsum immixtum esse understands all things, and because a
vel separatum; operatio autem power is the source of a thing’s operation.
pertinet ad potentiam ut ad
principium.
Unde patet quod nec [9] Clearly, that is why Aristotle’s
demonstratio Aristotelis hoc demonstration does not result in the
concludit, quod substantia proposition that the intellective substance
intellectiva non uniatur corpori is not united to the body as its form. For, if
sicut forma. Si enim ponamus we maintain that the soul’s substance is
substantiam animae secundum thus united in being to the body, and that
esse corpori sic unitam, the intellect is not the act of any organ, it
intellectum autem nullius organi will not follow that the intellect has a
actum esse, non sequetur quod particular nature—I refer to the natures of
intellectus habeat aliquam sensible things—since the soul is not held
naturam, de naturis dico to be a harmony, nor the form of an organ.
sensibilium: cum non ponatur (As Aristotle in De anima II [12] says of the
harmonia, vel ratio alicuius sensepower, it is a certain form of an
organi, sicut de sensu dicit organ.) None of these things is true of
Aristoteles, in II de anima, quod man’s soul, because the intellect has no
est quaedam ratio organi. Non operation in common with the body.
enim habet intellectus [10] Now, by saying that the intellect is free
operationem communem cum from all admixture, or is separate, Aristotle
corpore. does not mean to exclude its being a part
Quod autem per hoc quod or power of the soul which is the form of
Aristoteles dicit intellectum esse the whole body. This is clear from what he
immixtum vel separatum, non says toward the end of De anima I [5] in
intendat excludere ipsum esse opposing those who maintained that the
partem sive potentiam animae soul has diverse parts of itself in diverse
quae est forma totius corporis, parts of the body: “If the whole soul holds
patet per hoc quod dicit in fine together the whole body, it is fitting that
primi de anima, contra illos qui each part of the soul should hold together
dicebant animam in diversis a part of the body. But this seems an
partibus corporis diversas sui impossibility. For it is difficult to imagine
partes habere: si tota anima what bodily part the intellect will hold
omne corpus continet, convenit together, or how it will do this.”
et partium unamquamque aliquid
corporis continere. Hoc autem
videtur impossibile. Qualem enim
partem aut quomodo intellectus
continet, grave est fingere.
Patet etiam quod, ex quo [11] Moreover, from the fact that the
intellectus nullius partis corporis intellect is not the act of any part of the
actus est, quod non sequitur body, it clearly does not follow that its
receptionem eius esse receptiveness is that of prime matter, for
receptionem materiae primae: ex intellectual receptiveness and operation
quo eius receptio et operatio est are altogether without a corporeal organ.
omnino absque organo corporali.
Nec etiam infinita virtus [12] Nor, again, does union with the body
intellectus tollitur: cum non rob the intellect of its infinite power, since
ponatur virtus in magnitudine, that power is not placed in a magnitude,
sed in substantia intellectuali but is rooted in the intellectual substance,
fundata, ut dictum est. as was said.
Caput 70 Chapter 70
Quod secundum dicta Aristotelis THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS
oportet ponere intellectum uniri OF ARISTOTLE THE INTELLECT
corpori ut formam MUST BE SAID TO BE UNITED TO
THE BODY AS ITS FORM
Et quia Averroes maxime nititur [1] Now, since Averroes seeks to
suam opinionem confirmare per confirm his doctrine especially by
verba et demonstrationem appealing to the words and proof of
Aristotelis, ostendendum restat Aristotle, it remains for us to show that
quod necesse est dicere, secundum in the Philosopher’s judgment we must
opinionem Aristotelis, intellectum say that the intellect, as to its
secundum suam substantiam alicui substance, is united to the body as its
corpori uniri ut formam. form.
Probat enim Aristoteles, in libro [2] For Aristotle proves in the Physics
physicorum, quod in motoribus et [VIII, 5] that in movers and things
motis impossibile est procedere in moved it is impossible to proceed to
infinitum. Unde concludit quod infinity. Hence, he concludes to the
necesse est devenire ad aliquod necessity of a first moved thing, which
primum motum, quod vel moveatur either is moved by an immobile mover
ab immobili motore, vel moveat or moves itself. And of these two he
seipsum. Et de his duobus accipit takes the second, namely, that the first
secundum, scilicet quod primum movable being moves itself; for what is
mobile moveat seipsum: ea ratione, through itself is always prior to that
quia quod est per se, semper est which is through another. Then he
prius eo quod est per aliud. Deinde shows that a selfmover necessarily is
ostendit quod movens seipsum de divided into two parts, part moving and
necessitate dividitur in duas partes, part moved; whence it follows that the
quarum una est movens et alia est first selfmover must consist of two
mota. Oportet igitur primum parts, the one moving, the other moved.

seipsum movens componi ex Now, every thing of this kind is animate.
duabus partibus, quarum una est The first movable being, namely, the
movens et alia mota. Omne autem heaven, is therefore animate in
huiusmodi est animatum. Primum Aristotle’s opinion. So it is expressly
igitur mobile, scilicet caelum, est stated in De caelo [II, 2] that the heaven
animatum, secundum opinionem is animate, and on this account we must
Aristotelis. Unde et in II de caelo attribute to its differences of position not
dicitur expresse quod caelum est only in relation to us, but also in relation
animatum, et propter hoc oportet in to itself.
eo ponere differentias positionis non
solum quoad nos, sed etiam
secundum se.
Inquiramus igitur, secundum Let us, then, ask with what kind of soul

opinionem Aristotelis, qua anima sit Aristotle thinks the heaven to be
caelum animatum. animated.
Probat autem in XI metaphysicae, [3] In Metaphysics XI [7], Aristotle
quod in motu caeli est considerare proves that in the heaven’s movement
aliquid quod movet omnino two factors are to be considered:
immotum, et aliquid quod movet something that moves and is wholly
motum. Id autem quod movet unmoved, and something that moves
omnino immotum, movet sicut and is also moved. Now, that which
desiderabile: nec dubium quin ab moves without being moved moves as
eo quod movetur. Ostendit autem an object of desire; nor is there any
quod non sicut desiderabile doubt that it moves as a thing desirable
desiderio concupiscentiae, quod est by that which is moved. And he shows
desiderium sensus, sed sicut that it moves not as an object of
desiderabile intellectuali desiderio: concupiscent desire, which is a sense
unde dicit quod primum movens desire, but of intellectual desire; and he
non motum est desiderabile et therefore says that the first unmoved
intellectuale. Igitur id quod ab eo mover is an object of desire and
movetur, scilicet caelum, est understanding. Accordingly, that which
desiderans et intelligens nobiliori is moved by this mover, namely, the
modo quam nos, ut subsequenter heaven, desires and understands in a
probat. Est igitur caelum nobler fashion than we, as he
compositum, secundum opinionem subsequently proves. In Aristotle’s view,
Aristotelis, ex anima intellectuali et then, the heaven is composed of an
corpore. Et hoc significat in II de intellectual soul and a body. He
anima, ubi dicit quod quibusdam indicates this when he says in De anima
inest intellectivum et intellectus: ut II [3] that “in certain things there is
hominibus, et si aliquid huiusmodi intellect and the power of
est alterum, aut honorabilius, understanding, for example, in men,
scilicet caelum. and in other things Eke man or superior
to him,” namely, the heaven.
Constat autem quod caelum non [4] Now the heaven certainly does not
habet animam sensitivam, possess a sensitive soul, according to
secundum opinionem Aristotelis: the opinion of Aristotle; otherwise, it

haberet enim diversa organa, quae would have diverse organs, and this is
non competunt simplicitati caeli. Et inconsistent with the heaven’s simplicity.
ad hoc significandum, subiungit By way of indicating this fact, Aristotle
Aristoteles quod quibus de numero goes on to say that “among corruptible
corruptibilium inest intellectus, things, those that possess intellect have
insunt omnes aliae potentiae: ut all the other powers,” thus giving us to
daret intelligere quod aliqua understand that some incorruptible
incorruptibilia habent intellectum things, namely, the heavenly bodies,
quae non habent alias potentias have intellect without the other powers
animae, scilicet corpora caelestia. of the soul.
Non poterit igitur dici quod [5] It will therefore be impossible to say

intellectus continuetur corporibus that the intellect makes contact with the
caelestibus per phantasmata: sed heavenly bodies by the instrumentality
oportebit dicere quod intellectus of phantasms. On the contrary, it will
secundum suam substantiam have to be said that the intellect, by its
uniatur corpori caelesti ut forma. substance, is united to the heavenly
body as its form.
Sic igitur et corpori humano, quod [6] Now, the human body is the noblest

est inter omnia corpora inferiora of all lower bodies, and by, its equable
nobilissimum, et aequalitate suae temperament most closely resembles
complexionis caelo, ab omni the heaven, which is completely devoid
contrarietate absoluto, simillimum, of contrariety; so that in Aristotle’s
secundum intentionem Aristotelis judgment the intellectual substance is
substantia intellectualis unitur non united to the human body not by any
per aliqua phantasmata sed ut phantasms, but as its form.
forma ipsius.
Hoc autem quod dictum est de [7] As for the heaven being animate, we

animatione caeli, non diximus quasi have spoken of this not as though
asserendo secundum fidei asserting its accordance with the
doctrinam, ad quam nihil pertinet teaching of the faith, to which the whole
sive sic sive aliter dicatur. Unde question is entirely irrelevant. Hence,
Augustinus, in libro Enchiridion, Augustine says in the Enchiridion: “Nor
dicit: nec illud quidem certum is it certain, to my mind, whether the
habeo, utrum ad eandem sun, moon, and all the stars belong to
societatem, scilicet Angelorum, the same community, namely, that of the
pertineant sol et luna et cuncta angels; although to some they appear to
sidera: quamvis nonnullis lucida be luminous bodies devoid of sense or
esse corpora, non cum sensu vel intelligence.”
intelligentia, videantur.
Caput 71 Chapter 71
Quod anima immediate unitur THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE
corpori BODY WITHOUT INTERMEDIATION
Ex praemissis autem concludi [1] It can be inferred from the foregoing that

potest quod anima immediate the soul is united to the body immediately,
corpori unitur, nec oportet no medium being required to unite the soul
ponere aliquod medium quasi to the body, whether it be the phantasms,
animam corpori uniens: vel as Averroes holds, or the body’s powers, as
phantasmata, sicut dicit some say, or the corporeal spirit, as others
Averroes; vel potentias ipsius, have asserted.
sicut quidam dicunt; vel etiam
spiritum corporalem, sicut alii
dixerunt.
Ostensum est enim quod anima [2] For we have shown that the soul is
unitur corpori ut forma eius. united to the body as its form. Now, a form
Forma autem unitur materiae is united to matter without any medium at
absque omni medio: per se enim all, since to be the act of such and such a
competit formae quod sit actus body belongs to a form by its very essence,
talis corporis, et non per aliquid and not by anything else. That is why, as
aliud. Unde nec est aliquid unum Aristotle proves in Metaphysics VIII [6]
faciens ex materia et forma nisi there is nothing that makes a unitary thing
agens, quod potentiam reducit out of matter and form except the agent
ad actum, ut probat Aristoteles, which reduces the potentiality to act, for
in VIII metaphysicae: nam matter and form are related as potentiality
materia et forma habent se ut and act.
potentia et actus.
Potest tamen dici aliquid esse [3] Even so, it can be said that there is a
medium inter animam et corpus, medium between the soul and the body,
etsi non in essendo, tamen in not, however, from the point of view of
movendo et in via generationis. being, but of movement and the order of
In movendo quidem, quia in generation. Respecting movement, we find
motu quo anima movet corpus, such a medium, since the movement of the
est quidam ordo mobilium et body by the soul entails a certain order
motorum. Anima enim omnes among movables and movers. For the soul
operationes suas efficit per suas performs all its operations through its
potentias: unde mediante powers; thus, it moves the body by means
potentia movet corpus; et adhuc of its power, and, again, the members by
membra mediante spiritu; et means of the [vital] spirit, and, lastly, one
ulterius unum organum organ by means of another. And in the line
mediante alio organo. In via of generation, a certain medium is found in
autem generationis the fact that dispositions to a form precede
dispositiones ad formam the form’s reception in matter, but are
praecedunt formam in materia, posterior to it in being. That is why the
quamvis sint posteriores in body’s dispositions, which make it the
essendo. Unde et dispositiones proper perfectible subject of such and such
corporis quibus fit proprium a form, may thus be called intermediaries
perfectibile talis formae, hoc between the soul and the body.
modo possunt dici mediae inter
animam et corpus.
Caput 72 Chapter 72
Quod anima sit tota in toto et tota in THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE
qualibet parte WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH OF ITS
PARTS
Per eadem autem ostendi potest [1] In the light of the same
animam totam in toto corpore esse, considerations it can be shown that the
et totam in singulis partibus. whole soul is present in the whole body
and in its several parts.
Oportet enim proprium actum in [2] For the proper act must reside in its
proprio perfectibili esse. Anima proper perfectible subject. Now, the soul
autem est actus corporis organici, is the act of an organic body, not of one
non unius organi tantum. Est igitur organ only. It is, therefore, in the whole
in toto corpore, et non in una parte body, and not merely in one part,
tantum, secundum suam according to its essence whereby it is
essentiam, secundum quam est the body’s form.
forma corporis.
Sic autem anima est forma totius [3] Moreover, the soul is the form of the

corporis quod etiam est forma whole body in such fashion as to be also
singularium partium. Si enim esset the form of each part. For, were it the
forma totius et non partium, non form of the whole and not of the parts, it
esset forma substantialis talis would not be the substantial form of that
corporis: sicut forma domus, quae body; thus, the form of a house, which is
est forma totius et non singularium the form of the whole and not of each
partium, est forma accidentalis. part, is an accidental form. That the soul
Quod autem sit forma substantialis is the substantial form both of the whole
totius et partium, patet per hoc and of the parts, is clear from the fact
quod ab ea sortitur speciem et that not only the whole but also the parts
totum et partes. Unde, ea owe their species to it. This explains
abscedente, neque totum neque why it is that, when the soul departs,
partes remanent eiusdem speciei: neither the whole body nor its parts
nam oculus mortui et caro eius non remain of the same species as before;
dicuntur nisi aequivoce. Si igitur the eye or flesh of a dead thing are so
anima est actus singularium called only in an equivocal sense.
partium; actus autem est in eo Consequently, if the soul is the act of
cuius est actus: relinquitur quod sit each part, and an act is in the thing
secundum suam essentiam in whose act it is, it follows that the soul is
qualibet parte corporis. by its essence in each part of the body.
Quod autem tota, manifestum est. [4] And this is manifestly true of the
Cum enim totum dicatur per whole soul. For since a whole is spoken
relationem ad partes, oportet totum of in relation to parts, the word whole

diversimode accipi sicut must be taken in various senses,
diversimode accipiuntur partes. according to the meaning of parts. Now,
Dicitur autem pars dupliciter: uno the term part has a double signification;
quidem modo, inquantum dividitur it may refer to the quantitative division of
aliquid secundum quantitatem, sicut a thing (thus, two cubits is a part of
bicubitum est pars tricubiti; alio three cubits), or to a division of its
modo, inquantum dividitur aliquid essence (form and matter are in this
secundum divisionem essentiae, sense said to be parts of a composite).
sicut forma et materia dicuntur Accordingly, whole is used in reference
partes compositi. Dicitur ergo totum both to quantity and to the perfection of
et secundum quantitatem, et the essence. Now, whole and part
secundum essentiae perfectionem. quantitatively so called appertain to
Totum autem et pars secundum forms only accidentally, namely, so far
quantitatem dicta formis non as the forms are divided when the
conveniunt nisi per accidens, quantitative subject in which they reside
scilicet inquantum dividuntur is divided. But whole and part as applied
divisione subiecti quantitatem to the perfection of the essence are
habentis. Totum autem vel pars found in forms essentially. Respecting
secundum perfectionem essentiae this kind of totality, which belongs to
invenitur in formis per se. De hac forms essentially, it is therefore clear
igitur totalitate loquendo, quae per that the whole of every form is in the
se formis competit, in qualibet whole subject and the whole of it in each
forma apparet quod est tota in toto part; just as whiteness, by its total
et tota in qualibet parte eius: nam essence, is in a whole body, so is it in
albedo, sicut secundum totam each part. The case is different with a
rationem albedinis est in toto totality that is ascribed to forms
corpore, ita et in qualibet parte eius. accidentally, for in this sense we cannot
Secus autem est de totalitate quae say that the whole whiteness is in each
per accidens attribuitur formis: sic part. If, then, there exists a form which is
enim non possumus dicere quod not divided as a result of its subject
tota albedo sit in qualibet parte. Si being divided—and souls of perfect
igitur est aliqua forma quae non animals are such forms—there will be
dividatur divisione subiecti, sicut no need for a distinction, since only one
sunt animae animalium totality befits things of that kind; and it
perfectorum, non erit opus must be said unqualifiedly that the
distinctione, cum eis non competat whole of this form is in each part of the
nisi una totalitas: sed absolute body. Nor is this difficult to grasp by one
dicendum est eam totam esse in who understands that the soul is not
qualibet parte corporis. Nec est hoc indivisible in the same way as a point,
difficile apprehendere ei qui intelligit and that an incorporeal being is not
animam non sic esse indivisibilem united to a corporeal one in the same
ut punctum; neque sic incorporeum way as bodies are united to one
corporeo coniungi sicut corpora ad another, as we explained above.
invicem coniunguntur; ut supra
expositum est.
Non est autem inconveniens [5] Nor is it incongruous that the soul,
animam, cum sit quaedam forma since it is a simple form, should be the
simplex, esse actum partium tam act of parts so diverse in character. For
diversarum. Quia unicuique formae in every case the matter is adapted to
aptatur materia secundum suam the form according to the latter’s
congruentiam. Quanto autem aliqua requirements. Now, the higher and
forma est nobilior et simplicior, simpler a form is, the greater is its
tanto est maioris virtutis. Unde power; and that is why the soul, which is
anima, quae est nobilissima inter the highest of the lower forms, though
formas inferiores, etsi simplex in simple in substance, has a multiplicity of
substantia, est multiplex in potentia powers and many operations. The soul,
et multarum operationum. Unde then, needs various organs in order to
indiget diversis organis ad suas perform its operations, and of these
operationes complendas, quorum organs the soul’s various powers are
diversae animae potentiae proprii said to be the proper acts; sight of the
actus esse dicuntur: sicut visus eye, hearing of the ears, etc. For this
oculi, auditus aurium, et sic de aliis. reason perfect animals have the
Propter quod animalia perfecta greatest diversity of organs; plants, the
habent maximam diversitatem in least.
organis, plantae vero minimam.
Hac igitur occasione a quibusdam [6] Reflection on the fact that the soul
philosophis dictum est animam needs various organs for the
esse in aliqua parte corporis: sicut performance of its multifarious activities
ab ipso Aristotele, in libro de causa was the occasion for some philosophers
motus animalium, dicitur esse in to say that the soul is in some particular
corde, quia aliqua potentiarum eius part of the body. Thus, Aristotle himself
illi parti corporis attribuitur. Vis enim says in the De motu animalium [X] that
motiva, de qua Aristoteles in libro the soul is in the heart, because one of
illo agebat, est principaliter in the soul’s powers is ascribed to that part
corde, per quod anima in totum of the body. For the motive power, of
corpus motum et alias huiusmodi which Aristotle was treating in that work,
operationes diffundit. is principally in the heart, through which
the soul communicates movement and
other such operations to the whole body.
Caput 73 Chapter 73
Quod intellectus possibilis non est THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE
unus in omnibus hominibus INTELLECT IN ALL MEN
Ex praemissis autem evidenter [1] On the basis of what has already
ostenditur non esse unum been said it can be clearly demonstrated
intellectum possibilem omnium that there is not one possible intellect of
hominum qui sunt et qui erunt et qui all present, future and past men, as
fuerunt: ut Averroes, in III de anima, Averroes imagined.
fingit.
Ostensum est enim quod [2] For it has been proved that the
substantia intellectus unitur corpori substance of the intellect is united to the
humano ut forma. Impossibile est human body as its form. But one form
autem unam formam esse nisi cannot possibly exist in more than one
unius materiae: quia proprius actus matter, because the proper act comes to
in propria potentia fit; sunt enim ad be in the proper potentiality, since they
invicem proportionata. Non est are proportioned to one another.
igitur intellectus unus omnium Therefore, there is not one intellect of all
hominum. men.
Adhuc. Unicuique motori debentur [3] Moreover, every mover ought to have

propria instrumenta: alia enim sunt its proper instruments; the fluteplayer
instrumenta tibicinis, alia uses one kind of instrument, the builder
architectoris. Intellectus autem another. Now, the intellect is related to
comparatur ad corpus ut motor the body as its mover, as Aristotle
ipsius: sicut Aristoteles determinat shows in De anima III [10]. So, just as it
in III de anima. Sicut igitur is impossible for the builder to use a
impossibile est quod architector fluteplayer’s instruments, so is it
utatur instrumentis tibicinis, ita impossible for the intellect of one man to
impossibile est quod intellectus be the intellect of another.
unius hominis sit intellectus alterius.
Praeterea. Aristoteles, in I de [4] Again, Aristotle in De anima I [3]
anima, reprehendit antiquos de hoc takes the ancients to task for discussing
quod, dicentes de anima, nihil de the soul without saying anything about
proprio susceptibili dicebant: quasi its proper recipient, “as if it were
esset contingens, secundum possible, as in the Pythagorean fables,
Pythagoricas fabulas, quamlibet that any soul might put on any body.” It
animam quodlibet corpus indui. is, then, impossible for the soul of a dog
Non est igitur possibile quod anima to enter the body of a wolf, or for a
canis ingrediatur corpus lupi, vel man’s soul to enter any body other than
anima hominis aliud corpus quam a man’s. But the proportion between
hominis. Sed quae est proportio man’s soul and man’s body is the same
animae hominis ad corpus hominis, as between this man’s soul and this
eadem est proportio animae huius man’s body. Therefore, the soul of this
hominis ad corpus huius hominis. man cannot possibly enter a body other
Non est igitur possibile animam than his own. But it is this man’s soul by
huius hominis ingredi aliud corpus which this man understands: man
quam istius hominis. Sed anima understands by his soul, as Aristotle
huius hominis est per quam hic puts it in De anima I [4]. Hence, this
homo intelligit: homo enim per man and that man have not the same
animam intelligit secundum intellect.
sententiam Aristotelis in I de anima.
Non est igitur unus intellectus istius
et illius hominis.
Amplius. Ab eodem aliquid habet [5] Then, too, a thing owes its being and

esse et unitatem: unum enim et ens its unity to the same principle, for unity
se consequuntur. Sed and being are consequent upon one
unumquodque habet esse per another. But every thing has being
suam formam. Ergo et unitas rei through its form. Therefore, a thing’s
sequitur unitatem formae. unity follows upon the unity of its form.
Impossibile est igitur diversorum Hence, there cannot possibly be one
individuorum esse formam unam. form of diverse individual things. But the
Forma autem huius hominis est form of this particular man is his
anima intellectiva. Impossibile est intellective soul. Therefore, it is
igitur omnium hominum esse unum impossible that there should be one
intellectum. intellect for all men.
Si autem dicatur quod anima [6] Now, if it be said that this man’s
sensitiva huius hominis sit alia ab sensitive soul is distinct from that man’s,
anima sensitiva illius, et pro tanto and that to this extent there is not one
non est unus homo, licet sit unus man although there is one intellectsuch
intellectus: hoc stare non potest. an argument cannot stand. For each
Propria enim operatio cuiuslibet rei thing’s proper operation is a
consequitur et demonstrat speciem consequence and a manifestation of its
ipsius. Sicut autem animalis propria species. Now, just as the proper
operatio est sentire, ita hominis operation of an animal is sensation, so
propria operatio est intelligere: ut the operation proper to man is
Aristoteles dicit, in I Ethicorum. understanding, as Aristotle says in
Unde oportet quod, sicut hoc Ethics I [7]. It is therefore necessary that
individuum est animal propter just as this individual is an animal
sensum, secundum Aristotelem, in because it possesses the power of
II de anima; ita sit homo propter id sensation, as Aristotle remarks in De
quo intelligit. Id autem quo intelligit anima II [2], so is be a man in virtue of
anima, vel homo per animam, est that by which he understands. But “that
intellectus possibilis, ut dicitur in III whereby the soul, or man through the
de anima. Est igitur hoc individuum soul, understands,” is the possible
homo per intellectum possibilem. Si intellect, as the same philosopher says
igitur hic homo habet aliam animam in De anima III [4]. This individual, then,
sensitivam cum alio homine, non is a man through the possible intellect.
autem alium intellectum possibilem, Now, suppose that this man has a
sed unum et eundem, sequetur distinct sensitive soul from that man’s,
quod sint duo animalia, sed non and yet not a distinct possible intellect
duo homines. Quod patet but one and the same possible intellect.
impossibile esse. Non est igitur The consequence is obviously
unus intellectus possibilis omnium impossible, namely, that this man and
hominum. that man will be two animals, but not two
men. Therefore, there is not one
possible intellect of all men.
His autem rationibus respondet [7] Now, the Commentator Averroes

Commentator praedictus, in III de replies to these arguments by saying
anima, dicens quod intellectus that the possible intellect comes into
possibilis continuatur nobiscum per contact with us through its form, that is,
formam suam, scilicet per speciem by the intelligible species, whose single
intelligibilem, cuius unum subject is the phantasm existing in us
subiectum est phantasma in nobis and which is distinct in distinct subjects.
existens, quod est in diversis Thus, the possible intellect is
diversum. Et sic intellectus particularized in diverse subjects, not by

possibilis numeratur in diversis, non reason of its substance but of its form.
ratione suae substantiae, sed
ratione suae formae.
Quod autem haec responsio nulla [8] It is clear from what has been said
sit, apparet per ea quae supra dicta above” that this reply is worthless. For, if
sunt. Ostensum est enim supra the possible intellect makes contact with
quod non est possibile hominem us only in that way, man’s understanding
intelligere si sic solum intellectus is rendered impossible, as we have
possibilis continuaretur nobiscum. shown.”
Dato autem quod praedicta [9] But, even if we supposed that the
continuatio sufficeret ad hoc quod contact in question sufficed to account
homo esset intelligens, adhuc for man’s knowing, Averroes’ reply still
responsio dicta rationes supra fails to solve the arguments we
dictas non solvit. Secundum enim adduced. For in the Averroistic theory
dictam positionem, nihil ad under consideration nothing pertaining
intellectum pertinens remanebit to the intellect save only the phantasm
numeratum secundum multitudinem will be particularized in accordance with
hominum nisi solum phantasma. Et the number of men. Nor will this
hoc ipsum phantasma non erit phantasm itself be particularized so far
numeratum secundum quod est as it is actually understood, because in
intellectum in actu: quia sic est in this state it exists in the possible
intellectu possibili, et est intellect, being abstracted from material
abstractum a materialibus conditions by the agent intellect. But the
conditionibus per intellectum phantasm, as understood potentially, is
agentem. Phantasma autem, not above the level of being of the
secundum quod est intellectum in sensitive soul; so that this man will still
potentia, non excedit gradum remain indistinguishable from that man,
animae sensitivae. Adhuc igitur non except as concerns the sensitive soul;
remanebit alius hic homo ab illo nisi and there will follow the incongruity
per animam sensitivam. Et previously noted, namely, that this and
sequetur praedictum inconveniens, that man are not several men.
quod non sint plures homines hic et
ille.
Praeterea. Nihil sortitur speciem [10] Moreover, a thing derives its

per id quod est in potentia, sed per species, not from that which is in
id quod est actu. Phantasma potentiality, but from that which is in act.
autem, secundum quod est Yet the phantasm, as particularized, has
numeratum, est tantum in potentia only a potentially intelligible being.
ad esse intelligibile. Ergo per Therefore, it is not to the phantasm as
phantasma, secundum quod particularized that this individual owes
numeratur, non sortitur hoc the specific character of intellective
individuum speciem animalis animal, which is the nature of man. And
intellectivi, quod est ratio hominis. so we have the same result as before,
Et sic remanebit illud quod speciem namely, that the thing from which man’s
humanam dat, non esse specific nature is derived is not
numeratum in diversis. particularized in diverse subjects.
Adhuc. Illud per quod speciem [11] Again, the source of a living thing’s

sortitur unumquodque vivens, est species is its first and not its second
perfectio prima, et non perfectio perfection, as is clear from what
secunda: ut patet per Aristotelem, Aristotle says in De anima II. But the
in II de anima. Phantasma autem phantasm is not the first but a second
non est perfectio prima, sed perfection, for the imagination is “a
perfectio secunda: est enim movement resulting from the exercise of
phantasia motus factus a sensu a sensepower,” as we read in the same
secundum actum, ut dicitur in libro work. Therefore, it is not to the
de anima. Non est igitur ipsum particularized phantasm that man owes
phantasma quod numeratur, a quo his specific nature.
homo speciem habet.
Amplius. Phantasmata quae sunt [12] Phantasms that are potentially

intellecta in potentia, diversa sunt. understood are distinct. But the source
Illud autem quo aliquid speciem of a thing’s specific nature must be one,
sortitur, oportet esse unum: nam since of one thing there is one specific
species una est unius. Non igitur nature. Therefore, man does not derive
per phantasmata, prout ponuntur his specific nature through phantasms
numerari in diversis, ut sunt as particularized in diverse subjects and
intellecta in potentia, homo speciem hence as potentially understood.
sortitur.
Item. Illud quo homo sortitur [13] The source of man’s specific nature

speciem, oportet semper esse must always remain the same in the
manens in eodem individuo dum same individual as long as the individual
durat: alias individuum non semper continues to be; otherwise, the
esset unius et eiusdem speciei, sed individual would not always be of one
quandoque huius, quandoque illius. and the same species, but sometimes of
Phantasmata autem non semper this one and sometimes of that one. But
eadem manent in uno homine, sed phantasms do not always remain the
quaedam de novo adveniunt, et same in one man; rather, some new
quaedam praeexistentia abolentur. ones appear, while some old ones pass
Individuum igitur hominis neque per away. Therefore, the human individual
phantasma sortitur speciem; neque neither acquires his specific nature
per ipsum continuatur principio through the phantasm nor by its means
suae speciei, quod est intellectus is he brought into contact with the
possibilis. principle of his specific essence, namely,
the possible intellect.
Si autem dicatur quod hic homo [14] Now, if it be argued that this man
non sortitur speciem ab ipsis does not derive his specific nature from
phantasmatibus, sed a virtutibus in the phantasms themselves but from the
quibus sunt phantasmata, scilicet powers in which the phantasms reside,
imaginativa, memorativa et namely, imagination, memory, and
cogitativa, quae est propria homini, cogitation—the latter, which Aristotle in

quam Aristoteles in III de anima, De anima in calls the passive intellect,
passivum intellectum vocat: adhuc being proper to man—even so the same
sequuntur eadem inconvenientia. impossibilities ensue. For, since the
Quia, cum virtus cogitativa habeat cogitative power is operationally limited
operationem solum circa to particular things, makes its judgments
particularia, quorum intentiones on the basis of particular intentions, and
dividit et componit, et habeat acts by means of a bodily organ, it is not
organum corporale per quod agit, above the generic level of the sensitive
non transcendit genus animae soul. Now, man is not a man in virtue of
sensitivae. Homo autem ex anima his sensitive soul, but an animal.
sensitiva non habet quod sit homo, Therefore, it still remains that the only
sed quod sit animal. Adhuc igitur thing particularized in us is that which
relinquitur quod numeretur in nobis belongs to man as an animal.
solum id quod competit homini
inquantum est animal.
Praeterea. Virtus cogitativa, cum [15] Moreover, the cogitative power,

operetur per organum, non est id since it operates by means of an organ,
quo intelligimus: cum intelligere non is not that whereby we understand, for
sit operatio alicuius organi. Id understanding is not the operation of an
autem quo intelligimus, est illud quo organ. Now, that whereby we
homo est homo: cum intelligere sit understand is that by which man is man,
propria operatio hominis since understanding is man’s proper
consequens eius speciem. Non est operation, flowing from his specific
igitur hoc individuum homo per nature. Consequently, it is not by the
virtutem cogitativam: neque haec cogitative power that this individual is a
virtus est id per quod homo man, nor is it by this power that man
substantialiter differt a brutis, ut differs substantially from the brutes, as
Commentator praedictus fingit. the Commentator imagines.
Adhuc. Virtus cogitativa non habet [16] Nor, again, does the cogitative
ordinem ad intellectum possibilem, power bear any ordered relationship to
quo intelligit homo, nisi per suum the possible intellect whereby man
actum quo praeparantur understands, except through its act of
phantasmata ut per intellectum preparing the phantasms for the
agentem fiant intelligibilia actu et operation of the agent intellect which
perficientia intellectum possibilem. makes them actually intelligible and
Operatio autem ista non semper perfective of the possible intellect. But
eadem manet in nobis. Impossibile this activity of the cogitative power does
est igitur quod homo per eam vel not always remain the same in us. By its
continuetur principio speciei means, therefore, man cannot possibly
humanae; vel per eam habeat be brought into contact with the principle
speciem. Sic igitur patet quod of the human species, nor can he
praedicta responsio omnino receive his specific nature from it.
confutanda est. Clearly, the counterargument cited
above is therefore to be completely
rejected.
Item. Id quo aliquid operatur aut [17] Furthermore, that whereby a thing
agit, est principium ad quod operates or acts is a principle not only of
sequitur operatio non solum the being of the operation flowing from
quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam it, but also of the multiplicity or unity
quantum ad multitudinem aut involved. Thus, there is from the same
unitatem: ab eodem enim calore heat but one heating or active
non est nisi unum calefacere, sive calefaction, though there may be many
una calefactio activa; quamvis things heated, many passive
possit esse multiplex calefieri, sive calefactions according to the number of
multae calefactiones passivae, different things heated simultaneously
secundum diversitatem by the same heat. Now, the possible
calefactorum simul per unum intellect is that by which the soul
calorem. Intellectus autem understands, as Aristotle says in De
possibilis est quo intelligit anima: ut anima III.” Hence, if the possible intellect
dicit Aristoteles in III de anima. Si of this and that man is numerically one
igitur intellectus possibilis huius et and the same, then the act of
illius hominis sit unus et idem understanding will of necessity be one
numero, necesse erit etiam and the same in both men; which is
intelligere utriusque esse unum et obviously impossible, since a single
idem. Quod patet esse impossibile: operation cannot belong to distinct
nam diversorum individuorum individuals. Therefore, this and that man
impossibile est esse operationem cannot have the one possible intellect.
unam. Impossibile est igitur
intellectum possibilem esse unum
huius et illius.
Si autem dicatur quod ipsum [18] Now, if it be argued that the very act

intelligere multiplicatur secundum of understanding is multiplied in
diversitatem phantasmatum: hoc accordance with the diversity of
stare non potest. Sicut enim dictum phantasms, the contention is baseless.
est, unius agentis una actio For, as has been said, the one action of
multiplicatur solum secundum the one agent is multiplied only
diversa subiecta in quae transit illa according to the diverse subjects into
actio. Intelligere autem et velle, et which that action passes. But
huiusmodi, non sunt actiones understanding, willing, and the like, are
transeuntes in exteriorem not actions that pass into external
materiam, sed manent in ipso matter; on the contrary, they remain in
agente quasi perfectiones ipsius the agent as perfections of that very
agentis: ut patet per Aristotelem in agent, as Aristotle makes clear in
IX metaphysicae. Non potest igitur Metaphysics IX [8]. Therefore, one act
unum intelligere intellectus of understanding of the possible intellect
possibilis multiplicari per cannot be multiplied by means of a
diversitatem phantasmatum. diversity of phantasms.
Praeterea. Phantasmata se habent [19] The phantasms, moreover, are in a

ad intellectum possibilem ut certain manner related to the possible
activum quodammodo ad intellect as the active to the passive. In
passivum: secundum quod this connection Aristotle remarks in De
Aristoteles dicit, in III de anima, anima [III, 4] in that to understand is in a
quod intelligere quoddam pati est. certain way to be passive. Now, the
Pati autem ipsum patientis passivity of the patient is diversified
diversificatur secundum diversas according to the diverse forms or
formas activorum sive species, non species of the agents, not according to
secundum diversitatem eorum in their numerical diversity. For the one
numero. In uno enim passivo passive subject is heated and dried at
sequitur simul a duobus activis, the same time by two active causes,
scilicet calefaciente et desiccante, heating and drying; two heating agents
calefieri et desiccari: non autem a do not produce two heatings in one
duobus calefacientibus sequitur in heatable thing, but only one heating,
uno calefactibili duplex calefieri, unless, perchance, those agents be
sed unum tantum; nisi forte sint distinct species of heat. For, since two
diversae species caloris. Cum enim heats specifically the same cannot be
calor duplex unius speciei non present in one subject, and movement is
possit esse in uno subiecto; motus numbered in relation to its terminal
autem numeratur secundum point, if the movement take place at one
terminum ad quem: si sit unius time and in the same subject, there
temporis et eiusdem subiecti, non cannot be a double heating in one
poterit esse duplex calefieri in uno subject. I mean that this is the case
subiecto. Et hoc dico, nisi sit alia unless another species of beat is
species caloris: sicut ponitur in involved, as in the seed there is, said to
semine calor ignis, caeli et animae. be the beat of fire, of heaven, and of the
Ex diversitate igitur phantasmatum soul. Hence the possible intellect’s act of
intellectus possibilis non understanding is not multiplied in
multiplicatur nisi secundum accordance with the diversity of
diversarum specierum phantasms, except as concerns its
intelligentiam: ut dicamus quod understanding of diverse species (so we
aliud est eius intelligere prout may say that its act of understanding is
intelligit hominem, et prout intelligit different in the case of understanding a
equum. Sed horum unum intelligere man and understanding a horse); on the
simul convenit omnibus hominibus. contrary, one act of understanding these
Ergo adhuc sequetur quod idem things befits all men at the same time.
intelligere numero sit huius hominis Therefore, it will still follow that the act of
et illius. understanding is numerically the same
in this and that man.
Adhuc. Intellectus possibilis intelligit [20] Again, the possible intellect

hominem, non secundum quod est understands man, not as this man, but
hic homo, sed inquantum est homo simply as man, according to man’s
simpliciter, secundum rationem specific nature. Now, this nature of
speciei. Haec autem ratio una est, man’s is one, regardless of the
quantumcumque phantasmata multiplication of phantasms, whether in
hominis multiplicentur, vel in uno one man or in several, according to the
homine vel in diversis, secundum diverse human individuals to which
diversa individua hominis, quorum phantasms properly speaking belong.
proprie sunt phantasmata. Consequently, the multiplication of
Multiplicatio igitur phantasmatum phantasms cannot cause the
non potest esse causa quod multiplication of the possible intellect’s
multiplicetur ipsum intelligere act of understanding with respect to a
intellectus possibilis respectu unius single species. We are, then, left with
speciei. Et sic adhuc remanebit una the same result as before, namely,

actio numero diversorum hominum. numerically one action of many different
men.
Item. Proprium subiectum habitus [21] Also, the possible intellect is the
scientiae est intellectus possibilis: proper subject of the habit of science,
quia eius actus est considerare because its act is scientific
secundum scientiam. Accidens consideration. But, if an accident is one,
autem, si sit unum, non it is multiplied only in reference to its
multiplicatur nisi secundum subject; so that, if there is one possible
subiectum. Si igitur intellectus intellect of all men, then specifically the
possibilis sit unus omnium same habit of science—the habit of
hominum, necesse erit quod grammar, for instance—will of necessity
scientiae habitus idem secundum be numerically the same in all men;
speciem, puta habitus which is inconceivable. Therefore, the
grammaticae, sit idem numero in possible intellect is not one in all.
omnibus hominibus. Quod est
inopinabile. Non est igitur
intellectus possibilis unus in
omnibus.
Sed ad hoc dicunt quod subiectum [22] But to this they [the Averroists] reply

habitus scientiae non est intellectus that the subject of the habit of science is
possibilis, sed intellectus passivus not the possible intellect but the passive
et virtus cogitativa. Quod quidem intellect and the cogitative power.
esse non potest. [23] This, however, is impossible. For,
Nam, sicut probat Aristoteles, in II as Aristotle proves in Ethics II, “from like
Ethicorum, ex similibus actibus fiunt acts, like habits are formed, which in
similes habitus, et similes etiam turn give rise to like acts.” Now, the habit
actus reddunt. Ex actibus autem of science is formed in us by acts of the
intellectus possibilis fit habitus possible intellect, and we are capable of
scientiae in nobis: et ad eosdem performing those acts according to the
actus potentes sumus secundum habit of science. Therefore, the habit of
habitum scientiae. Habitus igitur science is in the possible, and not the
scientiae est in intellectu possibili, passive, intellect.
non passivo.
Adhuc. Scientia est de [24] It is with respect to the conclusions

conclusionibus demonstrationum: of demonstrations, moreover, that there
nam demonstratio est syllogismus is science. For a demonstration is “a
faciens scire, ut Aristoteles dicit in I syllogism productive of scientific
posteriorum. Conclusiones autem knowledge,” as Aristotle says in
demonstrationum sunt universales, Posterior Analytics I [2]. Now, the
sicut et principia. Erit igitur in illa conclusions of demonstrations are
virtute quae est cognoscitiva universals, and so, too, are their
universalium. Intellectus autem principles. Therefore, science will reside
passivus non est cognoscitivus in that power which is cognizant of
universalium, sed particularium universals. But the passive intellect has
intentionum. Non est igitur no knowledge of universals, but only of
subiectum habitus scientiae. particular intentions. Hence, it is not the
subject of the habit of science.
Praeterea. Contra hoc sunt plures [25] Then, too, against this [Averroistic
rationes adductae supra, cum de theory about the passive intellect] are a
unione intellectus possibilis ad number of arguments adduced above,
hominem ageretur. when we were treating of the possible
intellect’s union with man.
Videtur autem ex hoc fuisse [26] Seemingly, the fallacy of locating
deceptio in ponendo habitum the habit of science in the passive
scientiae in intellectu passivo esse, intellect resulted from the observation
quia homines inveniuntur that men are more or less apt for
promptiores vel minus prompti ad scientific studies according to the
scientiarum considerationes various dispositions of the cogitative and
secundum diversam dispositionem imaginative powers.
virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae. [27] This aptitude, however, depends on
Sed ista promptitudo dependet ab these powers as on remote dispositions,
illis virtutibus sicut ex as it likewise depends on a fine sense of
dispositionibus remotis: prout etiam touch and on bodily temperament. In
dependet a bonitate tactus et this connection, Aristotle remarks in De
corporis complexione; secundum anima II [9] that men possessed of a
quod dicit Aristoteles, in II de highly developed sense of touch and of
anima, homines boni tactus et soft flesh are “mentally well endowed.”
mollis carnis esse bene aptos Now, the habit of science gives rise to
mente. Ex habitu autem scientiae an aptitude for reflection, being the
inest facultas considerandi sicut ex proximate principle of that action; for the
proximo principio actus: oportet habit of science must perfect the power
enim quod habitus scientiae whereby we understand, so that it acts
perficiat potentiam qua intelligimus, easily at will, even as the other habits
ut agat cum voluerit faciliter, sicut et perfect the powers in which they inhere.
alii habitus potentias in quibus sunt.
Item. Dispositiones praedictarum [28] Moreover, the dispositions of the

virtutum sunt ex parte obiecti, cogitative and imaginative powers are
scilicet phantasmatis, quod propter relative to the object, namely, the
bonitatem harum virtutum phantasm, which, because of the well
praeparatur ad hoc quod faciliter developed character of these powers, is
fiat intelligibile actu per intellectum prepared in such a way as to facilitate
agentem. Dispositiones autem its being made actually intelligible by the
quae sunt ex parte obiectorum, non agent intellect. Now, dispositions relative
sunt habitus, sed quae sunt ex to objects are not habits, but
parte potentiarum: non enim dispositions relative to .powers are
dispositiones quibus terribilia fiunt habits. Thus, the habit of fortitude is not
toleranda, sunt habitus fortitudinis; a disposition whereby frightening things
sed dispositio qua pars animae, become endurable, but a disposition by
scilicet irascibilis, disponitur ad which the irascible part of the soul is
terribilia sustinenda. Ergo disposed to endure such things. It is
manifestum est quod habitus therefore evident that the habit of

scientiae non est in intellectu science is not in the passive intellect, as
passivo, ut Commentator the Commentator says, but rather in the
praedictus dicit, sed magis in possible intellect.
intellectu possibili.
Item. Si unus est intellectus [29] And if there is one possible intellect

possibilis omnium hominum, for all men, it must be granted that if (as
oportet ponere intellectum the Averroists assert) men have always
possibilem semper fuisse, si existed, then the possible intellect has
homines semper fuerunt, sicut always existed, and much more the
ponunt: et multo magis intellectum agent intellect, because “the agent is
agentem, quia agens est superior to the patient,” as Aristotle
honorabilius patiente, ut Aristoteles says. Now, if both the agent and the
dicit. Sed si agens est aeternum, et recipient are eternal, the things received
recipiens aeternum, oportet recepta must be eternal. It would then follow that
esse aeterna. Ergo species the intelligible species existed from all
intelligibiles ab aeterno fuerunt in eternity in the possible intellect; so, in
intellectu possibili. Non igitur de that case, the latter receives no
novo recipit aliquas species intelligible species anew. But it is only as
intelligibiles. Ad nihil autem sensus the subjects from which intelligible
et phantasia sunt necessaria ad species may be derived that sense and
intelligendum nisi ut ab eis imagination have any necessary role to
accipiantur species intelligibiles. play in the understanding of things.
Sensus igitur non erit necessarius Therefore, neither sense nor
ad intelligendum, neque phantasia. imagination will be necessary for
Et redibit opinio Platonis, quod understanding. And thus we shall come
scientiam non acquirimus per back to Plato’s theory that we do not
sensus, sed ab eis excitamur ad acquire knowledge through the senses,
rememorandum prius scita. but are awakened by them to the
remembrance of things we knew before.
Sed ad hoc respondet [30] To this Averroes replies that the
Commentator praedictus, quod intelligible species have a twofold
species intelligibiles habent duplex subject: the possible intellect, wherein
subiectum: ex uno quorum habent they have eternal being; the phantasm,
aeternitatem, scilicet ab intellectu as ground of their newness. So too, the
possibili; ab alio autem habent subject of the visible species is twofold:
novitatem, scilicet a phantasmate; the thing outside the soul, and the
sicut etiam speciei visibilis power of sight.
subiectum est duplex, scilicet res
extra animam et potentia visiva.
Haec autem responsio stare non [31] But this reply cannot stand,
potest. Impossibile enim est quod because the action and perfection of an
actio et perfectio aeterni dependeat eternal thing could not possibly depend
ab aliquo temporali. Phantasmata on something temporal. And phantasms
autem temporalia sunt, de novo are temporal, new ones springing up in
quotidie in nobis facta ex sensu. us every day from the senses. It follows

Impossibile est igitur quod species that the intelligible species whereby the
intelligibiles, quibus intellectus possible intellect is actualized and
possibilis fit actu et operatur, operates cannot depend on the
dependeant a phantasmatibus, phantasms, as the visible species
sicut species visibilis dependet a depends on things outside the soul.
rebus quae sunt extra animam.
Amplius. Nihil recipit quod iam [32] Nothing receives what it already
habet: quia recipiens oportet esse has, since, as Aristotle remarks, the
denudatum a recepto, secundum recipient must be devoid of the thing
Aristotelem. Sed species received. Now, prior to my sensation or
intelligibiles ante meum sentire vel yours, intelligible species were present
tuum fuerunt in intellectu possibili: in the possible intellect, for our
non enim qui fuerunt ante nos predecessors would have had no
intellexissent, nisi intellectus understanding of anything unless the
possibilis fuisset reductus in actum possible intellect had been actualized by
per species intelligibiles. Nec potest the intelligible species. Nor can it be
dici quod species illae prius said that these species already received
receptae in intellectu possibili, esse into the possible intellect have ceased to
cessaverunt: quia intellectus exist, for the possible intellect not only
possibilis non solum recipit; sed receives but also preserves what it
conservat quod recipit, unde in III receives; that is why in De anima II [4] it
de anima dicitur esse locus is called the place of species. Hence,
specierum. Igitur ex species are not received from our
phantasmatibus nostris non phantasms into the possible intellect.
recipiuntur species in intellectu Therefore, it would be useless for our
possibili. Frustra igitur per phantasms to be made actually
intellectum agentem fiunt intelligible by the agent intellect.
intelligibilia actu nostra
phantasmata.
Item. Receptum est in recipiente [33] Likewise, “The presence in the
per modum recipientis. Sed recipient of the thing received accords
intellectus secundum se est supra with the recipient’s manner of being. But
motum. Ergo quod recipitur in eo, the intellect, in itself, transcends
recipitur fixe et immobiliter. movement. Therefore, what is received
into it is received in a fixed and
immovable manner.
Praeterea. Cum intellectus sit [34] Since the intellect is a higher power

superior virtus quam sensus, than the sense, its unity must be
oportet quod sit magis unita: et ex greater. This explains the observed fact
hoc videmus quod unus intellectus of one intellect exercising judgment
habet iudicium de diversis upon diverse kinds of sensible things
generibus sensibilium, quae ad belonging to diverse sensitive powers.
diversas potentias sensitivas And from this we can gather that the
pertinet. Unde accipere possumus operations belonging to the various
quod operationes pertinentes ad sensitive powers are united in the one
diversas potentias sensitivas, in intellect. Now, some of the sensitive

uno intellectu adunantur. powers only receive—the senses, for
Potentiarum autem sensitivarum instance; while some retain, as
quaedam recipiunt tantum, ut imagination and memory, which
sensus: quaedam autem retinent, therefore are called storehouses. The
ut imaginatio et memoria; unde et possible intellect, then, must both
thesauri dicuntur. Oportet igitur receive and retain what it has received.
quod intellectus possibilis et
recipiat, et retineat recepta.
Amplius. In rebus naturalibus [35] It is idle, moreover, to say that in the

vanum est dicere quod id ad quod realm of natural things what is acquired
pervenitur per motum, non as the result of movement has no
permaneat, sed statim esse abiding reality but immediately ceases
desinat: propter quod repudiatur to be. The opinion of those who say that
positio dicentium omnia semper all things are always in motion is
moveri; oportet enim motum ad rejected in the light of the fact that
quietem terminari. Multo igitur motion necessarily terminates in repose.
minus dici potest quod receptum in Much less, therefore, can it be said that
intellectu possibili non conservetur. what is received into the possible
intellect is not preserved.
Adhuc. Si ex phantasmatibus quae [36] Again, if from the phantasms in us
sunt in nobis intellectus possibilis the possible intellect comes into
non recipit aliquas species possession of no intelligible species
intelligibiles, quia iam recepit a because it has already received from
phantasmatibus eorum qui fuerunt the phantasms of our predecessors,
ante nos; pari ratione, a nullorum then for the same reason it receives
phantasmatibus recipit quos alii from none of the phantasms of those
praecesserunt. Sed quoslibet aliqui whom others preceded. But, if the world
alii praecesserunt, si mundus est is eternal, as the Averroists say, there
aeternus, ut ponunt. Nunquam has never existed a person without
igitur intellectus possibilis recipit predecessors. It follows that the
aliquas species a phantasmatibus. possible intellect never receives any
Frustra igitur ponitur intellectus species from phantasms. There was
agens ab Aristotele, ut faciat then no point in Aristotle’s having
phantasmata esse intelligibilia actu. posited the agent intellect in order to
make the phantasms actually intelligible.
Praeterea. Ex hoc videtur sequi [37] The apparent consequence of all
quod intellectus possibilis non this, furthermore, is that the possible
indigeat phantasmatibus ad intellect has no need of phantasms in
intelligendum. Nos autem per order to understand. Now, it is the
intellectum possibilem intelligimus. possible intellect by which we
Neque igitur nos sensu et understand. It will, therefore, follow that
phantasmate indigebimus ad we need not have senses and
intelligendum. Quod est manifeste phantasms in order to understand. And
falsum et contra sententiam this is manifestly false, as well as being
Aristotelis. contrary to the judgment of Aristotle.
Si autem dicatur quod, pari ratione, [38] Now, it may be said that for the
non indigeremus phantasmate ad same reason we would not need a
considerandum ea quorum species phantasm in order to consider the things
intelligibiles sunt in intellectu whose species are retained in the
conservatae, etiam si intellectus possible intellect, even if there are many
possibiles sint plures in diversis: possible intellects in many different
quod est contra Aristotelem, qui persons. Not only is this objection
dicit quod nequaquam sine contrary to Aristotle, who says that “the
phantasmate intelligit anima: patet soul in no wise understands without a
quod non est conveniens obviatio. phantasm,” it is also clearly irrelevant.
Intellectus enim possibilis, sicut et For the possible intellect, like every
quaelibet substantia, operatur substance, operates in a manner
secundum modum suae naturae. consonant with its nature. Now, it is by
Secundum autem suam naturam its nature the form of the body. Hence, it
est forma corporis. Unde intelligit does indeed understand immaterial
quidem immaterialia, sed inspicit ea things, but it sees them in something
in aliquo materiali. Cuius signum material. An indication of this is that in
est, quod in doctrinis universalibus teaching universal notions particular
exempla particularia ponuntur, in examples are employed, so that the
quibus quod dicitur inspiciatur. Alio universals may be viewed in them.
ergo modo se habet intellectus Hence, the possible intellect, before
possibilis ad phantasma quo possessing the intelligible species, is
indiget, ante speciem intelligibilem: related in one way to the phantasms
et alio modo postquam recepit which it needs, and in another way after
speciem intelligibilem. Ante enim, receiving that species; before, it needs
indiget eo ut ab eo accipiat speciem that phantasm in order to receive from it
intelligibilem: unde se habet ad the intelligible species, and thus the
intellectum possibilem ut obiectum phantasm stands in relation to the
movens. Sed post speciem in eo possible intellect as the object moving
receptam, indiget eo quasi the latter; but, after the species has
instrumento sive fundamento suae been received into the possible intellect,
speciei: unde se habet ad the latter needs the phantasm as the
phantasmata sicut causa efficiens; instrument or foundation of its species,
secundum enim imperium so that the possible intellect is then
intellectus formatur in imaginatione related to the phantasm as efficient
phantasma conveniens tali speciei cause. For by the intellect’s command
intelligibili, in quo resplendet there is formed in the imagination a
species intelligibilis sicut exemplar phantasm corresponding to such and
in exemplato sive in imagine. Si such an intelligible species, the latter
ergo intellectus possibilis semper being mirrored in this phantasm as an
habuisset species, nunquam exemplar in the thing exemplified or in
compararetur ad phantasmata sicut the image. Consequently, were the
recipiens ad obiectum motivum. possible intellect always in possession
of the species, it would never stand in
relationship to the phantasms as
recipient to object moving it.
Item. Intellectus possibilis est quo [39] Then, too, the possible intellect,
anima et homo intelligit, secundum according to Aristotle, is that “whereby
Aristotelem. Si autem intellectus the soul and man understand.” But, if
possibilis est unus omnium ac the possible intellect is one in all men
aeternus, oportet quod in ipso iam and is eternal, then all the intelligible
sint receptae omnes species species of the things that are or have
intelligibiles eorum quae a been known by any men whatever must
quibuslibet hominibus sunt scita vel already be received in it. Therefore,
fuerunt. Quilibet igitur nostrum, qui each of us, since we understand by the
per intellectum possibilem intelligit, possible intellect, and, in fact, our act of
immo cuius intelligere est ipsum understanding is itself the possible
intelligere intellectus possibilis, intellect’s act of understanding, will
intelliget omnia quae sunt vel understand all that is or has been
fuerunt a quibuscumque intellecta. understood by anyone whatever; which
Quod patet esse falsum. is plainly false.
Ad hoc autem Commentator [40] Now, to this the Commentator
praedictus respondet, dicens quod replies that we do not understand by the
nos non intelligimus per intellectum possible intellect except so far as it is in
possibilem nisi secundum quod contact with us through our phantasms.
continuatur nobis per nostra And since phantasms are not the same
phantasmata. Et quia non sunt in all, nor disposed in the same manner,
eadem phantasmata apud omnes neither is whatever one person
nec eodem modo disposita, nec understands understood by another.
quicquid intelligit unus, intelligit And this reply seems to be consistent
alius. Et videtur haec responsio with things previously said. For, even if
consonare praemissis. Nam etiam the possible intellect is not one, we do
si intellectus possibilis non est not understand the things whose
unus, non intelligimus ea quorum species are in the possible intellect
species sunt in intellectu possibili without the presence of phantasms
nisi adsint phantasmata ad hoc disposed for this purpose.
disposita.
Sed quod dicta responsio non [41] But, that this reply cannot wholly
possit totaliter inconveniens evitare, avoid the difficulty is made clear as
sic patet. Cum intellectus possibilis follows. When the possible intellect has
factus est actu per speciem been actualized by the reception of the
intelligibilem receptam, potest intelligible species, it can act of itself, as
agere per seipsum, ut dicit Aristotle says in De anima III [4]. This
Aristoteles, in III de anima. Unde accounts for the experienced fact that
videmus quod illud cuius scientiam when we have once acquired
semel accepimus, est in potestate knowledge of a thing, it is in our power
nostra iterum considerare cum to consider it again at will. And since we
volumus. Nec impedimur propter are able to form phantasms adapted to
phantasmata: quia in potestate the thinking that we wish to do, they are
nostra est formare phantasmata no hindrance to us [in our
accommoda considerationi quam reconsideration of things], unless,
volumus; nisi forte esset perhaps, there be an obstacle on the
impedimentum ex parte organi part of the organ to which the phantasm
cuius est, sicut accidit in phreneticis belongs, as in madmen and those
et lethargicis, qui non possunt afflicted with lethargy, who cannot freely
habere liberum actum phantasiae exercise their imagination and memory.

