Thomas - ContraGentiles3b - Providence 2 PDF

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CONTRA GENTILES
BOOK THREE: PROVIDENCE
Part II: Chapters 84163
translated by
Vernon J. Bourke

CONTENTS
84. That the celestial bodies make no 122. The reason why simple
impression on our intellects fornication is a sin according to
85. That the celestial bodies are not the divine law, and that matrimony is
causes of our acts of will and choice natural
86. That the corporeal effects in things 123. That matrimony should be
here below do not necessarily result indivisible
from the celestial bodies 124. That matrimony should be
87. That the motion of a celestial body is between one man and one
not the cause of our acts of choice by woman
the power of its soul moving us, as 125. That matrimony should not take
some say place between close relatives
88. That separate created substances 126. That not all sexual intercourse is
cannot be directly the cause of our sinful
acts of choice and will, but only God 127. That the use of food is not a sin
89. That the movement of the will is in itself
caused by God and not only the 128. How man is ordered by the law
power. of the will of God in regard to his neighbor
90. That human acts of choice and of will 129. That some human acts are right
are subject to divine providence according to nature and not
91. How human events may be traced merely because they are
back to higher causes prescribed by law
92. How a person is favored by fortune 130. On the counsels that are given
and how man is assisted by higher in divine law
causes 131. On the error of the attackers of
93. On fate: whether and what it is voluntary poverty
94. On the certainty of divine providence 132. On the ways of life of those who
95. That the immutability of divine practice voluntary poverty
providence does not suppress the 133. In what way poverty is good
value of prayer 134. Answers to the arguments
96. That some prayers are not granted by brought forward above against
God poverty
97. How the disposition of providence has 135. Answer to the objections against
a rational plan the different ways of life of those
98. How God can act apart from the order who embrace voluntary poverty
of His providence, and how not 136. On the error of those who attack
99. That God can work apart from the perpetual continence
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order implanted in things, by 137. Another error concerning
producing effects without proximate perpetual continence
causes 138. Against those who attack vows
100. That things which God does apart 139. That neither meritorious acts nor
from the order of nature are not sins are equal
contrary to nature 140. That a man’s acts are punished
101. On miracles or rewarded by God
102. That God alone works miracles 141. On the diversity and order of
103. How spiritual substances do certain punishments
wonderful things which, however, are 142. That not all rewards and
not truly miracles punishments are equal
104. That the works of magicians are not 143. On the punishment due to
solely due to the influence of celestial mortal and venial sin in relation
bodies to the ultimate end
105. Where the performances of the 144. That by mortal sin a man is
magicians get their efficacy eternally deprived of his ultimate
106. That the intellectual substance which end
provides the efficacy for magic works 145. That sins are punished also by
is not morally good the experience of something
107. That the intellectual substance whose painful
help the arts of magic use is not evil in 146. That it is lawful for judges to
its own nature inflict punishments
108. Arguments whereby it seems to be 147. That man needs divine help to
proved that there can be no sin in attain happiness
demons 148. That by the help of divine grace
109. That sin can occur in demons, and in man is not forced toward virtue
what way 149. That man cannot merit divine
110. Answer to the previous arguments help in advance
111. That rational creatures are subject to 150. That the aforesaid divine help is
divine providence in a special way called grace, and what
112. That rational creatures are governed sanctifying grace is
for their own sakes, while others are 151. That sanctifying grace causes
governed in subordination to them the love of God in us
113. That the rational creature is directed 152. That divine grace causes faith in
by God to his actions not only by an us
ordering of the species, but also 153. That divine grace causes hope
according to what befits the individual in us
114. That laws are divinely given to man 154. On the gifts of gratuitous grace,
115. That the divine law principally orders including a consideration of the
man toward God divinations of demons
116. That the end of divine law is the love 155. That man needs the help of
of God grace to persevere in the good
117. That we are ordered by divine law to 156. That he who falls from grace
the love of neighbor through sin may again be
118. That through divine law men are restored through grace
bound to the right faith 157. That man cannot be freed from
119. That our mind is directed to God by sin except through grace
certain sense objects 158. How man is freed from sin
120. That the cult proper to latria is to be 159. That it is reasonable to hold a
offered to God alone man responsible if he does not
121. That divine law orders man according turn toward God, even though
to reason in regard to corporeal and he cannot do this without grace
sensible things 160. That man in the state of sin,
without grace, cannot avoid sin
161. That God frees some men from
sin and leaves others in sin
162. That God is not the cause of sin
for any person
163. On predestination, reprobation,
and divine election
Caput 84
Chapter 84
Quod corpora caelestia non
THAT THE CELESTIAL BODIES MAKE
imprimant in intellectus
NO IMPRESSION ON OUR INTELLECTS
nostros
Ex his autem quae praemissa [1] From the things set forth earlier it is
sunt, in promptu apparet quod immediately evident that celestial bodies
eorum quae sunt circa cannot be causes of events which go on in
intellectum, corpora caelestia the understanding. Indeed, we have
causae esse non possunt. Iam already shown that the order of divine
enim ostensum est quod divinae providence requires the lower things to be
providentiae ordo est ut per ruled and moved by the higher ones. But
superiora regantur inferiora et the understanding surpasses all bodies in
moveantur. Intellectus autem the order of nature, as is also clear from
naturae ordine omnia corpora what we have said before. So, it is
excedit: ut etiam ex praedictis impossible for celestial bodies to act
patet. Impossibile est igitur quod directly on the intellect. Therefore, they
corpora caelestia agant in cannot be the direct cause of things that
intellectum directe. Non igitur pertain to understanding.
possunt esse causa per se
eorum quae sunt circa
intellectum.
Adhuc. Nullum corpus agit nisi [2] Again, no body acts except through
per motum: ut probatur in VIII motion, as is proved in Physics VIII [6].
Physicor. Quae autem sunt But things that are immovable are not
immobilia, non causantur ex caused by motion, for nothing is caused
motu: nihil enim causatur ex motu by the motion of an agent, unless the
alicuius agentis nisi inquantum agent moves a passive subject during the
movet passum dum movetur. motion. So, things that are utterly apart
Quae igitur sunt omnino extra from motion cannot be caused by the
motum, non possunt esse celestial bodies. But things that are in the
causata a corporibus caelestibus. area of understanding are entirely apart
Sed ea quae sunt circa from motion, properly speaking, as is
intellectum, sunt omnino extra evident from the Philosopher, in Physics
motum, per se loquendo, sicut VII [3]. On the contrary, “through being
patet per philosophum in VII undisturbed by motions, the soul becomes
Phys.: quinimmo per quietem a prudent and knowing” as is stated in the
motibus fit anima prudens et same place. Therefore, it is impossible for
sciens, ut ibidem dicitur. celestial bodies to be the direct cause of
Impossibile est ergo quod things that pertain to understanding.
corpora caelestia sint per se
causa eorum quae circa
intellectum sunt.
Amplius. Si nihil causatur ab [3] Besides, if nothing is caused by a body

aliquo corpore nisi inquantum unless the body is moved while the motion
movet dum movetur, oportet is going on, it is necessary for everything
omne illud quod recipit that receives an impression from a body to
impressionem alicuius corporis, be moved. Now, nothing is so moved
moveri. Nihil autem movetur nisi except a body, as is proved in Physics VI
corpus, ut probatur in VI Phys. [4]. So, everything that receives an
Oportet ergo omne quod recipit impression from a body must be a body, or
impressionem alicuius corporis, some power of a body. Now, we showed in
esse corpus, vel aliquam virtutem Book Two that the intellect is neither a
corpoream. Ostensum est autem body nor a bodily power. Therefore, it is
in secundo quod intellectus impossible for the celestial bodies directly
neque est corpus neque virtus to make an impression on the intellect.
corporea. Impossibile est igitur
quod corpora caelestia directe
imprimant in intellectum.
Item. Omne quod movetur ab [4] Moreover, everything that is moved by
aliquo, reducitur ab eo de another thing is reduced by it from potency
potentia in actum. Nihil autem to act. But nothing is reduced by a thing
reducitur ab aliquo de potentia in from potency to act unless that thing is
actum nisi per id quod est actu. actual. So, every agent and mover must
Oportet ergo omne agens et be in some way actual, in regard to the
movens esse aliquo modo in actu effects to which the passive and movable
respectu eorum ad quae passum subject is in potency. Now, the celestial
et motum est in potentia. Corpora bodies are not actually intelligible, for they
autem caelestia non sunt actu are certain individual, sensible things. And
intelligibilia: cum sint quaedam so, since our intellect is not in potency to
singularia sensibilia. Cum igitur anything except actual intelligibles, it is
intellectus noster non sit in impossible for celestial substances directly
potentia nisi ad intelligibilia in to act on the intellect.
actu, impossibile est quod
corpora caelestia directe agant in
intellectum.
Adhuc. Propria operatio rei 15] Furthermore, the proper operation of a

consequitur naturam ipsius, quae thing depends on its nature, which, in
rebus generatis per things that are generated, is acquired,
generationem acquiritur, simul along with the proper operation, through
cum propria operatione: sicut the process of generation. This is clear in
patet de gravi et levi, quae the case of heavy and light things, which
habent statim proprium motum in immediately at the end of the process that
termino suae generationis, nisi sit generates them possess their proper
aliquid impediens, ratione cuius motion unless there be some impediment.
generans dicitur movens. Illud Because of this the generating agent is
ergo quod secundum principium called a mover. So, that which in regard to
suae naturae non est subiectum the beginning of its nature is not subject to
actionibus corporum caelestium, the actions of celestial bodies cannot be
neque secundum suam subject to them in regard to its operation.
operationem potest esse eis Now, man’s intellectual nature is not
subiectum. Pars autem caused by any corporeal principles, but is
intellectiva non causatur ab of completely extrinsic origin, as we
aliquibus principiis corporalibus, proved above. Therefore, the operation of
sed est omnino ab extrinseco, ut the intellect does not come directly under
supra est probatum. Operatio the celestial bodies.
igitur intellectus non subiacet
directe corporibus caelestibus.
Amplius. Ea quae causantur ex [6] Again, effects caused by celestial
motibus caelestibus, tempori motions are subject to time, which is “the
subduntur, quod est numerus measure of the first celestial motion.” And
primi motus caelestis. Quae igitur so, events that abstract from time entirely
omnino abstrahunt a tempore, are not subject to celestial motions. But
non sunt caelestibus subiecta. the intellect in its operation does abstract
Intellectus autem in sua from time, as it does also from place; in
operatione abstrahit a tempore, fact, it considers the universal which is
sicut et a loco: considerat enim abstracted from the here and now.
universale, quod est abstractum Therefore, intellectual operation is not
ab hic et nunc. Non igitur operatio subject to celestial motions.
intellectualis subditur caelestibus
motibus.
Adhuc. Nihil agit ultra suam [7] Besides, nothing acts beyond the
speciem. Ipsum autem intelligere capacity of its species. But the act of
transcendit speciem et formam understanding transcends the species and
cuiuscumque corporis agentis: form of every sort of bodily agent, since
quia omnis forma corporea est every corporeal form is material and
materialis et individuata; ipsum individuated, whereas the act of
autem intelligere habet speciem a understanding is specified by its object
suo obiecto, quod est universale which is universal and immaterial. As a
et immateriale. Unde nullum consequence, no body can understand
corpus per formam suam through its corporeal form. Still less, then,
corpoream intelligere potest. can any body cause understanding in
Multo igitur minus potest another being.
quodcumque corpus causare
ipsum intelligere in alio.
Item. Secundum illud quo aliquid [8] Moreover, a being cannot be subject to

unitur superioribus, non est its inferiors by the same part whereby it is
inferioribus subiectum. Anima united to its superiors. But our soul is
autem nostra, secundum quod united to the intellectual substances,

intelligit, unitur substantiis which are superior to the celestial bodies
intellectualibus, quae sunt in the order of nature, by virtue of the part
superiores ordine naturae which is the understanding. In fact, our
corporibus caelestibus: non enim soul cannot understand unless it receives
potest anima nostra intelligere intellectual light from those substances.
nisi secundum quod lumen Therefore, it is impossible for intellectual
intellectuale inde sortitur. operation directly to be subject to the
Impossibile est ergo quod celestial motions.
intellectualis operatio directe
motibus caelestibus subdatur.
Praeterea. Huic rei fidem faciet si [9] Furthermore, our confidence in this

consideremus ea quae a view will be increased if we consider the
philosophis circa hoc sunt dicta. statements of the philosophers on the
Antiqui enim philosophi naturales, point. As a matter of fact, the ancient
ut Democritus, Empedocles, et natural philosophers, like Democritus,
huiusmodi, posuerunt quod Empedocles, and those of similar
intellectus non differt a sensu: ut persuasion, claimed that understanding
patet in IV Metaph., et in III de does not differ from sense perception, as
anima. Et ideo sequebatur quod, is evident from Metaphysics IV [5] and
cum sensus sit quaedam virtus from Book III of On the Soul [3]. And so,
corporea sequens corporum the conclusion was made that, since
transmutationem, quod ita esset sensation is a bodily power depending on
etiam de intellectu. Et propter hoc changes in bodies, the same thing is also
dixerunt quod, cum transmutatio true of understanding. For this reason,
inferiorum corporum sequatur they said that intellectual operation results
transmutationem corporum from the motion of the celestial bodies,
superiorum, intellectualis operatio because change in lower bodies results
sequatur corporum caelestium from change in the higher bodies.
motus: secundum illud Homeri: According to a passage in Homer: “So
talis est intellectus in diis et understanding in gods and in earthly men
hominibus terrenis qualem in die is like the daylight which the father of men
ducit pater virorum deorumque: and gods brings down”; the reference is to
idest sol; vel magis Iupiter, quem the sun, or, better, to Jupiter, whom they
dicebant summum Deum, called the highest god, understanding him
intelligentes per ipsum totum to be the whole heavens, as is clear from
caelum, ut patet per Augustinum, Augustine in his City of God [IV, 11].
in libro de civitate Dei.
Hinc etiam processit Stoicorum [10] Next came the opinion of the Stoics,
opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem who said that intellectual knowledge is
intellectus causari ex hoc quod caused by the fact that the images of
imagines corporum nostris bodies are impressed on our minds, as a
mentibus imprimuntur, sicut sort of mirror or as a page receives the
speculum quoddam, vel sicut letters imprinted on it without its doing
pagina recipit litteras impressas, anything; as Boethius reports in Book V of
absque hoc quod aliquid agat: ut the Consolation. According to their view, it
Boetius narrat in V de followed that intellectual notions are
consolatione. Secundum quorum impressed on us chiefly by an impression
sententiam sequebatur quod from the celestial bodies. Hence, the

maxime ex impressione Stoics were the ones who especially
corporum caelestium asserted that the life of man is directed by
intellectuales notiones nobis a fatal necessity.
imprimerentur. Unde et Stoici
fuerunt qui praecipue necessitate
quadam fatali hominum vitam
duci posuerunt.
Sed haec positio inde falsa However, this theory appeared false, as
apparet, ut Boetius ibidem dicit, time went on, as Boethius says in the
quia intellectus componit et same place, for the understanding
dividit, et comparat suprema ad combines and separates, compares the
infima et cognoscit universalia et highest things with the lowest, and knows
simplices formas, quae in universals and simple forms that are not
corporibus non inveniuntur. Et sic found in bodies. So, it is obvious that the
manifestum est quod intellectus understanding is not simply receptive of
non est sicut recipiens tantum bodily images, but has a power higher
imagines corporum, sed habet than bodies, since external sensation
aliquam virtutem corporibus which is only receptive of bodily images
altiorem: nam sensus exterior, qui does not encompass the actions
solum imagines corporum recipit, mentioned above.
ad praedicta non se extendit.
Omnes autem sequentes [11] Now, all the philosophers who

philosophi, intellectum a sensu followed distinguished understanding from
discernentes, causam nostrae sense perception and attributed the cause
scientiae non aliquibus of our knowledge not to bodies, but to
corporibus, sed rebus immaterial things. Thus, Plato claimed that
immaterialibus attribuerunt: sicut the cause of our knowledge is the Ideal
Plato posuit causam nostrae Forms; while Aristotle said that it is the
scientiae esse ideas; Aristoteles agent intellect.
autem intellectum agentem.
Ex his omnibus est accipere quod [12] From all these views we may gather

ponere corpora caelestia esse that the assertion that the celestial bodies
causam nobis intelligendi, est are the cause of our act of understanding
consequens opinioni eorum qui is a consequence of the opinion of those
ponebant intellectum a sensu non who claimed that understanding does not
differre: ut patet etiam per differ from sensation, as is clear from
Aristotelem, in libro de anima. Aristotle in his book On the Soul [III, 3].
Hanc autem opinionem Now, it has been shown that this opinion is
manifestum est esse falsam. false. So, it is also obvious that the opinion
Igitur manifestum est et eam which asserts that celestial bodies are
esse falsam quae ponit corpora directly the cause of our act of
caelestia esse nobis causa understanding is false.
intelligendi directe.
Hinc est etiam quod sacra [13] Hence, Sacred Scripture also
Scriptura causam nostrae ascribes the cause of our understanding,
intelligentiae attribuit, non alicui not to any body but to God: “Where is
corpori, sed Deo: Iob 3510 ubi God, Who made me, Who gives songs in
est Deus qui fecit me, qui dedit the night; Who teaches us more than the
carmina in nocte, qui docet nos beasts of the earth, and instructs us more
super iumenta terrae, super than the fowls of the air?” (Job 35:1011).
volucres caeli erudit nos? Et in Again, in the Psalm (93:10): “He who
Psalmo, qui docet hominem teaches man knowledge.”
scientiam.
Sciendum est tamen quod, licet [14] However, we should note that, though

corpora caelestia directe celestial bodies cannot be directly the
intelligentiae nostrae causae causes of our understanding, they may do
esse non possint, aliquid tamen something indirectly in regard to it. For,
ad hoc operantur indirecte. Licet although the understanding is not a
enim intellectus non sit virtus corporeal power, the operation of
corporea, tamen in nobis operatio understanding cannot be accomplished in
intellectus compleri non potest us without the operation of corporeal
sine operatione virtutum powers: that is, the imagination, the power
corporearum, quae sunt of memory, and the cogitative power, as is
imaginatio et vis memorativa et evident from preceding explanations. And
cogitativa, ut ex superioribus as a result, if the operations of these
patet. Et inde est quod, impeditis powers are blocked by some indisposition
harum virtutum operationibus of the body, the operation of the intellect is
propter aliquam corporis impeded, as is evident in demented and
indispositionem, impeditur sleeping persons, and in others similarly
operatio intellectus: sicut patet in affected. And that is why even the good
phreneticis et lethargicis, et aliis disposition of the human body makes one
huiusmodi. Et propter hoc etiam able to understand well, for, as a result of
bonitas dispositionis corporis this, the aforesaid powers are in a
humani facit aptum ad bene stronger condition. Thus it is stated in
intelligendum, inquantum ex hoc Book II of On the Soul [9] that we observe
praedictae vires fortiores existunt: that “men with soft flesh are well endowed
unde dicitur in II de anima quod mentally.”
molles carne bene aptos mente
videmus.
Dispositio autem corporis humani Now, the condition of the human body

subiacet caelestibus motibus. does come under the influence of celestial
Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de motions. In fact, Augustine says, in the
civitate Dei, quod non City of God V, that “it is not utterly absurd
usquequaque absurde dici potest to say that certain influences of the stars
ad solas corporum differentias are able to produce differences in bodies
afflatus quosdam valere sidereos. only.” And Damascene says, in Book II [De
Et Damascenus dicit in secundo fide orthodoxa], that “different planets
libro, quod alii et alii planetae establish in us diverse temperaments,
diversas complexiones et habitus habits and dispositions.”“So, the celestial
et dispositiones in nobis bodies work indirectly on the good
constituunt. Et ideo indirecte condition of understanding. Thus, just as

corpora caelestia ad bonitatem physicians may judge the goodness of an
intelligentiae operantur. Et sic, intellect from the condition of its body, as
sicut medici possunt iudicare de from a proximate disposition, so also may
bonitate intellectus ex corporis an astronomer judge from the celestial
complexione sicut ex dispositione motions, as the remote cause of such
proxima, ita astrologus ex dispositions. In this way, then, it is possible
motibus caelestibus sicut ex that there is some truth in what Ptolemy
causa remota talis dispositionis. says in his Centiloquium: “When, at the
Et per hunc modum potest time of a man’s birth, Mercury is in
verificari quod Ptolomaeus in conjunction with Saturn and is itself in a
Centilogio dicit: cum fuerit strong condition, it gives inwardly to things
Mercurius in nativitate alicuius in the goodness of understanding.”
aliqua domorum Saturni, et ipse
fortis in esse suo, dat bonitatem
intelligentiae medullitus in rebus.
Caput 85 Chapter 85
Quod corpora caelestia non sunt THAT THE CELESTIAL BODIES ARE
causae voluntatum et electionum NOT THE CAUSES OF OUR ACTS
nostrarum OF WILL AND CHOICE
Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod [1] It further appears from this that the
corpora caelestia non sunt causa celestial bodies are not the causes of
voluntatum nostrarum neque our acts of will or of our choices.
nostrarum electionum.
Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva [2] Indeed, the will belongs in the
animae est: ut patet per intellectual part of the soul, as is
philosophum in III de anima. Si igitur evident from the Philosopher in Book III
corpora caelestia non possunt of On the Soul. So, if celestial bodies
imprimere directe in intellectum cannot directly make an impression on
nostrum, ut ostensum est, neque our intellect, as we showed, then
etiam in voluntatem nostram directe neither will they be able to make an
imprimere poterunt. impression directly on the will.
Amplius. Omnis electio et actualis [3] Again, every choice and act of will is

voluntas in nobis immediate ex caused immediately in us from an
apprehensione intelligibili causatur: intelligible apprehension, for the
bonum enim intellectum est intellectual good is the object of the
obiectum voluntatis, ut patet in III de will, as is clear from Book III of On the
anima et propter hoc non potest Soul [10]. For this reason, perversity
sequi perversitas in eligendo nisi cannot result in the act of choice,
intellectus iudicium deficiat in unless the intellectual judgment is
particulari eligibili, ut patet per defective in regard to the particular
philosophum in VII Ethicorum. object of choice, as is evident from the
Corpora autem caelestia non sunt Philosopher in Ethics VII [3]. But the
causa intelligentiae nostrae. Ergo celestial bodies are not the cause of
neque electionis nostrae possunt our act of understanding. Therefore,

esse causa. they cannot be the cause of our act of
choice.
Item. Quaecumque ex impressione [4] Besides, whatever events occur in

corporum caelestium in istis these lower bodies as a result of the
inferioribus eveniunt, naturaliter influence of celestial bodies happen
contingunt: cum haec inferiora sint naturally, because these lower bodies
naturaliter sub illis ordinata. Si ergo are naturally subordinated to them. So,
electiones nostrae eveniunt ex if our choices do occur as a result of
impressione corporum caelestium, the impression of celestial bodies, they
oportet quod naturaliter eveniant: ut will have to occur naturally; that is to
scilicet sic naturaliter homo eligat say, a man might choose naturally to
operari suas operationes, sicut have his operations go on, just as
naturali instinctu bruta operantur, et brutes are involved in operations by
naturaliter corpora inanimata natural instinct, and as inanimate
moventur. Non ergo erunt bodies are moved naturally. In that
propositum et natura duo principia case, there would not be choice and
agentia, sed unum tantum, quod est nature, as two active principles, but
natura. Cuius contrarium patet per only one, and that is nature. The
Aristotelem in II physicorum. Non est contrary of this view is evident from
igitur verum quod ex impressione Aristotle, in Physics II [5]. Therefore, it
corporum caelestium nostrae is not true that our choices originate
electiones proveniant. from the influence of the celestial
bodies.
Praeterea. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, [5] Moreover, things that are done
determinatis mediis perducuntur ad naturally are brought to their end by
finem, unde semper eodem modo determinate means, and so they
contingunt: natura enim determinata always happen in the same way, for
est ad unum. Electiones autem nature is determined to one result. But
humanae diversis viis tendunt in human choices tend to their end in
finem, tam in moralibus quam in various ways, both in moral actions and
artificialibus. Non igitur electiones in artistic productions. Therefore,
humanae sunt naturaliter. human choices are not accomplished
by nature.
Amplius. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, ut [6] Furthermore, things that are done

plurimum recte fiunt: natura enim naturally are done rightly in most
non deficit nisi in paucioribus. Si cases, for nature does not fail, except
igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, ut in in rare cases. So, if man were to
pluribus electiones essent rectae. choose naturally, his choices would be
Quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur right in most cases. Now, this is
homo naturaliter eligit. Quod evidently false. Therefore, man does
oporteret si ex impulsu corporum not choose naturally. But he would
caelestium eligeret. have to ff he chose as a result of the
impulsion of celestial bodies.
Item. Ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, [7] Again, things that belong to the

non diversificantur in operationibus same species do not differ in their
naturalibus quae naturam speciei natural operations which result from the
consequuntur: unde omnis hirundo nature of their species. Thus, every
similiter facit nidum, et omnis homo swallow builds its nest in the same way,
similiter intelligit prima principia, and every man understands naturally
quae sunt naturaliter nota. Electio known first principles in the same way.
autem est operatio consequens Now, choice is an operation resulting
speciem humanam. Si igitur homo from the species of man. So, if man
naturaliter eligeret, oporteret quod were to choose. naturally, then all men
omnes homines eodem modo would have to choose in the same way.
eligerent. Quod patet esse falsum, This is clearly false, both in moral and
tam in moralibus quam in in artistic actions.
artificialibus.
Adhuc. Virtutes et vitia sunt [8] Besides, virtues and vices are the
electionum principia propria: nam proper principles for acts of choice, for
virtuosus et vitiosus differunt ex hoc virtues and vices differ in the fact that
quod contraria eligunt. Virtutes they choose contraries. Now, the
autem politicae et vitia non sunt political virtues and vices are not
nobis a natura, sed ex assuetudine: present in us from nature but come
ut probat philosophus, in II Ethic., ex from custom, as the Philosopher
hoc quod quales operationes proves, in Ethics II [1], from the fact
assuescimus, et maxime a puero, ad that whatever kind of operations we
tales habitum habemus. Ergo have become accustomed to, and
electiones nostrae non sunt nobis a especially from boyhood, we acquire
natura. Non ergo causantur ex habits of the same kind. And so, our
impressione corporum caelestium, acts of choice are not in us from
secundum quam res naturaliter nature. Therefore, they are not caused
procedunt. from the influence of celestial bodies,
according to which things occur
naturally.
Adhuc. Corpora caelestia non [9] Moreover, celestial bodies make no

imprimunt directe nisi in corpora, ut direct impression, except on bodies, as
ostensum est. Si igitur sint causa we showed. So, if they are the cause of
electionum nostrarum, aut hoc erit our acts of choice, this will be either
inquantum imprimunt in corpora because they influence our bodies, or
nostra, aut inquantum imprimunt in because they influence external things.
exteriora. Neutro autem modo But in neither way can they be an
sufficienter possunt esse causa adequate cause of our act of choice. In
electionis nostrae. Non enim est fact, it is not an adequate cause of our
sufficiens causa nostrae electionis choice, for some corporeal things to be
quod aliqua corporalia nobis exterius externally presented to us; for it is clear
praesententur: patet enim quod ad that on encountering some pleasurable
occursum alicuius delectabilis, puta object, say an item of food or a woman,
cibi vel mulieris, temperatus non the temperate man is not moved to
movetur ad eligendum ipsum, choose it, but the intemperate man is
intemperatus autem movetur. moved. Likewise, whatever change
Similiter etiam non sufficit ad might take place in our body as a result

nostram electionem quaecumque of the influence of a celestial body, it
immutatio possit esse in nostro would not suffice to cause our choice,
corpore ab impressione caelestis because there are no other results from
corporis: cum per hoc non sequantur this in us than certain passions, more
in nobis nisi quaedam passiones, vel or less strong. But passions, whatever
magis vel minus vehementes; their strength, are not an adequate
passiones autem, quantumcumque cause for choice, since by the same
vehementes, non sunt causa passions an incontinent man is led to
sufficiens electionis, quia per follow them by choice, while a
easdem passiones incontinens continent man is not so induced.
inducitur ad eas sequendum per Therefore, it cannot be said that
electionem, continens autem non celestial bodies are the causes of our
inducitur. Non potest igitur dici quod acts of choice.
corpora caelestia sunt causae
nostrarum electionum.
Amplius. Nulla virtus datur alicui rei [10] Furthermore, no power is given
frustra. Homo autem habet virtutem anything unless it has a use. But man
iudicandi et consiliandi de omnibus has the power of judging and
quae per ipsum operabilia sunt, sive deliberating on all the things that may
in usu exteriorum rerum, sive in be done by him, whether in the use of
admittendo vel repellendo external things or in the entertaining or
intrinsecas passiones. Quod quidem repelling of internal passions. Of
frustra esset, si electio nostra course, this would be useless if our
causaretur a corporibus caelestibus, choice were caused by celestial bodies
non existens in nostra potestate. which do not come under our control.
Non igitur corpora caelestia sunt Therefore, celestial bodies are not the
causa nostrae electionis. cause of our act of choice.
Praeterea. Homo naturaliter est [11] Again, man is naturally a political
animal politicum, vel sociale. Quod animal, or a social one. This is
quidem ex hoc apparet quod unus apparent, indeed, from the fact that one
homo non sufficit sibi si solus vivat, man is not sufficient unto himself if he
propterea quod natura in paucis lives alone, because nature provides
homini providit sufficienter, dans ei but few things that are sufficient for
rationem, per quam posset sibi man. Instead, it gives him reason
omnia necessaria ad vitam whereby he may make ready all the
praeparare, sicut cibum, indumenta, things needed for life, such as food,
et alia huiusmodi ad quae omnia clothing, and the like; one man is not
operanda non sufficit unus homo. sufficient to do all these things. So, to
Unde naturaliter est inditum homini live in society is naturally implanted in
ut in societate vivat. Sed ordo man. But the order of providence does
providentiae non aufert alicui rei not take away from a thing what is
quod est sibi naturale, sed magis natural to it, but provides for each thing
unicuique providetur secundum in accord with its nature, as is evident
suam naturam, ut ex dictis patet. from what we have said. Therefore,
Non igitur per ordinem providentiae man is not so ordered by the order of
sic est homo ordinatus ut vita providence that his social life is taken
socialis tollatur. Tolleretur autem si away. Now, it would be removed if our
electiones nostrae ex acts of choice arose from impressions

impressionibus corporum caelestium due to the celestial bodies, as do the
provenirent, sicut naturales natural instincts of other animals.
instinctus aliorum animalium.
Frustra etiam darentur leges et [12] Besides, it would be useless for
praecepta vivendi, si homo suarum laws and rules of living to be
electionum dominus non esset. promulgated if man were not master of
Frustra etiam adhiberentur poenae his own choices. Useless, too, would
et praemia bonis aut malis, ex quo be the employment of punishments and
non est in nobis haec vel illa eligere. rewards for good or evil deeds, in
His autem desinentibus, statim regard to which it is not in our power to
socialis vita corrumpitur. Non igitur choose one or the other. In fact, if
homo est sic secundum ordinem these things disappear, social life is at
providentiae institutus ut electiones once corrupted. Therefore, man is not
eius ex motibus caelestium so established by the order of
corporum proveniant. providence that his choices originate
from the motions of the celestial
bodies.
Adhuc. Electiones hominum ad bona [13] Moreover, men’s choices are made
et mala se habent. Si igitur in regard to goods and evils. So, if our
electiones nostrae ex motibus choices originated from the motions of
stellarum provenirent, sequeretur the stars, it would follow that the stars
quod stellae per se essent causa would be the direct cause of evil
malarum electionum. Quod autem choices. But an evil thing has no cause
est malum, non habet causam in in nature, since evil results from a
natura: nam malum incidit ex defectu defect of a cause and has no direct
alicuius causae, et non habet cause, as we showed above.
causam per se, ut supra ostensum Therefore, it is not possible for our
est. Non igitur est possibile quod choices to originate directly and of
electiones nostrae directe et per se themselves from celestial bodies as
a corporibus caelestibus proveniant causes.
sicut ex causis.
Potest autem aliquis huic rationi [14] Now, someone might be able to
obviare dicendo quod omnis mala oppose this argument by saying that
electio ex alicuius boni appetitu every bad choice arises from a good
provenit, ut supra ostensum est: that is desired, as we showed above.
sicut electio adulteri provenit For instance, the choice of an adulterer
appetitu boni delectabilis quod est in arises from the desire for a pleasurable
venereis. Ad quod quidem bonum good associated with sexual activity,
universale aliqua stella movet. Et and some star moves him toward this
hoc necessarium est ad universal good. As a matter of fact, this
generationes animalium is necessary for the accomplishment of
perficiendas: nec debuit hoc the generating of animals, and this
commune bonum praetermitti common good should not be set aside
propter malum particulare huius, qui because of the particular evil of this
ex hoc instinctu eligit malum. person who makes a bad choice as a

result of such prompting.
Haec autem responsio sufficiens [15] But this argument is not adequate
non est, si ponantur corpora if celestial bodies are claimed to be the
caelestia per se causa electionum direct cause of our choices, in the
nostrarum, utpote per se imprimentia sense that they make direct
in intellectum et voluntatem. Nam impressions on the intellect and will.
impressio universalis causae For the impression of a universal cause
recipitur in unoquoque secundum is received in any being according to
modum suum. Effectus ergo stellae the mode of that being. So, the
moventis ad delectationem quae est influence of a star, that impels toward
in coniunctione ordinata ad the pleasure associated with the
generationem, recipietur in quolibet generative act will be received in any
secundum modum proprium sibi: being according to its own mode. Thus
sicut videmus quod diversa animalia we observe that different animals have
habent diversa tempora et diversos different times and various ways of
modos commixtionis, secundum reproducing, according to what befits
congruentiam suae naturae, ut their nature, as Aristotle says in his
Aristoteles dicit in libro de historiis treatise on the History of Animals [V, 8].
animalium. Recipient ergo intellectus So, intellect and will are going to
et voluntas impressionem illius receive the influence of this star
stellae secundum modum suum. according to their own mode. But,
Cum autem aliquid appetitur when an object is desired in
secundum modum, intellectus et accordance with the mode of intellect
rationis, non accidit peccatum in and reason, there is no sin in the
electione, quae quidem semper ex choice; in fact, a choice is bad, always
hoc mala est quod non est because it is not in accord with right
secundum rationem rectam. Non reason. Therefore, if celestial bodies
igitur, si corpora caelestia essent were the cause of our choices, there
causa electionum nostrarum, esset would never be a bad choice for us.
unquam in nobis electio mala.
Amplius. Nulla virtus activa se [16] Moreover, no active power extends

extendit ad ea quae sunt supra to effects that are beyond the species
speciem et naturam agentis: quia and nature of the agent, for every
omne agens agit per suam formam. agent acts by virtue of its form. But the
Sed ipsum velle transcendit omnem act of willing surpasses every bodily
speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsum species, as does the act of
intelligere: sicut enim intelligimus understanding. Indeed, just as we
universalia, ita et voluntas nostra in understand universals, so also is our
aliquod universale fertur, puta quod will attracted to the universal object; for
odimus omne latronum genus, ut example, “we hate every kind of thief,”
philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. as the Philosopher says in his Rhetoric
Nostrum igitur velle non causatur a [II, 4]. Therefore our willact is not
corpore caelesti. caused by a celestial body.
Praeterea. Ea quae sunt ad finem, [17] Furthermore, things that are
proportionantur fini. Electiones related to an end are proportioned to
autem humanae ordinantur ad that end. But human choices are

felicitatem sicut ad ultimum finem. ordered to felicity as their ultimate end.
Quae quidem non consistit in Of course, it does not consist in any
aliquibus corporalibus bonis, sed in corporeal goods but in the union of the
hoc quod anima coniungatur per soul with divine things by way of
intellectum rebus divinis: ut supra understanding, as we showed above,
ostensum est, tam secundum both according to the view of faith and
sententiam fidei, quam secundum according to the opinions of the
philosophorum opiniones. Corpora philosophers. Therefore, celestial
igitur caelestia non possunt esse bodies cannot be the cause of our acts
causa electionum nostrarum. of choice.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ier. 102 a [18] Hence it is said: “Be not afraid of
signis caeli nolite metuere, quae the signs of heaven which the
gentes timent: quia leges populorum heathens fear; for the laws of people
vanae sunt. are vain” (Jer. 10:23).
Per haec autem excluditur positio [19] By this conclusion the theory of the

Stoicorum, qui ponebant omnes Stoics is also refuted, for they claimed
actus nostros, et etiam electiones that all our acts, and even our choices,
nostras, secundum corpora caelestia are ordered by the celestial bodies.
disponi. Quae etiam fuisse dicitur This is also said to have been the
positio antiqua Pharisaeorum apud position of the ancient Pharisees
Iudaeos. Priscillianistae etiam huius among the Jews. The Priscillianists,
erroris rei fuerunt, ut dicitur in libro too, shared this error, as is stated in the
de haeresibus. book On Heresies [Augustine, 70].
Haec etiam fuit opinio antiquorum [20] It was also the opinion of the old
naturalium, qui ponebant sensum et natural philosophers who claimed that
intellectum non differre. Unde sensation and understanding did not
Empedocles dixit quod voluntas differ. Thus, Empedocles said that “the
augetur in hominibus, sicut in aliis will is increased in men, as in other
animalibus, ad praesens, idest, animals, in respect to what is present”;
secundum praesens momentum, ex that is, according to the present instant
motu caeli causante tempus, ut resulting from the celestial motion that
Aristoteles introducit in libro de causes time, as Aristotle reports it in
anima. his book On the Soul [III, 3].
Sciendum tamen est quod, licet [21] Yet we should note that, though
corpora caelestia non sint directe celestial bodies are not directly the
causa electionum nostrarum quasi cause of our choices, in the sense of
directe in voluntates nostras directly making impressions on our
imprimentia, indirecte tamen ex eis wills, some occasion for our choices
aliqua occasio nostris electionibus may be indirectly offered by them,
praestatur, secundum quod habent because they do make an impression
impressionem super corpora. Et hoc on bodies, and in a twofold sense. In
dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, one way, the impressions of the
secundum quod impressiones celestial bodies on external bodies are
corporum caelestium in exteriora for us the occasion of a certain act of
corpora est nobis occasio alicuius choice; for instance, when the
electionis: sicut, cum per corpora atmosphere is disposed to severe cold
caelestia disponitur aer ad frigus by the celestial bodies, we choose to
intensum, eligimus calefieri ad get warmed near a fire or to do other
ignem, vel aliqua huiusmodi facere such acts which suit the weather. In a
quae congruunt tempori. Alio modo, second way, they make an impression
secundum quod imprimunt in on our bodies; when a change occurs
corpora nostra: ad quorum in them, certain movements of the
immutationem insurgunt in nobis passions arise in us; or we are made
aliqui motus passionum: vel per prone by their impressions to certain
eorum impressionem efficimur passions, as the bilious are prone to
habiles ad aliquas passiones, sicut anger; or again, some bodily
cholerici sunt proni ad iram; vel disposition that is an occasion for an
etiam secundum quod ex eorum act of choice may be caused in us by
impressione causatur in nobis aliqua their impression, as when, resulting
dispositio corporalis quae est from our illness, we choose to take
occasio alicuius electionis, sicut medicine. At times, too, a human act
cum, nobis infirmantibus, eligimus may be caused by the celestial bodies,
accipere medicinam. Interdum etiam in the sense that some people become
ex corporibus caelestibus actus demented as a result of a bodily
humanus causatur inquantum ex indisposition and are deprived of the
indispositione corporis aliqui use of reason. Strictly speaking, there
amentes efficiuntur, usu rationis is no act of choice for such people, but
privati. In quibus proprie electio non they are moved by a natural instinct, as
est, sed moventur aliquo naturali are brutes.
instinctu, sicut et bruta.
Manifestum autem est, et [22] Moreover, it is plain and well
experimento cognitum, quod tales known by experience that such
occasiones, sive sint exteriores sive occasions, whether they are external or
sint interiores, non sunt causa internal, are not the necessary cause of
necessaria electionis: cum homo per choice, since man is able, on the basis
rationem possit eis resistere vel of reason, either to resist or obey them.
obedire. Sed plures sunt qui impetus But there are many who follow natural
naturales sequuntur, pauciores impulses, while but few, the wise only,
autem, scilicet soli sapientes, qui do not take these occasions of acting
occasiones male agendi et naturales badly and of following their natural
impetus non sequuntur. Et propter impulses. This is why Ptolemy says, in
hoc dicit Ptolomaeus in Centilogio his Centiloquium: “the wise soul assists
quod anima sapiens adiuvat opus the work of the stars”; and that “the
stellarum; et quod non poterit astronomer could not give a judgment
astrologus dare iudicia secundum based on the stars, unless he knew
stellas nisi vim animae et well the power of the soul and the
complexionem naturalem bene natural temperament”; and that “the
cognoverit; et quod astrologus non astronomer should not speak in detail
debet dicere rem specialiter, sed on a matter, but in general.” That is to
universaliter: quia scilicet impressio say, the impression from the stars
stellarum in pluribus sortitur produces its result in most people who
effectum, qui non resistunt do not resist the tendency that comes
inclinationi quae est ex corpore; non from their body, but it is not always
autem semper in hoc vel in illo, qui effective, for, in one case or another a
forte per rationem naturali man may resist, perhaps, the natural
inclinationi resistit. inclination by means of reason.
Caput 86 Chapter 86
Quod corporales effectus in istis THAT THE CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN
inferioribus non sequuntur ex THINGS HERE BELOW DO NOT
necessitate a corporibus NECESSARILY RESULT FROM THE
caelestibus CELESTIAL BODIES
Non solum autem corpora caelestia [1] Not only is it impossible for the

humanae electioni necessitatem celestial bodies to impose necessity on
inferre non possunt, sed nec etiam human choice; in fact, not even
corporales effectus in istis corporeal effects in things here below
inferioribus ex necessitate ab eis necessarily result from them.
procedunt.
Impressiones enim causarum [2] For the impressions of universal

universalium recipiuntur in causes are received in their effects
effectibus secundum recipientium according to the mode of the recipients.
modum. Haec autem inferiora sunt Now, these lower things are fluctuating
fluxibilia et non semper eodem and do not always maintain the same
modo se habentia: propter condition: because of matter which is in
materiam, quae est in potentia ad potency to many forms and because of
plures formas; et propter the contrariety of forms and powers.
contrarietatem formarum et Therefore, the impressions of celestial
virtutum. Non igitur impressiones bodies are not received in these lower
corporum caelestium recipiuntur in things by way of necessity.
istis inferioribus per modum
necessitatis.
Item. A causa remota non sequitur [3] Again, an effect does not result from

effectus de necessitate nisi etiam a remote cause unless there be also a
sit causa media necessaria: sicut et necessary intermediate cause; just as in
in syllogismis ex maiori de necesse syllogisms, from a necessary major and
et minori de contingenti non a contingent minor, a necessary
sequitur conclusio de necesse. conclusion does not follow. But celestial
Corpora autem caelestia sunt bodies are remote causes, whereas the
causae remotae: proximae autem proximate causes of lower effects are
causae inferiorum effectuum sunt the active and passive powers in these
virtutes activae et passivae in istis lower things, which are not necessary
inferioribus, quae non sunt causae causes, but contingent, for they may fail
necessariae, sed contingentes; in a few instances. So, effects in these
possunt enim deficere ut in lower bodies do not follow of necessity
paucioribus. Non ergo ex from the motions of the celestial bodies.
corporibus caelestibus sequuntur in
istis inferioribus corporibus effectus
de necessitate.
Praeterea. Motus caelestium [4] Besides, the motion of the celestial
corporum semper est eodem bodies always is in the same mode. So,
modo. Si igitur effectus caelestium if the effect of the celestial bodies on
corporum in istis inferioribus ex these lower ones came about from
necessitate proveniret, semper necessity, the events in lower bodies
eodem modo se haberent quae in would always happen in the same way.
inferioribus sunt. Non autem Yet they do not always occur in the
semper eodem modo se habent, same way, but in most cases. So, they
sed ut in pluribus. Non ergo ex do not come about by necessity.
necessitate proveniunt.
Adhuc. Ex multis contingentibus [5] Moreover, it is not possible for one
non potest fieri unum necessarium: necessary thing to come to be out of
quia, sicut quodlibet contingentium many contingent things, because, just as
per se deficere potest ab effectu, any contingent thing of itself can fall
ita et omnia simul. Constat autem short of its effect, so, too, all of them
quod singula quae in istis may together. Now, it is obvious that the
inferioribus fiunt ex impressione individual effects that are accomplished
caelestium corporum, sunt in these lower things, as a result of the
contingentia. Non igitur connexio impression of celestial bodies, are
eorum quae in inferioribus contingent. Therefore, the combination
contingunt ex impressione of these events that occur in lower things
caelestium corporum, est as a result of the impression of celestial
necessaria: manifestum est enim bodies is not a necessary one, for it is
quod quodlibet eorum potest plain that any one of them may be
impediri. prevented from happening.
Amplius. Corpora caelestia sunt [6] Moreover, the celestial bodies are
agentia naturaliter, quae requirunt agents in the order of nature; they need
materiam in quam agant. Non igitur matter on which to act. So, the need for
ex actione corporum caelestium matter is not removed as a result of the
tollitur id quod materia requirit. action of celestial bodies. Now, the
Materia autem in quam agunt matter on which the celestial bodies act
corpora caelestia, sunt corpora consists of the lower bodies which, being
inferiora: quae, cum sint corruptible in their nature, may be just as
corruptibilia secundum suam able to fail in their operations as they are
naturam, sicut deficere possunt ab able to fail in their being. Thus, their
esse, ita ab operari; et sic eorum nature has this characteristic: they do
natura hoc habet ut non ex not produce their effects by necessity.
necessitate producant effectus. Therefore, the effects of the celestial
Non igitur ex necessitate bodies do not come about by necessity,
proveniunt effectus caelestium even in the lower bodies.
corporum etiam in corporibus
inferioribus.
Aliquis autem forte dicat quod [7] But someone will say, perhaps, that
necessarium est ut effectus the effects of the celestial bodies must
caelestium corporum compleantur, be accomplished. Yet, possibility is not
nec tamen per hoc tollitur removed from the lower bodies by this
possibilitas a rebus inferioribus, eo fact, because each effect is in potency
quod quilibet effectus est in before it comes about. So, it is then
potentia antequam fiat, et tunc called possible, but when it now
dicitur possibilis, quando autem becomes actual, it passes from
iam est in actu, transit a possibility to necessity. All of this comes
possibilitate in necessitatem; et under the control of the celestial bodies;
totum hoc subiacet caelestibus and so, the fact that the effect is at one
motibus; et sic non tollitur quin time possible is not removed in this way,
aliquando effectus sit possibilis, even though it is necessary that this
licet necessarium sit effectum illum effect be produced at another time.
quandoque produci:— sic enim Indeed, this is the way that Albumasar,
Albumasar, in primo libro sui in his book, Introduction to Astronomy,
introductorii, defendere nititur tries to defend the possible.
possibile.
Non est autem possibile quod per [8] But one cannot defend this meaning
hunc modum possibile defendatur. of the possible. For there is a sort of
Possibile enim quoddam est quod possibility that depends on what is
ad necessarium sequitur. Nam necessary. Indeed, what is necessary in
quod necesse est esse, possibile regard to actual being must be possible
est esse: quod enim non possibile in regard to being; and what is not
est esse, impossibile est esse; et possible in relation to being is impossible
quod impossibile est esse, necesse in regard to being; and what is
est non esse; igitur quod necesse impossible in regard to being is
est esse, necesse est non esse. necessarily nonbeing. Therefore, what is
Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo necessary in relation to being is
impossibile est quod aliquid necessary in relation to nonbeing. But
necesse sit esse, et tamen non sit this is impossible. So, it is impossible for
possibile illud esse. Ergo possibile something to be necessary in relation to
esse sequitur ad necesse esse. being, yet not possible in regard to this
being. Therefore, possible being follows
from necessary being.
Hoc autem possibile non est [9] As a matter of fact, we do not have to

necessarium defendere contra hoc defend this meaning of possible against
quod effectus ex necessitate the statement that effects are caused by
causari dicuntur, sed possibile necessity, but, rather, the possible that is
quod opponitur necessario, prout opposed to the necessary, in the sense
dicitur possibile quod potest esse that the possible is called that which can
et non esse. Non dicitur autem be, and also not be. Now, a thing is not
aliquid per hunc modum possibile called possible, or contingent, in this way
vel contingens ex hoc solum quod from the sole fact that it is at one time in
quandoque sit in potentia et potency and at another time in act, as
quandoque in actu, ut praedicta the preceding answer takes it. In fact, in
responsio supponit: nam sic etiam that preceding sense there is possibility
in motibus caelestibus est possibile and contingency even in celestial
et contingens: non enim semper motions, for there is not always an actual
est coniunctio vel oppositio solis conjunction or opposition of the sun or
aut lunae in actu, sed quandoque moon. Rather, it is sometimes actually
quidem in actu, quandoque autem so, sometimes potentially so; yet these
in potentia; quae tamen necessaria events are necessary, for
sunt, cum de his dentur demonstrations of such events may be
demonstrationes. Sed possibile vel given. But the possible, or contingent,
contingens quod opponitur that is opposed to the necessary has this
necessario, hoc in sua ratione characteristic: it is not necessary for it to
habet, quod non sit necesse illud happen when it is not. This is indeed so,
fieri quando non est. Quod quidem because it does not follow of necessity
est quia non de necessitate from its cause. Thus, we say that
sequitur ex causa sua. Sic enim Socrates will sit is a contingent fact, but
dicimus quod Socratem sessurum that he. will die is necessary, because
esse est contingens, ipsum autem the second of these facts follows
esse moriturum est necessarium, necessarily from its cause, whereas the
quia secundum horum ex causa first does not. So, if it follows necessarily
sua de necessitate sequitur, non from the celestial motions that their
autem primum. Si ergo ex motibus effects will occur at some time in the
caelestibus de necessitate sequitur future, then the possible and contingent
quod eorum effectus sint that is opposed to the necessary is
quandoque futuri, tollitur possibile thereby excluded.
et contingens quod necessario
opponitur.
Sciendum est autem quod ad [10] Moreover, we should note that, in
probandum effectus caelestium order to prove that the effects of the
corporum ex necessitate provenire, celestial bodies come about by
Avicenna, in sua metaphysica, necessity, Avicenna uses an argument
utitur tali ratione. Si aliquis effectus like this in his Metaphysics [X, 1]. If any
caelestium corporum impeditur, effect of the celestial bodies is blocked,
oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam this must be due to some voluntary or
causam voluntariam vel naturalem. natural cause. But every voluntary or
Omnis autem causa voluntaria vel natural cause is reducible to some
naturalis reducitur ad aliquod celestial source. Therefore, even the
caeleste principium. Ergo blocking of the effects of the celestial
impedimentum etiam effectuum bodies results from some celestial
caelestium corporum procedit ex sources. So, if the entire order of
aliquibus caelestibus principiis. celestial things be taken together, it is
Impossibile est ergo quod, si totus impossible for its effect ever to fail to
ordo caelestium simul accipiatur, come about. Hence he concludes that
quod effectus eius unquam the celestial bodies produce necessarily
cassetur. Unde concludit quod the effects which must occur in these
corpora caelestia faciunt lower bodies, both the voluntary and the
necessario esse debere effectus in natural ones.
his inferioribus, tam voluntarios
quam naturales.
Haec autem ratio, ut Aristoteles in [11] But this way of arguing, as Aristotle

II Phys. dicit, fuit quorundam says in Physics [II, 4], was used by
antiquorum, qui negabant casum et some of the ancients who denied chance
fortunam, per hoc quod cuiuslibet and fortune on the basis of the view that
effectus est aliqua causa there is a definite cause for every effect.

determinata; posita autem causa, If the cause be granted, then the effect
ponitur effectus de necessitate; et must be granted. Thus, since everything
sic, cum omnia ex necessitate occurs by necessity, there is nothing
proveniant, non est aliquid fortuitous or by chance.
fortuitum neque casuale.
Hanc autem rationem ipse solvit in [12] He answers this argument, in

VI Metaphys., negando duas Metaphysics VI [23], by denying two
propositiones quibus haec ratio propositions which the argument uses.
utitur. Quarum una est quod, posita One of these is: “if any cause be
causa quacumque, necesse sit granted, it is necessary to grant its
eius effectum poni. Hoc enim non effect.” Indeed, this is not necessary in
oportet in omnibus causis: quia the case of all causes, for a certain
aliqua causa, licet sit per se et cause, though it may be the direct,
propria causa et sufficiens alicuius proper and sufficient cause of a given
effectus, potest tamen impediri ex effect, may be hindered by the
concursu alterius causae, ut non interference of another cause so that the
sequatur effectus. Alia propositio effect does not result. The second
est, quam negat, quod non omne proposition that he denies is: “not
quod est quocumque modo, habet everything that exists in any way at all
causam per se, sed solum ea quae has a direct cause, but only those things
sunt per se; quae autem sunt per that exist of themselves; on the other
accidens, non habent aliquam hand, things that exist accidentally have
causam; sicut quod sit musicum, no cause.” For instance, there is a cause
habet aliquam causam in homine, within a man for the fact that he is
quod autem homo sit simul albus et musical, but there is no cause for the
musicus, non habet aliquam fact that he is at once white and musical.
causam. Quaecumque enim sunt As a matter of fact, whenever plural
simul propter aliquam causam, things occur together because of some
ordinem habent ad invicem ex illa cause they are related to each other as
causa: quae autem sunt per a result of that cause, but whenever they
accidens, non habent ordinem ad occur by accident they are not so related
invicem. Non igitur sunt ex aliqua to each other. So, they do not occur as a
causa per se agente, sed solum result of a cause acting directly; their
per accidens hoc evenit: accidit occurrence is only accidental. For
enim docenti musicam quod doceat instance, it is an accident to the teacher
hominem album, est enim praeter of music that he teaches a white man;
eius intentionem, sed intendit indeed, it is quite apart from his
docere disciplinae susceptibilem. intention; rather, he intends to teach
someone who is capable of learning the
subject.
Sic igitur, proposito aliquo effectu, [13] And thus, given a certain effect, we

dicemus quod habuit aliquam will say that it had a cause from which it
causam ex qua non de necessitate did not necessarily follow, since it could
sequebatur: quia poterat impediri have been hindered by some other
ex aliqua alia causa concurrente accidentally conflicting cause. And even
per accidens. Et licet illam causam though it be possible to trace this
concurrentem sit reducere in conflicting cause back to a higher cause,

aliquam causam altiorem, tamen it is not possible to trace this conflict,
ipsum concursum, qui impedit, non which is a hindrance, back to any cause.
est reducere in aliquam causam. Et Thus, it cannot be said that the
sic non potest dici quod hindrance of this or that effect proceeds
impedimentum huius effectus vel from a celestial source. Hence, we
illius procedat ex aliquo caelesti should not say that the effects of
principio. Unde non oportet dicere celestial bodies come about in these
quod effectus corporum caelestium lower bodies as a result of necessity.
ex necessitate proveniant in istis
inferioribus.
Hinc est quod Damascenus dicit, in [14] Hence, Damascene says, in Book II
secundo libro, quod corpora [De fide orthodoxa], that “the celestial
caelestia non sunt causa bodies are not the cause of any process
generationis alicuius eorum quae of generating things that come into
fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum being, or of the process of corrupting
quae corrumpuntur: quia scilicet things that are corrupted”; that is to say,
non ex necessitate ex eis effectus these effects do not come about of
proveniunt. necessity from them.
Aristoteles etiam dicit, in II de [15] Aristotle also says, in On Sleep II,
somno et vigilia, quod eorum quae that “of those signs which occur in
in corporibus sunt signorum etiam bodies, and even of the celestial signs,
caelestium, velut aquarum et such as movements of water and wind,
ventorum, multa non eveniunt. Si many of their results do not come about.
enim alius vehementior isto accidat For, if another movement occurs,
motus a quo futurum est signum, stronger than the one which is a sign of
non fit: sicut et multa consulta the future, then the event does not
bene, quae fieri expediebat, happen; just as many of our well laid
dissoluta sunt propter alias plans, which were suitable to be
digniores inchoationes. accomplished, come to no result,
because of the interference of higher
powers.”
Ptolomaeus etiam, in quadripartito, [16] Ptolemy, too, in his Fourfold Work,
dicit: rursus, nec aestimare says: “Again, we should not think that
debemus quod superiora procedant higher events proceed inevitably, like
inevitabiliter, ut ea quae divina things that happen under divine control
dispositione contingunt et quae and which can in no way be avoided, nor
nullatenus sunt vitanda, necnon as things which come about truly and of
quae veraciter et ex necessitate necessity. He also says in the
proveniunt. In Centilogio etiam Centiloquium: “These prognostications
dicit: haec iudicia quae tibi trado, that I give you are midway between the
sunt media inter necessarium et necessary and the possible.”
possibile.
Chapter 87
Caput 87
THAT THE MOTION OF A CELESTIAL
Quod motus caelestis corporis
BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR
non sit causa electionum
ACTS OF CHOICE BY THE POWER
nostrarum ex virtute animae
OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME
moventis, ut quidam dicunt
SAY
Est tamen attendendum quod [1] However, we should note that
Avicenna vult quod motus Avicenna maintains that the motions of
caelestium corporum sint etiam the celestial bodies are also the causes
nostrarum electionum causae, non of our acts of choice, not simply as
quidem per occasionem tantum, occasions, as was said above, but
sicut supra dictum est, sed per se. directly. For he claims that the celestial
Ponit enim corpora caelestia esse bodies are animated. Hence, since
animata. Unde oportet, cum motus celestial motion is from a soul and is the
caelestis sit ab anima et sit motus motion of a body, therefore, just as it is
corporis, quod sicut, inquantum est a bodily motion with the power of
motus corporis, habet virtutem causing change in bodies, so as a
transmutandi corpora, ita, motion from the soul it must have the
inquantum est ab anima, habeat power to make an impression on our
virtutem imprimendi in animas souls. And thus, the celestial motion is
nostras, et sic motus caelestis sit the cause of our acts of will and choice.
causa nostrarum voluntatum et On this point also he seems to return to
electionum. Ad quod etiam redire the theory of Albumasar, in his
videtur positio Albumasar, in primo Introduction I.
sui introductorii.
Haec autem positio irrationabilis est. [2] But this theory is not reasonable.

Omnem enim effectum, qui est per Every effect proceeding through an
instrumentum aliquod ab efficiente instrument from an efficient cause must
procedens, oportet esse be proportionate to the instrument, as
proportionatum instrumento, sicut et also to the agent, for we cannot use just
agenti: non enim quolibet any instrument for any effect. Hence, a
instrumento utimur ad quemlibet result cannot be accomplished by
effectum. Unde illud non potest fieri means of an instrument if the action of
per aliquod instrumentum ad quod the instrument in no way covers the
nullo modo se extendit actio result. Now, the action of a body in no
instrumenti. Actio autem corporis way extends to the production of a
nullo modo se extendit ad change of understanding and will, as we
immutationem intellectus et showed, unless, perchance, by
voluntatis, ut ostensum est: nisi accident, through a change in the body,
forte per accidens, inquantum ex as we said before. So, it is impossible
his immutatur corpus, sicut for the soul of a celestial body, if it be
praedictum est. Impossibile est ergo animated, to make an impression on the
quod anima caelestis corporis, si sit intellect and will by means of the motion
animatum, in intellectum et of a celestial body.
voluntatem imprimat mediante motu
caelestis corporis.
Amplius. Causa agens particularis [3] Again, a particular agent cause,

similitudinem in agendo gerit when acting, bears a likeness to the
causae agentis universalis, et est universal agent cause and is patterned
exemplum eius. Si autem anima on it. But, if a human soul were to
humana in aliam animam humanam impress another human soul through a
aliquid per operationem corporalem corporeal operation, as when it reveals
imprimeret, sicut cum per its thought by means of meaningful
significationem vocis suam speech, the bodily action initiated by
intelligentiam pandit, actio one soul does not reach the other soul
corporalis quae est ab una anima without the mediation of its body. In fact,
non pervenit ad aliam nisi mediante the spoken word moves the auditory
corpore: vox enim prolata immutat organ, and then, having been so
organum auditus, et, sic a sensu perceived by the sense power, it
percepta, pervenit eius significatum extends its message to the
usque ad intellectum. Si igitur understanding. So, if the celestial soul
anima caelestis aliquid imprimat in makes an impression on our souls
animas nostras per motum through bodily movement, that action
corporeum, actio illa non perveniet will not reach our soul without making a
ad animam nostram nisi per change in our body. Now, this is not a
immutationem corporis nostri. Quae cause of our acts of choice, but simply
quidem non est causa electionum an occasion, as is clear from the
nostrarum, sed occasio tantum, foregoing. Therefore, celestial motion
sicut ex praemissis patet. Non igitur will not be a cause of our act of choice,
erit motus caelestis causa nostrae except as a mere occasion.
electionis nisi per occasionem
tantum.
Item. Cum movens et motum [4] Besides, since the mover and the
oporteat esse simul, ut probatur in thing moved must be simultaneous, as
VII Phys., oportet quod a primo is proved in Physics VII the motion must
movente perveniat motus usque ad extend in a definite order, from the first
ultimum quod movetur, quodam mover to the last thing that is moved;
ordine: ut scilicet movens per id that is, such that the mover moves what
quod est sibi proximum, moveat is far away from it by means of what is
illud quod est ab eo distans. Corpori near to it. Now, our body is nearer than
autem caelesti, quod moveri ponitur our soul is to the celestial body which is
ab anima sibi coniuncta, asserted to be moved by a soul joined
propinquius est corpus nostrum to it, for our soul has no relation to a
quam anima, quae non habet celestial body except through our body.
ordinem ad corpus caeleste nisi This is evident from the fact that
mediante corpore: quod ex hoc separate intelligences have no relation
patet, quia intellectus separati to a celestial body, unless, perhaps, that
nullum ordinem habent ad corpus of a mover to a thing moved. So, a
caeleste, nisi forte moventis ad change in a celestial body, initiated by
motum. Immutatio igitur corporis its soul, does not reach our soul except
caelestis ab anima eius procedens through the mediation of our body. But
non pertingit ad animam nostram our soul is not moved when our body is
nisi mediante corpore. Ad motum moved, except accidentally; nor does
autem corporis non movetur anima choice result from a change in our body,
nisi per accidens, nec except by way of occasion, as we said.
immutationem corporis sequitur Therefore, celestial motion, by virtue of

electio nisi per occasionem, ut the fact that it is from a soul, cannot be
dictum est. Motus igitur caelestis the cause of our act of choice.
non potest esse causa electionis
nostrae per hoc quod est ab anima.
Praeterea. Secundum positionem [5] Moreover, according to the theory of

Avicennae, et quorundam aliorum Avicenna and some other philosophers,
philosophorum, intellectus agens the agent intellect is a separate
est quaedam substantia separata, substance that acts on our souls by
quae quidem agit in animas nostras making potentially understood things to
inquantum facit intellecta in potentia be actually understood. Now, this is
esse intellecta in actu. Hoc autem fit done by abstraction from all material
per abstractionem ab omnibus conditions, as is evident from our
materialibus dispositionibus: ut explanations in Book Two. So, that
patet ex his quae dicta sunt in which acts directly on the soul does not
secundo. Quod igitur agit directe in act on it through corporeal motion, but,
animam, non agit in eam per motum rather, through abstraction from
corporeum, sed magis per everything corporeal. Therefore, the
abstractionem ab omni corporeo. soul of the heavens, if it be animated,
Anima igitur caeli, si sit animatum, cannot be the cause of our acts of
non potest esse causa electionum choice or understanding through the
vel intelligentiarum nostrarum per motion of the heavens.
motum caeli.
Per easdem etiam rationes potest [6] It is also possible to prove by the
probari quod motus caeli non sit same arguments that the motion of the
causa electionum nostrarum per heavens is not the cause of our acts of
virtutem substantiae separatae, si choice by means of separate
quis ponat caelum non esse substances, if someone claims that the
animatum, sed a substantia heavens are not animated, but moved
separata moveri. by a separate substance.
Chapter 88
Caput 88
THAT SEPARATE CREATED
Quod substantiae separatae
SUBSTANCES CANNOT BE
creatae non possunt esse causa
DIRECTLY THE CAUSE OF OUR
directe electionum et voluntatum
ACTS OF CHOICE AND WILL, BUT
nostrarum, sed solus Deus
ONLY GOD
Non est autem aestimandum quod [1] Now, we must not think that the souls

animae caelorum, si quae sint, vel of the heavens, if there be such, or any
quaecumque aliae intellectuales other created, separate, intellectual
substantiae separatae creatae, substances can directly insert a willact
possint directe voluntatem nobis into us or cause our act of choice to
immittere, aut electionis nostrae occur.
causa esse.
Omnium enim creatorum actiones [2] For the actions of all creatures are
sub ordine divinae providentiae embraced under the order of divine
continentur: unde praeter leges providence, so they cannot operate
ipsius agere non possunt. Est outside its laws. But it is the law of
autem providentiae lex ut providence that everything be moved
unumquodque immediate a immediately by its proximate cause. So,
proxima sibi causa moveatur. unless such an order were obeyed, a
Causa igitur superior creata, tali superior created cause could neither
ordine praetermisso, nec movere move nor do anything. Now, the
nec aliquid agere potest. Proximum proximate mover of the will is the good
autem motivum voluntatis est as apprehended, which is its object, and
bonum intellectum, quod est suum it is moved by it, just as sight is by color.
obiectum, et movetur ab ipso sicut So, no created substance can move the
visus a colore. Nulla igitur will except by means of a good which is
substantia creata potest movere understood. Now, this is done by
voluntatem nisi mediante bono showing it that something is a good thing
intellecto. Hoc autem est to do: this is the act of persuading.
inquantum manifestat ei aliquid Therefore, no created substance can act
esse bonum ad agendum: quod est on the will, or be the cause of our act of
persuadere. Nulla igitur substantia choice, except in the way of a
creata potest agere in voluntatem, persuading agent.
vel esse causa electionis nostrae,
nisi per modum persuadentis.
Item. Ab illo agente aliquid natum [3] Again, a thing is by nature capable of

est moveri et pati per cuius formam being moved by, and of undergoing a
reduci potest in actum: nam omne passion from, an agent with a form by
agens agit per formam suam. which the thing can be reduced to act,
Voluntas autem reducitur in actum for every agent acts through its form. But
per appetibile, quod motum the will is reduced to act by the desirable
desiderii eius quietat. In solo autem object which gives rest to its desire.
bono divino quietatur desiderium Now, the will’s desire finds rest in the
voluntatis sicut in ultimo fine, ut ex divine good only, as in its ultimate end,
supra dictis patet. Solus igitur Deus as is evident from what we said above.
potest movere voluntatem per Therefore, God alone can move the will
modum agentis. in the fashion of an agent.
Adhuc. Sicut in re inanimata se [4] Besides, as natural inclination in an
habet inclinatio naturalis ad inanimate thing, which is also called
proprium finem, quae et appetitus natural appetite, is related to its proper
naturalis dicitur; ita se habet in end, so also is the will, which is also
substantia intellectuali voluntas, called intellectual appetite, in an
quae dicitur appetitus intellectualis. intellectual substance. Now, to give
Inclinationes autem naturales dare natural inclinations is the sole
non est nisi illius qui naturam prerogative of Him Who has established
instituit. Ergo et voluntatem the nature. So also, to incline the will to
inclinare in aliquid non est nisi eius anything, is the sole prerogative of Him
qui est naturae intellectualis causa. Who is the cause of the intellectual
Hoc autem solius Dei est, sicut ex nature. Now, this is proper to God alone,

superioribus patet. Ipse igitur solus as is evident from our earlier
voluntatem nostram ad aliquid explanations. Therefore, He alone can
inclinare potest. incline our will to something.
Amplius. Violentum, ut dicitur in III [5] Moreover, the violent, as is said in
Ethic., est cuius principium est Ethics III [1], is “that whose principle is
extra, nil conferente vim passo. Si outside; the patient making no
igitur voluntas moveatur ab aliquo contribution of force.” So, if the will is
exteriori principio, erit violentus moved by some external principle, the
motus: dico autem moveri a motion will be violent. Now, I am talking
principio extrinseco quod moveat about being moved by some external
per modum agentis, et non per principle which moves in the way of an
modum finis. Violentum autem agent, and not in the way of an end. But
voluntario repugnat. Impossibile est the violent is incompatible with the
ergo quod voluntas moveatur a voluntary. So, it is impossible for the will
principio extrinseco quasi ab to be moved by an extrinsic principle as
agente, sed oportet quod omnis by an agent; rather, every movement of
motus voluntatis ab interiori the will must proceed from within. Now,
procedat. Nulla autem substantia no created substance is joined to the
creata coniungitur animae intellectual soul in regard to its inner
intellectuali quantum ad sua parts, but only God, Who is alone the
interiora nisi solus Deus, qui solus cause of its being and Who sustains it in
est causa esse ipsius, et sustinens being. Therefore, by God alone can
eam in esse. A solo igitur Deo voluntary movement be caused.
potest motus voluntarius causari.
Adhuc. Violentum opponitur [6] Furthermore, violent movement is

naturali et voluntario motui: quia opposed to natural and voluntary
utrumque oportet quod sit a movement, because both of the latter
principio intrinseco. Agens autem must arise from an intrinsic source. The
exterius sic solum naturaliter only way in which an external agent
movet, inquantum causat in mobili moves a thing naturally is by causing an
intrinsecum principium motus: sicut intrinsic principle of motion within the
generans, quod dat formam movable thing. Thus, a generating
gravitatis corpori gravi generato, agent, which gives the form of weight to
movet ipsum naturaliter deorsum. a heavy generated body, moves it
Nihil autem aliud extrinsecum downward in a natural way. No other
movere potest absque violentia extrinsic being can move a natural body
corpus naturale: nisi forte per without violence, except perhaps
accidens, sicut removens accidentally, by removing an
prohibens; quod magis utitur motu impediment, and this uses a natural
naturali vel actione quam causaret motion, or action, rather than causes it.
ipsum. Illud igitur solum agens So, the only agent that can cause a
potest causare motum voluntatis movement of the will, without violence, is
absque violentia, quod causat that which causes an intrinsic principle of
principium intrinsecum huius this movement, and such a principle is
motus, quod est potentia ipsa the very power of the will. Now, this
voluntatis. Hoc autem est Deus, qui agent is God, Who alone creates a soul,
animam solus creat, ut in secundo as we showed in Book Two. Therefore,
ostensum est. Solus igitur Deus God alone can move the will in the
potest movere voluntatem, per fashion of an agent, without violence.
modum agentis, absque violentia.
Hinc est quod dicitur Prov. 211: [7] Hence it is said in Proverbs (21:1):
cor regis in manu domini, et “The heart of the king is in the hand of
quocumque voluerit inclinabit illud. the Lord; wherever He wishes, He turns
Et Philip. 213: Deus est qui it.” And again in Philippians (2:13): “It is
operatur in nobis velle et perficere, God Who works in us, both to will and to
pro bona voluntate. accomplish, according to His good will.”
Caput 89 Chapter 89
Quod motus voluntatis causatur THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL
a Deo, et non solum potentia IS CAUSED BY GOD AND NOT ONLY
voluntatis THE POWER OF THE WILL
Quidam vero, non intelligentes [1] Some people, as a matter of fact, not