et memorativae. Et propter hoc For this reason Aristotle says in Physics
Aristoteles dicit, in VIII Phys., quod VIII [4] that one already possessed of
ille qui iam habet habitum scientiae, the habit of science, though he be
licet sit potentia considerans, non considering potentially, needs no mover
indiget motore qui reducat eum de to bring him from potentiality to act,
potentia in actum, nisi removente except a remover of obstacles, but is
prohibens, sed potest ipse exire in himself able to exercise his knowledge
actum considerationis ut vult. Si at will. If, however, the intelligible
autem in intellectu possibili sunt species of all sciences are present in
species intelligibiles omnium the possible intellect—which the
scientiarum, quod oportet dicere si hypothesis of its unicity and eternity
est unus et aeternus, necessitas necessarily implies—then that intellect
phantasmatum ad intellectum will require phantasms, just as one
possibilem erit sicut est illius qui already in possession of a science
iam habet scientiam ad needs them in order to think in terms of
considerandum secundum that science; this the intellect cannot do
scientiam illam, quod etiam sine without phantasms. Therefore, since
phantasmatibus non posset. Cum every man understands by the possible
igitur quilibet homo intelligat per intellect as a result of its being
intellectum possibilem secundum actualized by the intelligible species,
quod est reductus in actum per every man will be able to apply his mind
species intelligibiles, quilibet homo at will to the things known in every
poterit considerare, cum voluerit, science. This is manifestly false, since in
scita omnium scientiarum. Quod est that case no one would need a teacher
manifeste falsum: sic enim nullus in order to acquire a science. Therefore,
indigeret doctore ad acquirendum the possible intellect is not one and
scientiam. Non est igitur unus et eternal.
aeternus intellectus possibilis.
Caput 74 Chapter 74
De opinione Avicennae, qui posuit CONCERNING THE THEORY OF
formas intelligibiles non conservari in AVICENNA, WHO SAID THAT
intellectu possibili INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT
PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE
INTELLECT
Praedictis vero rationibus obviare [1] What Avicenna has to say,
videntur quae Avicenna ponit. Dicit however, seems to conflict with the
enim, in suo libro de anima, quod in arguments given above, for he asserts
intellectu possibili non remanent in his De animal that the intelligible
species intelligibiles nisi quandiu species do not remain in the possible
actu intelliguntur. intellect except when they are being
actually understood.
Quod quidem ex hoc probare nititur, [2] Avicenna endeavors to prove this
quia, quandiu formae apprehensae by arguing that, as long as the
manent in potentia apprehensiva, apprehended forms remain in the

actu apprehenduntur: ex hoc enim fit apprehending power, they are actually
sensus in actu, quod est idem cum apprehended, since [as Aristotle says]
sensato in actu, et similiter intellectus “sense is actualized by being identified
in actu est intellectum in actu. Unde with the thing actually sensed” and,
videtur quod, quandocumque sensus similarly, “the intellect in act is one with
vel intellectus est factus unum cum the thing actually understood” [De
sensato vel intellecto, secundum anima III, 2]. So, it seems that
quod habet formam ipsius, fit whenever sense or intellect becomes
apprehensio in actu per sensum vel one with the thing sensed or
per intellectum. Vires autem quae understood, as the result of
conservant formas non apprehensas possessing its form, there is actual
in actu, dicit non esse vires apprehension through sense or
apprehensivas, sed thesauros intellect. And Avicenna says that the
virtutum apprehensivarum: sicut powers wherein are preserved the
imaginatio, quae est thesaurus forms not actually apprehended are
formarum apprehensarum per not powers of apprehension, but store
sensum; et memoria, quae est, houses thereof; for example, the
secundum ipsum, thesaurus imagination, which is the storehouse
intentionum apprehensarum absque of senseapprehended forms, and the
sensu, sicut cum ovis apprehendit memory, which, he says, is the store
inimicitiam lupi. Hoc autem contingit house of intentions apprehended
huiusmodi virtutibus quod conservant without the senses—the sheep’s
formas non apprehensas actu, apprehension of the wolf as its enemy,
inquantum habent quaedam organa for instance. Now, it happens that
corporea, in quibus recipiuntur these powers preserve forms not
formae receptione propinqua actually apprehended, so far as they
apprehensioni. Et propter hoc, virtus possess bodily organs wherein forms
apprehensiva, convertens se ad are received in a manner closely
huiusmodi thesauros, apprehendit in resembling apprehension. Accordingly,
actu. Constat autem quod intellectus the apprehensive power, by turning to
possibilis est virtus apprehensiva, et these storehouses, apprehends
quod non habet organum corporeum. actually. Now, the possible intellect
Unde concludit quod impossibile est certainly is an apprehensive power,
quod species intelligibiles and certainly it has no corporeal organ.
conserventur in intellectu possibili, Hence, Avicenna concludes that it is
nisi quandiu intelligit actu. Oportet impossible for the intelligible species to
ergo quod vel ipsae species be preserved in the possible intellect,
intelligibiles conserventur in aliquo except while it understands actually.
organo corporeo, sive in aliqua There are, then, the following
virtute habente organum corporeum; alternatives: either the intelligible
vel oportet quod formae intelligibiles species themselves must be preserved
sint per se existentes, ad quas in some bodily organ or in some power
comparetur intellectus possibilis having such an organ; or the intelligible
noster sicut speculum ad res quae forms are of necessity selfexistent,
videntur in speculo; vel oportet quod our possible intellect being to them as
species intelligibiles fluant in a mirror to the things seen in it; or the
intellectum possibilem de novo ab intelligible species have to be infused
aliquo agente separato, anew into the possible intellect
quandocumque actu intelligit. whenever it understands actually. Now,
Primum autem horum trium est the first of these three is impossible,
impossibile: quia formae existentes because forms existing in powers
in potentiis utentibus organis which employ bodily organs are only
corporalibus, sunt intelligibiles in potentially intelligible; and the second
potentia tantum. Secundum autem is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle
est opinio Platonis, quam reprobat refutes in the Metaphysics [I, 9]. So,
Aristoteles, in metaphysica. Unde Avicenna takes the third, namely, that
concludit tertium: quod whenever we understand actually, the
quandocumque intelligimus actu, agent intellect, which he says is a
fluunt species intelligibiles in separate substance, infuses intelligible
intellectum possibilem nostrum ab species into our possible intellect.
intellectu agente, quem ponit ipse
quandam substantiam separatam.
Si vero aliquis obiiciat contra eum [3] Now, if anyone attacks Avicenna by

quod tunc non est differentia inter arguing that on his theory there is no
hominem cum primo addiscit, et cum difference between a man when he
postmodum vult considerare in actu first learns and when afterwards he
quae prius didicit: respondet quod wishes to consider actually what he
addiscere nihil aliud est quam had learned before, Avicenna replies
acquirere perfectam habitudinem that learning simply consists “in
coniungendi se intelligentiae agenti acquiring the perfect aptitude for
ad recipiendum ab eo formam uniting oneself with the agent intellect
intelligibilem. Et ideo ante addiscere so as to receive the intelligible form
est nuda potentia in homine ad talem from it”; so that before learning there
receptionem: addiscere vero est sicut exists in man the bare potentiality for
potentia adaptata. such reception, and learning is, as it
were, the potentiality adapted.
Videtur etiam huic positioni [4] In apparent harmony with this
consonare quod Aristoteles, in libro position is Aristotle’s proof, given in the
de memoria, ostendit memoriam non De memoria [I] that the memory is in
esse in parte intellectiva, sed in parte the sensitive and not the intellective
animae sensitiva. Ex quo videtur part of the soul; whence it seems to
quod conservatio specierum follow that the retention of the
intelligibilium non pertineat ad intelligible species is not the function of
partem intellectivam. the intellective part.
Sed si diligenter consideretur, haec [5] But, if this position is examined
positio, quantum ad originem, parum carefully, it will be seen that in principle
aut nihil differt a positione Platonis. it differs little or not at all from that of
Posuit enim Plato formas intelligibiles Plato. For Plato maintained that
esse quasdam substantias intelligible forms are separate
separatas, a quibus scientia fluebat substances, from which knowledge
in animas nostras. Hic autem ponit poured into our souls, while Avicenna
ab una substantia separata, quae est asserts that knowledge flows into our
intellectus agens secundum ipsum, souls from one separate substance,
scientiam in animas nostras fluere. the agent intellect. Now, so far as the
Non autem differt, quantum ad manner of acquiring knowledge is
modum acquirendi scientiam, utrum concerned, it makes no difference

ab una vel pluribus substantiis whether it be caused by one or several
separatis scientia nostra causetur: separate substances; in either case, it
utrobique enim sequetur quod follows that our knowledge is not
scientia nostra non causetur a caused by sensible things—a
sensibilibus. Cuius contrarium consequence clearly contradicted by
apparet per hoc quod qui caret the fact that a person who lacks one
aliquo sensu, caret scientia sense lacks, also, the knowledge of
sensibilium quae cognoscuntur per those sensible things which are known
sensum illum. through that sense.
Dicere autem quod per hoc quod [6] And a mere innovation is the
intellectus possibilis inspicit statement that by casting its gaze upon
singularia quae sunt in imaginatione, the singulars present in the
illustratur luce intelligentiae agentis imagination the possible intellect is
ad cognoscendum universale; et illuminated by the light of the agent
quod actiones virium inferiorum, intellect so as to know the universal,
scilicet imaginationis et memorativae and that the actions of the lower
et cogitativae, sunt aptantes animam powers—imaginative, memorative,
ad recipiendam emanationem cogitative—make the soul fit subject
intelligentiae agentis, est novum. for receiving the influx of the agent
Videmus enim quod anima nostra intellect. For it is a matter of
tanto magis disponitur ad observation that our soul is the more
recipiendum a substantiis separatis, disposed to receive from separate
quanto magis a corporalibus et substances, the further removed it is
sensibilibus removetur: per recessum from corporeal and sensible things; by
enim ab eo quod infra est, acceditur withdrawing from the lower we
ad id quod supra est. Non igitur est approach the higher. The notion that
verisimile quod per hoc quod anima the soul is disposed to receive the
respicit ad phantasmata corporalia, influx of a separate intelligence by
quod disponatur ad recipiendam reflecting upon corporeal phantasms
influentiam intelligentiae separatae. is, therefore, without verisimilitude.
Plato autem radicem suae positionis [7] Now, Plato followed the root
melius est prosecutus. Posuit enim principle of his position more
quod sensibilia non sunt disponentia consistently, because he held that
animam ad recipiendum influentiam sensible things do not dispose the soul
formarum separatarum, sed solum to receive the influx of separate forms,
expergefacientia intellectum ad but merely awaken the intellect to
considerandum ea quorum scientiam consider the things the knowledge of
habebat ab exteriori causatam. which it had received from an external
Ponebat enim quod a principio a cause. For he asserted that knowledge
formis separatis causabatur scientia of all things knowable was caused in
in animabus nostris omnium our souls from the beginning by
scibilium: unde addiscere dixit esse separate forms. Learning he therefore
quoddam reminisci. Et hoc declared to be a kind of remembering.
necessarium est secundum eius And this is a necessary consequence
positionem. Nam, cum substantiae of his position, for, since separate
separatae sint immobiles et semper substances are immobile and ever the
eodem modo se habentes, semper same, the knowledge of things always
ab eis resplendet scientia rerum in shines forth from them into our soul,
anima nostra, quae est eius capax. which is the fit subject of that
knowledge.
Amplius. Quod recipitur in aliquo, est [8] Moreover, the presence in the

in eo per modum recipientis. Esse recipient of the thing received accords
autem intellectus possibilis est magis with the recipient’s manner of being.
firmum quam esse materiae Now, the possible intellect exists in a
corporalis. Cum igitur formae more stable manner than corporeal
fluentes in materiam corporalem ab matter. Therefore, since forms flowing
intelligentia agente, secundum into corporeal matter from the agent
ipsum, conserventur in ea, multo intellect are according to Avicenna
magis conservantur in intellectu preserved in that matter, much more
possibili. are they preserved in the possible
intellect.
Adhuc. Cognitio intellectiva est [9] Again, intellective cognition is more

perfectior sensitiva. Si igitur in perfect than sensitive; so that, if there
sensitiva cognitione est aliquid is something to preserve things
conservans apprehensa, multo apprehended by the senses, this will
fortius hoc erit in cognitione be all the more true of things
intellectiva. apprehended by the intellect.
Item. Videmus quod diversa quae in [10] Likewise, we see that distinct
inferiori ordine potentiarum pertinent things, which in a lower order of
ad diversas potentias, in superiori powers belong to distinct powers, in a
ordine pertinent ad unum: sicut higher order belong to one. Thus, the
sensus communis apprehendit common sense apprehends the things
sensata omnium sensuum sensed by all the proper senses. It
propriorum. Apprehendere igitur et follows that apprehension and
conservare, quae in parte animae preservation, which in the sensitive
sensitivae pertinent ad diversas part of the soul are functions of distinct
potentias, oportet quod in suprema powers, must be united in the highest
potentia, scilicet in intellectu, power, namely, the intellect.
uniantur.
Praeterea. Intelligentia agens, [11] Then, too, according to Avicenna,

secundum ipsum, influit omnes the agent intellect causes all sciences
scientias. Si igitur addiscere nihil est by way of influx. Hence, if to learn is
aliud quam aptari ut uniatur simply to be made apt for union with
intelligentiae agenti, qui addiscit that intellect, then he who learns one
unam scientiam, non magis addiscit science does not learn that one more
illam quam aliam. Quod patet esse than another; which is obviously false.
falsum.
Patet etiam quod haec opinio est [12] This doctrine of Avicenna’s is also

contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui clearly contrary to Aristotle, who says
dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus in De anima III [4] that the possible

possibilis est locus specierum: quod intellect is the place of species, a
nihil aliud est dicere quam ipsum phrase having the same meaning as
esse thesaurum intelligibilium Avicenna’s storehouse of intelligible
specierum, ut verbis Avicennae species.
utamur.
Item. Postea subiungit quod quando [13] Moreover, Aristotle goes on to say

intellectus possibilis acquirit that when the possible intellect
scientiam, est potens operari per acquires knowledge, it is capable of
seipsum, licet non actu intelligat. Non acting on its own initiative, although it
igitur indiget influentia alicuius is not actually understanding.
superioris agentis. Therefore, it has no need of the influx
of any higher agent.
Dicit etiam, in VIII physicorum, quod [14] He also says in Physics VIII [4]
ante addiscere est homo in potentia that, before learning, a man is in a
essentiali ad scientiam, et ideo state of essential potentiality with
indiget motore per quem reducatur in respect to knowledge and therefore
actu: non autem, postquam iam needs a mover to bring him to a state
addidicit, indiget per se motore. Ergo of actual knowledge, but, when he has
non indiget influentia intellectus already learned, he needs no mover
agentis. essentially so called. Therefore, the
influx of the agent intellect is
unnecessary for him.
Dicit etiam, in III de anima, quod [15] And in De anima III [7,8] Aristotle
phantasmata se habent ad says that “phantasms are to the
intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia possible intellect what sensibles are to
ad sensum. Unde patet quod species the senses.” So, it is clear that
intelligibiles sunt in intellectu possibili intelligible species in the possible
a phantasmatibus, non a substantia intellect are derived from the
separata. phantasms, not from a separate
substance.
Rationes autem quae videntur in [16] The arguments seemingly contrary

contrarium esse, non est difficile to this conclusion are not difficult to
solvere. Intellectus enim possibilis solve. For the possible intellect is
est in actu perfecto secundum completely actualized with respect to
species intelligibiles cum considerat the intelligible species when actually
actu: cum vero non considerat actu, exercising its power; when it is not so
non est in actu perfecto secundum doing, it is not in their regard
illas species, sed se habet medio completely actualized, but is in a state
modo inter potentiam et actum. Et between potentiality and act. And
hoc est quod Aristoteles dicit, in III Aristotle remarks that, when this part,
de anima, quod, cum haec pars, namely, the possible intellect, “has
scilicet intellectus possibilis, become each of its objects, it is said to
unaquaeque fiat, sciens dicitur be actually possessed of knowledge;
secundum actum. Hoc autem accidit and this happens when it is capable of

cum possit operari per seipsum. Est acting on its own initiative, yet, even
quidem et tunc potentia similiter so, its condition is one of potentiality, in
quodammodo, non tamen similiter et a certain sense, but not in the same
ante addiscere aut invenire. sense as before learning or
discovering.”
Memoria vero in parte sensitiva [17] Now, the memory is located in the

ponitur, quia est alicuius prout cadit sensitive part of the soul, because its
sub determinato tempore: non est scope is limited to things subject to
enim nisi praeteriti. Et ideo, cum non determinate times; there is memory
abstrahat a singularibus only of what is past. Therefore, since
conditionibus, non pertinet ad partem memory does not abstract from
intellectivam, quae est universalium. singular conditions, it does not belong
Sed per hoc non excluditur quin to the intellective part of the soul,
intellectus possibilis sit conservativus which is cognizant of universals. This,
intelligibilium, quae abstrahunt ab however, does not stand in the way of
omnibus conditionibus particularibus. the possible intellect’s retentiveness of
intelligibles, which abstract from all
particular conditions.
Caput 75 Chapter 75
Solutio rationum quibus videtur SOLUTION OF THE SEEMINGLY
probari unitas intellectus possibilis DEMONSTRATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR
THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE
INTELLECT
Ad probandum autem unitatem [1] We must now show the inefficacy of
intellectus possibilis quaedam the arguments put forward with the
rationes adducuntur, quas oportet object of proving the unit of the possible
ostendere efficaces non esse. intellect.
Videtur enim quod omnis forma [2] For it seems that every form which is

quae est una secundum speciem one specifically and many in number is
et multiplicatur secundum individuated by matter; because things
numerum, individuetur per one in species and many in number
materiam: quae enim sunt unum agree in form and differ in matter.
specie et multa secundum Therefore, if the possible intellect is
numerum, conveniunt in forma et multiplied numerically in different men,
distinguuntur secundum materiam. while being specifically one, then it must
Si igitur intellectus possibilis in be individuated in this and that man by
diversis hominibus sit multiplicatus matter. But this individuation is not
secundum numerum, cum sit unus brought about by matter which is a part
secundum speciem, oportet quod of the intellect itself, since in that case
sit individuatus in hoc et in illo per the intellect’s receptivity would be of the
materiam. Non autem per same genus as that of prime matter, and
materiam quae sit pars sui: quia sic it would receive individual forms; which is
esset receptio eius de genere contrary to the nature of intellect. It
receptionis materiae primae, et remains that the intellect is individuated
reciperet formas individuales; quod by that matter which is the human body
est contra naturam intellectus. and of which the intellect is held to be
Relinquitur ergo quod individuetur the form. But every form individuated by
per materiam quae est corpus matter of which that form is the act is a
hominis cuius ponitur forma. Omnis material form. For the being of a thing
autem forma individuata per must stem from that to which it owes its
materiam cuius est actus, est individuation; since just as common
forma materialis. Oportet enim principles belong to the essence of the
quod esse cuiuslibet rei dependeat species, so individuating principles
ab eo a quo dependet individuatio belong to the essence of this individual
eius: sicut enim principia thing. It therefore follows that the
communia sunt de essentia possible intellect is a material form, and,
speciei, ita principia individuantia consequently, that it neither receives
sunt de essentia huius individui. anything nor operates without a bodily
Sequitur ergo quod intellectus organ. And this, too, is contrary to the
possibilis sit forma materialis. Et nature of the possible intellect.
per consequens quod non recipiat Therefore, the possible intellect is not
aliquid nec operetur sine organo multiplied in different men, but is one for
corporali. Quod etiam est contra them all.
naturam intellectus possibilis. Igitur
intellectus possibilis non
multiplicatur in diversis hominibus,
sed est unus omnium.
Item. Si intellectus possibilis esset [3] Also, if the possible intellect in this
alius in hoc et in illo homine, and that man were distinct, then the
oporteret quod species intellecta species understood would be
esset alia numero in hoc et in illo, numerically distinct in this and that man,
una vero in specie: cum enim though one in species. For the possible
specierum intellectarum in actu intellect is the proper subject of species
proprium subiectum sit intellectus actually understood, so that, with a
possibilis, oportet quod, multiplication of possible intellects, the
multiplicato intellectu possibili, intelligible species must be multiplied
multiplicentur species intelligibiles numerically in those diverse intellects.
secundum numerum in diversis. Now, species or forms which are
Species autem aut formae quae specifically the same and numerically
sunt eaedem secundum speciem diverse are individual forms. And these
et diversae secundum numerum, cannot be intelligible forms, because
sunt formae individuales. Quae intelligibles are universal, not particular.
non possunt esse formae Therefore, the possible intellect cannot
intelligibiles: quia intelligibilia sunt be multiplied in diverse human
universalia, non particularia. individuals; it must be one in all.
Impossibile est igitur intellectum
possibilem esse multiplicatum in
diversis individuis hominum.
Necesse est igitur quod sit unus in
omnibus.
Adhuc. Magister scientiam quam [4] And again, the master imparts the
habet transfundit in discipulum. Aut knowledge that he possesses to his
igitur eandem numero: aut aliam disciple. Hence, either he conveys
numero diversam, non specie. numerically the same knowledge or a
Secundum videtur impossibile knowledge numerically, but not
esse: quia sic magister causaret specifically, diverse. The latter seems
scientiam suam in discipulo sicut impossible, because in that case the
causat formam suam in alio master would cause his own knowledge
generando sibi simile in specie; to exist in his disciple, even as he
quod videtur pertinere ad agentia causes his own form to exist in
materialia. Oportet ergo quod something else by begetting one
eandem scientiam numero causet specifically like to himself; and this
in discipulo. Quod esse non posset seems to apply to material agents. It
nisi esset unus intellectus possibilis follows that the master causes
utriusque. Necesse igitur videtur numerically the same knowledge to exist
intellectum possibilem esse unum in the disciple. But, unless there were
omnium hominum. one possible intellect for both persons,
this would be impossible. So, the
existence of one possible intellect for all
men seems to be a necessary
conclusion.
Sicut autem praedicta positio [5] Nevertheless, just as this doctrine is
veritatem non habet, ut ostensum devoid of truth, as we have shown, so
est, ita rationes positae ad ipsam the arguments put forward to confirm it
confirmandam facile solubiles sunt. are easy of solution.
Confitemur enim intellectum [6] As to the first argument adduced
possibilem esse unum specie in above, we admit that the possible
diversis hominibus, plures autem intellect is specifically one in different
secundum numerum: ut tamen non men and yet is numerically many; though
fiat in hoc vis, quod partes hominis this is not to be taken so as to
non ponuntur in genere vel specie emphasize the fact that man’s parts are
secundum se, sed solum ut sunt not ascribed to his generic or specific
principia totius. Nec tamen sequitur essence as such, but only as principles
quod sit forma materialis of the whole man. Nor does it follow that
secundum esse dependens a the possible intellect is a material form
corpore. Sicut enim animae dependent on the body for its being. For
humanae secundum suam just as it belongs to the human soul by
speciem competit quod tali corpori its specific nature to be united to a
secundum speciem uniatur, ita particular species of body, so this
haec anima differt ab illa numero particular soul differs only numerically
solo ex hoc quod ad aliud numero from that one as the result of having a
corpus habitudinem habet. Et sic relationship to a numerically different
individuantur animae humanae, et body. In this way are human souls
per consequens intellectus individuated in relation to bodies, and not
possibilis, qui est potentia animae, as though their individuation were
secundum corpora, non quasi caused by bodies; and so the possible
individuatione a corporibus intellect, which is a power of the soul, is

causata. individuated likewise.
Secunda vero ratio ipsius deficit, [7] Averroes’ second argument fails
ex hoc quod non distinguit inter id because it does not distinguish between
quo intelligitur, et id quod that by which one understands and that
intelligitur. Species enim recepta in which is understood. The species
intellectu possibili non habet se ut received into the possible intellect is not
quod intelligitur. Cum enim de his that which is understood; for, since all
quae intelliguntur sint omnes artes arts and sciences have to do with things
et scientiae, sequeretur quod understood, it would follow that all
omnes scientiae essent de sciences are about species existing in
speciebus existentibus in intellectu the possible intellect. And this is patently
possibili. Quod patet esse falsum: false, because no science, except logic
nulla enim scientia de eis aliquid and metaphysics, is concerned with such
considerat nisi rationalis et things. And yet, in all the sciences,
metaphysica. Sed tamen per eas whatever is known is known through
quaecumque sunt in omnibus those species. Consequently, in the act
scientiis cognoscuntur. Habet se of understanding, the intelligible species
igitur species intelligibilis recepta in received into the possible intellect
intellectu possibili in intelligendo functions as the thing by which one
sicut id quo intelligitur, non sicut id understands, and not as that which is
quod intelligitur: sicut et species understood, even as the species of color
coloris in oculo non est id quod in the eye is not that which is seen, but
videtur, sed id quo videmus. Id that by which we see. And that which is
vero quod intelligitur, est ipsa ratio understood is the very intelligible
rerum existentium extra animam: essence of things existing outside the
sicut et res extra animam soul, just as things outside the soul are
existentes visu corporali videntur. seen by corporeal sight. For arts and
Ad hoc enim inventae sunt artes et sciences were discovered for the
scientiae ut res in suis naturis purpose of knowing things as existing in
existentes cognoscantur. their own natures.
Nec tamen oportet quod, quia [8] Nor need we follow Plato in holding
scientiae sunt de universalibus, that, because science is about
quod universalia sint extra animam universals, universals are selfsubsisting
per se subsistentia: sicut Plato entities outside the soul. For, although
posuit. Quamvis enim ad veritatem the truth of knowledge requires the
cognitionis necesse sit ut cognitio correspondence of cognition to thing, this
rei respondeat, non tamen oportet does not mean that these two must have
ut idem sit modus cognitionis et rei. the same mode of being. For things
Quae enim coniuncta sunt in re, united in reality are sometimes known
interdum divisim cognoscuntur: separately; in a thing that is at once
simul enim una res est et alba et white and sweet, sight knows only the
dulcis; visus tamen cognoscit whiteness, taste only the sweetness. So,
solam albedinem, et gustus solam too, the intellect understands, apart from
dulcedinem. Sic etiam et intellectus sensible matter, a line existing in
intelligit lineam in materia sensibili sensible matter, although it can also
existentem, absque materia understand it with sensible matter. Now,
sensibili: licet et cum materia this diversity comes about as a result of
sensibili intelligere possit. Haec the diversity of intelligible species

autem diversitas accidit secundum received into the intellect, the species
diversitatem specierum being sometimes a likeness of quantity
intelligibilium in intellectu alone, and sometimes a likeness of a
receptarum: quae quandoque est quantitative sensible substance.
similitudo quantitatis tantum, Similarly, although the generic nature
quandoque vero substantiae and the specific nature never exist
sensibilis quantae. Similiter autem, except in individual things, the intellect
licet natura generis et speciei nevertheless understands those natures
nunquam sit nisi in his individuis, without understanding the individuating
intelligit tamen intellectus naturam principles; and to do this is to understand
speciei et generis non intelligendo universals. Thus, there is no
principia individuantia: et hoc est incompatibility between the fact that
intelligere universalia. Et sic haec universals do not subsist outside the
duo non repugnant, quod soul, and that in understanding
universalia non subsistant extra universals the intellect understands
animam: et quod intellectus, things that do exist outside the soul. The
intelligens universalia, intelligat res intellect’s understanding of the generic or
quae sunt extra animam. Quod specific nature apart from the
autem intelligat intellectus naturam individuating principles is due to the
generis vel speciei denudatam a condition of the intelligible species
principiis individuantibus, contingit received into it, for the species is
ex conditione speciei intelligibilis in immaterialized by the agent intellect
ipso receptae, quae est through being abstracted from matter
immaterialis effecta per intellectum and material conditions whereby a
agentem, utpote abstracta a particular thing is individuated.
materia et conditionibus materiae, Consequently, the sensitive powers are
quibus aliquid individuatur. Et ideo unable to know universals; they cannot
potentiae sensitivae non possunt receive an immaterial form, since
cognoscere universalia: quia non whatever is received by them is always
possunt recipere formam received in a corporeal organ.
immaterialem, cum recipiant
semper in organo corporali.
Non igitur oportet esse numero [9] Hence, it does not follow that the
unam speciem intelligibilem huius intelligible species are numerically one in
intelligentis et illius: ad hoc enim this or that knower; otherwise, this and
sequeretur esse unum intelligere that person’s act of understanding would
numero huius et illius, cum be numerically one, since operation
operatio sequatur formam quae est follows upon the form which is the
principium speciei. Sed oportet, ad principle of the species. But in order that
hoc quod sit unum intellectum, there be one thing understood, there
quod sit unius et eiusdem must be a likeness of one and the same
similitudo. Et hoc est possibile si thing; and this is possible if the
species intelligibiles sint numero intelligible species are numerically
diversae: nihil enim prohibet unius distinct. For there is no reason why there
rei fieri plures imagines differentes; should not be several different images of
et ex hoc contingit quod unus one thing; it is thus that one man is seen
homo a pluribus videtur. Non igitur by several. Hence, the existence of
repugnat cognitioni universali several intelligible species in several

intellectus quod sint diversae persons is not incompatible with the
species intelligibiles in diversis. intellect’s knowledge of the universal.
Nec propter hoc oportet quod, si [10] Nor does it then follow, if intelligible

species intelligibiles sint plures species are several in number and
numero et eaedem specie, quod specifically the same, that they are not
non sint intelligibiles actu, sed actually intelligible but only potentially
potentia tantum, sicut alia intelligible, like other individual things.
individua. Non enim hoc quod est For to be individual is not incompatible
esse individuum, repugnat ei quod with being actually intelligible, since, on
est esse intelligibile actu: oportet the supposition that the possible and
enim dicere ipsum intellectum agent intellects are separate substances
possibilem et agentem, si ponuntur not united to the body but selfsubsistent,
quaedam substantiae separatae it must be said that they are themselves
corpori non unitae per se individual things; and yet they are
subsistentes, quaedam individua intelligible. No; it is materiality that is
esse, et tamen intelligibilia sunt. incompatible with intelligibility, a sign of
Sed id quod repugnat intelligibilitati this being the fact that for the forms of
est materialitas: cuius signum est material things to be made actually
quod, ad hoc quod fiant formae intelligible they must be abstracted from
rerum materialium intelligibiles matter. Hence, things whose
actu, oportet quod a materia individuation is effected by particular
abstrahantur. Et ideo in illis in signate matter are not actually
quibus individuatio fit per hanc intelligible, but nothing prevents things
materiam signatam, individuata whose individuation is not due to matter
non sunt intelligibilia actu. Si autem from being actually intelligible. Now,
individuatio fiat non per materiam, intelligible species, in common with all
nihil prohibet ea quae sunt other forms, are individuated by their
individua esse actu intelligibilia. subject, which in this case is the possible
Species autem intelligibiles intellect. That is why the possible
individuantur per suum subiectum, intellect, being immaterial, does not
qui est intellectus possibilis, sicut deprive of actual intelligibility the species
et omnes aliae formae. Unde, cum which it individuates.
intellectus possibilis non sit
materialis, non tollitur a speciebus
individuatis per ipsum quin sint
intelligibiles actu.
Praeterea. In rebus sensibilibus, [11] Moreover, just as individuals in the
sicut non sunt intelligibilia actu realm of sensible things are not actually
individua quae sunt multa in una intelligible if there be many of them in
specie, ut equi vel homines; ita nec one species—for example, horses or
individua quae sunt unica in sua men—so neither are sensible individuals
specie, ut hic sol et haec luna. which are unique in their species, as this
Eodem autem modo individuantur particular sun and this particular moon.
species per intellectum possibilem But species are individuated in the same
sive sint plures intellectus way by the possible intellect, whether
possibiles sive unus: sed non there be several such intellects or only
eodem modo multiplicantur in one; yet they are not multiplied in the
eadem specie. Nihil igitur refert, same way in the one species. Hence, so
quantum ad hoc quod species far as the actual intelligibility of the
receptae in intellectu possibili sint species received into the possible
intelligibiles actu, utrum intellectus intellect is concerned, it makes no
possibilis sit unus in omnibus, aut difference whether there be one or
plures. several possible intellects in all men.
Item. Intellectus possibilis, [12] Then, too, the possible intellect,

secundum Commentatorem according to Averroes, is the last in the
praedictum, est ultimus in ordine order of intelligible substances, which in
intelligibilium substantiarum, quae his view are several. Nor can it be
quidem secundum ipsum sunt denied that some of the higher
plures. Nec potest dici quin aliquae substances are cognizant of things which
superiorum substantiarum habeant the possible intellect knows; for in the
cognitionem eorum quae movers of the spheres are present the
intellectus possibilis cognoscit: in forms of the things caused by the
motoribus enim orbium, ut ipse movement of a sphere, as he himself
etiam dicit, sunt formae eorum says. Hence, even if there is but one
quae causantur per orbis motum. possible intellect, it will still follow that the
Adhuc igitur remanebit, licet intelligible forms are multiplied in
intellectus possibilis sit unus, quod different intellects.
formae intelligibiles multiplicentur
in diversis intellectibus.
Licet autem dixerimus quod [13] Now, while we have said that the
species intelligibilis in intellectu intelligible species received into the
possibili recepta, non sit quod possible intellect is not that which is
intelligitur, sed quo intelligitur; non understood but that whereby one
tamen removetur quin per understands, this does not prevent the
reflexionem quandam intellectus intellect, by a certain reflexion, from
seipsum intelligat, et suum understanding itself, and its act of
intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. understanding, and the species whereby
Suum autem intelligere intelligit it understands. Indeed, it understands its
dupliciter: uno modo in particulari, own act of understanding in two ways:
intelligit enim se nunc intelligere; particularly, for it understands that it
alio modo in universali, secundum presently understands; universally, so far
quod ratiocinatur de ipsius actus as it reasons about the nature of its act.
natura. Unde et intellectum et So, likewise, the intellect understands
speciem intelligibilem intelligit both itself and the intelligible species in
eodem modo dupliciter: et two ways: by perceiving its own being
percipiendo se esse et habere and its possession of an intelligible
speciem intelligibilem, quod est species—and this is a kind of particular
cognoscere in particulari; et knowing—by considering its own nature
considerando suam et speciei and that of the intelligible species, which
intelligibilis naturam, quod est is a universal knowing. It is in this latter
cognoscere in universali. Et mode that the intellect and the intelligible
secundum hoc de intellectu et are treated in the sciences.
intelligibili tractatur in scientiis.
Per haec autem quae dicta sunt [14] As to the third argument, its solution

etiam tertiae rationis apparet emerges from what has already been
solutio. Quod enim dicit scientiam said. For Averroes statement that
in discipulo et magistro esse knowledge in the disciple and in the
numero unam, partim quidem vere master is numerically one is partly true
dicitur, partim autem non. Est enim and partly false. It is numerically one as
numero una quantum ad id quod concerns the thing known; it is not
scitur: non tamen quantum ad numerically one either in respect of the
species intelligibiles quibus scitur, intelligible species whereby the thing is
neque quantum ad ipsum scientiae known, or of the habit of knowledge
habitum. Non tamen oportet quod itself. Nor does this entail the
eodem modo magister causet consequence that the master causes
scientiam in discipulo sicut ignis knowledge in the disciple in the same
generat ignem. Non enim idem est way as fire generates fire. For things are
modus eorum quae a natura not in the same fashion generated by
generantur, et eorum quae ab arte. nature as by art; fire generates fire
Ignis quidem enim generat ignem naturally, by making actual the form of
naturaliter, reducendo materiam de fire potentially present in the matter,
potentia in actum suae formae: whereas the master causes knowledge
magister vero causat scientiam in in his disciple by way of art, since this is
discipulo per modum artis; ad hoc the aim of the art of demonstration,
enim datur ars demonstrativa, which Aristotle teaches in the Posterior
quam Aristoteles in posterioribus Analytics; for demonstration is “a
tradit; demonstratio enim est syllogism productive of scientific
syllogismus faciens scire. knowledge,” as he says in that work [I,
2].
Sciendum tamen quod, secundum [15] It must be borne in mind, however,
quod Aristoteles in VII that according to Aristotle’s teaching in
metaphysicae docet, artium Metaphysics VII [9] there are some arts
quaedam sunt in quarum materia wherein the matter is not an active
non est aliquod principium agens principle productive of the art’s effect.
ad effectum artis producendum, The art of building is a case in point,
sicut patet in aedificativa: non enim since in wood and stone there is no
est in lignis et lapidibus aliqua vis active force tending to the construction of
activa movens ad domus a house, but only a passive aptitude. On
constitutionem, sed aptitudo the other hand, there exists an art whose
passiva tantum. Aliqua vero est ars matter is an active principle tending to
in cuius materia est aliquod produce the effect of that art. Such is the
activum principium movens ad art of medicine, for in the sick body there
producendum effectum artis, sicut is an active principle conducive to health.
patet in medicativa: nam in corpore Thus, the effect of an art of the first kind
infirmo est aliquod activum is never produced by nature, but is
principium ad sanitatem. Et ideo always the result of the art; every house
effectum artis primi generis is an artifact. But the effect of an art of
nunquam producit natura, sed the second kind is the result both of art
semper fit ab arte: sicut domus and of nature without art, for many are
omnis est ab arte. Effectus autem healed by the action of nature without
artis secundi generis fit et ab arte, the art of medicine. Now, in those things
et a natura sine arte: multi enim that can be done both by art and by
per operationem naturae, sine arte nature, art imitates nature; if the cause of
medicinae, sanantur. In his autem a person’s illness is something cold,
quae possunt fieri et arte et natura, nature cures him by heating; and that is
ars imitatur naturam: si quis enim why the physician, if his services are
ex frigida causa infirmetur, natura needed in order to cure the patient, does
eum calefaciendo sanat; unde et so by applying beat. Now, the art of
medicus, si eum curare debeat, teaching resembles this art. For in the
calefaciendo sanat. Huic autem arti person taught there is an active principle
similis est ars docendi. In eo enim conducive to knowledge, namely, the
qui docetur, est principium activum intellect, and there are also those things
ad scientiam: scilicet intellectus, et that are naturally understood, namely,
ea quae naturaliter intelliguntur, first principles. Knowledge, then, is
scilicet prima principia. Et ideo acquired in two ways: by discovery
scientia acquiritur dupliciter: et sine without teaching, and by teaching. So,
doctrina, per inventionem; et per the teacher begins to teach in the same
doctrinam. Docens igitur hoc modo way as the discoverer begins to discover,
incipit docere sicut inveniens incipit that is, by offering to the disciple’s
invenire: offerendo scilicet consideration principles known by him,
considerationi discipuli principia ab since all learning results from pre
eo nota, quia omnis disciplina ex existent knowledge; by drawing
praeexistenti fit cognitione, et illa conclusions from those principles; and
principia in conclusiones by proposing sensible examples, from
deducendo; et proponendo which the phantasms necessary for the
exempla sensibilia, ex quibus in disciple’s understanding are found in the
anima discipuli formentur soul. And since the outward action of the
phantasmata necessaria ad teacher would have no effect without the
intelligendum. Et quia exterior inward principle of knowledge, whose—
operatio docentis nihil operaretur presence in us we owe to God, the
nisi adesset principium intrinsecum theologians remark that man teaches by
scientiae, quod inest nobis outward ministration, but God by inward
divinitus, ideo apud theologos operation. So, too, is the physician said
dicitur quod homo docet to minister to nature in the practice of his
ministerium exhibendo, Deus art of healing. Thus, knowledge is
autem interius operando: sicut et caused in the disciple by his master, not
medicus dicitur naturae minister in by way of natural action, but of art, as
sanando. Sic igitur causatur was said.
scientia in discipulo per magistrum,
non modo naturalis actionis, sed
artificialis, ut dictum est.
Praeterea, cum Commentator [16] Furthermore, since the

praedictus ponat habitus Commentator locates the habits of
scientiarum esse in intellectu science in the passive intellect as their
passivo sicut in subiecto, unitas subject, the unicity of the possible
intellectus possibilis nihil facit ad intellect does nothing whatever to effect
hoc quod sit una scientia numero a numerical unity of knowledge in
in discipulo et magistro. Intellectum disciple and master. For the passive
enim passivum constat non esse intellect certainly is not the same in
eundem in diversis: cum sit different individuals, since it is a material
potentia materialis. Unde haec power. That is why this argument is wide

ratio non est ad propositum, of the mark even in terms of Averroes
secundum eius positionem. own position.
Caput 76 Chapter 76
Quod intellectus agens non sit THAT THE AGENT INTELLECT IS
substantia separata, sed aliquid NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE,
animae BUT PART OF THE SOUL
Ex his etiam concludi potest quod [1] From the foregoing it can be
nec intellectus agens est unus in inferred that neither is there one agent
omnibus, ut Alexander etiam ponit, et intellect in all, as maintained by
Avicenna, qui non ponunt intellectum Alexander and by Avicenna, who do
possibilem esse unum omnium. not hold there is one possible intellect
for all.
Cum enim agens et recipiens sint [2] For, since agent and recipient are
proportionata, oportet quod unicuique proportionate to one another, to every
passivo respondeat proprium passive principle there must
activum. Intellectus autem possibilis correspond a proper active one. Now,
comparatur ad agentem ut proprium the possible intellect is compared to
passivum sive susceptivum ipsius: the agent intellect as its proper patient
habet enim se ad eum agens sicut or recipient, because the agent
ars ad materiam, ut dicitur in III de intellect is related to it as art to its
anima. Si igitur intellectus possibilis matter; So that if the possible intellect
est aliquid animae humanae, is part of the human soul and is
multiplicatum secundum multiplied according to the number of
multitudinem individuorum, ut individuals, as was shown, then the
ostensum est; et intellectus agens agent intellect also will be part of the
erit etiam eiusmodi, et non erit unus soul and multiplied in like manner, and
omnium. not one for all.
Adhuc. Intellectus agens non facit [3] Again, the purpose for which the
species intelligibiles actu ut ipse per agent intellect renders the species
eas intelligat, maxime sicut actually intelligible is not that they may
substantia separata, cum non sit in serve as means of understanding on
potentia: sed ut per eas intelligat its part, especially as a separate
intellectus possibilis. Non igitur facit substance, because the agent intellect
eas nisi tales quales competunt is not in a state of potentiality; this
intellectui possibili ad intelligendum. purpose, on the contrary, is that the
Tales autem facit eas qualis est ipse: possible intellect may understand by
nam omne agens agit sibi simile. Est those species which the agent intellect
igitur intellectus agens proportionatus has made actually intelligible. Thus,
intellectui possibili. Et sic, cum the function of the agent intellect in
intellectus possibilis sit pars animae, regard to the intelligible species is
intellectus agens non erit substantia simply to render them fit vehicles for
separata. the possible intellect’s understanding.

Now, the agent intellect makes them to
be such as it is itself; for every agent
produces its like. Therefore, the agent
intellect is proportionate to the possible
intellect; and since the possible
intellect is a part of the soul, the agent
intellect will not be a separate
substance.
Amplius. Sicut materia prima [4] just as prime matter is perfected by

perficitur per formas naturales, quae natural forms, which are outside the
sunt extra animam, ita intellectus soul, so the possible intellect is
possibilis perficitur per formas perfected by forms actually
intellectas in actu. Sed formae understood. Natural forms, however,
naturales recipiuntur in materia are received into prime matter, not by
prima, non per actionem alicuius the action of some separate substance
substantiae separatae tantum, sed alone, but by the action of a form of
per actionem formae eiusdem the same kind, namely, a form existing
generis, scilicet quae est in materia: in matter; thus, this particular flesh is
sicut haec caro generatur per begotten through a form in this flesh
formam quae est in his carnibus et in and these bones, as Aristotle proves in
his ossibus, ut probat Aristoteles in Metaphysics VII [8]. If the possible
VII metaphysicae. Si igitur intellectus intellect is a part of the soul and not a
possibilis sit pars animae et non sit separate substance, as we have
substantia separata, ut probatum est, shown, then the agent intellect, by
intellectus agens, per cuius actionem whose action the intelligible species
fiunt species intelligibiles in ipso, non are made present in the possible
erit aliqua substantia separata, sed intellect, will not be a separate
aliqua virtus activa animae. substance but an active power of the
soul.
Item. Plato posuit scientiam in nobis [5] Also, Plato held that the cause of
causari ab ideis, quas ponebat esse our knowledge is Ideas, which he said
quasdam substantias separatas: were separate substances: a theory
quam quidem positionem Aristoteles disproved by Aristotle in Metaphysics I
improbat in I metaphysicae. Constat [9]. Now, it is certain that our
autem quod scientia nostra dependet knowledge depends on the agent
ab intellectu agente sicut ex primo intellect as its first principle. So, if the
principio. Si igitur intellectus agens agent intellect were a separate
esset quaedam substantia separata, substance, there would be little or no
nulla esset vel modica differentia difference between this opinion and
inter opinionem istam et Platonicam the Platonic theory referred to, which
a philosopho improbatam. the Philosopher has refuted.
Adhuc. Si intellectus agens est [6] Then, too, if the agent intellect is a

quaedam substantia separata, separate substance, its action must be
oportet quod eius actio sit continua et continuous and not interrupted; or at
non intercisa: vel saltem oportet least it is not continued or interrupted
dicere quod non continuetur et at our will—this in any case must be
intercidatur ad nostrum arbitrium. said. Now, the function of the agent
Actio autem eius est facere intellect is to make phantasms actually
phantasmata intelligibilia actu. Aut intelligible. Therefore, either it will do
igitur hoc semper faciet, aut non this always or not always. If not
semper: si non semper, non tamen always, this, however, will not be by
hoc faciet ad arbitrium nostrum. Sed our choosing. Yet we understand
tunc intelligimus actu quando actually when the phantasms are
phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia actu. made actually intelligible. Hence it
Ergo oportet quod vel semper follows that either we always
intelligamus; vel quod non sit in understand or that it is not in our
potestate nostra actu intelligere. power to understand actually.
Praeterea. Comparatio substantiae [7] A separate substance, furthermore,

separatae ad omnia phantasmata has one and the same relationship to
quae sunt in quibuscumque all the phantasms present in any men
hominibus, est una: sicut comparatio whatever, just as the sun stands in the
solis est una ad omnes colores. Res same relation to all colors. Persons
autem sensibiles similiter sentiunt possessed of knowledge perceive
scientes et inscii: et per consequens sensible things, but so also do the
eadem phantasmata sunt in utrisque. ignorant. Hence, the same phantasms
Similiter igitur fient intelligibilia ab are in both, and these phantasms will
intellectu agente. Uterque ergo in like manner be made actually
similiter intelliget. intelligible by the agent intellect.
Therefore, both will understand m
similar fashion.
Potest autem dici quod intellectus [8] Even so, it can be said that the
agens semper agit quantum in se agent intellect is, in itself, always
est, sed non semper phantasmata acting, but that the phantasms are not
fiunt intelligibilia actu, sed solum always made actually intelligible, but
quando sunt ad hoc disposita. only when they are disposed to this
Disponuntur autem ad hoc per actum end. Now, they are so disposed by the
cogitativae virtutis, cuius usus est in act of the cogitative power, the use of
nostra potestate. Et ideo intelligere which is in our power. Hence, to
actu est in nostra potestate. Et ob understand actually is in our power.
hoc etiam contingit quod non omnes And this is the reason why not all men
homines intelligunt ea quorum understand the things whose
habent phantasmata: quia non phantasms they have, since not all are
omnes habent actum virtutis possessed of the requisite act of the
cogitativae convenientem, sed solum cogitative power, but only those who
qui sunt instructi et consueti. are instructed and habituated.
Videtur autem quod haec responsio [9] This reply, however, seems not
non sit omnino sufficiens. Haec enim entirely adequate. For the disposition
dispositio quae fit per cogitativam ad to understand which the cogitative
intelligendum, oportet quod sit vel power causes must either be a
dispositio intellectus possibilis ad disposition of the possible intellect to
recipiendum formas intelligibiles ab receive intelligible forms flowing from
intellectu agente fluentes, ut the agent intellect, as Avicenna says,