qualiter motum voluntatis Deus in understanding how God could cause a
nobis causare possit absque movement of the will in us without
praeiudicio libertatis voluntatis, prejudice to freedom of will, have tried to
coacti sunt has auctoritates male explain these texts in a wrong way. That
exponere: ut scilicet dicerent quod is, they would say that God causes
Deus causat in nobis velle et willing and accomplishing within us in
perficere, inquantum causat nobis the sense that He causes in us the
virtutem volendi, non autem sic power of willing, but not in such a way
quod faciat nos velle hoc vel illud; that He makes us will this or that. Thus
sicut Origenes exponit in III does Origen, in his Principles, explain
periarchon, liberum arbitrium free choice, defending it against the
defendens contra auctoritates texts above.
praedictas.
Et ex hoc processisse videtur [2] So, it seems that there developed
opinio quorundam qui dicebant from this view the opinion of certain
quod providentia non est de his people who said that providence does
quae subsunt libero arbitrio, scilicet not apply to things subject to free choice,
de electionibus, sed providentia that is, to acts of choice, but, instead,
refertur ad exteriores eventus. Non that providence is applied to external
enim qui eligit aliquid consequi vel events. For he who chooses to attain or
perficere, puta aedificare vel ditari, accomplish something, such as to make
semper poterit ad hoc pervenire: et a building or to become rich, is not
sic eventus actionum nostrarum always able to reach this end; thus, the
non subiacent libero arbitrio, sed results of our actions are not subject to
providentia disponuntur. free choice, but are controlled by
providence.
Quibus quidem auctoritatibus [3] To these people, of course,

sacrae Scripturae resistitur opposition is offered quite plainly by the
evidenter. Dicitur enim Isaiae 26 texts from Sacred Scripture. For it is
12: omnia opera nostra operatus es stated in Isaiah (26:2): “O Lord, you
in nobis, domine. Unde non solum have wrought all our works in us.” So,
virtutem volendi a Deo habemus, we receive not only the power of willing
sed etiam operationem. from God, but also the operation.
Praeterea. Hoc ipsum quod [4] Again, this statement of Solomon,
Salomon dicit, quocumque voluerit, “wherever He wishes, He turns it” shows
vertet illud ostendit non solum that divine causality is not only extended
divinam causalitatem ad potentiam to the power of the will but also to its act.
voluntatis extendi, sed etiam ad
actum ipsius.
Item. Deus non solum dat rebus [5] Besides, God not only gives powers
virtutes, sed etiam nulla res potest to things but, beyond that, no thing can
propria virtute agere nisi agat in act by its own power unless it acts
virtute ipsius, ut supra ostensum through His power, as we showed
est. Ergo homo non potest virtute above. So, man cannot use the power of
voluntatis sibi data uti nisi will that has been given him except in so
inquantum agit in virtute Dei. Illud far as he acts through the power of God.
autem in cuius virtute agens agit, Now, the being through whose power the
est causa non solum virtutis, sed agent acts is the cause not only of the
etiam actus. Quod in artifice power, but also of the act. This is
apparet, in cuius virtute agit apparent in the case of an artist through
instrumentum, etiam quod ab hoc whose power an instrument works, even
artifice propriam formam non though it does not get its own form from
accepit, sed solum ab ipso this artist, but is merely applied to action
applicatur ad actum. Deus igitur est by this man. Therefore, God is for us the
causa nobis non solum voluntatis, cause not only of our will, but also of our
sed etiam volendi. act of willing.
Amplius. Perfectius invenitur ordo [6] Moreover, a more perfect order is

in spiritualibus quam in found in spiritual things than in corporeal
corporalibus. In corporalibus autem ones. Among bodies, however, every
omnis motus causatur a primo motion is caused by the first motion.
motu. Oportet igitur quod et in Therefore, among spiritual things, also,
spiritualibus omnis motus voluntatis every movement of the will must be
a prima voluntate causetur, quae caused by the first will, which is the will
est voluntas Dei. of God.
Adhuc. Superius est ostensum [7] Furthermore, we showed somewhat

quod Deus est causa omnis earlier that God is the cause of every
actionis, et operatur in omni action and that He operates in every
agente. Est igitur causa motuum agent. Therefore, He is the cause of the
voluntatis. movements of the will.
Item. Argumentatur ad hoc [8] Besides, an argument that is
Aristoteles, in VIII Eudemicae pertinent is offered by Aristotle, in Book
Ethicae, per hunc modum. Huius VIII of the Eudemian Ethics, as follows.
quod aliquis intelligat et consilietur There must be a cause for the fact that a
et eligat et velit, oportet aliquid person understands, deliberates,
esse causam: quia omne novum chooses, and wills, for every new event
oportet quod habeat aliquam must have some cause. But, if its cause
causam. Si autem est causa eius is another act of deliberation, and
aliud consilium et alia voluntas another act of will preceding it, then,
praecedens, cum non sit procedere since one cannot go on to infinity in
in his in infinitum, oportet devenire these acts, one must reach something
ad aliquid primum. Huiusmodi that is first. Now, a first of this type must
autem primum oportet esse aliquid be something that is better than reason.
quod est melius ratione. Nihil But nothing is better than intellect and
autem est melius intellectu et reason except God. Therefore, God is
ratione nisi Deus. Est igitur Deus the first principle of our acts of counsel
primum principium nostrorum and of will.
consiliorum et voluntatum.
Caput 90 Chapter 90
Quod electiones et voluntates THAT HUMAN ACTS OF CHOICE AND
humanae subduntur divinae OF WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE
providentiae PROVIDENCE
Ex quo patet quod oportet etiam [1] It is clear, next, that even acts of
voluntates humanas et electiones human willing and choosing must be
divinae providentiae subditas subject to divine providence.
esse.
Omnia enim quae Deus agit, ex [2] For, everything that God does He
ordine providentiae suae agit. does as a result of the order of His
Cum igitur ipse sit causa electionis providence. So, since He is the cause of
et voluntatis nostrae, electiones et our act of choice and volition, our choices
voluntates nostrae divinae and willacts are subject to divine
providentiae subduntur. providence.
Amplius. Omnia corporalia per [3] Again, all corporeal things are
spiritualia administrantur, sicut governed through spiritual beings, as we
superius est ostensum. Spiritualia showed above. But spiritual beings act
autem agunt in corporalia per on corporeal things through the will.
voluntatem. Si igitur electiones et Therefore, if choices and movements of
motus voluntatum intellectualium the wills of intellectual substances do not
substantiarum ad Dei providentiam belong to God’s providence, it follows
non pertinent, sequitur quod etiam that even corporeal things are withdrawn
corporalia ipsius providentiae from His providence. And thus, there will
subtrahantur. Et sic totaliter nulla be no providence at all.
erit providentia.
Item. Quanto aliqua sunt nobiliora [4] Besides, the more noble things are in

in universo, tanto oportet quod the universe, the more must they
magis participent ordine, in quo participate in the order in which the good
bonum universi consistit. Unde of the universe consists. So, in Physics II
Aristoteles, in II Phys., arguit [4], Aristotle accuses the ancient
antiquos philosophos, qui philosophers of putting chance and
ponebant casum et fortunam in fortune in the makeup of the celestial
constitutione caelestium corporum, bodies, but not in things below. Now, the
non autem in inferioribus rebus. intellectual substances are more noble
Substantiae autem intellectuales than bodily substances. Therefore, if
sunt nobiliores substantiis bodily substances, in their substances
corporalibus. Si ergo substantiae and actions, fall under the order of
corporales, quantum ad suas providence, so do intellectual
substantias et actiones, cadunt substances, for a greater reason.
sub ordine providentiae, multo
magis substantiae intellectuales.
Praeterea. Ea quae sunt [5] Moreover, things that are nearer the
propinquiora fini, magis cadunt end fall more definitely under the order
sub ordine qui est ad finem: nam which is for the end, for by their
eis mediantibus etiam alia mediation other things also are ordered
ordinantur in finem. Actiones to the end. But the actions of intellectual
autem substantiarum substances are more closely ordered to
intellectualium propinquius God as end than are the actions of other
ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, things, as we showed above. So, the
quam actiones aliarum rerum, actions of intellectual substances, by
sicut supra ostensum est. Magis which God orders all things to Himself,
igitur cadunt actiones more definitely fall under the order of
intellectualium substantiarum sub providence than the actions of other
ordine providentiae, qua Deus things.
omnia in seipsum ordinat, quam
actiones aliarum rerum.
Adhuc. Gubernatio providentiae ex [6] Furthermore, the governance of

amore divino procedit, quo Deus providence stems from the divine love
res a se creatas amat: in hoc enim whereby God loves the things created by
praecipue consistit amor, quod Him; in fact, love consists especially in
amans amato bonum velit. Quanto this, “that the lover wills the good for his
ergo Deus aliqua magis amat, loved one.” So, the more that God loves
magis sub eius providentia cadunt. things, the more do they fall under His
Hoc autem et sacra Scriptura providence. Moreover, Sacred Scripture
docet in Psalmo, dicens, custodit also teaches this in the Psalm (144:20)
dominus omnes diligentes se; et when it states: “The Lord keeps all those
etiam philosophus tradit, in X who love Him.” And the Philosopher,
Ethicorum, dicens quod Deus also, supports this view, in Ethics X [8],
maxime curat de his qui diligunt when he says that God takes greatest
intellectum, tanquam de suis care of those who love understanding, as
amicis. Ex quo etiam habetur quod He does of His friends. It may, then, be
maxime substantias intellectuales gathered from this, that He loves
amet. Sub eius igitur providentia intellectual substances best. Therefore,
cadunt earum voluntates et their acts of will and choice fall under His

electiones. providence.
Amplius. Bona interiora hominis, [7] Again, man’s internal goods, which
quae ex voluntate et actione are dependent on will and action, are
dependent, sunt magis propria more proper to man than things that are
homini quam illa quae extra ipsum outside him, like the acquisition of wealth
sunt, ut adeptio divitiarum, vel si or anything else of that kind. Hence, man
quid aliud est huiusmodi: unde per is deemed good by virtue of the former
haec homo dicitur esse bonus, and not of the latter. So, if acts of human
non autem per illa. Si igitur choice and movements of will do not fall
electiones humanae et voluntatis under divine providence, but only their
motus non cadunt sub divina external results, it will be truer that
providentia, sed solum exteriores human affairs are outside providence
proventus, verius erit quod res than that they come under providence.
humanae sint extra providentiam, But this view is suggested by the words
quam quod providentiae subsint. of blasphemers: “He walks about the
Quod quidem ex persona poles of heaven, and He does not
blasphemantium inducitur, Iob 22 consider our things” (Job 22:14); and
14, circa cardines caeli considerat, again: “The Lord has forsaken the earth,
nec nostra considerat; et Ezech. 9 and the Lord does not see” (Ez. 9:9); and
9, dereliquit dominus terram, also: “Who is he who will command a
dominus non videt; et Thren. 337, thing to be done, when the Lord does not
quis est iste qui dixit ut fieret, command it?” (Lam. 3:37).
domino non iubente?
Videntur autem quaedam in sacra [8] However, certain passages in Sacred

doctrina secundum praedictam Scripture appear to be consonant with
sententiam sonare. Dicitur enim the aforementioned view. It is said in fact
Eccli. 1514: Deus ab initio (Sirach 15:14): “God made man from the
constituit hominem, et reliquit illum beginning, and left him in the hand of his
in manu consilii sui. Et infra: 17 own counsel”; and later: “He has set
proposuit tibi aquam et ignem: ad water and fire before you; stretch forth
quod volueris, porrige manum your hand to whichever you wish. Before
tuam. Ante hominem vita et mors, man is life and death, good and evil; that
bonum et malum: quod placuerit which he chooses shall be given him”
ei, dabitur illi. Et Deut. 3015: (Sirach 15:14, 1718). And also:
considera quod hodie proposuerit “Consider that I have set before thee this
in conspectu tuo vitam et bonum, day life and good, and on the other hand
et e contrario mortem et malum. death and evil” (Deut. 30:15). But these
Haec autem verba ad hoc words are brought forward to show that
inducuntur ut hominem esse liberi man is possessed of free choice, not that
arbitrii ostendatur: non ut eius his choices are placed outside divine
electiones a divina providentia providence.
subtrahantur.
Et similiter quod Gregorius [9] Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa states in
Nyssenus dicit, in libro quem de his book On Man: “Providence is
homine fecit, providentia est concerned with the things that are not in
eorum quae non sunt in nobis, non our power, but not with those that are in

autem eorum quae sunt in nobis; our power”; and, following him,
et Damascenus eum sequens, Damascene states in Book II, that “God
dicit in secundo libro, quod ea foreknows the things that are within our
quae sunt in nobis Deus power, but He does not predetermine
praenoscit, sed non them.” These texts should be explained
praedeterminat, exponenda sunt as meaning that things in our power are
ut intelligantur ea quae sunt in not subject to determination by divine
nobis divinae providentiae providence in the sense that they receive
determinationi non esse subiecta necessity from it.
quasi ab ea necessitatem
accipientia.
Caput 91 Chapter 91
Quomodo res humanae ad HOW HUMAN EVENTS MAY BE
superiores causas reducantur TRACED BACK TO HIGHER CAUSES
Ex his ergo quae supra ostensa [1] From the things shown above we can

sunt, colligere possumus gather how human actions may be traced
quomodo humana ad superiores back to higher causes and are not
causas reducuntur, et non aguntur performed fortuitously.
fortuito.
Nam electiones et voluntatum [2] Of course, acts of choice and
motus immediate a Deo movements of the will are controlled
disponuntur. Cognitio vero immediately by God. And human
humana ad intellectum pertinens intellectual knowledge is ordered by God
a Deo mediantibus Angelis through the mediation of the angels.
ordinatur. Ea vero quae ad Whereas matters pertinent to bodily
corporalia pertinent, sive sint things, whether they are internal or
interiora sive exteriora, in usum external, when they come within the use
hominis venientia, a Deo of man, are governed by God by means
mediantibus Angelis et of the angels and the celestial bodies.
caelestibus corporibus
dispensantur.
Huius autem ratio generaliter una [3] Now, in general, there is one reason
est. Nam oportet omne for this. Everything that is multiform,
multiforme, et mutabile, et mutable, and capable of defect must be
deficere potens, reduci sicut in reducible to a source in something that is
principium in aliquod uniforme, et uniform, immutable, and capable of no
immobile, et deficere non valens. defect. But all things that are within our
Omnia autem quae in nobis sunt, power are found to be multiple, variable,
inveniuntur esse multiplicia, and defectible.
variabilia, et defectibilia.
Patet enim quod electiones [4] It is clear that our acts of choice have

nostrae multiplicitatem habent: the character of multiplicity, since choices

cum in diversis et a diversis are made of different things, by different
diversa eligantur. Mutabiles etiam people, in different ways. They are also
sunt: tum propter animi levitatem, mutable, both because of the instability of
qui non est firmatus in ultimo fine; the mind, which is not firmly fixed on the
tum etiam propter mutationem ultimate end, and also because of the
rerum quae nos extra circumstant. fluctuating character of the things which
Quod autem defectibiles sint, provide our circumstantial environment.
hominum peccata testantur. That they are defectible, of course the
Divina autem voluntas uniformis sins of men testify. But the divine will is
est, quia unum volendo, omnia uniform, because by willing one object it
alia vult; et immutabilis et wills all else, and it is immutable and
indeficiens; ut in primo ostensum without defect, as we showed in Book
est. Oportet ergo omnium One. So, the movement of all wills and
voluntatum et electionum motus in choices must be traced back to the divine
divinam voluntatem reduci. Non will, and not to any other cause, for God
autem in aliquam aliam causam: alone is the cause of our acts of will and
quia solus Deus nostrarum choice.
voluntatum et electionum causa
est.
Similiter autem intelligentia nostra [5] Likewise, our understanding has the

multiplicationem habet: quia ex quality of multiplicity, since we gather, as
multis sensibilibus veritatem it were, intelligible truth from many sense
intelligibilem quasi congregamus. objects. It is also mutable, for it advances
Est etiam mutabilis: quia ex uno in by discursive movement from one thing to
aliud discurrendo procedit, ex another, proceeding from known things to
notis ad ignota proveniens. Est unknown ones. It is, moreover, defectible,
etiam defectibilis, propter because of the admixture of imagination
permixtionem phantasiae et with sensation, as the errors of mankind
sensus: ut errores hominum show. On the other hand, the cognitive
ostendunt. Angelorum autem acts of the angels are uniform: for they
cognitiones sunt uniformes: quia receive the knowledge of truth from one
ab ipso uno veritatis fonte, scilicet fount of truth; namely, God. Their
Deo, accipiunt veritatis cognition is also immutable, because they
cognitionem. Est etiam immobilis: see directly the pure truth about things by
quia non discurrendo ab a simple intuition, not by a discursive
effectibus in causas, aut e movement from effects to their causes or
converso, sed simplici intuitu the reverse. It is even incapable of defect,
puram veritatem de rebus since they directly intuit the very natures,
intuentur. Est etiam indefectibilis: or quiddities, of things, and understanding
cum ipsas rerum naturas seu cannot err in regard to such objects, just
quidditates intueantur per seipsas, as sense cannot err in regard to proper
circa quas non potest intellectus sensibles. We, however, make guesses
errare, sicut nec sensus circa as to the quiddities of things from their
propria sensibilia. Nos autem accidents and effects. Therefore, our
quidditates rerum ex accidentibus intellectual knowledge must be regulated
et effectibus coniectamus. Oportet by means of the angels' knowledge.
ergo quod nostra intellectualis
cognitio reguletur per Angelorum
cognitionem.
Rursus, de corporibus humanis, et [6] Again, in regard to human bodies and
exterioribus quibus homines the external things that men use, it is
utuntur, manifestum est quod est obvious that there is in them a multiplicity
in eis multiplicitas commixtionis et of admixture and contrariety; and that
contrarietatis; et non semper they are not moved uniformly, since their
eodem modo moventur, quia motions cannot be continuous; and that
motus eorum non possunt esse they are defectible through alteration and
continui; et quod defectibilia sunt corruption. In contrast, the celestial
per alterationem et corruptionem. bodies are uniform in the way of simple
Corpora autem caelestia sunt beings with no contrariety in their
uniformia, utpote simplicia et constitution. Their motions are also
absque omni contrarietate uniform, continuous, and always in the
existentia. Motus etiam eorum same condition. Nor can there be
sunt uniformes, continui, et corruption or alteration in them. Hence, it
semper eodem modo se is necessary for our bodies, and the
habentes. Nec in eis potest esse others which come under our use, to be
corruptio aut alteratio. Unde regulated by means of the motions of the
necessarium est quod corpora celestial bodies.
nostra, et alia quae in usum
nostrum veniunt, per motus
caelestium corporum regulentur.
Caput 92
Chapter 92
Quomodo dicitur aliquis bene
HOW A PERSON IS FAVORED BY
fortunatus, et quomodo
FORTUNE AND HOW MAN IS
adiuvetur homo ex superioribus
ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES
causis
Ex his autem apparere potest [1] Next, we can show how a person
quomodo aliquis possit dici bene might be said to be favored by fortune.
fortunatus.
Dicitur enim alicui homini bene [2] In fact, we say that some good
secundum fortunam contingere, fortune has befallen a man “when
quando aliquod bonum accidit sibi something good happens to him, without
praeter intentionem: sicut cum his having intended it.” For example, a
aliquis, fodiens in agro, invenit man digging in a field may find a
thesaurum, quem non quaerebat. treasure for which he was not looking.
Contingit autem aliquem operantem Now, something may happen to a
praeter intentionem operari certain agent which is not intended by
propriam, non tamen praeter him as he is doing his job, but which is
intentionem alicuius superioris, cui not unintended by the superior under
ipse subest: sicut, si dominus whom he is working. Suppose, for
aliquis praecipiat alicui servo quod instance, a master orders a servant to
vadat ad aliquem locum quo ipse go to a certain place to which the master
alium servum iam miserat, illo has already sent another servant ,
ignorante, inventio conservi est unknown to the first one; the encounter
praeter intentionem servi missi, non with his fellow servant is not intended by
autem praeter intentionem domini the servant who has been sent, but it is
mittentis; et ideo, licet per not unintended by the master who sent
comparationem ad hunc servum sit him. And so, though the meeting is
fortuitum et casuale, non autem per fortuitous and a matter of chance to this
comparationem ad dominum, sed servant, it is not so to the master, but
est aliquid ordinatum. Cum igitur has been a planned event. So, since
homo sit ordinatus secundum man is ordered in regard to his body
corpus sub corporibus caelestibus; under the celestial bodies, in regard to
secundum intellectum vero sub his intellect under the angels, and in
Angelis; secundum voluntatem regard to his will under God—it is quite
autem sub Deo: potest contingere possible for something apart from man’s
aliquid praeter intentionem hominis intention to happen, which is, however,
quod tamen est secundum ordinem in accord with the ordering of the
caelestium corporum, vel celestial bodies, or with the control of
dispositionem Angelorum, vel etiam the angels, or even of God. For, though
Dei. Quamvis autem Deus solus God alone directly works on the choice
directe ad electionem hominis made by man, the action of an angel
operetur, tamen actio Angeli does have some effect on man’s choice
operatur aliquid ad electionem by way of persuasion, and the action of
hominis per modum persuasionis: a celestial body by way of disposition, in
actio vero corporis caelestis per the sense that the corporeal
modum disponentis, inquantum impressions of celestial bodies on our
corporales impressiones caelestium bodies give a disposition to certain
corporum in corpora nostra choices. So, when as a result of the
disponunt ad aliquas electiones. influence of higher causes in the
Quando igitur aliquis ex foregoing way a man is inclined toward
impressione superiorum causarum, certain choices that are beneficial to
secundum praedictum modum, him, but whose benefit he does not
inclinatur ad aliquas electiones sibi know by his own reasoning, and when
utiles, quarum tamen utilitatem besides this his intellect is illuminated by
propria ratione non cognoscit; et the light of intellectual substances so
cum hoc, ex lumine intellectualium that he may do these things, and when
substantiarum, illuminatur his will is inclined by divine working to
intellectus eius ad eadem agenda; choose something beneficial to him
et ex divina operatione inclinatur while he is ignorant of its nature, he is
voluntas eius ad aliquid eligendum said to be favored by fortune. And, on
sibi utile cuius rationem ignorat: the contrary, he is said to be subject to
dicitur esse bene fortunatus; et e misfortune when his choice is inclined to
contrario male fortunatus, quando contrary results by higher causes, as is
ex superioribus causis ad contraria said of a certain man: “Write this man
eius electio inclinatur; sicut de barren, a man that shall not prosper in
quodam dicitur Ierem. 2230: scribe his days” (Jer. 22:30).
virum istum sterilem, qui in diebus
suis non prosperabitur.
Sed in hoc est attendenda [3] But, on this point, a difference is to
differentia. Nam impressiones be noted. The impressions of celestial
corporum caelestium in corpora bodies on our bodies cause natural
nostra causant in nobis naturales dispositions of our bodies within us.
corporum dispositiones. Et ideo ex Thus, as a result of a disposition left by
dispositione relicta ex corpore a celestial body in our body, a man is
caelesti in corpore nostro dicitur called not merely fortunate or
aliquis non solum bene fortunatus unfortunate, but also well or ill favored
aut male, sed etiam bene naturatus by nature, and it is in this way that the
vel male: secundum quem modum Philosopher says, in his Magna Moralia,
philosophus dicit, in magnis that a man favored by fortune is also
moralibus, quod bene fortunatum favored by nature. Indeed, this fact, that
est esse bene naturatum. Non enim one man chooses things beneficial to
potest intelligi quod hoc ex natura him, whereas another man chooses
intellectus diversa procedat, quod things harmful to him, apart from their
unus utilia sibi eligit et alius nociva proper reasoning, cannot be understood
praeter rationem propriam, cum as resulting from differences of
natura intellectus et voluntatis in intellectual nature, because the nature
omnibus hominibus sit una: of intellect and will is one in all men. In
diversitas enim formalis induceret fact, a formal diversity would lead to a
diversitatem secundum speciem; difference according to species,
diversitas autem materialis inducit whereas a material diversity leads to a
diversitatem secundum numerum. numerical difference. Hence, in so far as
Unde secundum quod intellectus man’s intellect is enlightened for the
hominis illustratur ad aliquid performance of some action, or as his
agendum, vel voluntas a Deo will is prompted by God, the man is not
instigatur, non dicitur homo bene said to be favored by birth, but, rather,
natus sed magis custoditus vel well guarded or well governed.
gubernatus.
Rursus, attendenda est circa hoc [4] Again, another difference on this
alia differentia. Nam operatio matter is to be observed. As a matter of
Angeli, et corporis caelestis, est fact, the operation of an angel and of a
solum sicut disponens ad celestial body is merely like something
electionem: operatio autem Dei est disposing toward choice; while God’s
sicut perficiens. Cum autem operation is like something perfecting.
dispositio quae est ex corporis Now, since a disposition which results
qualitate, vel intellectus from a quality of the body, or from an
persuasione, necessitatem ad intellectual persuasion, does not bring
eligendum non inducat, non semper necessity to the act of choice, a man
homo eligit illud quod Angelus does not always choose what his
custodiens intendit, neque illud ad guardian angel intends, or that toward
quod corpus caeleste inclinat. which a celestial body gives inclination.
Semper tamen hoc homo eligit But a man does choose in all cases the
secundum quod Deus operatur in object in accord with God’s operation
eius voluntate. Unde custodia within his will. Consequently, the
Angelorum interdum cassatur, guardianship of the angels is sometimes
secundum illud Ierem. 519: frustrated, according to this text: “We
curavimus Babylonem, et non est would have cured Babylon, but she is
curata; et multo magis inclinatio not healed” (Jer. 51:9); and still more is
caelestium corporum; divina vero this true of the inclination of the celestial
providentia semper est firma. bodies, but divine providence is always
steadfast.
Est etiam et alia differentia [5] Moreover, there is still another
consideranda. Nam cum corpus difference to be considered. Since a
caeleste non disponat ad celestial body does not dispose to a
electionem nisi inquantum imprimit choice, unless it makes an impression
in corpora nostra, ex quibus homo on our body by which man is stimulated
incitatur ad eligendum per modum to choose in the way that passions
quo passiones inducunt ad induce one to choose, every disposition
electionem; omnis dispositio ad to choice which results from the celestial
electionem quae est ex corporibus bodies works by means of some
caelestibus, est per modum alicuius passion, as when a person is led to
passionis; sicut cum quis inducitur choose something by means of hatred,
ad aliquid eligendum per odium vel or love, or anger, or some similar
amorem, vel iram, vel aliquid passion. But a person is disposed to an
huiusmodi. Ab Angelo vero act of choice by an angel, by means of
disponitur aliquis ad eligendum per an intellectual consideration, without
modum intelligibilis considerationis, passion. In fact, this happens in two
absque passione. Quod quidem ways. Sometimes, a man’s
contingit dupliciter. Quandoque understanding is enlightened by an
enim illuminatur intellectus hominis angel to know only that something is a
ab Angelo ad cognoscendum solum good thing to be done, but it is not
quod aliquid est bonum fieri, non instructed as to the reason why it is a
autem instruitur de ratione propter good, since this reason is derived from
quam est bonum, quae sumitur ex the end. Thus, at times, a man thinks
fine. Et ideo quandoque homo that something is a good thing to be
aestimat quod aliquid sit bonum done, “but, if he be asked why, he would
fieri, si tamen quaereretur quare, answer that he does not know. Hence,
responderet se nescire. Unde, when he reaches a beneficial end, to
quando perveniet in finem utilem which he has given no thought before, it
quem non praeconsideravit, erit sibi will be fortuitous for him. But sometimes
fortuitum. Quandoque vero per he is instructed by angelic illumination,
illuminationem Angeli instruitur et both that this act is good and as to the
quod hoc sit bonum, et de ratione reason why it is good, which depends
quare est bonum, quae pendet ex on the end. And if this be so, when he
fine. Et sic, quando perveniet ad reaches the end which he has thought
finem quem praeconsideravit, non about before, it will not be fortuitous. We
erit fortuitum. Sciendum est etiam should also note that, just as the active
quod vis activa spiritualis naturae, power of a spiritual nature is higher than
sicut est altior quam corporalis, ita a corporeal one, so also is it more
etiam est universalior. Unde non ad universal. Consequently, the disposition
omnia ad quae se extendit humana resulting from a celestial body does not
electio, se extendit dispositio extend to all the objects which human
caelestis corporis. choice covers.
Rursumque, virtus humanae [6] Still another point: the power of the
animae, vel etiam Angeli, est human soul, or also of an angel, is
particularis in comparatione ad particularized in comparison with divine
virtutem divinam, quae quidem est power which, in fact, is universal in
universalis respectu omnium regard to all beings. Thus, then, some
entium. Sic igitur aliquod bonum good thing may happen to a man which

accidere potest homini et praeter is apart from his own intention, and
propriam intentionem; et praeter apart from the inclination given by
inclinationem caelestium corporum; celestial bodies, and apart from the
et praeter Angelorum enlightenment coming from the angels—
illuminationem; non autem praeter but not apart from divine providence,
divinam providentiam, quae est which is regulative, just as it is
gubernativa sicut et factiva entis productive, of being as such, and,
inquantum est ens, unde oportet consequently, which must include all
quod omnia sub se contineat. Sic things under it. Thus, some good or evil
ergo aliquid fortuitum bonum vel may happen to man that is fortuitous in
malum potest contingere homini et relation to himself, and in relation to the
per comparationem ad ipsum; et celestial bodies, and in relation to the
per comparationem ad caelestia angels, but not in relation to God.
corpora; et per comparationem ad Indeed, in relation to Him, nothing can
Angelos; non autem per be a matter of chance and unforeseen,
comparationem ad Deum. Nam per either in the sphere of human affairs or
comparationem ad ipsum, non in any matter.
solum in rebus humanis, sed nec in
aliqua re potest esse aliquid
casuale et improvisum.
Quia vero fortuita sunt quae sunt [7] But, since fortuitous events are those

praeter intentionem; bona autem apart from intention, and since moral
moralia praeter intentionem esse goods cannot be apart from intention,
non possunt, cum in electione because they are based on choice, in
consistant: respectu eorum non their case no one can be called well or ill
potest dici aliquis bene vel male favored by fortune. However, in regard
fortunatus; licet respectu eorum to them, a person can be called well or
possit aliquis dici bene vel male ill favored by birth; when, as a result of
natus, quando ex naturali the natural disposition of his body, he is
dispositione corporis est aptus ad prone to virtuous, or vicious, acts of
electiones virtutum vel vitiorum. choice. But in regard to external goods,
Respectu autem exteriorum which can accrue to a man apart from
bonorum, quae praeter intentionem his intention, a man may be said to be
homini evenire possunt, potest dici both favored by birth and by fortune,
homo et bene natus, et bene and also governed by God and guarded
fortunatus, et a Deo gubernatus, et by the angels.
ab Angelis custoditus.
Consequitur autem homo ex [8] Moreover, man may obtain from

superioribus causis et aliud higher causes still another help in
auxilium, quantum ad exitus regard to the outcome of his actions.
suarum actionum. Cum enim homo For, since a man has both the ability to
et eligere habeat, et prosequi quae choose and to carry out what he
eligit, in utroque a causis chooses, he may at times be assisted
superioribus adiuvatur interdum, vel by higher causes in regard to both or he
etiam impeditur. Secundum may also be hindered. In regard to
electionem quidem, ut dictum est, choice, of course, as we said, man is
inquantum homo vel disponitur ad either disposed by the celestial bodies
aliquid eligendum per caelestia to choose something, or he is

corpora; vel quasi illustratur per enlightened by the guardianship of the
Angelorum custodiam; vel etiam angels, or even he is inclined by divine
inclinatur per operationem divinam. operation. But in regard to the carrying
Secundum executionem vero, out of the choice man may obtain from a
inquantum homo consequitur ex higher cause the strength and efficacy
aliqua superiori causa robur et needed to accomplish what he has
efficaciam ad implendum quod chosen. Now, this can come not only
elegit. Quae quidem non solum a from God and the angels, but also from
Deo et ab Angelis esse potest, sed the celestial bodies, to the extent that
etiam a corporibus caelestibus, such efficacy is located in his body. For
inquantum talis efficacia in corpore it is obvious that inanimate bodies also
sita est. Manifestum est enim quod obtain certain powers and abilities from
etiam inanimata corpora quasdam the celestial bodies, even beyond those
vires et efficacias a caelestibus which go along with the active and
corporibus consequuntur, etiam passive qualities of the elements, which,
praeter eas quae ad qualitates doubtless, are also subject to the
activas et passivas elementorum celestial bodies. Thus, the fact that a
consequuntur, quas etiam non est magnet attracts iron is due to the power
dubium caelestibus corporibus esse of a celestial body, and so have certain
subiectas: sicut quod magnes stones and herbs other hidden powers.
attrahat ferrum, habet ex virtute So, nothing prevents a man, too, from
caelestis corporis, et lapides getting, as a result of the influence of a
quidam et herbae alias occultas celestial body, a certain special
virtutes. Unde nihil prohibet quod efficiency in doing some bodily actions,
etiam aliquis homo habeat ex which another man does not possess:
impressione caelestis corporis for instance, a physician in regard to
aliquam efficaciam in aliquibus healing, a farmer in regard to planting,
corporalibus faciendis, quas alius and a soldier in regard to fighting.
non habet: puta medicus in
sanando, et agricola in plantando,
et miles in pugnando.
Hanc autem efficaciam multo [9] Now, in a much more perfect way,
perfectius Deus hominibus largitur God lavishes on man this special
ad sua opera efficaciter exequenda. efficiency in the carrying out of His
Quantum ergo ad primum auxilium, works efficaciously. So, in regard to the
quod est in eligendo, dicitur Deus first kind of help, which applies to the act
hominem dirigere. Quantum vero of choosing, God is said to direct man,
ad secundum auxilium, dicitur whereas in regard to the second kind of
hominem confortare. Et haec duo help He is said to strengthen man. And
auxilia tanguntur simul in Psalmo, these two forms of help are touched on
ubi dicitur, dominus illuminatio mea, together in the Psalms (26:1), where it is
et salus mea, quem timebo? said in regard to the first: “The Lord is
Quantum ad primum; dominus my light and my salvation, whom shall I
protector vitae meae, a quo fear?” and in regard to the second: “The
trepidabo? Quantum ad secundum. Lord is the protector of my life, of whom
shall I be afraid?”
Sed inter haec duo auxilia est [10] But there are two differences
differentia duplex. Prima quidem, between these two helps. First, man is
quia ex auxilio primo adiuvatur assisted by the first kind of help, both in
homo tam in his quae virtuti regard to things subject to the power of
hominis subduntur, quam etiam in man, and also in regard to other things.
aliis. Sed secundum auxilium ad illa But the second sort of help extends only
tantum se extendit ad quae virtus to things of which man’s power is
hominis valet. Quod enim homo capable. Indeed, the fact that a man
fodiens sepulcrum inveniat digging a grave discovers a treasure
thesaurum, ex nulla hominis virtute results from no power of man; so, in
procedit: unde respectu talis regard to such an outcome, man may be
proventus, adiuvari potest homo in helped by the fact that be is prompted to
hoc quod instigetur ad quaerendum look in the place where the treasure is,
ubi est thesaurus; non autem in hoc not, however, in the sense that he is
quod ei aliqua virtus detur ad given any power to find treasure. But, in
thesaurum inveniendum. In hoc the case of the physician healing, or the
autem quod medicus sanet, vel soldier winning a fight, he may be
miles in pugna vincat, potest helped in regard to the end, and also in
adiuvari et in hoc quod eligat the sense that he may carry out the
convenientia ad finem, et in hoc choice efficaciously, by means of a
quod efficaciter exequatur per power acquired from a higher cause.
virtutem a superiori causa adeptam. Hence, the first kind of help is more
Unde primum auxilium est universal. The second difference is that
universalius. Secunda differentia the second help is given to carry out
est, quia secundum auxilium datur efficaciously what he intends.
ad prosequendum efficaciter ea Consequently, since fortuitous events
quae intendit. Unde, cum fortuita are apart from one’s intention, man
sint praeter intentionem, ex tali cannot, properly speaking, be called
auxilio non potest dici homo, fortunate as a result of such help, as he
proprie loquendo, bene fortunatus, can be from the first, as we showed
sicut potest dici ex primo, ut supra above.
ostensum est.
Contingit autem homini bene vel [11] Now, it is possible for a man to be
male secundum fortunam, well or ill favored by fortune, in some
quandoque quidem ipso solo cases, when he is the sole agent, as for
agente, sicut cum fodiens in terram instance, when he is digging in the
invenit thesaurum quiescentem: earth, he finds a treasure lying there. In
quandoque autem actione alterius other cases, it may result from the
causae concurrente, sicut cum action of another concurrent cause, as
aliquis vadens ad forum causa when the man going to market to buy
emendi, invenit debitorem, quem something encounters a debtor whom
non credebat invenire. In primo he did not think he would find. Now, in
autem eventu, homo adiuvatur ad the first case, the man is helped so that
hoc quod aliquid sibi bene something good happens to him, only in
contingat, secundum hoc solum the fact that he is directed to the
quod dirigitur in eligendo illud cui choosing of an object to which
coniunctum est per accidens something advantageous is attached,
aliquod commodum quod provenit and this comes about apart from his
praeter intentionem. In secundo intention. But in the second case, both
autem eventu, oportet quod uterque agents must be directed to choose the

agens dirigatur ad eligendum action, or movement, which is the
actionem vel motum unde sibi occasion for their meeting.
occurrant.
Oportet autem et aliud considerare [12] We must consider another thing in
circa ea quae praedicta sunt. regard to what was said above. For we
Dictum est enim quod ad hoc quod said that, in order for something
homini aliquid bene contingat vel favorable or unfavorable to happen to a
male secundum fortunam, et ex man on the basis of fortune, the help
Deo est, et ex corpore caelesti esse can come from God, and it can also
potest: inquantum homo a Deo come from a celestial body: in so far as
inclinatur ad eligendum aliquid cui a man is inclined by God to choose
coniunctum est aliquod commodum something with which there is combined
vel incommodum quod eligens non an advantageous, or disadvantageous,
praeconsiderat; et inquantum a result which the chooser has not thought
corpore caelesti ad tale aliquid of before, and in so far as he is
eligendum disponitur. Hoc autem disposed by a celestial body to choose
commodum vel incommodum such an object. Now, this advantage, or
quidem, relatum ad electionem disadvantage, is fortuitous in regard to
hominis, est fortuitum; relatum ad man’s choice; in regard to God, it loses
Deum, rationem amittit fortuiti; non the character of the fortuitous, but not in
autem relatum ad corpus caeleste. regard to the celestial body.
Quod sic patet. Non enim aliquis This becomes evident, as follows. In
eventus amittit rationem fortuiti nisi fact, an event does not lose its fortuitous
reducatur in causam per se. Virtus character unless it may be referred back
autem caelestis corporis est causa to a direct cause. But the power of a
agens, non per modum intellectus celestial body is an agent cause, not by
et electionis, sed per modum way of understanding and choice, but as
naturae. Naturae autem est a nature. Now, it is proper for a nature to
proprium tendere ad unum. Si ergo tend to one objective. So, if an effect is
aliquis effectus non est unus, non not simply one result, then its direct
potest per se esse causa eius cause cannot be a natural power. But,
aliqua virtus naturalis. Cum autem when two things are combined with
aliqua duo sibi per accidens each other accidentally, they are not
coniunguntur, non sunt vere unum, truly one, but only accidentally so.
sed solum per accidens. Unde Hence, there can be no direct, natural
huius coniunctionis nulla causa cause for this union. Let us suppose,
naturalis per se causa esse potest. then, that a certain man is prompted to
Sit ergo quod iste homo ex dig a grave by the influence of a
impressione caelestis corporis celestial body, working by way of a
instigetur, per modum passionis, ut passion as we said. Now, the grave and
dictum est, ad fodiendum the location of the treasure are one only
sepulcrum. Sepulcrum autem, et accidentally, for they have no relation to
locus thesauri, non sunt unum nisi each other. Hence, the power of the
per accidens: quia non habent celestial body cannot directly give an
aliquem ordinem ad invicem. Unde inclination toward this entire result: that
virtus caelestis corporis non potest this man should dig this grave and that it
per se inclinare ad hoc totum, quod should be done at the place where the

iste fodiat sepulcrum et locum ubi treasure is. But an agent working
est thesaurus. Sed aliquis per through understanding can be the cause
intellectum agens potest esse of an inclination to this entire result, for it
causa inclinationis in hoc totum: is proper to an intelligent being to order
quia intelligentis est multa ordinare many things into one. It is clear, indeed,
in unum. Patet etiam quod etiam that even a man who knew where the
homo qui sciret thesaurum esse ibi, treasure was might send another man
posset alium ignorantem mittere ad who did not know to dig a grave in that
fodiendum sepulcrum in loco same place and thus to find a treasure
eodem, ut, praeter intentionem unintentionally. So, in this way, fortuitous
suam, inveniret thesaurum. Sic events of this kind, when referred to
ergo huiusmodi fortuiti eventus, their divine cause, lose their fortuitous
reducti in causam divinam, amittunt character, but when referred to a
rationem fortuiti: reducti vero in celestial cause, they do not.
causam caelestem, nequaquam.
Per eandem etiam rationem [13] It is also apparent by the same
apparet quod homo non potest reasoning that a man cannot be
esse bene fortunatus universaliter universally favored by fortune through
ex virtute corporis caelestis, sed the power of a celestial body, but only in
solum quantum ad hoc vel illud. regard to this or that incident. I say
Dico autem universaliter, ut aliquis universally, meaning that a man might
homo habeat in natura sua, ex have the ability in his nature, resulting
impressione caelestis corporis, ut from the influence of a celestial body, to
eligat semper, vel in pluribus, aliqua choose always, or in most cases,
quibus sint coniuncta per accidens objects to which certain advantages or
aliqua commoda vel incommoda. disadvantages are accidentally
Natura enim non ordinatur nisi ad connected. For nature is ordered to one
unum. Ea autem secundum quae result only. But these factors, in terms of
homini accidit bene vel male which good or bad fortune befalls a
secundum fortunam, non sunt man, are not reducible to any one thing;
reducibilia in aliquid unum, sed sunt rather, they are indeterminate and
indeterminata et infinita: ut indefinite, as the Philosopher teaches in
philosophus docet in II Phys., et ad Physics II, and as is clear to our senses.
sensum patet. Non est ergo So, it is not possible for a man to have
possibile quod aliquis habeat in the ability in his nature to choose always
natura sua eligere semper ea ad those objects from which advantageous
quae etiam per accidens sequuntur results accidentally follow. But it is
aliqua commoda. Sed potest esse possible that, by celestial influence, he
quod ex inclinatione caelesti may be inclined to choose one thing to
inclinetur ad eligendum aliquid cui which an advantage is accidentally
coniungitur per accidens aliquod attached; then, from another inclination
commodum; et ex alia inclinatione to another advantage; and from a third
aliud; et ex tertia tertium; non to a third advantage; but not in such a
autem ita quod ex una inclinatione way that all such advantages would
ad omnia. Ex una autem divina follow from one inclination. However,
dispositione potest homo ad omnia from one divine disposition a man can
dirigi. be directed to all results.
Caput 93 Chapter 93
De fato: an sit, et quid sit ON FATE: WHETHER AND WHAT IT IS
Ex his autem quae praemissa [1] It is evident from the points set forth
sunt, apparet quid sit de fato above what view we should take
sentiendum. regarding fate.
Videntes enim homines multa in [2] Indeed, men observe that many
hoc mundo per accidens things happen by accident in this world if
contingere, si causae particulares their particular causes be considered,
considerentur, posuerunt quidam and some men have maintained that they
quod nec etiam ab aliquibus are not even ordered by higher causes.
superioribus causis ordinentur. Et To these people it has appeared that
his videbatur fatum nihil esse there is no fate at all.
omnino.
Quidam vero ea in aliquas altiores [3] But others have attempted to reduce

causas reducere sunt conati, ex these events to certain higher causes
quibus cum quadam dispositione from which they result in an orderly way,
ordinate procedant. Et hi fatum in accord with a definite plan. These
posuerunt: quasi ea quae videntur people have asserted that there is fate in
a casu contingere, sint ab aliquo the sense that things observed to happen
effata, sive praelocuta, et by chance are “prefated,” that is, foretold
praeordinata ut essent. and preordained to happen.
Horum ergo quidam omnia quae [4] Some of these people, then, have
hic accidunt a casu contingentia, tried to reduce all contingent events
reducere sunt conati sicut in which occur by chance, here below, to
causas in caelestia corpora, etiam causes among the celestial bodies, and
electiones humanas, vim even human acts of choice to the
dispositionis siderum, cui omnia controlling power of the stars; to which
cum quadam necessitate subdi power all things are subject, they
ponebant, fatum appellantes. claimed, with a certain necessity which
Quae quidem positio impossibilis they called fate. Of course, this theory is
est, et a fide aliena, ut ex impossible and foreign to the faith, as is
superioribus patet. clear from our preceding considerations.
Quidam vero in dispositionem [5] On the other hand, some men have
divinae providentiae omnia desired to reduce to the control of divine
reducere voluerunt, quaecumque providence all things whatsoever that
in his inferioribus a casu appear to happen by chance in these
contingere videntur. Unde omnia lower beings. Hence, they said that all
fato agi dixerunt, ordinationem things are done by fate, meaning by fate
quae est in rebus ex divina the ordering which is found in things as a
providentia fatum nominantes. result of divine providence. Thus,
Unde Boetius dicit quod fatum est Boethius says [De consol. phil. IV, 6]:
inhaerens rebus mobilibus “fate is a disposition inherent in mutable

dispositio, per quam providentia things, whereby providence connects
suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. In each thing with His orders.” In this
qua fati descriptione, dispositio pro description of fate, “disposition” is used
ordinatione ponitur. In rebus autem for ordering; while the phrase “inherent in
inhaerens ponitur ut distinguatur things” is used to distinguish fate from
fatum a providentia: nam ipsa providence; since the ordering, as
ordinatio secundum quod in mente present in the divine mind and not yet
divina est, nondum rebus impressed on things, is providence, but,
impressa, providentia est; as already unfolded in things, it is called
secundum vero quod iam est fate. Moreover, he speaks of “mutable
explicata in rebus, fatum things” to show that the order of
nominatur. Mobilibus autem dicit ut providence does not take away
ostendat quod ordo providentiae contingency and mobility from things, as
rebus contingentiam et mobilitatem some men have claimed.
non aufert, ut quidam posuerunt.
Secundum hanc ergo [6] So, according to this meaning, to

acceptionem, negare fatum est deny fate is to deny providence. But,
providentiam divinam negare. Sed since we should not even have names in
quia cum infidelibus nec nomina common with unbelievers, lest occasion
debemus habere communia, ne ex for error could be taken from the
consortio nominum possit sumi association of names, the name fate is
erroris occasio; nomine fati non est not to be used by the faithful lest we
a fidelibus utendum, ne videamur appear to agree with those who have
illis assentire qui male de fato held a wrong opinion about fate, by
senserunt, omnia necessitati subjecting all things to the necessitation
siderum subiicientes. Unde of the stars. Consequently, Augustine
Augustinus dicit, in V de civitate says, in Book V of the City of God: “If any
Dei: si quis voluntatem vel man calls the will, or power, of God by
potestatem Dei fati nomine the name, fate, let him hold his view, but
appellat, sententiam teneat, correct his way of speaking.” And also
linguam corrigat. Et Gregorius, Gregory, in accord with the same
secundum eundem intellectum, understanding of it, says: “Far be it from
dicit: absit a fidelium mentibus ut the minds of the faithful to say that there
fatum aliquid esse dicant. is any fate.”
Caput 94 Chapter 94
De certitudine divinae ON THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE
providentiae PROVIDENCE
Difficultas autem quaedam ex [1] Now, there is a difficulty that arises
praemissis suboritur. Si enim omnia out of the foregoing. If all things that are
quae hic inferius aguntur, etiam done here below, even contingent
contingentia, providentiae divinae events, are subject to divine providence,
subduntur, oportet, ut videtur, vel then, seemingly, either providence
providentiam non esse certam; vel cannot be certain or else all things
omnia ex necessitate contingere. happen by necessity.
Ostendit enim philosophus, in VI [2] In fact, the Philosopher shows in the

Metaph., quod, si omnem effectum Metaphysics [V, 3] that, if we assert that
ponimus habere aliquam causam every effect has a direct cause, and
per se; et iterum quod, qualibet again that, given any direct cause we
causa per se posita, necessarium must necessarily grant its effect, it
sit effectum poni: sequetur quod follows that all future events come about
omnia futura ex necessitate by necessity. For, if each effect has a
eveniant. Si enim quilibet effectus direct cause, then any future effect will
habeat causam per se, quodlibet be reducible to a present or past cause.
futurum erit reducere in aliquam Thus, if we ask whether a certain man is
causam praesentem vel to be killed by robbers, the cause
praeteritam. Sicut, si quaeratur de preceding this effect is his encounter
aliquo utrum sit occidendus a with the robbers; and, in turn, another
latronibus, huius effectus praecedit cause precedes this effect, namely, the
causa occursus latronum; hunc fact that he went out of his home; still
autem effectum iterum praecedit another precedes this, that he wished to
alia causa, scilicet quod ipse exivit look for water; and a cause precedes
domum; hunc autem adhuc alia, this, namely, his thirst; and this was
quod vult quaerere aquam; quam caused by the eating of salted foods;
quidem praecedit causa, scilicet and this eating is going on now, or was
sitis; et haec causatur ex done in the past. Therefore, if it be so,
comestione salsorum; quod iam est that, granted the cause, the effect must
vel fuit. Si ergo, causa posita, be granted, then necessarily, if he cats
necesse est effectum poni, salt foods, he must get thirsty; and if he
necesse est, si comedit salsa, quod is thirsty, he must desire to get water;
sitiat; et si sitit, quod velit quaerere and if he desires to get water, he must
aquam; et si vult quaerere aquam, go out of his home; and if he leaves his
quod exeat domum; et si exit home, the robbers must encounter him;
domum, quod occurrant ei latrones; and if they encounter him, he must be
et si occurrunt, quod occidatur. killed. So, from the first to the last, it is
Ergo, de primo ad ultimum, necessary for this eater of salty foods to
necesse est hunc comedentem be killed by robbers. Therefore, the
salsa a latronibus occidi. Concludit Philosopher concludes that it is not true
ergo philosophus non esse verum that, granted the cause, the effect must
quod, posita causa, necesse sit be granted; since there are some causes
effectum poni: quia aliquae causae which can fail. Again, it is not true that
sunt quae possunt deficere. Neque every effect has a direct cause, for
iterum verum est quod omnis something that comes about
effectus habeat per se causam: accidentally, for instance, that this man
quia quod est per accidens, scilicet who wishes to look for water encounters
istum volentem aquam quaerere the robbers, has no cause.
occurrere latronibus, non habet
aliquam causam.
Ex hac autem ratione apparet quod [3] Now, by this reasoning it appears that
omnes effectus qui reducuntur in all effects that may be reduced to some
aliquam causam per se, direct cause, present or past, which
praesentem vel praeteritam, qua when granted requires that the effect be
posita necesse sit effectum poni, granted must of necessity happen.
ex necessitate contingunt. Vel ergo Either, then, we must say that not all

oportet dicere quod non omnes effects are subject to divine providence
effectus divinae providentiae and, thus, that providence does not
subdantur. Et sic providentia non apply to all—but we showed earlier that
est de omnibus. Quod prius fuit it does; or else it is not necessarily so,
ostensum. Vel non est necessarium that, granted providence, its effect must
ut, providentia posita, effectus eius be granted, and thus providence is not
ponatur. Et sic providentia non est certain; or, finally, it is necessary for all
certa. Aut est necessarium quod things to happen by necessity. For
omnia ex necessitate contingant. providence is not only in present or past
Providentia enim non solum est in time, but in eternity, since nothing can be
praesenti tempore vel praeterito, in God that is not eternal.
sed aeterno: quia nihil potest esse
in Deo non aeternum.
Adhuc. Si divina providentia est [4] Again, if divine providence is certain,

certa, oportet hanc conditionalem then this conditional proposition must be
esse veram: si Deus providit hoc, true: If God foresees this, then this will
hoc erit. Huius autem conditionalis happen. Now, the antecedent of this
antecedens est necessarium: quia conditional proposition is necessary, for
est aeternum. Ergo consequens est He is eternal. Therefore, the consequent
necessarium: oportet enim omnis is necessary, for every consequent in a
conditionalis consequens esse conditional proposition must be
necessarium cuius antecedens est necessary when the antecedent is
necessarium; et ideo consequens necessary. So, the consequent is like the
est sicut conclusio antecedentis; conclusion of the antecedent, and
quicquid autem ex necessario whatever follows from a necessary
sequitur, oportet esse necessarium. proposition must be necessary.
Sequitur igitur, si divina providentia Therefore, it follows that, if divine
est certa, quod omnia ex providence is certain, all things must
necessitate proveniant. occur by necessity.
Amplius. Sit aliquid esse provisum [5] Besides, suppose that something is
a Deo, puta quod talis sit foreseen by God; for example, that a
regnaturus. Aut ergo possibile est certain man will become a ruler. Now, it
accidere quod non regnet: aut non. is either possible that be will not rule, or
Si quidem non est possibile ipsum it is not. But, if it is not possible that be
non regnare, ergo impossibile est will not rule, then it is impossible for him
ipsum non regnare: ergo not to rule; therefore, it is necessary for
necessarium est eum regnare. Si him to rule. However, if it is possible that
autem possibile est eum non he will not rule, and if, given the possible
regnare; possibili autem posito, non something impossible does not follow,
sequitur aliquid impossibile; then it does follow that divine providence
sequitur autem divinam will fail; hence, it is not impossible for
providentiam deficere; non est divine providence to fail. Therefore, it is
igitur impossibile divinam either necessary, if all things are
providentiam deficere. Aut igitur foreseen by God, that divine providence
oportet, si omnia sunt provisa a be not certain or else that all things
Deo, quod divina providentia non happen by necessity.
sit certa; aut quod omnia ex

necessitate eveniant.
Item. Argumentatur sic Tullius, in [6] Moreover, Tully argues as follows, in

libro de divinatione. Si omnia a Deo his book On Divination [II, 7]: if all things
provisa sunt, certus est ordo are foreseen by God, the order of
causarum. Si autem hoc verum est, causes is certain. But, if this is true, all
omnia fato aguntur. Quod si omnia things are done by fate. And if all things
fato aguntur, nihil est in nostra are done by fate, nothing is within our
potestate, nullum est voluntatis power, there is no volitional choice.
arbitrium. Sequitur igitur quod Therefore, it follows that free choice is
tollatur liberum arbitrium, si divina taken away if divine providence be
providentia sit certa. Et eodem certain. And in the same way it will follow
modo sequetur quod omnes that all contingent causes are taken
causae contingentes tollantur. away.
Praeterea. Divina providentia [7] Furthermore, divine providence does

causas medias non excludit, ut not exclude intermediate causes, as we
supra ostensum est. Inter causas showed above, But, among causes,
autem sunt aliquae contingentes et some are contingent and capable of
deficere valentes. Deficere igitur failing. So, it is possible for an effect of
potest providentiae effectus. Non providence to fail. Therefore, God’s
est igitur Dei providentia certa. providence is not certain.
Oportet autem, ad horum [8] However, for the purpose of

solutionem, aliqua repetere ex his answering these arguments, we must
quae supra posita sunt: ut repeat some of the observations put
manifestum fiat quod nihil divinam down before, so that it may be made
providentiam effugit; et quod ordo clear that nothing escapes divine
divinae providentiae omnino providence; also, that the order of divine
immutari non potest; nec tamen providence cannot possibly be changed;
oportet quod ea quae ex and yet that it is not necessary for all
providentia divina proveniunt, ex things to happen of necessity simply
necessitate cuncta eveniant. because they come about as a result of
divine providence.
Primo namque considerandum est [9] First, then, we must consider the fact

quod, cum Deus sit omnium that, since God is the cause of all
existentium causa, rebus omnibus existing things, giving being to all, the
conferens esse, oportet quod suae order of His providence must embrace
providentiae ordo omnes res all things. Indeed, on the things on which
complectatur. Quibus enim esse He has lavished being He must also
largitus est, oportet quod et lavish preservation and guide them
conservationem largiatur, et toward perfection in their ultimate end.
perfectionem conferat in ultimo
fine.
Cum autem in quolibet providente [10] Now, two things must be considered
duo considerari oporteat, scilicet in the case of any provident agent—
ordinis praemeditationem, et namely, premeditation of the order, and
praemeditati ordinis institutionem in the establishment of the premeditated
rebus quae providentiae subduntur, order—in the things that are subject to
quorum primum ad cognoscitivam providence. The first of these pertains to
virtutem pertinet, aliud vero ad the cognitive power, while the second
operativam: hoc inter utrumque belongs to the operative. Between the
differt, quod in praemeditando two there is this difference: in the act of
ordinem, tanto est providentia premeditating the order, the more perfect
perfectior, quanto magis usque ad that providence is, the more can the
minima ordo providentiae potest order of providence be extended to the
produci. Quod enim nos omnium smallest details. The fact that we are not
particularium ordinem praemeditari able to think out, ahead of time, the
non possumus circa ea quae sunt order of all particular events in regard to
disponenda a nobis, ex defectu matters to be arranged by us stems from
nostrae cognitionis provenit, quae the deficiency of our knowledge, which
cuncta singularia complecti non cannot embrace all singular things.
potest, tanto autem in providendo However, the more a person is able to
unusquisque solertior habetur, think ahead about a plurality of singular
quanto plura singularia things, the more adroit does he become
praemeditari potest; cuius autem in his foresight, while the man whose
provisio in solis universalibus foresight is restricted to universals only
consisteret, parum de prudentia participates but little in prudence. Now, a
participaret. Simile autem in similar consideration can be made in
omnibus operativis artibus regard to all the operative arts. But, in
considerari potest. Sed in hoc quod regard to imposing the premeditated
ordo praemeditatus rebus order on things, the providence of a
imponitur, tanto est dignior et governing agent is more noble and
perfectior providentia gubernantis, perfect the more universal it is and the
quanto est universalior, et per plura more it accomplished his premeditated
ministeria suam explicat plan by means of a plurality of ministers,
praemeditationem: quia et ipsa because this controlling of ministers
ministeriorum dispositio magnam occupies an important place in the order
partem provisi ordinis habet. that pertains to foresight.
Oportet autem quod divina Moreover, divine providence must

providentia in summo perfectionis consist in the highest position, since He
consistat: quia ipse est simpliciter is absolutely and universally perfect, as
et universaliter perfectus, ut in we showed in Book One. So, in the
primo libro ostensum est. In function of providential foresight, by
providendo igitur suae sapientiae means of the sempiternal meditative act
meditatione sempiterna omnia of His wisdom, He orders all things, no
ordinat quantumcumque minima matter how detailed they may appear;
videantur: quaecumque vero rerum and whatever things perform any action,
aliquid operantur, instrumentaliter they act instrumentally, as moved by
agunt ab eo mota, et ei Him. And they obediently serve as His
obtemperando ministrant, ad ministers in order to unfold in things the
ordinem providentiae, ab aeterno, order of providence, which has been
ut ita dicam, excogitatum, thought out, as I might say, from eternity.
explicandum in rebus. Si autem But, if all things able to act must serve
omnia quae agere possunt, as ministers to Him in their actions, it is
necesse est ut in agendo ei impossible for any agent to block the
ministrent, impossibile est quod execution of divine providence by acting
aliquod agens divinae providentiae in opposition to it. Nor is it possible for
executionem impediat sibi divine providence to be hindered by the
contrarium agendo. Neque etiam defect of any agent or patient, since
possibile est divinam providentiam every active and passive power is
impediri per defectum alicuius caused in things in accord with divine
agentis vel patientis: cum omnis disposition. It is also impossible for the
virtus activa vel passiva sit in rebus execution of divine providence to be
secundum divinam dispositionem impeded by a change in the provident
causata. Impossibile est etiam Agent, since God is altogether
quod impediatur divinae immutable, as we showed above. The
providentiae executio per conclusion remains, then, that divine
providentis mutationem: cum Deus foresight is utterly incapable of being
sit omnino immutabilis, ut supra frustrated.
ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo
quod divina provisio omnino
cassari non potest.
Deinceps autem considerandum [11] Next, we must consider that every
est quod omne agens intendit ad agent intends the good and the better, in
bonum et melius secundum quod so far as he can, as we showed above.
potest, ut supra ostensum est. But the good and the better are not
Bonum autem et melius non eodem considered in the same way, in the
modo consideratur in toto et whole and in the parts. For, in the whole,
partibus. In toto enim bonum est the good is integrity, which is the result
integritas, quae ex partium ordine of the order and composition of its parts.
et compositione relinquitur. Unde Consequently, it is better for there to be
melius est toti quod sit inter partes an inequality among the parts of the
eius disparitas, sine qua ordo et whole, without which the order and
perfectio totius esse non potest, perfection of the whole cannot be, than
quam quod omnes partes essent for all its parts to be equal, even if each
aequales, unaquaque earum of them were to exist on the level of the
perveniente ad gradum most important part. However, if the
nobilissimae partis: quaelibet parts are considered in themselves,
autem pars inferioris gradus, in se each part of a lower grade would be
considerata, melior esset si esset better if it were on the level of the higher
in gradu superioris partis. Sicut part. This is exemplified in the human
patet in corpore humano: dignior body: in fact, the foot would be a more
enim pars esset pes si oculi worthy part if it possessed the beauty
pulchritudinem et virtutem haberet; and power of the eye, but the whole
corpus autem totum esset body would be more imperfect if it lacked
imperfectius, si ei officium pedis the functioning of the foot.
deesset.
Ad aliud igitur tendit intentio Therefore, the intention of a particular
particularis agentis, et universalis: agent tends toward a different objective
nam particulare agens tendit ad from that of the universal agent. Indeed,
bonum partis absolute, et facit eam the particular agent tends to the good of
quanto meliorem potest; universale the part without qualification, and makes
autem agens tendit ad bonum it the best that it can, but the universal
totius. Unde aliquis defectus est agent tends to the good of the whole. As
praeter intentionem particularis a result, a defect which is in accord with
agentis, qui est secundum the intention of the universal agent may
intentionem agentis universalis. be apart from the intention of the
Sicut patet quod generatio feminae particular agent. Thus, it is clear that the
est praeter intentionem naturae generation of a female is apart from the
particularis, idest, huius virtutis intention of a particular nature, that is, of
quae est in hoc semine, quae ad the power which is in this semen which,
hoc tendit quod perficiat conceptum as much as possible, tends to a perfect
quanto magis potest: est autem de result of conception; but it is in accord
intentione naturae universalis, with the intention of the universal nature,
idest, virtutis universalis agentis ad that is, of the power of the universal
generationem inferiorum, quod agent for the generation of inferior
femina generetur, sine qua beings, that a female be generated; for
generatio multorum animalium without a female the generation of a
compleri non posset. Et eodem number of animals could not be
modo corruptio, et diminutio, et accomplished. Similarly, corruption,
omnis defectus, est de intentione decrease, and every defect pertain to
naturae universalis, non autem the intention of the universal nature, but
naturae particularis: nam quaelibet not of the particular nature, for each
res fugit defectum, tendit vero ad thing avoids defect, and tends to
perfectionem, quantum in se est. perfection, to the extent that it can. So, it
Patet ergo quod de intentione is evident that the intention of the
agentis particularis est quod particular agent is that its effect become
effectus suus fiat perfectus as perfect as is possible in its kind, but
quantumcumque potest in genere the intention of the universal nature is
suo: de intentione autem naturae that this individual effect become perfect
universalis est quod hic effectus fiat in a certain type of perfection, say in
perfectus tali perfectione, puta male perfection, while another would
perfectione masculi, ille autem become so in female perfection.
perfectione feminae.
Inter partes autem totius universi Now the primary perfection among the
prima distinctio apparet secundum parts of the whole universe appears on
contingens et necessarium: the basis of the contingent and the
superiora enim in entibus sunt necessary. For the higher beings are
necessaria et incorruptibilia et necessary and incorruptible and
immobilia; a qua quidem conditione immobile, and the more they fall short of
tanto magis deficiunt, quanto in this condition, the lower the level on
inferiori gradu constituuntur; ita which they are established. Thus, the
quod infima corrumpuntur quidem lowest things may be corrupted even in
quantum ad esse suum, moventur regard to their being, whereas they are
vero quantum ad suas changed in regard to their dispositions,
dispositiones, suos etiam effectus and they produce their effects not
non de necessitate, sed necessarily but contingently. So, any
contingenter producunt. Quodlibet agent that is a part of the universe
igitur agens quod est pars universi, intends as much as possible to
intendit quantum potest in suo esse persevere in its actual being and natural
et naturali dispositione persistere, disposition, and to make its effect stable.
et suum stabilire effectum: Deus However, God, Who is the governor of
autem, qui est universi gubernator, the universe, intends some of His effects
intendit quod effectum eius hic to be established by way of necessity,
quidem stabiliatur per modum and others contingently. On this basis,
necessitatis, hic autem He adapts different causes to them; for
contingenter. Et secundum hoc one group of effects there are necessary
diversas eis causas adaptat, his causes, but for another, contingent
quidem necessarias, his autem causes. So, it falls under the order of
contingentes. Cadit igitur sub divine providence not only that this effect
ordine divinae providentiae non is to be, but also that this effect is to be
solum hunc effectum esse, sed contingently, while another is to be
hunc effectum esse contingenter, necessarily. Because of this, some of the
alium autem necessario. Et things that are subject to providence are
secundum hoc, quaedam eorum necessary, whereas others are
quae divinae providentiae contingent and not at all necessary.
subduntur sunt necessaria,
quaedam vero contingentia, non
autem omnia necessaria.
Patet ergo quod, etsi divina [17] So, it is obvious that, though divine

providentia est per se causa huius providence is the direct cause of an
effectus futuri; et est in praesenti individual future effect, and though it is
vel praeterito, magis autem ab so in the present, or in the past, indeed
aeterno: non sequitur, ut prima ratio from eternity, it does not follow, as the
procedebat, quod effectus iste sit first argument implies, that this individual
de necessitate futurus; est enim effect will come about of necessity. For
divina providentia per se causa divine providence is the direct cause
quod hic effectus contingenter why this effect occurs contingently. And
proveniat. Et hoc cassari non this cannot be prevented.
potest.
Ex quo etiam patet quod haec [13] From this it is also evident that this
conditionalis est vera, si Deus conditional proposition is true: If God
providit hoc futurum, hoc erit: sicut foresees that this event will be, it will
secunda ratio procedebat. Sed sic happen, just as the second argument
erit sicut Deus providit illud esse suggested. But it will occur in the way
futurum. Providit autem illud esse that God foresaw that it would be. Now,
futurum contingenter. Sequitur ergo He foresaw that it would occur
infallibiliter quod erit contingenter, contingently. So, it follows that, without
et non necessario. fail, it will occur contingently and not
necessarily.
Patet etiam quod hoc quod ponitur [14] It is also clear that, if this thing
esse provisum a Deo ut sit futurum, which, we grant, is foreseen by God as
si sit de genere contingentium, to occur in the future belongs in the
poterit non esse secundum se genus of contingent beings, it will be
consideratum: sic enim provisum possible for it, considered in itself, not to
est ut sit contingens, potens non be; for thus is it foreseen, as something

esse. Non tamen est possibile that is contingent, as able not to be. Yet
quod ordo providentiae deficiat it is not possible for the order of
quin contingenter eveniat. Et sic providence to fail in regard to its coming
tertia ratio solvitur. Unde potest into being contingently. Thus the third
poni quod iste non sit regnaturus si argument is answered. Consequently, it
secundum se consideretur: non can be maintained that this man may not
autem si consideretur ut provisum. become a ruler if he be considered in
himself, but not if he be considered as
an object of divine foresight.
Illud etiam quod Tullius obiicit, [15] Also, the objection that Tully offers
secundum praemissa frivolum seems frivolous, in view of the foregoing.
apparet. Cum enim divinae Indeed, since not only effects are subject
providentiae non solum subdantur to divine providence, but also causes
effectus, sed etiam causae et modi and ways of being, as is obvious from
essendi, sicut ex praemissis patet, what we have asserted before, it does
non sequitur quod, si omnia divina not follow that, if everything be done by
providentia aguntur, quod nihil sit in divine providence, nothing is within our
nobis. Sic enim sunt a Deo provisa power. For the effects are foreseen by
ut per nos libere fiant. God, as they are freely produced by us.
Neque autem defectibilitas [16] Nor can the possibility of failure on
causarum secundarum, quibus the part of secondary causes, by means
mediantibus effectus providentiae of which the effects of providence are
producuntur, certitudinem divinae produced, take away the certainty of
providentiae potest auferre, ut divine providence, as the fifth argument
quinta ratio procedebat: cum ipse implied. For God Himself operates in all
Deus in omnibus operetur, et pro things, and in accord with the decision of
suae arbitrio voluntatis, ut supra His will, as we showed above. Hence, it
ostensum est. Unde ad eius is appropriate to His providence
providentiam pertinet ut causas sometimes to permit defectible causes to
defectibiles quandoque sinat fail, and at other times to preserve them
deficere, quandoque eas a defectu from failure.
conservet.
Ea vero quae ad necessitatem [17] Finally, those arguments in favor of
provisorum a Deo possent assumi the necessity of effects foreseen by God,
ex certitudine scientiae, supra which might be drawn from the certainty
soluta sunt, cum de Dei scientia of knowledge, are solved above, where
ageretur. we treated of God’s knowledge.
Caput 95 Chapter 95
Quod immobilitas divinae THAT THE IMMUTABILITY OF DIVINE
providentiae utilitatem PROVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPRESS
orationis non excludit THE VALUE OF PRAYER
Considerare etiam oportet quod, [1] We should also keep in mind the fact
sicut providentiae immobilitas that, just as the immutability of providence
necessitatem rebus provisis non does not impose necessity on things that
imponit, ita etiam nec orationis are foreseen, so also it does not suppress
utilitatem excludit. Non enim ad the value of prayer. For prayer is not
hoc oratio ad Deum funditur ut established for the purpose of changing
aeterna providentiae dispositio the eternal disposition of providence, since
immutetur, hoc enim impossibile this is impossible, but so that a person
est: sed ut aliquis illud quod may obtain from God the object which he
desiderat, assequatur a Deo. desires.
Piis enim desideriis rationalis [2] Indeed, it is appropriate for God to
creaturae conveniens est quod consent to the holy desires of a rational
Deus assentiat, non tanquam creature, not in the sense that our desires
desideria nostra moveant may move the immutable God, but that
immobilem Deum: sed ex sua He, in His goodness, takes steps to
bonitate procedit ut convenienter accomplish these desired effects in a fitting
desiderata perficiat. Cum enim way. For, since all things naturally desire
omnia naturaliter bonum the good, as we proved above, and since it
desiderent, ut supra probatum pertains to the supereminence of divine
est; ad supereminentiam autem goodness to assign being, and wellbeing,
divinae bonitatis pertinet quod to all in accord with a definite order, the
esse, et bene esse, omnibus result is that, in accord with His goodness,
ordine quodam distribuat: He fulfills the holy desires which are
consequens est ut, secundum brought to completion by means of prayer.
suam bonitatem, desideria pia,
quae per orationem explicantur,
adimpleat.
Adhuc. Ad moventem pertinet ut [3] Again, it is proper for a mover to bring
id quod movetur, perducat ad the object that is moved to its end; hence,
finem: unde et per eandem a thing is moved toward its end, and
naturam aliquid movetur ad attains its end, and finds rest in it, by
finem, et consequitur finem, et in means of the same nature. Now, every
eo quiescit. Omne autem desire is a certain movement toward the
desiderium est quidam motus ad good, and indeed it cannot be present in
bonum. Qui quidem non potest things unless it be from God, Who is good
rebus inesse nisi a Deo, qui est essentially and the source of goodness. In
per essentiam suam bonus, et fact, every mover moves toward something
fons bonitatis: movens enim like itself. So, it is proper for God, in accord
omne movet ad aliquid simile with His goodness, to bring to a fitting
sibi. Ad Deum igitur pertinet, conclusion the proper desires that are
secundum suam bonitatem, quod expressed by our prayers.
desideria convenientia, quae per
orationes explicantur, ad
effectum convenientem perducat.
Item. Quanto aliqua sunt [4] Besides, the nearer certain things are
propinquiora moventi, tanto to the mover, the more efficaciously do
efficacius impressionem they follow the influence of the mover; for
moventis assequuntur: nam et instance, things that are nearer to a fire
quae propinquiora sunt igni, become hotter from it. Now, intellectual
magis ab ipso calefiunt. substances are nearer to God than are
Substantiae autem intellectuales inanimate natural substances. Therefore,
propinquiores sunt Deo quam the influence of divine motion is more
substantiae naturales efficacious on intellectual substances than
inanimatae. Efficacior est igitur on other natural substances. But natural
impressio divinae motionis in bodies participate in divine motion to the
substantiis intellectualibus quam extent that they receive from Him a natural
in substantiis aliis naturalibus. appetite for the good, and even in the
Corpora autem naturalia in appetite for fulfillment which is realized
tantum participant de motione when they attain their appropriate ends.
divina quod naturalem boni Therefore, there is much more reason for
appetitum consequuntur ex eo, et intellectual substances attaining the
etiam appetitus impletionem, fulfillment of their desires which are
quod quidem fit dum proprios presented to God by prayer.
fines consequuntur. Multo igitur
magis intellectuales substantiae
desideriorum suorum, quae per
orationem Deo offeruntur,
impletionem consequuntur.
Amplius. De ratione amicitiae est [5] Moreover, it pertains to the essential