Avicenna dicit, vel quia disponuntur or a disposition of the phantasms to be
phantasmata ut fiant intelligibilia actu, made actually intelligible, as Averroes
sicut Averroes et Alexander dicunt. and Alexander declare. But the former
Primum autem horum non videtur seems incongruous, because the
esse conveniens. Quia intellectus possible intellect by its very nature is in
possibilis secundum suam naturam potentiality with respect to species
est in potentia ad species actually intelligible, so that it bears the
intelligibiles actu: unde comparatur same relationship to them as a
ad eas sicut diaphanum ad lucem vel transparent medium to light or to color
ad species coloris. Non autem indiget species. Now, a thing equipped by
aliquid in cuius natura est recipere nature to receive a certain form needs
formam aliquam, disponi ulterius ad no further disposition to that form,
formam illam: nisi forte sint in eo unless there happen to be contrary
contrariae dispositiones, sicut dispositions in it, as the matter of water
materia aquae disponitur ad formam is disposed to the form of air by the
aeris per remotionem frigiditatis et removal of cold and density. But there
densitatis. Nihil autem contrarium est is nothing contrary in the possible
in intellectu possibili quod possit intellect that could prevent it from
impedire cuiuscumque speciei receiving any intelligible species
intelligibilis susceptionem: nam whatever, for the intelligible species
species intelligibiles etiam even of contraries are not contrary in
contrariorum in intellectu non sunt the intellect, as Aristotle proves in
contrariae, ut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphysics VII [7], since one is the
metaphysicae, cum unum sit ratio reason of the knowledge of the other.
cognoscendi aliud. Falsitas autem And any falsity occurring in the
quae accidit in iudicio intellectus intellect’s affirmative or negative
componentis et dividentis, provenit, judgments is due, not to the presence
non ex eo quod in intellectu possibili in the possible intellect of certain
sint aliqua intellecta, sed ex eo quod things understood, but to its lack of
ei aliqua desunt. Non igitur, quantum certain things. In and of itself,
in se est, intellectus possibilis indiget therefore, the possible intellect needs
aliqua praeparatione ut suscipiat no preparation in order to receive the
species intelligibiles ab intellectu intelligible species issuing from the
agente fluentes. agent intellect.
Praeterea. Colores facti visibiles actu [10] Moreover, colors made actually

per lucem pro certo imprimunt suam visible by light unfailingly impress their
similitudinem in diaphano, et per likeness upon the transparent body
consequens in visum. Si igitur ipsa and, consequently, upon the power of
phantasmata illustrata ab intellectu sight. Therefore, if the very phantasms
agente non imprimerent suas which the agent intellect has illumined
similitudines in intellectum did not impress their likeness on the
possibilem, sed solum disponunt possible intellect, but only disposed it
ipsum ad recipiendum; non esset to receive them, the phantasms would
comparatio phantasmatum ad not bear the same relationship to the
intellectum possibilem sicut colorum possible intellect as colors to the
ad visum, ut Aristoteles ponit. faculty of sight as Aristotle maintains.
Item. Secundum hoc phantasmata [11] According to this [Avicennian

non essent per se necessaria ad theory], the phantasms would not be
intelligendum, et per consequens nec essentially necessary for our
sensus: sed solum per accidens, understanding, nor, then, would the
quasi excitantia et praeparantia senses; but necessary only
intellectum possibilem ad accidentally, as things so to speak
recipiendum. Quod est opinionis inciting and preparing the possible
Platonicae, et contra ordinem intellect to accomplish its receptive
generationis artis et scientiae quem function. This is part of the Platonic
ponit Aristoteles, in I Metaph. et ult. doctrine, and is contrary to the order in
Poster., dicens quod ex sensu fit which art and science come to birth in
memoria, ex multis memoriis unum the mind, as Aristotle explains it in
experimentum; ex multis Metaphysics I [1], and in the Posterior
experimentis universalis acceptio, Analytics [II, 15], where he says that
quae est principium scientiae et artis. “memory results from sensation; one
experience from many memories; from
many experiences the universal
apprehension which is the beginning of
science and art.”
Est autem haec positio Avicennae This position of Avicenna’s, however,
consona his quae de generatione is in accord with what its author says
rerum naturalium dicit. Ponit enim about the generation of natural things.”
quod omnia agentia inferiora solum For he asserts that the actions of all
per suas actiones praeparant lower agents have merely the effect of
materiam ad suscipiendas formas preparing matter to receive the forms
quae effluunt in materias ab which flow into their matters from the
intelligentia agente separata. Unde separate agent intellect. So, too, for
et, eadem ratione, ponit quod the same reason, he holds that the
phantasmata praeparant intellectum phantasms prepare the possible
possibilem, formae autem intellect, and that the intelligible forms
intelligibiles fluunt a substantia emanate from a separate substance.
separata.
Similiter autem quod per cogitativam [12] Similarly, on the hypothesis that
disponuntur phantasmata ad hoc the agent intellect is a separate
quod fiant intelligibilia actu et substance it would seem incongruous
moventia intellectum possibilem, that the phantasms should he
conveniens non videtur si intellectus prepared by the cogitative power so as
agens ponatur substantia separata. to be actually intelligible and move the
Hoc enim videtur esse conforme possible intellect. For, seemingly, this
positioni dicentium quod inferiora agrees with the position of those who
agentia sunt solum disponentia ad say that the lower agents are merely
ultimam perfectionem, ultima autem dispositive causes with respect to the
perfectio est ab agente separato: ultimate perfection [of a thing], the
quod est contra sententiam source of which is a separate agent: a
Aristotelis in VII metaphysicae. Non position contrary to the judgment
enim videtur imperfectius se habere expressed by Aristotle in Metaphysics
anima humana ad intelligendum, VII [8]. For the human soul would
quam inferiora naturae ad proprias seem to be not less perfectly fitted for
operationes. understanding than the lower things of
nature for their proper operations.
Amplius. Effectus nobiliores in istis [13] Then, too, among these lower
inferioribus producuntur non solum things the more noble effects are
ab agentibus superioribus, sed produced not only by higher agents but
requirunt agentia sui generis: also require agents of their own genus;
hominem enim generat sol et homo. for the sun and man generate a man.
Et similiter videmus in aliis Likewise, we observe that among
animalibus perfectis quod quaedam other perfect animals, some less noble
ignobilia animalia ex solis tantum are generated entirely by the sun’s
actione generantur, absque principio action, without an active principle of
activo sui generis: sicut patet in their own genus; so it is with animals
animalibus generatis ex engendered by putrefaction. Now,
putrefactione. Intelligere autem est understanding is the noblest effect
nobilissimus effectus qui est in istis found in this world of lower things.
inferioribus. Non igitur sufficit ponere Therefore, it is not enough to ascribe
ad ipsum agens remotum, nisi etiam this effect to a remote agent, unless a
ponatur agens proximum. Haec proximate one is also assigned. This
tamen ratio contra Avicennam non argument, however, does not militate
procedit: nam ipse ponit omne animal against Avicenna, because he holds
posse generari absque semine. that any animal can be generated
without seed.
Adhuc. Intentio effectus demonstrat [14] Again, the effect intended reveals

agentem. Unde animalia generata ex the agent. Hence, animals engendered
putrefactione non sunt ex intentione by putrefaction are not intended by a
naturae inferioris, sed superioris lower nature, but only by a higher one,
tantum, quia producuntur ab agente because they are produced by a
superiori tantum: propter quod higher agent alone; for this reason
Aristoteles, in VII Metaph., dicit ea Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII [7]
fieri casu. Animalia autem quae fiunt that their production is fortuitous. On
ex semine, sunt ex intentione naturae the other hand, animals generated
superioris et inferioris. Hic autem from seed are intended both by the
effectus qui est abstrahere formas higher and the lower nature. Now, this
universales a phantasmatibus, est in effect which consists in abstracting
intentione nostra, non solum in universal forms from phantasms is
intentione agentis remoti. Igitur intended by us, and not merely by a
oportet in nobis ponere aliquod remote agent. Hence, there must exist
proximum principium talis effectus. in us a proximate principle of such an
Hoc autem est intellectus agens. Non effect; and this is the agent intellect,
est igitur substantia separata, sed which, therefore, is not a separate
aliqua virtus animae nostrae. substance but a power of our soul.
Item. In natura cuiuslibet moventis [15] And again, present in the nature of

est principium sufficiens ad every mover is a principle sufficient for
operationem naturalem eiusdem: et its natural operation. If this operation
si quidem operatio illa consistat in consists in an action, then the nature
actione, adest ei principium activum, contains an active principle; for
sicut patet de potentiis animae instance, the powers of the nutritive
nutritivae in plantis; si vero operatio soul of plants. But, if this operation is a
illa consistat in passione, adest ei passion, the nature contains a passive
principium passivum, sicut patet de principle, as appears in the sensitive
potentiis sensitivis in animalibus. powers of animals. Now, man is the
Homo autem est perfectissimus inter most perfect of all lower movers, and
omnia inferiora moventia. Eius autem his proper and natural operation is
propria et naturalis operatio est understanding, which is not
intelligere: quae non completur sine accomplished without a certain
passione quadam, inquantum passivity, in that the intellect is passive
intellectus patitur ab intelligibili; et to the intelligible; nor again, without
etiam sine actione, inquantum action, in that the intellect makes
intellectus facit intelligibilia in potentia things that are potentially intelligible to
esse intelligibilia in actu. Oportet be actually so. Therefore, the proper
igitur in natura hominis esse principles of both these operations
utriusque proprium principium scilicet must be in man’s nature, nor must
intellectum agentem et possibilem; et either of them have being in separation
neutrum secundum esse ab anima from his soul. And these principles are
hominis separatum esse. the agent and the possible intellects.
Adhuc. Si intellectus agens est [16] Also, if the agent intellect is a
quaedam substantia separata, separate substance, it is manifest that
manifestum est quod est supra it is above man’s nature. Now, an
naturam hominis. Operatio autem operation which man performs solely
quam homo exercet sola virtute by the power of a supernatural
alicuius supernaturalis substantiae, substance is a supernatural operation;
est operatio supernaturalis: ut for instance, the working of miracles,
miracula facere et prophetare, et alia prophesying, and other like things
huiusmodi quae divino munere which men do by God’s favor. Since
homines operantur. Cum igitur homo man cannot understand except by the
non possit intelligere nisi virtute power of the agent intellect,
intellectus agentis, si intellectus understanding will not be for man a
agens est quaedam substantia natural operation if the agent intellect
separata, sequetur quod intelligere is a separate substance. Nor in that
non sit operatio naturalis homini. Et case can man be defined as being
sic homo non poterit definiri per hoc intellectual or rational.
quod est intellectivus aut rationalis.
Praeterea. Nihil operatur nisi per [17] Furthermore, no thing operates
aliquam virtutem quae formaliter in except by virtue of a power formally in
ipso est: unde Aristoteles, in II de it. Hence, Aristotle in De anima II [2]
anima, ostendit quod quo vivimus et shows that the thing whereby we live
sentimus, est forma et actus. Sed and sense is a form and an act. Now,
utraque actio, scilicet intellectus both actions—of the agent intellect and
possibilis et intellectus agentis, of the possible intellect as well—are
convenit homini: homo enim abstrahit proper to man, since man abstracts
a phantasmatibus, et recipit mente from phantasms, and receives in his
intelligibilia in actu; non enim aliter in mind things actually intelligible. For,
notitiam harum actionum venissemus indeed, we should not have become
nisi eas in nobis experiremur. Oportet aware of these actions had we not

igitur quod principia quibus experienced them in ourselves. It
attribuuntur hae actiones, scilicet follows that the principles to which we
intellectus possibilis et agens, sint ascribe these actions, namely, the
virtutes quaedam in nobis formaliter possible and agent intellects, must be
existentes. powers formally existing in us.
Si autem dicatur quod hae actiones [18] And if it be argued that these
attribuuntur homini inquantum actions are attributed to man so far as
praedicti intellectus continuantur those intellects are in contact with us,
nobis, ut Averroes dicit, iam supra as Averroes claims, we refer to our
ostensum est quod continuatio previous proof that the possible
intellectus possibilis nobiscum, si sit intellect’s conjunction with us does not
quaedam substantia separata, suffice as a means of understanding
qualem ipse intelligit, non sufficit ad on our part, if, as Averroes maintains,
hoc quod per ipsum intelligamus. it is a separate substance. And,
Similiter etiam patet de intellectu clearly, the same thing is true of the
agente. Comparatur enim intellectus agent intellect. For the agent intellect
agens ad species intelligibiles stands in the same relation to the
receptas in intellectu possibili, sicut intelligible species received into the
ars ad formas artificiales quae per possible intellect as art to the artificial
artem ponuntur in materia: ut patet forms which it produces in matter, as
ex exemplo Aristotelis in III de anima. the example used by Aristotle in De
Formae autem artis non anima III [5] makes clear. But artforms
consequuntur actionem artis, sed are artistically inoperative, attaining
solum similitudinem formalem: unde only to a formal likeness, and that is
nec subiectum harum formarum why the subject of these forms cannot
potest per huiusmodi formas through them exercise the action of a
actionem artificis facere. Ergo nec maker. Therefore, neither can man
homo, per hoc quod sunt in ipso exercise the operation of the agent
species intelligibiles actu factae ab intellect through the presence in him of
intellectu agente, potest facere intelligible species made actual by the
operationem intellectus agentis. agent intellect.
Adhuc. Unumquodque quod non [19] Again, a thing that cannot initiate

potest exire in propriam operationem its proper operation without being
nisi per hoc quod movetur ab moved by an external principle is
exteriori principio, magis agitur ad moved to operate rather than moves
operandum quam seipsum agat. itself. Thus, irrational animals are
Unde animalia irrationalia magis moved to operate rather than move
aguntur ad operandum quam seipsa themselves, because every one of
agant, quia omnis operatio eorum their operations depends on an
dependet a principio extrinseco extrinsic principle which moves them.
movente: sensus enim, motus a For the sense, moved by an external
sensibili exteriori, imprimit in sensible object, places an impress
phantasiam, et sic per ordinem upon the imagination, thus giving rise
procedit in omnibus potentiis usque to an orderly process in all the powers,
ad motivas. Operatio autem propria down to the motive ones. Now, man’s
hominis est intelligere: cuius primum proper operation is understanding, and
principium est intellectus agens, qui of this the primary principle is the
facit species intelligibiles, a quibus agent intellect, which makes species

patitur quodammodo intellectus intelligible, to which species the
possibilis, qui factus in actu, movet possible intellect in a certain manner is
voluntatem. Si igitur intellectus agens passive; and the possible intellect,
est quaedam substantia extra having been actualized, moves the
hominem, tota operatio hominis will. Therefore, if the agent intellect is a
dependet a principio extrinseco. Non substance outside man, all man’s
igitur erit homo agens seipsum, sed operation depends on an extrinsic
actus ab alio. Et sic non erit dominus principle. Man, then, will not act
suarum operationum; nec merebitur autonomously, but will be activated by
laudem aut vituperium; et peribit tota another. So, he will not be master of
scientia moralis et conversatio his own operations, nor will he merit
politica; quod est inconveniens. Non either praise or blame. All moral
est igitur intellectus agens substantia science and social intercourse thus will
separata ab homine. perish; which is unfitting. Therefore,
the agent intellect is not a substance
separate from man.
Caput 77 Chapter 77
Quod non est impossibile THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR
intellectum possibilem et agentem THE POSSIBLE AND AGENT
in una substantia animae convenire INTELLECT TO EXIST TOGETHER IN
THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL
Videbitur autem forsan alicui hoc [1] Perhaps someone will think it
esse impossibile, quod una et impossible for one and the same
eadem substantia, scilicet nostrae substance, namely, that of our soul, to
animae, sit in potentia ad omnia be in potentiality to all intelligibles, as
intelligibilia, quod pertinet ad becomes the possible intellect, and to
intellectum possibilem, et faciat ea actualize them, as becomes the agent
actu, quod est intellectus agentis: intellect. For nothing acts so far as it is
cum nihil agat secundum quod est in potentiality, but so far as it is in act.
in potentia, sed secundum quod est That is why it will seem impossible for
actu. Unde non videbitur quod the agent and possible intellect to exist
agens et possibilis intellectus concurrently in the one substance of the
possint in una substantia animae soul.
convenire.
Si quis autem recte inspiciat, nihil [2] Upon close examination, however, it

inconveniens aut difficile sequitur. is seen that this concurrence entails
Nihil enim prohibet hoc respectu nothing incongruous or difficult. For
illius esse secundum quid in nothing prevents one thing from being in
potentia et secundum aliud in actu, one respect potential in relation to some
sicut in rebus naturalibus videmus: other thing, and actual in another
aer enim est actu humidus et respect, as we observe in things of
potentia siccus, terra autem e nature; air is actually damp and
converso. Haec autem comparatio potentially dry, and the reverse is true of

invenitur esse inter animam earth. Now, this same interrelationship
intellectivam et phantasmata. Habet obtains between the intellective soul
enim anima intellectiva aliquid in and the phantasms. For the intellective
actu ad quod phantasma est in soul has something actual to which the
potentia: et ad aliquid est in potentia phantasm is potential, and is potential to
quod in phantasmatibus actu something present actually in the
invenitur. Habet enim substantia phantasm; since the substance of the
animae humanae immaterialitatem, human soul is possessed of
et, sicut ex dictis patet, ex hoc immateriality, and, as is clear from what
habet naturam intellectualem: quia has been said, it therefore has an
omnis substantia immaterialis est intellectual nature—every immaterial
huiusmodi. Ex hoc autem nondum substance being of this kind. But this
habet quod assimiletur huic vel illi does not mean that the soul is now
rei determinate, quod requiritur ad likened to this or that determinate thing,
hoc quod anima nostra hanc vel as it must be in order to know this or
illam rem determinate cognoscat: that thing determinately; for all
omnis enim cognitio fit secundum knowledge is brought about by the
similitudinem cogniti in likeness of the thing known being
cognoscente. Remanet igitur ipsa present in the knower. Thus, the
anima intellectiva in potentia ad intellectual soul itself remains potential
determinatas similitudines rerum with respect to the determinate
cognoscibilium a nobis, quae sunt likenesses of things that can be known
naturae rerum sensibilium. Et has by us, namely, the natures of sensible
quidem determinatas naturas rerum things. It is the phantasms which
sensibilium praesentant nobis present these determinate sensible
phantasmata. Quae tamen nondum natures to us. But these phantasms
pervenerunt ad esse intelligibile: have not yet acquired intelligible
cum sint similitudines rerum actuality, since they are likenesses of
sensibilium etiam secundum sensible things even as to material
conditiones materiales, quae sunt conditions, which are the individual
proprietates individuales, et sunt properties, and, moreover, the
etiam in organis materialibus. Non phantasms exist in material organs.
igitur sunt intelligibilia actu. Et Consequently, they are not actually
tamen, quia in hoc homine cuius intelligible. They are, however,
similitudinem repraesentant potentially intelligible, since in the
phantasmata, est accipere naturam individual man whose likeness the
universalem denudatam ab phantasms reflect it is possible to
omnibus conditionibus receive the universal nature stripped of
individuantibus, sunt intelligibilia in all individuating conditions. And so, the
potentia. Sic igitur habent phantasms have intelligibility potentially,
intelligibilitatem in potentia, while being actually determinate as
determinationem autem similitudinis likenesses of things. In the intellective
rerum in actu. E contrario autem soul the opposite was the case. Hence,
erat in anima intellectiva. Est igitur there is in that soul an active power vis
in anima intellectiva virtus activa in àvis the phantasms, making them
phantasmata, faciens ea intelligibilia actually intelligible; and this power is
actu: et haec potentia animae called the agent intellect; while there is
vocatur intellectus agens. Est etiam also in the soul a power that is in
in ea virtus quae est in potentia ad potentiality to the determinate
determinatas similitudines rerum likenesses of sensible things; and this

sensibilium: et haec est potentia power is the possible intellect.
Differt tamen hoc quod invenitur in [3] That which exists in the soul,
anima, ab eo quod invenitur in however, differs from what is found in
agentibus naturalibus. Quia ibi natural agents. For in the latter, one
unum est in potentia ad aliquid thing is in potentiality to something
secundum eundem modum quo in according to the same manner of being
altero actu invenitur: nam materia as that of its actual presence in
aeris est in potentia ad formam something else; the matter of air is in
aquae eo modo quo est in aqua. Et potentiality to the form of water in the
ideo corpora naturalia, quae same way as it is in water. That is why
communicant in materia, eodem natural bodies, which have matter in
ordine agunt et patiuntur ad common, are mutually active and
invicem. Anima autem intellectiva passive in the same order. On the other
non est in potentia ad similitudines hand, the intellective soul is not in
rerum quae sunt in phantasmatibus potentiality to the likenesses of things in
per modum illum quo sunt ibi: sed the phantasms, according to the mode
secundum quod illae similitudines of their presence therein, but according
elevantur ad aliquid altius, ut scilicet as they are raised to a higher level by
sint abstractae a conditionibus abstraction from material individuating
individuantibus materialibus, ex quo conditions, thus being made actually
fiunt intelligibiles actu. Et ideo actio intelligible. The action of the agent
intellectus agentis in phantasmate intellect on the phantasm, therefore,
praecedit receptionem intellectus precedes the reception by the possible
possibilis. Et sic principalitas intellect, so that operational primacy
actionis non attribuitur here is ascribed not to the phantasms,
phantasmatibus, sed intellectui but to the agent intellect. And for this
agenti. Propter quod Aristoteles reason Aristotle says that the agent
dicit quod se habet ad possibilem intellect is related to the possible
sicut ars ad materiam. intellect as art to its matter.
Huius autem exemplum omnino [4] A quite similar case would be that of

simile esset si oculus, simul cum the eye, if, being transparent and
hoc quod est diaphanum et receptive of colors, it were endowed
susceptivus colorum, haberet with sufficient light to make colors
tantum de luce quod posset colores actually visible; even as certain animals
facere visibiles actu: sicut quaedam are said to illuminate objects for
animalia dicuntur sui oculi luce themselves by the light of their own
sufficienter sibi illuminare obiecta; eyes, and so they see more at night and
propter quod de nocte vident magis, less by day, for their eyes are weak,
in die vero minus; sunt enim being activated by a dim light and
debilium oculorum, quia parva luce confused by a strong one. There is
moventur, ad multam autem something comparable to this in our
confunduntur. Cui etiam simile est in intellect, which, “as regards things
intellectu nostro quod ad ea quae which are most evident of all, is as the
sunt manifestissima, se habet sicut eyes of the owl to the blaze of day”; so
oculus noctuae ad solem: unde that the little intelligible light which is
parvum lumen intelligibile quod est connatural to us suffices for our act of
nobis connaturale, sufficit ad understanding.

nostrum intelligere.
Quod autem lumen intelligibile [5] It is clear that the intelligible light
nostrae animae connaturale sufficiat connatural to our soul suffices to cause
ad faciendum actionem intellectus the action of the agent intellect, if one
agentis, patet si quis consideret considers the necessity of affirming the
necessitatem ponendi intellectum existence of the agent intellect. For the
agentem. Inveniebatur enim anima soul was found to be in potentiality to
in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut intelligible things, as the senses are to
sensus ad sensibilia: sicut enim non sensible things; since, just as we do not
semper sentimus, ita non semper always sense, so neither do we always
intelligimus. Haec autem intelligibilia understand. Now, these intelligibles
quae anima intellectiva humana which the human intellective soul
intelligit, Plato posuit esse understands were asserted by Plato to
intelligibilia per seipsa, scilicet be intelligible of themselves, namely,
ideas: unde non erat ei Ideas, so that in his doctrine there was
necessarium ponere intellectum no necessity of an agent intellect: an
agentem ad intelligibilia. Si autem intellect having an active role with
hoc esset verum, oporteret quod, respect to intelligibles. But, if this
quanto aliqua sunt secundum se doctrine were true, it would follow
magis intelligibilia, magis necessarily that the more intelligible in
intelligerentur a nobis. Quod patet their own nature things are, the greater
esse falsum: nam magis sunt nobis would be our understanding of them;
intelligibilia quae sunt sensui which is manifestly false. For the nearer
proximiora, quae in se sunt minus things are to our senses, the more
intelligibilia. Unde Aristoteles fuit intelligible they are to us, though in
motus ad ponendum quod ea quae themselves they are less intelligible.
sunt nobis intelligibilia, non sunt That is why Aristotle was impelled to
aliqua existentia intelligibilia per maintain that those things which are
seipsa, sed quod fiunt ex intelligible to us are not existing entities
sensibilibus. Unde oportuit quod intelligible in themselves, but are made
poneret virtutem quae hoc faceret. intelligible from sensibles. Aristotle,
Et haec est intellectus agens. Ad therefore, saw the necessity of
hoc ergo ponitur intellectus agens, admitting a power capable of doing this,
ut faceret intelligibilia nobis namely, the agent intellect. So, the
proportionata. Hoc autem non function of that intellect is to make
excedit modum luminis intelligibilis intelligibles proportionate to our minds.
nobis connaturalis. Unde nihil Now, the mode of intellectual light
prohibet ipsi lumini nostrae animae connatural to us is not unequal to the
attribuere actionem intellectus performance of this function. Nothing,
agentis: et praecipue cum therefore, stands in the way of our
Aristoteles intellectum agentem ascribing the action of the agent intellect
comparet lumini. to the light of our soul, and especially
since Aristotle compares the agent
intellect to a light.
Caput 78 Chapter 78
Quod non fuit sententia THAT ARISTOTLE HELD NOT THAT THE
Aristotelis de intellectu agente AGENT INTELLECT IS A SEPARATE
quod sit substantia separata, sed SUBSTANCE, BUT THAT IT IS A PART
magis quod sit aliquid animae OF THE SOUL
Quia vero plures opinioni supra [1] Now, since a number of persons agree

positae assentiunt credentes with the Avicennian theory dealt with
eam fuisse opinionem Aristotelis above, in the belief that it is the position of
ostendendum est ex verbis eius Aristotle, we must show from his own
quod ipse hoc non sensit de words that in his judgment the agent
intellectu agente, quod sit intellect is not a separate substance.
substantia separata.
Dicit enim, primo, quod, sicut in [2] For Aristotle says [De anima III, 5] that

omni natura est aliquid quasi in “every nature we find two factors, the
materia in unoquoque genere, et one material, which, like the matter in
hoc est in potentia ad omnia every genus, is in potentiality to all the
quae sunt illius generis; et altera things contained under it, the other causal,
causa est quasi efficiens, quod which, like the efficient cause, produces all
facit omnia quae sunt illius the things of a given genus, the latter factor
generis, sicut se habet ars ad standing to the former as art to its matter”;
materiam: necesse est et in and therefore, Aristotle concludes, “these
anima esse has differentias. Et two factors must likewise be found within
huiusmodi quidem, scilicet quod the soul.” The quasimaterial principle in
in anima est sicut materia, est the soul is “the (possible) intellect wherein
intellectus (possibilis) in quo fiunt all things become intelligible”; the other
omnia intelligibilia. Ille vero, qui principle, having the role of efficient cause
in anima est sicut efficiens in the soul, “is the intellect by which all
causa, est intellectus in quo est things are made” (namely, actually
omnia facere (scilicet intelligibilia intelligible), and this is the agent intellect,
in actu), idest intellectus agens, “which is like a habit,” and not a power.
qui est sicut habitus, et non sicut Aristotle explains what he means by calling
potentia. Qualiter autem dixerit the agent intellect a habit, when he goes
intellectum agentem habitum, on to speak of it as a kind of light, for “in a
exponit subiungens quod est certain way light makes potential colors to
sicut lumen: quodam enim modo be colors actually,” that is to say, so far as
lumen facit potentia colores esse it makes them actually visible. And this
actu colores, inquantum scilicet function in regard to intelligibles is
facit eos visibiles actu: hoc attributed to the agent intellect.
autem circa intelligibilia attribuitur
intellectui agenti.
Ex his manifeste habetur quod [3] These considerations clearly imply that
intellectus agens non sit the agent intellect is not a separate
substantia separata, sed magis substance, but, rather, a part of the soul;
aliquid animae: expresse enim for Aristotle says explicitly that the possible
dicit quod intellectus possibilis et and agent intellects are differences of the
agens sunt differentiae animae, soul, and that they are in the soul.
et quod sunt in anima. Neutra Therefore, neither of them is a separate
ergo earum est substantia substance.
separata.
Adhuc. Ratio eius hoc idem [4] Aristotle’s reasoning also proves the
ostendit. Quia in omni natura in same point. For in every nature containing
qua invenitur potentia et actus, potentiality and act we find something
est aliquid quasi materia, quod which, having the character of matter, is in
est in potentia ad ea quae sunt potentiality to the things of that genus, and
illius generis, et aliquid quasi something in the role of an efficient cause
agens, quod reducit potentiam in which actualizes the potentiality; similarly,
actum, sicut in artificialibus est in the products of art there is art and
ars et materia. Sed anima matter. But the intellective soul is a nature
intellectiva est quaedam natura in which we find potentiality and act, since
in qua invenitur potentia et actus: sometimes it is actually understanding, and
cum quandoque sit actu sometimes potentially. Consequently, in the
intelligens et quandoque in nature of the intellective soul there is
potentia. Est igitur in natura something having the character of matter,
animae intellectivae aliquid quasi which is in potentiality to all intelligibles—
materia, quod est in potentia ad and this is called the possible intellect; and
omnia intelligibilia, quod dicitur there also is something which, in the
intellectus possibilis: et aliquid capacity of an efficient cause, makes all in
quasi causa efficiens, quod facit act— and this is called the agent intellect.
omnia in actu, et dicitur Therefore, both intellects, on Aristotle’s
intellectus agens. Uterque igitur showing, are within the nature of the soul,
intellectus, secundum and have no being separate from the body
demonstrationem Aristotelis, est of which the soul is the act.
in natura animae, et non aliquid
separatum secundum esse a
corpore cuius anima est actus.
Amplius. Aristoteles dicit quod [5] Aristotle says, moreover, that the agent

intellectus agens est sicut intellect is a sort of habit like light. Now, by
habitus quod est lumen. Habitus a habit we mean, not something existing by
autem non significatur ut aliquid itself, but something belonging to one who
per se existens, sed alicuius has it. Therefore, the agent intellect is not a
habentis. Non est igitur substance existing separately by itself, but
intellectus agens aliqua is part of the human soul.
substantia separatim per se
existens, sed est aliquid animae
humanae.
Non autem intelligitur littera [6] Yet, what this Aristotelian phrase means

Aristotelis ut habitus dicatur esse is not that the effect produced by the agent
effectus intellectus agentis, ut sit intellect may be called a habit, as though
sensus: agens facit hominem the sense were that the agent intellect
intelligere omnia, quod est sicut makes man to understand all things, and
habitus. Haec enim est definitio this effect is like a habit. “For the essence
habitus, ut Commentator of habit,” as the Commentator, Averroes,
Averroes ibidem dicit, quod says on this very text, “consists in this, that

habens habitum intelligat per its possessor understands by means of
ipsum quod est sibi proprium ex that which is proper to him—understands
se et quando voluerit, absque by himself and whenever he wills, with no
hoc quod indigeat in eo aliquo need of anything extrinsic”; since Averroes
extrinseco. Expresse enim explicitly likens to a habit, not the effect
assimilat habitui non ipsum itself, but “the intellect by which we make
factum, sed intellectum quo est all things.”
omnia facere.
Nec tamen intelligendum est [7] Nevertheless, the agent intellect is not
quod intellectus agens sit habitus to be thought of as a habit such as we find
per modum quo habitus est in in the second species of quality and in
secunda specie qualitatis, reference to which some have said that the
secundum quod quidam dixerunt agent intellect is the habit of principles. For
intellectum agentem esse this habit of principles is derived from
habitum principiorum. Quia sensible things, as Aristotle proves in
habitus ille principiorum est Posterior Analytics II [19]; and thus it must
acceptus a sensibilibus, ut be the effect of the agent intellect, whose
probat Aristoteles in II function is to make actually understood the
posteriorum: et sic oportet quod phantasms, which are potentially
sit effectus intellectus agentis, understood. Now, the meaning of habit is
cuius est phantasmata, quae grasped in terms of its distinction from
sunt intellecta in potentia, facere privation and potentiality; thus, every form
intellecta in actu. Sed accipitur and act can be called a habit. This is
habitus secundum quod dividitur clearly what Aristotle has in mind, because
contra privationem et potentiam: he says that the agent intellect is a habit in
sicut omnis forma et actus potest the same way as “light is a habit.”
dici habitus. Et hoc apparet, quia
dicit hoc modo intellectum
agentem esse habitum sicut
lumen habitus est.
Deinde subiungit, quod hic [8] Now, Aristotle goes on to say, that this
intellectus, scilicet agens, est intellect, namely, the agent intellect is
separatus et immixtus et separate, unmixed, impassible, and an
impassibilis et substantia actu actually existing substance. And of these
ens. Horum autem quatuor quae four perfections attributed to that intellect,
attribuit intellectui agenti, duo Aristotle had previously ascribed two to the
supra expresse de intellectu possible intellect, namely, freedom from
possibili dixerat, scilicet quod sit admixture and separate existence. The
immixtus et quod sit separatus. third—impassibility—he had applied to it in
Tertium, scilicet quod sit showing the distinction between the
impassibilis, sub distinctione impassibility of the senses and that of the
dixerat: ostendit enim primo possible intellect, pointing out that if
quod non est passibilis sicut passivity be taken broadly, the possible
sensus; et postmodum ostendit intellect is passive so far as it is in
quod, communiter accipiendo potentiality to intelligibles. The fourth
pati, passibilis est, inquantum perfection—substantial actuality—Aristotle
scilicet est in potentia ad simply denies of the possible intellect,
intelligibilia. Quartum vero saying that it was “in potentiality to

omnino negaverat de intellectu intelligibles, and none of these things was
possibili, dicendo quod erat in actual before the act of understanding.”
potentia ad intelligibilia, et nihil Thus, the possible intellect shares the first
horum erat actu ante intelligere. two perfections with the agent intellect; in
Sic igitur in duobus primis the third it agrees partly, and partly differs;
intellectus possibilis convenit but in the fourth the agent intellect differs
cum agente; in tertio partim altogether from the possible intellect.
convenit et partim differt; in Aristotle goes on to prove in a single
quarto autem omnino differt arguments that these four perfections
agens a possibili. Has quatuor belong to the agent intellect: “For always
conditiones agentis probat per the agent is superior to the patient, and the
unam rationem, subiungens: (active) principle to the matter.” For he had
semper enim honorabilius est already said that the agent intellect is like
agens patiente, et principium, an efficient cause, and the possible
scilicet activum, materia. Supra intellect like matter. Now, through this
enim dixerat quod intellectus proposition, as a demonstrative mean, the
agens est sicut causa efficiens, first two perfections are inferred as follows:
et possibilis sicut materia. Per “The agent is superior to the patient and to
hoc autem medium concluduntur matter. But the possible intellect, which is
duo prima, sic: agens est as patient and matter, is separate and
honorabilius patiente et materia. unmixed, as was proved before. Much
Sed possibilis, qui est sicut more, therefore, is the agent possessed of
patiens et materia, est separatus these perfections.” The other perfections
et immixtus, ut supra probatum are inferred through this middle
est. Ergo multo magis agens. proposition, as follows: “The agent is
Alia vero per hoc medium sic superior to the patient and to matter by
concluduntur: agens in hoc est being compared to the latter as an agent
honorabilius patiente et materia, and an actual being to a patient and a
quod comparatur ad ipsum sicut potential being. But the possible intellect is,
agens et actu ens ad patiens et in a certain way, a patient and a potential
ens in potentia. Intellectus autem being. Therefore, the agent intellect is a
possibilis est patiens nonpassive agent and an actual being.”
quodammodo et potentia ens. Now, from those words of Aristotle, it
Intellectus igitur agens est agens evidently cannot be inferred that the agent
non patiens, et actu ens. Patet intellect is a separate substance; rather,
autem quod nec ex his verbis that it is separate in the same sense of the
Aristotelis haberi potest quod term as he had previously applied to the
intellectus agens sit quaedam possible intellect, namely, as not having an
substantia separata: sed quod sit organ. Aristotle’s statement that the agent
separatus hoc modo quo supra intellect is an actual substantial being is not
dixit de possibili, scilicet ut non incompatible with the fact that the
habeat organum. Quod autem substance of the soul is in potentiality, as
dicit quod est substantia actu was shown above.
ens, non repugnat ei quod
substantia animae est in
potentia, ut supra ostensum est.
Deinde subiungit: idem autem [9] The Philosopher goes on to say that
est secundum actum scientia rei. actual knowledge is identical with its

In quo Commentator dicit quod object. On this text the Commentator
differt intellectus agens a remarks” that the agent intellect differs
possibili: nam in intellectu agente from the possible, because that which
idem est intelligens et understands and that which is understood
intellectum; non autem in are the same in the agent intellect, but not
possibili. Hoc autem manifeste in the possible intellect. But this clearly is
est contra intentionem Aristotelis. contrary to Aristotle’s meaning. For
Nam supra eadem verba dixerat Aristotle had used the same words before
de intellectu possibili, ubi dixit de in speaking of the possible intellect,
intellectu possibili quod ipse namely, that “it is intelligible in precisely the
intelligibilis est sicut intelligibilia: same way as its objects are; since in things
in his enim quae sine materia devoid of matter, the intellect and that
sunt, idem est intellectus et quod which is understood are the same; for
intelligitur; scientia namque speculative knowledge and its object are
speculativa, et quod speculatum identical.” For he plainly wishes to show
est, idem est. Manifeste enim per that the possible intellect is understood as
hoc quod intellectus possibilis, are other intelligible objects, from the fact
prout est actu intelligens, idem that the possible intellect, so far as it is
est cum eo quod intelligitur, vult actually understanding, is identical with
ostendere quod intellectus that which is understood. Moreover,
possibilis intelligitur sicut alia Aristotle had remarked a little before that
intelligibilia. Et parum supra the possible intellect “is in a sense
dixerat quod intellectus possibilis potentially whatever is intelligible, though
est potentia quodammodo actually it is nothing until it has exercized
intelligibilia, sed nihil actu est its power of understanding”; and here he
antequam intelligat: ubi expresse explicitly gives us to understand that, by
dat intelligere quod per hoc quod actually knowing, the possible intellect
intelligit actu, fit ipsa intelligibilia. becomes its objects. Nor is it surprising
Nec est mirum si hoc dicit de that he should say this of the possible
intellectu possibili: quia hoc intellect, since he had already said the
etiam supra dixerat de sensu et same thing about sense and the sensible
sensibili secundum actum. object in act. For the sense is actualized by
Sensus enim fit actu per speciem the species actually sensed and, similarly,
sensatam in actu; et similiter the possible intellect is actualized through
intellectus possibilis fit actu per the intelligible species in act; and for this
speciem intelligibilem actu; et reason the intellect in act is said to be the
hac ratione intellectus in actu very intelligible object itself in act. We must
dicitur ipsum intelligibile in actu. therefore say that Aristotle, having
Est igitur dicendum quod, definitively treated of the possible and
postquam Aristoteles agent intellects, here begins his treatment
determinavit de intellectu of the intellect in act, when he says that
possibili et agente, hic incipit actual knowledge is identical with the thing
determinare de intellectu in actu, actually known.
dicens quod scientia in actu est
idem rei scitae in actu.
Deinde dicit: qui vero secundum [10] Continuing, Aristotle states: “Although

potentiam, tempore prior in uno in the individual, potential knowledge is in
est: omnino autem, neque in time prior to actual knowledge, it is not
tempore. Qua quidem altogether prior even in time.” Indeed, in

distinctione inter potentiam et several places he employs this distinction
actum in pluribus locis utitur: between potentiality and act, namely, that
scilicet quod actus secundum act is in its nature prior to potentiality, but
naturam est prior potentia; that in time, potentiality precedes act in
tempore vero, in uno et eodem one and the same thing that is changed
quod mutatur de potentia in from potentiality to act; and yet, absolutely
actum, est prior potentia actu; speaking, potentiality is not even
simpliciter vero loquendo, non temporally prior to act, since it is only by an
est potentia etiam tempore prior act that a potentiality is reduced to act.
actu, quia potentia non reducitur That is why Aristotle says that the intellect
in actum nisi per actum. Dicit which is in potency, namely, the possible
ergo quod intellectus qui est intellect so far as it is in potency, is
secundum potentiam, scilicet temporally prior to the intellect in act—and
possibilis, prout est in potentia, this, I say, in one and the same subject.
prior est tempore quam Aristotle, however, adds: but not altogether,
intellectus in actu: et hoc dico in that is to say, not universally; because the
uno et eodem. Non tamen possible intellect is reduced to act by the
omnino, idest universaliter: quia agent intellect, which again is in act, as he
intellectus possibilis reducitur in said, through some possible intellect
actum per intellectum agentem, brought into act; thus, Aristotle remarked in
qui est actu, ut dixit, et iterum per Physics III [3] that, before learning, a
aliquem intellectum possibilem person needs a teacher, that he may be
factum actu; unde dixit in III brought from potency to act. In these
Physic., quod ante addiscere words, then, Aristotle explains the
indiget aliquis docente ut relationship which the possible intellect, as
reducatur de potentia in actum. potential, bears to the intellect in act.
Sic igitur in verbis istis ostendit
ordinem intellectus possibilis,
prout est in potentia, ad
intellectum in actu.
Deinde dicit: sed non aliquando [11] Aristotle then declares: But it is not at

quidem intelligit, et aliquando one time understanding and at another not,
non intelligit. In quo ostendit thus indicating the difference between the
differentiam intellectus in actu et intellect in act and the possible intellect.
intellectus possibilis. Supra enim For he had said earlier that the possible
dixit de intellectu possibili quod intellect is not perpetually understanding,
non semper intelligit, sed but sometimes is not actually
quandoque non intelligit, quando understanding, namely, when it is in
est in potentia ad intelligibilia; potentiality to intelligibles, and sometimes
quandoque intelligit, quando is actually understanding, namely, when it
scilicet est actu ipsa. Intellectus is actually identified with them. Now, the
autem per hoc fit actu quod est intellect becomes in act by the fact that it is
ipsa intelligibilia, ut iam dixit. the intelligibles themselves, as he had
Unde non competit ei quandoque already said. Hence, it does not pertain to
intelligere et quandoque non the intellect to understand sometimes and
intelligere. sometimes not to understand.
Deinde subiungit: separatum [12] The Philosopher thereupon adds: That

autem hoc solum quod vere est. alone is separate which truly is. This
Quod non potest intelligi de remark cannot apply to the agent intellect,
agente: non enim ipse solus est since it alone is not separate, for he had
separatus; quia iam idem dixerat already spoken of the possible intellect as
de intellectu possibili. Nec potest being separate. Nor can that statement be
intelligi de possibili: quia iam understood to refer to the possible intellect,
idem dixerat de agente. since Aristotle had already said the same
Relinquitur ergo quod dicatur de thing concerning the agent intellect. It
eo quod comprehendit utrumque, remains that the above remark applies to
scilicet de intellectu in actu, de that which includes both intellects, namely,
quo loquebatur: quia hoc solum to the intellect in act, of which he was
in anima nostra est separatum, speaking; because that alone in our soul
non utens organo, quod pertinet which belongs to the intellect in act is
ad intellectum in actu; idest, illa separate and uses no organ; I mean that
pars animae qua intelligimus part of the soul whereby we understand
actu, comprehendens possibilem actually and which includes the possible
et agentem. Et ideo subiungit and agent intellect. And that is why
quod hoc solum animae est Aristotle goes on to say that this part of the
immortale et perpetuum: quasi a soul alone is immortal and everlasting, as
corpore non dependens, cum sit being independent of the body in virtue of
separatum. its separateness.
Caput 79 Chapter 79
Quod anima humana, corrupto THAT THE HUMAN SOUL DOES NOT
corpore, non corrumpitur PERISH WHEN THE BODY IS
CORRUPTED
Ex praemissis igitur manifeste [1] From what has been said, therefore, it

ostendi potest animam humanam can be clearly shown that the human soul
non corrumpi, corrupto corpore. is not corrupted when the body is
corrupted.
Ostensum est enim supra omnem [2] For it was proved above that every

substantiam intellectualem esse intellectual substance is incorruptible. But
incorruptibilem. Anima autem man’s soul is an intellectual substance, as
hominis est quaedam substantia was shown. It therefore follows that the
intellectualis, ut ostensum est. human soul is incorruptible.
Oportet igitur animam humanam
incorruptibilem esse.
Adhuc. Nulla res corrumpitur ex [3] Again, no thing is corrupted with
eo in quo consistit sua perfectio: respect to that wherein its perfection
hae enim mutationes sunt consists, for mutations in regard to
contrariae, scilicet ad perfection and corruption are contrary to
perfectionem et corruptionem. one another. The perfection of the human
Perfectio autem animae humanae soul, however, consists in a certain
consistit in abstractione quadam a abstraction from the body. For the soul is
corpore. Perficitur enim anima perfected by knowledge and virtue, and it
scientia et virtute: secundum is perfected in knowledge the more it
scientiam autem tanto magis considers immaterial things, the
perficitur quanto magis perfection of virtue consisting in man’s not
immaterialia considerat; virtutis submitting to the passions of the body,
autem perfectio consistit in hoc but moderating and controlling them in
quod homo corporis passiones accordance with reason. Consequently,
non sequatur, sed eas secundum the soul is not corrupted by being
rationem temperet et refraenet. separated from the body.
Non ergo corruptio animae
consistit in hoc quod a corpore
separetur.
Si autem dicatur quod perfectio [4] Now, it may be said that the soul’s
animae consistit in separatione perfection lies in its operational
eius a corpore secundum separation from the body, and its
operationem, corruptio autem in corruption in its existential separation
separatione secundum esse, non therefrom. Such an argument misses the
convenienter obviatur. Operatio mark, for a thing’s operation manifests its
enim rei demonstrat substantiam substance and its being, since a thing
et esse ipsius: quia unumquodque operates according as it is a being, and
operatur secundum quod est ens, its proper operation follows upon its
et propria operatio rei sequitur proper nature. The operation of a thing,
propriam ipsius naturam. Non therefore, can be perfected only so far as
potest igitur perfici operatio its substance is perfected. Thus, if the
alicuius rei nisi secundum quod soul, in leaving the body, is perfected
perficitur eius substantia. Si igitur operationally, its incorporeal substance
anima secundum operationem will not fail in its being through separation
suam perficitur in relinquendo from the body.
corpus, incorporea substantia sua
in esse suo non deficiet per hoc
quod a corpore separatur.
Item. Proprium perfectivum [5] Likewise, that which properly perfects

hominis secundum animam est the soul of man is something
aliquid incorruptibile. Propria enim incorruptible; for the proper operation of
operatio hominis, inquantum man, as man, is understanding, since it is
huiusmodi, est intelligere: per in this that he differs from brutes, plants,
hanc enim differt a brutis et plantis and inanimate things. Now, it properly
et inanimatis. Intelligere autem pertains to this act to apprehend objects
universalium est et universal and incorruptible as such. But
incorruptibilium inquantum perfections must be proportionate to
huiusmodi. Perfectiones autem things perfectible. Therefore, the human
oportet esse perfectibilibus soul is incorruptible.
proportionatas. Ergo anima
humana est incorruptibilis.
Amplius. Impossibile est [6] Moreover, it is impossible that natural
appetitum naturalem esse frustra. appetite should be in vain. But man
Sed homo naturaliter appetit naturally desires to exist forever. This is
perpetuo manere. Quod patet ex evidenced by the fact that being is that
hoc quod esse est quod ab which all desire; and man by his intellect
omnibus appetitur: homo autem apprehends being not merely in the
per intellectum apprehendit esse present, as brute animals do, but
non solum ut nunc, sicut bruta unqualifiedly. Therefore, man attains
animalia, sed simpliciter. perpetual existence as regards his soul,
Consequitur ergo homo whereby he apprehends being
perpetuitatem secundum animam, unqualifiedly and in respect of every time.
qua esse simpliciter et secundum
omne tempus apprehendit.
Item. Unumquodque quod [7] Also, the reception of one thing in
recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo another accords with the recipient’s
secundum modum eius in quo est. manner of being. But the forms of things
Formae autem rerum recipiuntur are received in the possible intellect
in intellectu possibili prout sunt according as they are actually intelligible;
intelligibiles actu. Sunt autem and they are actually intelligible according
intelligibiles actu prout sunt as they are immaterial, universal, and
immateriales, universales, et per consequently incorruptible. Therefore, the
consequens incorruptibiles. Ergo possible intellect is incorruptible. The
intellectus possibilis est possible intellect, however, is part of the
incorruptibilis. Sed, sicut supra est human soul, as we proved above. Hence,
probatum, intellectus possibilis est the human soul is incorruptible.
aliquid animae humanae. Est
igitur anima humana
incorruptibilis.
Adhuc. Esse intelligibile est [8] Then, too, intelligible being is more
permanentius quam esse permanent than sensible being. But in
sensibile. Sed id quod se habet in sensible things that which has the role of
rebus sensibilibus per modum first recipient, namely, prime matter, is
primi recipientis, est incorruptibile incorruptible in its substance; much more
secundum suam substantiam, so, therefore, is the possible intellect,
scilicet materia prima. Multo igitur which is receptive of intelligible forms.
fortius intellectus possibilis, qui est Therefore, the human soul, of which the
receptivus formarum possible intellect is a part, is also
intelligibilium. Ergo et anima incorruptible.
humana, cuius intellectus
possibilis est pars, est
incorruptibilis.
Amplius. Faciens est honorabilius [9] Moreover, the maker is superior to the

facto: ut etiam Aristoteles dicit. thing made, as Aristotle says. But the
Sed intellectus agens facit actu agent intellect actualizes intelligibles, as
intelligibilia: ut ex praemissis was shown above. Therefore, since
patet. Cum igitur intelligibilia actu, intelligibles in act, as such, are
inquantum huiusmodi, sint incorruptible, much more will the agent

incorruptibilia, multo fortius intellect be incorruptible. So, too, then, is
intellectus agens erit the human soul, whose light is the agent
incorruptibilis. Ergo et anima intellect, as we have previously made
humana, cuius lumen est clear.
intellectus agens, ut ex praemissis
patet.
Item. Nulla forma corrumpitur nisi [10] Again, a form is corrupted by three
vel ex actione contrarii, vel per things only: the action of its contrary, the
corruptionem sui subiecti, vel per corruption of its subject, the failure of its
defectum suae causae: per cause; by the action of a contrary, as
actionem quidem contrarii, sicut when beat is destroyed by the action of
calor destruitur per actionem cold; by the corruption of its subject, as
frigidi; per corruptionem autem sui when the power of sight is destroyed
subiecti, sicut, destructo oculo through the destruction of the eye; by the
destruitur vis visiva; per defectum failure of its cause, as when the air’s
autem causae, sicut lumen aeris illumination fails through the failure of its
deficit deficiente solis praesentia, cause, the sun, to be present. But the
quae erat ipsius causa. Sed human soul cannot be corrupted by the
anima humana non potest action of a contrary, for nothing is contrary
corrumpi per actionem contrarii: to it; since, through the possible intellect,
non est enim ei aliquid contrarium; it is cognizant and receptive of all
cum per intellectum possibilem contraries. Nor can the human soul be
ipsa sit cognoscitiva et receptiva destroyed through the corruption of its
omnium contrariorum. Similiter subject, for we have already shown that it
autem neque per corruptionem sui is a form independent of the body in its
subiecti: ostensum est enim supra being. Nor, again, can the soul be
quod anima humana est forma destroyed through the failure of its cause,
non dependens a corpore since it can have no cause except an
secundum suum esse. Similiter eternal one, as we shall prove later on.
autem neque per deficientiam Therefore, in no way can the human soul
suae causae: quia non potest be corrupted.
habere aliquam causam nisi
aeternam, ut infra ostendetur.
Nullo igitur modo anima humana
corrumpi potest.
Adhuc. Si anima corrumpitur per [11] Furthermore, if the soul perishes as
corruptionem corporis, oportet the result of the body’s corruption, then its
quod eius esse debilitetur per being must be weakened through the
debilitatem corporis. Si autem debility of the body. But if a power of the
aliqua virtus animae debilitetur soul is weakened for that reason, this
debilitato corpore, hoc non est nisi occurs only by accident, namely, in so far
per accidens, inquantum scilicet as that power has need of a bodily organ.
virtus animae indiget organo Thus, the power of sight is debilitated
corporali: sicut visus debilitatur through the weakening of its organ—
debilitato organo, per accidens accidentally, however. The following
tamen. Quod ex hoc patet. Si considerations will make this point clear. If
enim ipsi virtuti per se accideret some weakness were attached to the
aliqua debilitas, nunquam power through itself, it would never be

restauraretur organo reparato: restored as the result of the organ’s being
videmus autem quod, restored; yet it is a fact of observation
quantumcumque vis visiva that, however much the power of sight
videatur debilitata, si organum may seem to be weakened, if the organ is
reparetur, quod vis visiva restored, then the power is restored. That
restauratur; unde dicit Aristoteles, is why Aristotle says, in De anima I [4],
in I de anima, quod, si senex “that if an old man were to recover the
accipiat oculum iuvenis, videret eye of a youth, he would see just as well
utique sicut iuvenis. Cum igitur as the youth does.” Since, then, the
intellectus sit virtus animae quae intellect is a power of the soul that needs
non indiget organo, ut ex no organ—as we proved above—it is not
praemissis patet, ipse non weakened, either through itself or
debilitatur, neque per se neque accidentally, by old age or any other
per accidens, per senium vel per bodily weakness. Now, if in the operation
aliquam aliam debilitatem of the intellect fatigue occurs, or some
corporis. Si autem in operatione impediment because of a bodily infirmity,
intellectus accidit fatigatio aut this is due not to any weakness on the
impedimentum propter part of the intellect itself, but to the
infirmitatem corporis, hoc non est weakness of the powers which the
propter debilitatem ipsius intellect needs, namely, of the
intellectus, sed propter debilitatem imagination, the memory, and the
virium quibus intellectus indiget, cogitative power. Clearly, therefore, the
scilicet imaginationis, intellect is incorruptible. And since it is an
memorativae et cogitativae intellective substance, the human soul
virtutum. Patet igitur quod likewise is incorruptible.
intellectus est incorruptibilis. Ergo
et anima humana, quae est
intellectiva quaedam substantia.
Hoc etiam apparet per [12] This conclusion also comes to light
auctoritatem Aristotelis. Dicit through the authority of Aristotle. For he
enim, in I de anima, quod says in De anima I [4] that the intellect is
intellectus videtur substantia evidently a substance and is incapable of
quaedam esse, et non corrumpi. being destroyed. And it can be inferred
Quod autem hoc non possit from what has been said already that
intelligi de aliqua substantia remark of Aristotle’s cannot apply to a
separata quae sit intellectus separate substance that is either the
possibilis vel agens, ex praemissis possible or the agent intellect.
haberi potest.
Praeterea apparet ex ipsis verbis [13] The same conclusion also follows
Aristotelis in XI metaphysicae. Ubi from what Aristotle says in Metaphysics
dicit, contra Platonem loquens, XI [3], speaking against Plato, namely,
quod causae moventes “that moving causes exist prior to their
praeexistunt, causae vero effects, whereas formal causes are
formales sunt simul cum his simultaneous with their effects; thus when
quorum sunt causae: quando a man is healed, then health exists,” and
enim sanatur homo, tunc sanitas not before—Plato’s position, that the
est, et non prius: contra hoc quod forms of things exist prior to the things

Plato posuit formas rerum themselves, to the contrary
praeexistere rebus. Et his dictis, notwithstanding. Having said this,
postmodum subdit: si autem et Aristotle adds: But we must examine
posterius aliquid manet, whether anything also survives
perscrutandum est. Nam in afterwards. “For in some cases there is
quibusdam nihil prohibet: ut si est nothing to prevent this—the soul, for
anima tale; non omnis, sed example, may be of this sort, not every
intellectus. Ex quo patet, cum soul, but the intellect.” Since Aristotle is
loquatur de formis, quod vult speaking of forms, he clearly means that
intellectum, qui est forma hominis, the intellect, which is the form of man,
post materiam remanere, scilicet remains after the matter, which is the
post corpus. body.
Patet autem ex praemissis [14] It is also clear from these texts of
Aristotelis verbis quod, licet ponat Aristotle that, while he maintains that the
animam esse formam, non tamen soul is a form, he does not say it is non
ponit eam non subsistentem et subsistent and therefore corruptible—an
per consequens corruptibilem, interpretation which Gregory of Nyssa
sicut Gregorius Nyssenus ei attributes to him. For Aristotle excludes
imponit: nam a generalitate the intellective soul from the generality of
aliarum formarum animam other forms, in saying that it remains after
intellectivam excludit, dicens eam the body, and is a certain substance.
post corpus remanere, et
substantiam quandam esse.
Praemissis autem sententia [15] The doctrine of the Catholic faith is in

Catholicae fidei concordat. Dicitur agreement on these matters. For in the
enim in libro de Ecclesiast. work On the Teachings of the Church
dogmatibus: solum hominem there is this statement: “We believe that
credimus habere animam man alone is possessed of a subsistent
substantivam, quae et exuta soul, which continues to live even after
corpore vivit, et sensus suos divesting itself of the body, and is the
atque ingenia vivaciter tenet; animating principle of the senses and
neque cum corpore moritur, sicut powers; nor does the soul die with the
Arabs asserit; neque post body, as the Arabian asserts, nor after a
modicum intervallum, sicut Zenon; short period of time, as Zeno would have
quia substantialiter vivit. it, because it is a living substance.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [16] This eliminates the error of the
impiorum, ex quorum persona ungodly, in whose person Solomon says:
Salomon dicit, Sap. 22: ex nihilo “We are born of nothing, and after this we
nati sumus, et post hoc erimus shall be as if we had not been” (Wis. 2:2);
tanquam non fuerimus; et ex and in whose person again Solomon
quorum persona Salomon dicit, says: “The death of man and of beasts is
Eccle. 319: unus est interitus one, and the condition of them both is
hominum et iumentorum, et aequa equal: as man dies, so they also die: all
utriusque conditio. Sicut moritur things breathe alike, and man has nothing
homo, sic et illa moriuntur. more than beast” (Eccle. 3:19). For
Similiter spirant omnia, et nihil Solomon clearly is not speaking in his
habet homo iumento amplius. own person but in that of the godless,
Quod enim non ex persona sua since at the end of the book he adds in a
sed impiorum dicat, patet per hoc decisive manner: “Before the dusts return
quod in fine libri quasi into its earth, from whence it was, and the
determinando subiungit: donec spirit returns to Him Who gave it” (Eccle.
revertatur pulvis in terram suam 17:67).
unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad [17] Furthermore, there are myriad
eum qui dedit illum. passages of sacred Scripture which
Infinitae etiam sunt auctoritates proclaim the immortality of the soul.
sacrae Scripturae quae
immortalitatem animae
protestantur.
Rationes probantes animam ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE
corrumpi corrupto corpore (et solutio CORRUPTION OF THE BODY
ipsarum) ENTAILS THAT OF THE SOUL [AND
THEIR SOLUTION]
Videtur autem quibusdam rationibus [1] There are certain arguments which

posse probari animas humanas non would seem to prove the impossibility of
posse remanere post corpus. human souls remaining after the body.
Si enim animae humanae [2] For, if human souls are multiplied in

multiplicantur secundum accordance with the multiplication of
multiplicationem corporum, ut supra bodies, as was shown above, then the
ostensum est, destructis ergo souls cannot remain in their multiple
corporibus, non possunt animae in being when the bodies are destroyed.
sua multitudine remanere. Unde One of two alternatives, therefore,
oportet alterum duorum sequi: aut follows ineluctably: either the human
quod totaliter anima humana esse soul perishes utterly, or only one soul
desinat; aut quod remaneat una remains. And, seemingly, this state of
tantum. Quod videtur esse affairs would accord with the theory of
secundum opinionem illorum qui those who maintain that what is one in
ponunt esse incorruptibile solum all men is alone incorruptible, whether
illud quod est unum in omnibus this be the agent intellect only, as
hominibus: sive hoc sit intellectus Alexander declares, or, in the
agens tantum, ut Alexander dicit; Averroistic doctrine, the possible along
sive cum agente etiam possibilis, ut with the agent intellect.
dicit Averroes.
Amplius. Ratio formalis est causa [3] Moreover, the formal principle [ratio]

diversitatis secundum speciem. is the cause of specific diversity. But, if
Sed, si remanent multae animae many souls remain after the corruption
post corporum corruptionem, oportet of bodies, they must be mutually
eas esse diversas: sicut enim idem diverse; for just as there is identity
est quod est unum secundum where there is unity of substance, so
substantiam, ita diversa sunt quae those things we diverse which are
sunt multa secundum substantiam. substantially many. Now, in souls that
Non potest autem esse in animabus survive the death of the bodies which
remanentibus post corpus diversitas they inform, the only possible diversity
nisi formalis: non enim sunt is of a formal character, since such
compositae ex materia et forma, ut souls are not composed of matter and
supra probatum est de omni form—a point proved above with
substantia intellectuali. Relinquitur respect to every intellectual substance.
igitur quod sunt diversae secundum It therefore follows that those souls are
speciem. Non autem per specifically diverse. Nevertheless, souls
corruptionem corporis mutantur are not changed to another species as
animae ad aliam speciem: quia a result of the body’s corruption,
omne quod mutatur de specie in because whatever is changed from
speciem, corrumpitur. Relinquitur species to species is corrupted.
ergo quod etiam antequam essent a Consequently, even before souls were
corporibus separatae, erant separated from their bodies, they were
secundum speciem diversae. specifically diverse. Now, composite
Composita autem sortiuntur things owe their specific nature to their
speciem secundum formam. Ergo et form. It follows that individual men will
individua hominum erant secundum be specifically diverse—an awkward
speciem diversa. Quod est consequence. It is, therefore, seemingly
inconveniens. Ergo impossibile impossible that a multiplicity of. human
videtur quod animae humanae souls should survive their bodies.
multae remaneant post corpora.
Adhuc. Videtur omnino esse [4] Then, too, for those who espouse
impossibile, secundum ponentes the doctrine of the eternity of the world
aeternitatem mundi, ponere quod it would seem utterly impossible to
animae humanae in sua multitudine maintain that a multiplicity of human
remaneant post mortem corporis. Si souls remain after the death of the
enim mundus est ab aeterno, motus body. For, if the world exists from
fuit ab aeterno. Ergo et generatio eternity, then movement did, too, so
est aeterna. Sed si generatio est that generation likewise is eternal. But
aeterna, infiniti homines mortui sunt in that case an infinite number of men
ante nos. Si ergo animae have died before us. If, then, the souls
mortuorum remanent post mortem of the dead remain in their multiple
in sua multitudine, oportet dicere being after death, it must be said that
animas infinitas esse nunc in actu there actually exist now an infinite
hominum prius mortuorum. Hoc number of souls of men already dead.
autem est impossibile: nam infinitum This, however, is impossible, because
actu non potest esse in natura. the actually infinite cannot exist in
Relinquitur igitur, si mundus est nature. Hence it follows, on the
aeternus, quod animae non hypothesis of the world’s eternity, that
remaneant multae post mortem. souls do not remain many after death.
Item. Quod advenit alicui et discedit [5] Also, “That which comes to a thing

ab eo praeter sui corruptionem, and departs from it, without the latter
advenit ei accidentaliter: haec enim being corrupted, accrues to it

est definitio accidentis. Si ergo accidentally”; for this is the definition of
anima non corrumpitur corpore an accident. Thus, if the soul is not
abscedente, sequetur quod anima corrupted as the result of its severance
accidentaliter corpori uniatur. Ergo from the body, it would follow that the
homo est ens per accidens, qui est soul is united to the body accidentally,
compositus ex anima et corpore. Et and, further, that man is an accidental
sequetur ulterius quod non sit aliqua being, composed of body and soul. In
species humana: non enim ex his that case, too, we should be faced with
quae coniunguntur per accidens, fit the consequence that there is no
species una; nam homo albus non human species, for one species does
est aliqua species. not result from things joined together by
accident; white man, for example, is not
a species.
Amplius. Impossibile est aliquam [6] A completely inoperative substance,

substantiam esse cuius non sit moreover, cannot possibly exist. All
aliqua operatio. Sed omnis operatio psychic operation, however, is
animae finitur cum corpore. Quod corporeally determined, as we see by
quidem patet per inductionem. Nam induction. For the soul’s nutritive
virtutes animae nutritivae operantur powers function through the bodily
per qualitates corporeas, et per qualities, and by a bodily instrument
instrumentum corporeum, et in acting upon the body, which is
ipsum corpus quod perficitur per perfected by the soul, which is
animam, quod nutritur et augetur, et nourished and increased, and from
ex quo deciditur semen ad which the seed is separated for
generationem. Operationes etiam generative purposes. Secondly, all the
omnes potentiarum quae pertinent operations of the powers belonging to
ad animam sensitivam, complentur the sensitive soul are executed through
per organa corporalia: et quaedam bodily organs, some of them entailing a
earum complentur cum aliqua certain bodily transmutation, as in those
transmutatione corporali, sicut quae which are called passions of the soul,
dicuntur animae passiones, ut amor, for instance, love, joy, and the like. And
gaudium et huiusmodi. Intelligere again, while understanding is not an
autem etsi non sit operatio per operation carried out through any bodily
aliquod organum corporale exercita, organ, nevertheless its objects are the
tamen obiecta eius sunt phantasms, which stand in relation to it
phantasmata, quae ita se habent ad as colors to the power of sight; so that,
ipsam ut colores ad visum: unde, just as sight cannot function in the
sicut visus non potest videre sine absence of colors, so the intellective
coloribus, ita anima intellectiva non soul is incapable of understanding
potest intelligere sine without phantasms. Moreover, to enable
phantasmatibus. Indiget etiam it to understand, the soul needs the
anima ad intelligendum virtutibus powers which prepare the phantasms
praeparantibus phantasmata ad hoc so as to render them actually
quod fiant intelligibilia actu, scilicet intelligible, namely, the cogitative power
virtute cogitativa et memorativa: de and the memorypowers which, being
quibus constat quod, cum sint actus acts of certain bodily organs and
quorundam organorum corporis per functioning through them, surely cannot
quae operantur, quod non possunt remain after the body perishes. And
remanere post corpus. Unde et that is why Aristotle says that the soul
Aristoteles dicit quod nequaquam never understands without a phantasm,
sine phantasmate intelligit anima; et and that it understands nothing without
quod nihil intelligit sine intellectu the passive intellect, which he terms the
passivo, quem vocat virtutem cogitative power, and which is
cogitativam, qui est corruptibilis. Et destructible. This explains why he says
propter hoc dicit, in I de anima, quod in De anima I [4] that man’s
intelligere hominis corrumpitur understanding is corrupted through the
quodam interius corrupto, scilicet decay of some inward part, namely, the
phantasmate vel passivo intellectu. phantasm, or the passive intellect.
Et in III de anima, dicitur quod non Aristotle also remarks in De anima III [5]
reminiscimur, post mortem, eorum that after death we do not remember
quae scivimus in vita. Sic igitur patet what we know in life. Evidently, then, no
quod nulla operatio animae potest operation of the soul can remain after
remanere post mortem. Neque igitur death. Therefore, neither does its
substantia eius manet: cum nulla substance continue to be, since no
substantia possit esse absque substance can exist without operation.
operatione.
Has autem rationes, quia falsum [7] [Chapter 81] Now, because these
concludunt, ut ex praemissis est arguments arrive at a false conclusion, as
ostensum, tentandum est solvere. was shown above, we must endeavor to
solve them.
Ac primo sciendum est quod And first of all, it must be understood that

quaecumque oportet esse whatever things have to be adapted and
invicem coaptata et proportionata, proportioned to one another
simul recipiunt multitudinem vel simultaneously derive their multiplicity or
unitatem, unumquodque ex sua unity, each from its own cause. Therefore,
causa. Si igitur esse unius if the being of one thing depends on
dependeat ab altero, unitas vel another, its unity or multiplicity likewise
multiplicatio eius etiam ex illo depends thereon; otherwise, its unity or
dependet: alioquin, ex alia causa multiplicity depends on some other
extrinseca. Formam igitur et extrinsic cause. Thus, form and matter
materiam semper oportet esse ad must always be mutually proportioned
invicem proportionata et quasi and, as it were, naturally adapted,
naturaliter coaptata: quia proprius because the proper act is produced in its
actus in propria materia fit. Unde proper matter. That is why matter and
semper oportet quod materia et form must always agree with one another
forma consequantur se invicem in in respect to multiplicity and unity.
multitudine et unitate. Si igitur Consequently, if the being of the form
esse formae dependet a materia, depends on matter, its multiplication, as
multiplicatio ipsius a materia well as its unity, depends on matter. But if
dependet, et similiter unitas. Si this is not the case, then the form will
autem non, erit quidem have to be multiplied in accordance with
necessarium multiplicari formam the multiplication of the matter, that is to
secundum multiplicationem say, together with the matter and in
materiae, idest simul cum proportion to it; yet not in such a manner
materia, et proportionem ipsius: that the unity or multiplicity of the form
non autem ita quod dependeat itself depends upon the matter. It has
unitas vel multitudo ipsius formae been shown,” however, that the human
a materia. Ostensum est autem soul is a form not depending in its being
quod anima humana est forma on matter. It therefore follows that souls
secundum suum esse a materia are multiplied in accordance with the
non dependens. Unde sequitur multiplication of bodies, yet the latter will
quod multiplicantur quidem not be the cause of the multiplication of
animae secundum quod souls. And for this reason it does not
multiplicantur corpora, non tamen follow that, with the destruction of bodies,
multiplicatio corporum erit causa the plurality of souls ceases, as the first
multiplicationis animarum. Et ideo argument concluded.
non oportet quod, destructis
corporibus, cesset pluralitas
animarum: ut prima ratio
concludebat.
Ex quo etiam de facili patet [8] From this the reply to the second
responsio ad secundam rationem. argument also clearly emerges. For not
Non enim quaelibet formarum every diversity of form causes diversity in
diversitas facit diversitatem species, but that diversity alone which
secundum speciem, sed solum concerns formal principles, or otherness in
illa quae est secundum principia respect of the intelligible essence of the
formalia, vel secundum diversam form; for obviously, the form of this and
rationem formae: constat enim that fire is essentially distinct, yet neither
quod alia est essentia formae the fire nor its form is specifically diverse.
huius ignis et illius, nec tamen est Thus, a multiplicity of souls separated
alius ignis neque alia forma from their bodies is due to the substantial
secundum speciem. Multitudo diversity of the forms, since the substance
igitur animarum a corporibus of this soul is other than the substance of
separatarum consequitur quidem that soul. This diversity, nevertheless,
diversitatem formarum secundum does not result from a diversity in the
substantiam, quia alia est essential principles of the soul itself, nor
substantia huius animae et illius: from otherness in respect of the intelligible
non tamen ista diversitas procedit essence of the soul, but from diversity in
ex diversitate principiorum the commensuration of souls to bodies,
essentialium ipsius animae, nec since this soul is adapted to this and not
est secundum diversam rationem to that body, and that soul to another
animae; sed est secundum body, and so in all other instances. And
diversam commensurationem such adaptabilities remain in souls even
animarum ad corpora; haec enim after the bodies have perished, even as
anima est commensurata huic their substances remain, as not
corpori et non illi, illa autem alii, et depending in their being on bodies. For
sic de omnibus. Huiusmodi autem souls are in their substances the forms of
commensurationes remanent in bodies; otherwise, they would be united to
animabus etiam pereuntibus their bodies accidentally, so that from the
corporibus: sicut et ipsae earum union of soul and body there would result
substantiae manent, quasi a a thing not essentially, but only
corporibus secundum esse non accidentally, one. Now, it is as forms that
dependentes. Sunt enim animae souls have to be adapted to bodies.
secundum substantias suas Clearly, that is why these diverse
formae corporum: alias adaptabilities remain in separated souls,
accidentaliter corpori unirentur, et and consequently explains their enduring
sic ex anima et corpore non fieret plurality.
unum per se, sed unum per
accidens. Inquantum autem
formae sunt, oportet eas esse
corporibus commensuratas. Unde
patet quod ipsae diversae
commensurationes manent in
animabus separatis: et per
consequens pluralitas.
Occasione autem tertiae rationis [9] For some advocates of the eternity of
inductae, aliqui aeternitatem the world the third argument cited above
mundi ponentes in diversas has been the occasion of their lapsing into
opiniones extraneas inciderunt. various bizarre opinions. For some
Quidam enim conclusionem admitted the conclusion unqualifiedly,
simpliciter concesserunt, dicentes declaring that human souls perish utterly
animas humanas cum corporibus with their bodies. Others said that of all
penitus interire. Alii vero dixerunt souls there remains a single separate
quod de omnibus animabus entity common to them all, namely, the
remanet aliquid unum separatum agent intellect, according to some, or, in
quod est omnibus commune: addition, the possible intellect, according
scilicet intellectus agens, to others. Still others maintained that
secundum quosdam; vel cum eo souls continue to exist in their multiplicity
intellectus possibilis, secundum after the death of the bodies; yet, on pain
alios. Alii autem posuerunt of having to admit an infinite number of
animas in sua multitudine post souls, these persons averred that the
corpora remanere: sed, ne same souls are united to different bodies
cogerentur animarum ponere after a certain period of time has elapsed.
infinitatem, dixerunt easdem This was the Platonists’ theory, of which
animas diversis corporibus uniri we shall treat further on. Avoiding all
post determinatum tempus. Et these inferences, another group of
haec fuit Platonicorum opinio, de thinkers held that it is not impossible for
qua infra agetur. Quidam vero, separate souls to be actually infinite in
omnia praedicta vitantes, dixerunt number. For in the case of things devoid
non esse inconveniens animas of mutual order, to be actually infinite is to
separatas actu existere infinitas. be infinite accidentally, and those thinkers
Esse enim infinitum actu in his saw no incongruity in admitting this. Such
quae non habent ad invicem is the position of Avicenna and AlGhazali.
ordinem, est esse infinitum per Aristotle does not tell us explicitly which of
accidens: quod ponere non these opinions he himself shared, but he
reputant inconveniens. Et est does expressly affirm the eternity of the
positio Avicennae et Algazelis. world. Nevertheless, of all the opinions
Quid autem horum Aristoteles cited above, the last one is not
senserit, ab eo expresse non inconsistent with the principle laid down
invenitur: cum tamen expresse by him. For in Physics III [5] and in De
mundi aeternitatem ponat. Ultima caelo I [5] he proves that there is no
tamen praedictarum opinionum actual infinity in natural bodies, but he

principiis ab eo positis non does not prove that there is no actual
repugnat. Nam in III Phys. et in I infinity in immaterial substances. In any
caeli et mundi, probat non esse case it is certain that this question
infinitum actu in corporibus presents no difficulty to those who profess
naturalibus, non autem in the Catholic faith, and do not posit the
substantiis immaterialibus. eternity of the world.
Certum tamen est circa hoc
nullam difficultatem pati
Catholicae fidei professores, qui
aeternitatem mundi non ponunt.
Non est etiam necessarium, quod [10] Moreover, if the soul remains in

si anima manet corpore destructo, existence after the death of the body, it
quod fuerit ei accidentaliter unita: does not follow that it must have been
ut quarta ratio concludebat. accidentally united to it, as the fourth
Accidens enim describitur: quod argument concluded. For an accident is
potest adesse et abesse praeter described as that which can be present or
corruptionem subiecti compositi absent without the corruption of the
ex materia et forma. Si autem subject composed of matter and form.
referatur ad principia subiecti However, if this statement is applied to the
compositi, verum non invenitur. principles of the composite subject, it is
Constat enim materiam primam found to be false; because it is clear, as
ingenitam et incorruptibilem esse: Aristotle shows in Physics I [9], that prime
ut probat Aristoteles in I matter is ungenerated and incorruptible.
physicorum. Unde, recedente That is why prime matter remains in its
forma, manet in sua essentia. essence when the form departs.
Non tamen forma accidentaliter ei Nevertheless, the form was united to it not
uniebatur, sed essentialiter: accidentally but essentially, since it was
uniebatur enim ei secundum esse joined to it according to one act of being.
unum. Similiter autem anima The soul likewise is united to the body as
unitur corpori secundum esse regards one act of being, as was shown
unum, ut supra ostensum est. above. Therefore, although the soul
Unde, licet maneat post corpus, continues to exist after the body has
substantialiter ei unitur, non passed away, it is nevertheless united to
accidentaliter. Quod autem the body substantially and not
materia prima non remanet actu accidentally. Now, prime matter does not
post formam nisi secundum remain in act after the form’s departure,
actum alterius formae, anima except in relation to the act of another
autem humana manet in actu form, whereas the human soul remains in
eodem, ex hoc contingit quod the same act; and the reason for this is
anima humana est forma et actus, that the human soul is a form and an act,
materia autem prima potentia while prime matter is a being only
ens. potentially.
Quod autem quinta ratio [11] The proposition advanced in the fifth
proponebat, nullam operationem argument, namely, that no operation ran
posse remanere in anima si a remain in the soul when separated from
corpore separetur, dicimus esse the body, we declare to be false, in view of

falsum: manent enim operationes the fact that those operations do remain
illae quae per organa non which are not exercised through organs.
exercentur. Huiusmodi autem Such are the operations of understanding
sunt intelligere et velle. Quae and willing. Those operations, however,
autem per organa corporea do not endure which are carried out by
exercentur, sicut sunt operationes means of bodily~ organs, and of such a
potentiarum nutritivae et kind are the operations of the nutritive and
sensitivae, non manent. sensitive powers.
Sciendum tamen est quod alio [12] Nevertheless it must be borne in mind

modo intelligit anima separata a that the soul understands in a different
corpore et corpori unita, sicut et manner when separated from the body
alio modo est: unumquodque and when united to it, even as it exists
enim secundum hoc agit diversely in those cases; for a thing acts
secundum quod est. Esse quidem according as it is. Indeed, although the
animae humanae dum est corpori soul, while united to the body, enjoys an
unita, etsi sit absolutum a corpore absolute being not depending on the
non dependens, tamen body, nevertheless the body is the soul’s
stramentum quoddam ipsius et housing, so to speak, and the subject that
subiectum ipsum recipiens est receives it. This explains why the soul’s
corpus. Unde et consequenter proper operation, understanding, has its
operatio propria eius, quae est object, namely, the phantasm, in the body,
intelligere, etsi non dependeat a despite the fact that this operation does
corpore quasi per organum not depend on the body as though it were
corporale exercita, habet tamen effected through the instrumentality of a
obiectum in corpore, scilicet bodily organ. It follows that, so long as the
phantasma. Unde, quandiu est soul is in the body, it cannot perform that
anima in corpore, non potest act without a phantasm; neither can it
intelligere sine phantasmate: nec remember except through the powers of
etiam reminisci nisi per virtutem cogitation and memory, by which the
cogitativam et memorativam, per phantasms are prepared, as stated above.
quam phantasmata praeparantur, Accordingly, understanding, so far as this
ut ex dictis patet. Et propter hoc mode of it is concerned, as well as
intelligere, quantum ad hunc remembering, perishes with the death of
modum, et similiter reminisci, the body. The separated soul, however,
destruitur corpore destructo. Esse exists by itself, apart from the body.
vero separatae animae est ipsi Consequently, its operation, which is
soli absque corpore. Unde nec understanding, will not be fulfilled in
eius operatio, quae est intelligere, relation to those objects existing in bodily
explebitur per respectum ad organs which the phantasms are; on the
aliqua obiecta in corporeis contrary, it will understand through itself,
organis existentia, quae sunt in the manner of substances which in their
phantasmata: sed intelliget per being are totally separate from bodies,
seipsam, ad modum and of which we shall treat subsequently.
substantiarum quae sunt totaliter And from those substances, as from
secundum esse a corporibus things above it, the separated soul will be
separatae, de quibus infra agetur. able to receive a more abundant influx,
A quibus etiam tanquam a productive of a more perfect
superioribus, uberius influentiam understanding on its own part. There is an
recipere poterit ad perfectius indication of this event in the young. For
intelligendum. Cuius signum the more the soul is freed from
etiam in iuvenibus apparet. Nam preoccupation with its body, the more fit
anima, quando impeditur ab does it become for understanding higher
occupatione circa corpus things. Hence, the virtue of temperance,
proprium, redditur habilior ad which withdraws the soul from bodily
intelligendum aliqua altiora: unde pleasures, is especially fruitful in making
et virtus temperantiae, quae a men apt in understanding. Then, too,
corporeis delectationibus retrahit sleeping persons, their bodily senses
animam, praecipue facit homines being dormant, with no disturbance of the
ad intelligendum aptos. Homines humours or vapors to impede their mental
etiam dormientes, quando processes, are, under the influence of
corporeis sensibus non utuntur, higher beings, enabled to perceive some
nec est aliqua perturbatio things pertaining to the future which
humorum aut fumositatum transcend the scope of human reason.
impediens, percipiunt de futuris, And this is all the more true of those in a
ex superiorum impressione, fainting condition or in ecstasy, since such
aliqua quae modum states involve an even greater withdrawal
ratiocinationis humanae from the bodily senses. Nor does this
excedunt. Et hoc multo magis come to pass undeservedly. For, since the
accidit in syncopizantibus et human soul, as we have shown already, is
exstasim passis: quanto magis fit situated on the boundary line between
retractio a corporeis sensibus. corporeal and incorporeal substances, as
Nec immerito hoc accidit. Quia, though it existed on the horizon of eternity
cum anima humana, ut supra and time, it approaches to the highest by
ostensum est, in confinio withdrawing from the lowest.
corporum et incorporearum Consequently, when the soul shall be
substantiarum, quasi in horizonte completely separated from the body, it will
existens aeternitatis et temporis, be perfectly likened to separate
recedens ab infimo, appropinquat substances in its mode of understanding,
ad summum. Unde et, quando and will receive their influx abundantly.
totaliter erit a corpore separata,
perfecte assimilabitur substantiis
separatis quantum ad modum
intelligendi, et abunde influentiam
eorum recipiet.
Sic igitur, etsi intelligere nostrum [13] Therefore, although the mode of
secundum modum praesentis understanding vouchsafed to us in the
vitae, corrupto corpore present life ceases upon the death of the
corrumpatur, succedet tamen body, nevertheless another and higher
alius modus intelligendi altior. mode of understanding will take its place.
Reminisci autem, cum sit actus [14] Now, recollection, being an act
per corporeum organum performed through a bodily organ, as
exercitus, ut in libro de memoria Aristotle shows in the De memoria [I],
et Reminisc. Aristoteles probat, cannot remain in the soul after the body,
non poterit post corpus in anima unless recollection be taken equivocally
remanere: nisi reminisci for the understanding of things which one
aequivoce sumatur pro knew before. For there must be present in

intelligentia eorum quae quis the separate soul even the things that it
prius novit; quam oportet animae knew in this life, since the intelligible
separatae adesse etiam eorum species are received into the possible
quae novit in vita, cum species intellect inexpugnably, as we have already
intelligibiles in intellectu possibili shown.
indelebiliter recipiantur, ut supra
ostensum est.
Circa alias vero animae [15] As for the other operations of the
operationes, sicut est amare, soul, such as loving, rejoicing, and the
gaudere, et alia huiusmodi, est like, one must beware of equivocation. For
aequivocatio cavenda. Nam sometimes such operations are taken
quandoque sumuntur ut sunt inasmuch as they are passions of the
animae passiones. Et sic sunt soul, and in this sense they are acts of the
actus sensibilis appetitus sensible appetite appertaining to the
secundum concupiscibilem vel concupiscible and irascible powers,
irascibilem, cum aliqua entailing some bodily change. And thus
permutatione corporali. Et sic in they cannot remain in the soul after death,
anima manere non possunt post as Aristotle proves in the De anima [I, 4].
mortem: ut Aristoteles probat in Sometimes, however, such operations are
libro de anima. Sumuntur autem taken for a simple act of the will, in the
quandoque pro simplici actu absence of all passion. That is why
voluntatis, qui est absque Aristotle says in Book VII of the Ethics that
passione. Unde Aristoteles dicit, God rejoices in a single and simple
in VII Ethic., quod Deus una operation; and in Book X that in the
simplici operatione gaudet; et in contemplation of wisdom there is
X, quod in contemplatione marvelous delight; and in Book VII he
sapientiae est delectatio distinguishes the love of friendship from
admirabilis; et in VIII, amorem the love that is a passion. Now, since the
amicitiae ab amatione, quae est will is a power employing no organ, as
passio, distinguit. Cum vero neither does the intellect, it is plain that
voluntas sit potentia non utens these things of which we are speaking
organo, sicut nec intellectus, remain in the separated soul, so far as
palam est huiusmodi, secundum they are acts of the will.
quod sunt actus voluntatis, in
anima separata remanere.
Sic igitur ex praedictis rationibus [16] From the preceding arguments,
concludi non potest animam therefore, it cannot be concluded that the
hominis esse mortalem. soul of man is mortal.
Caput 82 Chapter 82
Quod animae brutorum THAT THE SOULS OF BRUTE ANIMALS
animalium non sunt immortales ARE NOT IMMORTAL
Ex his autem quae dicta sunt, [1] This truth can be clearly inferred from
evidenter ostenditur brutorum what has been already said.
animas non esse immortales.
Iam enim ostensum est quod [2] For we demonstrated above that no
nulla operatio sensitivae partis operation of the sensitive part of the soul
esse sine corpore potest. In can be performed without the body. In the
animabus autem brutorum non souls of brute animals, however, there is
est invenire aliquam operationem no operation superior to those of the
superiorem operationibus sensitive part, since they neither
sensitivae partis: non enim understand nor reason. This is evident
intelligunt neque ratiocinantur. from the fact that all animals of the same
Quod ex hoc apparet, quia omnia species operate in the same way, as
animalia eiusdem speciei similiter though moved by nature and not as
operantur, quasi a natura motae operating by art; every swallow builds its
et non ex arte operantes: omnis nest and every spider spins its web, in the
enim hirundo similiter facit nidum, same manner. The souls of brutes, then,
et omnis aranea similiter telam. are incapable of any operation that does
Nulla igitur est operatio animae not involve the body. Now, since every
brutorum quae possit esse sine substance is possessed of some
corpore. Cum igitur omnis operation, the soul of a brute animal will
substantia aliquam operationem be unable to exist apart from its body; so
habeat, non poterit anima bruti that it perishes along with the body.
absque corpore esse. Ergo,
pereunte corpore, perit.
Item. Omnis forma separata a [3] Likewise, every form separate from
materia est intellecta in actu: sic matter is understood in act. for the agent
enim intellectus agens facit intellect renders species intelligible in act
species intelligibiles actu, by way of abstraction, as we see from
inquantum abstrahit eas, ut ex what was said above. But if the soul of the
supra dictis patet. Sed, si anima brute animal continues to exist after its
bruti manet corrupto corpore, erit body has passed away, then that soul will
forma a materia separata. Ergo be a form separate from matter, and
erit forma intellecta in actu. Sed in therefore a form understood in act. And
separatis a materia idem est yet, as Aristotle says in De anima III [4],
intelligens et intellectum, ut with things separate from matter, that
Aristoteles dicit, in III de anima. which understands is identical with that
Ergo anima bruti, si post corpus which is understood. It follows that the
manet, erit intellectualis. Quod est soul of a brute animal, if it survives the
impossibile. body, will be intellectual; and this is
impossible.
Adhuc. In qualibet re quae potest [4] Then, too, in every thing capable of

pertingere ad aliquam attaining a certain perfection, we find a
perfectionem, invenitur naturalis natural desire for that perfection, since
appetitus illius perfectionis: good is what all things desire, yet in such
bonum enim est quod omnia fashion that each thing desires the good
appetunt, ita tamen quod proper to itself. In brutes, however, we find
unumquodque proprium bonum. no desire for perpetual existence, but only

In brutis autem non invenitur a desire for the perpetuation of their
aliquis appetitus ad esse several species, since we do observe in
perpetuum, nisi ut perpetuentur them the desire to reproduce and thereby
secundum speciem, inquantum in perpetuate the species—a desire common
eis invenitur appetitus also to plants and to inanimate things,
generationis, per quam species though not as regards desire proper to an
perpetuatur, qui quidem invenitur animal as such, because animal appetite
et in plantis et in rebus inanimatis: is consequent upon apprehension. For,
non autem quantum ad proprium since the apprehending power of the
appetitum animalis inquantum est sensitive soul is limited to the here and
animal, qui est appetitus now, that soul cannot possibly be
apprehensionem consequens. cognizant of perpetual existence. Nor,
Nam, cum anima sensitiva non then, does it desire such existence with
apprehendat nisi hic et nunc, animal appetite. Therefore, the soul of a
impossibile est quod apprehendat brute animal is incapable of perpetual
esse perpetuum. Neque ergo existence.
appetit appetitu animali. Non est
igitur anima bruti capax perpetui
esse.
Amplius. Cum delectationes [5] Moreover, as Aristotle remarks in

operationes perficiant, ut patet Ethics X [4], pleasures perfect operations.
per Aristotelem in X Ethic., ad hoc Hence, a thing’s activity is directed to that
ordinatur operatio cuiuslibet rei object wherein it takes pleasure, as to its
sicut in finem in quo sua end. But all the pleasures of brute animals
delectatio figitur. Delectationes have reference to the preservation of their
autem brutorum animalium body; thus, they delight in sounds, odors,
omnes referuntur ad conservantia and sights only to the extent that they
corpus: non enim delectantur in signify for them food or sex, the sole
sonis, odoribus et aspectibus, nisi objects of all their pleasures. All the
secundum quod sunt indicativa activities of such animals, then, have but a
ciborum vel venereorum, circa single end: the preservation of their bodily
quae est omnis eorum delectatio. existence. Thus, there is in them no being
Tota igitur operatio eorum whatever which is independent of the
ordinatur ad conservationem body.
esse corporei sicut in finem. Non
igitur est eis aliquod esse absque
corpore.
Huic autem sententiae doctrina [6] The teaching of the Catholic faith is in

Catholicae fidei concordat. Dicitur harmony with this doctrine. For in the Old
enim Gen. 9, de anima bruti, Testament we read, concerning the soul of
anima illius in sanguine est: quasi the brute animal, that “the life of all flesh is
dicat: ex sanguinis permanentia in the blood” (Lev. 17:14; cf. Gen. 9:45),
esse illius dependet. Et in libro de which seemingly means that the existence
Ecclesiast. dogmatibus: solum of such souls depends on the permanence
hominem dicimus animam of the blood. And it is said in the work On
substantivam habere, idest per se the Teachings of the Church: “We declare
vitalem: brutorum animas cum that man alone has a subsistent soul,” that
corporibus interire. is, a soul having life of itself; and that “the
souls of brute animals perish along with
their bodies.”
Aristoteles etiam, in II de anima, [7] Aristotle likewise states, in De anima II

dicit quod intellectiva pars animae [2], that “the intellective part of the soul
separatur ab aliis sicut differs from the other parts as the
incorruptibile a corruptibili. incorruptible from the corruptible.”
Per hoc autem excluditur positio [8] This eliminates Plato’s theory that the
Platonis, qui posuit etiam souls even of brute animals are immortal.
brutorum animas immortales.
Videtur tamen posse probari [9] Nevertheless, it would seem possible
brutorum animas esse to show that the souls of such animals are
immortales. Cuius enim est aliqua immortal. For, if a thing possesses an
operatio per se separatim, et operation through itself, distinctly its own,
ipsum est per se subsistens. Sed then it is subsisting through itself. But the
animae sensitivae in brutis est sensitive soul in brutes enjoys an
aliqua operatio per se in qua non operation through itself, wherein the body
communicat corpus, scilicet has no part, namely, motion; for a mover
movere: nam movens componitur is compounded of two parts, the one being
ex duobus, quorum unum est mover and the other moved. Since the
movens et alterum est motum; body is a thing moved, it remains that the
unde, cum corpus sit motum, soul is exclusively a mover, and,
relinquitur quod anima sola sit consequently, is subsisting through itself.
movens. Ergo est per se Hence, the soul cannot be corrupted by
subsistens. Non igitur potest per accident, when the body is corrupted, for
accidens corrumpi, corpore only those things are corrupted by
corrupto: illa enim solum per accident which do not have being through
accidens corrumpuntur quae per themselves. Nor can the soul be corrupted
se non habent esse. Per se through itself, since it neither has a
autem non potest corrumpi: cum contrary nor is composed of contraries.
neque contrarium habeat, neque The result of the argument, therefore, is
sit ex contrariis composita. that the soul is altogether incorruptible.
Relinquitur igitur quod sit omnino
incorruptibilis.
Ad hoc etiam videbatur redire [10] And, seemingly, Plato’s argument that

Platonis ratio qua probabat every soul is immortal comes to the same
omnem animam esse thing, namely, that the soul is a self
immortalem: quia scilicet anima mover; and everything of this sort must be
est movens seipsum; omne immortal. For the body dies only when its
autem movens seipsum oportet mover departs from it, and a thing cannot
esse immortale. Corpus enim non abandon itself. That is why Plato inferred
moritur nisi abscedente eo a quo that Is thing which moves itself cannot die.
movebatur; idem autem a seipso And thus he came to the conclusion that
non potest discedere; unde every soul possessed of the power of
sequitur, secundum ipsum, quod motion, even that of brute animals, is
movens seipsum non possit mori. immortal. Now, we have remarked that

Et sic relinquebatur quod anima this argument is reductively the same as
omnis motiva esset immortalis, the preceding one, since, given Plato’s
etiam brutorum. Ideo autem hanc position that nothing moves without being
rationem in idem redire diximus moved, a thing that moves itself is a
cum praemissa, quia cum, mover through itself and therefore has an
secundum Platonis positionem, operation through itself.
nihil moveat nisi motum, illud
quod est seipsum movens, est
per seipsum motivum, et sic
habet aliquam operationem per
se.
Non solum autem in movendo, [11] Now, Plato also maintained that the
sed etiam in sentiendo ponebat sensitive soul enjoys an operation of its
Plato animam sensitivam own, not only in respect to movement, but
propriam operationem habere. also as regards sensation. For he said
Dicebat enim quod sentire est that sensation is a movement of the
motus quidam ipsius animae sensing soul itself, and that the soul, thus
sentientis: et ipsa, sic mota, moved, moved the body to sensation;
movebat corpus ad sentiendum. wherefore Plato said, in defining sense,
Unde, definiens sensum, dicebat that it is the motion of the soul through the
quod est motus animae per body.
corpus.
Haec autem quae dicta sunt, [12] Now, these Platonic dicta are patently

patet esse falsa. Non enim false. For the act of sensation is not an act
sentire est movere, sed magis of movement; rather, to sense is to be
moveri: nam ex potentia sentiente moved; since, through the sensible
fit animal actu sentiens per objects altering the condition of the
sensibilia, a quibus sensus senses in acting upon them, the animal is
immutantur. Non autem potest made actually sentient from being only
dici similiter sensum pati a potentially so. However, it cannot be
sensibili sicut patitur intellectus ab maintained that the passivity of the sense
intelligibili, ut sic sentire possit in respect of the sensible is the same as
esse operatio animae absque that of the intellect in relation to the
corporeo instrumento, sicut est intelligible, so that sensation could then be
intelligere: nam intellectus an operation of the soul without a bodily
apprehendit res in abstractione a instrument, just as understanding is. This
materia et materialibus is impossible, because the intellect grasps
conditionibus, quae sunt things in abstraction from matter and
individuationis principia; non material conditions, which are
autem sensus. Quod exinde individuating principles, whereas the
apparet quia sensus est sense does not, being manifestly limited to
particularium, intellectus vero the perception of particulars, while the
universalium. Unde patet quod intellect attains to universals. Clearly,
sensus patiuntur a rebus then, the senses are passive to things as
secundum quod sunt in materia: existing in matter, but not the intellect,
non autem intellectus, sed which is passive to things according as
secundum quod sunt abstractae. they are abstracted. Thus, in the intellect
Passio igitur intellectus est there is passivity in utter independence of

absque materia corporali, non corporeal matter, but not in the senses.
autem passio sensus.
Adhuc. Diversi sensus sunt [13] Moreover, diverse senses are

susceptivi diversorum receptive of diverse sensible objects—
sensibilium: sicut visus colorum, sight of colors, hearing of sounds, and so
auditus sonorum. Haec autem on. And it is quite clear that this diversity
diversitas manifeste ex stems from the diverse dispositions of the
dispositione diversa organorum organs. The organ of sight, for instance,
contingit: nam organum visus is, necessarily, in potentiality to all colors,
oportet esse in potentia ad and the organ of hearing to all sounds.
omnes colores, organum auditus But, if this sensereceptivity occurred
ad omnes sonos. Si autem haec without a corporeal organ, then the same
receptio fieret absque organo power would be receptive of all sensible
corporali, eadem potentia esset objects; for an immaterial power is of itself
omnium sensibilium susceptiva: related indifferently to all such qualities;
nam virtus immaterialis se habet and that is why the intellect, which
aequaliter, quantum de se est, ad employs no bodily organ, is cognizant of
omnes huiusmodi qualitates; all sensible things. Without a bodily organ,
unde intellectus, qui non utitur then, no sensation takes place.
organo corporali, omnia sensibilia
cognoscit. Sentire igitur non fit
absque organo corporeo.
Praeterea. Sensus corrumpitur ab [14] There is also the fact that sense is

excellentia sensibilium: non overwhelmed by an exceedingly high
autem intellectus, quia qui degree of intensity on the part of its
intelligit altiora intelligibilium, non objects; but the intellect is not, because he
minus poterit alia speculari, sed who understands the higher intelligibles is
magis. Alterius igitur generis est more and not less able to understand
passio sensus a sensibili, et other things. Hence, the state of passivity
intellectus ab intelligibili. brought about in the sense by the sensible
Intellectus quidem passio fit differs in kind from that which the
absque organo corporali: passio intelligible causes in the intellect; the latter
vero sensus cum organo occurs without a bodily organ, the former
corporali, cuius harmonia solvitur with a bodily organ, the harmonious
per sensibilium excellentiam. structure of whose parts is shattered by
the preeminent power of some sensible
objects.
Quod autem Plato dixit, animam [15] Now, Plato’s statement, that the soul
esse moventem seipsam, certum is selfmoving, appears true in the light of
esse videtur ex hoc quod circa our observations of bodily things. For no
corpora apparet. Nullum enim body seems to move without being
corpus videtur movere nisi sit moved, and Plato accordingly asserted
motum. Unde Plato ponebat that every mover is moved. Moreover,
omne movens moveri. Et quia since it is impossible to proceed to infinity,
non itur in infinitum ut every thing moved being moved by
unumquodque motum ab alio something else, he laid it down that the
moveatur, ponebat primum first mover in each and every order of
movens in unoquoque ordine things, moves itself. It therefore followed
movere seipsum. Et ex hoc that the soul, being the first mover in the
sequebatur animam, quae est order of animal movements, is a self
primum movens in motibus moving reality.
animalium, esse aliquod movens
seipsum.
Hoc autem patet esse falsum, [16] This conclusion, however, is seen to
dupliciter: primo quidem, quia be false, for two reasons. First, because it
probatum est quod omne quod has been proved in Book I of this work
movetur per se, est corpus. Unde, that whatever is moved through itself is a
cum anima non sit corpus, body; since, then, the soul is not a body, it
impossibile est ipsam moveri nisi cannot possibly be moved except by
per accidens. accident.
Secundo quia, cum movens [17] The second reason is this. A mover,
inquantum huiusmodi sit actu, precisely as such, is in act; the thing
motum autem inquantum moved, as such, is in potentiality; and
huiusmodi sit in potentia; nihil nothing can be in act and in potentiality in
autem potest esse secundum the same respect. The same thing,
idem actu et potentia: impossibile therefore, cannot possibly be mover and
erit quod idem secundum idem sit moved in the same respect, so that, if a
movens et motum, sed oportet, si thing is said to move itself, one part of it
aliquid dicitur movens seipsum, must be mover and the other part moved.
quod una pars eius sit movens et And this is what is meant by saying that
alia pars sit mota. Et hoc modo an animal moves itself, for the animal’s
dicitur animal movere seipsum: soul is the mover and its body the moved.
quia anima est movens, et corpus Now, Plato did not hold that the soul is a
est motum. Sed quia Plato body, although he did use the word
animam non ponebat esse movement in this connection, and in the
corpus, licet uteretur nomine proper sense of the term, movement
motus, qui proprie corporum est, belongs to bodies. But it was not this
non tamen de hoc motu proprie meaning that Plato had in mind; rather, he
dicto intelligebat, sed accipiebat was taking movement in a more universal,
motum communius pro qualibet extended sense, as applying to any
operatione: prout etiam operation, even as Aristotle does in De
Aristoteles dicit, in III de anima, anima III [7]: “Sensation and
quod sentire et intelligere sunt understanding are certain movements.”
motus quidam. Sic autem motus But in this case movement is the act, not
non est actus existentis in of that which exists potentially, but of that
potentia, sed actus perfecti. which is perfect. So, in saying that the
Unde, cum dicebat animam soul moves itself, Plato meant that it acts
movere seipsam, intendebat per without the help of the body, whereas just
hoc dicere quod ipsa operatur the reverse is true of other forms,
absque adminiculo corporis, e incapable as they are of exercising any
contrario ei quod accidit in aliis action whatever apart from matter. (It is
formis, quae non agunt absque not any separately existing beat that
materia: non enim calor calefacit produces beat, but only something hot.)
separatim, sed calidum. Ex quo Plato wishes to conclude from this that
volebat concludere omnem every soul capable of causing movement
animam motivam esse is immortal, for that which by its essence
immortalem: nam quod per se is endowed with operation can likewise
habet operationem, et per se enjoy an essential mode of existence.
habet operationem, et per se
existentiam habere potest.
Sed iam ostensum est quod [18] But we have shown already that the
operatio animae brutalis, quae brute animal’s operation of sensing is
est sentire, non potest esse sine impossible without the body. And this
corpore. Multo autem magis hoc impossibility is all the more apparent in the
apparet in operatione eius quod case of the operation of appetite. For all
est appetere. Nam omnia quae things pertaining to sense appetite
ad appetitum sensitivae partis manifestly involve some bodily change;
pertinent, manifeste cum that is why they are called passions of the
transmutatione aliqua corporis soul.
fiunt: unde et passiones animae
dicuntur.
Ex quibus sequitur quod nec [19] From these points it follows that
ipsum movere sit operatio animae movement is itself no organless operation
sensitivae absque organo. Non of the sensitive soul. For it is only through
enim movet anima brutalis nisi sense and appetite that the soul of the
per sensum et appetitum. Nam brute animal moves; since the power
virtus quae dicitur exequens designated as the executor of movement
motum, facit membra esse makes the animal’s members obedient to
obedientia imperio appetitus: the appetite’s command. Thus, the powers
unde magis sunt virtutes of which we speak are of the sort that
perficientes corpus ad moveri, perfect the body as regards its being
quam virtutes moventes. moved, rather than powers of actively
moving.
Sic igitur patet quod nulla [20] It is, then, clearly impossible for any
operatio animae brutalis potest operation of the brute animal’s soul to be
esse absque corpore. Ex quo de independent of its body. And from this it
necessitate concludi potest quod can be inferred with necessity that the
anima brutalis cum corpore soul of the brute perishes with the body.
intereat.
Caput 83 Chapter 83
Quod anima humana incipiat cum THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO
corpore EXIST WHEN THE BODY DOES
Sed quia eaedem res inveniuntur [1] Now, since the same things are found

et esse incipere et finem essendi both to begin to be and to end, someone

habere, potest alicui videri quod, might suppose that, because the human
ex quo anima humana finem soul will not cease to exist, neither will it
essendi non habet, quod nec have begun to exist, but, on the contrary,
principium essendi habuerit, sed has always been. And it would seem
fuerit semper. Quod quidem possible to prove this by the following
videtur his rationibus posse arguments.
probari.
Nam illud quod nunquam esse [2] That which will never cease to be has

desinet, habet virtutem ut sit the power to exist forever. But no such
semper. Quod autem habet thing can ever be truly said not to be; for
virtutem ut sit semper nunquam de the extent of a thing’s existential duration
eo verum est dicere non esse: is exactly commensurate with its power
quia quantum se extendit virtus of existing. But of every thing which had
essendi, tantum res durat in esse. begun to exist, it is at some time true to
Omne autem quod incoepit esse, say that it is not. Therefore, that which
est aliquando verum dicere non will never cease to exist, at no time
esse. Quod igitur nunquam begins to be.
desinet esse, nec esse aliquando
incipiet.
Adhuc. Veritas intelligibilium, sicut [3] Moreover, just as the truth of
est incorruptibilis, ita, quantum est intelligible things is imperishable, so is
de se, est aeterna: est enim that truth, of itself, eternal; because it is
necessaria; omne autem necessary, and whatever is necessary is
necessarium est aeternum, quia eternal, for what is necessary to be
quod necesse est esse, cannot possibly not be. Now, the
impossibile est non esse. Ex imperishable being of the soul is
incorruptibilitate autem veritatis demonstrated from the imperishability of
intelligibilis ostenditur anima intelligible truth. Hence, by the same
secundum esse incorruptibilis. Pari reasoning, the soul’s eternity can be
ergo ratione, ex eius aeternitate proved from the eternal being of
potest probari animae aeternitas. intelligible both.
Amplius. Illud non est perfectum [4] Also, a thing that lacks several of its
cui plurimae suarum principalium principal parts is not perfect. But, clearly,
partium desunt. Patet autem the principal parts of the universe are
principales partes universi esse intellectual substances, in the genus of
intellectuales substantias, in which human souls belong, as we have
quarum genere ostensum est shown above. If every day as many
supra esse animas humanas. Si human souls begin to exist as men are
igitur quotidie de novo tot animae born, then, obviously, many of the
humanae esse incipiant quot principal parts of the universe are added
homines nascuntur, patet quotidie to it daily, so that it lacks a multiplicity of
universo plurimas principalium things. Consequently, the universe is
partium addi, et plurimas ei imperfect. But this is impossible.
deesse. Sequitur igitur universum
esse imperfectum. Quod est
impossibile.
Adhuc etiam quidam [5] Then, too, some draw their arguments

argumentantur ex auctoritate from the authority of Sacred Scripture.
sacrae Scripturae. Dicitur enim For in Genesis (2:2) it is said that “on the
Gen. 1, quod Deus die septimo seventh day God ended His work which
complevit opus suum quod He had made: and He rested from all His
fecerat, et requievit ab omni opere work which He had done.” But, if God
quod patrarat. Hoc autem non made new souls every day, this would not
esset si quotidie novas animas be true. Therefore, no new human souls
faceret. Non igitur de novo animae ever begin to exist, but they have existed
humanae esse incipiunt, sed a from the beginning of the world.
principio mundi fuerunt.
Propter has ergo et similes [6] Hence, for these and similar reasons,

rationes quidam, aeternitatem proponents of the doctrine of the world’s
mundi ponentes, dixerunt animam eternity have said that, just as the human
humanam, sicut est incorruptibilis, soul is incorruptible, so has it existed
ita et ab aeterno fuisse. Unde qui from all eternity. That is why the
posuerunt animas humanas in sui upholders of the theory of the immortality
multitudine esse immortales, of human souls in their multiple existence
scilicet Platonici, posuerunt —I refer to the Platonists—asserted that
easdem ab aeterno fuisse, et nunc they have existed from eternity, and are
quidem corporibus uniri, nunc united to bodies at one time and
autem a corporibus absolvi, hac separated from them at another, these
vicissitudine secundum vicissitudes following a fixed cyclical
determinata annorum curricula pattern throughout set periods of years.
observata. Qui vero posuerunt Advocates of the theory that human souls
animas humanas esse immortales are immortal in respect of some single
secundum aliquid unum quod ex reality, pertaining to all men, which
omnibus hominibus manet post remains after death, declared, however,
mortem, posuerunt hoc ipsum that this one entity has endured from all
unum ab aeterno fuisse: sive hoc eternity; whether it be the agent intellect
sit intellectus agens tantum, ut alone, as Alexander held, or, together
posuit Alexander sive, cum eo, with this, the possible intellect, as
etiam intellectus possibilis, ut Averroes maintained. Aristotle, also,
posuit Averroes. Hoc etiam seems to be making the same point
videntur sonare et Aristotelis when, speaking of the intellect, he says
verba: nam, de intellectu loquens, that it is not only incorruptible, but also
dicit ipsum non solum everlasting.
incorruptibilem, sed etiam
perpetuum esse.
Quidam vero Catholicam fidem [7] On the other hand, some who profess

profitentes, Platonicorum doctrinis the Catholic faith, yet are imbued with the
imbuti, viam mediam tenuerunt. teachings of the Platonists, have taken a
Quia enim, secundum fidem middle position. For, since the Catholic
Catholicam, nihil est aeternum faith teaches that nothing is eternal
praeter Deum, humanas quidem except God, these persons maintain, not

animas aeternas non posuerunt, that human souls are eternal, but that
sed eas cum mundo, sive potius they were created with, or rather before,
ante mundum visibilem, creatas the visible world, yet are fettered to
fuisse, et tamen eas de novo bodies anew. Among these Christians,
corporibus alligari. Quam quidem Origen was the first exponent of this
positionem primus inter theory, and a number of his disciples
Christianae fidei professores followed suit. The theory, indeed,
Origenes posuisse invenitur, et survives to this day among heretics, the
post eum plures ipsum sequentes. Manicheans, for example, siding with
Quae quidem opinio usque hodie Plato in proclaiming the eternity and
apud haereticos manet: quorum transmutation of souls.
Manichaei eas etiam aeternas
asserunt, cum Platone, et de
corpore ad corpus transire.
Sed de facili ostendi potest [8] Now, all these opinions can be easily

praemissas positiones non esse shown to have no foundation in truth. For
veritate subnixas. Quod enim non it has already been proved that there
sit unus omnium intellectus does not exist only one possible agent
possibilis neque agens, iam supra intellect for all men. Hence, it remains for
ostensum est. Unde restat contra us to proceed against those theories
istas positiones procedere quae which, while envisaging the existence of
dicunt plures animas esse many human souls, maintain that they
hominum, et tamen ponunt eas existed before bodies, either from
ante corpora extitisse, sive ab eternity, or from the foundation of the
aeterno sive a mundi constitutione. world. The incongruity of such a notion is
Quod quidem videtur inconveniens exposed by the following arguments.
his rationibus.
Ostensum est enim supra animam [9] For, it has already been established