quod amans velit impleri meaning of friendship for the lover to will
desiderium amati, inquantum vult the fulfillment of the desire of the beloved,
eius bonum et perfectionem: because he wishes the good and the
propter quod dicitur quod perfect for the beloved. This is the reason
amicorum est idem velle. for the statement that “it is characteristic of
Ostensum est autem supra quod friends that they will the same thing. Now,
Deus suam creaturam amat; et we showed above that God loves His
tanto magis unamquamque creature, and the more that any one of
quanto plus de eius bonitate them participates in His goodness which is
participat, quae est primum et the first and chief object of His love, the
principale amatum ab ipso. Vult more does He love it. So, He wills the
igitur impleri desideria rationalis desires of a rational creature to be
creaturae, quae perfectissime satisfied, for, compared to other creatures,
divinam bonitatem participat inter it participates most perfectly in divine
ceteras creaturas. Sua autem providence. But His will is perfective in
voluntas est perfectiva rerum: est regard to things; indeed, He is the cause
enim causa rerum per suam of things through His will, as we showed
voluntatem, ut supra ostensum above. Therefore, it is appropriate to divine
est. Ad bonitatem igitur divinam providence for Him to fulfill the desires of a
pertinet ut impleat desideria rational creature when they are presented
rationalis creaturae sibi per to Him through prayer.
orationem proposita.
Praeterea. Bonum creaturae [6] Furthermore, a creature’s good is

derivatum est secundum transmitted by the divine goodness in
quandam similitudinem a accord with a certain likeness. But this
bonitate divina. Hoc autem characteristic seems most approvable

maxime commendabile in among men: that they should not refuse
hominibus apparet, ut iuste consent to those who ask for favors in a
petentibus assensum non just manner. Because of this, men are
denegent: ex hoc enim vocantur called liberal, clement, merciful, and
liberales, clementes, upright. Therefore, this characteristic, of
misericordes et pii. Maxime igitur granting upright prayers, especially
hoc ad divinam bonitatem belongs to divine goodness.
pertinet, ut pias orationes
exaudiat.
Hinc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: [7] Hence, it is said in the Psalm (144:19):

voluntatem timentium se faciet, “He will do the will of those who fear Him,
et orationes eorum exaudiet, et and He will hear their prayers and save
salvos faciet eos. Et Matth. 78, them”; and again the Lord says: “Everyone
dominus dicit: omnis qui petit who asks receives, and he who seeks
accipit, et qui quaerit invenit, et finds, and to him who knocks it shall be
pulsanti aperietur. opened” (Mat. 7:8).
Chapter 96
Caput 96 THAT SOME PRAYERS ARE NOT
GRANTED BY GOD
Non est autem inconveniens si [1] Now, it is not inappropriate if also, at
quandoque etiam petitiones times, the requests of some who pray are
orantium non admittantur a Deo. not granted by God.
Ea enim ratione ostensum est [2] For we showed by reasoning that God

quod Deus desideria rationalis fulfills the desires of a rational creature, to
creaturae adimplet, inquantum the extent that he desires the good. Now,
desiderat bonum. Quandoque it sometimes happens that what is sought
autem contingit quod id quod in prayer is not a true, but an apparent,
petitur non est verum bonum, sed good; speaking absolutely, it is an evil.
apparens, simpliciter autem Therefore, such a prayer is not capable of
malum. Non est igitur talis oratio being granted by God. Hence, it is said in
Deo exaudibilis. Hinc est quod James (4:3): “You ask and you receive
dicitur Iac. 43: petitis et non not, because you ask amiss.”
accipitis, eo quod male petatis.
Similiter autem ex hoc quod Deus [3] Likewise, because God moves us to

ad desiderandum movet, the act of desiring, we showed that it is
ostensum est conveniens esse appropriate for Him to fulfill our desires.
quod desideria impleat. Mobile Now, the thing that is moved is not
autem ad finem motus non brought to its end by the mover unless the
perducitur a movente nisi motus motion be continued. So, if the movement
continuetur. Si igitur motus of desire is not continued by constant
desiderii per orationis instantiam prayer, it is not inappropriate for the
non continuetur, non est prayer to fail to receive its expected
inconveniens si oratio effectum result. Hence, the Lord says in Luke
debitum non sortiatur. Hinc est (18:1) “that we ought always to pray and
quod dominus dicit, Lucae 181: not to faint”; also, the Apostle says, in 1
quoniam oportet semper orare, et Thessalonians (5:17): “Pray without
non deficere. Et I Thess. 517, ceasing.”
dicit apostolus: sine intermissione
orate.
Rursus. Ostensum est quod Deus [4] Again, we showed that God fulfills in a
rationalis creaturae decenter suitable way the desire of a rational
desiderium implet inquantum ei creature, depending on its nearness to
appropinquat. Appropinquat Him. But one becomes near to Him
autem ei aliquis per through contemplation, devout affection,
contemplationem, et devotam and humble but firm intention. So, the
affectionem, et humilem et firmam prayer which does not approach God in
intentionem. Illa igitur oratio quae this way is not capable of being heard by
sic Deo non appropinquat, non est God. Hence, it is said in the Psalm
a Deo exaudibilis. Unde et in (101:18): “He has had regard to the
Psalmo dicitur: respexit in prayer of the humble”; and in James (1:6):
orationem humilium; Iac. 16: “Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.”
postulet autem in fide, nihil
haesitans.
Item. Ostensum est quod ratione [5] Besides, we showed that on the basis

amicitiae, Deus vota piorum of friendship God grants the wishes of
exaudit. Qui igitur a Dei amicitia those who are holy. Therefore, he who
declinat, non est dignum ut eius turns away from God’s friendship is not
oratio exaudiatur. Hinc est quod worthy of having his prayer granted.
Prov. 289 dicitur: qui declinat Hence, it is said in Proverbs (28:9): “He
aurem suam ne audiat legem, who turns away his ears from hearing the
oratio eius erit execrabilis. Et law, his prayer shall be an abomination.”
Isaiae 115: cum multiplicaveritis And again in Isaiah (1:15): “When you
orationes, non exaudiam: manus multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your
enim vestrae sanguine plenae hands are full of blood.”
sunt.
Ex hac etiam radice procedit quod [6] For the same reason it happens

quandoque aliquis Dei amicus sometimes that a friend of God is not
non auditur quando pro his rogat beard when he prays for those who are
qui non sunt Dei amici: secundum not God’s friends, according to the
illud Ierem. 716: tu ergo noli passage in Jeremiah (7:16): “Therefore,
orare pro populo hoc, nec do not You pray for this people, nor take
assumas pro eis laudem et to You praise and supplication for them,
orationem, et non obsistas mihi: and do not withstand me: for I will not
quia non exaudiam te. hear You.”
Contingit autem quandoque quod [7] However, it happens at times that a
aliquis ex amicitia denegat quod person is refused because of friendship a

petitur ab amico, quia cognoscit petition which he asks of a friend, since
hoc ei esse nocivum, vel he knows that it is harmful to him, or that
contrarium ei magis expedire: ut the opposite is more helpful to him. Thus,
medicus infirmanti quandoque a physician may deny sometimes the
negat quod petit, considerans request of a sick person, having in mind
quod non expedit ei ad salutem that it is not beneficial to him in the
corporis consequendam. Unde, recovery of his health. Consequently,
cum ostensum sit quod Deus ex since we showed that God, because of
amore quem ad creaturam the love which He has for the rational
rationalem habet, eius desideria creature, satisfies his desires when they
impleat sibi per orationem are presented to Him through prayer, it is
proposita, non est mirandum si no cause for astonishment if at times He
quandoque eorum etiam quos does not grant the petition, even of those
praecipue diligit, petitionem non whom He especially loves, in order to
implet, ut impleat quod petenti provide something that is more helpful for
magis expedit ad salutem. Propter the salvation of the petitioner. For this
quod a Paulo stimulum carnis non reason, He did not withdraw the sting of
amovit, quamvis hoc ter peteret, the flesh from Paul, though he asked it
providens hoc ei esse utile ad thrice, for God foresaw that it was helpful
humilitatis conservationem, ut to him for the preservation of humility, as
habetur II Cor. 1289. Unde et is related in 2 Corinthians (12:79).
Matth. 2022, quibusdam dominus Hence, the Lord says to certain people, in
dicit: nescitis quid petatis. Et Rom. Matthew (20:22): “You do not know what
826 dicitur: nam quid oremus you ask”; and it is said in Romans (8:26):
sicut oportet, nescimus. Et propter “For we do not know what we should pray
hoc Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad for as we ought.” For this reason,
Paul. et Ther.: bonus dominus, qui Augustine says in his letter to Paulinus
non tribuit saepe quod volumus, and Therasia: “The Lord is good, for He
ut quod mallemus attribuat. often does not grant what we desire, so
that He may give us what we desire even
more.”
Patet igitur ex praemissis quod [8] It is apparent, then, from the foregoing

aliquorum quae fiunt a Deo, causa that the cause of some things that are
sunt orationes et pia desideria. done by God is prayers and holy desires.
Ostensum est autem supra quod But we showed above that divine
divina providentia causas alias providence does not exclude other
non excludit: quin potius ordinat causes; rather, it orders them so that the
eas ad hoc quod ordo quem apud order which providence has determined
se statuit, rebus imponatur; et sic within itself may be imposed on things.
causae secundae non repugnant And thus, secondary causes are not
providentiae, sed magis incompatible with providence; instead,
providentiae exequuntur effectum. they carry out the effect of providence. In
Sic igitur orationes apud Deum this way, then, prayers are efficacious
efficaces sunt, nec tamen ordinem before God, yet they do not destroy the
immutabilem divinae providentiae immutable order of divine providence,
solvunt: quia et hoc ipsum quod because this individual request that is
tali petenti hoc concedatur, sub granted to a certain petitioner falls under
ordine divinae providentiae cadit. the order of divine providence. So, it is the
Simile est ergo dicere non esse same thing to say that we should not pray

orandum ut aliquid consequamur in order to obtain something from God,
a Deo quia ordo suae because the order of His providence is
providentiae est immutabilis, ac si immutable, as to say that we should not
diceretur quod non est walk in order to get to a place, or eat in
ambulandum ut perveniamus ad order to be nourished; all of which are
locum, nec comedendum ut clearly absurd.
nutriamur: quae omnia patent
esse absurda.
Excluditur ergo ex praemissis [9] So, a double error concerning prayer is

duplex error circa orationem. set aside as a result of the foregoing.
Quidam enim dixerunt nullum Some people have said that prayer is not
esse orationis fructum. Quod fruitful. In fact, this has been stated both
quidem dicebant tam illi qui by those who denied divine providence
negabant divinam providentiam altogether, like the Epicureans, and by
omnino, sicut Epicurei; quam illi those who set human affairs apart from
qui res humanas divinae divine providence, as some Peripatetics
providentiae subtrahebant, sicut do, and also by those who thought that all
aliqui Peripateticorum; necnon et things subject to providence occur of
illi qui omnia quae providentiae necessity, as the Stoics did. From all
subsunt, ex necessitate these views, it follows that prayer is
contingere arbitrabantur, sicut fruitless and, consequently, that all
Stoici. Ex his enim omnibus worship of the Deity is offered in vain.
sequitur quod nullus sit orationis Indeed, this error is mentioned in Malachi
fructus, et per consequens quod (3:14), where it states: “You have said: He
omnis deitatis cultus fiat in vanum: labors in vain who serves God. And what
qui quidem error tangitur Malach. profit is it that we have kept His
314: dixistis, inquit, vanus est qui ordinances, and that we have walked
servit Deo. Et quod emolumentum sorrowful before the Lord of hosts?”
quia custodivimus praecepta eius,
et quia ambulavimus tristes coram
domino exercituum?
Quidam vero e contrario divinam [10] Contrariwise, others have in fact said

dispositionem orationibus that the divine disposition is capable of
vertibilem esse dicebant: sicut et being changed by prayers; thus, the
Aegyptii dicebant quod fatum Egyptians said that fate was subject to
orationibus et quibusdam change by prayers and by means of
imaginibus, subfumigationibus, certain idols, incensings, or incantations.
sive incantationibus, vertebatur.
Et ad hunc sensum pertinere [11] Indeed, certain statements in the
videntur quaedam quae in divine Scriptures seem, according to their
Scripturis divinis dicuntur, superficial appearance, to favor this view.
secundum id quod prima facie For it is said that Isaiah, at the command
apparet ex eis. Dicitur enim Isaiae of the Lord, said to King Hezekiah: “Thus
38 quod Isaias, ex mandato says the Lord: Take order with Your
domini, dixit Ezechiae regi, haec house, for You shall die, and shall not
dicit dominus: dispone domui live”; and that, after the prayer of
tuae, quia morieris tu, et non Hezekiah, “the word of the Lord came to
vives; et quod post orationem Isaiah, saying: Go and say to Hezekiah...
Ezechiae, factum est verbum I have heard Your prayer... behold I will
domini ad Isaiam dicens, vade, et add to Your days fifteen years” (Is. 38:1
dic Ezechiae: audivi orationem 5). And again, it is said in the name of the
tuam. Ecce, ego adiiciam super Lord: “I will suddenly speak against a
dies tuos quindecim annos. Et nation and against a kingdom to root out
Ierem. 18 dicitur ex persona and to pull down and to destroy it. If that
domini: repente loquar adversus nation against which I have spoken shall
gentem et adversus regnum, ut repent of their evil, I will also repent of the
eradicem et destruam et evil that I have thought to do to them”
disperdam illud. Si poenitentiam (Jer. 18:78). And in Joel (2:1314): “Turn
egerit gens illa a malo suo, quod to the Lord your God, for He is gracious
locutus sum adversus eam, agam and merciful... Who knows whether God
et ego poenitentiam super malo will return and forgive?”
quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Et
Ioelis 213 convertimini ad
dominum Deum vestrum, quia
benignus et misericors est. Quis
scit si convertatur et ignoscat
Deus?
Haec autem si secundum suam [12] Now, these texts, if understood
superficiem intelligantur, ad superficially, lead to an unsuitable
inconveniens ducunt. Sequitur conclusion. For it follows, first of all, that
enim primo, quod voluntas Dei sit God’s will is mutable; also, that something
mutabilis. Item, quod aliquid ex accrues to God in the course of time; and
tempore Deo adveniat. Et ulterius, further, that certain things that occur in
quod aliqua quae temporaliter in time to creatures are the cause of
creaturis sunt, sint causa alicuius something occurring in God. Obviously,
existentis in Deo. Quae sunt these things are impossible, as is evident
manifeste impossibilia, sicut ex from earlier explanations.
superioribus patet.
Adversantur etiam auctoritatibus [13] They are opposed, too, by texts of
sacrae Scripturae, quae Sacred Scripture which contain the
infallibilem continent veritatem et infallible truth clearly expressed. Indeed, it
expressam. Dicitur enim Num. 23 is said in Numbers (23:19): “God is not as
19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut a man that He should lie, nor as the son
mentiatur; nec ut filius hominis, ut of man that He should be changed. Did
mutetur. Dixit ergo, et non faciet? He say then, and will not do it? Has he
Locutus est, et non implebit? Et I spoken, and will He not fulfill?” And in 1
Reg. 1529: triumphator in Israel Sam (15:29): “The triumpher in Israel will
non parcet, et poenitudine non not spare, and will not be moved to
flectetur: neque enim homo est, ut repentance; for He is not a man that He
agat poenitentiam. Et Malach. 36: should repent.” And in Malachi (3:6): “I am
ego dominus, et non mutor. the Lord and I do not change.”
Si quis autem diligenter [14] Now, if a person carefully considers
consideret circa praedicta, these statements, he will find that every
inveniet quod omnis error qui in error that occurs on these points arises
his accidit, ex hoc provenit quod from the fact that thought is not given to
non consideratur differentia inter the difference between universal and
universalem ordinem et particular order. For, since all effects are
particularem. Cum enim omnes mutually ordered, in the sense that they
effectus ordinem ad invicem come together in one cause, it must be
habeant secundum quod in una that, the more universal the cause is, the
causa conveniunt, oportet tanto more general is the order. Hence, the
esse communiorem ordinem, order stemming from the universal cause
quanto est universalior causa. which is God must embrace all things. So,
Unde ab universali causa, quae nothing prevents some particular order
Deus est, ordo proveniens from being changed, either by prayer, or
necesse est quod omnia by some other means, for there is
complectatur. Nihil igitur prohibet something outside that order which could
aliquem particularem ordinem vel change it. For this reason, it is not
per orationem, vel per aliquem astonishing for the Egyptians who reduce
alium modum immutari: est enim the order of human affairs to the celestial
extra illum ordinem aliquid quod bodies, to claim that fate, which depends
possit ipsum immutare. Propter on the stars, can be changed by certain
quod non est mirum si Aegyptii, prayers and ceremonies. Indeed, apart
reducentes rerum humanarum from the celestial bodies and above them
ordinem in corpora caelestia, is God, Who is able to impede the
posuerunt fatum ex stellis celestial bodies' effect which was
proveniens aliquibus orationibus supposed to follow in things here below
et ritibus posse immutari: nam as a result of their influence.
extra caelestia corpora, et supra
ea, est Deus, qui potest impedire
caelestium corporum effectum qui
in istis inferioribus ex illorum
impressione secuturus erat.
Sed extra ordinem complectentem But, outside the order that embraces all

omnia, non potest poni aliquid per things, it is not possible for anything to be
quod possit ordo ab universali indicated by means of which the order
causa dependens everti. Propter depending on a universal cause might be
quod Stoici, qui in Deum sicut in changed. That is why the Stoics, who
causam universalem omnium considered the reduction of the order of
ordinis rerum reductionem things to God to be to a universal cause
considerabant, ponebant quod of all things, claimed that the order
ordo institutus a Deo nulla ratione established by God could not be changed
potest immutari. Sed in hoc iterum for any reason. But, again on this point,
a consideratione universalis they departed from the consideration of a
ordinis recedebant, quod universal order, because they claimed
ponebant orationes ad nihil utiles that prayers were of no use, as if they
esse, tanquam arbitrarentur thought that the wills of men and their
voluntates hominum et eorum desires, from which prayers arise, are not
desideria, ex quibus orationes included under that universal order. For,
procedunt, sub illo universali when they say that, whether prayers are
ordine non comprehendi. Cum offered or not, in any case the same effect

enim dicunt quod, sive orationes in things follows from the universal order
fiant sive non, nihilominus idem of things, they clearly isolate from that
effectus sequitur in rebus ex universal order the wishes of those who
universali ordine rerum, manifeste pray. For, if these prayers be included
ab illo universali ordine vota under that order, then certain effects will
orantium sequestrant. Si enim result by divine ordination by means of
haec sub illo ordine these prayers, just as they do by means
comprehendantur, sicut per alias of other causes. So, it will be the same
causas, ita et per haec, ex divina thing to exclude the effect of prayer as to
ordinatione, aliqui effectus exclude the effect of all other causes.
sequentur. Idem ergo erit Because, if the immutability of the divine
excludere orationis effectum, et order does not take away their effects
omnium aliarum causarum. Quod from other causes, neither does it remove
si aliis causis immobilitas divini the efficacy of prayers. Therefore, prayers
ordinis effectus non subtrahit, retain their power; not that they can
neque orationum efficaciam tollit. change the order of eternal control, but
Valent igitur orationes, non quasi rather as they themselves exist under
ordinem aeternae dispositionis such order.
immutantes, sed quasi sub tali
ordine etiam ipsae existentes.
Nihil autem prohibet per [15] But nothing prevents some particular

orationum efficaciam aliquem order, due to an inferior cause, from being
particularem ordinem alicuius changed through the efficacy of prayers,
inferioris causae mutari, Deo under the operation of God Who
faciente, qui omnes supergreditur transcends all causes, and thus is not
causas, unde sub nulla confined under the necessity of any order
necessitate ordinis alicuius of cause; on the contrary, all the necessity
causae continetur, sed, e of the order of an inferior cause is
converso, omnis necessitas confined under Him as being brought into
ordinis inferioris causae continetur being by Him. So, in so far as something
sub ipso quasi ab eo institutus. in the order of inferior causes established
Inquantum ergo per orationem by God is changed through prayer, God is
immutatur aliquid de ordine said to turn or to repent; not in the sense
inferiorum causarum instituto a that His eternal disposition is changed,
Deo, propter orationes piorum, but that some effect of His is changed.
dicitur Deus converti, vel Hence, Gregory says that “God does not
poenitere: non quod aeterna eius change His plan, though at times He may
dispositio mutetur, sed quia change His judgment”; not, I say, the
mutatur aliquis eius effectus. judgment which expresses His eternal
Unde et Gregorius dicit quod non disposition, but the judgment which
mutat Deus consilium etsi expresses the order of inferior causes, in
quandoque mutet sententiam: accord with which Hezekiah was to have
non, inquam, illam quae exprimit died, or a certain people were to have
dispositionem aeternam; sed illam been punished for their sins. Now, such a
sententiam quae exprimit ordinem change of judgment is called God’s
inferiorum causarum, secundum repentance, using a metaphorical way of
quem Ezechias erat moriturus, vel speaking, in the sense that God is
gens aliqua pro suis peccatis disposed like one who repents, for whom
evertenda. Talis autem sententiae it is proper to change what he had been
mutatio dicitur transumptiva doing. In the same way, He is also said,
locutione Dei poenitentia, metaphorically, to become angry, in the
inquantum Deus ad similitudinem sense that, by punishing, He produces the
poenitentis se habet, cuius est same effect as an angry person.
mutare quod fecerat. Per quem
modum dicitur etiam metaphorice
irasci, inquantum puniendo facit
irascentis effectum.
Caput 97 Chapter 97
Quomodo dispositio HOW THE DISPOSITION OF
providentiae habeat rationem PROVIDENCE HAS A RATIONAL PLAN
Ex his autem quae praemissa [1] From the points set forth above it may

sunt, manifeste videri potest quod be seen clearly that the things which are
ea quae sunt per divinam disposed by divine providence follow a
providentiam dispensata, rational plan.
sequuntur aliquam rationem.
Ostensum enim est quod Deus per [2] Indeed, we showed that God, through
suam providentiam omnia ordinat His providence, orders all things to the
in divinam bonitatem sicut in divine goodness, as to an end; not, of
finem: non autem hoc modo quod course, in such a way that something
suae bonitati aliquid per ea quae adds to His goodness by means of things
fiunt accrescat, sed ut similitudo that are made, but, rather, that the
suae bonitatis, quantum possibile likeness of His goodness, as much as
est, imprimatur in rebus. Quia vero possible, is impressed on things.
omnem creatam substantiam a However, since every created substance
perfectione divinae bonitatis must fall short of the perfection of divine
deficere necesse est, ut perfectius goodness, in order that the likeness of
divinae bonitatis similitudo rebus divine goodness might be more perfectly
communicaretur, oportuit esse communicated to things, it was
diversitatem in rebus, ut quod necessary for there to be a diversity of
perfecte ab uno aliquo things, so that what could not be perfectly
repraesentari non potest, per represented by one thing might be, in
diversa diversimode perfectiori more perfect fashion, represented by a
modo repraesentaretur: nam et variety of things in different ways. For
homo, cum mentis conceptum uno instance, when a man sees that his
vocali verbo videt sufficienter mental conception cannot be expressed
exprimi non posse, verba adequately by one spoken word, he
diversimode multiplicat ad multiplies his words in various ways, to
exprimendam per diversa suae express his mental conception through a
mentis conceptionem. Et in hoc variety of means. And the eminence of
etiam divinae perfectionis divine perfection may be observed in this
eminentia considerari potest, quod fact, that perfect goodness which is
perfecta bonitas, quae in Deo est present in God in a unified and simple
unite et simpliciter, in creaturis manner cannot be in creatures except in
esse non potest nisi secundum a diversified manner and through a

modum diversum et per plura. Res plurality of things. Now, things are
autem per hoc diversae sunt, quod differentiated by their possession of
formas habent diversas, a quibus different forms from which they receive
speciem sortiuntur. Sic igitur ex their species. And thus, the reason for
fine sumitur ratio diversitatis the diversity of forms in things is derived
formarum in rebus. from this end.
Ex diversitate autem formarum [3] Moreover, the reason for the order of
sumitur ratio ordinis rerum. Cum things is derived from the diversity of
enim forma sit secundum quam forms. Indeed, since it is in accord with
res habet esse; res autem its form that a thing has being, and since
quaelibet secundum quod habet anything, in so far as it has being,
esse, accedat ad similitudinem approaches the likeness of God Who is
Dei, qui est ipsum suum esse His own simple being, it must be that
simplex: necesse est quod forma form is nothing else than a divine
nihil sit aliud quam divina likeness that is participated in things.
similitudo participata in rebus; Hence, Aristotle, where he speaks about
unde convenienter Aristoteles, in I form in Physics I [9], quite appropriately
Physic., de forma loquens, dicit says that it is “something godlike and
quod est divinum quoddam et desirable.” But a likeness that is viewed
appetibile. Similitudo autem ad in relation to one simple thing cannot be
unum simplex considerata diversified unless by virtue of the likeness
diversificari non potest nisi being more or less close or remote. Now,
secundum quod magis vel minus the nearer a thing comes to divine
similitudo est propinqua vel likeness, the more perfect it is.
remota. Quanto autem aliquid Consequently, there cannot be a
propinquius ad divinam difference among forms unless because
similitudinem accedit, perfectius one thing exists more perfectly than
est. Unde in formis differentia esse another. That is why Aristotle, in
non potest nisi secundum quod Metaphysics VIII [3], likens definitions,
una perfectior existit quam alia: through which the natures of things and
propter quod Aristoteles, in VIII forms are signified, to numbers, in which
Metaphys., definitiones, per quas species are varied by the addition or
naturae rerum et formae subtraction of unity; so, from this, we are
significantur, assimilat numeris, in made to understand that the diversity of
quibus species variantur per forms requires different grades of
additionem vel subtractionem perfection.
unitatis, ut ex hoc detur intelligi
quod formarum diversitas
diversum gradum perfectionis
requirit.
Et hoc evidenter apparet naturas This is quite clear to one who observes
rerum speculanti. Inveniet enim, si the natures of things. He will find, in fact,
quis diligenter consideret, if he makes a careful consideration, that
gradatim rerum diversitatem the diversity of things is accomplished by
compleri: nam supra inanimata means of gradations. Indeed, he will find
corpora inveniet plantas; et super plants above inanimate bodies, and
has irrationalia animalia; et super above plants irrational animals, and
has intellectuales substantias; et in above these intellectual substances. And
singulis horum inveniet among individuals of these types he will
diversitatem secundum quod find a diversity based on the fact that
quaedam sunt aliis perfectiora, in some are more perfect than others,
tantum quod ea quae sunt inasmuch as the highest members of a
suprema inferioris generis, lower genus seem quite close to the next
videntur propinqua superiori higher genus; and the converse is also
generi, et e converso, sicut true; thus, immovable animals are like
animalia immobilia sunt similia plants. Consequently, Dionysius says [De
plantis; unde et Dionysius dicit, VII div. nom. VII, 3] “Divine wisdom draws
cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina together the last members of things in a
sapientia coniungit fines primorum first class, with the first members of
principiis secundorum. Unde patet things in a second class.” Hence, it is
quod rerum diversitas exigit quod apparent that the diversity of things
non sint omnia aequalia, sed sit requires that not all be equal, but that
ordo in rebus et gradus. there be an order and gradation among
things.
Ex diversitate autem formarum, [4] Now, from the diversity of forms by
secundum quas rerum species which the species of things are
diversificantur, sequitur et differentiated there also results a
operationum differentia. Cum enim difference of operations. For, since
unumquodque agat secundum everything acts in so far as it is actual
quod est actu, quae enim sunt in (because things that are potential are
potentia, secundum quod found by that very fact to be devoid of
huiusmodi, inveniuntur actionis action), and since every being is actual
expertia; est autem unumquodque through form, it is necessary for the
ens actu per formam: oportet quod operation of a thing to follow its form.
operatio rei sequatur formam Therefore, if there are different forms,
ipsius. Oportet ergo, si sunt they must have different operations.
diversae formae, quod habeant
diversas operationes.
Quia vero per propriam actionem [5] But, since each thing attains its proper

res quaelibet ad proprium finem end through its own action, various
pertingit, necesse est et proprios proper ends must be distinguished in
fines diversificari in rebus: things, even though the ultimate end is
quamvis sit finis ultimus omnibus common to all.
communis.
Sequitur etiam ex diversitate [6] From the diversity of forms there also

formarum diversa habitudo follows a diverse relationship of matter to
materiae ad res. Cum enim formae things. In fact, since forms differ because
diversae sint secundum quod some are more perfect than others, there
quaedam sunt aliis perfectiores, are some of them so perfect that they are
sunt inter eas aliquae in tantum selfsubsistent and selfcomplete,
perfectae quod sunt per se requiring no substructure of matter. But
subsistentes et perfectae, ad nihil other forms cannot perfectly subsist by
indigentes materiae fulcimento. themselves, and do require matter as a

Quaedam vero per se perfecte foundation, so that what does subsist is
subsistere non possunt, sed not simply form, nor yet merely matter,
materiam pro fundamento but a thing composed of both.
requirunt: ut sic illud quod subsistit
non sit forma tantum, neque
materia tantum, quae per se non
est ens actu, sed compositum ex
utroque.
Non autem possent materia et [7] Now, matter and form could not
forma ad aliquid unum combine to make up one thing unless
constituendum convenire nisi there were some proportion between
esset aliqua proportio inter ea. Si them. But, if they must be proportionally
autem proportionata oportet ea related, then different matters must
esse, necesse est quod diversis correspond to different forms. Hence, it
formis diversae materiae develops that some forms need simple
respondeant. Unde fit ut quaedam matter, while others need composite
formae requirant materiam matter; and also, depending on the
simplicem, quaedam vero various forms, there must be a different
materiam compositam; et composition of parts, adapted to the
secundum diversas formas, species of the form and to its operation.
diversam partium compositionem
oportet esse, congruentem ad
speciem formae et ad operationem
ipsius.
Ex diversa autem habitudine ad [8] Moreover, as a result of the diversified

materiam sequitur diversitas relationship to matter, there follows a
agentium et patientium. Cum enim diversity of agents and patients. For,
agat unumquodque ratione since each thing acts by reason of its
formae, patiatur vero et moveatur form, but suffers passion and is moved
ratione materiae, oportet quod illa by reason of its matter, those things
quorum formae sunt perfectiores whose forms are more perfect and less
et minus materiales, agant in illa material must act on those that are more
quae sunt magis materialia, et material and whose forms are more
quorum formae sunt imperfect.
imperfectiores.
Ex diversitate autem formarum et [9] Again, from the diversity of forms and

materiarum et agentium sequitur matters and agents there follows a
diversitas proprietatum et diversity of properties and accidents.
accidentium. Cum enim substantia Indeed, since substance is the cause of
sit causa accidentis, sicut accident, as the perfect is of the
perfectum imperfecti, oportet quod imperfect, different proper accidents must
ex diversis principiis result from different substantial principles.
substantialibus diversa accidentia In turn, since from different agents there
propria consequantur. Rursus, result different impressions on the
cum ex diversis agentibus sint patients, there must be, depending on
diversae impressiones in the different agents, different accidents
patientibus, oportet quod that are impressed by agents.
secundum diversa agentia, diversa
sint accidentia quae ab agentibus
imprimuntur.
Patet ergo ex dictis quod, cum per [10] So, it is evident from what we have
divinam providentiam rebus creatis said that, when various accidents,
diversa accidentia, et actiones et actions, passions, and arrangements are
passiones, et collocationes allotted things by divine providence, this
distribuantur, non hoc absque distribution does not come about without
ratione accidit. Hinc est quod a rational plan. Hence, Sacred Scripture
sacra Scriptura rerum ascribes the production and governance
productionem et gubernationem of things to divine wisdom and prudence.
sapientiae et prudentiae divinae Indeed, it is stated in Proverbs (3:1920):
attribuit. Dicitur enim Prov. 319 “The Lord by wisdom bath founded the
dominus sapientia fundavit terram, earth; He has established the heavens by
stabilivit caelos prudentia. prudence. By His wisdom the depths
Sapientia illius eruperunt abyssi, et have broken out, and the clouds grow
nubes rore concrescunt. Et Sap. 8 thick with dew.” And in Wisdom (8:1) it is
1 dicitur de Dei sapientia quod said of the wisdom of God that “it
attingit a fine usque ad finem reaches from end to end mightily, and
fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter. orders all things sweetly.” Again, it is said
Et 1121 eiusdem dicitur: omnia in in the same book: “You have ordered all
mensura, numero et pondere things in measure, and number, and
disposuisti: ut per mensuram weight” (Wis. 11:21). Thus, we I may
quantitatem, sive modum aut understand by measure: the amount, or
gradum perfectionis uniuscuiusque the mode, or degree, of perfection
rei intelligamus; per numerum vero pertaining to each thing; but by number:
pluralitatem et diversitatem the plurality and diversity of species
specierum, consequentem ex resulting from the different degrees of
diversis perfectionis gradibus; per perfection; and by weight: the different
pondus vero inclinationes diversas inclinations to proper ends and
ad proprios fines et operationes, et operations, and also the agents, patients,
agentia et patientia, et accidentia and accidents which result from the
quae sequuntur distinctionem distinction of species.
specierum.
In praedicto autem ordine, [11] Now, in the aforesaid order, in which

secundum quem ratio divinae the rational Plan of divine providence is
providentiae attenditur, primum observed, we have said that first place is
esse diximus divinam bonitatem, occupied by divine goodness as the
quasi ultimum finem, qui est ultimate end, which is the first principle in
primum principium in agendis; matters of action. Next comes the
dehinc vero rerum numerositatem; numerical plurality of things, for the
ad quam constituendam necesse constitution of which there must be
est gradus diversos in formis et different degrees in forms and matters,
materiis, et agentibus et and in agents and patients, and in
patientibus, et actionibus et actions and accidents. Therefore, just as

accidentibus esse. Sicut ergo the first rational principle of divine
prima ratio divinae providentiae providence is simply the divine
simpliciter est divina bonitas, ita goodness, so the first rational principle in
prima ratio in creaturis est earum creatures is their numerical plurality, to
numerositas, ad cuius the establishment and conservation of
institutionem et conservationem which all other things seem to be
omnia alia ordinari videntur. Et ordered. Thus, on this basis it seems to
secundum hoc rationabiliter have been reasonably stated by
videtur esse a Boetio dictum, in Boethius, at the beginning of his
principio suae arithmeticae, quod Arithmetic, that: “All things whatever that
omnia quaecumque a primaeva have been established, at the original
rerum natura constituta sunt, ex coming into being of things, seem to
numerorum videntur ratione esse have been formed in dependence on the
formata. rational character of numbers.
Est autem considerandum quod [12] Moreover, we should consider the
operativa ratio et speculativa fact that operative and speculative
partim quidem conveniunt, partim reason partly agree and partly disagree.
vero differunt. Conveniunt quidem They agree, indeed, on this point: just as
in hoc quod, sicut ratio speculativa speculative reason starts from some
incipit ab aliquo principio et per principle and proceeds through
media devenit ad conclusionem intermediaries to the intended
intentam, ita ratio operativa incipit conclusion, so does operative reason
ab aliquo primo et per aliqua start from something that is first, and go
media pervenit ad operationem vel through certain intermediaries to the
operatum quod intenditur. operation, or to the product of the
Principium autem in speculativis operation, which is intended. But the
est forma et quod quid est: in principle in speculative matters is the
operativis vero finis, quod form and that which is; while in operative
quandoque quidem est forma, matters it is the end, which at times is the
quandoque aliquid aliud. form, at other times something else. Also,
Principium etiam in speculativis the principle in speculative matters must
semper oportet esse necessarium: always be necessary, but in operative
in operativis autem quandoque matters it is sometimes necessary and
quidem est necessarium, sometimes not. Indeed, it is necessary
quandoque autem non; for a man to will felicity as his end, but it
necessarium enim est hominem is not necessary to will to build a house.
velle felicitatem ut finem, non Likewise, in matters of demonstration the
necessarium autem velle domus posterior propositions always follow of
aedificationem. Similiter in necessity from the prior ones, but it is not
demonstrativis semper posteriora always so in operative reasoning; rather,
ad priora de necessitate it is only so when there can be only this
sequuntur: non autem in operativis single way of reaching the end. For
semper, sed tunc solum quando instance, it is necessary for a man who
ad finem non nisi per hanc viam wishes to build a house to get some
perveniri potest; sicut necessarium lumber, but the fact that he tries to get
est volenti aedificare domum quod lumber made of fir depends solely on his
quaerat ligna, sed quod quaerat own will, and not at all on the reason for
ligna abiegna, hoc ex simplici building the house.
voluntate ipsius dependet, non

autem ex ratione domus
aedificandae.
Sic igitur quod Deus suam [13] And so, the fact that God loves His
bonitatem amet, hoc necessarium goodness is necessary, but the fact that it
est: sed hoc non necessario is represented by means of creatures is
sequitur, quod per creaturas not necessary, because divine goodness
repraesentetur, cum sine hoc is perfect without them. Hence, the fact
divina bonitas sit perfecta. Unde that creatures are brought into existence,
quod creaturae in esse though it takes its origin from the rational
producantur, etsi ex ratione character of divine goodness,
divinae bonitatis originem habeat, nevertheless depends solely on God’s
tamen ex simplici Dei voluntate will. But, if it be granted that God wills to
dependet. Supposito autem quod communicate, in so far as is possible, His
Deus creaturis suam bonitatem goodness to creatures by way of
communicare, secundum quod est likeness, then one finds in this the reason
possibile, velit per similitudinis why there are different creatures, but it
modum: ex hoc rationem accipit does not necessarily follow that they are
quod sint creaturae diversae. Non differentiated on the basis of this or that
autem ex necessitate sequitur measure of perfection, or according to
quod secundum hanc vel illam this or that number of things. On the
perfectionis mensuram, aut other hand, if we grant that, as a result of
secundum hunc vel illum numerum an act of divine will, He wills to establish
rerum. Supposito autem ex divina this particular number of things, and this
voluntate quod hunc numerum in definite measure of perfection for each
rebus statuere velit, et hanc thing, then as a result one finds the
unicuique rei perfectionis reason why each thing has a certain form
mensuram: ex hoc rationem and a certain kind of matter. And the
accipit quod habeat formam talem same conclusion is obvious in regard to
et materiam talem. Et similiter in the things that follow.
consequentibus patet.
Manifestum igitur fit quod [14] So, it becomes apparent that
providentia secundum rationem providence disposes things according to
quandam res dispensat: et tamen a rational plan; yet this plan is taken as
haec ratio sumitur ex suppositione something based on the divine will.
voluntatis divinae.
Sic igitur per praemissa duplex [15] Thus, a double error is set aside by
error excluditur. Eorum scilicet qui the foregoing points. There is the mistake
credunt quod omnia simplicem of those who believe that all things follow,
voluntatem sequuntur absque without any rational plan, from God’s
ratione. Qui est error loquentium in pure will. This is the error of the
lege Saracenorum, ut Rabbi exponents of the Law of the Moors, as
Moyses dicit: secundum quos Rabbi Moses says; according to them, it
nulla differentia est quod ignis makes no difference whether fire heats or
calefaciat et infrigidet, nisi quia cools, unless God wills it so. Also refuted
Deus ita vult. Excluditur etiam is the error of those who say that the
error eorum qui dicunt causarum order of causes comes forth from divine
ordinem ex divina providentia providence by way of necessity. It is
secundum modum necessitatis evident from what we have said that both
provenire. Quorum utrumque patet of these views are false.
esse falsum ex dictis.
Sunt autem quaedam verba [16] However, there are some texts of
Scripturae quae videntur simplici Scripture that seem to attribute all things
voluntati divinae omnia attribuere. to the pure divine will. These are not
Quae non dicuntur ad hoc ut ratio expressed in order that reason may be
tollatur a providentiae removed from the dispensation of
dispensatione, sed ut omnium providence, but to show that the will of
primum principium Dei voluntas God is the first principle of all things, as
ostendatur, sicut iam supra dictum we have already said above. Such a text
est. Sicut est illud Psalmi, omnia is that of the Psalm (134:6): “All things
quaecumque voluit dominus, fecit; whatsoever the Lord hath willed, He hath
et Iob 11, quis ei dicere potest: cur done”; again in Job (9:12): “Who can say
ita facis? Et Rom. 919, voluntati to Him: Why dost You so?” Also in
enim eius quis resistit? Et Romans (9:19): “Who resists His will?”
Augustinus dicit, III de Trin.: non And Augustine says: “Nothing but the will
nisi Dei voluntas causa est prima of God is the first cause of health and
sanitatis et aegritudinis; sickness, of rewards and punishments, of
praemiorum atque poenarum, graces and retributions.”
gratiarum atque retributionum.
Sic ergo, cum quaeritur propter [17] And so, when we ask the reason
quid de aliquo naturali effectu, why,” in regard to a natural effect, we can
possumus reddere rationem ex give a reason based on a proximate
aliqua proxima causa: dum tamen, cause; provided, of course, that we trace
sicut in primam causam, back all things to the divine will as a first
reducamus omnia in voluntatem cause. Thus, if the question is asked:
divinam. Sicut, si quaeratur, quare “Why is wood heated in the presence of
lignum est calefactum ad fire?” it is answered: “Because heating is
praesentiam ignis? Dicitur, quia the natural action, of fire”; and this is so
calefactio est naturalis actio ignis. “because beat is its proper accident.” But
Hoc autem: quia calor est this is the result of its proper form, and so
proprium accidens eius. Hoc on, until we come to the divine will.
autem consequitur propriam Hence, if a person answers someone
formam eius. Et sic inde, who asks why wood is heated: “Because
quousque perveniatur ad divinam God willed it,” he is answering it
voluntatem. Unde, si quis appropriately, provided he intends to take
respondet quaerenti quare lignum the question back to a first cause; but not
calefactum est, quia Deus voluit: appropriately, if he means to exclude all
convenienter quidem respondet si other causes.
intendit reducere quaestionem in
primam causam; inconvenienter
vero si intendit omnes alias
excludere causas.
Caput 98 Chapter 98
Quomodo Deus possit facere HOW GOD CAN ACT APART FROM
praeter ordinem suae THE ORDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE,
providentiae, et quomodo non AND HOW NOT
Ex praemissis autem accipi potest [1] Moreover, from the foregoing,

duplicis ordinis consideratio: consideration can be made of a twofold
quorum unus quidem dependet ex order: one depends on the first cause of
prima omnium causa, unde et all, and consequently takes in all things;
omnia complectitur; alius autem while the other is particular, since it
particularis, qui ex aliqua causa depends on a created cause and
creata dependet, et continet illa includes the things that are subject to it.
quae causae illi subduntur. Et hic The second is also of many types,
quidem multiplex est, secundum depending on the diversity of causes that
diversitatem causarum quae inter are found among creatures. Yet, one
creaturas inveniuntur. Unus tamen order is included under another, just as
eorum sub altero continetur: sicut one cause stands under another.
et causarum una sub altera existit. Consequently, all particular orders are
Unde oportet quod omnes contained under the universal order, and
particulares ordines sub illo they come down from that order which is
universali ordine contineantur, et present in things by virtue of their
ab illo descendant qui invenitur in dependence on the first cause. An
rebus secundum quod a prima illustration of this may be observed in the
causa dependent. Huius political area. As a matter of fact, all the
exemplum in politicis considerari members of a family, with one male head
potest. Nam omnes domestici of the household, have a definite order to
unius patrisfamilias ordinem each other, depending on their being
quendam ad invicem habent subject to him. Then, in turn, both this
secundum quod ei subduntur; bead of the family and all other fathers
rursus, tam ipse paterfamilias, who belong to his state have a certain
quam omnes alii qui sunt suae order in regard to each other, and to the
civitatis, ordinem quendam ad governor of the state; and again, the
invicem habent, et ad principem latter, together with all other governors
civitatis; qui iterum, cum omnibus who belong in the kingdom, have an
qui sunt in regno aliquo, ordinem order in relation to the king.
habent ad regem.
Ordinem autem universalem, [2] However, we can consider the

secundum quem omnia ex divina universal order in two ways, in accord
providentia ordinantur, possumus with which all things are ordered by
considerare dupliciter: scilicet divine providence: that is to say, in regard
quantum ad res quae subduntur to the things subject to the order, and in
ordini; et quantum ad ordinis regard to the plan of the order which
rationem, quae ex principio ordinis depends on the principle of order.
dependet.
Ostensum est autem in secundo Now, we showed in Book Two’. that these

quod res ipsae quae a Deo sub things which are subordinated to God do
ordine ponuntur, proveniunt ab not come forth from Him, as from one
ipso non sicut ab agente per who acts by natural necessity, or any
necessitatem naturae, vel other kind of necessity, but from His
cuiuscumque alterius, sed ex simple will, especially as regards the
simplici voluntate, maxime original establishment of things. The
quantum ad primam rerum conclusion remains, then, that apart from
institutionem. Relinquitur ergo the things that fall under the order of
quod praeter ea quae sub ordine divine providence God can make other
divinae providentiae cadunt, Deus things, for His power is not tied down to
aliqua facere potest; non enim est these things.
eius virtus ad has res obligata.
Si autem consideremus [3] But, if we were to consider the
praedictum ordinem quantum ad foregoing order in relation to the rational
rationem a principio dependentem, plan which depends on the principle, then
sic praeter ordinem illum Deus God cannot do what is apart from that
facere non potest. Ordo enim ille order. For that order derives, as we
procedit, ut ostensum est, ex showed, from the knowledge and will of
scientia et voluntate Dei omnia God, ordering all things to His goodness
ordinante in suam bonitatem sicut as an end. Of course, it is not possible for
in finem. Non est autem possibile God to do anything that is not willed by
quod Deus aliquid faciat quod non Him, since creatures do not come forth
sit ab eo volitum: cum creaturae from Him by nature but by will, as has
ab ipso non prodeant naturaliter, been shown. Nor, again, is it possible that
sed per voluntatem, ut ostensum something be done by Him which is not
est. Neque etiam est possibile ab comprehended in His knowledge, since it
eo aliquid fieri quod eius scientia is impossible for anything to be willed
non comprehendatur: cum unless it be known. Nor, further, is it
voluntas esse non possit nisi de possible for Him to do anything in regard
aliquo noto. Neque iterum est to creatures which is not ordered to His
possibile quod in creaturis aliquid goodness as an end, since His goodness
faciat quod in suam bonitatem non is the proper object of His will. In the
sit ordinatum sicut in finem: cum same way, since God is utterly
sua bonitas sit proprium obiectum immutable, it is impossible for Him to will
voluntatis ipsius. Similiter autem, something which He has previously
cum Deus sit omnino immutabilis, rejected with His will; or for Him to begin
impossibile est quod aliquid velit to know something new; or to order it to
cum prius noluerit; aut aliquid de His goodness in a new way.
novo incipiat scire, vel in suam
ordinet bonitatem.
Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin Therefore, God can do nothing that does
sub ordine suae providentiae not fall under the order of His providence,
cadat: sicut non potest aliquid just as He can do nothing that is not
facere quod eius operationi non subject to His operation. Nevertheless, if
subdatur. Potest tamen alia facere His power be considered without
quam ea quae subduntur eius qualification, He can do other things than
providentiae vel operationi, si those which are subject to His providence
absolute consideretur eius or operation, but, because of the fact that
potestas: sed nec potest facere He cannot be mutable, He cannot do
aliqua quae sub ordine things that have not been eternally under
providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non the order of His providence.
fuerint, eo quod mutabilis esse
non potest.
Hanc autem distinctionem quidam [4] Now, certain people who have not
non considerantes, in diversos kept this distinction in mind have fallen
errores inciderunt. Quidam enim into various errors. Thus, some have tried
immobilitatem divini ordinis ad res to stretch the immutability of divine order
ipsas quae ordini subduntur, to the things themselves that are subject
extendere conati sunt, dicentes to the order, asserting that all things must
quod omnia necesse est esse be as they are, with the result that some
sicut sunt: in tantum quod quidam have said that God can do no things
dixerunt quod Deus non potest other than what He does. Against this
alia facere quam quae facit. view is what is found in Matthew (26:53):
Contra quod est quod habetur “Cannot I ask my Father, and He will give
Matth. 2653: an non possum me more than twelve legions of angels?”
rogare patrem meum, et exhibebit
mihi plus quam duodecim legiones
Angelorum?
Quidam autem, e converso, [5] Certain others, conversely, have

mutabilitatem rerum quae divinae transferred the mutability of things
providentiae subiiciuntur, in subject to divine providence to a
mutabilitatem divinae providentiae mutability of divine providence, thinking in
transtulerunt, de eo carnaliter their carnal wisdom that God, in the
sapientes quod Deus, ad modum fashion of a carnal man, is mutable in His
carnalis hominis, sit in sua will. Against this it is stated in Numbers
voluntate mutabilis. Contra quod (23:19): “God is not as a man that He
dicitur Num. 2319: non est Deus should lie, nor as the son of man that He
ut homo, ut mentiatur: nec quasi should be changed.”
filius hominis, ut mutetur.
Alii vero contingentia divinae [6] Others still have removed contingent
providentiae subtraxerunt. Contra events from divine providence. Against
quos dicitur Thren. 337: quis est them it is said in Lamentations (3:37):
iste qui dixit ut fieret aliquid, “Who can command a thing to be done,
domino non iubente? when the Lord commands it not?”
Chapter 99
Caput 99
THAT GOD CAN WORK APART
Quod Deus potest operari praeter
FROM THE ORDER IMPLANTED IN
ordinem rebus inditum,
THINGS,
producendo effectus absque
BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT
causis proximis
PROXIMATE CAUSES
Restat autem ostendere quod [1] It remains to show now that He can

praeter ordinem ab ipso rebus act apart from the order implanted by
inditum agere possit. Him in things.
Est enim ordo divinitus institutus in [2] Indeed, there is an order divinely
rebus ut inferiora per superiora instituted in things to the effect that
moveantur a Deo, ut supra dictum lower things are moved through higher
est. Potest autem Deus praeter ones by God, as we said above. Now,
hunc ordinem facere: ut scilicet ipse God can act apart from this order; for
effectum aliquem in inferioribus instance, He may Himself produce an
operetur, nihil ad hoc agente effect in lower things, with nothing
superiori agente. In hoc enim differt being done, in this case, by a higher
agens secundum necessitatem agent. In fact, there is a difference on
naturae, ab agente secundum this point between an agent that acts by
voluntatem, quod ab agente natural necessity and one that acts
secundum necessitatem naturae according to will; an effect cannot result
effectus non potest sequi nisi from one that acts by natural necessity
secundum modum virtutis activae: except according to the mode of the
unde agens quod est maximae active power—so, an agent that has
virtutis, non potest immediate very great power cannot directly
producere effectum aliquem produce a small effect, but it produces
parvum, sed producit effectum suae an effect in proportion to its power. But,
virtuti proportionatum; in quo tamen in this effect, there is sometimes less
invenitur quandoque minor virtus power than in the cause, and so, by
quam in causa, et sic per multa means of many intermediaries, there
media tandem a causa suprema finally comes to be a small effect from
provenit aliquis parvus effectus. In the highest cause. However, the
agente autem per voluntatem non situation is not the same in the case of
est sic. Nam agens per voluntatem an agent working through will. For one
statim sine medio potest producere who acts through will is able at once to
quemcumque effectum qui suam produce without an intermediary any
non excedat virtutem: artifex enim effect that does not exceed its power.
perfectissimus potest facere opus For instance, the very perfect artisan
quale faciat artifex imperfectus. can produce any kind of work that the
Deus autem operatur per less perfect artisan could make. Now,
voluntatem, et non per necessitatem God operates through will, and not
naturae, ut supra ostensum est. through natural necessity, as we
Igitur minores effectus, qui fiunt per showed above. Therefore, He can
causas inferiores, potest facere produce immediately, without special
immediate absque propriis causis. causes, the smaller effects that are
produced by lower causes.
Adhuc. Virtus divina comparatur ad [3] Again, the divine power is related to

omnes virtutes activas sicut virtus all active powers as a universal power
universalis ad virtutes particulares, in regard to particular powers, as is
sicut per supra dicta patet. Virtus evident from our earlier statements.
autem activa universalis ad Now, universal active power can be
particularem effectum producendum limited in two ways for the purpose of
determinari potest dupliciter. Uno producing a particular effect. One way
modo, per causam mediam is by means of a particular intermediate

particularem: sicut virtus activa cause: thus, the active power of a
caelestis corporis determinatur ad celestial body is limited to the effect of
effectum generationis humanae per generating human beings, by the
virtutem particularem quae est in particular power which is in the semen;
semine; sicut et in syllogismis virtus so, too, in syllogisms, the force of the
propositionis universalis universal proposition is limited to a
determinatur ad conclusionem particular conclusion, by the inclusion of
particularem per assumptionem a particular premise. Another way is by
particularem. Alio modo, per means of understanding, which
intellectum, qui determinatam apprehends a definite form and
formam apprehendit, et eam in produces it in the effect. But the divine
effectum producit. Divinus autem understanding is capable of knowing
intellectus non solum est not only the divine essence which is like
cognoscitivus suae essentiae, quae a universal active power, and also not
est quasi universalis virtus activa; only of knowing universal and first
neque etiam tantum universalium et causes, but all particular ones, as is
primarum causarum; sed omnium clear from the things said above.
particularium, sicut per supra dicta Therefore, it is able to produce
patet. Potest igitur producere immediately every effect that any
immediate omnem effectum quem particular agent can bring about.
producit quodcumque particulare
agens.
Amplius. Cum accidentia [4] Besides, since accidents result from

consequantur principia substantialia the substantial principles of a thing, the
rei, oportet quod ille qui immediate agent who immediately produces the
substantiam rei producit, possit substance of a thing must be able
immediate circa ipsam rem operari immediately to cause, in relation to this
quaecumque ad substantiam ipsius thing, anything whatever that results
consequuntur: generans enim, quod from the thing’s substance. For
dat formam, dat omnes proprietates instance, the generating agent,
et motus consequentes. Ostensum because it gives the form, gives all the
autem est supra quod Deus, in properties and resultant motions. Now,
prima rerum institutione, omnes res we showed above that God, at the first
per creationem immediate in esse establishment of things, brought all
produxit. Potest igitur immediate things immediately into being by
unamquamque rem movere ad creation. Therefore, He is able
aliquem effectum absque mediis immediately to move anything to any
causis. effect without intermediate causes.
Item. Ordo rerum profluit a Deo in [5] Moreover, the order of things flows
res secundum quod est forth from God into things, according as
praeexcogitatus in intellectu ipsius: it is foreknown in His intellect. We
sicut videmus in rebus humanis observe, for example, in human affairs
quod princeps civitatis ordinem apud that the head of a state imposes on the
se praemeditatum civibus imponit. citizens an order that is preconceived
Intellectus autem divinus non est within himself. But the divine
determinatus ad hunc ordinem ex understanding is not determined by
necessitate, ut nullum alium ordinem necessity to this particular order, in the
intelligere possit: cum et nos alium sense that He can understand no other

ordinem per intellectum order; because even we can apprehend
apprehendere possumus; potest intellectually another order. For
enim intelligi a nobis quod Deus instance, it can be understood by us
hominem absque semine ex terra that God may form a man from the
formet. Potest igitur Deus, praeter earth without the use of semen.
inferiores causas, effectum illis Therefore, God can bring about the
causis proprium operari. proper effect of these causes without
lower causes.
Praeterea. Licet ordo rebus inditus a [6] Furthermore, although the order

providentia divina divinam bonitatem implanted in things by divine
suo modo repraesentet, non tamen providence represents in its own way
ipsam repraesentat perfecte: cum divine goodness, it does not represent it
non pertingat bonitas creaturae ad perfectly, because the goodness of a
aequalitatem bonitatis divinae. Quod creature does not attain to equality with
autem non repraesentatur perfecte divine goodness. But that which is not
per aliquod exemplatum, potest perfectly represented by a given copy
iterum praeter hoc alio modo may again be represented in another
repraesentari. Repraesentatio way besides this one. Now, the
autem divinae bonitatis in rebus est representation in things of the divine
finis productionis rerum a Deo, ut goodness is the end for the production
supra ostensum est. Non est igitur of things by God, as we showed above.
voluntas divina determinata ad hunc Therefore, the divine will is not limited
ordinem causarum et effectuum, ut to this particular order of causes and
non possit velle effectum aliquem in effects in such a manner that it is
inferioribus producere immediate unable to will to produce immediately
absque aliis causis. an effect in things here below without
using any other causes.
Adhuc. Universa creatura magis est [7] Again, the whole of creation is more
Deo subdita quam corpus humanum subject to God than the human body is
sit subditum animae eius: nam to its soul, for the soul is in proportion to
anima est corpori proportionata ut its body, as its form, but God surpasses
forma ipsius, Deus autem omnem all proportion to creation. Now, as a
proportionem creaturae excedit. Ex result of the soul imagining something
hoc autem quod anima imaginatur and being moved by strong emotion in
aliquid et vehementer afficitur ad regard to it, there follows at times a
illud, sequitur aliquando immutatio in change in the body toward good health
corpore ad sanitatem vel or sickness, independent of the action
aegritudinem absque actione of the bodily principles that are present
principiorum corporalium quae sunt from birth in the body, in order to affect
nata in corpore aegritudinem vel sickness or health. Therefore, by all the
sanitatem causare. Multo igitur greater reason, as a result of divine will,
magis ex voluntate divina potest an effect can be produced in creatures
effectus aliquis sequi in creaturis without using the causes that are
absque causis quae natae sunt, naturally brought into being for the
secundum naturam, illum effectum purpose of producing such an effect.
producere.
Praeterea. Secundum naturae [8] Besides, according to the order of

ordinem, virtutes activae nature, the active powers of the
elementorum sub virtutibus activis elements are subordinated to the active
corporum caelestium ordinantur. powers of the celestial bodies. But, at
Proprium autem effectum virtutum times, celestial power brings about the
elementarium interdum virtus proper effect of the elemental powers
caelestis efficit absque actione without the action of the element. An
elementi: sicut patet cum sol example is the sun heating,
calefacit absque ignis actione. Multo independently of the action of fire.
igitur magis et divina virtus, absque Therefore, the divine power, for a much
actione causarum creatarum, potest greater reason, can produce the proper
producere proprios effectus earum. effects of. created causes without the
action of these causes.
Si autem quis dicat quod, cum [9] Now, if someone says that, since
ordinem istum rebus Deus indiderit, God did implant this order in things, the
non potest esse absque mutatione production in things of an effect
ipsius ut, praeter ordinem ab ipso independently of its proper causes, and
statutum, operetur in rebus effectus apart from the order established by
absque propriis causis producendo: Him, could not be done without a
ex ipsa rerum natura repelli potest. change in this order, this objection can
Ordo enim inditus rebus a Deo, be refuted by the very nature of things.
secundum id est quod in rebus For the order imposed on things by God
frequenter accidere solet, non is based on what usually occurs, in
autem ubique secundum id quod est most cases, in things, but not on what
semper: multae enim naturalium is always so. In fact, many natural
causarum effectus suos producunt causes produce their effects in the
eodem modo ut frequenter, non same way, but not always. Sometimes,
autem ut semper; nam quandoque, indeed, though rarely, an event occurs
licet ut in paucioribus, aliter accidit, in a different way, either due to a defect
vel propter defectum virtutis agentis, in the power of an agent, or to the
vel propter materiae unsuitable condition of the matter, or to
indispositionem, vel propter aliquod an agent with greater strength—as
fortius agens; sicut cum natura in when nature gives rise to a sixth finger
homine generat digitum sextum. on a man. But the order of providence
Non autem propter hoc deficit aut does not fail, or suffer change, because
mutatur providentiae ordo: nam et of such an event. Indeed, the very fact
hoc ipsum quod naturalis ordo, that the natural order, which is based
institutus secundum ea quae sunt on things that happen in most cases,
frequenter, quandoque deficiat, does fail at times is subject to divine
providentiae subest divinae. Si ergo providence. So, if by means of a
per aliquam virtutem creatam fieri created power it can happen that the
potest ut ordo naturalis mutetur ab natural order is changed from what is
eo quod est frequenter ad id quod usually so to what occurs rarely—
est raro, absque mutatione without any change of divine
providentiae divinae; multo magis providence—then it is more certain that
divina virtus quandoque aliquid divine power can sometimes produce
facere potest, sine suae an effect, without prejudice to its
providentiae praeiudicio, praeter providence, apart from the order
ordinem naturalibus inditum rebus a implanted in natural things by God. In

Deo. Hoc enim ipsum ad suae fact, He does this at times to manifest
virtutis manifestationem facit His power. For it can be manifested in
interdum. Nullo enim modo melius no better way, that the whole of nature
manifestari potest quod tota natura is subject to the divine will, than by the
divinae subiecta est voluntati, quam fact that sometimes He does something
ex hoc quod quandoque ipse outside the order of nature. Indeed, this
praeter naturae ordinem aliquid makes it evident that the order of things
operatur: ex hoc enim apparet quod has proceeded from Him, not by natural
ordo rerum processit ab eo non per necessity, but by free will.
necessitatem naturae, sed per
liberam voluntatem.
Nec debet haec ratio frivola reputari, [10] Nor should this argument, that God
quod Deus aliquid facit in natura ad does a thing in nature in order to
hoc quod se mentibus hominum manifest Himself to the minds of men,
manifestet: cum supra ostensum sit be regarded as of slight importance,
quod omnes creaturae corporales because we showed above that all
ad naturam intellectualem ordinentur corporeal creatures are, in a sense,
quodammodo sicut in finem; ipsius ordered to intellectual nature as an end;
autem intellectualis naturae finis est moreover, the end of this intellectual
divina cognitio, ut in superioribus est nature is divine knowledge, as we
ostensum. Non est ergo mirum si, showed in earlier remarks. So, it is not
ad cognitionem de Deo intellectuali astonishing that some change is made
naturae praebendam, fit aliqua in corporeal substance in order to make
immutatio in substantia corporali. provision for the knowing of God by
intellectual nature.
Chapter 100
Caput 100
THAT THINGS WHICH GOD DOES
Quod ea quae Deus facit praeter
APART FROM THE ORDER OF
naturae ordinem non sunt contra
NATURE ARE NOT CONTRARY TO
naturam
NATURE
Considerandum tamen videtur [1] However, it seems that we should
quod, licet Deus interdum praeter keep in mind that, though God at times
ordinem rebus inditum aliquid does something apart from the order
operetur, nihil tamen facit contra implanted in things, He does nothing
naturam. contrary to nature.
Cum enim Deus sit actus purus, [2] In fact, since God is pure act,
omnia vero alia habeant aliquid de whereas all other things have some
potentia admixtum, oportet quod admixture of potency, God must be
Deus comparetur ad omnia sicut related to all else as a mover is to what
movens ad motum, et activum ad id is moved, and as the active is to what is
quod est in potentia. Quod autem in potency. Now, considering a thing
est in potentia secundum ordinem that is in potency in the natural order to
naturalem in respectu alicuius a certain agent, if some impression is

agentis, si aliquid imprimatur in made on it by that agent, this is not
ipsum ab illo agente, non est contra contrary to nature in an absolute sense,
naturam simpliciter, etsi sit though it may be at times contrary to the
aliquando contrarium particulari particular form which is corrupted by
formae quae corrumpitur per this action. Thus, when fire is generated
huiusmodi actionem: cum enim and air is corrupted by the fiery agent,
generatur ignis et corrumpitur aer natural generation and corruption take
igne agente, est generatio et place. So, whatever is done by God in
corruptio naturalis. Quicquid igitur a created things is not contrary to nature,
Deo fit in rebus creatis, non est even though it may seem to be opposed
contra naturam, etsi videatur esse to the proper order of a particular
contra ordinem proprium alicuius nature.
naturae.
Adhuc. Cum Deus sit primum [3] Again, since God is the primary
agens, ut supra ostensum est, agent as we showed above, all things
omnia quae sunt post ipsum, sunt that come after Him are like instruments
quasi quaedam instrumenta ipsius. for Him. But instruments are made for
Ad hoc autem sunt instrumenta the purpose of subserving the action of
instituta ut deserviant actioni the principal agent, while being moved
principalis agentis, dum moventur by him. Consequently, the matter and
ab ipso: unde talis instrumenti form of an instrument should be such
materia et forma esse debet ut sit that they are suitable for the action
competens actioni quam intendit which the principal agent intends. This
principale agens. Et propter hoc is why it is not contrary to the nature of
non est contra naturam instrumenti an instrument for it to be moved by a
ut moveatur a principali agente, sed principal agent, but, rather, is most
est ei maxime conveniens. Neque fitting for it. Therefore, it is not contrary
igitur est contra naturam cum res to nature when created things are
creatae moventur qualitercumque a moved in any way by God; indeed, they
Deo: sic enim institutae sunt ut ei were so made that they might serve
deserviant. Him.
Praeterea. In agentibus etiam [4] Besides, even among corporeal

corporalibus hoc videtur, quod agents it may be observed that the
motus qui sunt in inferioribus motions that go on in lower bodies, as a
corporibus ex impressione result of the action of higher ones, are
superiorum, non sunt violenti neque not violent or contrary to nature, though
contra naturam, quamvis non they may not seem to be in agreement
videantur convenientes motui with the natural motion which the lower
naturali quem corpus inferius habet body has in accord with the particular
secundum proprietatem suae character of its form, For instance, we
formae: non enim dicimus quod do not say that the tidal ebb and flow of
fluxus et refluxus maris sit motus the sea is a violent motion, because it
violentus, cum sit ex impressione results from the influence of a celestial
caelestis corporis, licet naturalis body; even though the natural motion of
motus aquae sit solum ad unam water is only in one direction, toward the
partem, scilicet ad medium. Multo center. Therefore, it is much more
igitur magis quicquid a Deo fit in impossible to say that whatever is done
qualibet creatura, non potest dici in any creature by God is violent or
violentum neque contra naturam. contrary to nature.
Item. Prima mensura essentiae et [5] Moreover, the primary measure of

naturae cuiuslibet rei est Deus, sicut the essence and nature of each thing is
primum ens, quod est omnibus God; just as He is the first being, which
causa essendi. Cum autem per is the cause of being in all things. Now,
mensuram de unaquaque re since a judgment concerning anything is
sumatur iudicium, oportet hoc dici based on its measure, what is natural
naturale unicuique rei per quod for anything must be deemed what is in
conformatur suae mensurae. Hoc conformity with its measure. So, what is
igitur erit naturale unicuique rei implanted by God in a thing will be
quod ei a Deo inditum est. Ergo et natural to it. Therefore, even if
si eidem rei a Deo aliquid aliter something else is impressed on the
imprimatur, non est contra naturam. same thing by God, that is not contrary
to nature.
Amplius. Omnes creaturae [6] Furthermore, all creatures are

comparantur ad Deum sicut related to God as art products are to an
artificiata ad artificem, ut ex artist, as is clear from the foregoing.
praemissis patet. Unde tota natura Consequently, the whole of nature is
est sicut quoddam artificiatum like an artifact of the divine artistic mind.
divinae artis. Non est autem contra But it is not contrary to the essential
rationem artificii si artifex aliter character of an artist if he should work
aliquid operetur in suo artificio, in a different way on his product, even
etiam postquam ei primam formam after he has given it its first form.
dedit. Neque ergo est contra Neither, then, is it against nature if God
naturam si Deus in rebus does something to natural things in a
naturalibus aliquid operetur aliter different way from that to which the
quam consuetus cursus naturae course of nature is accustomed.
habet.
Hinc est quod Augustinus dicit: [7] Hence, Augustine says: “God, the
Deus, creator et conditor omnium creator and founder of all natures, does
naturarum, nihil contra naturam nothing contrary to nature; for what the
facit: quia id est naturale cuique rei source of all measure, number and
quod facit a quo est omnis modus, order in nature does, is natural to each
numerus et ordo naturae. thing” [Contra Faustum, XXVI, 3].
Caput 101 Chapter 101
De miraculis ON MIRACLES
Haec autem quae praeter [1] Things that are at times divinely
ordinem communiter in rebus accomplished, apart from the generally
statutum quandoque divinitus established order in things, are
fiunt, miracula dici solent: customarily called miracles; for we admire
admiramur enim aliquid cum, with some astonishment a certain event
effectum videntes, causam when we observe the effect but do not
ignoramus. Et quia causa una et know its cause. And since one and the
eadem a quibusdam interdum est same cause is at times known to some
cognita et a quibusdam ignota, people and unknown to others, the result
inde contingit quod videntium is that of several who see an effect at the
simul aliquem effectum, aliqui same time, some are moved to admiring
mirantur et aliqui non mirantur: astonishment, while others are not. For
astrologus enim non miratur instance, the astronomer is not astonished
videns eclipsim solis, quia when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he
cognoscit causam; ignarus autem knows its cause, but the person who is
huius scientiae necesse habet ignorant of this science must be amazed,
admirari, causam ignorans. Sic for he ignores the cause. And so, a certain
igitur est aliquid mirum quoad event is wondrous to one person, but not
hunc, non autem quoad illum. so to another. So, a thing that has a
Illud ergo simpliciter mirum est completely hidden cause is wondrous in
quod habet causam simpliciter an unqualified way, and this the name,
occultam: et hoc sonat nomen miracle, suggests; namely, what is of itself
miraculi, quod scilicet sit de se filled with admirable wonder, not simply in
admiratione plenum, non quoad relation to one person or another. Now,
hunc vel illum tantum. Causa absolutely speaking, the cause hidden
autem simpliciter occulta omni from every man is God. In fact, we proved
homini est Deus: probatum enim above that no man in the present state of
est supra quod eius essentiam life can grasp His essence intellectually.
nullus homo in statu huius vitae Therefore, those things must properly be
intellectu capere potest. Illa igitur called miraculous which are done by
proprie miracula dicenda sunt divine power apart from the order
quae divinitus fiunt praeter generally followed in things.
ordinem communiter observatum
in rebus.
Horum autem miraculorum [2] Now, there are various degrees and
diversi sunt gradus et ordines. orders of these miracles. Indeed, the
Nam summum gradum inter highest rank among miracles is held by
miracula tenent in quibus aliquid those events in which something is done
fit a Deo quod natura nunquam by God which nature never could do. For
facere potest: sicut quod duo example, that two bodies should be
corpora sint simul, quod sol coincident; that the sun reverse its course,
retrocedat aut stet, quod mare or stand still; that the sea open up and
divisum transeuntibus iter offer a way through which people may
praebeat. Et inter haec etiam pass. And even among these an order
ordo attenditur. Nam quanto may be observed. For the greater the
maiora sunt illa quae Deus things that God does are, and the more
operatur, et quanto magis sunt they are removed from the capacity of
remota a facultate naturae, tanto nature, the greater the miracle is. Thus, it
miraculum maius est: sicut maius is more miraculous for the sun to reverse
est miraculum quod sol its course than for the sea to be divided.
retrocedat quam quod mare
dividatur.
Secundum autem gradum in [3] Then, the second degree among