uniri corpori ut formam et actum that the soul is united to the body as its
ipsius. Actus autem, licet sit form and act. Now, although act is prior in
naturaliter prior potentia, tamen, in its nature to potentiality, nevertheless in
uno et eodem, tempore est one and the same thing it is temporally
posterior: movetur enim aliquid de posterior to it; for a thing is moved from
potentia in actum. Prius igitur fuit potentiality to act. Thus, seed, which is
semen, quod est potentia vivum, potentially living, preceded the soul,
quam esset anima, quae est actus which is the act of life.
vitae.
Adhuc. Unicuique formae naturale [10] Moreover, it is natural to every form
est propriae materiae uniri: to be united to its proper matter;
alioquin constitutum ex forma et otherwise, that which is made of form
materia esset aliquid praeter and matter would be something
naturam. Prius autem attribuitur preternatural. But that which befits a
unicuique quod convenit ei thing naturally is attributed to it before
secundum naturam, quam quod that which befits it preternaturally,
convenit ei praeter naturam: quod because the latter is in it by accident, the
enim convenit alicui praeter former, through itself. Now, that which is
naturam inest ei per accidens, by accident is always posterior to that
quod autem convenit secundum which is through itself. It is, therefore,
naturam inest ei per se; quod becoming to the soul to be united to the
autem per accidens est, semper body before being separated from it. The
posterius est eo quod est per se. soul, then, was not created before the
Animae igitur prius convenit esse body to which it is united.
unitam corpori quam esse a
corpore separatam. Non igitur
creata fuit ante corpus cui unitur.
Amplius. Omnis pars a suo toto [11] Again, every part existing in
separata est imperfecta. Anima separation from its whole is imperfect.
autem, cum sit forma, ut probatum Now, the soul, being a form, as has been
est, est pars speciei humanae. proved, is a part of the specific nature of
Igitur, existens per se absque man. Hence, as long as it exists through
corpore, est imperfecta. Perfectum itself apart from the body, it is imperfect.
autem est prius imperfecto in But in the order of natural things, the
rerum naturalium ordine. Non igitur perfect is prior to the imperfect. It would,
competit naturae ordini quod therefore, be inconsistent with the order
anima fuerit prius creata a corpore of nature were the soul created apart
exuta, quam corpori unita. from the body before being united to it.
Amplius. Si animae sunt creatae [12] And again, if souls are created
absque corporibus, quaerendum without bodies, it must be asked how
est quomodo sint corporibus they are united to bodies. This union
unitae. Aut enim hoc fuit violenter: could he effected in but two ways: by
aut per naturam. Si autem violence or by nature. Now, everything
violenter; omne autem violentum violent is against nature, so that if the
est contra naturam: unio igitur union of soul and body is brought about
animae ad corpus est praeter by violence it is not natural. Hence, man,
naturam. Homo igitur, qui ex who is composed of both, is something
utroque componitur, est quid unnatural; which is obviously false. There
innaturale. Quod patet esse is also the consideration that intellectual
falsum. Praeterea, substantiae substances are of a higher order than the
intellectuales altioris ordinis sunt heavenly bodies. But in the latter there is
quam corpora caelestia. In nothing violent or contrary. Much less,
corporibus autem caelestibus nihil therefore, does any such thing exist in
invenitur violentum neque intellectual substances.
contrarium. Multo igitur minus in [13] Now, if the union of souls to bodies is
substantiis intellectualibus. natural, then, in their creation, souls had
Si autem naturaliter animae sunt a natural desire to be united to bodies.
corporibus unitae, naturaliter igitur Now, natural appetite immediately issues
animae in sui creatione in act if no obstacle stands in the way, as
appetierunt corporibus uniri. we see in the movement of heavy and
Appetitus autem naturalis statim light bodies; for nature always works in
prodit in actum nisi sit aliquid the same way. So, unless something
impediens, sicut patet in motu existed to prevent it, souls would have
gravium et levium: natura enim been united to bodies from the very
semper uno modo operatur. Statim beginning of their creation. But whatever

igitur a principio suae creationis obstructs the realisation of natural
fuissent corporibus unitae nisi appetite does violence to it. That at some
esset aliquid impediens. Sed time souls existed in separation from
omne impediens executionem bodies was therefore the result of
naturalis appetitus, est violentiam violence. And this is incongruous, not
inferens. Per violentiam igitur fuit only because in such substances there
quod animae essent aliquo can be nothing violent, as was shown,
tempore a corporibus separatae. but also because the violent and the
Quod est inconveniens. Tum quia unnatural, being accidental, cannot be
in illis substantiis non potest esse prior to that which is in keeping with
aliquid violentum, ut ostensum est. nature, nor can they be consequent upon
Tum quia violentum, et quod est the total species.
contra naturam, cum sit per
accidens, non potest esse prius eo
quod est secundum naturam,
neque totam speciem
consequens.
Praeterea. Cum unumquodque [14] Furthermore, since everything

naturaliter appetat suam naturally desires its own perfection, it
perfectionem, materiae est pertains to matter to desire form, and not
appetere formam, et non e conversely. But the soul is compared to
converso. Anima autem the body as form to matter, as was
comparatur ad corpus sicut forma shown above.” Therefore, the union of
ad materiam, ut supra ostensum the soul to the body is not brought about
est. Non igitur unio animae ad in response to the desire of the soul, but,
corpus fit per appetitum animae, rather, of the body.
sed magis per appetitum corporis.
Si autem dicatur quod utrumque [15] Now, the argument may be raised
est animae naturale, scilicet uniri that union with the body is natural to the
corpori et esse a corpore soul, as well as separation from it,
separatum, pro diversis according to various periods of time. But
temporibus: hoc videtur esse such a notion seems impossible. For
impossibile. Quia ea quae changes that take place naturally in a
naturaliter variantur circa subject are accidental, such as youth and
subiectum, sunt accidentia: sicut old age; so that, if its union with, and
iuventus et senectus. Si igitur uniri separation from the body are for the soul
corpori et separari a corpore natural changes, then union with the
naturaliter circa animam varietur, body will be an accident of the soul. The
erit accidens animae corpori uniri. human being constituted by this union
Et sic ex hac unione homo therefore will not be an essential but an
constitutus non erit ens per se, accidental being.
sed per accidens.
Praeterea. Omne illud cui accidit [16] Then, too, whatever is subject to
alteritas aliqua secundum alternate phases of existence according
diversitatem temporum, est to various periods of time is subject to the
subiectum caelesti motui, quem movement of the heaven, which the
sequitur totus temporis cursus. whole course of time follows. But
Substantiae autem intellectuales intellectual and incorporeal substances,
et incorporeae, inter quas sunt including separately existing souls,
animae separatae, excedunt totum transcend the entire realm of bodily
ordinem corporum. Unde non things. Hence, they cannot be subject to
possunt esse subiectae the movements of the heavenly bodies.
caelestibus motibus. Impossibile Therefore, it is impossible that they
est igitur quod, secundum diversa should be naturally united during one
tempora, naturaliter uniantur period of time and separated during
quandoque et separentur another, or that they should naturally
quandoque, vel naturaliter nunc desire this at one time, and that at
hoc, nunc illud appetant. another.
Si autem dicatur quod neque per [17] On the other hand, the hypothesis
violentiam neque per naturam that souls are united to bodies neither by
corporibus uniuntur, sed violence nor by nature, but by free
spontanea voluntate: hoc esse choice, is likewise impossible. For no one
non potest. Nullus enim vult in voluntarily enters into a state worse than
statum peiorem venire nisi the previous one, unless he be deceived.
deceptus. Anima autem separata But the separate soul enjoys a higher
est altioris status quam corpori state of existence than when united to
unita: et praecipue secundum the body; especially according to the
Platonicos qui dicunt quod ex Platonists, who say that through its union
unione corporis patitur oblivionem with the body, the soul forgets what it
eorum quae prius scivit, et knew before, its power to contemplate
retardatur a contemplatione pura truth in a pure manner thus being
veritatis. Non igitur volens corpori checked. Hence, the soul is not willingly
unitur nisi decepta. Deceptionis united to the body unless it be the victim
autem nulla in ea causa potest of deception. But there can be nothing in
existere: cum ponatur, secundum the soul that could cause deception,
eos, scientiam omnem habere. since, for the Platonists, the soul is
Nec posset dici quod iudicium ex possessed of all knowledge. Nor can it
universali scientia procedens in be said that the soul’s judgment,
particulari eligibili subvertatur proceeding from universal scientific
propter passiones, sicut accidit in knowledge and applied to a particular
incontinentibus: quia passiones matter of choice, is overwhelmed by the
huiusmodi non sunt absque passions, as in the incontinent; for no
corporali transmutatione; unde non passions of this sort occur without bodily
possunt esse in anima separata. change, and, consequently, they cannot
Relinquitur ergo quod anima, si exist in the separate soul. We are, then,
fuisset ante corpus, non uniretur left with the conclusion that, if the soul
corpori propria voluntate. had existed before the body, it would not
be united to the body of its own will.
Praeterea. Omnis effectus [18] Moreover, every effect issuing from

procedens ex concursu duarum the concurrent operation of two mutually
voluntatum ad invicem non unrelated wills is fortuitous, as in the
ordinatarum, est effectus casualis: case of a person who goes out to shop
sicut patet cum aliquis, intendens and meets his creditor in the market
emere, obviat in foro creditori illuc place without any prior arrangement

non ex condicto venienti. Voluntas between the two. Now, the will of the
autem propria generantis, ex qua generative agent, whereon the body’s
dependet generatio corporis, non production depends, is independent of
habet ordinem cum voluntate the will of the separate soul which wills to
animae separatae uniri volentis. be united. It follows that the union of the
Cum igitur absque utraque soul and body is fortuitous, since it
voluntate unio corporis et animae cannot be effected without the
fieri non possit, sequitur quod sit concurrence of both wills. Thus, the
casualis. Et ita generatio hominis begetting of a man results not from
non est a natura, sed a casu. nature, but from chance, which is
Quod patet esse falsum: cum sit ut patently false, since it occurs in the
in pluribus. majority of cases.
Si autem rursus dicatur quod non [19] Now, again, the theory may be
ex natura, neque ex propria advanced that the soul is united to the
voluntate anima corpori unitur, sed body by divine decree, and not by nature,
ex divina ordinatione: hoc etiam nor of its own will. But such a supposition
non videtur conveniens, si animae also seems inadmissible on the
ante corpora fuerunt creatae. hypothesis that souls were created
Unumquodque enim Deus instituit before bodies. For God established each
secundum convenientem modum thing in being in a mode congruent with
suae naturae: unde et Gen. 1, de its nature. Hence, in the Book of Genesis
singulis creatis dicitur, videns (1:10, 31) it is said of each creature:
Deus quod esset bonum, et simul “God saw that it was good,” and of all
de omnibus, vidit Deus cuncta creatures collectively: “God saw all the
quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. things that He had made, and they were
Si igitur animas creavit a very good.” If, then, God created souls
corporibus separatas, oportet separate from bodies, it must be said that
dicere quod hic modus essendi sit this manner of being is more suitable to
convenientior naturae earum. Non their nature. But it is not becoming to the
est autem ad ordinationem divinae ordering of things by the divine goodness
bonitatis pertinens res ad to relegate them to a lower state, but,
inferiorem statum reducere, sed rather, to raise them to a higher. Hence, it
magis ad meliorem promovere. could not have been by God’s ordinance
Non igitur ex divina ordinatione that the soul was united to the body.
factum fuisset quod anima corpori
uniretur.
Praeterea. Non pertinet ad [20] Moreover, it is inconsistent with the
ordinem divinae sapientiae cum order of divine wisdom to raise up lower
superiorum detrimento ea quae things to the detriment of higher things.
sunt infima nobilitare. Infima But generable and corruptible bodies
autem in rerum ordine sunt have the lowest rank in the order of
corpora generabilia et corruptibilia. things. Hence, it would not have been
Non igitur fuisset conveniens consistent with the order of divine
ordini divinae sapientiae, ad wisdom to ennoble human bodies by
nobilitandum humana corpora, uniting preexisting souls to them, since
animas praeexistentes eis unire: this would be impossible without
cum hoc sine detrimento earum detriment to the latter, as we have
esse non possit, ut ex dictis patet. already seen.
Hoc autem Origenes considerans, [21] Having this point in mind—for he
cum poneret animas humanas a asserted that human souls had been
principio fuisse creatas, dixit quod created from the beginning—Origen said
ordinatione divina animae that they were united to bodies by divine
corporibus sunt unitae, sed in decree, but as a punishment. For Origen
earum poenam. Nam ante corpora thought that souls had sinned before
eas peccasse existimavit; et pro bodies existed, and that according to the
quantitate peccati corporibus gravity of their sin, souls were shut up in
nobilioribus vel minus nobilibus bodies of higher or lower character, as in
eas esse, quasi quibusdam so many prisons.
carceribus, inclusas.
Sed haec positio stare non potest. [22] This doctrine, however, is untenable,
Poena enim bono naturae for, being contrary to a good of nature,
adversatur, et ex hoc dicitur mala. punishment is said to be an evil. If, then,
Si igitur unio animae et corporis the union of soul and body is something
est quoddam poenale, non est penal in character, it is not a good of
bonum naturae. Quod est nature. But this is impossible, for that
impossibile: est enim intentum per union is intended by nature, since natural
naturam; nam ad hoc naturalis generation terminates in it. And again, on
generatio terminatur. Et iterum Origen’s theory, it would follow that man’s
sequeretur quod esse hominem being would not be a good according to
non esset bonum secundum nature, yet it is said, after man’s creation:
naturam: cum tamen Gen. 131 “God saw all the things that He had
dicatur, post hominis creationem, made, and they were very good.”
vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et
erant valde bona.
Praeterea. Ex malo non provenit [23] Furthermore, good does not issue
bonum nisi per accidens. Si igitur from evil save by accident. Therefore, if
propter peccatum animae the soul’s union with the body were due
separatae hoc constitutum est, to sin on the part of the separate soul, it
quod anima corpori uniatur, cum would follow that this union is accidental,
hoc sit quoddam bonum, per since it is a kind of good. In that case the
accidens erit. Casuale igitur fuit production of man was a matter of
quod homo fieret. Quod derogat chance. But such a thing is derogatory to
divinae sapientiae, de qua dicitur, God’s wisdom, of which it is written that
Sap. 1121, quod omnia in “It ordered all things in number, weight,
numero, pondere et mensura and measure” (Wis. 11:21).
instituit.
Adhuc autem et hoc repugnat [24] That notion also clearly clashes with

manifeste apostolicae doctrinae. apostolic doctrine. For St. Paul says of
Dicitur enim Rom. 9 de Iacob et Jacob and Esau, that “when they were
Esau, quod, cum nondum nati not yet born, nor had done any good or
essent aut aliquid boni aut mali evil, it was said that the elder shall serve
egissent, dictum est, quod maior the younger” (Rom. 9:1117). Hence,
serviet minori. Non igitur, before this was said, their souls had not
antequam hoc verbum diceretur, sinned at all, yet the Apostle’s statement
aliquid eorum animae postdates the time of their conception, as
peccaverant: cum tamen hoc post Genesis (25:23) makes clear.
eorum conceptionem dictum fuerit,
ut patet Gen. 2523.
Sunt autem supra, cum de [25] Earlier, in treating of the distinction of

distinctione rerum ageretur, plura things, we leveled against Origen’s
contra Origenis positionem position a number of arguments which
inducta, quae etiam hic possent may also be used here. Omitting them,
assumi. Et ideo, eis praetermissis, therefore, we pass on to others.
ad alia transeundum est.
Item. Necesse est dicere quod [26] It must be said that the human soul
anima humana aut indigeat either needs the senses or does not need
sensibus: aut non. Videtur autem them. Now, experience seems to show
manifeste per id quod experimur, clearly that the former is true. For a
quod indigeat sensibus: quia qui person who lacks a certain sense has no
caret sensu aliquo, non habet knowledge of the sensible objects which
scientiam de sensibilibus quae are perceived through that sense; a man
cognoscuntur per sensum illum; born blind has neither knowledge nor any
sicut caecus natus nullam understanding of colors. Furthermore, if
scientiam habet nec aliquid the human soul does not require the
intelligit de coloribus. Et praeterea, senses in order to understand, then
si non sunt necessarii humanae sensitive and intellective cognition in man
animae sensus ad intelligendum, would have so ordered relationship to
non inveniretur in homine aliquis one another. But experience
ordo sensitivae et intellectivae demonstrates the contrary; for our
cognitionis. Cuius contrarium senses give rise to memories, and from
experimur: nam ex sensibus fiunt these we obtain experiential knowledge
in nobis memoriae, ex quibus of things, which in turn is the means
experimenta de rebus accipimus, through which we come to an
per quae ad comprehendendum understanding of the universal principles
universalia scientiarum et artium of sciences and arts. Now, nature is
principia pervenimus. Si ergo wanting in nothing that is necessary for
anima humana ad intelligendum the fulfillment of its proper operation;
sensibus indiget; natura autem thus, to animals whose soul is endowed
nulli deficit in necessariis ad with powers of sense and movement
propriam operationem explendam, nature gives the appropriate organs of
sicut animalibus habentibus sense and movement. Hence, if the
animam sensitivam et motivam, human soul needs the senses in order to
dat convenientia organa sensus et understand, then that soul would never
motus: non fuisset anima humana have been made to be in the first place
sine necessariis adminiculis without the indispensable assistants
sensuum instituta. Sensus autem which the senses are. But the senses do
non operantur sine organis not function without corporeal organs, as
corporeis, ut ex dictis patet. Non we have seen. The soul, therefore, was
igitur fuit instituta anima sine not made without such organs.
organis corporeis. [27] The argument that the human soul

Si autem anima humana non does not need the senses in order to
indiget sensibus ad intelligendum, understand, and thus is said to have
et propter hoc dicitur absque been created apart from the body,
corpore fuisse creata; oportet necessarily implies that, before being
dicere quod, antequam corpori united to the body, the soul was by itself
uniretur, omnium scientiarum cognizant of all scientific truths. The
veritates intelligebat per seipsam. Platonists indeed admitted this in saying
Quod et Platonici concesserunt, that Ideas, which according to Plato are
dicentes ideas, quae sunt formae the separate intelligible forms of things,
rerum intelligibiles separatae are the cause of knowledge; and thus,
secundum Platonis sententiam, the separate soul, having no obstacle
causam scientiae esse: unde confronting it, received full knowledge of
anima separata, cum nullum all sciences. Therefore, since the soul is
impedimentum adesset, plenarie found to be ignorant when united to the
omnium scientiarum cognitionem body, it must be said that it forgets the
accipiebat. Oportet igitur dicere knowledge which it previously
quod, dum corpori unitur, cum possessed. The Platonists acknowledge
inveniatur ignorans, oblivionem this inference, also, adducing the
praehabitae scientiae patiatur. following observation as indicative of its
Quod etiam Platonici confitentur: truth: If a man, however ignorant he may
huius rei signum esse dicentes be, is questioned systematically about
quod quilibet, quantumcumque matters taught in the sciences, he will
ignoret, ordinate interrogatus de answer the truth; so, if a man has
his quae in scientiis traduntur, forgotten some of the things that he knew
veritatem respondet; sicut, cum before, and a person proposes to him
aliquis iam oblito aliquorum quae one by one the things he has forgotten,
prius scivit, seriatim proponit ea he recalls them to his memory. And from
quae prius fuerat oblitus, in eorum this they inferred that learning was
memoriam ipsum reducit. Ex quo nothing else than remembering. This
etiam sequebatur quod discere theory then necessarily led to the
non esset aliud quam reminisci. conclusion that union with the body
Sic igitur ex hac positione de places an obstacle in the way of the
necessitate concluditur quod unio soul’s understanding. In no case,
corporis animae praestet however, does nature unite a thing to that
intelligentiae impedimentum. Nulli which impedes its operation; on the
autem rei natura adiungit aliquid contrary, nature unites the thing to that
propter quod sua operatio which facilitates its operation. Thus, the
impediatur: sed magis ea per quae union of body and soul will not be natural,
fiat convenientior. Non igitur erit so that man will not be a natural thing,
unio corporis et animae naturalis. nor will his engendering be natural;
Et sic homo non erit res naturalis, which, of course, is false.
nec eius generatio naturalis. Quae
patet esse falsa.
Praeterea. Ultimus finis rei [28] The ultimate end of every thing,
cuiuslibet est illud ad quod res moreover, is that which it strives to attain
pervenire nititur per suas by its operations. But man, by all his
operationes. Sed per omnes proper operations fittingly ordered and

proprias operationes ordinatas et rightly directed, strives to attain the
rectas homo pervenire nititur in contemplation of truth; for the operations
veritatis contemplationem: nam of the active powers are certain
operationes virtutum activarum preparations and dispositions to the
sunt quaedam praeparationes et contemplative powers. The end of man,
dispositiones ad virtutes therefore, is to arrive at the
contemplativas. Finis igitur contemplation of truth. It is for this
hominis est pervenire ad purpose, then, that the soul is united to
contemplationem veritatis. Propter the body, and in this union does man’s
hoc igitur anima est unita corpori: being consist. Therefore, it is not union
quod est esse hominem. Non igitur with the body that causes the soul to lose
per hoc quod unitur corpori, knowledge which it had possessed; on
scientiam habitam perdit, sed the contrary, the soul is united to the
magis ei unitur ut scientiam body so that it may acquire knowledge.
acquirat.
Item. Si aliquis scientiarum ignarus [29] Then, too, if a person ignorant of the
de his quae ad scientias pertinent sciences is questioned about matters
interrogetur, non respondebit pertaining to the sciences, his answers
veritatem nisi de universalibus will not be true, except with regard to the
principiis, quae nullus ignorat, sed universal principles of which no one is
sunt ab omnibus eodem modo et ignorant, but which are known by all in
naturaliter cognita. Postmodum the same way and naturally. But, if that
autem ordinate interrogatus, ignorant person is questioned
respondebit veritatem de his quae systematically later on, he will answer
sunt propinqua principiis, habito truly concerning matters closely related
respectu ad principia; et sic to the principles, by referring them to the
deinceps quousque virtutem latter; and he will go on answering truly
primorum principiorum ad ea de as long as he is able to apply the power
quibus interrogatur, applicare of first principles to the subjects about
potest. Ex hoc igitur manifeste which he is questioned. This makes it
apparet quod per principia prima, quite clear, therefore, that through the
in eo qui interrogatur, causatur primary principles new knowledge is
cognitio de novo. Non igitur prius caused in the person questioned. This
habitae notitiae reminiscitur. new knowledge, then, is not caused by
recalling to memory things previously
known.
Praeterea. Si ita esset animae [30] Furthermore, if the knowledge of
naturalis cognitio conclusionum conclusions were as natural to the soul
sicut principiorum, eadem esset as knowledge of principles, then
sententia apud omnes de everyone’s judgment concerning
conclusionibus sicut de principiis: conclusions, as well as principles, would
quia quae sunt naturalia, sunt be the same, since things natural are the
eadem apud omnes. Non est same for all. But not all persons share
autem apud omnes eadem the same judgment in respect to
sententia de conclusionibus, sed conclusions, but only to principles.
solum de principiis. Patet igitur Clearly, then, the knowledge of principles
quod cognitio principiorum est is natural to us, but not the knowledge of
nobis naturalis, non autem conclusions. The nonnatural, however, is

conclusionum. Quod autem non acquired by us through the natural; thus it
est naturale nobis, acquirimus per is through our hands that we produce, in
id quod est naturale: sicut etiam in the world of things outside us, all our
exterioribus per manus instituimus artifacts. Therefore, we have no
omnia artificialia. Non ergo knowledge of conclusions except that
conclusionum scientia est in nobis which we acquire from principles.
nisi ex principiis acquisita.
Adhuc. Cum natura semper [31] Again, since nature is always
ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis directed to one thing, of one power there
oportet esse naturaliter unum must naturally be one object, as color of
obiectum: sicut visus colorem, et sight, and sound of hearing. Hence, the
auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur intellect, being one power, has one
cum sit una vis, est eius unum natural object, of which it has knowledge
naturale obiectum, cuius per se et essentially and naturally. And this object
naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc must be one under which are included all
autem oportet esse id sub quo things known by the intellect; just as
comprehenduntur omnia ab under color are included all colors
intellectu cognita: sicut sub colore essentially visible. Now, this is none other
comprehenduntur omnes colores, than being [ens]. Our intellect, therefore,
qui sunt per se visibiles. Quod non knows being naturally, and whatever
est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter essentially belongs to a being as such;
igitur intellectus noster cognoscit and upon this knowledge is founded the
ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis knowledge of first principles, such as the
inquantum huiusmodi; in qua impossibility of simultaneously affirming
cognitione fundatur primorum and denying, and the like. Thus, only
principiorum notitia, ut non esse these principles are known naturally by
simul affirmare et negare, et alia our intellect, while conclusions are known
huiusmodi. Haec igitur sola through them; just as, through color, sight
principia intellectus noster is cognizant of both common and
naturaliter cognoscit, conclusiones accidental sensibles.
autem per ipsa: sicut per colorem
cognoscit visus tam communia
quam sensibilia per accidens.
Praeterea. Id quod per sensum in [32] And again. That which we acquire
nobis acquiritur, non infuit animae through the senses did not exist in the
ante corpus. Sed ipsorum soul before its union with the body. But
principiorum cognitio in nobis ex our knowledge of principles themselves
sensibilibus causatur: nisi enim is derived from sensible things; if, for
aliquod totum sensu instance, we had not perceived some
percepissemus, non possemus whole by our senses, we would be
intelligere quod totum esset maius unable to understand the principle that
parte; sicut nec caecus natus the whole is greater than its parts; even
aliquid percipit de coloribus. Ergo as a man born blind is utterly insensible
nec ipsorum principiorum cognitio of colors. Therefore, neither did the soul
affuit animae ante corpus. Multo prior to its union with the body have any
igitur minus aliorum. Non igitur knowledge of principles; much less, of
firma est Platonis ratio quod anima other things. Hence, Plato’s argument

fuit antequam corpori uniretur. that the soul existed before its union with
the body is without solidity.
Item. Si omnes animae [33] There is also the argument that if all

praeextiterunt corporibus quibus souls existed before the bodies to which
uniuntur, consequens videtur quod they are united, it would then seemingly
eadem anima secundum follow that the same soul is united to
vicissitudinem temporum diversis different bodies according to the
corporibus uniatur. Quod quidem vicissitudes of time—an obvious
aperte consequitur ponentes consequence of the doctrine of the
aeternitatem mundi. Si enim eternity of the world. For from the
generatio hominum est hypothesis of the engendering of human
sempiterna, oportet infinita corpora beings from eternity it follows that an
humana generari et corrumpi infinite number of human bodies have
secundum totum temporis come into being and passed away
decursum. Aut ergo oportebit throughout the whole course of time.
dicere animas praeextitisse actu Hence, two possibilities: either an
infinitas, si singulae animae actually infinite number of souls pre
singulis corporibus uniuntur: aut existed, if each soul is united to a single
oportebit dicere, si animae sunt body, or, if the number of souls is finite,
finitae, quod eaedem uniantur then the same souls are united at one
nunc his, nunc illis corporibus. time to these particular bodies and at
Idem autem videtur sequi si another time to those. And seemingly we
ponantur animae praefuisse would be faced with the same
corporibus, et tamen generatio consequence if we held that souls
non sit aeterna. Etsi enim ponatur existed before bodies but that they were
humana generatio non semper not produced from eternity. For, even if it
fuisse, tamen nulli dubium est quin be supposed that the engendering of
secundum naturam in infinitum men has not always been in progress,
possit durare: sic enim est nevertheless, in the very nature of the
unusquisque naturaliter institutus, case, it indubitably can be of infinite
nisi per accidens impediatur, ut, duration; because every man is so
sicut est ab alio generatus, ita constituted by nature that, unless he be
possit alium generare. Hoc autem impeded accidentally, he is able to beget
esset impossibile, si, animabus another man, even as he himself was
existentibus finitis, una pluribus begotten of another. But this would be
corporibus uniri non possit. Unde impossible if, given the existence of a
et plures ponentium animas ante finite number of souls, one soul cannot
corpora, ponunt transitum animae be united to several bodies. That is why a
de corpore in corpus. Hoc autem number of proponents of the doctrine that
est impossibile. Non igitur animae souls exist before bodies espoused the
ante corpora praeextiterunt. theory of transmigration; which cannot
Quod autem sit impossibile unam possibly be true. Therefore, souls did not
animam diversis corporibus uniri, exist before bodies.
sic patet. Animae enim humanae [34] Now, the impossibility of one soul’s
non differunt specie ab invicem, being united to diverse bodies is clearly
sed numero solo: alioquin et seen in the light of the following
homines specie differrent. considerations. Human souls do not differ
Differentia autem secundum specifically from one another, but only
numerum est secundum principia numerically; otherwise, men also would

materialia. Oportet igitur differ specifically, one from the other.
diversitatem animarum secundum Material principles, however, are the
aliquid materiale sumi. Non autem source of numerical distinction. It follows
ita quod ipsius animae sit materia that the distinction among human souls
pars: ostensum est enim supra must be attributed to something material
quod est substantia intellectualis, in character—but not so as to imply that
et quod nulla talis substantia matter is a part of the soul, because the
materiam habet. Relinquitur ergo soul is an intellectual substance, and no
quod secundum ordinem ad such substance has matter, as we have
diversas materias quibus animae proved above. It therefore remains that in
uniuntur, diversitas et pluralitas the manner explained above the diversity
animarum sumatur, eo modo quo and plurality of souls result from their
supra dictum est. Si igitur sunt relationship to the diverse matters to
diversa corpora, necesse est quod which they are united; so that, if there are
habeant diversas animas sibi different bodies, they must have different
unitas. Non igitur una pluribus souls united to them. One soul, then, is
unitur. not united to several bodies.
Adhuc. Ostensum est supra [35] Moreover, it was shown above that
animam uniri corpori ut formam. the soul is united to the body as its form.
Formas autem oportet esse But forms must be proportionate to their
propriis materiis proportionatas: proper matters, since they are related to
cum se habeant ad invicem sicut one another as act to potentiality, the
potentia et actus; proprius enim proper act corresponding to the proper
actus propriae potentiae potentiality. Therefore, one soul is not
respondet. Non ergo una anima united to a number of bodies.
pluribus corporibus unitur.
Amplius. Virtutem motoris oportet [36] We argue further from the fact that
esse suo mobili proportionatam: the power of the mover must be
non enim quaecumque virtus proportionate to the thing movable by it,
movet quodcumque mobile. Anima for not every power moves every
autem, etsi non sit forma corporis, movable. But, even if the soul were not
non tamen potest dici quod non sit the form of the body, it could not be said
motor ipsius: animatum enim ab that the soul is not the body’s mover, for
inanimato distinguimus sensu et we distinguish the animate from the
motu. Oportet igitur secundum inanimate by sense and movement. It
diversitatem corporum esse therefore follows that the distinction
diversitatem animarum. among souls must correspond to the
distinction among bodies.
Item. In his quae generantur et [37] Likewise, in the realm of things
corrumpuntur, impossibile est per subject to generation and corruption it is
generationem reiterari idem impossible for one and the same thing to
numero: cum enim generatio et be reproduced by generation; for
corruptio sit motus in substantiam, generation and corruption are
in his quae generantur et movements in respect of substance, so

corrumpuntur non manet that in things generated and corrupted
substantia eadem, sicut manet in the substance does not remain the same,
his quae secundum locum as it does in things moved locally. But, if
moventur. Sed si una anima one soul is united successively to
diversis corporibus generatis different generated bodies, the selfsame
unitur successive, redibit idem man will come into being again through
numero homo per generationem. generation. This follows necessarily for
Quod Platoni de necessitate Plato, who said that man is a “soul
sequitur, qui dixit hominem esse clothed with a body.” This consequence
animam corpore indutam. Sequitur also holds for any others. For a thing’s
etiam et aliis quibuscumque: quia, unity follows upon its form, even as its
cum unitas rei sequatur formam, being does, so that those things are one
sicut et esse, oportet quod illa sint in number whose form is one in number.
unum numero quorum est forma It is, therefore, impossible for one soul to
numero una. Non igitur est be united to different bodies. From this it
possibile unam animam diversis follows, too, that souls were not in
corporibus uniri. Ex quo etiam existence before bodies.
sequitur quod nec animae fuerunt
ante corpora.
Huic autem veritati Catholicae fidei [38] With this truth the Catholic faith

sententia concordat. Dicitur enim expressly agrees. For it is said in a
in Psalmo: qui finxit singillatim Psalm (32:15): “He who made the hearts
corda eorum: quia scilicet of every one of them”; namely, because
unicuique seorsum Deus animam God created a soul specially for each
fecit, non autem simul omnes one, and neither created them all
creavit, neque unam diversis together, nor united one to different
corporibus adiunxit. Hinc etiam in bodies. In this connection also we read in
libro de Ecclesiast. dogmatibus the work On the Teachings of the Church:
dicitur: animas hominum dicimus “We declare that human souls were not
non esse ab initio inter ceteras created from the beginning together with
intellectuales naturas, nec simul other intellectual natures, nor all at the
creatas, sicut Origenes fingit. same time, as Origen imagines.”
Caput 84 Chapter 84
Solutio rationum praemissarum SOLUTION OF THE PRECEDING
ARGUMENTS
Rationes autem quibus probatur [1] The arguments in proof of the
animas ab aeterno fuisse, vel saltem thesis that souls have existed from
corporibus praeextitisse, facile est eternity, or that at least they existed
solvere. before bodies, are easily solved.
Quod enim primo dicitur, animam [2] As to the first argument, the
habere virtutem ut sit semper, statement that the soul has the power
concedi oportet: sed sciendum quod to exist always, must be granted. But it

virtus et potentia rei non se extendit must be borne in mind that the power
ad id quod fuit, sed ad id quod est vel and potentiality of a thing extend not
erit; unde et in praeteritis possibilitas to what was, but to what is or will be;
locum non habet. Non igitur ex hoc hence, there is no possibility with
quod anima habet virtutem ut sit respect to things past. Therefore, from
semper, potest concludi quod semper the fact that the soul has the power to
fuerit; sed quod semper erit. exist always it can be concluded, not
that the soul always was, but that it
always will be.
Praeterea. Ex virtute non sequitur id [3] Moreover, that to which a power is

ad quod est virtus, nisi supposita ordained does not follow from the
virtute. Quamvis igitur anima habeat power except on the supposition of the
virtutem ut sit semper, non tamen latter’s existence. Therefore, though
potest concludi quod anima sit the soul have the power to exist
semper, nisi postquam hanc virtutem always, it cannot be inferred that the
accepit. Si autem sumatur quod hanc soul does exist always, except after it
virtutem ab aeterno habuerit, erit has actually received this power; and
petitum id quod oportebit probari, if it is assumed that the soul has
scilicet quod fuerit ab aeterno. received this power from eternity, the
point that has to be proved, namely,
the soul’s existence from eternity, will
be begged.
Quod vero secundo obiicitur, de [4] The second argument, concerning

aeternitate veritatis, quam intelligit the eternity of the truth which the soul
anima, considerare oportet quod understands, calls for a distinction. In
intellectae veritatis aeternitas potest one way, this eternity can be taken to
intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, quantum refer to the thing understood; in
ad id quod intelligitur; alio modo, another, to that by which it is
quantum ad id quo intelligitur. Et si understood. In the first case, the thing
quidem veritas intellecta sit aeterna understood would be eternal, but not
quantum ad id quod intelligitur, the one who understands; in the
sequetur aeternitas rei quae second, eternity would be on the side
intelligitur, non autem intelligentis. Si of the soul which understands. Now,
autem veritas intellecta sit aeterna the understood truth is eternal, not in
quantum ad id quo intelligitur, the latter but in the former reference;
sequeretur intelligentem animam since, a we have already clearly
esse aeternam. Sic autem veritas shown, the intelligible species,
intellecta non est aeterna, sed primo whereby our soul understands truth,
modo: ex praemissis enim patet come to us repeatedly ham the
species intelligibiles quibus anima phantasms through the operation of
nostra intelligit veritatem, de novo the agent intellect. It cannot, then, he
nobis advenire ex phantasmatibus inferred that the soul is eternal, but
per intellectum agentem. Unde non that the truths understood are based
potest concludi quod anima sit upon something eternal; for, indeed,
aeterna: sed quod veritates their foundation is in the first truth, as
intellectae fundentur in aliquo in the universal cause embracing all
aeterno; fundantur enim in prima truth. But the soul stands in relation to
veritate, sicut in causa universali this eternal entity, not as subject to
contentiva omnis veritatis. Ad hoc form, but as thing to proper end, since
autem aeternum comparatur anima, the true is the good of the intellect,
non sicut subiectum ad formam, sed and its end. Now, argument
sicut res ad proprium finem: nam concerning a thing’s duration can be
verum est bonum intellectus et finis drawn from its end, just as the
ipsius. Ex fine autem argumentum question of its beginning is arguable
accipere possumus de rei duratione, through its efficient cause; for, indeed,
sicut et de initio rei argumentari a thing ordained to an eternal end
possumus per causam agentem: must be capable of enduring forever.
quod enim est ordinatum ad finem That is why the soul’s immortality can
sempiternum, oportet esse capax be proved from the eternity of
perpetuae durationis. Unde potest intelligible truth, but not its eternity.
probari ex aeternitate veritatis And what we have already said on the
intelligibilis immortalitas animae, non question of the eternity of creatures
autem eius aeternitas. Quod vero makes it quite clear that the eternity of
etiam non possit probari ex the soul cannot be demonstrated from
aeternitate agentis, patet ex his quae the eternity of its efficient cause.
supra dicta sunt cum de aeternitate
creaturarum quaereretur.
Quod etiam tertio obiicitur, de [5] The third argument, in regard to the

perfectione universi, necessitatem perfection of the universe, is void of
non habet. Universi enim perfectio necessity. For the perfection of the
attenditur quantum ad species, non universe envisages species, not
autem quantum ad individua: cum individuals; since the universe is
continue universo plurima individua constantly receiving the addition of
addantur praeexistentium specierum. myriad individuals of preexisting
Animae autem humanae non sunt species. Human souls, however, do
diversae secundum speciem, sed not differ in specific nature but only in
solum numero, ut probatum est. Unde number, as was shown above. Hence,
non repugnat perfectioni universi si it is not incompatible with the
animae de novo creentur. perfection of the universe if new souls
be created.
Ex quo etiam patet solutio ad id quod [6] And from this we see the solution

quarto obiicitur. Simul enim dicitur, of the fourth argument. For in the
Gen. 1, quod Deus consummavit Book of Genesis (2:2) it is said at the
opera sua, et quod requievit ab omni same time that “God ended His work,”
opere quod patrarat. Sicut ergo and that “He rested from an His work
consummatio sive perfectio which He had done.” Hence, just as
creaturarum secundum species the consummation or perfection of
consideratur et non secundum creatures is considered in terms of
individua, ita quies Dei est species, not individuals, so God’s
intelligenda secundum cessationem a resting must be understood to refer to
novis speciebus condendis: non cessation from forming new species,
autem a novis individuis, quorum but not new individuals, of which
similia secundum speciem others specifically alike have existed
praecesserunt. Et sic, cum omnes before. Thus, since all human souls
animae humanae sint unius speciei are of one species, and likewise all
sicut et omnes homines, non men, it is not inconsistent with God’s
repugnat praedictae quieti si Deus rest if He creates new souls every day.
quotidie novas animas creat.
Sciendum autem est quod ab [7] Now, it should be known that in
Aristotele non invenitur dictum quod Aristotle we do not find the statement
intellectus humanus sit aeternus: that the human intellect is eternal; yet
quod tamen dicere consuevit in his he customarily says this of those
quae secundum suam opinionem things which he thinks have existed
semper fuerunt. Dicit autem ipsum always. But he does say that the
esse perpetuum: quod quidem potest human intellect is everlasting; and this
dici de his quae semper erunt, etiam can be said of those things that
si non semper fuerunt. Unde et in XI always will be, even if they have not
Metaphys., cum animam intellectivam always been. Hence, when Aristotle,
a conditione aliarum formarum in Metaphysics XI [3], excepted the
exciperet, non dixit quod haec forma intellective soul from the condition of
fuerit ante materiam, quod tamen other forms, he did not say that it was
Plato de ideis dicebat, et sic videbatur prior to matter, but Plato said this of
conveniens materiae in qua the Ideas; and so it would seem that
loquebatur ut aliquid tale de anima Aristotle might consistently have said
diceret: sed dixit quod manet post something of the sort here about the
corpus. soul; but what he did say was that the
soul remains after the body.
Caput 85 Chapter 85
Quod anima non sit de substantia THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF
Dei GOD’S SUBSTANCE
Ex his etiam patet animam non [1] Things already said make it quite
esse de substantia Dei. clear that the soul is not of God’s
substance.
Ostensum est enim supra divinam [2] For it was shown in Book I of this
substantiam esse aeternam, nec work that the divine substance is
aliquid eius de novo incipere. eternal, and that no perfection of it has
Animae autem humanae non any beginning. Human souls, however,
fuerunt ante corpora, ut ostensum did not exist before bodies, as we have
est. Non igitur anima potest esse just shown. Therefore, the soul cannot
de substantia divina. be made of God’s substance.
Amplius. Ostensum est supra quod [3] It was likewise shown in Book I that

Deus nullius rei forma esse potest. God cannot be the form of anything. But
Anima autem humana est forma the human soul is, as proved above, the
corporis, ut ostensum est. Non form of the body. Therefore, it is not of
igitur est de substantia divina. the divine substance.
Praeterea. Omne illud ex quo fit [4] Moreover, everything from which
aliquid, est in potentia ad id quod fit something is made is in potentiality to
ex eo. Substantia autem Dei non that which is made from it. But the divine
est in potentia ad aliquid: cum sit substance is not in potentiality to
purus actus, ut supra ostensum est. anything, since it is pure act, as was
Impossibile est igitur quod ex shown in Book I. Therefore, neither the
substantia Dei fiat anima, vel soul nor anything else can possibly be
quodcumque aliud. made from God’s substance.
Adhuc. Illud ex quo fit aliquid, [5] Then, too, that from which something

aliquo modo mutatur. Deus autem is made is in some way changed. But
est omnino immobilis, ut supra God is absolutely unchangeable, as was
probatum est. Impossibile est igitur proved in Book I It is, therefore,
quod ex eo aliquid fieri possit. impossible for anything to be made from
Him.
Amplius. In anima manifeste [6] Furthermore, that the soul suffers
apparet variatio secundum variations in knowledge and virtue, and
scientiam et virtutem et eorum their opposites, is a fact of observation.
opposita. Deus autem est omnino But in God there is absolutely no
invariabilis, et per se et per variation, either through himself or by
accidens. Non igitur anima potest accident.
esse de substantia divina.
Item. Supra ostensum est quod [7] Also, it was shown in Book I that God

Deus est actus purus, in quo nulla is pure act, completely devoid of
potentialitas invenitur. In anima potentiality. But in the human soul we
autem humana invenitur et potentia find both potentiality and act, since it
et actus: est enim in ea intellectus contains the possible intellect, which is
possibilis, qui est potentia ad omnia in potentiality to all intelligibles, as well
intelligibilia, et intellectus agens, ut as the agent intellect, as was shown
ex supra dictis patet. Non est igitur above. Therefore, it is not of God’s
anima humana de natura divina. nature that the human soul is made.
Item. Cum substantia divina sit [8] Again, since the divine substance is
omnino impartibilis, non potest utterly indivisible, the soul cannot be
aliquid substantiae eius esse anima part of it, but only the whole substance,
nisi sit tota substantia eius. But the divine substance can be one
Substantiam autem divinam only, as shown in Book I. It therefore
impossibile est esse nisi unam, ut follows that of all men there is but one
supra ostensum est. Sequitur igitur soul so far as intellect is concerned. And
quod omnium hominum sit tantum this was disproved above. Therefore,
anima una quantum ad intellectum. the soul is not made of God’s
Et hoc supra improbatum est. Non substance.
est igitur anima de substantia
divina.
Videtur autem haec opinio ex triplici [9] Now, the theory that the soul is part
fonte processisse. Quidam enim and parcel of God’s own substance or
posuerunt nullam substantiam nature seems to have had three
incorpoream esse. Unde sources: the doctrine that no substance
nobilissimum corporum Deum esse is incorporeal; the doctrine that there is
dicebant, sive hoc esset aer, sive but one intellect for all men; the very
ignis, sive quodcumque aliud likeness of our soul to God. As to the
principium ponebant, et de natura first source, some, having denied that
huius corporis animam esse any substance is incorporeal, asserted
dicebant: nam omnes id quod that God is the noblest body, whether it
ponebant principium, animae be air or fire or anything else putatively
attribuebant, ut patet per a principle, and that the soul was of the
Aristotelem in I de anima. Et sic nature of this body. For, as Aristotle
sequebatur animam esse de points out [De Anima I, 2], the partisans
substantia divina. Et ex hac radice of this doctrine all attributed to the soul
pullulavit positio Manichaei, qui whatever to their mind had the character
existimavit Deum esse quandam of a principle. So, from this position, it
lucem corpoream per infinita spatia followed that the soul is of the
distensam, cuius quandam substance of God. And from this root
particulam humanam animam esse sprang the theory of Manes, who held
dicebat. that God is a luminous body Wended
Haec autem positio supra through infinite space, and of this body,
improbata est, et per hoc quod he said, the human soul is a fragment.
ostensum est Deum non esse [10] This theory, however, was
corpus; et per hoc quod ostensum previously refuted by the demonstration
est animam etiam humanam corpus that God is not a body, as well as the
non esse, nec aliquam proof that neither the human soul nor
intellectualem substantiam. any intellectual substance is a body.
Quidam vero posuerunt intellectum [11] As to the second source indicated
omnium hominum esse unum, vel above, some have held that of all men
agentem tantum, vel agentem et there is but a single intellect, whether an
possibilem simul, sicut supra agent intellect alone, or an agent and a
dictum est. Et quia quamlibet possible intellect together, as we
substantiam separatam antiqui explained above. And since the ancients
Deum esse dicebant, sequebatur attributed divinity to every separate
animam nostram, idest intellectum substance, it followed that our soul, the
quo intelligimus, esse divinae intellect by which we understand, is of
naturae. Unde et a quibusdam the nature of the divine. And that is why
nostri temporis Christianae fidei in this age certain persons who profess
professoribus, ponentibus the Christian faith and who posit a
intellectum agentem separatum, separately existing agent intellect
dictum est expresse quod explicitly identify the agent intellect with
intellectus agens sit Deus. God.
Haec autem positio de unitate [12] Now, this whole doctrine of the
intellectus nostri supra improbata unicity of man’s intellect has already
est. been refuted.
Potuit autem et ex ipsa similitudine [13] In the very likeness of our soul to
animae nostrae ad Deum haec God may be found the third source of
opinio nasci. Intelligere enim, quod the theory that the soul is of the
maxime aestimatur proprium Dei, substance or nature of God Himself. For
nulli substantiae in mundo inferiori we find that understanding, which is
convenire invenitur nisi homini, thought to be proper to God above all, is
propter animam. Unde videri potuit possessed by no substance in this lower
animam ad naturam divinam world except man—and this on account
pertinere. Et praesertim apud of his soul. It might, then, seem that the
homines in quorum opinionibus erat soul partakes of the nature of God; and
firmatum quod anima hominis esset this notion might appeal especially to
immortalis. persons firmly convinced of the
immortality of the human soul.
Ad hoc etiam coadiuvare videtur [14] This idea even seems to find
quod Gen. 126, postquam dictum support in the Book of Genesis (1:26),
est: faciamus hominem ad where, after the statement, “Let us make
imaginem et similitudinem nostram, man to Our image and likeness,” it is
subditur: formavit Deus hominem added: “God formed man of the slime of
de limo terrae, et inspiravit in the earth; and breathed into his face the
faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Ex breath of life.” From this text some
quo quidam accipere voluerunt wished to infer that the soul is of the
quod anima sit de natura divina. very nature of God. For, since he who
Qui enim in faciem alterius spirat, breathes into another’s face puts forth
idem numero quod in ipso erat, in into the latter numerically the same thing
alium emittit. Et sic videtur Scriptura that was in himself, holy Scripture itself
innuere quod aliquid divinum a Deo would here seem to imply that God put
in hominem ad ipsum vivificandum into man something divine in order to
immissum sit. give him life.
Sed similitudo praedicta non [15] But the likeness in question is no
ostendit hominem esse aliquid proof that man is a part of the divine
substantiae divinae: cum in substance, for man’s understanding
intelligendo defectum multipliciter suffers from many defects—which
patiatur, quod de Deo dici non cannot be said of God’s. This likeness,
potest. Unde haec similitudo magis then, is rather indicative of a certain
est indicativa cuiusdam imperfectae imperfect image than of any
imaginis quam alicuius consubstantiality. And, indeed, Scripture
consubstantialitatis. Quod etiam implies this in saying that man was
Scriptura innuit cum dicit ad made “to the image” of God. And thus
imaginem Dei hominem factum. the “breathing” of which Genesis speaks
Unde et inspiratio praedicta signifies the pouring forth of life from
processum vitae a Deo in hominem God into man according to a certain
secundum quandam similitudinem likeness, and not according to unity of
demonstrat, non secundum substance. So, too, “the spirit of life” is
unitatem substantiae. Propter quod said to have been “breathed into his
et in faciem spiritus vitae dicitur face,” for, since the organs of several
inspiratus: quia, cum in hac parte senses are located in this part of the
corporis sint plurium sensuum body, life is more palpably manifested in
organa sita, in ipsa facie evidentius the face. God, therefore, is said to have
vita monstratur. Sic igitur Deus breathed the spirit into man’s face,
inspirasse in faciem hominis because He gave man the spirit of life,
spiraculum dicitur, quia spiritum but not by detaching it from His own
vitae homini dedit, non eum ex sua substance. For he who literally breathes
substantia decidendo. Nam et qui into the face of someone—and this
corporaliter insufflat in faciem bodily breathing is evidently the source
alicuius, unde videtur sumpta esse of the Scriptural metaphor—blows air
metaphora, aerem in faciem eius into his face, but does not infuse part of
impellit, non autem aliquam suae his substance into him.
substantiae partem in ipsum
immittit.
Caput 86 Chapter 86
Quod anima humana non THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT
traducatur cum semine TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN
Ex praemissis autem ostendi [1] From points previously established it

potest quod anima humana non can be shown that the human soul is not
traducitur cum semine, quasi per transmitted with the semen, as though it
coitum seminata. were begotten by coition.
Quorumcumque enim principiorum [2] For any principles whatever whose

operationes non possunt esse operations cannot be without the body
sine corpore, nec eorum initium cannot without the body begin to be at all;
sine corpore esse potest: sic enim a thing’s way of being and its way of
res habet esse sicut et operatur, operating are in mutual accord, since
cum unumquodque operetur everything operates inasmuch as it is a
inquantum est ens. E contrario being. Contrariwise, those principles
vero, quorum principiorum whose operations are performed without
operationes sunt sine corpore, the body are not generated through the
eorum generatio non est per generation of the body. Now, the nutritive
generationem corporis. Operatio and sensitive soul cannot operate
autem animae nutritivae et independently of the body, as we have
sensitivae non potest esse sine seen before. On the other hand, as we
corpore, ut ex praemissis patet. have likewise pointed out, the intellective
Operatio autem animae soul does not operate through any bodily
intellectivae non fit per organum organ. Therefore, the nutritive and
corporeum, ut supra habitum est. sensitive souls are brought into being
Igitur anima nutritiva et sensitiva through the body’s engendering; but not
per generationem corporis the intellective soul. The transmission of
generatur: non autem anima the semen, however, has as its aim the
intellectiva. Sed traductio seminis generation of the body. It is, therefore,
ad corporis generationem through the transmission of the semen
ordinatur. Igitur anima nutritiva et that the nutritive and sensitive souls
sensitiva esse incipiunt per begin to be; but this is not true of the
seminis traductionem, non autem intellective soul.
intellectiva.
Adhuc. Si anima humana per [3] Moreover, there are but two ways in
traductionem seminis esse which the human soul could conceivably
inciperet, hoc non posset esse nisi originate through the transmission of the
dupliciter. Uno modo, ut semen. First, it might be thought to exist
intelligeretur esse in semine actu, in the semen actually, as though it were
quasi per accidens divisa ab parted by accident from the soul of the
anima generantis, sicut semen generative agent, in the manner in which
dividitur a corpore: ut videmus in the semen is separated from the body. A
animalibus anulosis, quae decisa case in point are annulose animals which
vivunt, in quibus est anima una in live after being cut in two and which
actu et multae in potentia; diviso contain one soul actually and several
autem corpore animalis praedicti, potentially, since, when the body of such
in qualibet parte vivente incipit an animal is divided, the soul begins to
anima esse actu. Alio modo, ut exist actually in each living part. Second,
intelligatur in semine esse virtus the semen might be thought to possess a
productiva animae intellectivae: ut power productive of the intellective soul,
sic anima intellectiva ponatur esse and thus the latter would be held to exist
in semine virtute, sed non actu. virtually in the semen, but not actually.
Primum autem horum est [4] Now, the first of these is impossible for

impossibile, duplici ratione. Primo two reasons. One: since the intellective
quia, cum anima intellectiva sit soul is the most perfect of souls and its
perfectissima animarum et power the highest, its proper perfectible
maximae virtutis, eius proprium subject is a body having many different
perfectibile est corpus habens organs through which its multifarious
magnam diversitatem in organis, operations can be carried out; and that is
per quae possunt multiplices eius why the soul cannot possibly be actually
operationes expleri. Unde non present in the semen separated from the
potest esse quod fiat actu in body; for, indeed, not even the souls of
semine deciso: quia nec etiam perfect brute animals are multiplied by
animae brutorum perfectorum per division, as with annulose animals. And
decisionem multiplicantur, prout the second reason is this. The intellect,
contingit in animalibus anulosis. which is the proper and principal power of
Secundo quia, cum intellectus, qui the intellective soul, is not the act of any
est propria et principalis virtus part of the body, and therefore it cannot
animae intellectivae, non sit be divided accidentally as a result of the
alicuius partis corporis actus, non body’s being divided. Nor, then, can the
potest dividi per accidens intellective soul be so divided.
secundum corporis divisionem.
Unde nec anima intellectiva.
Secundum etiam est impossibile. [5] The seconds is also impossible. For it