miraculis tenent illa in quibus miracles is held by those events in which
Deus aliquid facit quod natura God does something which nature can do,
facere potest, sed non per illum but not in this order. It is a work of nature
ordinem. Opus enim naturae est for an animal to live, to see, and to walk;
quod aliquod animal vivat, videat but for it to live after death, to see after
et ambulet: sed quod post becoming blind, to walk after paralysis of
mortem vivat, post caecitatem the limbs, this nature cannot do—but God
videat, post debilitatem claudus at times does such works miraculously.
ambulet, hoc natura facere non Even among this degree of miracles a
potest, sed Deus interdum gradation is evident, according as what is
miraculose operatur. Inter haec done is more removed from the capacity of
etiam miracula gradus attenditur, nature.
secundum quod illud quod fit,
magis est a facultate naturae
remotum.
Tertius autem gradus [4] Now, the third degree of miracles
miraculorum est cum Deus facit occurs when God does what is usually
quod consuetum est fieri done by the working of nature, but without
operatione naturae, tamen the operation of the principles of nature.
absque principiis naturae For example, a person may be cured by
operantibus: sicut cum aliquis a divine power from a fever which could be
febre curabili per naturam, divina cured naturally, and it may rain
virtute curatur; et cum pluit sine independently of the working of the
operatione principiorum naturae. principles of nature.
Chapter 102
Caput 102
THAT GOD ALONE WORKS
Quod solus Deus facit miracula
MIRACLES
Ex praemissis autem ostendi potest [1] It can be shown from the foregoing

quod miracula facere solus Deus that God alone can work miracles.
potest.
Quod enim est sub ordine totaliter [2] In fact, whatever is completely
constitutum, non potest supra confined under a certain order cannot
ordinem illum operari. Omnis autem work above that order. But every
creatura constituta est sub ordine creature is established under the order
quem Deus in rebus statuit. Nulla which God has put in things. So, no
ergo creatura potest supra hunc creature can operate above this order;
ordinem operari. Quod est miracula but that is what it means to work
facere. miracles.
Item. Quando aliqua virtus finita [3] Again, when any finite power
proprium effectum operatur ad produces the proper effect to which it is
quem determinatur, non est determined, this is not a miracle, though

miraculum: licet possit esse mirum it may be a matter of wonder for some
alicui qui illam virtutem non person who does not understand that
comprehendit; sicut mirum videtur power. For example, it may seem
ignaris quod magnes trahit ferrum, astonishing to ignorant people that a
vel quod aliquis parvus piscis sit magnet attracts iron or that some little
retinens navem. Omnis autem fish might hold back a ship. But the
creaturae potentia est limitata ad potency of every creature is limited to
aliquem determinatum effectum, vel some definite effect or to certain effects.
ad aliquos. Quicquid igitur virtute So, whatever is done by the power of
cuiuscumque creaturae fiat, non any creature cannot be called a miracle
potest dici miraculum proprium, etsi properly, even though it may be
sit mirum virtutem illius creaturae astonishing to one who does not
non comprehendenti. Quod autem comprehend the power of this creature.
fit virtute divina, quae, cum sit But what is done by divine power, which,
infinita, de se incomprehensibilis being infinite, is incomprehensible in
est, vere miraculum est. itself, is truly miraculous.
Amplius. Omnis creatura in sua [4] Besides, every creature needs for its

actione requirit subiectum aliquod action some subject on which to act, for
in quod agat: solius enim Dei est ex it is the prerogative of God alone to
nihilo aliquid facere, ut supra make something out of nothing, as we
ostensum est. Nihil autem quod showed above. Now, nothing that
requirit in sua actione subiectum, requires a subject for its action can do
potest agere nisi illa ad quae anything other than that to which the
subiectum illud est in potentia: hoc subject is in potency, for the agent acts
enim agens in subiectum aliquod on the subject in order to bring it from
operatur, ut educat illud de potentia potency to act. So, just as no creature
in actum. Nulla igitur creatura, sicut can create, so no creature can produce
nec creare potest, ita nec agere in any effect in a thing except what is
aliqua re nisi quod est in potentia within the potency of that thing. But
illius rei. Fiunt autem multa many miracles are divinely
miracula divinitus dum in re aliqua accomplished, when something is done
fit divina virtute quod non est in in a thing, which is not within the
potentia illius rei: sicut quod potency of that thing; for instance, that a
mortuus reviviscat, quod sol dead person be revived, that the sun
retrocedat, quod duo corpora sint move backwards, that two bodies be
simul. Haec igitur miracula nulla coincident. Therefore, these miracles
virtute creata fieri possunt. cannot be done by any created power.
Adhuc. Subiectum in quod agitur, [5] Moreover, the subject in which an
ordinem habet et ad agens quod action goes on has a relation both to the
reducit ipsum de potentia in actum, agent that reduces it from potency to act
et ad actum in quem reducitur. and to the act to which it is reduced.
Sicut ergo subiectum aliquod est in Hence, just as a certain subject is in
potentia ad aliquem determinatum potency to some definite act, and not to
actum, et non ad quemlibet, ita non merely any act, so also is it impossible
potest reduci de potentia in actum for it to be reduced from potency to
determinatum nisi per agens some definite act except by means of
aliquod determinatum: requiritur some definite agent. Indeed, a different

enim agens diversimode ad kind of agent is required to reduce to
reducendum in diversum actum; different types of act. For instance, since
nam, cum aer sit potentia ignis et air is potentially either fire or water, it is
aqua, alio agente fit actu ignis, et actually made into fire by one agent and
actu aqua. Similiter etiam patet into water by a different one. Likewise, it
quod materia corporalis in actum is clear that corporeal matter is not
aliquem perfectum non reducitur a brought to the condition of perfect
sola virtute universali agente, sed actuality by the sole power of a universal
oportet esse aliquod agens agent; rather, there must be a particular
proprium, per quod determinetur agent by which the influence of the
impressio universalis virtutis ad universal power is limited to a definite
determinatum effectum; in actum effect. Of course, corporeal matter may
autem minus perfectum potest be brought to less perfect actuality by
reduci materia corporalis sola universal power alone, without a
virtute universali, absque particulari particular agent. For example, perfect
agente: animalia enim perfecta non animals are not generated by celestial
generantur ex sola virtute caelesti, power alone, but require a definite kind
sed requiritur determinatum semen; of semen; however, for the generation of
ad generationem vero quorundam certain imperfect animals, celestial
imperfectorum animalium sola power by itself is enough, without
virtus caelestis sufficit, sine semine. semen. So, if the effects that are
Effectus igitur qui in his inferioribus accomplished in these lower bodies are
fiunt, si sint nati fieri a causis naturally capable of being done by
superioribus universalibus sine superior universal causes without the
operatione causarum particularium working of particular lower causes, such
inferiorum, non est miraculum si sic accomplishment is not miraculous. Thus,
fiant: sicut non est miraculum quod it is not miraculous for animals to be
animalia ex putrefactione sine originated from putrefaction,
semine nascantur. Si autem non independently of semen. But, if they do
sunt nati fieri per solas causas not naturally come about through
superiores, requiruntur ad eorum superior causes alone, then particular
complementum causae inferiores lower causes are needed for their
particulares. Cum autem aliquis development. Now, when some effect is
effectus producitur ab aliqua causa produced by a higher cause through the
superiori mediantibus propriis mediation of proper principles, there is
principiis, non est miraculum. Nullo no miracle. Therefore, no miracles can
igitur modo virtute superiorum be worked in any way by the power of
creaturarum aliqua miracula fieri the higher creatures.
possunt.
Amplius. Eiusdem rationis esse [6] Furthermore, it seems to pertain to
videtur quod aliquid operetur ex the same rational principle for a thing to
subiecto; et quod operetur id ad be produced from a subject; for that to
quod est in potentia subiectum; et which the subject is in potency to be
quod ordinate operetur per produced; and for an orderly action to be
determinata media. Nam subiectum produced through definite intermediate
non fit in potentia propinqua ad stages. Indeed, a subject is not
ultimum nisi cum fuerit actu in advanced to proximate potency unless it
media: sicut cibus non est statim has become actual in regard to the
potentia caro, sed cum fuerit intermediate stages; thus, food is not
conversus in sanguinem. Omnis immediately potential flesh, but only
autem creatura necesse habet when it has been changed into blood.
subiecto ad hoc quod aliquid faciat: Now, every creature must have a
nec potest facere nisi ad quod subject, in order to make something, nor
subiectum est in potentia, ut can it make anything to which the
ostensum est. Ergo non potest subject is not in potency, as we showed.
facere aliquid nisi subiectum So, it cannot make anything unless the
reducat in actum per determinata subject is brought to actuality through
media. Miracula igitur, quae fiunt ex definite intermediate stages. Miracles,
hoc quod aliquis effectus producitur then, which result from the fact that an
non illo ordine quo naturaliter fieri effect is produced, but not according to
potest, virtute creaturae fieri non the order in which it can be
possunt. accomplished naturally, cannot be
worked by the power of a creature.
Adhuc. Inter species motus ordo [7] Again, a certain order may be
quidam naturalis attenditur: nam observed in the types of motion. The
primus motuum est motus localis, primary motion is local movement, and
unde et causa aliorum existit; so it is the cause of the other kinds,
primum enim in quolibet genere since the first in any genus is the cause
causa invenitur eorum quae in illo of the subsequent items in that genus.
genere consequuntur. Omnis Now, every effect that is produced in
autem effectus qui in his these lower things must be produced by
inferioribus producitur, per aliquam some generation or alteration. So, this
generationem vel alterationem must occur by means of something that
necesse est ut producatur. Oportet is moved locally if it be accomplished by
igitur quod per aliquid localiter an incorporeal agent, which, strictly
motum hoc proveniat, si fiat ab speaking, cannot be moved locally. Now,
aliquo agente incorporali, quod the effects that are produced by
proprie localiter moveri non possit. incorporeal substances through
Effectus autem qui fiunt a corporeal instruments are not
substantiis incorporeis per corporea miraculous, since bodies only work
instrumenta, non sunt miraculosi: naturally. Therefore, created incorporeal
corpora enim non operantur nisi substances cannot work any miracles by
naturaliter. Non igitur substantiae their own power, and much less can
creatae incorporeae possunt aliqua corporeal substances whose every
miracula facere propria virtute. Et action is natural.
multo minus substantiae corporeae,
quarum omnis actio naturalis est.
Solius igitur Dei est miracula [8] So, it is the prerogative of God alone

facere. Ipse enim est superior to work miracles. Indeed, He is superior
ordine quo universa continentur, to the order in which the whole of things
sicut a cuius providentia totus hic are contained, just as from His
ordo fluit. Eius etiam virtus, cum sit providence this entire order flows.
omnino infinita, non determinatur Moreover, His power, being utterly
ad aliquem specialem effectum; infinite, is not limited to any special
neque ad hoc quod effectus ipsius effect or to the production of a particular
producatur aliquo determinato effect in any limited way, or order.

modo vel ordine.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur de [9] Hence it is said about God in the
Deo: qui facit mirabilia magna Psalm (135:4): “Who alone does great
solus. wonders.”
Quo modo substantiae HOW SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO
spirituales aliqua mirabilia CERTAIN WONDERFUL THINGS
operantur, quae tamen non sunt WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT TRULY
vere miracula MIRACLES
Fuit autem positio Avicennae [1] It was Avicenna’s position that matter
quod substantiis separatis multo is much more obedient to separate
magis obedit materia ad substances, in the production of a certain
productionem alicuius effectus, effect, than it is to the contrary agencies
quam contrariis agentibus in within matter. Consequently, he claimed
materia. Unde ponit quod ad that, when there is an act of apprehension
apprehensionem praedictarum in the aforesaid substances, there results
substantiarum sequitur interdum at times an effect in these things here
effectus aliquis in istis inferioribus, below—for instance, rain, or the healing
vel pluviarum, vel sanitatis alicuius of a sick person—without the mediation of
infirmi, absque aliquo corporeo a corporeal agent.
agente medio.
Cuius quidem signum ab anima [2] He took an indication of this from our
nostra accepit, quae cum fuerit soul. For, when it is possessed of a strong
fortis in sua imaginatione, ad imagination, its body may be changed by
solam apprehensionem immutatur an act of cognition alone. For example,
corpus: sicut cum quis ambulans when a man is walking over a beam
super trabem in alto positam, cadit placed at some height, he falls quite
de facili, quia imaginatur casum easily because, through fear, he imagines
ex timore; non autem caderet si his fall. But he would not fall if the beam
esset trabs illa posita super were placed on the earth, where there
terram, unde casum timere non would be no possibility of fearing a fall. It
posset. Manifestum est etiam is also obvious that, simply as a result of
quod ad solam apprehensionem the cognitive act of the soul, the body
animae calescit corpus, sicut becomes hot, as happens in those who
accidit in concupiscentibus vel are prone to concupiscence, or anger; or
iratis; aut etiam infrigidatur, sicut it may also grow cold, as happens in
accidit in timentibus. Quandoque those subject to fear. Sometimes, too, it is
etiam immutatur ex forti moved by a strong cognitive act toward
apprehensione ad aliquam some illness, such as fever, or even
aegritudinem, puta febrem, vel leprosy. And on this basis, he says that, if
etiam lepram. Et per hunc modum the soul be pure, not subject to bodily
dicit quod, si anima sit pura, non passions, and strong in its cognitive
subiecta corporalibus passionibus, functioning, then not only its own body,
et fortis in sua apprehensione, but even external bodies, obey its act of
obedit apprehensioni eius non apprehension. So much so, that on the
solum corpus proprium, sed etiam occurrence of its act of apprehension a
corpora exteriora: adeo quod ad sick person may be cured, or some
eius apprehensionem sanetur similar result may occur. And he claims
aliquis infirmus, vel aliquid that this is the explanation of the casting
huiusmodi aliud accidat. Et hoc of a spell by fascination; namely, that the
ponit esse causam fascinationis: soul of a person strongly moved by
quia scilicet anima alicuius malevolence has the power to inflict an
vehementer affecta in injury on someone, particularly a child,
malivolentia, habet impressionem who is quite susceptible to impressions,
nocumenti in aliquem, maxime because of the tender condition of his
puerum, qui propter corporis body. Consequently, Avicenna favored the
teneritudinem est facile notion that it is much more likely that the
susceptivus impressionis. Unde cognitive functions of separate
vult quod multo amplius ad substances, which he regarded as the
apprehensionem substantiarum souls or movers of the spheres, result in
separatarum, quas ponit animas certain effects in lower bodies, without the
vel motores orbium, sequantur action of any corporeal agent.
aliqui effectus in istis inferioribus
absque actione alicuius corporalis
agentis.
Haec autem positio satis consona [3] Now, this theory is in agreement with

est aliis suis positionibus. Ponit his other views. For he asserts that all
enim quod omnes formae substantial forms flow down to these
substantiales effluunt in haec lower bodies from separate substances,
inferiora a substantia separata; et and that corporeal agents are merely to
quod corporalia agentia non sunt prepare matter to receive the impression
nisi disponentia materiam ad of a separate agent. Of course, this is not
suscipiendam impressionem true, according to the teaching of
agentis separati. Quod quidem Aristotle, who proves, in the Metaphysics
non est verum secundum [VI, 8], that the forms which are in matter
Aristotelis doctrinam, qui probat in do not come from separate forms, but
VII Metaphys., quod formae quae from forms which are in matter; in this
sunt in materia, non sunt a formis way, in fact, the likeness between the
separatis, sed a formis quae sunt maker and the thing made is discovered.
in materia: sic enim invenietur
similitudo inter faciens et factum.
Exemplum etiam quod sumitur de [4] Moreover, the example that he takes

impressione animae in corpus, from the influence of the soul on the body
non multum adiuvat eius does not help his contention much. For no
intentionem. Non enim ex change in the body results from an act of
apprehensione sequitur aliqua apprehension unless there be attached to
immutatio corporis nisi the apprehension some sort of emotion,
apprehensioni adiuncta fuerit such as joy or fear, or lust, or some other
affectio aliqua, ut gaudii vel passion. Now, passions of this kind occur
timoris, aut concupiscentiae, aut along with a definite motion of the heart,
alterius passionis. Huiusmodi from which there results later a change of
autem passiones accidunt cum the whole body, either in the way of local

aliquo determinato motu cordis, ex motion or of alteration. Consequently, it
quo consequitur ulterius immutatio still remains true that the act of
totius corporis, vel secundum apprehension in a spiritual substance
motum localem vel secundum does not alter the body except through
alterationem aliquam. Unde adhuc the mediation of local motion.
remanet quod apprehensio
substantiae spiritualis non alterat
corpus nisi mediante motu locali.
Quod autem de fascinatione [5] Again, what he suggests in regard to
inducit, non ob hoc accidit quod fascination does not happen as a result of
apprehensio unius immediate the apprehension of one person
immutet corpus alterius: sed quia, immediately changing the body of
mediante motu cordis, immutat another, but because, by means of the
corpus coniunctum; cuius motion of the heart, it causes a change in
immutatio pervenit ad oculum, a the body that is united with the soul; and
quo infici potest aliquid its change reaches the eye, from which it
extrinsecum, praecipue si sit facile is possible to affect something external,
immutabile; sicut etiam oculus particularly if it is easily changed. Thus,
menstruatae inficit speculum. for instance, the eye of a menstruating
woman may affect a mirror.
Substantia igitur spiritualis creata [6] So, with the exception of the use of the

propria virtute nullam formam local motion of some body, a created
inducere potest in materiam spiritual substance cannot by its, own
corporalem, quasi materia ad hoc power produce any form in bodily matter,
sibi obediente ut exeat in actum in the sense that matter would be directly
alicuius formae, nisi per motum subject to it in order to become actual in
localem alicuius corporis. Est terms of a form. Of course, there is this
enim hoc in virtute substantiae capacity within the power of a spiritual
spiritualis creatae, ut corpus substance: a body is obedient to it in
obediat sibi ad motum localem. regard to local motion. But, to move any
Movendo autem localiter aliquod body locally, it makes use of any naturally
corpus, adhibet aliqua naturaliter active power in order to produce its
activa ad effectus aliquos effects, just as the art of metal working
producendos: sicut etiam ars makes use of fire in order to soften the
fabrilis adhibet ignem ad metal. Now, this is not miraculous,
mollificationem ferri. Hoc autem properly speaking. So, the conclusion
non est miraculosum, proprie stands, that created spiritual substances
loquendo. Unde relinquitur quod do not work miracles by their own power.
substantiae spirituales creatae
non faciant miracula propria
virtute.
Dico autem propria virtute: quia [7] Now, I say by their own power, since
nihil prohibet huiusmodi nothing prevents these substances from
substantias, inquantum agunt in working miracles provided they act
virtute divina, miracula facere. through divine power. This may be seen
Quod etiam ex hoc videtur, quod from the fact that one order of angels is
unus ordo Angelorum specialiter specially assigned, as Gregory says, to
deputatur, ut Gregorius dicit, ad the working of miracles. He even says
miracula facienda. Qui etiam dicit that some of the saints “work miracles by
quod quidam sancti miracula their power,” and not merely through
interdum faciunt ex potestate, non intercession.
solum ex intercessione.
Considerandum tamen est quod, [8] However, we should bear in mind the
cum res aliquas naturales vel fact that, when either angels or demons
Angeli vel Daemones adhibent ad make use of natural things in order to
aliquos determinatos effectus, produce definite effects, they use them as
utuntur eis quasi instrumentis instruments, just as a physician uses
quibusdam, sicut et medicus utitur certain herbs as instruments of healing.
ut instrumentis aliquibus herbis ad Now, there proceeds from an instrument
sanandum. Ex instrumento autem not merely an effect corresponding to the
procedit non solum suae virtuti power of the instrument, but also an effect
correspondens effectus, sed etiam beyond its power, in so far as it acts
ultra propriam virtutem, inquantum through the power of the principal agent.
agit in virtute principalis agentis: For instance, a saw or an axe could not
serra enim, aut securis, non make a bed unless they worked as things
posset facere lectum nisi moved by the art adapted to such a
inquantum agunt ut motae ab arte product. Nor could natural heat generate
ad talem effectum; nec calor flesh without the power of the vegetative
naturalis posset carnem generare soul which uses it as a sort of instrument.
nisi virtute animae vegetabilis, So, it is appropriate that certain higher
quae utitur ipso quasi quodam effects result from these natural things,
instrumento. Conveniens est igitur due to the fact that spiritual substances
quod ex ipsis rebus naturalibus use them as instruments.
proveniant aliqui altiores effectus
ex hoc quod spirituales
substantiae eis utuntur quasi
instrumentis quibusdam.
Sic ergo, licet tales effectus [9] So, then, although such effects cannot

simpliciter miracula dici non be called miracles without qualification,
possint, quia ex naturalibus causis since they do result from natural causes,
proveniunt, mirabiles tamen nobis they remain wonderful to us, in two
redduntur dupliciter. Uno modo, ex senses. In one way, this is ‘because such
hoc quod per spirituales causes are applied by spiritual
substantias tales causae modo substances to the Production of their
nobis inconsueto ad effectus effects, in a fashion that is strange to us.
proprios apponuntur: unde et As a consequence, the works of clever
ingeniosorum artificum opera mira artisans appear wondrous because it is
redduntur cum ab aliis non not evident to other people how they are
percipitur qualiter operantur. Alio produced. In a second way, this is due to
modo, ex hoc quod causae the fact that natural causes which are
naturales appositae ad effectus applied to the production of certain effects
aliquos producendos, aliquid receive a particular power as a result of
virtutis sortiuntur ex hoc quod sunt their being instruments of spiritual
instrumenta spiritualium substances. This latter way comes rather

substantiarum. Et hoc magis close to the notion of a miracle.
accedit ad rationem miraculi.
Quod opera magorum non sunt THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS
solum ex impressione ARE NOT SOLELY DUE TO THE
caelestium corporum INFLUENCE OF CELESTIAL BODIES
Fuerunt autem quidam dicentes [1] There have been some who say that

quod huiusmodi opera nobis works of this kind, which are astonishing
mirabilia quae per artes magicas to us when accomplished by the arts of
fiunt, non ab aliquibus spiritualibus magic, are not performed by spiritual
substantiis fiunt, sed ex virtute substances but by the power of celestial
caelestium corporum. Cuius bodies. An indication of this is seen in
signum videtur quod ab the fact that the precise position of the
exercentibus huiusmodi opera stars is carefully noted by those who
stellarum certus situs consideratur. perform these works. Moreover, they
Adhibentur etiam quaedam make use of certain herbs, and other
herbarum et aliarum corporalium corporeal things, as aids in the
rerum auxilia, quasi ad preparation, as it were, of lowgrade
praeparandam inferiorem matter for the reception of the influence
materiam ad suscipiendam of celestial power.
influentiam virtutis caelestis.
Hoc autem expresse apparentibus [2] But this view is clearly opposed by the

adversatur. Cum enim non sit apparitions. Indeed, since it is not
possibile ex aliquibus corporeis possible for understanding to be caused
principiis intellectum causari, ut by corporeal principles, as we proved
supra probatum est, impossibile above, it is impossible for effects peculiar
est quod effectus qui sunt proprii to intellectual nature to be caused by the
intellectualis naturae, ex virtute power of a celestial body. Now, among
caelestis corporis causentur. In these workings of the magicians some
huiusmodi autem operationibus events appear which are the proper
magorum apparent quaedam quae functions of a rational nature. For
sunt propria rationalis naturae instance, answers are given concerning
opera: redduntur enim responsa de things removed by theft, and concerning
furtis sublatis, et de aliis other such matters, and this could be
huiusmodi, quod non posset fieri done only through understanding. So, it
nisi per intellectum. Non est igitur is not true that all effects of this kind are
verum omnes huiusmodi effectus caused solely by the power of celestial
ex sola virtute caelestium bodies.
corporum causari.
Praeterea. Ipsa loquela proprius [3] Again, speech is itself an act peculiar

actus est rationalis naturae. to a rational nature. Now, certain agents
Apparent autem aliqui colloquentes that speak to men appear in these
hominibus in praedictis performances, and they reason

operationibus, et ratiocinantes de discursively about various matters.
diversis. Non est igitur possibile Therefore, it is not possible for things like
quod huiusmodi fiant sola virtute this to be done solely by the power of
caelestium corporum. celestial bodies.
Si quis autem dicat quod [4] Now, if someone says that apparitions

huiusmodi apparentiae non sunt of this kind do not work through external
secundum sensum exteriorem, sed sensation, but only through the
secundum imaginationem tantum: imagination, then, first of all, this does
hoc quidem, primo, non videtur not seem true. In fact, imaginary forms
verum. Non enim alicui apparent do not look like true things to an observer
formae imaginatae quasi res unless there be a loss of discriminatory
verae, nisi fiat alienatio ab power in the external senses. For it is
exterioribus sensibus: quia non impossible for a person to be made to
potest esse quod similitudinibus regard images as things unless the
intendatur tanquam rebus, nisi natural power of sense discrimination
ligato naturali iudicatorio sensus. has been overcome. But these vocal
Huiusmodi autem collocutiones et messages and apparitions are made to
apparitiones fiunt ad homines qui men who exercise their external senses
utuntur libere sensibus freely. So, it is not possible for these
exterioribus. Non est igitur visions and auditory responses to be
possibile quod huiusmodi visa vel solely a matter of imagination.
audita sint secundum
imaginationem tantum.
Deinde, ex quibuscumque formis [5] Then, too, from imaginary forms it is
imaginatis non potest alicui not possible for intellectual knowledge
provenire intellectualis cognitio beyond the natural or acquired ability of
ultra facultatem naturalem vel the intellect to come to a person. This is
acquisitam sui intellectus: quod clear even in the case of dreams, in
etiam in somniis patet, in quibus, which, though there may be some
etsi sit aliqua praesignatio premonition of future events, not
futurorum, non tamen quicumque everyone who experiences dreams is
videns somnia, eorum significata able to understand their meaning. But,
intelligit. Per huiusmodi autem visa through these visions or auditory
vel audita quae apparent in messages which appear in the
operibus magorum, plerumque performances of magicians, intellectual
advenit alicui intellectualis cognitio knowledge of things which surpass the
aliquorum quae sui intellectus capacity of his understanding often
facultatem excedunt: sicut revelatio comes to a person. Examples are the
occultorum thesaurorum, revealing of hidden treasures, the
manifestatio futurorum, et showing of future events, and sometimes
quandoque etiam de aliquibus true answers are given concerning
documentis scientiae alicuius vera scientific demonstrations. So, it must be
respondentur. Oportet ergo quod that either these apparitions and vocal
vel illi apparentes et colloquentes messages are not grasped through the
non videantur secundum imagination only, or, at least, that this
imaginationem tantum: vel saltem case of a man being brought to a
quod hoc fiat virtute alicuius knowledge of such matters through
intellectus superioris, quod homo imaginary presentations of this kind is

per huiusmodi imaginationes in done by the power of a higher
cognitionem talium adducatur; et understanding, and is not done solely by
non fiat hoc virtute solum the power of celestial bodies.
caelestium corporum.
Adhuc. Quod virtute caelestium [6] Again, what is done by the power of
corporum fit, est effectus naturalis: celestial bodies is a natural effect, for the
nam formae naturales sunt quae in forms that are caused in lower bodies by
inferioribus causantur ex virtute the power of celestial bodies are natural.
caelestium corporum. Quod igitur So, that which cannot be natural for
nulli rei potest esse naturale, non anything cannot be done by the power of
potest fieri virtute caelestium celestial bodies. But some such things
corporum. Quaedam autem talia are said to be done during the
fieri dicuntur per operationes aforementioned performances; for
praedictas: sicut quod ad instance, in the presence of a certain
praesentiam alicuius quaecumque man, the bolt of any door is opened for
sera ei pandatur, quod aliquis him, a certain person can become
invisibilis reddatur, et multa invisible, and many other such things are
huiusmodi narrantur. Non est igitur reported. Therefore, it is not possible for
possibile hoc fieri virtute this to be done by the power of celestial
caelestium corporum. bodies.
Amplius. Cuicumque virtute [7] Besides, whenever a subsequent

caelestium corporum confertur perfection is conferred on a subject by
quod posterius est, confertur et ei the power of the celestial bodies, what is
quod prius est. Moveri autem ex se prior to this perfection is also conferred.
consequitur ad habere animam: Now, the power of selfmovement is
animatorum enim proprium est subsequent to the possession of a soul,
quod moveant seipsa. Impossibile for it is proper to animated beings for
est igitur fieri virtute caelestium them to move themselves. So, it is
corporum quod aliquod impossible for something inanimate to be
inanimatum per se moveatur. Fieri made able to move itself by the power of
autem hoc per magicas artes celestial bodies. But it is said that this
dicitur, quod aliqua statua per se can be done by the arts of magic; that a
moveatur, aut vocem emittat. Non statue, for instance, can move itself, or
est ergo possibile quod effectus even speak. So, it is not possible for the
magicarum artium fiat virtute effect of the arts of magic to be done by
caelesti. celestial power.
Si autem dicatur quod statua illa [8] Now, if it is suggested that this statue

sortitur aliquod principium vitae receives a principle of life from the power
virtute caelestium corporum, hoc of celestial bodies, this is impossible. In
est impossibile. Principium enim fact, the principle of life in all living things
vitae in omnibus viventibus est is the substantial form, “for living beings,
forma substantialis: vivere enim est to live is to be,” as the Philosopher says
esse viventibus, ut philosophus in Book II [4] of On the Soul. But it is
dicit, in II de anima. Impossibile est impossible for a thing to receive a new
autem quod aliquid recipiat substantial form without losing the form
aliquam formam substantialem de which it previously possessed, “for the

novo nisi amittat formam quam generation of one thing is the corruption
prius habuit: generatio enim unius of another thing.” Now, in the process of
est corruptio alterius. In making a statue no substantial form is
fabricatione autem alicuius statuae ejected; rather, what is accomplished is a
non abiicitur aliqua forma change of shape only, and this is
substantialis, sed fit transmutatio accidental; the form of copper, or other
solum secundum figuram, quae est material, remains. So, it is not possible
accidens: manet enim forma cupri, for these statues to receive a principle of
vel alicuius huiusmodi. Non est life.
igitur possibile quod huiusmodi
statuae sortiantur aliquod
principium vitae.
Adhuc. Si aliquid per principium [9] Again, if anything is moved by a
vitae moveatur, necesse est quod principle of life, it must have sense
habeat sensum: movens enim est power: the mover is, in fact, sense or
sensus vel intellectus. Intellectus understanding. Now, understanding is
autem in generabilibus et not present in things subject to
corruptibilibus non est sine sensu. generation and corruption, without
Sensus autem non potest esse ubi sensation. But sensation cannot be
non est tactus: nec tactus sine present where there is no touch, nor can
organo medie temperato. Talis touch be without an organ that has a
autem temperies non invenitur in balanced mixture of sensory qualities.
lapide vel cera vel metallo, ex quo Now, such a balanced mixture is not
fit statua. Non est igitur possibile found in stone, or wax, or metal, from
quod huiusmodi statuae moveantur which a statue is made. Therefore, it is
per principium vitae. not possible for these statues to be
moved by a principle of life.
Amplius. Viventia perfecta non [10] Besides, perfect living things are not

solum generantur virtute caelesti, generated by the celestial power alone,
sed etiam ex semine: homo enim but also from semen, “for man, together
generat hominem et sol. Quae with the sun, generates a man.” On the
vero ex sola virtute caelesti sine other hand, things generated without
semine generantur, sunt animalia semen, by the celestial power alone, are
generata ex putrefactione, quae animals generated from putrefaction, and
inter alia ignobiliora sunt. Si igitur they are the lower type of animals. So, if
per virtutem caelestem solam these statues receive a principle of life,
huiusmodi statuae sortiuntur whereby to move themselves, through
principium vitae, per quod moveant the celestial power alone, they must be
seipsa, oportet ea esse the lowest grade of animals. Yet this
ignobilissima inter animalia. Quod would be false if they work through an
tamen esset falsum, si per internal principle of life, for noble
principium vitae intrinsecum operations appear among their activities,
operarentur: nam in earum actibus since they give answers about hidden
apparent nobiles operationes, cum things.
respondeant de occultis. Non est
igitur possibile quod operentur vel
moveantur per principium vitae.
Item. Effectum naturalem virtute [11] Moreover, it is possible for a natural

caelestium corporum productum effect produced by the power of celestial
contingit inveniri absque artis bodies to be accomplished without the
operatione: etsi enim aliquo operation of an art. For, though a man
artificio aliquis operetur ad might work by means of some artful
generationem ranarum, vel device for the purpose of generating
aliquorum huiusmodi, contingit frogs, yet it happens that frogs are
tamen generari ranas absque omni generated without any artificial device.
artificio. Si ergo virtute caelestium So, if these statues that are made by the
corporum huiusmodi statuae, quae art of necromancy receive their principle
per artem nigromanticam fiunt, of life from the power of celestial bodies,
sortiantur principium vitae, erit there should be a possibility of finding a
invenire generationem talium case of the generation of such statues
absque huiusmodi arte. Hoc autem apart from art of this kind. But such a
non invenitur. Manifestum est igitur case is not found. It is obvious, then, that
quod huiusmodi statuae non these statues do not have a principle of
habent principium vitae, neque life, nor are they moved by the power of
moventur virtute caelestis corporis. a celestial body.
Per haec autem excluditur positio [12] The position of Hermes is disposed
Hermetis, qui sic dixit, ut of by these considerations, for he spoke
Augustinus refert, VIII de civitate as follows, as Augustine reports it in the
Dei: Deus sicut effector est deorum City of God [VIII, 23]: “Just as God is the
caelestium, ita homo fictor est maker of the celestial gods, so man is
deorum qui in templis sunt, the maker of the gods who are in the
humana proximitate contenti: temples, content in their nearness to
statuas dico animatas, sensu et man. I mean the animated statues,
spiritu plenas, tantaque facientes endowed with sense and spirit, that do
et talia; statuas futurorum such great and unusual things; statues
praescias; easdem de somniis et that foresee future events, predicting
multis aliis rebus praedicentes; them from dreams and from many other
imbecillitates hominibus facientes, things, that cause weaknesses in men
eosque curantes; tristitiam and also cure them, that give sorrow and
laetitiamque dantes pro meritis. joy, in accord with one’s merits.
Haec etiam positio auctoritate [13] This view is also refuted by divine
divina destruitur. Dicitur enim in authority, for it is said in the Psalm
Psalmo: simulacra gentium (134:1517): “The idols of the Gentiles
argentum et aurum, opera are silver and gold, the works of men’s
manuum hominum. Os habent et hands. They have a mouth and they do
non loquentur: neque enim est not speak... neither is there any breath in
spiritus in ore ipsorum. their mouths.”
Non videtur autem omnino [14] However, it does not seem
negandum quin in praedictis ex necessary to deny altogether that some
virtute caelestium corporum aliquid power may be present in the
virtutis esse possit: ad illos tamen aforementioned objects, resulting from
solos effectus quos virtute the power of the celestial bodies—only it
caelestium corporum aliqua will be for those effects, of course, which
inferiora corpora producere any lower bodies are able to produce by
possunt. the power of celestial bodies.
Unde magorum operationes WHERE THE PERFORMANCES OF THE
efficaciam habeant MAGICIANS GET THEIR EFFICACY
Investigandum autem relinquitur [1] Now, it remains to investigate where
unde artes magicae efficaciam the arts of magic get their efficacy. Indeed,
habeant. Quod quidem facile this can easily be thought out if attention
perpendi potest si modus is paid to their method of operation.
operationis earum attendatur.
In suis enim operationibus utuntur [2] As a matter of fact, in their