Virtus enim activa quae est in is by transmuting the body that the active
semine, agit ad generationem power in the semen contributes to the
animalis transmutando corpus: generation of the animal; indeed, a power
non enim aliter agere potest virtus present in matter cannot act otherwise.
quae est in materia. Sed omnis But every form that is initiated through
forma quae incipit esse per the transmutation of matter is dependent

transmutationem materiae, habet upon matter for its being, since by this
esse a materia dependens: means the form is made actual from
transmutatio enim materiae reducit being potential, and thus the material
eam de potentia in actum, et sic transmutation issues in the actual being
terminatur ad esse actu materiae, of the matter through its union with the
quod est per unionem formae; form. Hence, if in this way the form also
unde, si per hoc etiam incipiat begins to be simply, then the form will
esse formae simpliciter, esse have no being at all except that which
formae non erit nisi in hoc quod accrues to it through being united to a
est uniri materiae, et sic erit matter; that is to say, the form will be
secundum esse a materia dependent on matter for its being. Hence,
dependens. Si igitur anima from the hypothesis that the human soul
humana producatur in esse per is brought into being through the active
virtutem activam quae est in power in the semen it follows that its
semine, sequitur quod esse suum being depends upon matter, as with other
sit dependens a materia, sicut material forms. But the contrary of this
esse aliarum formarum has already been proved. The intellective
materialium. Cuius contrarium soul, therefore, is in no way produced
supra ostensum est. Nullo igitur through the transmission of the semen.
modo anima intellectiva producitur
in esse per seminis traductionem.
Amplius. Omnis forma quae [6] Moreover, every form brought into
educitur in esse per materiae being through the transmutation of matter
transmutationem, est forma is educed from the potentiality of matter,
educta de potentia materiae: hoc for the transmutation of matter is its
enim est materiam transmutari, de reduction from potentiality to act. Now,
potentia in actum reduci. Anima the intellective soul cannot be educed
autem intellectiva non potest educi from the potentiality of matter, since it has
de potentia materiae: iam enim already been shown that the intellective
supra ostensum est quod ipsa soul altogether exceeds the power of
anima intellectiva excedit totum matter, through having a materially
posse materiae, cum habeat independent operation, as was likewise
aliquam operationem absque proved above. The intellective soul,
materia, ut supra ostensum est. therefore, is not brought into being
Non igitur anima intellectiva through the transmutation of matter; nor,
educitur in esse per then, is it produced by the action of a
transmutationem materiae. Et sic, power in the semen.
neque per actionem virtutis quae
est in semine.
Praeterea. Nulla virtus activa agit [7] Then, too, the operation of no active
ultra suum genus. Sed anima power exceeds the genus to which that
intellectiva excedit totum genus power belongs. But the intellective soul
corporum: cum habeat transcends the whole genus of bodies,
operationem supra omnia corpora since it enjoys an operation completely
elevatam, quae est intelligere. surpassing the range of bodily things,
Nulla igitur virtus corporea potest namely, the operation of understanding.
producere animam intellectivam. Therefore, no corporeal power can
Sed omnis actio virtutis quae est produce the intellective soul. But every
in semine, est per aliquam action of a power present in the semen is
virtutem corpoream: agit enim exercised through some bodily potency,
virtus formativa mediante triplici since the formative power acts by means
calore, ignis, caeli, et calore of a threefold heat—the heat of fire, of
animae. Non igitur potest produci the heaven, and of the soul. Therefore,
in esse anima intellectiva per the intellective soul cannot be produced
virtutem quae est in semine. by a power in the semen.
Praeterea. Ridiculum est dicere [8] Furthermore, it is ridiculous to say that

aliquam intellectualem an intellective substance is either divided
substantiam vel per divisionem in consequence of the division of a body
corporis dividi, vel etiam ab aliqua or produced by a power corporeal in
virtute corporea produci. Sed nature. But, as was previously shown, the
anima humana est quaedam human soul is an intellectual substance.
intellectualis substantia, ut supra Therefore, it cannot be said that the soul
ostensum est. Non igitur potest is divided as the result of the semen’s
dici quod dividatur per divisionem being divided, or that it is brought into
seminis, neque quod producatur in being by an active power in the semen. In
esse a virtute activa quae est in no way, then, does the human soul begin
semine. Et sic nullo modo per to exist through the transmission of the
seminis traductionem anima semen.
humana incipit esse.
Praeterea. Si generatio alicuius [9] Again, if the generation of a thing is
est causa quod aliquid sit, the cause of a thing’s being, then its
corruptio eius erit causa quod illud corruption will be the cause of its ceasing
esse desinat. Corruptio autem to be. The corruption of the body,
corporis non est causa quod however, does not cause the soul to
anima humana esse desinat: cum cease to be, since the soul is immortal,
sit immortalis, ut supra ostensum as was proved above. Consequently,
est. Neque igitur generatio neither is the production of the body the
corporis est causa quod anima cause of the soul’s entry into existence.
incipiat esse. Sed traductio But the transmission of the semen is the
seminis est propria causa proper cause of the engendering of the
generationis corporis. Non est body. Hence, the transmission of the
igitur traductio seminis causa semen is not the generating cause that
generationis animae in esse. brings the soul into being.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [10] Thus is excluded the error of
Apollinaris et sequacium eius, qui Apollinaris and his followers, who said
dixerunt animas ab animabus that “souls are generated by souls, just
generari, sicut a corporibus as bodies are generated by bodies.”
corpora.
Caput 87 Chapter 87
Quod anima humana THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT
producatur in esse a Deo per INTO BEING THROUGH THE CREATIVE
creationem ACTION OF GOD
Ex his autem quae dicta sunt, [1] On the basis of what has already been
ostendi potest quod solus Deus said, it can be demonstrated that God alone
animam humanam producit in brings the human soul into being.
esse.
Omne enim quod in esse [2] There are but three possibilities:
producitur vel generatur per se whatever is brought into being is either
aut per accidens, vel creatur. generated through itself, or by accident, or it
Anima autem humana non is created. But the human soul is not
generatur per se: cum non sit generated through itself, since it is not
composita ex materia et forma, composed of matter and form, as was
ut supra ostensum est. Neque shown above. Nor is it generated by
generatur per accidens: cum accident; for, since the soul is the form of
enim sit forma corporis, the body, it would be generated through the
generaretur per corporis generation of the body, which results from
generationem, quae est ex the active power of the semen—a notion
virtute activa seminis; quod just now disproved. And, as was shown a
improbatum est. Cum ergo while back, the human soul begins to be, for
anima humana de novo esse it is not eternal, nor does it exist before the
incipiat, non enim est aeterna, body. It therefore remains that it comes into
nec praeexistit corpori, ut supra being by way of creation. Now, it was shown
ostensum est, relinquitur quod above that only God can create. Hence, He
exeat in esse per creationem. alone brings the human soul into being.
Ostensum est autem supra
quod solus Deus potest creare.
Solus igitur ipse animam
humanam in esse producit.
Amplius. Omne illud cuius [3] There is also the point, previously
substantia non est suum esse, demonstrated, that everything whose
habet sui esse auctorem, ut substance is not its being has an author of
supra ostensum est. Anima its being. But the human soul is not its
autem humana non est suum being; this, as we proved in the same place,
esse: hoc enim solius Dei est, is the prerogative of God alone. The human
ut supra ostensum est. Habet soul, therefore, has an active cause of its
igitur causam activam sui esse. being. Now, that which has being through
Sed quod per se habet esse, itself is also actuated through itself; while
per se etiam agitur: quod vero that which does not have being through
non habet esse per se, sed itself, but only together with another, is
solum cum alio, non per se fit, produced not through itself, but through this
sed alio facto; sicut forma ignis other thing being made; the form of fire
fit igne generato. Anima autem emerges when the fire itself is produced.
humana hoc habet proprium Now, it pertains to the human soul
inter alias formas, quod est in distinctively, in contrast to other forms, to be
suo esse subsistens, et esse subsisting in its being, and to communicate
quod est sibi proprium, corpori to the body the being proper to itself. The
communicat. Anima igitur per human soul therefore enjoys, through itself,
se habet suum fieri, praeter a mode of production beyond that of other
modum aliarum formarum, quae forms, which come to be by accident
fiunt per accidens compositis through the making of the composites. But,
factis. Sed, cum anima humana since the human soul does not have matter
non habeat materiam partem as part of itself, it cannot be made from
sui, non potest fieri ex aliquo something as from matter. It therefore
sicut ex materia. Relinquitur remains that the soul is made from nothing.
ergo quod ex nihilo fiat. Et sic, And thus, it is created. And in view of the
creatur. Cum igitur creatio sit previously demonstrated fact that creation is
opus proprium Dei, ut supra the proper work of God, it follows that the
ostensum est, sequitur quod a soul is created immediately by Cod alone.
solo Deo immediate creatur.
Adhuc. Eorum quae sunt unius [4] Moreover, as we have just proved, things

generis, est idem modus of the same genus come into being in the
prodeundi in esse, ut supra same way. But the soul belongs to the
probatum est. Anima autem est genus of intellectual substances, which
de genere substantiarum cannot conceivably be brought into being
intellectualium, quae non except by way of creation. Therefore, it is
possunt aliter intelligi prodire in through creation by God that the human
esse nisi per viam creationis. soul comes into being.
Anima igitur humana exit in
esse per creationem a Deo.
Item. Quicquid producitur in [5] Furthermore, whatever is produced by an

esse ab aliquo agente, acquirit agent acquires therefrom either something
ab ipso vel aliquid quod est that is the source of a thing’s being in such
principium essendi in tali and such a species, or it acquires being
specie, vel ipsum esse itself, purely and simply. Now, the soul
absolutum. Anima autem non cannot be brought into being in such a way
potest sic produci in esse quasi as to acquire something having the
acquiratur ei aliquid quod sit character of a source of its being, as with
principium essendi, sicut things composed of matter and form, which
contingit in rebus compositis ex are generated through acquiring an actual
materia et forma, quae form; because the soul, being a simple
generantur per hoc quod substance, as we have already shown,
acquirunt formam in actu: non contains nothing that would be a source of
enim habet anima aliquid in its own being. Thus, the only way in which
seipsa quod sit sibi principium the soul is brought into being by an agent is
essendi, cum sit substantia by receiving from it being unqualifiedly
simplex, ut supra ostensum est. speaking. Now, being itself is the proper
Relinquitur igitur quod non effect of the first and universal agent. For
producatur in esse ab aliquo secondary agents act by impressing the
agente nisi per hoc quod likenesses of their forms on the things they
consequitur ab ipso esse make, these likenesses being the forms of
absolute. Ipsum autem esse est the thing made. Therefore, the soul cannot
proprius effectus primi et be brought into being save by the first and
universalis agentis: secunda universal agent, namely, God.

enim agentia agunt per hoc
quod imprimunt similitudines
suarum formarum in rebus
factis, quae sunt formae
factorum. Anima igitur non
potest produci in esse nisi a
primo et universali agente, quod
est Deus.
Praeterea. Finis rei respondet [6] Then, too, the end of a thing corresponds

principio eius: tunc enim res to its source; for a thing achieves its
perfecta est cum ad proprium perfection when it attains its proper source,
principium pertingit, vel per whether by way of likeness to it, or in any
similitudinem vel quocumque manner whatsoever. Now, the end and
modo. Finis autem animae ultimate perfection of the human soul lies in
humanae et ultima perfectio its transcending by knowledge and love the
eius est quod per cognitionem whole order of creatures, thus reaching up
et amorem transcendat totum to the first principle, which is God. It is
ordinem creaturarum et therefore He that is the proper principle of
pertingat ad primum principium, the soul’s origin.
quod Deus est. Igitur ab eo
habet propriae suae originis
principium.
Hoc etiam innuere videtur sacra [7] This truth also seems to be implied in

Scriptura, Gen. 1. Cum enim, sacred Scripture, for in speaking of the
de institutione aliorum formation of other animals, it ascribes their
animalium loquens, eorum souls to other causes, as in the text: “Let the
animas aliis causis adscribat, waters bring forth the creeping creatures
utpote cum dicit: producant with a living soul” (Gen. 1:20), and so it is
aquae reptile animae viventis, with other things. But when man is spoken
et similiter de aliis, ad hominem of later on, the creation of his soul by God is
veniens, animam eius a Deo revealed: “God formed man of the slime of
creari ostendit, dicens: formavit the earth, and breathed into his face the
Deus hominem de limo terrae, breath of life” (Gen. 2:7).
et inspiravit in faciem eius
spiraculum vitae.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [8] And this does away with the error of
ponentium animas ab Angelis those who maintained that souls were
esse creatas. created by angels.
Caput 88 Chapter 88
Rationes ad probandum quod ARGUMENTS DESIGNED TO PROVE
anima humana causetur ex semine THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED
FROM THE SEMEN
Sunt autem quaedam quae [1] There are, however, certain

praemissis videntur esse adversa. arguments which seem to militate
against what we have said above.
Cum enim homo sit animal [2] From the fact that man is an animal
inquantum habet animam inasmuch as he has a sensitive soul,
sensitivam: ratio autem animalis and the concept of animal applies
univoce homini et aliis animalibus univocally to man and other animals, it
conveniat; videtur quod anima seems to follow that man’s sensitive soul
sensitiva hominis sit eiusdem is of the same genus as the souls of
generis cum animabus aliorum other animals. Now, things of the same
animalium. Quae autem sunt unius genus have the same manner of coming
generis, eundem modum habent into being. Hence, the sensitive soul of
prodeundi in esse. Anima igitur man, just as of other animals, comes
sensitiva hominis, sicut et aliorum into being through a power in the
animalium, per virtutem quae est in semen. But in man the intellective and
semine in esse procedit. Est autem sensitive soul are, as shown above, the
idem secundum substantiam anima same in respect of substance.
intellectiva et sensitiva in homine, Seemingly, therefore, the intellective
ut supra ostensum est. Videtur soul also is produced through a power in
igitur quod etiam anima intellectiva the semen.
per virtutem seminis producatur.
Praeterea. Sicut docet Aristoteles [3] Moreover, as Aristotle teaches in the

in libro de generatione animalium, De generation animalium [II, 3], the fetus
prius tempore est fetus animal is an animal before becoming a man.
quam homo. Sed, cum est animal But, during the time in which the fetus is
et non homo, habet animam an animal and not a man, it has a
sensitivam et non intellectivam; sensitive and not an intellective soul;
quam quidem sensitivam non est and, just as in other animals, this
dubium ex virtute activa seminis sensitive soul in indubitably produced by
produci, sicut et in ceteris the active power of the semen. And yet
animalibus contingit. Illa autem met that same sensitive soul is potentially
anima sensitiva est in potentia ut sit intellective, just as that animal is
intellectiva, sicut et illud animal est potentially a rational animal; and the
in potentia ut sit animal rationale: notion that the supervening intellective
nisi forte dicatur quod anima soul is substantially distinct from the
intellectiva superveniens sit alia in sensitive one has been refuted already.
substantia, quod supra improbatum It therefore seems that the substance of
est. Videtur ergo quod substantia the intellective soul is derived from a
animae intellectivae sit ex virtute power in the semen.
quae est in semine.
Item. Anima, cum sit forma [4] Then, too, the soul, being the form of

corporis, unitur corpori secundum the body, is united to the body according
suum esse. Sed ad ea quae sunt to the soul’s own being. But things that
unum secundum esse, terminatur we one in being are the term of one
una actio et unius agentis: si enim action and of one agent; for, if there
sunt diversa agentia, et per were diverse agents, and, consequently,
consequens diversae actiones, diverse actions, effects diverse in being
sequetur quod sint facta diversa would ensue. Hence, it is in the being of
secundum esse. Oportet igitur soul and body that the one action of one
unius agentis unam actionem agent must terminate. But the body’s
terminari ad esse animae et production is clearly due to the action of
corporis. Constat autem quod a power in the semen. Hence, the soul,
corpus fit per actionem virtutis quae which is the body’s form, is the effect of
est in semine. Ergo et ab eadem the same cause, and not of a separate
est anima, quae est eius forma, et agent.
non ab agente separato.
Amplius. Homo generat sibi simile [5] Furthermore, it is by a power present

secundum speciem per virtutem in the emitted semen that man
quae est in semine deciso. Omne generates things specifically like himself.
autem agens univocum generat sibi But any univocal agent generates such
simile in specie per hoc quod things by causing the form of the effect
causat formam generati, a qua est generated, which owes its specific
eius species. Anima igitur humana, nature to that form. Consequently, the
a qua est species hominis, human soul, whence man derives his
producitur ex virtute quae est in specific nature, is produced by a power
semine. in the semen.
Item. Apollinaris sic argumentatur. [6] Then there is the argument of
Quicumque dat complementum Apollinaris, that whoever completes a
operi, cooperatur agenti. Sed, si work cooperates with the agent, so that,
animae creantur a Deo, ipse dat if souls are created by God, He is
complementum generationi responsible for completing the
puerorum qui quandoque ex generation of children who are
adulteris nascuntur. Ergo Deus sometimes born of adulterers; and thus
adulteris cooperatur. Quod sibi God cooperates with adulterers—which
inconveniens videtur. seems incongruous.
Inveniuntur autem in libro qui [7] Also, in a book ascribed to Gregory
Gregorio Nysseno inscribitur, of Nyssa, there are arguments designed
quaedam rationes ad hoc idem to prove the same thing. The author
probandum. Argumentatur autem argues as follows. From the soul and the
sic. Ex anima et corpore fit unum, body there results one being, and this is
quod est homo unus. Si igitur one man. Hence, if the soul is made
anima fiat prius quam corpus, aut before the body, or the body before the
corpus prius quam anima, idem erit soul, one and the same thing will be
prius et posterius seipso; quod prior and posterior to itself; which does
videtur impossibile. Simul igitur fit not seem possible. Body and soul, then,
corpus et anima. Sed corpus incipit are produced simultaneously. But the
fieri in decisione seminis. Ergo et formation of the body begins at the time
per decisionem seminis anima in when the semen is separated. Hence,
esse producitur. the soul also is brought into being a a
result of the separation of the semen.
Adhuc. Imperfecta videtur esse [8] Seemingly imperfect, moreover, is

operatio agentis qui non totam rem the operation of an agent which does
in esse producit, sed solum eius not produce a thing in its entirely, but
alteram partem. Si igitur Deus only some part of it. Suppose that God
animam in esse produceret, corpus brought the soul into being and that the
vero virtute seminis formaretur, body was formed by a seminal power.
quae duo sunt partes unius, scilicet Now, body and soul are parts of one
hominis, utriusque operatio, scilicet being: man. So, on that hypothesis the
Dei et seminativae virtutis, operation of both God and the seminal
imperfecta videretur. Quod patet power would seem to be imperfect;
esse inconveniens. Ab una igitur et which obviously cannot be allowed.
eadem causa producitur anima et Therefore, man’s soul and body are
corpus hominis. Constat autem produced by one and the same cause.
corpus hominis produci virtute But man’s body certainly is produced
seminis. Ergo et anima. through a power residing in the semen.
The same, therefore, is true of the soul.
Item. In omnibus quae generantur [9] Again, in everything generated from
ex semine, omnes partes rei seed, all the parts of the thing generated
generatae simul comprehenduntur are together contained in the seed
virtute in semine, licet actu non virtually, though they appear not to be
appareant: sicut videmus in tritico, present actually. “For example, in wheat
aut in quolibet alio semine, quod or any other seed we observe that the
herba et culmus et internodia et plant itself, with stem, joints, fruit and
fructus et aristae virtute tassel, are contained virtually in the
comprehenduntur in primo semine, original seed, and that afterwards the
et postea protenditur semen et seed spreads forth and discloses itself,
declaratur, quadam consequentia thus attaining perfection by a kind of
naturali, ad perfectionem, non natural resultance, without assuming
assumens aliquid extrinsecum. anything extrinsic. Now, the soul
Constat autem animam esse certainly is part of man. Therefore, the
partem hominis. In semine igitur human soul is virtually contained in the
hominis virtute continetur anima human seed, and does not originate
humana, non autem ex aliqua from any external cause.
exteriori causa principium sumit.
Amplius. Eorum quorum invenitur [10] And again, things having the same
idem processus et terminus, development and the same term must
oportet esse idem originis have the same originative principle. But
principium. Sed in generatione in the generation of a man we find the
hominis idem processus corporis et same development and term in the body
animae, et idem terminus invenitur: as in the soul; for the manifestation of
secundum enim quod figuratio et the soul’s operations goes hand in hand
quantitas membrorum procedit, et with the development in shape and size
animae operationes magis ac of the members of the body, the
magis manifestantur; nam prius operation of the nutritive soul appearing
apparet operatio animae nutritivae, first, and afterwards, that of the sensitive

et postmodum operatio animae soul, and lastly, when the bodily
sensitivae, et tandem, corpore development is complete, the operation
completo, operatio animae of the intellective soul. Hence, both the
intellectivae. Ergo idem est body and the soul have the same
principium corporis et animae. Sed source. But the body originates through
principium originis corporis est per the separation of the semen. The
decisionem seminis. Ergo et principle of the soul’s origin is, therefore,
principium originis animae. the same.
Adhuc. Quod configuratur alicui, [11] Furthermore, that which is

constituitur ex actione eius cui conformed to a thing is made by the
configuratur: sicut cera quae action of that to which it is conformed;
configuratur sigillo, accipit hanc the wax that is conformed to the seal
configurationem ex impressione receives this conformity from the seal’s
sigilli. Constat autem corpus impress. Now, clearly, the body of a man
hominis, et cuiuslibet animalis, or of any animal is conformed to its own
esse propriae animae soul, for its organs are disposed in a
configuratum: talis est enim manner befitting the psychic operations
organorum dispositio qualis which are to be exercised by those
competit ad operationes animae organs.” Hence, the body is formed by
per eas exercendas. Corpus igitur the action of the soul, and that is why
formatur ex actione animae. Unde Aristotle says in De anima II [4] that the
et Aristoteles dicit, in II de anima, soul is the efficient cause of the body.
quod anima est efficiens causa But this would not be so if the soul was
corporis. Hoc autem non esset nisi not present in the semen; for the body is
anima esset in semine: nam corpus formed by the semen’s power.
per virtutem quae est in semine Therefore, the human soul is in the
constituitur. Est igitur anima human seed, and thus owes its origin to
humana in semine hominis. Et ita the separation of that seed.
ex decisione seminis originem
habet.
Item. Nihil vivit nisi per animam. [12] Likewise, nothing lives except by a
Semen autem est vivum. Quod soul. But the semen is a living entity.
patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, quia And this is evident for three reasons:
a vivente deciditur. Secundo, quia because it is parted from a living being;
in semine apparet calor vitalis et because the semen exhibits vital heat
operatio vitae, quae sunt rei and vital operation, which are the marks
viventis indicia. Tertio, quia semina of a living thing; and because, if plant
plantarum terrae mandata, nisi in seeds were not possessed of life in
se vitam haberent, ex terra, quae themselves, they could not, when sown,
est exanimis, non possent obtain from the soil, which is inanimate,
calescere ad vivendum. Est igitur the heat indispensable to life. Therefore,
anima in semine. Et sic ex the soul is in the semen, and thus
decisione seminis originem capit. originates with its separation.
Amplius. Si anima non est ante [131 Moreover, if the soul did not, as we

corpus, ut ostensum est; neque have shown, exist before the body, nor
incipit esse cum seminis decisione: begin to exist with the separation of the
sequitur quod prius formetur semen, it follows that the formation of
corpus, et postea ei infundatur the body came first, the newly created
anima de novo creata. Sed si hoc soul being infused into it afterwards. But
est verum, sequitur ulterius quod this, if true, would imply that the soul is
anima sit propter corpus: quod for the sake of the body, since what
enim est propter aliud, invenitur eo exists on another’s account is posterior
posterius; sicut vestimenta fiunt to it; the clothes are for the man. That
propter hominem. Hoc autem est notion, however, is not true, because the
falsum: nam magis corpus est body is for the soul’s sake; the end is
propter animam; finis enim semper always nobler. It must, therefore, be said
nobilior est. Oportet igitur dicere that the soul originates simultaneously
quod anima simul cum decisione with the separation of the semen.
seminis oriatur.
Caput 89 Chapter 89
Solutio rationum praemissarum SOLUTION OF THE PRECEDING
ARGUMENTS
Ad faciliorem vero [1] In order to facilitate the solution of these

praemissarum rationum arguments, certain things must be premised
solutionem, praemittenda sunt in explanation of the order and process of
quaedam ad exponendum the generation of man and of animals in
ordinem et processum general.
generationis humanae, et
generaliter animalis.
Primo itaque sciendum est [2] To be taken into account first of all is the

falsam esse opinionem falsity of the opinion of those who say that
quorundam dicentium quod the vital operations appearing in the embryo
opera vitae quae apparent in before its complete development do not
embryone ante ultimum proceed from a soul, or from a soul’s power
complementum, non sunt ex existing in the embryo, but from the soul of
aliqua anima, vel virtute the mother. If this were true, the embryo
animae, in eo existente, sed ex would not even be an animal, since every
anima matris. Si enim hoc animal consists of soul and body. Vital
esset verum, iam embryo non operations, moreover, do not issue from an
esset animal: cum omne animal extrinsic active principle, but from an internal
ex anima et corpore constet. power; and in this respect particularly are
Operationes etiam vitae non living things, to which selfmovement
proveniunt a principio activo properly belongs, seen to differ from the
extrinseco, sed ab intranea nonliving. For the thing that is nourished
virtute, in quo praecipue a non assimilates the nourishment and thus must
viventibus viventia videntur possess an active power of nutrition; what
discerni, quorum est proprie the agent effects is like to itself. And this fact
movere seipsa. Quod enim is much more manifest in the operation of
nutritur, assimilat sibi the senses; it is through a power existing in
nutrimentum: unde oportet in this person, and not in another, that he is
nutrito esse virtutem nutritionis enabled to see and to hear. Hence,
activam, cum agens sibi simile nourishment and even sensation on the part
agat. Et multo est hoc of the embryo prior to its complete
manifestius in operibus sensus: development cannot be attributed to the soul
nam videre et audire convenit of the mother.
alicui per virtutem aliquam in
ipso existentem, non in alio.
Unde, cum embryo inveniatur
nutriri ante ultimum
complementum, et etiam
sentire, non potest hoc attribui
animae matris.
Neque tamen potest dici quod [3] Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the
in semine ab ipso principio sit soul in its complete essence is present in the
anima secundum suam semen from the very beginning, though its
essentiam completam, cuius operations are not manifested because of
tamen operationes non the lack of organs. This is impossible in view
appareant propter organorum of the fact that since the soul is united to the
defectum. Nam, cum anima body as its form, it is united only to a body of
uniatur corpori ut forma, non which it is properly the act. Now, a soul is
unitur nisi corpori cuius est the “act of an organic body.” Prior to the
proprie actus. Est autem anima organization of the body, therefore, the soul
actus corporis organici. Non est is not in the semen actually, but only
igitur ante organizationem potentially or virtually. Thus, Aristotle says in
corporis in semine anima actu, De anima II [1] that “seeds and fruits are
sed solum potentia sive virtute. endowed with life potentially so far as they
Unde et Aristoteles dicit, in II de are rid of,” that is, lack, “a soul; whereas the
anima, quod semen et fructus thing of which the soul is the act has indeed
sic sunt potentia vitam habentia the power of life, but is not without a soul.”
quod abiiciunt animam, idest
anima carent: cum tamen id
cuius anima est actus, sit
potentia vitam habens, non
tamen abiiciens animam.
Sequeretur etiam, si a principio [4] And the hypothesis of the soul’s

anima esset in semine, quod presence in the semen from the beginning
generatio animalis esset solum would entail the further consequence that
per decisionem: sicut est in animal generation takes place solely by way
animalibus anulosis, quod ex of partition, as with annulose animals, where
uno fiunt duo. Semen enim, si two are produced from one. For, if the
statim cum est decisum semen were possessed of a soul at the
animam haberet, iam haberet moment of its separation, it would then
formam substantialem. Omnis already be endowed with a substantial form.
autem generatio substantialis But in every case substantial generation
praecedit formam precedes the substantial form; it never
substantialem, non eam comes after it; and if any changes follow in
sequitur: si quae vero the wake of the substantial form, they
transmutationes formam concern not the being but the wellbeing of
substantialem sequuntur, non the thing generated. Thus, the engendering
ordinantur ad esse generati, of the animal would be completed with the
sed ad bene esse ipsius. Sic mere alienation of the semen; and all
igitur generatio animalis subsequent changes would have no bearing
compleretur in ipsa decisione upon the process of generation.
seminis: omnes autem
transmutationes sequentes
essent ad generationem
impertinentes.
Sed adhuc magis est ridiculum [5] But this theory would be even more
si hoc de anima rationali ridiculous if applied to the rational soul. For,
dicatur. Tum quia impossibile first, the soul cannot possibly be divided as
est ut dividatur secundum the body is, so as to be present in the
divisionem corporis, ad hoc ut separated semen; and second, it would
in deciso semine esse possit. follow that in all extracopulative emissions
Tum quia sequeretur quod in of semen, without conception taking place,
omnibus pollutionibus ex rational souls would nevertheless be
quibus conceptus non sequitur, multiplied.
nihilominus rationales animae
multiplicarentur.
Neque etiam dici potest, quod [6] Another theory, likewise inadmissible, is
quidam dicunt: etsi a principio stated as follows. From the moment of
decisionis in semine non sit severance the soul is not present in the
anima actu, sed virtute, propter semen actually but virtually, because of the
deficientiam organorum; tamen lack of organs and yet this very power of the
ipsammet virtutem seminis, semen—itself a body potentially endowed
quod est corpus organizabile, with organs though actually without them—
etsi non organizatum, esse is, proportionately to the semen, a potential
proportionaliter semini animam but not an actual soul. Moreover, since plant
in potentia, sed non actu; et life requires fewer organs than animal life,
quia vita plantae pauciora from the moment that the organic
requirit organa quam vita development of the semen suffices for plant
animalis, primo semine life, the aforesaid seminal power becomes a
sufficienter ad vitam plantae vegetative soul; and later, the organs having
organizato, ipsam praedictam been perfected and multiplied still more, the
virtutem fieri animam same power is raised to the level of a
vegetabilem; deinde, organis sensitive soul; and finally, with the perfecting
magis perfectis et multiplicatis, of the organs form, the same soul becomes
eandem perduci ut sit anima rational, not indeed, by the action of that
sensitiva; ulterius autem, forma seminal power, but through the influx of an
organorum perfecta, eandem external agent. And for this reason the
animam fieri rationalem, non proponents of the theory suppose Aristotle
quidem per actionem virtutis to have said in the De generatione
seminis, sed ex influxu animalium that “the intellect is from without”
exterioris agentis, propter quod [II, 3]. Now, this theory would involve the
suspicantur Aristotelem dixisse consequence that numerically one and the

intellectum ab extrinseco esse, same power is at one time a purely
in libro de generatione vegetative soul, and afterwards a sensitive
animalium. Secundum enim soul, the substantial form itself thus being
hanc positionem, sequeretur perfected successively more and more. It
quod aliqua virtus eadem would further follow both that the substantial
numero nunc esset anima form would be brought from potentiality to
vegetabilis tantum, et act, not all at once but in successive stages,
postmodum anima sensitiva: et and that generation is a continuous
sic ipsa forma substantialis movement, just as alteration is. Now, all
continue magis ac magis these consequences are impossible in
perficeretur. Et ulterius nature.
sequeretur quod non simul, sed
successive educeretur forma
substantialis de potentia in
actum. Et ulterius quod
generatio esset motus
continuus, sicut et alteratio.
Quae omnia sunt impossibilia
in natura.
Sequeretur etiam adhuc maius [7] But that theory would entail a
inconveniens, scilicet quod consequence still more incongruous,
anima rationalis esset mortalis. namely, the mortality of the rational soul. For
Nihil enim formaliter alicui rei nothing formal in character that accrues to a
corruptibili adveniens facit corruptible thing makes it incorruptible by
ipsum esse incorruptibile per nature; in that case, the corruptible would be
naturam: alias corruptibile changed into the incorruptible, which is
mutaretur in incorruptibile, quod impossible, since they differ in genus, as
est impossibile, cum differant Aristotle says in Metaphysics X [10]. In the
secundum genus, ut dicitur in X process described above, however, the
metaphysicae. Substantia substance of the sensitive soul is held to be
autem animae sensibilis, cum generated accidentally by the generated
ponatur esse per accidens body, and hence that substance must
generata a corpore generato in necessarily be corruptible with the corruption
processu praedicto, de of the body. Therefore, if the same soul
necessitate est corruptibilis ad becomes rational through the infusion into it
corruptionem corporis. Si igitur of a kind of light, having the role of a form in
ipsamet fit rationalis quodam its regard, for the sensitive is potentially
lumine intrinsecus inducto, intellective, then necessarily the rational soul
quod formaliter se habet ad perishes along with the body. But this is
ipsam, est enim sensitivum impossible, as we proved above, and as the
potentia intellectivum; de Catholic faith teaches.
necessitate sequitur quod
anima rationalis, corpore
corrupto, corrumpitur. Quod est
impossibile: ut supra probatum
est, et fides Catholica docet.
Non igitur ipsamet virtus quae [8] Therefore, the very same power which is

cum semine deciditur et dicitur separated, together with the semen, and is
formativa, est anima, neque in called the formative power, is not the soul,
processu generationis fit nor does it become the soul in the process
anima: sed, cum ipsa fundetur of generation; but, being based, as on its
sicut in proprio subiecto in proper subject, on the vital spirit which the
spiritu cuius est semen semen contains as a kind of froth, this power
contentivum, sicut quoddam is responsible for the formation of the body
spumosum, operatur so far as it functions by virtue of the father’s
formationem corporis prout agit soul, to whom generation is attributed as the
ex vi animae patris, cui principal agent, and not by virtue of the soul
attribuitur generatio sicut of the subject conceived, even after the soul
principali generanti, non ex vi exists in that subject; for the latter does not
animae concepti, etiam generate itself, but is generated by the
postquam anima inest; non father. And the truth of this becomes quite
enim conceptum generat clear if we survey the powers of the soul one
seipsum, sed generatur a by one. For, indeed, the body’s formation
patre. Et hoc patet discurrenti cannot be attributed to the soul of the
per singulas virtutes animae. embryo by reason of the generative power;
Non enim potest attribui not only because that power does not
animae embryonis ratione function until the powers of nutrition and
virtutis generativae: tum quia growth, which are its auxiliaries, have
vis generativa non habet suam completed their work—for the generative
operationem nisi completo function is the prerogative of that which
opere nutritivae et already exists as a complete being—but also
augmentativae, quae ei because the generative power has as its
deserviunt, cum generare sit object, not the perfection of the individual
iam perfecti; tum quia opus itself, but the preservation of the species.
generativae non ordinatur ad Nor can The body’s formation be attributed
perfectionem ipsius individui, to the nutritive power, whose function is to
sed ad speciei conservationem. assimilate nourishment to the subject
Nec etiam potest attribui virtuti nourished; and this is not the case here,
nutritivae, cuius opus est since in the process of formation the
assimilare nutrimentum nutrito, nourishment is not assimilated to something
quod hic non apparet: non already existing, but is brought to a form
enim nutrimentum in processu more perfect in character and one more
formationis trahitur in closely resembling the father. So, neither
similitudinem praeexistentis, can the formation of the body be ascribed to
sed perducitur ad perfectiorem the power of growth, whose proper function
formam et viciniorem is to produce change, not in the form, but
similitudini patris. Similiter nec only in quantity. And the sensitive and
augmentativae: ad quam non intellective parts clearly have no operation
pertinet mutatio secundum appropriate to such a formation. It therefore
formam, sed solum secundum remains that the formation of the body,
quantitatem. De sensitiva especially as concerns its primary and
autem et intellectiva particula, principal parts, a not due to the soul of the
patet quod non habet aliquod thing generated, nor to a formative power
opus formationi tali acting by virtue of the soul of the generated
appropriatum. Relinquitur igitur subject, but to a formative power acting by
quod formatio corporis, virtue of the generative soul of the father, the
praecipue quantum ad primas work of that soul being the production of that

et principales partes, non est which is specifically like the generator.
ab anima geniti, nec a virtute
formativa agente ex vi eius, sed
agente ex vi animae
generativae patris, cuius opus
est facere simile generanti
secundum speciem.
Haec igitur vis formativa eadem [9] This formative power thus remains the

manet in spiritu praedicto a same in the abovementioned vital spirit from
principio formationis usque in the beginning of the body’s formation until
finem. Species tamen formati the end. The species of the subject formed,
non manet eadem: nam primo however, does not remain the same; since at
habet formam seminis, postea first it possesses the form of semen,
sanguinis, et sic inde quousque afterwards of blood, and so on, until at last it
veniat ad ultimum arrives at that wherein it finds its fulfillment.
complementum. Licet enim For, although the generation of simple
generatio simplicium corporum bodies does not proceed in serial order,
non procedat secundum since each of them possesses a form related
ordinem, eo quod quodlibet immediately to prime matter, a progressive
eorum habet formam order must obtain in the generation of other
immediatam materiae primae; bodies because of the many intermediate
in generatione tamen corporum forms between the first elemental form and
aliorum, oportet esse the ultimate form which is the object of the
generationum ordinem, propter generative process; so that there are many
multas formas intermedias, generations and corruptions following one
inter primam formam elementi another.
et ultimam formam ad quam
generatio ordinatur. Et ideo
sunt multae generationes et
corruptiones sese
consequentes.
Nec est inconveniens si aliquid [10] Nor is it inconsistent if the generation of
intermediorum generatur et an intermediate form takes place and then at
statim postmodum once is interrupted, because the
interrumpitur: quia intermedia intermediate forms lack specific
non habent speciem completeness, but are on the way toward
completam, sed sunt ut in via that end. Thus, the reason why they are
ad speciem; et ideo non generated is not that they may remain in
generantur ut permaneant, sed existence, but that the ultimate term of
ut per ea ad ultimum generation may be attained through them.
generatum perveniatur. Nec est And if the process of generation is not
mirum si tota generationis entirely continuous, and there are many
transmutatio non est continua, intermediate generations, this is nothing to
sed sunt multae generationes be wondered at, for such is the case, too, in
intermediae: quia hoc etiam alteration and growth, since neither of them
accidit in alteratione et is continuous throughout, local movement
augmento; non enim est tota alone being truly continuous, as Physics VIII
alteratio continua, neque totum [7] makes clear.

augmentum, sed solum motus
localis est vere continuus, ut
patet in VIII physicorum.
Quanto igitur aliqua forma est [11] Therefore, the more noble a form is and

nobilior et magis distans a the further removed it is from the elemental
forma elementi, tanto oportet form, the more numerous must be the
esse plures formas intermediate forms, through which the
intermedias, quibus gradatim ultimate form is reached step by step, and,
ad formam ultimam veniatur, et consequently, the intervening generative
per consequens plures processes will be multiplied too. That is why,
generationes medias. Et ideo in in the generation of an animal and a man,
generatione animalis et hominis wherein the most perfect type of form exists,
in quibus est forma there are many intermediate forms and
perfectissima, sunt plurimae generations—and, hence, corruptions,
formae et generationes because the generation of one thing is the
intermediae, et per consequens corruption of another. Thus, the vegetative
corruptiones, quia generatio soul, which is present first (when the embryo
unius est corruptio alterius. lives the life of a plant), perishes, and is
Anima igitur vegetabilis, quae succeeded by a more perfect soul, both
primo inest, cum embryo vivit nutritive and sensitive in character, and then
vita plantae, corrumpitur, et the embryo lives an animal life; and when
succedit anima perfectior, quae this passes away it is succeeded by the
est nutritiva et sensitiva simul, rational soul introduced from without, while
et tunc embryo vivit vita the preceding souls existed in virtue of the
animalis; hac autem corrupta, semen.
succedit anima rationalis ab
extrinseco immissa, licet
praecedentes fuerint virtute
seminis.
His igitur visis, facile est [12] With these considerations in mind, it is
respondere ad obiecta. easy to answer the objections.
Quod enim primo obiicitur, To the first objection, that the sensitive soul
oportere animam sensitivam must originate in the same way in man and
eundem modum originis in in irrational animals because animal is
homine et in brutis habere, ex predicated of them both univocally, we reply
eo quod animal de eis univoce that this is not necessary. For, although the
praedicatur: dicimus hoc sensitive souls in man and brute are
necessarium non esse. Etsi generically alike, they differ specifically, as
enim anima sensitiva in homine do the things whose forms they are; since,
et bruto conveniant secundum just as the human animal differs specifically
generis rationem, differunt from the other animals by the fact that it is
tamen specie, sicut et ea rational, so the sensitive soul of man differs
quorum sunt formae: sicut enim specifically from the sensitive soul of the
animal quod est homo, ab aliis brute by the fact that it is also intellective.
animalibus specie differt per Therefore, in the soul of the brute there is
hoc quod est rationale, ita nothing suprasensitive, and, consequently,
anima sensitiva hominis ab it transcends the body neither in being nor in
anima sensitiva bruti specie operation; and that is why the brute soul
differt per hoc quod est etiam must be generated together with the body
intellectiva. Anima igitur in and perish with the body. But in man the
bruto habet id quod est sensitive soul is possessed of intellective
sensitivum tantum; et per power over and above the sensitive nature
consequens nec esse nec eius and is therefore raised above the body both
operatio supra corpus elevatur; in being and in operation; it is neither
unde oportet quod simul cum generated through the generation of the
generatione corporis generetur, body, nor corrupted through the body’s
et cum corruptione corruption. Thus, the diversity in mode of
corrumpatur. Anima autem origin of the human and of the brute soul is
sensitiva in homine, cum not on the part of the sensitive faculty, from
habeat supra sensitivam which the generic nature is derived, but on
naturam vim intellectivam, ex the part of the intellective faculty, whence
qua oportet ut ipsa substantia the specific difference stems. Hence, it
animae sit secundum esse et cannot be inferred that they are diverse
operationem supra corpus generically, but only specifically.
elevata; neque per
generationem corporis
generatur, neque per eius
corruptionem corrumpitur.
Diversus ergo modus originis in
animabus praedictis non est ex
parte sensitivi, ex quo sumitur
ratio generis: sed ex parte
intellectivi, ex quo sumitur
differentia speciei. Unde non
potest concludi diversitas
generis, sed sola diversitas
speciei.
Quod vero secundo obiicitur, [13] As to the second objection, to say that
conceptum prius esse animal the thing conceived is an animal before a
quam hominem, non ostendit man does not prove that the rational soul is
rationalem animam cum produced together with the semen. For the
semine propagari. Nam anima sensitive soul, by which it was an animal,
sensitiva per quam animal erat, does not remain, but is succeeded by a soul
non manet, sed ei succedit both sensitive and intellective in character,
anima quae est simul sensitiva by which it is at once animal and man, as we
et intellectiva, ex qua est have already made clear.
animal et homo simul, ut ex
dictis patet.
Quod vero tertio obiicitur, [14] In the third objection, the remark that
diversorum agentium actiones the actions of diverse agents do not
non terminari ad unum factum, terminate in the production of one thing must
intelligendum est de diversis be understood to refer to diverse agents that

agentibus non ordinatis. Si are not ordered to one another. For, if they
enim ordinata sint ad invicem, are so ordered, they must have one effect;
oportet eorum esse unum since the action of the primary efficient
effectum: nam causa agens cause upon the effect of the secondary
prima agit in effectum causae efficient cause is more powerful even than
secundae agentis vehementius that which is exercised by the latter. This
quam etiam ipsa causa accounts for our observation of the fact that
secunda; unde videmus quod an effect produced by a principal agent
effectus qui per instrumentum through an instrument is more properly
agitur a principali agente, attributed to the principal agent than to the
magis proprie attribuitur instrument. In some instances, however, the
principali agenti quam action of the principal agent attains to
instrumento. Contingit autem something in the effect produced, to which
quandoque quod actio the action of the instrument does not attain.
principalis agentis pertingit ad The vegetative power, for example, extends
aliquid in operato ad quod non to the production of the form of flesh, which
pertingit actio instrumenti: sicut the instrument of that power, namely, the
vis vegetativa ad speciem heat of fire, cannot produce, although it acts
carnis perducit, ad quam non dispositively in regard to that effect by
potest perducere calor ignis, dissolving and consuming. Therefore, since
qui est eius instrumentum, licet every active power of nature is compared to
operetur disponendo ad eam God as an instrument to the primary and
resolvendo et consumendo. principal agent, nothing prevents the action
Cum igitur omnis virtus naturae of nature, in that selfsame generated
activa comparetur ad Deum subject which is man from terminating in a
sicut instrumentum ad primum part of man, and not in the whole, the
et principale agens, nihil production of which is due to the action of
prohibet in uno et eodem God. The human body, therefore, is formed
generato quod est homo, at the same time both by the power of God,
actionem naturae ad aliquid as principal and first agent, and by the
hominis terminari, et non ad power of the semen, as secondary agent;
totum quod fit actione Dei. but it is God’s action that produces the
Corpus igitur hominis formatur human soul, which the seminal power
simul et virtute Dei quasi cannot produce, but to which it disposes.
principalis agentis et primi, et
etiam virtute seminis quasi
agentis secundi: sed actio Dei
producit animam humanam,
quam virtus seminis producere
non potest, sed disponit ad
eam.
Unde patet solutio ad quartum. [15] The answer to the fourth objection thus
Sic enim homo sibi simile in is clear; for a man begets that which is like
specie generat, inquantum himself in species, so far as his seminal
virtus seminis eius dispositive power acts in a dispositive manner toward
operatur ad ultimam formam, the ultimate form from which he derives his
ex qua homo speciem sortitur. specific nature.
Deum vero adulteris cooperari [16] Regarding the fifth objection, there is
in actione naturae, nihil est nothing incongruous in God’s cooperating
inconveniens. Non enim natura with adulterers in the action of nature; for it
adulterorum mala est, sed is not the nature of adulterers that is evil, but
voluntas. Actio autem quae est their will, and the action deriving from their
ex virtute seminis ipsorum est seminal power is natural, not voluntary.
naturalis, non voluntaria. Unde Hence, it is not unfitting that God should co
non est inconveniens si Deus operate in their action by bringing it to its
illi operationi cooperatur final completion.
ultimam perfectionem
inducendo.
Quod vero sexto obiicitur, patet [17] Now, the inference drawn in the sixth

quod non de necessitate objection clearly lacks necessity. For, even if
concludit. Etsi enim detur quod it is granted that man’s body is formed
corpus hominis formetur prius before the soul is created, or vice versa, it
quam anima creetur, aut e does not follow that one and the same man
converso, non sequitur quod is prior to himself, because a man is not his
idem homo sit prior seipso: non body nor his soul. Rather, it follows that
enim homo est suum corpus, some part of him is prior to the other; and
neque sua anima. Sequitur quite reasonably so, because matter is
autem quod aliqua pars eius sit temporally prior to form—I mean, matter so
altera prior. Quod non est far as it is in potentiality to form, and not as
inconveniens: nam materia actually completed by a form, for in that
tempore est prior forma; state it is simultaneous with the form. It
materiam dico secundum quod follows that the human body, so far as it is in
est in potentia ad formam, non potentiality to the soul, as not yet having
secundum quod actu est per one, precedes the soul in time; it is, then, not
formam perfecta, sic enim est actually human, but only potentially human.
simul cum forma. Corpus igitur However, when the body is actually human,
humanum, secundum quod est as being perfected by the human soul, it
in potentia ad animam, utpote neither precedes nor follows the soul, but is
cum nondum habet animam, simultaneous with it.
est prius tempore quam anima:
tunc autem non est humanum
actu, sed potentia tantum. Cum
vero est humanum actu, quasi
per animam humanam
perfectum, non est prius neque
posterius anima, sed simul cum
ea.
Neque etiam sequitur, si anima [18] Nor does the argument follow that is put
ex virtute seminis non forward in the seventh objection, namely,
producitur sed solum corpus, that if the soul is not produced by the
quod sit imperfecta operatio seminal power, but only the body, then the
tam Dei quam naturae, ut operation both of God and of nature is
septima ratio procedebat. imperfect. The inference is false, because
Virtute enim Dei utrumque fit, et both the body and the soul are made by the
corpus et anima: licet formatio power of God; although the formation of the

corporis sit ab eo mediante body derives from Him by means of the
virtute seminis naturali, animam natural power residing in the semen,
autem immediate producat. whereas He produces the soul immediately.
Neque etiam sequitur quod Nor does it follow that the action of the
actio virtutis seminis sit seminal power is imperfect, since it fulfils its
imperfecta: cum perficiat hoc proper function.
ad quod est.
Sciendum est etiam in semine [19] The eighth argument is likewise
virtute contineri omnia illa quae inconclusive. For, while it is true that the
virtutem corpoream non seed contains virtually whatever does not
excedunt, sicut faenum, exceed the scope of a power corporeal in
culmus, internodia, et similia. nature—such as the grass, the stalk, the
Ex quo concludi non potest joints, and so on—it cannot be concluded
quod id hominis quod totam that the part of man which totally surpasses
virtutem corpoream excedit, in such a power is contained virtually in the
semine virtute contineatur, ut seed.
octava ratio concludebat.
Quod autem operationes [20] The ninth argument, to the effect that
animae videntur proficere in the operations of the soul seem to develop
processu generationis in the process of generation as the parts of
humanae sicut proficiunt the body develop, does not prove that the
corporis partes, non ostendit human soul and body have the same
animam humanam et corpus source; rather, it proves that the disposition
idem principium habere, sicut of the body’s parts is necessary for the
nona ratio procedebat: sed soul’s operation.
ostendit quod dispositio
partium corporis est necessaria
ad animae operationem.
Quod autem decimo obiicitur, [21] The tenth objection, that the body is
corpus animae configurari, et conformed to the soul and that, therefore,
ob hoc animam sibi corpus the soul forms a body like to itself, is partly
simile praeparare: partim true and partly false. This statement is true if
quidem est verum, partim referred to the soul of the begetter, but false
autem falsum. Si enim if referred to the soul of the begotten; for, as
intelligatur de anima regards its primary and principal parts, the
generantis, est verum quod body is not formed by the power of the
dicitur: falsum autem si latter’s soul, but by that of the former, as we
intelligatur de anima generati. have just shown. So, too, is every matter
Non enim virtute animae configured to its form: a configuration which,
generati formatur corpus however, is not brought about by the action
quantum ad primas et of the thing generated, but by the action of
praecipuas partes, sed virtute the generating form.
animae generantis, ut supra
probatum est. Similiter enim et
omnis materia suae formae
configuratur: non tamen haec

configuratio fit ex actione
generati, sed ex actione formae
generantis.
Quod autem undecimo obiicitur [22] As to the eleventh objection, it is quite

de seminis vita in principio clear, from what has been said, that at the
decisionis: patet quidem ex beginning of its separation the semen is only
dictis non esse vivum nisi in potentially animate; hence, it does not at that
potentia: unde tunc animam time have a soul actually, but virtually. In the
actu non habet, sed virtute. In process of generation the semen is, by its
processu autem generationis own power, endowed with a vegetative and
habet animam vegetabilem et a sensitive soul, which do not remain but
sensibilem ex virtute seminis: pass away, being succeeded by a rational
quae non manent, sed soul.
transeunt, anima rationali
succedente.
Neque etiam, si formatio [23] Nor, again, is the reasoning in the
corporis animam praecedit twelfth objection conclusive. For, if the
humanam, sequitur quod formation of the body precedes the human
anima sit propter corpus, ut soul, it does not follow that the soul is for the
duodecima ratio inferebat. Est sake of the body. Indeed, a thing is for the
enim aliquid propter alterum sake of another, in two ways. In one way, for
dupliciter. Uno modo propter the sake of the latter’s operation, or
eius operationem, sive preservation, or anything of the sort which
conservationem vel quicquid follows upon being; and such things are
huiusmodi est quod posterior to that on whose account they are;
consequitur ad esse: et the clothes are for the man, and tools for the
huiusmodi sunt posteriora eo worker. In another way, for the sake of its
propter quod sunt; sicut being; and thus, a thing which is for the sake
vestimenta sunt propter of another is prior to the latter in time, but
hominem, et instrumenta posterior in nature. It is in this sense that the
propter artificem. Alio modo est body is for the sake of the soul, just as in
aliquid propter alterum, idest, every case matter is for the sake of the form.
propter esse eius: et sic quod But this would not be true if the joining of
est propter alterum, est prius soul and body did not constitute a thing one
tempore et natura posterius. in being, as those say who deny that the
Hoc autem modo corpus est soul is the form of the body.
propter animam: sicut et omnis
materia propter formam. Secus
autem esset si ex anima et
corpore non fieret unum
secundum esse: sicut dicunt
qui ponunt animam non esse
corporis formam.
Caput 90 Chapter 90
Quod nulli alii corpori nisi humano THAT AN INTELLECTUAL
unitur substantia intellectualis ut SUBSTANCE IS UNITED ONLY TO A
forma HUMAN BODY AS ITS FORM
Quia vero ostensum est [1] Having shown that a certain

substantiam aliquam intellectual substance—the human soul—
intellectualem corpori uniri ut is united to a body as its form, we must
formam, scilicet animam now inquire whether any intellectual
humanam, inquirendum restat substance is united to any other body as
utrum alicui alteri corpori aliqua its form. As to the heavenly bodies, we
substantia intellectualis ut forma have, indeed, already presented
uniatur. Et quidem de corporibus Aristotle’s opinion on the question of their
caelestibus, quod sint animata being animated by an intellectual soul,
anima intellectuali, superius, est and have observed that Augustine leaves
ostensum quid de hoc Aristoteles the matter in doubt. Bodies composed of
senserit, et quod Augustinus hoc elements, then, should be the focal point
sub dubio dereliquit. Unde of the present inquiry.
praesens inquisitio circa corpora
elementaria versari debet.
Quod autem nulli corpori [2] Now, it is quite clear that an
elementari substantia intellectualis intellectual substance is not united as
uniatur ut forma nisi humano, form to such a body except a human one.
evidenter apparet. Si enim alteri For, were it united to a body other than
corpori uniatur, aut unitur corpori the human, the latter would be either
mixto, aut simplici. Non autem mixed or simple. But it cannot be united
potest uniri corpori mixto. Quia to a mixed body, because that body
oporteret illud corpus maxime would have to be the most symmetrically
esse aequalis complexionis, structured one of its genus; and it is a fact
secundum suum genus, inter of observation that mixed bodies have
cetera corpora mixta: cum forms so much the more noble, the
videamus tanto corpora mixta nearer they come to possessing an
nobiliores formas habere quanto equable blending of their constituent
magis ad temperamentum parts. Thus, if the subject of a form of the
mixtionis perveniunt; et sic, quod noblest type, such as an intellectual
habet formam nobilissimam, substance, is a mixed body, it must
utpote substantiam intellectualem, possess that harmonious quality in the
si sit corpus mixtum, oportet esse highest degree. And this explains why we
temperatissimum. Unde etiam find that flesh of fine texture and a keen
videmus quod mollities carnis et sense of touch, which reveal evenness of
bonitas tactus, quae aequalitatem bodily temperament, are signs of mental
complexionis demonstrant, sunt acuteness. Now, the most evenly
signa boni intellectus. Complexio tempered body is the human, so that, if
autem maxime aequalis est an intellectual substance is united to a
complexio corporis humani. mixed body, the latter must be of the
Oportet igitur, si substantia same nature as the human body; and its
intellectualis uniatur alicui corpori form, too, would be of the same nature as
mixto, quod illud sit eiusdem the human soul, if it were an intellectual
naturae cum corpore humano. substance. Hence, there would be no

Forma etiam eius esset eiusdem specific difference between the animal so
naturae cum anima humana, si constituted and man.
esset substantia intellectualis. Non
igitur esset differentia secundum
speciem inter illud animal et
hominem.
Similiter autem neque corpori [3] It is likewise impossible for an
simplici, puta aeri aut aquae aut intellectual substance to be united as
igni aut terrae, uniri potest form to a simple body, such as air, water,
substantia intellectualis ut forma. fire, or earth. For each of these bodies is
Unumquodque enim horum of uniform character in the whole and in
corporum est simile in toto et the parts; a part of air is of the same
partibus: eiusdem enim naturae et nature and species as the whole air,
speciei est pars aeris et totus aer, having, indeed, the same motion; and so
etenim eundem motum habet; et it is with the other simple bodies. Like
similiter de aliis. Similibus autem movers, however, must have like forms.
motoribus similes formae Therefore, if any part of any one of those
debentur. Si igitur aliqua pars bodies—air, for example—is animated by
alicuius dictorum corporum sit an intellectual soul, then for that very
animata anima intellectuali, puta reason the whole air and all its parts will
aeris, totus aer et omnes partes be animated. But this manifestly is not so;
eius, eadem ratione, erunt for there is no evidence of vital operation
animata. Hoc autem manifeste in the parts of the air or of other simple
apparet falsum: nam nulla bodies. Therefore, a substance of
operatio vitae apparet in partibus intellectual type is not united as form to
aeris vel aliorum simplicium any part of the air or of similar bodies.
corporum. Non igitur alicui parti
aeris, vel similium corporum,
substantia intellectualis unitur ut
forma.
Adhuc. Si alicui simplicium [4] Moreover, if an intellectual substance
corporum unitur aliqua substantia is united as form to one of the simple
intellectualis ut forma, aut habebit bodies, it will either be endowed with an
intellectum tantum: aut habebit intellect only, or will have other powers
alias potentias, utpote quae such as those that belong to the sensitive
pertinent ad partem sensitivam aut or to the nutritive part, as in man. In the
nutritivam, sicut est in homine. Si first case, there would be no point in its
autem habet intellectum tantum, being united to a body. For every
frustra unitur corpori. Omnis enim corporeal form has some operation
forma corporis habet aliquam proper to itself which is exercised through
propriam operationem per corpus. the body; whereas the intellect has no
Intellectus autem non habet operation pertaining to the body, except
aliquam operationem ad corpus by way of moving it; because
pertinentem, nisi secundum quod understanding is not an operation that
movet corpus: intelligere enim can be exercised through any bodily
ipsum non est operatio quae per organ, and, for the same reason, neither
organum corporis exerceatur; et is the act of the will. The movements of
eadem ratione, nec velle. the elements, moreover, are derived from
Elementorum etiam motus sunt a natural movers, namely, from generators;
moventibus naturalibus, scilicet a the elements do not move themselves.
generantibus, et non movent Hence, the mere possession of
seipsa. Unde non oportet quod, movement on their part does not imply
propter eorum motum, sint that they are animated. But, if the
animata. Si autem habet intellectual substance, hypothetically
substantia intellectualis quae united to an element or a part of an
ponitur uniri elemento aut parti element, is endowed with other psychic
eius, alias animae partes, cum parts, then, since these parts are parts of
partes illae sint partes aliquorum certain organs, a diversity of organs will
organorum, oportebit in corpore necessarily be found in the body of the
elementi invenire diversitatem element. But this is incompatible with its
organorum. Quod repugnat simplicity. An intellectual substance,
simplicitati ipsius. Non igitur therefore, cannot possibly be united as
substantia intellectualis potest form to an element or to a part thereof.
uniri ut forma alicui elemento aut
parti eius.
Amplius. Quanto aliquod corpus [5] There is also the fact that the nearer a

est propinquius materiae primae, body is to prime matter, the less noble it
tanto est ignobilius: utpote magis is, being more in potentiality and less in
in potentia existens, et minus in complete act. The elements, however,
actu completo. Elementa autem are nearer than mixed bodies to prime
ipsa sunt propinquiora materiae matter, since they are the proximate
primae quam corpora mixta: cum matter of mixed bodies. Hence, the
et ipsa sint mixtorum corporum bodies of the elements are less noble in
materia proxima. Sunt igitur their specific nature than mixed bodies.
elementorum corpora ignobiliora Since, then, the nobler form belongs to
secundum suam speciem the nobler body, it is impossible that the
corporibus mixtis. Cum igitur noblest form, namely, the intellective soul,
nobilioris corporis sit nobilior should be united to bodies of the
forma, impossibile est quod elements.
nobilissima forma, quae est anima
intellectiva, sit unita corporibus
elementorum.
Item. Si corpora elementorum, aut [6] Furthermore, if such bodies or any of

aliquae partes eorum, essent their parts were animated by souls of the
animata nobilissimis animabus, noblest type—the intellective—then the
quae sunt animae intellectivae, more closely bodies are annexed to the
oporteret quod, quanto aliqua elements, the nearer they must be to life.
corpora essent viciniora Yet this evidently is not so, but rather the
elementis, essent propinquiora ad contrary; for plants have life in a lesser
vitam. Hoc autem non apparet, degree than animals, yet they are nearer
sed magis contrarium: nam to earth; and minerals, which are nearer
plantae minus habent de vita still, have no life at all. Therefore, an
quam animalia, cum tamen sint intellectual substance is not united as
propinquiores terrae; et mineralia, form to an element or to a part thereof.

quae sunt adhuc propinquiora,
nihil habent de vita. Non igitur
substantia intellectualis unitur
alicui elemento, vel parti eius, ut
forma.
Adhuc. Omnium moventium [7] Then, too, extreme contrariety is

corruptibilium vita per excellentiam destructive of life in all corruptible agents;
contrarietatis corrumpitur: nam excessive heat or cold, wet or dryness,
animalia et plantae mortificantur are fatal to animals and plants. Now, it is
ab excellenti calido et frigido, in the bodies of the elements especially
humido aut sicco. In corporibus that we find the extremes of these
autem elementorum praecipue contraries. So, life cannot possibly exist
sunt excellentiae harum in them. It is, therefore, impossible for an
contrarietatum. Non igitur est intellectual substance to be united to
possibile quod in eis sit vita. them as their form.
Impossibile igitur est quod
substantia intellectiva uniatur eis
ut forma.
Amplius. Elementa etsi secundum [8] Again, although the elements are
totum sint incorruptibilia, tamen incorruptible as a whole, each of their
singulae partes sunt corruptibiles, parts is corruptible as having contrariety.
utpote contrarietatem habentes. Si So, if some of their parts have cognitive
igitur aliquae partes elementorum substances united to them, it seems that
habeant sibi unitas substantias the power of discerning things corruptive
cognoscentes, maxime videtur of them will be attributed to them in the
quod assignetur eis vis discretiva highest degree. Now, this power is the
corrumpentium. Quae quidem est sense of touch, which discriminates
sensus tactus, qui est discretivus between hot and cold, and similar
calidi et frigidi et similium contraries; and for this reason, all animals
contrarietatum: propter quod et, possess that sense, as something
quasi necessarius ad necessary for preservation from
praeservationem a corruptione, corruption. But the sense of touch cannot
omnibus animalibus inest. Hunc possibly be present in a simple body,
autem sensum impossibile est since the organ of touch must not contain
inesse corpori simplici: cum contraries actually but only potentially;
oporteat organum tactus non and this is true of mixed and tempered
habere actu contrarietates, sed bodies alone. It is, therefore, impossible
potentia; quod contingit solum in that any parts of the elements should be
mixtis et temperatis. Non igitur est animated by an intellective soul.
possibile aliquas partes
elementorum esse animatas
anima intellectiva.
Item. Omne corpus vivens aliquo [9] And again, every living body has local

modo secundum animam localiter motion of some kind through its soul;
movetur: nam corpora caelestia, si thus, the heavenly bodies—if in fact they
tamen sint animata, moventur are animated—have circular movement;
circulariter; animalia perfecta motu perfect animals, a progressive movement;
progressivo; ostrea autem motu shell fish, a movement of expansion mid
dilatationis et constrictionis; contraction; plants, a movement of
plantae autem motu augmenti et increase and decrease; and all these are
decrementi, qui sunt aliquo modo in some way movements in respect of
secundum locum. Sed in place. Yet in the elements there is no
elementis non apparet aliquis evidence of any motion deriving from a
motus qui sit ab anima, sed solum soul, but only of natural movements.
motus naturales. Non sunt igitur Therefore, The elements are not living
corpora viventia. bodies.
Si autem dicatur quod substantia [10] There is, however, another
intellectualis, etsi non uniatur hypothesis, namely, that although an
corpori elementi aut parti eius ut intellectual substance be not united to a
forma, unitur tamen ei ut motor. body of an element, or to a part thereof,
Primum quidem, in aere hoc dici as its form, nevertheless it is united to it
impossibile est. Cum enim pars as its mover. Now, the former cannot be
aeris non sit per seipsam said of the air; for, since a part of air is
terminabilis, non potest aliqua not terminable through itself, no
pars eius determinata motum determinate part of it can have its own
proprium habere, propter quem proper movement, by reason of which an
sibi substantia intellectualis intellectual substance may be united to it.
uniatur.
Praeterea. Si aliqua substantia [11] Moreover, if an intellectual substance

intellectualis unitur alicui corpori is naturally united to a body as a mover to
naturaliter sicut motor proprio its proper movable, then the motive
mobili, oportet virtutem motivam power of that substance must be limited
illius substantiae limitari ad corpus to the movable body to which it is united
mobile cui naturaliter unitur: nam naturally; for in no case does the exercise
cuiuslibet motoris proprii virtus of the power of a proper mover exceed its
non excedit in movendo proprium proper movable. But it seems ridiculous
mobile. Ridiculum autem videtur to say that the power of an intellectual
dicere quod virtus alicuius substance does not, in discharging its
substantiae intellectualis non function of moving, exceed a determinate
excedat in movendo aliquam part of an element, or some mixed body.
determinatam partem alicuius Seemingly, then, it must not be said that
elementi, aut aliquod corpus an intellectual substance is in a natural
mixtum. Non videtur igitur fashion united to an elemental body as its
dicendum quod aliqua substantia mover, unless it is also united to it as its
intellectualis uniatur alicui corpori form.
elementari naturaliter ut motor, nisi
sibi etiam uniatur ut forma.
Item. Motus corporis elementaris [12] Furthermore, principles other than

potest ex aliis principiis causari the intellectual substance can cause the
quam ex substantia intellectuali. movement of a body composed of
Superfluum igitur esset propter elements. Therefore, intellectual

huiusmodi motus naturaliter substances would not need to be
substantias intellectuales naturally united to such bodies so as to
corporibus elementaribus uniri. account for this movement.
Per hoc autem excluditur opinio [13] This rules out the opinion of Apuleius

Apuleii, et quorundam and of certain Platonists, who said that
Platonicorum, qui dixerunt “the demons are animals ethereal in
Daemonia esse animalia corpore body, endowed with reason, passive in
aerea, mente rationabilia, animo soul, and of eternal duration”; as well as
passiva, tempore aeterna; et the theory of certain heathen thinkers,
quorundam gentilium ponentium who, supposing the elements to be
elementa esse animata, unde et animated, instituted divine worship in
eis cultum divinum instituebant. their honor. Likewise set aside is the
Excluditur etiam opinio dicens opinion of those who say that angels and
Angelos et Daemones habere demons have bodies naturally united to
corpora naturaliter sibi unita, de them—bodies of the nature of the higher
natura superiorum vel inferiorum or lower elements.
elementorum.
Caput 91 Chapter 91
Quod sunt aliquae substantiae THAT THERE ARE SOME
intellectuales corporibus non unitae INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES
WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO
BODIES
Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest [1] Now, the preceding considerations

esse aliquas substantias enable us to show that some intellectual
intellectuales corporibus penitus non substances exist in complete separation
unitas. from bodies.
Ostensum est enim supra, [2] For we have already shown that
corporibus corruptis, intellectus when bodies perish the intellect retains
substantiam, quasi perpetuam, its substantial character forever. And,
remanere. Et si quidem substantia indeed, if the substance of the intellect
intellectus quae remanet, sit una which remains be one in all, as some
omnium, sicut quidam dicunt, de say, it follows necessarily that it is
necessitate consequitur eam esse separate in its being from the body; and
secundum suum esse a corpore thus our thesis is established, namely,
separatum. Et sic habetur that some intellectual substance
propositum, quod substantia subsists apart from a body. But, if a
intellectualis aliqua sine corpore number of intellective souls remain after
subsistat. Si autem plures animae the bodies have perished, then it
intellectivae remaneant, corporibus belongs to some intellectual substances
destructis, conveniet aliquibus to subsist apart from a body—especially
substantiis intellectualibus absque in view of the demonstrated fact that
corpore subsistere: praesertim cum souls do not pass from one body to
ostensum sit quod animae non another. But to exist apart from bodies
transeant de corpore ad corpus. is an accidental competence on the part
Convenit autem animabus esse a of souls, since they are naturally forms
corporibus separatas per accidens: of bodies. Now, that which is through
cum naturaliter sint formae itself must be prior to that which is by
corporum. Eo autem quod est per accident. Therefore, there are some
accidens, oportet prius esse id quod intellectual substances, prior in nature
est per se. Sunt igitur aliquae to souls, which, through themselves,
substantiae intellectuales, animabus enjoy subsistence without bodies.
secundum naturam priores, quibus
per se inest sine corporibus
subsistere.
Amplius. Omne quod est de ratione [3] Furthermore, everything included in

generis, oportet de ratione speciei the essence of the genus must also be
esse: sunt autem quaedam quae found in that of the species, whereas
sunt de ratione speciei, non autem certain things belong to the latter which
de ratione generis; sicut rationale are not in the former; for instance,
est de ratione hominis, non autem rational belongs to the essence of man,
de ratione animalis. Quicquid autem but not to the essence of animal. Now,
est de ratione speciei, non autem de whatever is of the essence of the
ratione generis, non est necesse species, but not of the genus, does not
omnibus speciebus generis inesse: necessarily exist in all species of the
multae enim species sunt genus; thus, there are many species of
irrationabilium animalium. irrational animals. But it belongs to the
Substantiae autem intellectuali intellectual substance, according to its
secundum suum genus convenit genus, to be subsisting through itself,
quod sit per se subsistens, cum since it is, through itself, endowed with
habeat per se operationem: sicut operation, as shown above. Now, it is of
superius est ostensum. De ratione the essence of a thing thus subsisting
autem rei per se subsistentis non not to be united to another. Hence, it is
est quod alteri uniatur. Non est igitur not of the generic essence of an
de ratione substantiae intellectualis intellectual substance to be united to a
secundum suum genus quod sit body, although this is of the essence of
corpori unita: etsi sit hoc de ratione that intellectual substance which is the
alicuius intellectualis substantiae, soul. There are, then, some intellectual
quae est anima. Sunt igitur aliquae substances which are not united to
substantiae intellectuales corporibus bodies.
non unitae.
Adhuc. Natura superior in suo infimo [4] Then, too, the higher nature in its

contingit naturam inferiorem in eius lowest part touches the lower nature in
supremo. Natura autem its highest part. Now, the intellectual
intellectualis est superior corporali. nature is higher than the corporeal, and
Attingit autem eam secundum it makes contact with it in one of its
aliquam partem sui, quae est anima parts, namely, the intellective soul.
intellectiva. Oportet igitur quod, sicut Consequently, just as the body
corpus perfectum per animam perfected by the intellective soul is the
intellectivam est supremum in highest in the genus of bodies, so the
genere corporum, ita anima intellective soul which is united to a
intellectiva, quae unitur corpori, sit body is the lowest in the genus of
infima in genere substantiarum intellectual substances. Therefore,
intellectualium. Sunt igitur aliquae there are some intellectual substances
substantiae intellectuales non unitae not united to bodies which, in the order
corporibus, superiores secundum of nature, are superior to the soul.
naturae ordinem anima.
Item. Si est aliquid imperfectum in [5] If in a genus, moreover, there exists

aliquo genere, invenitur ante illud, something imperfect, then one finds a
secundum naturae ordinem, aliquid reality antecedent to it; a thing which, in
in genere illo perfectum: perfectum the order of nature, is perfect in that
enim natura prius est imperfecto. genus, for the perfect is prior in nature
Formae autem quae sunt in to the imperfect. Now, forms existing in
materiis, sunt actus imperfecti: quia matters are imperfect acts, since they
non habent esse completum. Sunt have not complete being. Hence, there
igitur aliquae formae quae sunt are some forms that are complete acts,
actus completi per se subsistentes, subsisting in themselves, and having a
et speciem completam habentes. complete species. But every form that
Omnis autem forma per se subsists through itself without matter is
subsistens absque materia, est an intellectual substance, since, as we
substantia intellectualis: immunitas have seen, immunity from matter
enim materiae confert esse confers intelligible being. Therefore,
intelligibile, ut ex praemissis patet. there are some intellectual substances
Sunt ergo aliquae substantiae that are not united to bodies, for every
intellectuales corporibus non unitae: body has matter.
omne enim corpus materiam habet.
Amplius. Substantia potest esse [6] Then, too, it is possible for
sine quantitate, licet quantitas sine substance to be without quantity, but
substantia esse non possit: not vice versa. “For substance is prior
substantia enim aliorum generum to the other genera in time, in nature,
prima est tempore, ratione et and in knowledge.” But no corporeal
cognitione. Sed nulla substantia substance is without quantity. Hence,
corporea est sine quantitate. there can be some things in the genus
Possunt igitur esse quaedam in of substance that are completely
genere substantiae omnino absque incorporeal. But all possible natures are
corpore. Omnes autem naturae found in the order of things; otherwise,
possibiles in rerum ordine the universe would be imperfect. And
inveniuntur: aliter enim esset indeed, “in the case of eternal things, to
universum imperfectum. In be and to be possible are one and the
sempiternis etiam non differt esse et same.” Therefore, below the first
posse. Sunt igitur aliquae substance, God, who is not in a genus
substantiae absque corporibus (as was shown in Book I of this works),
subsistentes; post primam and above the soul, which is united to a
substantiam, quae Deus est, qui body, there are some substances
non est in genere, ut supra subsisting without bodies.
ostensum est; et supra animam,
quae est corpori unita.
Adhuc. Si ex aliquibus duobus [7] Furthermore, if in a thing composed

invenitur aliquid compositum; et of two entities the less perfect one be
alterum eorum invenitur per se quod found to exist through itself, then the
est minus perfectum: et alterum, one which is more perfect and has less
quod est magis perfectum et minus need of the other is also found to exist
reliquo indigens, per se invenitur. in the same way. Now, as we have
Invenitur autem aliqua substantia seen, there is in fact a substance
composita ex substantia intellectuali composed of an intellectual substance
et corpore, ut ex praemissis patet. and a body. And a bodily thing existing
Corpus autem invenitur per se: sicut through itself, is also an observed fact
patet in omnibus corporibus —of which all inanimate bodies are
inanimatis. Multo igitur fortius evident instances. All the more reason,
inveniuntur substantiae then, for our finding intellectual
intellectuales corporibus non unitae. substances that are not united to
bodies.
Item. Substantiam rei oportet esse [8] Also, the substance of a thing must
proportionatam suae operationi: be proportionate to its operation,
quia operatio est actus et bonum because operation is the act and the
substantiae operantis. Sed good of the operator’s substance. Now,
intelligere est propria operatio understanding is the proper operation of
substantiae intellectualis. Oportet an intellectual substance. Hence, an
igitur substantiam intellectualem intellectual substance must be the kind
talem esse quae competat of substance to which such operation
praedictae operationi. Intelligere belongs. But, since understanding is an
autem, cum sit operatio per operation that is not exercised through
organum corporeum non exercita, a corporeal organ, it has no need of the
non indiget corpore nisi inquantum body except so far as intelligibles are
intelligibilia sumuntur a sensibilibus. taken from sensible things. This is an
Hic autem est imperfectus modus imperfect way of understanding; the
intelligendi: perfectus enim modus perfect way consists in the
intelligendi est ut intelligantur ea understanding of things which in their
quae sunt secundum naturam suam very nature are intelligible; to
intelligibilia; quod autem non understand only those things which are
intelligantur nisi ea quae non sunt not intelligible in themselves but which
secundum se intelligibilia, sed fiunt are made intelligible by the intellect, is
intelligibilia per intellectum, est an imperfect way of understanding.
imperfectus modus intelligendi. Si Now, prior to every imperfect thing there
igitur ante omne imperfectum must be something perfect in the same
oportet esse perfectum aliquid in genus; so that above human souls,
genere illo, oportet quod ante which understand by receiving from
animas humanas, quae intelligunt phantasms, there are some intellectual
accipiendo a phantasmatibus, sint substances which understand things
aliquae intellectuales substantiae that are intelligible in themselves,
intelligentes ea quae sunt without receiving knowledge from
secundum se intelligibilia, non sensible things; and, therefore, such
accipientes cognitionem a substances are by their nature entirely
sensibilibus, ac per hoc omnino a separate from bodies.
corporibus secundum suam

naturam separatae
Praeterea. Aristoteles argumentatur [9] Again, in Metaphysics XI [8] Aristotle

sic in XI metaphysicae. Motum reasons as follows. Movement that is
continuum, regularem et, quantum continuous, regular, and in its own
in se est, indeficientem, oportet nature unfailing must be derived from a
esse a motore qui non movetur mover which is not moved, either
neque per se neque per accidens, through itself or by accident, as was
ut supra probatum est. Plures etiam proved in Book I of this work. Moreover,
motus oportet a pluribus motoribus a plurality of movements must proceed
esse. Motus autem caeli est from a plurality of movers. The
continuus, regularis, et, quantum in movement of the heaven, however, is
se est, indeficiens est: et praeter continuous, regular, and in its nature
primum motum, sunt multi tales unfailing, And besides the first
motus in caelo, sicut per movement, there are many such
considerationes astrologorum movements in the heaven, as the
probatur. Oportet igitur esse plures studies of the astronomers show.
motores qui non moveantur neque Hence, there must be several movers
per se neque per accidens. Nullum which are not moved, either through
autem corpus movet nisi motum, ut themselves or by accident. But, as we
supra probatum est. Motor autem proved in that same Book, no body
incorporeus unitus corpori, movetur moves unless it is itself moved; and an
per accidens ad motum corporis: incorporeal mover united to a body is
sicut patet de anima. Oportet igitur moved accidentally in keeping with the
esse plures motores qui neque sint movement of the body, as we see in the
corpora neque sint corporibus uniti. case of the soul. Hence, there must be
Motus autem caelestes sunt ab a number of movers which neither are
aliquo intellectu, ut supra probatum bodies nor are united to bodies. Now,
est. Sunt igitur plures substantiae the heavenly movements proceed from
intellectuales corporibus non unitae. an intellect, as we have also shown. We
therefore conclude to the existence of a
plurality of intellectual substances that
are not united to bodies.
His autem concordat sententia [10] With this conclusion Dionysius is in

Dionysii, IV cap. de Div. Nom., agreement, when, speaking of the
dicentis de Angelis quod, sicut angels, he says that “they are
immateriales, et incorporei understood to be immaterial and
intelliguntur. incorporeal” [De div. nom. IV].
Per hoc autem excluditur error [11] Excluded hereby are the error of
Sadducaeorum, qui dicebant the Sadducees, who said that “no spirit
spiritum non esse. Et positio exists” (Acts 23:8); the doctrine of the
antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant natural philosophers of old, who
omnem substantiam corpoream maintained that every substance is
esse. Positio etiam Origenis qui dixit corporeal; as well as the position of
quod nulla substantia, post Origen, who held that no substance,
Trinitatem divinam, absque corpore save the divine Trinity, can subsist apart

potest subsistere. Et omnium from a body; and, indeed, of all the
aliorum ponentium omnes Angelos, other thinkers who hold that all the
bonos et malos, habere corpora angels, both good and bad, have
naturaliter sibi unita. bodies naturally united to them.
Caput 92 Chapter 92
De multitudine substantiarum CONCERNING THE GREAT NUMBER
separatarum OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
Sciendum est autem quod [1] In treating this problem, let it be noted

Aristoteles probare nititur non that Aristotle attempts to prove that not
solum esse aliquas substantias only some intellectual substances exist
intellectuales absque corpore, sed apart from a body, but also that they are
quod sunt eiusdem numeri cuius of the same number, neither more nor
sunt motus deprehensi in caelo, less, as the movements observed in the
neque pauciores. heaven.
Probat enim quod non sunt aliqui [2] Now, Aristotle proves that no
motus in caelo qui a nobis movements unobservable by us exist in
deprehendi non possint, per hoc the heaven, because every movement in
quod omnis motus qui est in caelo, the heaven exists by reason of the
est propter motum alicuius stellae, movement of some star—a thing
quae sensibilis est: orbes enim perceptible to the senses; for the
deferunt stellas; motus autem spheres are the conveyers of the stars,
deferentis est propter motum and the movement of the conveyer is for
delati. Item probat quod non sunt the sake of the movement of the
aliquae substantiae separatae a conveyed. He proves also that there are
quibus non proveniant aliqui motus no separate substances from which
in caelo: quia, cum motus some movements do not arise in the
caelestes ordinentur ad heaven, for the heavenly movements are
substantias separatas sicut ad directed to the separate substances as
fines, si essent aliae substantiae their ends; so that, if there were any
separatae quam illae quas separate substances other than those
numerat, essent aliqui motus in which he enumerates, there would be
eas ordinati sicut in fines; aliter some movements directed to them as
essent motus imperfecti. Unde ex their ends; otherwise, those movements
his concludit quod non sunt plures would be imperfect. In view of all this,
substantiae separatae quam motus Aristotle concludes that such substances
deprehensi, et qui possunt are not more numerous than the
deprehendi, in caelo: praesertim movements that are and can be
cum non sint plura corpora observed in the heaven; especially since
caelestia eiusdem speciei, ut sic there are not several heavenly bodies of
etiam possint esse plures motus the same species, so as to make
nobis incogniti. possible the existence of several
movements unknown to us.
Haec autem probatio non habet [3] This proof, however, lacks necessity.
necessitatem. In his enim quae For, as Aristotle himself teaches in
sunt ad finem, sumitur necessitas Physics II [9], with things directed to an
ex fine, sicut ipsemet docet in II end, necessity derives from the end, and
physicorum: non autem e not conversely. So if, as he says, the
converso. Unde, si motus heavenly movements are ordained to
caelestes ordinantur in substantias separate substances as their ends, the
separatas sicut in fines, ut ipsemet number of such substances cannot be
dicit, non potest concludi inferred with necessity from the number
necessario numerus substantiarum of the movements. For it can be said that
praedictarum ex numero motuum. there are some separate substances of a
Potest enim dici quod sunt aliquae higher nature than those which are the
substantiae separatae altioris proximate ends of the celestial
naturae quam illae quae sunt movements; even so, the fact that
proximi fines motuum caelestium: craftsmen’s tools we for those who work
sicut, si instrumenta artificialia sunt with them does not preclude the
propter homines qui per ea existence of other men who do not work
operantur, nihil prohibet esse alios with such tools themselves, but direct the
homines qui per instrumenta workers. And, in point of fact, Aristotle
huiusmodi non operantur himself adduces the preceding proof, not
immediate, sed imperant as necessary but as probable; for he
operantibus. Et ideo ipse says: “hence the number of the
Aristoteles hanc rationem non unchangeable substances and principles
inducit quasi necessariam, sed may probably be taken to be just so
tanquam probabilem: dicit enim: many; the assertion of necessity may be
quare substantias et principia left to more powerful thinkers.”
immobilia rationabile est tot
aestimare: necessarium enim
dimittatur fortioribus dicere.
Restat igitur ostendendum quod [4] It therefore remains to be shown that

sunt multo plures substantiae the intellectual substances existing apart
intellectuales a corporibus from bodies are much more numerous
separatae quam sint motus than the heavenly movements.
caelestes.
Substantiae enim intellectuales [5] Now, intellectual substances are in

secundum suum genus their genus transcendent with respect to
transcendunt omnem naturam all corporeal natures. Hence, the rank of
corpoream. Oportet igitur accipere such substances must be determined in
gradum in praedictis substantiis accordance with their elevation above
secundum elevationem earum the corporeal nature. Now, some
supra corpoream naturam. Sunt intellectual substances transcend the
autem quaedam intellectuales corporeal substance only in their generic
substantiae elevatae supra nature, and yet, as we have seen, are
corpoream substantiam secundum united to bodies as form. And since
sui generis naturam tantum, quae intellectual substances enjoy a kind of
tamen corporibus uniuntur ut being that is entirely independent of the
formae, ut ex praemissis patet. Et body, as was shown above, we find a
quia esse substantiarum higher grade of such substances, which,

intellectualium secundum suum though not united to bodies as forms, are
genus nullam a corpore nevertheless the proper movers of
dependentiam habet, ut supra certain determinate bodies. And the
probatum est, invenitur altior nature of an intellectual substance
gradus dictarum substantiarum, likewise does not depend on its
quae etsi non uniantur corporibus producing movement, since the latter
ut formae, sunt tamen proprii follows upon their principal operation,
motores aliquorum corporum which is understanding. Consequently,
determinatorum. Similiter autem there will exist a still higher grade of
natura substantiae intellectualis intellectual substances, which are not the
non dependet a movendo: cum proper movers of certain bodies, but are
movere sit consequens ad superior to the movers.
principalem eorum operationem,
quae est intelligere. Erit igitur et
aliquis gradus altior substantiarum
intellectualium, quae non sunt
proprii motores aliquorum
corporum, sed superiores
motoribus.
Amplius. Sicut agens per naturam [6] Moreover, just as an agent that acts
agit per suam formam naturalem, by nature acts by its natural form, so an
ita agens per intellectum agit per agent that acts by intellect acts by its
formam intellectus: ut patet in his intellectual form, as we see in those who
qui agunt per artem. Sicut igitur act by art. Therefore, just as the former
agens per naturam est agent is proportionate to the patient by
proportionatum patienti ratione reason of its natural form, so the latter
suae formae naturalis, ita agens agent is proportionate to the patient and
per intellectum est proportionatum to the thing made, through the form in its
patienti et facto per formam intellect; that is to say, the intellective
intellectus: ut scilicet huiusmodi sit form is then such that it can be
forma intellectiva quod possit introduced by the agent’s action into
induci per actionem agentis in matter which receives it. Therefore, the
materiam recipientem. Oportet proper movers of the spheres, which (if
igitur proprios motores orbium, qui we wish to side with Aristotle here) move
per intellectum movent, si in hoc by their intellect, must have such
opinionem Aristotelis sustinere understandings as are explicable by the
volumus, tales intelligentias habere motions of the spheres and reproducible
quales sunt explicabiles per motus in natural things. But above intelligible
orbium, et producibiles in rebus conceptions of this sort there are some
naturalibus. Sed supra huiusmodi which are more universal. For the
conceptiones intelligibiles est intellect apprehends the forms of things
accipere aliquas universaliores: in a more universal mode than that in
intellectus enim universalius which they exist in things; and for this
apprehendit formas rerum quam sit reason we observe that the form of the
esse earum in rebus; unde speculative intellect is more universal
videmus quod universalior est than that of the practical intellect, and
forma intellectus speculativi quam among the practical arts, the conception
practici, et inter artes practicas of the commanding art is more universal
universalior est conceptio artis than that of an executive art. Now, the
imperantis quam exequentis. grades of intellectual substances must
Oportet autem substantiarum be reckoned according to the grade of
intelligibilium gradus accipere intellectual operation proper to them.
secundum gradum intellectualis Therefore, there are some intellectual
operationis quae est eis propria. substances above those which are the
Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae proper and proximate movers of certain
intellectuales supra illas quae sunt determinate spheres.
proprii et proximi motores
determinatorum orbium.
Adhuc. Ordo universi exigere [7] The order of the universe,
videtur ut illud quod est in rebus furthermore, seems to require that
nobilius, excedat quantitate vel whatever is nobler among things should
numero ignobiliora: ignobiliora exceed in quantity or number the less
enim videntur esse propter noble; since the latter seem to exist for
nobiliora. Unde oportet quod the sake of the former. That is why the
nobiliora, quasi propter se more noble things, as existing for their
existentia, multiplicentur quantum own sake, should be as numerous as
possibile est. Et ideo videmus quod possible. Thus we see that the
corpora incorruptibilia, scilicet incorruptible, or heavenly, bodies so far
caelestia, in tantum excedunt exceed the corruptible, or element
corruptibilia, scilicet elementaria, ut composed, bodies, that the latter are in
quasi haec non habeant notabilem number practically negligible by
quantitatem in comparatione ad comparison. However, just as the
illa. Sicut autem caelestia corpora heavenly bodies are nobler than those
digniora sunt elementaribus, ut composed of elements—the incorruptible
incorruptibilia corruptibilibus; ita than the corruptible—so intellectual
substantiae intellectuales omnibus substances are superior to all bodies, as
corporibus, ut immobile et the immovable and immaterial to the
immateriale mobili et materiali. movable and material. The number of
Excedunt igitur in numero separate intellectual substances,
intellectuales substantiae therefore, surpasses that of the whole
separatae omnium rerum multitude of material things. Such
materialium multitudinem. Non substances, then, are not limited to the
igitur comprehenduntur numero number of the heavenly movements.
caelestium motuum.
Item. Species rerum materialium [8] Then, too, it is not through the matter

non multiplicantur per materiam, that the species of material things are
sed per formam. Formae autem multiplied, but through the form. Now,
quae sunt extra materiam, habent forms outside of matter enjoy a more
esse completius et universalius complete and universal being than forms
quam formae quae sunt in materia: in matter, because forms are received
nam formae in materia recipiuntur into matter in keeping with the receptive
secundum materiae capacitatem. capacity of matter. Hence, those forms
Non videntur igitur esse minoris which exist apart from matter, and which
multitudinis formae quae sunt extra we call separate substances, are
materiam, quas dicimus seemingly not less numerous than the
substantias separatas, quam sint species of material things.
species materialium rerum.
Non autem propter hoc dicimus [9] But we do not on this account say,
quod substantiae separatae sint with the Platonists, that separate
species istorum sensibilium: sicut substances are the species of these
Platonici senserunt. Cum enim non sensible things. For, not being able to
possent ad praedictarum arrive at the knowledge of such
substantiarum notitiam pervenire substances except from sensible things,
nisi ex sensibilibus, apposuerunt the Platonists supposed the former to be
istas substantias esse eiusdem of the same species as the latter, or
speciei cum istis, vel magis rather to be their species. In the same
species istarum: sicut, si aliquis way, a person who had not seen the sun
non videret solem et lunam et alia or the moon or the other stars, and had
astra, et audiret esse quaedam heard that they were incorruptible
corpora incorruptibilia, nominaret bodies, might call them by the names of
ea nominibus istorum corporum these corruptible bodies, thinking them to
corruptibilium, existimans ea esse be of the same species as the latter;
eiusdem speciei cum istis. Quod which could not be so. And it is likewise
non esset possibile. Similiter etiam impossible that immaterial substances
impossibile est substantias should be of the same species as
immateriales esse eiusdem speciei material ones, or that they should be the
cum materialibus, vel species species of the latter. For the specific
ipsarum: cum materia sit de ratione essence of these sensible things
speciei horum sensibilium, licet includes matter, though not this particular
non haec materia, quae est matter, which is the proper principle of
proprium principium individui; sicut the individual, just as the specific
de ratione speciei hominis sunt essence of man includes flesh and
carnes et ossa, non autem hae bones, but not this flesh and these bones
carnes et haec ossa, quae sunt which are principles of Socrates and
principia Socratis et Platonis. Sic Plato. Thus, we do not say that separate
igitur non dicimus substantias substances are the species of these
separatas esse species istorum sensible things, but that they are other
sensibilium: sed esse alias species species superior to them, inasmuch as
nobiliores istis, quanto purum est the pure is nobler than the mixed. Those
nobilius permixto. Et tunc illas substances, then, must be more
substantias esse plures oportet numerous than the species of these
istis speciebus rerum materialium. material things.
Adhuc. Magis est aliquid [10] Moreover, a thing is multipliable in

multiplicabile secundum suum respect of its intelligible being rather than
esse intelligibile quam secundum its material being. For we grasp with our
suum esse materiale. Multa enim intellect many things which cannot exist
intellectu capimus quae in materia in matter. This accounts for the fact that
esse non possunt: ex quo contingit any straight finite line can be added to
quod cuilibet rectae lineae finitae mathematically, but not physically; and
potest mathematice fieri additio, that rarefaction of bodies, the velocity of
non autem naturaliter; raritas etiam movements, and the diversity of shapes
corporum, velocitas motuum, et can be increased ad infinitum in thought,
diversitas figurarum, in infinitum though not in nature. Now, separate
augeri comprehenditur secundum substances are by their nature endowed

intellectum, quamvis sit impossibile with intelligible being. Therefore, greater
in natura sic esse. Substantiae multiplicity is possible in such
autem separatae sunt in esse substances than in material ones,
intelligibili secundum suam considering the properties and the nature
naturam. Maior igitur multiplicitas in of both these kinds of being. But in
eis est possibilis quam in rebus eternal things, to be and to be possible
materialibus, secundum are one and the same. The multitude of
proprietatem et rationem pensatam separate substances is, therefore,
generis utriusque. In perpetuis greater than that of material bodies.
autem non differt esse et posse.
Excedit igitur multitudo
substantiarum separatarum
multitudinem materialium
corporum.
His autem attestatur sacra [11] Now, to these things Holy Scripture
Scriptura. Dicitur enim Dan. 710: bears witness. For it is said in the Book
millia millium ministrabant ei, et of Daniel (7:10): “Thousands of
decies millies centena millia thousands ministered to Him, and ten
assistebant ei. Et Dionysius, 14 thousand times a hundred thousand
cap. Cael. Hier., dicit quod stood before Him.” And Dionysius in his
numerus illarum substantiarum work, The Celestial Hierarchy, writes that
excedit omnem materialem the number of those substances
multitudinem. “exceeds all material multitude.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [12] This excludes the error of those who

dicentium substantias separatas say that the number of separate
secundum numerum motuum substances corresponds to the number
caelestium, aut secundum of heavenly movements, or of the
numerum sphaerarum caelestium heavenly spheres, as well as the error of
esse. Et error Rabbi Moysi, qui Rabbi Moses, who said that the number
dixit numerum Angelorum qui in of angels which Scripture affirms is not
Scriptura ponitur, non esse the number of separate substances, but
numerum substantiarum of forces in this lower world; as if the
separatarum, sed virtutum in istis concupiscible power were called the
inferioribus: sicut si vis “spirit of concupiscence,” and so on.
concupiscibilis dicatur spiritus
concupiscentiae, et sic de aliis.
Caput 93 Chapter 93
Quod in substantiis separatis non ON THE NONEXISTENCE OF A
sunt multae unius speciei PLURALITY OF SEPARATE
SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES
Ex his autem quae de istis [1] From the preceding observations
substantiis praemissa sunt, ostendi concerning these substances it can be

potest quod non sunt plures shown that there are not several of them
substantiae separatae unius belonging to the same species.
speciei.
Ostensum est enim supra quod [2] For it was shown above that separate

substantiae separatae sunt substances are certain subsisting
quaedam quidditates subsistentes. quiddities. But the species of a thing is
Species autem rei est quam what is signified by the definition, which
significat definitio, quae est signum is the sign of a thing’s quiddity. Hence,
quidditatis rei. Unde quidditates subsisting quiddities are subsisting
subsistentes sunt species species. Therefore, several separate
subsistentes. Plures ergo substances cannot exist unless they be
substantiae separatae esse non several species.
possunt nisi sint plures species.
Adhuc. Quaecumque sunt idem [3] Moreover, things specifically the

specie differentia autem numero, same, but numerically diverse, possess
habent materiam: differentia enim matter. For the difference that results
quae ex forma procedit, inducit from the form introduces specific
diversitatem speciei; quae autem diversity; from the matter, numerical
ex materia, inducit diversitatem diversity. But separate substances have
secundum numerum. Substantiae no matter whatever, either as part of
autem separatae non habent themselves or as that to which they are
omnino materiam, neque quae sit united as forms. It is therefore impossible
pars earum, neque cui uniantur ut that there be several such substances of
formae. Impossibile est igitur quod one species.
sint plures unius speciei.
Amplius. Ad hoc sunt plura [4] Then, too, the reason why there exist

individua in una specie in rebus among corruptible things several
corruptibilibus, ut natura speciei, individuals in one species is that the
quae non potest perpetuo specific nature, which cannot be
conservari in uno individuo, perpetuated in one individual, may be
conservetur in pluribus: unde etiam preserved in several. Hence, even in
in corporibus incorruptibilibus non incorruptible bodies there is but one
est nisi unum individuum in una individual in one species. The nature of
specie. Substantiae autem the separate substance, however, can be
separatae natura potest conservari preserved in one individual, because
in uno individuo: eo quod sunt such substances are incorruptible, as
incorruptibiles, ut supra ostensum was shown above. Consequently, in
est. Non igitur oportet esse plura those substances there is no need for
individua in illis substantiis several individuals of the same species.
eiusdem speciei.
Item. Id quod est speciei in [5] Furthermore, in each individual that
unoquoque, dignius est eo quod which belongs to the species is superior
est individuationis principium, to the individuating principle, which lies
praeter rationem speciei existens. outside the essence of the species.
Multiplicatio igitur specierum plus Therefore, the universe is ennobled more

addit nobilitatis universo quam by the multiplication of species than by
multiplicatio individuorum in una the multiplication of individuals of one
specie. Perfectio autem universi species. But it is in separate substances,
maxime consistit in substantiis above all, that the perfection of the
separatis. Magis igitur competit ad universe consists. Therefore, it is more
perfectionem universi quod sint consonant with the perfection of the
plures secundum speciem universe that they constitute a plurality,
diversae, quam quod sint multae each diverse in species from the other,
secundum numerum in eadem rather than a numerical multiplicity within
specie. one and the same species.
Praeterea. Substantiae separatae [6] Again, separate substances are more

sunt perfectiores quam corpora perfect than the heavenly bodies. But in
caelestia. Sed in corporibus the heavenly bodies, on account of their
caelestibus, propter eorum very perfection, we find that one species
perfectionem, non invenitur nisi contains only one individual; both
unum individuum unius speciei: because each of them exhausts the
tum quia unumquodque eorum entire matter pertaining to its species,
constat ex tota materia suae and because each heavenly body
speciei; tum quia in uno individuo possesses perfectly the power of its
est perfecte virtus speciei ad species to fulfil in the universe that to
complendum illud in universo ad which the species is ordered, as the sun
quod illa species ordinatur, sicut and the moon exemplify conspicuously.
praecipue patet in sole et luna. For all the more reason, then, should we
Multo igitur magis in substantiis find in separate substances but one
separatis non invenitur nisi unum individual of the one species.
individuum in una specie.
Caput 94 Chapter 94
Quod substantia separata et anima THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
non sunt unius speciei AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF THE
SAME SPECIES
Ex his autem ulterius ostenditur [1] From the above we can proceed to
quod anima non est eiusdem prove that the soul is not of the same
speciei cum substantiis separatis. species as separate substances.
Maior enim est differentia animae [7] For the difference between the
humanae a substantia separata human soul and a separate substance
quam unius substantiae separatae is greater than that between one
ab alia. Sed substantiae separatae separate substance and another. But,
omnes ad invicem specie differunt, as we have just shown, all separate
ut ostensum est. Multo igitur magis substances differ in species from one
substantia separata ab anima. another. Much more, then, does a
separate substance differ in species
from the soul.
Amplius. Unaquaeque res habet [3] Moreover, the being proper to each
proprium esse secundum rationem thing accords with its specific nature;
suae speciei: quorum enim est things diverse in the nature of their
diversa ratio essendi, horum est being are diverse in species. But the
diversa species. Esse autem being of the human soul and of the
animae humanae et substantiae separate substance is not of the same
separatae non est unius rationis: nature; for in the being of a separate
nam in esse substantiae separatae substance the body cannot
non potest communicare corpus, communicate, as, indeed, it can in the
sicut potest communicare in esse being of the human soul, which is united
animae humanae, quae secundum in being to the body as form to matter.
esse unitur corpori ut forma The human soul, therefore, differs in
materiae. Anima igitur humana species from separate substances.
differt specie a substantiis separatis.
Adhuc. Quod habet secundum [4] Furthermore, that which of itself has

seipsum speciem, non potest esse species cannot be of the same species
eiusdem speciei cum eo quod non as that which of itself does not, but
habet secundum se speciem, sed which is part of a species. Now, the
est pars speciei. Substantia autem separate substance is so endowed, but
separata habet per seipsam the soul, being part of the human
speciem: anima autem non, sed est species, is not. The soul, therefore,
pars speciei humanae. Impossibile cannot possibly be of the same species
est igitur quod anima sit eiusdem as separate substances—unless,
speciei cum substantiis separatis: perchance, man be of the same species
nisi forte homo esset eiusdem as they; which is clearly impossible.
speciei cum illis, quod patet esse
impossibile.
Praeterea. Ex propria operatione rei [5] Then, too, the species of a thing is

percipitur species eius: operatio gathered from its proper operation; for
enim demonstrat virtutem, quae the operation manifests the power,
indicat essentiam. Propria autem which reveals the essence. Now,
operatio substantiae separatae et understanding is the proper operation of
animae intellectivae est intelligere. the separate substance and of the
Est autem omnino alius modus intellective soul. But these two have an
intelligendi substantiae separatae et utterly different mode of understanding;
animae: nam anima intelligit a the soul understands by receiving from
phantasmatibus accipiendo; non phantasms; the separate substance
autem substantia separata, cum does not, since it has no corporeal
non habeat organa corporea, in organs—which are the necessary loci of
quibus oportet esse phantasmata. phantasms. It follows that the human
Non sunt igitur anima humana et soul and the separate substance are
substantia separata unius speciei. not of the same species.
Caput 95 Chapter 95
Quomodo accipiatur genus et HOW IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
species in substantiis separatis GENUS AND SPECIES ARE TO BE
TAKEN
Oportet autem considerare [1] We must now consider in what
secundum quid diversificatur respect species is diversified in separate
species in substantiis separatis. In substances. For in material things which
rebus enim materialibus quae sunt are of diverse species and of one genus,
diversarum specierum unius the concept of the genus is taken from
generis existentes, ratio generis ex the material principle; the difference of
principio materiali sumitur, species from the formal principle. Thus,
differentia speciei a principio the sensitive nature, whence the notion
formali: natura enim sensitiva, ex of animal is derived, is in man material
qua sumitur ratio animalis, est with respect to the intellective nature,
materiale in homine respectu from which man’s specific difference,
naturae intellectivae, ex qua rational, is obtained. Therefore, if
sumitur differentia specifica separate substances are not composed
hominis, scilicet rationale. Si igitur of matter and form, as we have seen,” it
substantiae separatae non sunt ex is not clear how genus and specific
materia et forma compositae, ut ex difference can apply to them.
praemissis, patet, non apparet
secundum quid in eis genus et
differentia specifica accipi possit.
Scire igitur oportet quod diversae [2] It must, therefore, be known that the

rerum species gradatim naturam diverse species of things possess the
entis possident. Statim enim in nature of being [ens] in graded fashion.
prima entis divisione invenitur hoc Thus, in the first division of being we at
quidem perfectum, scilicet ens per once find something perfect, namely,
se et ens actu: aliud vero being through itself and being in act, and
imperfectum, scilicet ens in alio et something imperfect, namely, being in
ens in potentia. Et eodem modo another and being in potency. And
discurrenti per singula apparet passing thus from species to species, it
unam speciem super aliam aliquem becomes quite apparent that one
gradum perfectionis adiicere: sicut species has an additional grade of
animalia super plantas, et animalia perfection over another—animals over
progressiva super animalia plants, and animals that can move about
immobilia; in coloribus etiam una over those that cannot; while in colors
species alia perfectior invenitur, one species is found to be more perfect
secundum quod est albedini than another the nearer it approaches to
propinquior. Propter quod whiteness. Wherefore Aristotle says in
Aristoteles, in VIII Metaph., dicit Metaphysics VIII [8] that “the definitions
quod definitiones rerum sunt sicut of things are like number, the species of
numerus, in quo unitas subtracta which is changed by the subtraction or
vel addita speciem numeri variat: addition of unity”; just as in definitions
per quem modum in definitionibus, the subtraction or addition of a
si una differentia subtrahatur vel difference gives us a new species.
addatur, diversa species invenitur.
Ratio igitur determinatae speciei Hence, the essence of a determinate

consistit in hoc quod natura species consists in this, that the
communis in determinato gradu common nature is placed in a
entis collocatur. Et quia in rebus ex determinate grade of being. Now, in
materia et forma compositis forma things composed of matter and form, the
est quasi terminus, id autem quod form has the character of a term, and
terminatur per eam est materia vel that which is terminated by it is the
materiale: oportet quod ratio matter or something material. The
generis sumatur ex materiali, concept of the genus must, therefore, be
differentia vero specifica ex formali. taken from the material principle, and
Et ideo ex differentia et genere fit the specific difference from the formal
unum sicut ex materia et forma. Et principle. Accordingly, from genus and
sicut una et eadem est natura quae difference, as from matter and form,
ex materia et forma constituitur, ita there results one thing. And just as it is
differentia non addit quandam one and the same nature that is
extraneam naturam super genus, constituted by the matter and the form,
sed est quaedam determinatio so the difference does not add to the
ipsius naturae generis: ut, si genus genus a nature extraneous to it, but is a
accipiatur animal pedes habens, certain determination of the generic
differentia eius est animal duos nature itself. For instance, suppose that
pedes habens; quam quidem the genus is animal with feet, and its
differentiam nihil extraneum super difference, animal with two feet; this
genus addere, manifestum est. difference manifestly adds nothing
extraneous to the genus.
Unde patet quod accidit generi et [3] Clearly, then, it is accidental to the
differentiae quod determinatio genus and difference that the
quam differentia importat, ex alio determination introduced by the
principio causetur quam natura difference be caused by a principle other
generis, ex hoc quod natura quam than the nature of the genus; for the
significat definitio, est composita ex nature signified by the definition is
materia et forma sicut ex composed of matter, as that which is
terminante et terminato. Si igitur est determined, and form as that which
aliqua natura simplex, ipsa quidem determines. Therefore, if a simple nature
per seipsam erit terminata, nec exists, it will be terminate d by itself, and
oportebit quod habeat duas partes, will not need to have two parts, one
quarum una sit terminans et alia terminating, the other terminated. Thus,
terminata. Ex ipsa igitur ratione the concept of the genus will be derived
naturae sumetur ratio generis: ex from the very intelligible essence of that
terminatione autem eius secundum simple nature; its specific difference,
quod est in tali gradu entium, from its termination according as it is in
sumetur eius differentia specifica. such a grade of beings.
Ex quo etiam patet quod, si aliqua [4] From this, also, we see that if there is
natura est non terminata, sed a nature devoid of limits and infinite in
infinita in se, sicut supra ostensum itself, as was shown in Book Is to be
est de natura divina, non est in ea true of the divine nature, neither genus
accipere neque genus neque nor species is applicable to it; and this
speciem; quod est consonum his agrees with the things we proved
quae supra, de Deo ostendimus. concerning God in that same Book.
Patet etiam ex praemissis quod, [5] It is likewise clear from what has
cum diversae species in substantiis been said that no two separate
separatis accipiantur secundum substances are equal in rank, but that
quod diversos gradus sortiuntur; in one is naturally superior to another;
una autem specie non sunt plura because there are diverse species in
individua: quod non sunt in separate substances according to the
substantiis separatis duae diverse grades allotted to them, and
aequales secundum ordinem, sed there are not here several individuals in
una naturaliter est altera superior. one species. And so it is that we read in
Unde et Iob 3833 dicitur: numquid the Book of Job (38:33): “Do you know
nosti ordinem caeli? Et Dionysius the order of heaven?” While Dionysius
dicit, X cap. caelestis hierarchiae, says in The Celestial Hierarchy [X] that
quod sicut in tota Angelorum just as in the whole multitude of angels
multitudine est hierarchia suprema, there is a highest, a middle, and a
media et infima; ita in qualibet lowest hierarchy, so in each hierarchy
hierarchia est ordo supremus, there is a highest, a middle, and a
medius et infimus; et in quolibet lowest order, and in each order, highest,
ordine supremi, medii et infimi. middle, and lowest angels.
Per hoc autem excluditur positio [6] Now, this disposes of the theory of
Origenis, qui dixit a principio omnes Origen, who said that all spiritual
substantias spirituales aequales substances, including souls, were
creatas fuisse, inter quas etiam created equal from the beginning; and
animas connumerat: diversitas that the diversity found among these
autem quae in huiusmodi substances—this one being united to a
substantiis invenitur, quod body and that one not, this one being
quaedam est unita corpori, higher and that one lower—results from
quaedam non unita, et quaedam a difference of merits. The theory is
altior, quaedam vero inferior, false, because we have just shown that
provenit ex differentia meritorum. this difference of grades is natural; that
Ostensum est enim hanc the soul is not of the same species as
differentiam graduum naturalem separate substances; that the latter are
esse; et quod anima non est themselves not of the same species with
eiusdem speciei cum substantiis one another; and that they are not equal
separatis; nec ipsae substantiae in the order of nature.
separatae ad invicem; nec etiam
secundum ordinem naturae
aequales.
Caput 96 Chapter 96
Quod substantiae separatae non THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO
accipiunt cognitionem a sensibilibus NOT RECEIVE THEIR KNOWLEDGE
FROM SENSIBLE THINGS
Ex praemissis ostendi potest quod [1] This point can be demonstrated
substantiae separatae non accipiunt from what has gone before.
intellectivam cognitionem de rebus

ex sensibilibus.
Sensibilia enim secundum suam [2] For sensibles by their very nature
naturam nata sunt apprehendi per are the appropriate objects of sense
sensum, sicut intelligibilia per apprehension, as are intelligibles of
intellectum. Omnis igitur substantia intellectual apprehension. Thus, every
cognoscitiva ex sensibilibus cognitive substance that derives its
cognitionem accipiens, habet knowledge from sensibles possesses
cognitionem sensitivam: et per sensitive knowledge, and,
consequens habet corpus naturaliter consequently, has a body united to it
unitum, cum cognitio sensitiva sine naturally, since such knowledge is
organo corporeo esse non possit. impossible without a bodily organ. But it
Substantiae autem separatae non has already been shown that separate
habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita, substances have no bodies naturally
ut superius est ostensum. Non igitur united to them. Hence, they do not
intellectivam cognitionem ex rebus derive intellective knowledge from
sensibilibus sumunt. sensible things.
Amplius. Altioris virtutis oportet esse [3] The object of a higher power,

altius obiectum. Virtus autem moreover, must itself be higher. But the
intellectiva substantiae separatae intellective power of a separate
est altior quam vis intellectiva substance is higher than that of the
animae humanae: cum intellectus human soul, since, as we have also
animae humanae sit infimus in shown, the intellect with which the
ordine intellectuum, ut ex praemissis human soul is endowed is the lowest in
patet. Intellectus autem animae the order of intellects. And the object of
humanae obiectum est phantasma, that intellect, we have seen, is the
ut supra dictum est: quod est phantasm, which, in the order of
superius in ordine obiectorum quam objects, is higher than the sensible
res sensibilis extra animam existens, thing existing outside the soul, as the
sicut ex ordine virtutum order of cognitive powers clearly
cognoscitivarum apparet. Obiectum shows. Therefore, the object of a
igitur substantiae separatae non separate substance cannot be a thing
potest esse res existens extra existing outside the soul, as that from
animam, ut ab ea immediate accipiat which it derives its knowledge
cognitionem; neque phantasma. immediately; nor can it be a phantasm.
Relinquitur igitur quod obiectum It therefore remains that the object of
intellectus substantiae separatae sit the separate substance’s intellect is
aliquid altius phantasmate. Nihil something higher than a phantasm. But
autem est altius phantasmate in in the order of knowable objects,
ordine obiectorum cognoscibilium nothing is higher than a phantasm
nisi id quod est intelligibile actu. except that which is intelligible in act.
Substantiae igitur separatae non Separate substances, then, do not
accipiunt cognitionem intellectivam a derive intellectual knowledge from
sensibilibus, sed intelligunt ea quae sensibles, but they understand things
sunt per seipsa etiam intelligibilia. which are intelligible even through
themselves.
Adhuc. Secundum ordinem [4] Then, too, the order of intelligibles is

intellectuum est ordo intelligibilium. in keeping with the order of intellects.
Sed ea quae sunt secundum seipsa Now, in the order of intelligibles, things
intelligibilia, sunt superiora in ordine that are intelligible in themselves rank
intelligibilium his quae non sunt above things whose intelligibility is due
intelligibilia nisi quia nos facimus ea solely to our own making. And all
intelligibilia. Eiusmodi autem oportet intelligibles derived from sensibles must
esse omnia intelligibilia a be of the latter sort, because sensibles
sensibilibus accepta: nam sensibilia are not intelligible in themselves. But
non sunt secundum se intelligibilia. the intelligibles which our intellect
Huiusmodi autem intelligibilia sunt understands are derived from
quae intelligit intellectus noster. sensibles. Therefore, the separate
Intellectus igitur substantiae substance’s intellect, being superior to
separatae, cum sit superior intellectu ours, has not as the object of its
nostro, non intelligit intelligibilia a understanding intelligibles received
sensibilibus accepta, sed quae sunt from sensibles, but those which are in
secundum se intelligibilia actu. themselves intelligible in act.
Amplius. Modus operationis propriae [5] Furthermore, the mode of a thing’s

alicuius rei proportionaliter proper operation corresponds
respondet modo substantiae et proportionately to the mode of its
naturae ipsius. Substantia autem substance and nature. Now, a separate
separata est intellectus per se substance is an intellect existing by
existens, non in corpore aliquo. itself and not in a body, so that the
Operatio igitur intellectualis eius erit objects of its intellectual operation will
intelligibilium quae non sunt fundata be intelligibles having no bodily
in aliquo corpore. Omnia autem foundation. But all intelligibles derived
intelligibilia a sensibilibus accepta from sensibles have some sort of basis
sunt in aliquibus corporibus in bodies; our intelligibles, for instance,
aliqualiter fundata: sicut intelligibilia are founded on the phantasms, which
nostra in phantasmatibus, quae sunt reside in bodily organs. Therefore,
in organis corporeis. Substantiae separate substances do not derive their
igitur separatae non accipiunt knowledge from sensible things.
cognitionem ex sensibilibus.
Adhuc. Sicut materia prima est [6] Again, just as prime matter ranks
infimum in ordine rerum sensibilium, lowest in the order of sensible things,
et per hoc est in potentia tantum ad and is, therefore, purely potential with
omnes formas sensibiles; ita respect to all sensible forms, so the
intellectus possibilis, infimus in possible intellect, being the lowest in
ordine intelligibilium existens, est in the order of intelligible things, is in
potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, ut ex potentiality to all intelligibles, as we
praemissis patet. Sed ea quae sunt have already seen. Now, in the order of
in ordine sensibilium supra materiam sensibles the things above prime
primam, habent in actu suam matter are in actual possession of their
formam, per quam constituuntur in form, through which they are
esse sensibili. Substantiae igitur established in sensible being.
separatae, quae sunt in ordine Therefore, separate substances, which,
intelligibilium supra intellectum in the order of intelligibles, are above
possibilem humanum, sunt actu in the human possible intellect, are

esse intelligibili: intellectus enim actually in intelligible being; for, an
accipiens cognitionem a intellect receiving knowledge from
sensibilibus, non est actu in esse sensibles, is in intelligible being, not
intelligibili, sed in potentia. actually, but potentially. The separate
Substantia igitur separata non substance, therefore, does not receive
accipit cognitionem a sensibilibus. knowledge from sensibles.
Adhuc. Perfectio naturae superioris [7] And again, the perfection of a higher

non dependet a natura inferiori. nature does not depend on a lower
Perfectio autem substantiae nature. Now, since the separate
separatae, cum sit intellectualis, est substance is intellectual, its perfection
in intelligendo. Earum igitur consists in understanding. Therefore,
intelligere non dependet a rebus the act of understanding exercised by
sensibilibus, sic quod ab eis such substances does not depend on
cognitionem accipiat. sensible things, in such fashion as to
derive knowledge from them.
Patet autem ex hoc quod in [8] And from this we see that in
substantiis separatis non est separate substances there is no agent
intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi and possible intellect, except, perhaps,
forte aequivoce. Intellectus enim in an equivocal sense. For a possible
possibilis et agens in anima and an agent intellect are found in the
intellectiva inveniuntur propter hoc intellective soul by reason of its
quod accipit cognitionem receiving intellective knowledge from
intellectivam a sensibilibus: nam sensible things; since it is the agent
intellectus agens est qui facit intellect which makes intelligible in act
species a sensibilibus acceptas the species received from such things,
esse intelligibiles actu; intellectus while the possible intellect is that which
autem possibilis est qui est in is in potentiality to the knowledge of all
potentia ad omnes formas forms of sensibles. Since, then,
sensibilium cognoscendas. Cum separate substances do not receive
igitur substantiae separatae non knowledge from sensibles, no agent or
accipiant cognitionem a sensibilibus, possible intellect exists in them. And so
non est in eis intellectus agens et it is that when Aristotle, in De anima III
possibilis. Unde et Aristoteles, in III [5], introduces the possible and agent
de anima, intellectum possibilem et intellects, he says that they must be
agentem inducens, dicit eos in located in the soul.
anima oportere poni.
Item manifestum est in eisdem quod [9] It is likewise manifest that for such

localis distantia cognitionem substances local distance cannot be a
substantiae separatae impedire non hindrance to knowledge. For local
potest. Localis enim distantia per se distance is through itself related to
comparatur ad sensum: non autem sense, but to intellect, only by accident,
ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, so far as it receives things from sense.
inquantum a sensu accipit; nam The reason why local distance bears
sensibilia secundum determinatam such a relationship to sense is that
distantiam movent sensum. sensibles move the senses in respect
Intelligibilia autem actu, secundum of a determinate distance; whereas

quod movent intellectum, non sunt in things intelligible in act, inasmuch as
loco, cum sint a materia corporali they move the intellect, are not in place,
separata. Cum igitur substantiae being separate from corporeal matter.
separatae non accipiant Since separate substances do not
intellectivam cognitionem a derive intellective knowledge from
sensibilibus, in eorum cognitionem sensible things, it follows that their
distantia localis nihil operatur. knowledge is unaffected by local
distance.
Palam est etiam quod intellectuali [10] It is also quite clear that time does

operationi eorum non admiscetur not enter into the intellectual operation
tempus. Sicut enim intelligibilia actu of separate substances. For just as
sunt absque loco, ita etiam sunt things intelligible in act are without
absque tempore: nam tempus place, so, too, are they outside of time;
consequitur motum localem; unde following upon local movement, time
non mensurat nisi ea quae measures only such things as exist
aliqualiter sunt in loco. Et ideo somehow in place. Thus, the
intelligere substantiae separatae est understanding exercised by a separate
supra tempus: operationi autem substance is above time; whereas time
intellectuali nostrae adiacet tempus, touches our intellectual operation,
ex eo quod a phantasmatibus through the fact that we obtain
cognitionem accipimus, quae knowledge from phantasms, which
determinatum respiciunt tempus. Et have a determinate temporal reference.
inde est quod in compositione et Hence, in composition and division our
divisione semper noster intellectus intellect always links up with time, past
adiungit tempus praeteritum vel or future, but not in understanding what
futurum: non autem in intelligendo a thing is. For it understands what a
quod quid est. Intelligit enim quod thing is by abstracting intelligibles from
quid est abstrahendo intelligibilia a sensible conditions; so that in this
sensibilium conditionibus: unde operation it grasps the intelligible apart
secundum illam operationem, neque from time and all conditions to which
sub tempore neque sub aliqua sensible things are subject. On the
conditione sensibilium rerum other hand, the intellect composes or
intelligibile comprehendit. Componit divides by applying previously
autem aut dividit applicando abstracted intelligibles to things; and in
intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res: et this application time is necessarily
in hac applicatione necesse est involved.
cointelligi tempus.
Caput 97 Chapter 97
Quod intellectus substantiae THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE
separatae semper intelligit actu SUBSTANCE IS ALWAYS IN ACT OF
UNDERSTANDING
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] The truth of this statement clearly
intellectus substantiae separatae emerges from what was said above.

est semper intelligens actu.
Quod enim est quandoque in [2] For, whatever is sometimes in act and
actu, quandoque in potentia, sometimes in potentiality is measured by
mensuratur tempore. Intellectus time. But the intellect of a separate
autem substantiae separatae est substance is above time, as we have just
supra tempus, ut probatum est. shown. Therefore, it is not sometimes in
Non est igitur quandoque act of understanding and sometimes not.
intelligens actu et quandoque
non.
Amplius. Omnis substantia [3] Moreover, there is always actually

vivens habet aliquam present in every living substance some
operationem vitae in actu ex sua vital operation with which it is endowed by
natura quae inest ei semper, licet its very nature, although other operations
aliae quandoque insint ei in are sometimes present potentially. Thus,
potentia: sicut animalia semper the process of nourishment is perpetual in
nutriuntur, licet non semper animals, but not sensation. Now, as
sentiant. Substantiae autem preceding considerations make clear,
separatae sunt substantiae separate substances are living
viventes, ut ex praemissis patet: substances, and the only vital operation
nec habent aliam operationem which they have is understanding. It
vitae nisi intelligere. Oportet igitur follows that they are by their very nature
quod ex sua natura sint sicut always actually understanding.
intelligentes actu semper.
Item. Substantiae separatae [4] Then, too, the philosophers teach that
movent per intellectum corpora the separate substances move the
caelestia, secundum heavenly bodies by their intellect. But the
philosophorum doctrinam. Motus movement of the heavenly bodies is
autem corporum caelestium est always continuous. Therefore, the act of
semper continuus. Intelligere understanding exercised by separate
igitur substantiarum separatarum substances is continuous and perpetual.
est continuum et semper.
Hoc autem idem sequitur etsi non [5] And the same conclusion follows even

ponantur moventes corpora if that teaching is denied, because
caelestia: cum sint altiores separate substances are higher than the
corporibus caelestibus. Unde, si heavenly bodies; so that, if the proper
propria operatio corporis operation of a heavenly body, namely, its
caelestis, quae est motus ipsius, movement, is continuous, for all the more
est continua; multo magis propria reason will the proper operation of
operatio substantiarum separate substances, namely,
separatarum, quae est intelligere. understanding, be continuous.
Amplius. Omne quod quandoque [6] Furthermore, whatever sometimes

operatur et quandoque non operates and sometimes does not operate
operatur, movetur per se vel per is moved either through itself or by
accidens. Unde et hoc quod nos accident. Changes occurring in the
quandoque intelligimus, sensible part of our nature, then, are
quandoque non, provenit ex responsible for the fact that we are
alteratione quae est circa partem sometimes understanding and sometimes
sensibilem, ut dicitur in VIII not understanding, as Aristotle observes in
physicorum. Sed substantiae Physics VIII [6]. But separate substances
separatae non moventur per se, are not moved through themselves, since
quia non sunt corpora: neque they are not bodies, nor are they moved
moventur per accidens, quia non by accident, because they are not united
sunt unitae corporibus. Igitur to bodies; so that in them understanding,
operatio propria, quae est which is their proper operation, is not
intelligere, est in eis continua, intermittent, but continuous.
non intercisa.
Caput 98 Chapter 98
Quomodo una substantia separata HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
intelligit aliam UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER
Si autem substantiae separatae [1] Now, if separate substances

intelligunt ea quae sunt per se understand those things which are
intelligibilia, ut ostensum est; per se intelligible through themselves, as was
autem intelligibilia sunt substantiae shown, and if separate substances are
separatae, immunitas enim a intelligible through themselves, since,
materia facit aliquid esse per se as we have also seen, freedom from
intelligibile, ut ex superioribus patet: matter makes a thing intelligible through
consequitur quod substantiae itself, then it follows that separate
separatae intelligant, sicut propria substances have separate substances
obiecta, substantias separatas. as the proper objects of their
Unaquaeque igitur et seipsam et understanding. Each of them, therefore,
alias cognoscet. knows both itself and others.
Seipsam quidem unaquaeque [2] Indeed, each separate substance

earum aliter cognoscit quam knows itself otherwise than the possible
intellectus possibilis seipsum. intellect knows itself. For the possible
Intellectus enim possibilis est ut intellect exists as in potency in
potentia existens in esse intelligibili; intelligible being, and becomes in act
fit autem actu per speciem through the intelligible species, just as
intelligibilem, sicut materia prima fit prime matter is actualized in sensible
actu in esse sensibili per formam being by a natural form. Now, nothing is
naturalem. Nihil autem cognoscitur known, so far as it is only in potentiality,
secundum quod est potentia tantum, but so far as it is in act. That is why the
sed secundum quod est actu: unde form is the principle of the knowledge of
et forma est principium cognitionis the thing which becomes in act through
rei quae per eam fit actu; similiter the form. And the cognitive power
autem potentia cognoscitiva fit actu likewise is rendered actually cognitive
cognoscens per speciem aliquam. through some species. Thus, our
Intellectus igitur possibilis noster possible intellect knows itself, thanks

non cognoscit seipsum nisi per only to the intelligible species whereby
speciem intelligibilem, qua fit actu in it becomes in act in intelligible being;
esse intelligibili: et propter hoc dicit and for this reason Aristotle says in De
Aristoteles, in III de anima, quod est anima III [4] that the human intellect “is
cognoscibilis sicut et alia, scilicet itself knowable in the same way as
per species a phantasmatibus other things are,” namely, through
acceptas, sicut per formas proprias. species derived from phantasms, as
Substantiae autem separatae sunt through proper forms. But separate
secundum suam naturam ut actu substances by their very nature enjoy
existentes in esse intelligibili. Unde intelligible being actually; so that each
unaquaeque earum seipsam per of them knows itself through its
essentiam suam cognoscit, non per essence, and not through the species of
aliquam speciem alterius rei. another thing.
Cum autem omnis cognitio sit [3] Now, as the likeness of the thing
secundum quod in cognoscente est known is in the knower, so in every
similitudo cogniti; una autem case is the knowledge. But, one
substantiarum separatarum sit separate substance is like another as
similis alteri secundum communem regards the nature of the genus that
naturam generis, differant autem ab such substances have in common,
invicem secundum speciem, ut ex while they differ from each other in
praemissis apparet: videtur sequi species, as was made clear above. It
quod una earum aliam non would then seem to follow that the one
cognoscat quantum ad propriam separate substance knows the other,
rationem speciei, sed solum not according to the proper nature of
quantum ad communem generis the species, but only as regards the
rationem. common nature of the genus.
Dicunt ergo quidam quod una [4] Some therefore say that one
substantiarum separatarum est separate substance is the efficient
causa effectiva alterius. In qualibet cause of another. Now, in every efficient
autem causa effectiva oportet esse cause there must be the likeness of its
similitudinem sui effectus, et similiter effect, and, similarly, in every effect the
in quolibet effectu oportet esse likeness of its cause must be present;
similitudinem suae causae: eo quod for every agent produces its like. Thus,
unumquodque agens agit sibi simile. in the higher separate substance there
Sic igitur in superiori substantiarum exists the likeness of the lower, as in
separatarum est similitudo inferioris the cause resides the likeness of the
sicut in causa est similitudo effectus: effect; and in the lower is the likeness of
in inferiori autem similitudo the higher, as in the effect dwells the
superioris est sicut in effectu est likeness of its cause. Now, in non
similitudo suae causae. In causis univocal causes the likeness of the
autem non univocis similitudo effect exists in the cause in a higher
effectus est in causa eminentius, mode, while the likeness of the cause is
causae autem in effectu inferiori in the effect in a lower mode. But the
modo. Tales autem causas oportet higher separate substances must be
esse substantias separatas nonunivocal causes of the lower ones,
superiores inferiorum: cum non sint since the former, placed in diverse
unius speciei in diversis gradibus grades, are not of one species.
constitutae. Cognoscit igitur Therefore, a lower separate substance
substantia separata inferior knows a higher substance in a lower
superiorem secundum modum way, according to the mode of the
substantiae cognoscentis, non substance knowing and not of the
secundum modum substantiae substance known; whereas the higher
cognitae, sed inferiori modo: knows the lower in a higher way. This is
superior autem inferiorem expressed as follows in the work On
eminentiori modo. Et hoc est quod Causes [VIII]: “An intelligence knows
in libro de causis dicitur, quod what is below it and what is above it,
intelligentia scit quod est sub se et according to the mode of its substance,
quod est supra se, per modum suae because the one is the cause of the
substantiae: quia alia est causa other.”
alterius.
Sed cum superius sit ostensum [5] But, since it was shown above that
quod substantiae separatae separate intellectual substances are not
intellectuales non sunt compositae composed of matter and form, they
ex materia et forma, non possunt cannot be caused except by way of
causari nisi per modum creationis. creation. We have also proved that to
Creare autem solius Dei est, ut create belongs to God alone. One
supra ostensum est. Non poterit separate substance, therefore, could
igitur una substantiarum not be the cause of another.
separatarum esse alterius causa.
Praeterea. Ostensum est quod [6] It has been demonstrated, moreover,

principales partes universi omnes that all the principal parts of the
sunt a Deo immediate creatae. Non universe are created immediately by
est igitur una earum ab alia. God. Hence, one of them is not caused
Unaquaeque autem substantiarum by another. Now, each of the separate
separatarum est de principalibus substances is a principal part of the
partibus universi, multo amplius universe, much more than the sun or
quam sol vel luna: cum unaquaeque the moon; since each of them has the
earum habeat propriam speciem, et nature of a species all its own, which is
nobiliorem quam quaevis species nobler than that of any corporeal things.
corporalium rerum. Non igitur una Therefore, one separate substance is
earum causatur ab alia, sed omnes not caused by another, but all are
immediate a Deo. immediately from God.
Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, [7] So, according to what was said
quaelibet substantiarum above, each of the separate substances
separatarum cognoscit Deum, knows God, by its natural knowledge,
naturali cognitione, secundum after the manner of its substance; and
modum suae substantiae, per quam through this knowledge they are like
similes sunt Deo sicut causae. Deus God as their cause. But God knows
autem cognoscit eas sicut propria them as their proper cause, possessing
causa, earum omnium in se in Himself the likeness of them all. Not
similitudinem habens. Non autem in this way, however, could one
hoc modo una substantiarum separate substance know another,
separatarum poterit cognoscere since one is not the cause of another.

aliam: cum una non sit causa
alterius.
Considerandum est igitur quod, cum [8] We must, therefore, consider that,

nulla huiusmodi substantiarum since none of these substances is by its
secundum suam essentiam sit essence a sufficient principle of the
sufficiens principium cognitionis knowledge of all other things, there
omnium aliarum rerum, unicuique must accrue to each of them, over and
earum, supra propriam substantiam, above its own substance, certain
oportet superaddere quasdam intelligible likenesses, whereby each of
intelligibiles similitudines, per quas them is enabled to know another in its
quaelibet earum aliam in propria proper nature.
natura cognoscere possit.
Hoc autem sic manifestum esse [9] Now, this can be made clear as
potest. Est enim proprium obiectum follows. The proper object of intellect is
intellectus ens intelligibile: quod intelligible being, which includes all
quidem comprehendit omnes possible differences and species of
differentias et species entis being, since whatever can be, can be
possibiles; quicquid enim esse known. Now, since all knowledge is
potest, intelligi potest. Cum autem brought about by way of likeness, the
omnis cognitio fiat per modum intellect cannot know its object wholly
similitudinis, non potest totaliter unless it has in itself the likeness of all
suum obiectum intellectus being and of all its differences. But such
cognoscere nisi habeat in se a likeness of all being, can be nothing
similitudinem totius entis et omnium other than an infinite nature: a nature
differentiarum eius. Talis autem not determined to some species or
similitudo totius entis esse non genus of being, but the universal
potest nisi natura infinita, quae non principle of all being and the power
determinatur ad aliquam speciem productive of all being; and this, as was
vel genus entis, sed est universale shown in Book I, is the divine nature
principium et virtus activa totius alone. Indeed, no other nature can be
entis: qualis est sola natura divina, the universal likeness of all being, since
ut in primo ostensum est. Omnis every nature except God is limited to
autem alia natura, cum sit terminata some genus and species of being. It
ad aliquod genus et speciem entis, therefore remains that God alone, by
non potest esse universalis His essence, knows all things. Every
similitudo totius entis. Relinquitur separate substance, on the other hand,
igitur quod solus Deus per suam is by its nature possessed of a perfect
essentiam omnia cognoscat; knowledge only of its own species;
quaelibet autem substantiarum while the possible intellect knows itself
separatarum per suam naturam not at all in this way, but through the
cognoscit, perfecta cognitione, intelligible species, as we remarked
suam speciem tantum; intellectus already in this chapter.
autem possibilis nequaquam, sed
per intelligibilem speciem, ut supra
dictum est.
Ex hoc autem quod substantia [10] Now, from the very fact that a
aliqua est intellectualis, substance is intellectual, all being lies
comprehensiva est totius entis. within the scope of its understanding.
Unde, cum substantia separata per Since it is not endowed by its nature
suam naturam non fiat actu with actual understanding of all being, a
comprehendens totum ens, ipsa, in separate substance, considered in
sua substantia considerata, est itself, is in potentiality, as it were, to the
quasi potentia ad similitudines intelligible likenesses whereby all being
intelligibiles quibus totum ens is known, and these likenesses will be
cognoscitur, et illae similitudines its act, so far as it is intellectual. It is,
erunt actus eius inquantum est however, impossible that these
intellectualis. Non autem est likenesses should not be several. For
possibile quin istae similitudines sint we have, already shown that the perfect
plures: quia iam ostensum est quod likeness of all being cannot but be
totius entis universalis perfecta infinite. And just as the nature of a
similitudo esse non potest nisi separate substance is not infinite, but
infinita; sicut autem natura limited, so an intelligible likeness
substantiae separatae non est existing in it cannot be infinite, but is
infinita sed terminata, ita similitudo limited to some species or genus of
intelligibilis in ea existens non potest being, so that a plurality of such
esse infinita, sed terminata ad likenesses is required for the
aliquam speciem vel genus entis; comprehension of all being. Now, the
unde ad comprehensionem totius higher the rank of a separate
entis requiruntur plures huiusmodi substance, the more is its nature like to
similitudines. Quanto autem aliqua the divine; and thus it is less limited,
substantia separata est superior, inasmuch as it approaches nearer to
tanto eius natura est divinae naturae the perfection and goodness of the
similior; et ideo est minus contracta, universal being, enjoying, therefore, a
utpote propinquius accedens ad ens more universal participation in
universale perfectum et bonum; et goodness and being. The intelligible
propter hoc, universaliorem boni et likenesses existing in the higher
entis participationem habens. Et substance are, consequently, less
ideo similitudines intelligibiles in numerous and more universal. And this
substantia superiori existentes sunt is what Dionysius says in The Celestial
minus multiplicatae et magis Hierarchy [12], namely, that the higher
universales. Et hoc est quod angels have a more universal
Dionysius, XII cap. caelestis knowledge; while in the book On
hierarchiae, dicit, quod Angeli Causes we read [X]: “The higher
superiores habent scientiam magis intelligences have more universal
universalem; et in libro de causis forms.” Now, the apogee of this
dicitur quod intelligentiae superiores universality is found in God, who,
habent formas magis universales. through one thing, namely, His
Summum autem huius essence, is cognizant of all things;
universalitatis est in Deo, qui per whereas its lowest realization is in the
unum, scilicet per essentiam suam, human intellect, which for each
omnia cognoscit: infimum autem in intelligible object needs an intelligible
intellectu humano, qui ad species appropriate to ,that object and
unumquodque intelligibile indiget on a par with it.
specie intelligibili propria et ei
coaequata.
Non est igitur per formas [11] Consequently, in the higher
universaliores apud substantias substances, knowledge acquired
superiores imperfectior cognitio, through forms of greater universality is
sicut apud nos. Per similitudinem not more imperfect, as it is with us. For
enim animalis, per quam through the likeness of animal, whereby
cognoscimus aliquid in genere we know a thing only in its genus, we
tantum, imperfectiorem cognitionem have a more imperfect knowledge than
habemus quam per similitudinem through the likeness of man, whereby
hominis, per quam cognoscimus we know the complete species; since to
speciem completam: cognoscere know a thing only in terms of its genus
enim aliquid secundum genus is to know it imperfectly and as though
tantum, est cognoscere imperfecte in potency, while to know a thing in its
et quasi in potentia, cognoscere species is to know it perfectly and in
autem in specie est cognoscere act. Occupying the lowest place in the
perfecte et in actu. Intellectus autem order of intellectual substances, our
noster, quia infimum gradum tenet in intellect requires likenesses
substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particularized to such a degree that
particulatas similitudines requirit there must exist in it a proper likeness
quod unicuique cognoscibili proprio corresponding to each proper object of
oportet respondere propriam its knowledge. That is why, through the
similitudinem in ipso: unde per likeness of animal it does not know
similitudinem animalis non cognoscit rational, and therefore neither does it
rationale, et per consequens nec know man, except in a relative manner.
hominem, nisi secundum quid. The intelligible likeness present in a
Similitudo autem intelligibilis quae separate substance is, however, more
est in substantia separata, est universal in its power, and suffices to
universalioris virtutis, ad plura represent more things. Hence, it makes
repraesentanda sufficiens. Et ideo for a more perfect, not a more
non facit imperfectiorem imperfect, knowledge; because it is
cognitionem, sed perfectiorem: est universal in power, after the fashion of
enim universalis virtute, ad modum the productive form in a universal cause
formae agentis in causa universali, which, the more universal it is, the
quae quanto fuerit universalior, tanto greater its causal range and its efficacy.
ad plura se extendit et efficacius Therefore, by one likeness the separate
producit. Per similitudinem igitur substance knows both animal and its
unam cognoscit et animal et differences; or, again, it knows them in
differentias animalis: aut etiam a more universal or more limited way
universaliori modo et contractiori, according to the order of such
secundum ordinem substantiarum substances.
praedictarum.
Exempla igitur huius ut dictum est, [12] We have examples of this, as we
in duobus extremis accipere remarked, in the two extremes, the
possumus, scilicet in intellectu divine and human intellects. For
divino et humano. Deus enim per through one thing, His essence, God
unum, quod est sua essentia, knows all things; whereas man requires
cognoscit omnia: homo autem ad diverse likenesses in order to know
diversa cognoscenda diversas diverse things. And the higher his
similitudines requirit. Qui etiam, intellect, the more things is he able to
quanto altioris fuerit intellectus, know through fewer; and so it is that
tanto ex paucioribus plura particular examples must be presented
cognoscere potest: unde his qui to the slowwitted to enable them to
sunt tardi intellectus, oportet acquire knowledge of things.
exempla particularia adducere ad
cognitionem de rebus sumendam.
Cum autem substantia separata, in [13] Now, although a separate

sua natura considerata, sit in substance, considered in its nature, is
potentia ad similitudines quibus potential with respect to the likenesses
totum ens cognoscatur, non est whereby all being is known, we must
aestimandum quod sit denudata ab not suppose that it is deprived of all
omnibus huiusmodi similitudinibus: such likenesses; for this is the condition
haec est enim dispositio intellectus of the possible intellect before it
possibilis antequam intelligat, ut understands, as Aristotle points out in
dicitur in III de anima. Neque est De anima III [4]. Nor must we even
etiam aestimandum quod aliquas think that it is possessed of some of
earum habeat in actu, et alias in those likenesses actually, and of others
potentia tantum: sicut materia prima only potentially; in the way in which
in corporibus inferioribus habet prime matter in the lower bodies has
unam formam in actu et alias in one form actually and others potentially,
potentia; et sicut intellectus and as our possible intellect, when we
possibilis noster cum iam sumus are presently knowing, is in act with
scientes, est actu secundum aliqua respect to some intelligibles and in
intelligibilia, secundum alia vero in potentiality as regards others. For, since
potentia. Cum enim illae substantiae these separate substances are not
separatae non moveantur neque per moved, either through themselves or by
se neque per accidens, ut ostensum accident, as we have shown, all that is
est, omne quod est in eis in in them in potency must be in act,
potentia, oportet esse in actu: alias otherwise, they would pass from
exirent de potentia in actum, et sic potentiality to act, being moved, in that
moverentur per se vel per accidens. case, through themselves or by
Est igitur in eis potentia et actus accident. Thus, they have in them
quantum ad esse intelligibile, sicut potentiality and act as regards
in corporibus caelestibus quantum intelligible being, as do the heavenly
ad esse naturale. Materia enim bodies as regards natural being. For the
corporis caelestis ita perficitur per matter of a heavenly body is perfected
suam formam quod non remanet in by its form to such an extent that it does
potentia ad aliquas formas: et not remain in potentiality to other forms;
similiter intellectus substantiae and the intellect of a separate
separatae totaliter perficitur per substance is likewise wholly perfected
formas intelligibiles, quantum ad by intelligible forms, so far as its natural
cognitionem naturalem. Intellectus knowledge is concerned. Our possible
autem possibilis noster intellect, however, is proportionate to
proportionaliter se habet corporibus the corruptible bodies to which it is
corruptibilibus, quibus unitur ut united as a form; f or it is so constituted
forma: sic enim fit actu habens as to possess certain intelligible forms
quasdam formas intelligibiles quod actually, while remaining in potentiality
remanet in potentia ad alias. Et to others. And so it is said in the book
propter hoc dicitur in libro de causis, On Causes [X] that an intelligence is full
quod intelligentia est plena formis: of forms, since the whole potentiality of

quia scilicet tota potentialitas its intellect is fulfilled through intelligible
intellectus eius est completa per forms. Accordingly, one separate
formas intelligibiles. Et sic per substance is able to know another
huiusmodi intelligibiles species una through intelligible species of this sort.
substantia separata aliam intelligere
potest.
Forte autem alicui videri potest [14] Because a separate substance is

quod, cum substantia separata per intelligible by essence, someone may
essentiam sit intelligibilis, non see no necessity for holding that one
oportet ponere quod per aliquas such substance is understood by
species intelligibiles una ab alia another through intelligible species, but
intelligatur, sed per essentiam ipsius may think that one understands another
substantiae intellectae. Hoc enim through the very essence of the
quod substantia aliqua per speciem substance understood. For, in the case
intelligibilem cognoscatur, videtur of material substances, knowledge
accidere substantiis materialibus ex through an intelligible species seems to
hoc quod non sunt per suam result accidentally from the fact that
essentiam intelligibiles actu: unde such substances are not by their
oportet quod per intentiones essence intelligible in act; and that is
abstractas intelligantur. Huic etiam why they must needs be understood
videtur consonare dictum philosophi through abstract intentions. This,
dicentis, in XI Metaph., quod in moreover, seems to agree with the
substantiis separatis a materia non remark made by Aristotle in
differt intellectus, intelligere, et quod Metaphysics XI [9], that intellect, act of
intelligitur. understanding, and thing understood
are not different in the case of
substances separate from matter.
Hoc autem si concedatur, habet [15] The admission of this point,
dubitationes non paucas. Primo however, involves a number of
quidem, quia intellectus in actu est difficulties. For, in the first place, the
intellectum in actu, secundum intellect in act is the thing understood in
doctrinam Aristotelis. Difficile est act, according to the teaching of
autem videre quomodo una Aristotle, and it is difficult to see how
substantia separata sit unum alteri one separate substance is identified
dum intelligit ipsam. with another when it understands it.
Adhuc. Omne agens vel operans [16] Then too, every agent or operator
operatur per suam formam, cui acts through its form, to which its
operatio respondet, sicut calefactio operation corresponds, as the operation
calori: unde et illud videmus cuius of heating to the form of heat; thus,
specie visus informatur. Non videtur what we see is the thing by whose
autem esse possibile quod una species our sight is informed. But it
substantia separata sit forma does not seem possible for one
alterius: cum habeat unaquaeque separate substance to be the form of
esse separatum ab alia. Impossibile another, since each has existence
igitur videtur quod una videatur ab separate from the other. It therefore
altera per essentiam suam. seems impossible that the one should

be seen by the other through its
essence.
Amplius. Intellectum est perfectio [17] Moreover, the thing understood is

intelligentis. Non potest autem the perfection of the one who
inferior substantia esse perfectio understands. But a lower substance
superioris. Sequeretur igitur quod cannot be the perfection of a higher
superior inferiorem non intelligeret, one. Hence it would follow that the
si per essentiam suam unaquaeque higher would not understand the lower,
intelligeretur, et non per speciem if each were understood through its
aliam. essence, and not through another
species.
Item. Intelligibile est intra intellectum [18] Also, the intelligible is within the

quantum ad id quod intelligitur. Nulla intellect as to that which is understood.
autem substantia illabitur menti nisi But no substance enters into the mind
solus Deus, qui est in omnibus per save God alone, who is in all things by
essentiam, praesentiam et His essence, presence, and power. It
potentiam. Impossibile igitur videtur therefore seems impossible for a
quod substantia separata per separate substance to be understood
essentiam suam intelligatur ab alia, by another through its essence, and not
et non per similitudinem eius in ipsa. through its likeness present in the latter.
Et hoc quidem oportet verum esse [19] And, indeed, this must be true for
secundum sententiam Aristotelis, Aristotle, who asserts that
qui ponit quod intelligere contingit understanding occurs as the result of
per hoc quod intellectum in actu sit the thing actually understood being one
unum cum intellectu in actu. Unde with the intellect actually understanding;
substantia separata, quamvis sit per so that a separate substance, though
se intelligibilis actu, non tamen actually intelligible of itself, is
secundum se intelligitur nisi ab nevertheless not understood in itself
intellectu cui est unum. Sic autem except by an intellect with which it is
substantia separata seipsam one. And it is in this way that a separate
intelligit per essentiam suam. Et substance understands itself through its
secundum hoc est idem intellectus, essence. Accordingly, the intellect, the
et intellectum, et intelligere. thing understood, and the act of
Secundum autem positionem understanding are the same.
Platonis, intelligere fit per contactum [20] On the other hand, according to
intellectus ad rem intelligibilem. Sic Plato’s position, understanding is
igitur una substantia separata potest effected through the contact of the
aliam per eius essentiam intelligere, intellect with the intelligible thing. One
dum eam spiritualiter contingit: separate substance can, therefore,
superior quidem inferiorem, quasi understand another through its
eam sua virtute concludens et essence, when it is in contact with it
continens; inferior vero superiorem, spiritually; the higher substance
quasi eam capiens ut sui understanding the lower through
perfectionem. Unde et Dionysius enclosing and containing it, so to speak,
dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod by its power; the lower understanding
superiores substantiae intelligibiles the higher, as though grasping it as its
sunt quasi cibus inferiorum. own perfection. Wherefore Dionysius
likewise says, in The Divine Names [IV],
that the higher substances are
intelligible “as the food of the lower.”
Caput 99 Chapter 99
Quod substantiae separatae THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
cognoscunt materialia KNOW MATERIAL THINGS
Per dictas igitur formas [1] Thus, through the intelligible forms in

intelligibiles substantia separata question a separate substance knows
non solum cognoscit alias not only other separate substances, but
substantias separatas, sed etiam also the species of corporeal things.
species rerum corporalium.
Cum enim intellectus earum sit [2] For their intellect, being wholly in act,

perfectus naturali perfectione, is perfect in point of natural perfection,
utpote totus in actu existens, and, therefore, it must comprehend its
oportet quod suum obiectum, object—intelligible being—in a universal
scilicet ens intelligibile, manner. Now, the species of corporeal
universaliter comprehendat. Sub things are also included within intelligible
ente autem intelligibili being, and the separate substance,
comprehenduntur etiam species therefore, knows them.
rerum corporalium. Eas igitur
substantia separata cognoscit.
Adhuc. Cum species rerum [3] Moreover, since the species of things

distinguantur sicut species are distinguished as the species of
numerorum, ut supra habitum est, numbers are distinguished, as noted
oportet quod in specie superiori above, the higher species must contain
contineatur aliqualiter quod est in in some way that which is in the lower,
inferiori, sicut maior numerus just as the greater number contains the
continet minorem. Cum igitur lesser. Since, then, separate substances
substantiae separatae sint supra are above corporeal substances, it
substantias corporales, oportet ‘follows that whatever things exist in
quod ea quae sunt in substantiis corporeal substances in a material way
corporalibus per modum are present in separate substances in an
materialem, sint in substantiis intelligible way, for that which is in
separatis per modum intelligibilem: something is in it according to the mode
quod enim est in aliquo, est in eo of that in which it is.
per modum eius in quo est.
Item. Si substantiae separatae [4] Also, if the separate substances move

movent corpora caelestia, ut the heavenly bodies, as the philosophers
philosophi ponunt, quicquid say, then whatever results from the

provenit ex motu corporum movement of the heavenly bodies is
caelestium attribuitur ipsis attributed to those bodies as instruments,
corporibus sicut instrumentis, eo since they move in being moved, but is
quod movent mota; substantiis ascribed to the separate substances
autem separatis moventibus sicut which move them, as principal agents.
principalibus agentibus. Agunt Now, separate substances act and move
autem et movent per intellectum. by their intellect. Hence, they are actually
Sunt igitur causantes ea quae fiunt causing whatever is effected by the
per motum corporum caelestium movement of the heavenly bodies, even
sicut artifex operatur per sua as the craftsman works through his tools.
instrumenta. Formae igitur eorum Therefore, the forms of things generated
quae generantur et corrumpuntur, and corrupted enjoy intelligible being in
sunt intelligibiliter in substantiis the separate substances. And that is why
separatis. Unde et Boetius, in libro Boethius, in his book On the Trinity [II],
de Trinitate, dicit quod ex formis says that from forms that are without
quae sunt sine materia, venerunt matter came the forms that are in matter.
formae quae sunt in materia. Separate substances, then, ‘know not
Cognoscunt igitur substantiae only separate substances, but also the
separatae non solum substantias species of material things. For, if they
separatas, sed etiam species know the species of generable and
rerum materialium. Nam, si corruptible bodies, as the species of their
cognoscunt species generabilium proper effects, much more do they know
et corruptibilium corporum, the species of the heavenly bodies, as
tanquam propriorum effectuum, being the species of their proper
multo magis species corporum instruments.
caelestium, quasi propriorum
instrumentorum.
Quia vero intellectus substantiae [5] Indeed, the intellect of a separate
separatae est in actu, habens substance is in act, having all the
omnes similitudines ad quas est in likenesses to which it is in potentiality, as
potentia; habet autem virtutem well as being endowed with the power to
comprehendendi omnes species et comprehend all the species and
differentias entis: necesse est differences of being; so that of necessity
quod substantia separata every separate substance knows all
quaelibet cognoscat omnes res natural things and the total order thereof.
naturales et totum ordinem earum.
Cum autem intellectus in actu [6] But since the intellect in perfect act is

perfecto sit intellectum in actu, the thing understood in act, someone
potest alicui videri quod substantia may think that a separate substance
separata non intelligat res does not understand material things; for
materiales: inconveniens enim it would seem incongruous that a
videtur quod res materialis sit material thing should be the perfection of
perfectio substantiae separatae. a separate substance.
Sed si recte consideretur, res [7] Rightly considered, however, it is
intellecta est perfectio intelligentis according to its likeness present in the
secundum suam similitudinem intellect that the thing understood is the
quam habet in intellectu: non enim perfection of the one who understands it;
lapis qui est extra animam, est for it is not the stone existing outside the
perfectio intellectus possibilis soul that is a perfection of our possible
nostri. Similitudo autem rei intellect. Now, the likeness of the material
materialis in intellectu substantiae thing is in the intellect of a separate
separatae est immaterialiter, substance immaterially, according to the
secundum modum substantiae latter’s mode, not according to that of a
separatae, non secundum modum material substance. Hence, there is no
substantiae materialis. Unde non incongruity in saying that this likeness is
est inconveniens si haec similitudo a perfection of the separate substance’s
dicatur esse perfectio intellectus intellect, as its proper form.
substantiae separatae, sicut
propria forma eius.
Caput 100 Chapter 100
Quod substantiae separatae THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
cognoscunt singularia KNOW SINGULARS
Quia vero similitudines rerum in [1] Now, the likenesses of things existing

intellectu substantiae separatae in the intellect of a separate substance
sunt universaliores quam in are more universal than in our intellect,
intellectu nostro, et efficaciores ad and more efficacious as means through
hoc quod per eas aliquid which something is known. And that is
cognoscatur, per similitudines why separate substances, through the
rerum materialium substantiae likenesses of material things, know
separatae non solum cognoscunt material things, not only in terms of the
res materiales secundum rationem nature of the genus or the species, as
generis vel speciei, sicut intellectus our intellect does, but in their individual
noster, sed etiam secundum nature as well.
individua.
Cum enim species rerum in [2] For, since the species of things
intellectu existentes oporteat esse present in the intellect must be
immateriales, non poterunt, immaterial, they could not in our intellect
secundum quod sunt in intellectu be the principle of knowing singulars,
nostro, esse principium which are individuated by matter; the
cognoscendi singularia, quae per species of our intellect are, in fact, of
materiam individuantur, eo quod such limited power that one leads only
species intellectus nostri in tantum to the knowledge of one. Hence, even
sunt contractae virtutis quod una as it is impossible for the likeness of the
ducit solum in cognitionem unius. generic nature to lead to the knowledge
Unde, sicut similitudo naturae of the genus and difference so that the
generis non potest ducere in species be known through that likeness,
cognitionem generis et differentiae, so the likeness of the specific nature
ut per eam species cognoscatur; ita cannot lead to the knowledge of the
similitudo naturae speciei non individuating principles, which are
potest ducere in cognitionem material principles, so that through that
principiorum individuantium, quae likeness the individual may be known in
sunt principia materialia, ut per eam its singularity. But the likeness existing in
individuum in sua singularitate the separate substance’s intellect as a
cognoscatur. Similitudo vero certain single and immaterial thing is of
intellectus substantiae separatae, more universal power and,
cum sit universalis virtutis, quasi consequently, is able to lead to the
quaedam una et immaterialis knowledge of both the specific and the
existens, potest ducere in individuating principles, so that through
cognitionem principiorum speciei et this likeness, residing in its intellect, the
individuantium, ita quod per eam separate substance can be cognizant,
substantia separata non solum not only of the generic and specific
naturam generis et speciei, sed natures, but of the individual nature as
etiam individui, cognoscere possit well. Nor does it follow that the form
per suum intellectum. Nec sequitur through which it knows is material; nor
quod forma per quam cognoscit, sit that those forms are infinite, according
materialis; vel quod sint infinitae, to the number of individuals.
secundum numerum individuorum.
Adhuc. Quod potest inferior virtus, [3] Moreover, whatever lies within the
potest et superior, sed eminentius. competence of a lower power a higher
Unde virtus inferior operatur per power can also do, but in a higher way.
multa, virtus superior operatur per That is why the lower power operates
unum tantum. Virtus enim, quanto through many instruments; the higher,
est superior, tanto magis colligitur through one only. For the higher, a
et unitur; e contrario vero virtus power is, the greater its compactness
inferior dividitur et multiplicatur; and unity; whereas the lower power is,
unde videmus quod diversa genera on the contrary, divided and multiplied.
sensibilium, quae quinque sensus Ibis accounts for our observation of the
exteriores percipiunt, una vis fact that the one power of the common
sensus communis apprehendit. sense apprehends the diverse genera of
Anima autem humana est inferior sensible objects which the five external
ordine naturae quam substantia senses perceive. Now, in the order of
separata. Ipsa autem cognoscitiva nature the human soul is lower than a
est universalium et singularium per separate substance. And the human
duo principia, scilicet per sensum et soul is cognizant of singulars and of
intellectum. Substantia igitur universals through two principles, sense
separata, quae est altior, cognoscit and intellect. Therefore, the separate
utrumque altiori modo per unum substance, which is higher, knows both
principium, scilicet per intellectum. universals and singulars in a higher way,
through one principle; namely, the
intellect.
Item. Species rerum intelligibiles [4] A further argument. The species of

contrario ordine perveniunt ad intelligible things come to our intellect in
intellectum nostrum, et ad an order contrary to that in which they
intellectum substantiae separatae. reach the intellect of a separate
Ad intellectum enim nostrum substance. For they reach our intellect
perveniunt per viam resolutionis, by way of analysis, through abstraction
per abstractionem a conditionibus from material and individuating

materialibus et individuantibus: conditions; that is why we cannot know
unde per eas singularia cognosci singulars through them. But it is as it
non possunt a nobis. Ad intellectum were by way of synthesis that intelligible
autem substantiae separatae species reach the intellect of a separate
perveniunt species intelligibiles substance, for the latter has intelligible
quasi per viam compositionis: species by reason of its likeness to the
habet enim species intelligibiles ex first intelligible species—the divine
assimilatione sui ad primam intellect—which is not abstracted from
intelligibilem speciem intellectus things, but productive of them. And it is
divini, quae quidem non est a rebus productive not only of the form, but also
abstracta, sed rerum factiva. Est of the matter, which is the principle of
autem factiva non solum formae, individuation. Therefore, the species of
sed materiae, quae est the separate substance’s intellect regard
individuationis principium. Species the total thing, not only the principles of
igitur intellectus substantiae the species, but even the individuating
separatae totam rem respiciunt, et principles. The knowledge of singulars,
non solum principia speciei, sed therefore, must not be denied to
etiam principia individuantia. Non separate substances, although our
est igitur singularium cognitio intellect cannot be cognizant of
subtrahenda substantiis separatis, singulars.
licet intellectus noster singularia
cognoscere non possit.
Praeterea. Si corpora caelestia [5] Moreover, if, as the philosophers say,

moventur a substantiis separatis, the heavenly bodies are moved by the
secundum philosophorum separate substances, then, since
positionem, cum substantiae separate substances act and move by
separatae agant et moveant per their intellect, they must know the
intellectum, oportet quod movable thing which they move; and this
cognoscant mobile quod movent: is some particular entity, for universals
quod est quoddam particulare; nam are immovable. The new places, also,
universalia immobilia sunt. Situs which result from movement are certain
etiam, qui renovantur per motum, singular realities that cannot be
sunt quaedam singularia, quae non unknown to the substance which
possunt ignorari a substantia exercises movement by its intellect.
movente per intellectum. Oportet Therefore, it must be said that separate
igitur dicere quod substantiae substances know singulars belonging to
separatae singularia cognoscant these material things.
istarum materialium rerum.
Caput 101 Chapter 101
Utrum substantiae separatae WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
naturali cognitione cognoscant HAVE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF ALL
omnia simul THINGS AT THE SAME TIME
Quia vero intellectus in actu est [1] Now, since “the intellect in act is the
intellectum in actu, sicut sensus thing understood in act, just as the sense in

in actu est sensibile in actu; act is the sensible in act,” and since the
idem autem non potest simul same thing cannot at the same time be
esse multa in actu; impossibile many things actually, it is seemingly
videtur quod intellectus impossible, as we observed above, that the
substantiae separatae habeat intellect of a separate substance should be
species intelligibilium diversas, possessed of diverse species of
sicut iam supra dictum est. intelligibles.
Sed sciendum est quod non [2] But it must be known that not everything

omne illud est intellectum in actu is actually understood, the intelligible
cuius species intelligibilis actu species of which is actually present in the
est in intellectu. Cum enim intellect. For, since an intelligent substance
substantia intelligens sit etiam is also endowed with will, being, thereby,
volens, ac per hoc sit domina sui master of its own acts, it is in its power
actus, in potestate ipsius est, after it possesses an intelligible species to
postquam habet speciem use it for understanding actually, or, if it
intelligibilem, ut ea utatur ad have several intelligible species, to use one
intelligendum actu; vel, si habet of them. That is why we do not actually
plures, ut utatur una ipsarum. consider all the things of which we have
Unde et ea quorum scientiam scientific knowledge. Therefore, an
habemus, non omnia actu intellectual substance, being cognizant of
consideramus. Substantia igitur things through a plurality of species, uses
intellectualis, per plures species the one that it chooses, and thereby
cognoscens, utitur una, qua vult, actually knows at the same time through
ac per hoc simul actu cognoscit the one species all the things which it
omnia quae per unam speciem knows; for they are all as one intelligible
cognoscit: omnia enim sunt ut thing so far as they are known through one,
unum intelligibile inquantum sunt even as our intellect knows at the same
per unum cognita; sicut et time several things brought together or
intellectus noster simul cognoscit related to one another as one individual
multa ad invicem composita vel thing. On the other hand, the things that the
relata ut unum quiddam. Ea vero intellect knows through diverse species, it
quae per diversas species does not know at the same time. And,
cognoscit, non cognoscit simul. consequently, just as there is one
Et ideo, sicut est intellectus understanding, so is there one thing
unus, ita est intellectum in actu actually understood.
unum. [3] Therefore, in the intellect of a separate
Est igitur in intellectu substantiae substance there is a certain succession of
separatae quaedam understandings, but not movement properly
intelligentiarum successio. Non so called, since act does not succeed
tamen motus, proprie loquendo: potentiality; rather, act succeeds act.
cum non succedat actus
potentiae, sed actus actui.
Intellectus autem divinus, quia [4] But the divine intellect knows all things
per unum, quod est sua at the same time, because it knows all
essentia, omnia cognoscit, et things through one thing, its essence, and
sua actio est sua essentia, because its action is its essence.
omnia simul intelligit. [5] Wherefore, in God’s understanding

Unde in intelligentia eius non there is no succession, but His act of
cadit aliqua successio, sed suum understanding, wholly and simultaneously
intelligere est totum simul perfect, endures through all the ages.
perfectum, permanens per Amen.
omnia saecula saeculorum.
Amen.

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unumquodque natum est operari operation follows upon its actual

Utraque autem dictarum [3] Now, both kinds of operation belong to

Prima igitur dictarum [4] Therefore, as a simple perfection of

De prima quidem Dei operatione [5] Of the first type of operation in God we

Quem quidem ordinem ex [6], In fact, this order we can gather from

Primo quidem, quia ex factorum [2] First, because meditation on His works

sapientiam, super omnia opera Psalmist, after saying: “Your knowledge is

Secundo, haec consideratio in [3] Secondly, this consideration [of God’s

Quarto, haec consideratio [5] Fourthly, this consideration endows

Est etiam necessaria creaturarum [1] The consideration of creatures is

Secundo, ex hoc quod id quod Dei [3] Secondly, because they attribute to

Manifestum est autem ex praedictis [1] Now, from what has been said it is

Supponentes igitur quae in [1] Presupposing the things already

Item. Ostensum est in primo libro, [3] Also, it was shown in Book I, by the

Amplius. Quod per se alicui convenit, [4] Furthermore, that which belongs to

Adhuc. Signum perfectionis in rebus [5] It is, moreover, a sign of perfection

Hinc est quod dicitur Iob 5­9: qui facit [8] Hence, it is said: “Who does great

Potentia enim activa est principium [2] For active power is the principle of

Adhuc. Divina perfectio omnium [4] The divine perfection, furthermore,

Item. In rebus quarum potentiae [5] Again, in things whose powers are not

Praeterea. Omne quod est per [6] Moreover, everything which is through

aliud, reducitur ad id quod est per another is reduced to that which is

Ex hoc autem ostendi potest quod [1] From this it can be shown that God’s

Adhuc. Actio quae non est [5] Furthermore, an action that is not the

Patet etiam ex praedictis quod [2] From the foregoing it is clear, also,

Adhuc. Movens dicitur relative [5] Again. Mover is spoken of in relation to

Item. Primum relationem [6] And again. First implies a relation, and

substantia ab alio extrinseco esset something else extrinsic to it, so that He

Adhuc. Relationes praedictae [4] A further point. The aforesaid

Amplius. Cuicumque aliquid de [5] Furthermore, we observe that

Non autem potest dici quod [1] It cannot be said, however, that these

Cum enim Deus sit primum entium [2] For, if they did, we should have to

Item. Duplex est modus quo [3] Moreover, there are two ways in which

Patet etiam ex his quod divinae [6] [Chapter 14] From these considerations

simplex sub multiplici relatione that simple reality under a manifold

Omne enim quod alicui convenit non [2] For whatever does not belong to a

Amplius. Quod alicui convenit ex sua [3] Furthermore, whatever a thing

Adhuc. Secundum ordinem effectuum [4] Then, too, the order of causes

Item. Quod per essentiam dicitur, est [5] Moreover, the cause of everything

necessitatis: in quo etiam in infinitum also, progression to infinity is

Item. Imperfecta a perfectis sumunt [8] A final argument. Imperfect things

Per hoc autem excluditur antiquorum [10] The error of the natural

Si enim est aliquid effectus Dei, aut [2] For, if a thing is an effect produced

Adhuc. Unaquaeque materia per [3] Every matter, furthermore, is limited

agens particulare: causae enim upon it in any manner whatsoever. But

Item. Quanto aliquis effectus est [4] Again. The more universal an effect

Praeterea. Quod agit tantum per [5] Moreover, to act only by motion and

praeiacenti materia ad aliquid make something.

Amplius. Unumquodque agens sibi [6] An additional argument. Every

Item. Materia comparatur ad agens [7] Then, too, matter stands in relation

agendo requirit materiam necessitates the prior existence of

Adhuc. Diversarum rerum diversae [9] Diverse things, furthermore, have

Amplius. Quorumcumque in rerum [10] Moreover, wherever in the

enim ordinem in uno constitui being from another, or both from some

Hoc autem ostenso, manifestum [1] In the light of what has been proved,

Motus enim omnis vel mutatio est [2] For all motion or change is the “act of

Item. Extrema motus vel mutationis [3] Moreover, the extremes of a motion

rationem creationis. Creatio igitur creation. Creation, therefore, is neither a

Videtur tamen creatio esse [3] Nevertheless, creation appears to be a

Amplius. Omnem factionem [5] And again. Every successive making

Praeterea. Successio in rerum [6] Successiveness in the making of

Hinc est quod dicitur Iob 59: qui facit [8] Hence, it is said: “Who does great

non inveniuntur. Quicumque autem numerous entities, nonexistent in the