vocibus quibusdam significativis performances they use certain significant
ad determinatos effectus words in order to produce given effects.
producendos. Vox autem, But a word, as endowed with meaning,
inquantum est significativa, non has no force except as derived from some
habet virtutem nisi ex aliquo understanding: either from the
intellectu: vel ex intellectu understanding of the speaker or from the
proferentis; vel ex intellectu eius understanding of the one to whom it is
ad quem profertur. Ex proferentis spoken. As an example of such
quidem intellectu, sicut si aliquis dependence on the understanding of the
intellectus sit tantae virtutis quod speaker, suppose an intellect is of such
sua conceptione res possit great power that a thing can be caused by
causare, quam quidem its act of conception, and that the function
conceptionem vocis officio of the spoken word is to present, in some
producendis effectibus way, this conception to the effects that are
quodammodo praesentat. Ex produced. As an example of dependence
intellectu autem eius ad quem on the understanding of the person to
sermo dirigitur, sicut cum per whom the speech is directed, take the
significationem vocis in intellectu case of a listener who is induced to do
receptam, audiens inducitur ad something, through the reception in his
aliquid faciendum. Non autem intellect of the meaning of the word. Now,
potest dici quod voces illae it cannot be claimed that these meaningful
significativae a magis prolatae words spoken by magicians get their
efficaciam habeant ex intellectu efficacy from the understanding of the
proferentis. Cum enim virtus speaker. Indeed, since power results from
essentiam consequatur, virtutis essence, a diversity of power manifests a
diversitas essentialium diversity of essential principles. But the
principiorum diversitatem intellect of men in general is so disposed
ostendit. Intellectus autem that its knowledge is caused by things,
communiter hominum huius instead of it being able to cause things by
dispositionis invenitur quod eius its act of conception. So, if there be any
cognitio ex rebus causatur, magis men who, by their own power, can change
quam sua conceptione res things by the words which express their
causare possit. Si igitur sint aliqui intellectual thought, they will belong to a
homines qui verbis conceptionem different species and will be called men in
sui intellectus exprimentibus res an equivocal sense.
possint transmutare propria
virtute, erunt alterius speciei, et
dicentur aequivoce homines.
Amplius. Virtus faciendi non [3] Moreover, the power to do something
acquiritur per disciplinam, sed is not acquired by study, but only the
solum cognitio aliquid faciendi. knowledge of what to do. Now, some men
Per disciplinam autem aliqui acquire through study the ability to
acquirunt quod huiusmodi produce these magical performances. So,
operationes magicas efficiant. there is no special power in them to
Non igitur est in eis ad huiusmodi produce effects of this kind, but only
effectus producendos virtus knowledge.
aliqua, sed cognitio sola.
Si quis autem dicat quod [4] Now, if someone says that men like
huiusmodi homines sua nativitate, this, in distinction from other men, receive
ex virtute stellarum, sortiuntur the aforesaid power from birth, due to the
prae ceteris virtutem praedictam, power of the stars, so that, no matter how
ita quod, quantumcumque alii much instruction is given to other men, if
instruantur, qui hoc ex nativitate they do not possess this from birth, they
non habent, efficaces in cannot be successful in works of this kind,
huiusmodi operibus esse non our first answer must be that the celestial
possunt: primo quidem dicendum bodies are not able to make an
est quod corpora caelestia super impression on the understanding, as we
intellectum imprimere non showed above. Therefore, no intellect can
possunt, ut supra ostensum est. receive from the power of the stars such a
Non igitur ex virtute stellarum power that the expression of its thought
sortiri potest intellectus alicuius through speech is capable of producing
hanc virtutem quod something.
repraesentatio suae conceptionis
per vocem sit alicuius effectiva.
Si autem dicatur quod etiam [5] But, if it be said that even the
imaginatio aliquid in prolatione imagination produces something when it
vocum significativarum operatur, utters meaningful words, and that the
super quam possunt corpora celestial bodies can make an impression
caelestia imprimere, cum eius on this utterance since this action is
operatio sit per organum performed by means of a bodily organ,
corporale: hoc non potest esse this cannot be true in regard to all the
quantum ad omnes effectus qui effects produced by these arts. It has
per huiusmodi artes fiunt. been shown that not all of these effects
Ostensum est enim quod non can be produced by the power of the
possunt omnes huiusmodi stars. Neither, then, can a man receive
effectus virtute stellarum produci. from the power of the stars this power to
Ergo neque ex virtute stellarum produce such effects.
aliquis sortiri potest hanc virtutem
ut eosdem effectus producat.
Relinquitur igitur quod effectus [6] So, we are left with the conclusion that

huiusmodi compleantur per effects of this kind are accomplished by
aliquem intellectum ad quem some understanding to which the speech
sermo proferentis huiusmodi of the person uttering these words is
voces dirigitur. Huius autem addressed. An indication of this fact is that
signum est: nam huiusmodi meaningful words such as the magicians
significativae voces quibus magi use are called invocations, supplications,
utuntur, invocationes sunt, adjurations, or even commands, implying
supplicationes, adiurationes, aut that one person is speaking to another.
etiam imperia, quasi ad alterum
colloquentis.
Item. In observationibus huius [7] Again, in the practices of this art they
artis utuntur quibusdam use certain symbols and specially shaped
characteribus et figuris figures. Now, shape is the principle of
determinatis. Figura autem nullius neither action nor passion; if it were,
actionis principium est neque mathematical bodies would be active and
passionis: alias, mathematica passive. Hence, it is not possible to
corpora essent activa et passiva. dispose matter by special figures so that it
Non ergo potest per figuras will be receptive to a natural effect. So,
determinatas disponi materia ad the magicians do not use figures as
aliquem effectum naturalem dispositions. The conclusion remains,
suscipiendum. Non ergo utuntur then, that they may use them only as
magi figuris aliquibus quasi signs, for there is no third possibility. Now,
dispositionibus. Relinquitur ergo we do not use signs except in regard to
quod utantur eis solum quasi other intelligent beings. Therefore, the arts
signis: non enim est aliquid of magic get their efficacy from another
tertium dare. Signis autem non intelligent being to whom the speech of
utimur nisi ad alios intelligentes. the magician is addressed.
Habent igitur magicae artes
efficaciam ab alio intelligente, ad
quem sermo magi dirigitur.
Si quis autem dicat quod figurae [8] Now, if someone says that some
aliquae appropriantur aliquibus figures are proper to certain celestial
caelestium corporum; et ita bodies, and so lower bodies are marked
corpora inferiora determinantur by certain figures for the reception of the
per aliquas figuras ad aliquorum influences of the celestial bodies, this
caelestium corporum does not seem a reasonable answer. In
impressiones suscipiendas: fact, a patient is not ordered to the
videtur non rationabiliter dici. Non reception of the influence of an agent,
enim ordinatur aliquod patiens ad unless it be because it is in potency. So,
suscipiendam impressionem only those things whereby a thing
agentis nisi per hoc quod est in becomes potential, in some way,
potentia. Illa ergo tantum determine it to receive a special
determinant ipsum ad specialem impression. But matter is not disposed by
impressionem suscipiendum, per figures so that it is in potency to any form,

quae in potentia fit quodammodo. because figure, according to its rational
Per figuras autem non disponitur meaning, abstracts from all sensible
materia ut sit in potentia ad matter and form, for it is a mathematical
aliquam formam: quia figura object. Therefore, a body is not
abstrahit, secundum suam determined by figures or symbols for the
rationem, ab omni materia et reception of any influence from a celestial
forma sensibili, cum sit quoddam body.
mathematicum. Non ergo per
figuras vel characteres
determinatur aliquod corpus ad
suscipiendam aliquam influentiam
caelestis corporis.
Praeterea. Figurae aliquae [9] Moreover, certain figures are assigned

appropriantur corporibus as proper to celestial bodies, as their
caelestibus ut effectus ipsorum: effects; for the shapes of lower bodies are
nam figurae inferiorum corporum caused by the celestial bodies. But the
causantur a corporibus aforesaid arts do not use characters or
caelestibus. Praedictae autem figures like the effects of celestial bodies.
artes non utuntur characteribus Rather, they are the productions of man,
aut figuris quasi effectibus working by means of art. So, the
caelestium corporum, sed sunt assigning of certain figures as proper to
effectus hominis operantis per celestial bodies seems to contribute
artem. Appropriatio igitur nothing to the discussion.
figurarum ad aliqua caelestia
corpora nihil ad propositum facere
videtur.
Item. Per figuras non disponitur [10] Furthermore, as we have shown,
aliqualiter materia naturalis ad natural matter is not in any way disposed
formam, ut ostensum est. toward form by figures. So, the bodies on
Corpora igitur in quibus sunt which these figures are put have the same
impressae huiusmodi figurae, readiness to receive the celestial influence
sunt eiusdem habilitatis ad as any other bodies of the same species.
recipiendam influentiam Now, the fact that a thing acts on one of a
caelestem cum aliis corporibus group of things equally disposed, because
eiusdem speciei. Quod autem of something specially assigned to that
aliquid agat in unum eorum quae agent which is to be found on that object
sunt aequaliter disposita, propter and not on another, is not indicative of an
aliquid sibi appropriatum ibi agent which acts by natural necessity, but,
inventum, et non in aliud, non est rather, of one which acts through will. It is
operantis per necessitatem clear, then, that arts of this sort which use
naturae, sed per electionem. figures to produce certain effects do not
Patet ergo quod huiusmodi artes get their efficacy from a natural agent, but
figuris utentes ad effectus aliquos from some intellectual substance that acts
producendos, non habent through understanding.
efficaciam ab aliquo agente per
naturam, sed ab aliqua
intellectuali substantia per

intellectum agente.
Hoc etiam demonstrat et ipsum [11] Indeed, the very name that they give
nomen quod talibus figuris to such figures demonstrates this point,
imponunt, characteres eos for they call them characters. As a matter
dicentes. Character enim signum of fact, a character is a sign. By this usage
est. In quo datur intelligi quod we are given to understand that they do
figuris huiusmodi non utuntur nisi not use these figures except as signs
ut signis exhibitis alicui addressed to some intellectual nature.
intellectuali naturae.
Quia vero figurae in artificialibus [12] However, since figures are like
sunt quasi formae specificae, specific forms for art objects, some person
potest aliquis dicere quod nihil could say that nothing prevents the
prohibet quin constitutionem construction of a figure, which specifies an
figurae, quae dat speciem image, as result of some power due to
imagini, consequatur aliqua virtus celestial influence, not as a figure, but as
ex influentia caelesti, non it specifies the artifact which obtains its
secundum quod figura est, sed power from the stars. However,
secundum quod causat speciem concerning the letters with which
artificiati, quod adipiscitur virtutem something is written on an image, and the
ex stellis. Sed de litteris quibus other characters, nothing else can be said
inscribitur aliquid in imagine, et than that they are signs. Hence, they are
aliis characteribus, nihil aliud directed only to some intellect. This is also
potest dici quam quod signa sunt. shown by the offerings, prostrations, and
Unde non habent ordinem nisi ad other similar practices which they use, for
aliquem intellectum. Quod etiam they can be nothing but signs of
ostenditur per sacrificia, reverence addressed to some intellectual
prostrationes, et alia huiusmodi nature.
quibus utuntur, quae non possunt
esse nisi signa reverentiae
exhibitae alicui intellectuali
naturae.
Quod substantia intellectualis THAT THE INTELLECTUAL
quae praestat efficaciam SUBSTANCE WHICH PROVIDES THE
magicis operibus, non est bona EFFICACY FOR MAGIC WORKS IS
secundum virtutem NOT MORALLY GOOD
Est autem ulterius inquirendum [1] We must further inquire what this
quae sit haec intellectualis natura, intellectual nature is, by whose power
cuius virtute tales operationes such operations are done.
fiunt.
Et primo quidem apparet quod [2] First of all, it appears not to be good
non sit bona et laudabilis. and praiseworthy. To offer patronage to
Praestare enim patrocinium things that are contrary to virtue is not the
aliquibus quae sunt contraria act of a welldisposed understanding. But
virtuti, non est alicuius intellectus this is done in these arts, for they are
bene dispositi. Hoc autem fit in often used for purposes of adultery, theft,
huiusmodi artibus: fiunt enim homicide, and other kinds of wrongdoing.
plerumque ad adulteria, furta, As a result, the practitioners of these arts
homicidia, et alia huiusmodi are called malefics. So, the intellectual
maleficia procuranda; unde nature on whose assistance these arts
utentes his artibus malefici depend is not well disposed in relation to
vocantur. Non est ergo bene virtue.
disposita secundum virtutem
intellectualis natura cuius auxilio
huiusmodi artes innituntur.
Item. Non est intellectus bene [3] Again, a morally welldisposed

dispositi secundum virtutem intellect should not be the associate of,
familiarem esse et patrocinium and provide protection for, scoundrels,
exhibere sceleratis, et non while having nothing to do with the best
quibuslibet optimis viris. men. Now, evil men often make use of
Huiusmodi autem artibus utuntur these arts. Therefore, the intellectual
plerumque homines scelerati. Non nature from whose help these arts get
igitur intellectualis natura cuius their efficacy is not well disposed in
auxilio hae artes efficaciam relation to virtue.
habent, est bene disposita
secundum virtutem.
Adhuc. Intellectus bene dispositi [4] Besides, it pertains to a welldisposed

est reducere homines in ea quae intellect to bring men back to things that
sunt hominum propria bona, quae are proper goods for men, namely, the
sunt bona rationis. Abducere igitur goods of reason. Consequently, to lead
ab istis, pertrahendo ad aliqua them away from these goods, by diverting
minima bona, est intellectus them to the least important goods, is the
indecenter dispositi. Per mark of an improperly disposed intellect.
huiusmodi autem artes non Men do not make any progress by means
adipiscuntur homines aliquem of these arts in the goods of reason which
profectum in bonis rationis, quae are the sciences and the virtues, but,
sunt scientiae et virtutes: sed in rather, in certain least important things,
quibusdam minimis, sicut in such as the finding of stolen goods and
inventione furtorum et the catching of thieves, and such things.
deprehensione latronum, et his Therefore, the intellectual substances
similibus. Non igitur substantiae with whose aid these arts are exercised
intellectivae quarum auxilio hae are not well disposed in relation to virtue.
artes utuntur, sunt bene dispositae
secundum virtutem.
Amplius. In operationibus [5] Moreover, some deception and

praedictarum artium illusio irrationality are observable in the

quaedam videtur, et practices of these arts. In fact, arts of this
irrationabilitas: requirunt enim kind need a man who is not engrossed in
huiusmodi artes hominem re sexual matters, yet they often are used to
venerea non attrectatum, cum arrange illicit affairs. But, in the workings
tamen plerumque adhibeantur ad of a welldisposed intellect nothing
illicitos concubitus conciliandos. In unreasonable or out of keeping with its
operatione autem intellectus bene nature is apparent. Therefore, these arts
dispositi nihil irrationabile et sibi do not employ the patronage of an
diversum apparet. Non igitur intellect that is well disposed in relation to
huiusmodi artes utuntur patrocinio virtue.
intellectus bene dispositi
secundum virtutem.
Praeterea. Non est bene [6] Furthermore, he who feels called upon

dispositus secundum intellectum to help another by the committing of a
qui per aliqua scelera commissa crime is not well disposed in his intellect.
provocatur ad auxilium alicui But this is done in these arts, for we read
ferendum. Hoc autem fit in istis about some people who, in their practice,
artibus: nam aliqui in executione have killed innocent children. Therefore,
earum leguntur innocentes pueros those by whose help such things are
occidisse. Non igitur sunt boni done are not good intellects.
intellectus quorum auxilio ista
fiunt.
Item. Bonum proprium intellectus [7] Again, the proper good of an intellect
est veritas. Cum igitur boni sit is truth. So, since to attract to the good is
bonum adducere, cuiuslibet proper to a good being, it seems to be the
intellectus bene dispositi esse function of every welldisposed intellect to
videtur alios perducere ad bring others to the truth. But in the
veritatem. In operationibus autem practices of the magicians many things
magorum pleraque fiunt quibus are done whereby men are made sport of
ludificentur homines et and are deceived. So, the intellect whose
decipiantur. Intellectus igitur cuius help they use is not well disposed
auxilio utuntur, non est bene morally.
dispositus secundum morem.
Adhuc. Intellectus bene dispositus [8] Besides, a welldisposed intellect is

veritate allicitur, in qua delectatur, attracted by truth, takes pleasure in it and
non autem mendaciis. Magi autem not in lies. But the magicians use certain
in suis invocationibus utuntur lies in their invocations, by which they
quibusdam mendaciis, quibus entice those whose help they employ.
alliciant eos quorum auxilio They also make certain impossible
utuntur: comminantur enim threats, such as, unless he who is being
quaedam impossibilia, sicut quod, invoked provides help, the magician who
nisi ille qui invocatur opem ferat, is asking it will shatter the sky, or displace
invocans caelum comminuet, aut the stars, as Porphyry relates in his Letter
sidera deponet; ut narrat to Anebontes. Therefore, these
Porphyrius in epistola ad intellectual substances with whose help

Anebontem. Illae igitur the works of the magicians are
intellectuales substantiae quibus accomplished do not seem to be well
adiuvantibus operationes disposed in their intellect.
magorum perficiuntur, non
videntur bene dispositae
secundum intellectum.
Amplius. Non videtur esse [9] Moreover, it does not seem the
habentis intellectum bene attribute of a possessor of a well
dispositum ut, si sit superior, disposed intellect for it, if it be superior, to
imperanti sibi subdatur sicut submit like an inferior to the one who
inferior: aut si sit inferior, ut sibi ab commands it, or, if it is inferior, to permit
eo quasi superiori supplicari itself to be invoked as if it were a
patiatur. Magi autem invocant eos superior. But the magicians humbly
quorum auxilio utuntur suppliciter, invoke as their superiors those whose
quasi superiores: cum autem assistance they employ, but when they
advenerint, imperant eis quasi appear the magicians command them like
inferioribus. Nullo igitur modo inferiors. So, in no way do they seem well
videntur bene dispositi secundum disposed in relation to intellect.
intellectum.
Per haec autem excluditur [10] By these considerations the error of
gentilium error, qui huiusmodi the pagans is set aside, for they
operationes diis attribuebant. attributed such works to the gods.
Quod substantia intellectualis THAT THE INTELLECTUAL
cuius auxilio magicae artes SUBSTANCE WHOSE HELP THE
utuntur, non est mala secundum ARTS OF MAGIC USE IS NOT EVIL
suam naturam IN ITS OWN NATURE
Non est autem possibile quod sit [1] Now, it is not possible for there to
naturalis malitia in substantiis be natural malice in the intelligent
intelligentibus quarum auxilio substances with whose help the arts of
magicae artes operantur. magic work.
In illud enim in quod aliquid tendit [2] A thing does not tend accidentally,
secundum suam naturam, non tendit but essentially, to the objective to which
per accidens, sed per se: sicut grave it inclines by its nature, as, for instance,
deorsum. Sed si huiusmodi a heavy body tends downward. But, if
intellectuales substantiae sint intellectual substances of this kind are
secundum suam naturam malae, evil in their nature, they tend to evil
naturaliter in malum tendent. Non naturally. Therefore, they do not tend
igitur per accidens, sed per se accidentally, but essentially, to evil. But
tendent ad malum. Hoc autem est this is impossible, for we showed
impossibile: ostensum est enim above that all things essentially tend to
supra quod omnia per se tendunt ad the good, and that nothing tends to

bonum, et nihil tendit ad malum nisi evil, except accidentally. Therefore,
per accidens. Non igitur huiusmodi these intellectual substances are not
intellectuales substantiae sunt evil in their nature.
secundum suam naturam malae.
Adhuc. Quicquid est in rebus, [3] Again, whatever is present in things

oportet quod vel causa vel causatum must be either a cause or a thing
sit: alioquin ad alia ordinem non caused; otherwise, it would have no
haberet. Aut igitur huiusmodi relation to other things. So, these
substantiae sunt causae tantum, aut substances are either causes only or
etiam causata. Si autem causae; they are also caused. Now, if they are
malum autem non potest esse causa causes, and if evil cannot be the cause
alicuius nisi per accidens, ut supra of anything, except accidentally, as we
ostensum est; omne autem quod est showed above, but if everything that is
per accidens, oportet reduci ad id accidental must be traced back to what
quod est per se: oportet quod in eis is essential, then there must be
sit aliquid prius quam eorum malitia, something in them prior to their malice,
per quod sint causae. Primum autem something by which they may be
in unoquoque est eius natura et causes. Now, first in each thing is its
essentia. Non igitur secundum suam nature and essence. Therefore,
naturam sunt malae huiusmodi substances of this kind are not evil in
substantiae. their nature.
Idem etiam sequitur si sunt causata. [4] Moreover, the same thing follows, if
Nam nullum agens agit nisi they are caused. For no agent acts
intendens ad bonum. Malum ergo unless it intends the good. So, evil
non potest esse effectus alicuius cannot be the effect of any cause,
causae nisi per accidens. Quod except accidentally. Now, that which is
autem causatur per accidens only caused accidentally cannot be
tantum, non potest esse secundum according to nature, since every nature
naturam: cum omnis natura has a definite way of coming into
determinatum modum habeat quo being. Therefore, it is impossible for
procedit in esse. Non est igitur substances of this kind to be evil in
possibile quod huiusmodi their nature.
substantiae sint malae secundum
suam naturam.
Amplius. Unumquodque entium [5] Furthermore, each thing has its

habet proprium esse secundum proper act of being in accord with the
modum suae naturae. Esse autem, mode of its nature. Now, to be, as
inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum: such, is good: the mark of this is that
cuius signum est quod omnia esse all things desire to be. Therefore, if
appetunt. Si igitur huiusmodi substances of this kind were evil in
substantiae secundum suam their nature, they would have no act of
naturam essent malae, nullum esse being.
haberent.
Item. Ostensum est supra quod nihil [6] Again, we showed above that

potest esse quin a primo ente esse nothing can be unless it gets its act of
habeat; et quod primum ens est being from the first being, and that the
summum bonum. Cum autem omne first being is the highest good. Now,
agens, inquantum huiusmodi, agat since every agent, as such, produces
sibi simile, oportet quod ea quae a something like itself, the things that
primo ente sunt, bona sint. come from the first being must be
Praedictae igitur substantiae, good. Therefore, the aforesaid
secundum quod sunt et naturam substances, in so far as they exist and
aliquam habent, non possunt esse have a nature, cannot be evil.
malae.
Adhuc. Impossibile est aliquid esse [7] Besides, it is impossible for
quod sit universaliter privatum anything to be which is wholly deprived
participatione boni: cum enim idem of participation in the good. For, since
sit appetibile et bonum, si aliquid the desirable and the good are the
esset omnino expers boni, nihil same thing, if something were utterly
haberet in se appetibile; unicuique devoid of goodness it would have
autem est appetibile suum esse. nothing desirable in it; but to each thing
Oportet igitur quod, si aliquid its own being is desirable. Therefore, it
secundum suam naturam dicatur is necessary that, if anything is called
malum, quod hoc non sit quasi evil in its nature, then this is not evil in
simpliciter malum, sed quia est the absolute sense, but evil in relation
malum huic, vel quantum ad hoc: to a particular thing or in some
sicut venenum non est simpliciter particular way. Thus, poison is not an
malum, sed huic, cui est nocivum; unqualified evil, but only to this
unde quod est uni venenum, est individual for whom it is harmful.
alteri cibus. Hoc autem contingit ex Hence, “what is one man’s poison is
eo quod bonum particulare quod est another man’s meat.” Now, this
proprium huius, est contrarium bono happens because the particular good
particulari quod est proprium that is proper to this individual is
alterius: sicut calor, qui est bonum contrary to the particular good that is
ignis, est contrarium frigori, quod est proper to another individual. Thus,
bonum aquae, et destruit ipsum. Illud heat, which is good for fire, is the
igitur quod secundum suam naturam contrary to and is destructive of cold,
ordinatur in bonum non particulare, which is good for water. Now,
sed simpliciter, impossibile est quod something which is by its nature
neque secundum hunc modum ordered to the good that is not
possit naturaliter dici malum. Tale particular, but absolute, cannot be
autem est omnis intellectus: nam called evil naturally, even in this sense.
eius bonum est in propria But every intellect is such, for its good
operatione, quae est universalium, et is found in its proper operation, which
eorum quae sunt simpliciter. Non est is concerned with universals and with
igitur possibile quod aliquis things that exist without qualification.
intellectus sit secundum suam So, it is impossible for any intellect to
naturam malus, non solum be evil in its own nature, either
simpliciter, sed nec secundum quid. absolutely or relatively so.
Item. In unoquoque habente [8] Moreover, in each thing that
intellectum, naturali ordine intellectus possesses understanding the intellect
movet appetitum: proprium enim moves the appetite according to the
obiectum voluntatis est bonum natural order, for the proper object of
intellectum. Bonum autem voluntatis the will is the good that is understood.
est in eo quod sequitur intellectum: But the good of the will consists in the
sicut in nobis bonum est quod est fact that it follows the understanding; in
secundum rationem, quod autem est our case, for instance, the good is what
praeter hoc, malum est. Naturali is in accord with reason, but what is
igitur ordine substantia intellectualis apart from reason is evil. So, in the
vult bonum. Impossibile est igitur natural order, an intellectual substance
quod illae substantiae intellectuales wills the good. It is impossible, then, for
quarum auxilio magicae artes these intellectual substances, whose
utuntur, sint naturaliter malae. help the arts of magic use, to be
naturally evil.
Praeterea. Cum voluntas tendat in [9] Furthermore, since the will tends
bonum intellectum naturaliter, sicut naturally toward the good that is
in proprium obiectum et finem, understood as to its proper object and
impossibile est quod aliqua end, it is impossible for an intellectual
intellectualis substantia malam substance to have a will evil in its
secundum naturam habeat nature unless its intellect naturally errs
voluntatem, nisi intellectus eius in regard to the judgment of the good.
naturaliter erret circa iudicium boni. But no intellect can be like that, for
Nullus autem intellectus talis potest false judgments in the area of
esse: falsa enim iudicia in intellectual operations are like
operationibus intellectus sunt sicut monsters among natural things; they
monstra in rebus naturalibus, quae are not in accord with nature, but apart
non sunt secundum naturam, sed from nature. In fact, the good of the
praeter naturam; nam bonum intellect, and its natural end, is the
intellectus, et eius finis naturalis est knowledge of truth. Therefore, it is
cognitio veritatis. Impossibile est impossible for any intellect to exist
igitur quod aliquis intellectus sit qui which is naturally deceived in its
naturaliter in iudicio veri decipiatur. judgment of the true. And so, neither is
Non igitur possibile est quod sit it possible for there to be an intellectual
aliqua substantia intellectualis substance naturally possessing a bad
habens naturaliter malam will.
voluntatem.
Adhuc. Nulla potentia cognoscitiva [10] Again, no cognitive potency fails in

deficit a cognitione sui obiecti nisi the knowing of its object unless
propter aliquem defectum aut because of some defect or corruption
corruptionem suam, cum secundum in itself, since it is ordered according to
propriam rationem ad cognitionem its own rational character to the
talis obiecti ordinetur: sicut visus non knowledge of this object. Thus, sight
deficit a cognitione coloris nisi aliqua does not fail in the knowing of color
corruptione circa ipsum existente. unless there be some corruption
Omnis autem defectus et corruptio present in sight itself. But all defect and
est praeter naturam: quia natura corruption are apart from nature,
intendit esse et perfectionem rei. because nature intends the being and
Impossibile est igitur quod sit aliqua perfection of the thing. So, it is
virtus cognoscitiva quae naturaliter impossible that there be any cognitive
deficiat a recto iudicio sui obiecti. power which naturally falls short of the

Proprium autem obiectum intellectus right judgment of its object. But the
est verum. Impossibile est igitur proper object of the intellect is the true.
quod sit aliquis intellectus naturaliter It is impossible, then, for there to be an
circa cognitionem veri oberrans. intellect naturally tending to err in
Neque igitur voluntas aliqua regard to the knowledge of the true.
naturaliter potest a bono deficere. Therefore, neither can any will naturally
fall short of the good.
Hoc etiam auctoritate Scripturae [11] This is also solidly supported by
firmatur. Dicitur enim I Tim. 44: the text of Scripture. Indeed, it is said
omnis creatura Dei bona. Et Gen. 1 in 1 Timothy (4:4): “Every creature of
31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, God is good”; and in Genesis (1:31):
et erant valde bona. “God saw all things that He had made,
and they were very good.”
Per haec autem excluditur error [12] By this, then, we refute the error of

Manichaeorum ponentium huiusmodi the Manicheans, who asserted that
substantias intellectuales, quas intellectual substances of this kind,
Daemones consueto nomine dicimus whom we call by the customary name
vel Diabolos, esse naturaliter malas. of demons or devils, are naturally evil.
Excluditur etiam opinio quam [13] Also disposed of is the view which

Porphyrius narrat, in epistola ad Porphyry reports, in his Letter to
Anebontem, dicens quosdam opinari Anebontes, where he says: “Some
esse quoddam spirituum genus, cui people are of the opinion that there is a
exaudire magos sit proprium, natura kind of spirits whose function is to hear
fallax, omniforme, simulans deos et the requests of the magicians, spirits
Daemones et animas defunctorum. who are false by nature, having every
Et hoc est quod efficiat haec omnia form, taking on the appearance of gods
quae videntur esse vel bona vel and demons and the souls of the dead.
prava. Ceterum circa ea quae vere And this is the kind that produces all
sunt bona, nihil opitulari: immo vero these apparitions, whether good or
ista nec nosse. Sed et mala bad. Moreover, as regards the things
conciliare et insimulare, atque that are truly good, no help is given by
impedire nonnunquam virtutis them; or, better, they do not even know
sedulos sectatores, et plenum esse them. Instead, they advise evil things,
temeritatis et fastus, gaudere and blame and frequently binder
nidoribus, adulationibus capi. Haec zealous followers of virtue; and they
quidem Porphyrii verba malitiam are full of boldness and pride; they take
Daemonum, quorum auxilio artes pleasure in frothy exhalations and are
magicae utuntur, satis aperte overcome by false praises.” Indeed,
declarant. In hoc autem solo these words of Porphyry quite plainly
reprehensibilia sunt, quod hanc express the evil character of the
malitiam naturaliter eis dicit inesse. demons whose help the magic arts
employ. The only point in which his
words are objectionable is his
statement that this evil is naturally
present in them.
Rationes quibus probari videtur ARGUMENTS WHEREBY IT SEEMS
quod in Daemonibus non possit TO BE PROVED THAT THERE CAN
esse peccatum BE NO SIN IN DEMONS
Si autem in Daemonibus non est [1] Now, if malice is not natural in the
naturalis malitia; ostensum autem demons, and if it has been shown that
est eos esse malos: necessario they are evil, it must follow that they are
relinquitur quod sint voluntate mali. had voluntarily. So, we must ask how
Oportet igitur inquirere quomodo this can be, for it seems to be altogether
hoc possibile sit. Videtur enim impossible.
omnino hoc impossibile esse.
Ostensum est enim in secundo [2] Indeed, it was shown in Book Twos
nullam substantiam intellectualem that no intellectual substance is naturally
esse corpori naturaliter unitam nisi united to a body except the human soul,
animam humanam: vel secundum or also, according to some thinkers, the
quosdam, animas corporum souls of celestial bodies. But, in regard
caelestium, de quibus inconveniens to the latter, it is not appropriate to think
est aestimare quod sint malae, cum that they are evil, since the motion of the
motus caelestium corporum sit celestial bodies is most orderly, and in a
ordinatissimus, et totius ordinis way is the source of the entire order of
naturalis quodammodo principium. nature. Now, every other cognitive
Omnis autem alia cognoscitiva potency besides the intellect uses
potentia praeter intellectum utitur animated bodily organs. So, it is not
organis corporalibus animatis. Non possible for there to be in substances of
est ergo possibile quod in this kind any cognitive power other than
huiusmodi substantiis sit aliqua understanding. Hence, whatever they
virtus cognoscitiva nisi intellectus. know, they understand. Now, one does
Quicquid igitur cognoscunt, not err in regard to the object which one
intelligunt. In eo autem quod quis understands, since all error arises from
intelligit, non errat: ex defectu enim a failure to understand. Therefore, there
intelligendi provenit omnis error. can be no error in such substances'
Non potest igitur esse aliquis error knowledge. Moreover, no sin can occur
in cognitione substantiarum talium. in the will without error, since the will
Nullum autem voluntatis peccatum always tends toward the good as
potest esse absque errore: quia apprehended. Consequently, unless
voluntas semper tendit in bonum there is an error in the apprehension of
apprehensum; unde, nisi in the good, there cannot be a sin in the
apprehensione boni erretur, non will. Therefore, it seems that there can
potest esse in voluntate peccatum. be no sin in the will of these substances.
Videtur igitur quod in huiusmodi
substantiis non possit esse
voluntatis peccatum.
Adhuc. In nobis peccatum [3] Again, in our case, as regards the
voluntatis accidit circa ea de quibus things of which we possess universal

in universali scientiam veram knowledge, sin occurs in our will
habemus, per hoc quod in because the judgment of reason is
particulari impeditur iudicium impeded on a particular point by some
rationis ex aliqua passione passion which shackles the reason. But
rationem ligante. Hae autem these passions cannot occur in demons,
passiones in Daemonibus esse non because such passions belong to the
possunt: quia hae passiones sunt sensitive part of the soul, which cannot
partis sensitivae, quae nullam operate without a bodily organ. So, if
habet operationem sine organo separate substances of this kind have
corporali. Si igitur huiusmodi right knowledge on the universal level, it
substantiae separatae habent is impossible for their will to incline to
rectam scientiam in universali, evil because of a defect of knowledge
impossibile est quod per defectum on the particular level.
cognitionis in particulari voluntas in
malum tendat.
Amplius. Nulla virtus cognoscitiva [4] Besides, no cognitive power is

circa proprium obiectum decipitur, deceived in regard to its proper object,
sed solum circa extraneum: visus but only in regard to something foreign
enim non decipitur in iudicio to it. For instance, sight is not deceived
colorum; sed, dum homo per visum in judging color, but, when a man judges
iudicat de sapore vel de specie rei, by sight concerning the taste or species
in hoc deceptio accidit. Proprium of a thing, deception may occur in that
autem obiectum intellectus est case. But the proper object of
quidditas rei. In cognitione igitur understanding is the quiddity of a thing.
intellectus deceptio accidere non Hence, in the cognitive act of an
potest, si puras rerum quidditates intellect, provided it apprehend pure
apprehendat, sed omnis deceptio quiddities, deception cannot occur.
intellectus accidere videtur ex hoc Rather, all intellectual deception seems
quod apprehendit formas rerum to happen because it apprehends the
permixtas phantasmatibus, ut in forms of things mixed together with
nobis accidit. Talis autem modus phantasms, as happens in our case. But
cognoscendi non est in substantiis such a mode of knowing is not found in
intellectualibus corpori non unitis: intellectual substances that are not
quia phantasmata non possunt united with a body, since phantasms
esse absque corpore. Non est igitur cannot be without a body. Therefore, it is
possibile quod in substantiis not possible for cognitive error to occur
separatis accidat error in in separate substances; neither, then,
cognitione. Ergo neque peccatum can sin be in their will.
voluntatis.
Item. In nobis falsitas accidit in [5] Moreover, falsity occurs in our case
operatione intellectus componentis in the intellectual operation of
et dividentis, ex hoc quod non composing and dividing, as a result of
absolute rei quidditatem the fact that it does not apprehend the
apprehendit, sed rei apprehensae quiddity of a thing simply, but, rather,
aliquid componit. In operatione combines something with the thing that
autem intellectus qua apprehendit is apprehended. Of course, in the
quod quid est, non accidit falsum operation of the intellect, whereby it
nisi per accidens, secundum quod apprehends that which is, no falsity
in hac etiam operatione permiscetur occurs except accidentally, by virtue of
aliquid de operatione intellectus mixing, even in this operation, some part
componentis et dividentis. Quod of the operation of the intellect
quidem contingit inquantum composing and dividing. Indeed, this
intellectus noster non statim, sed happens because our intellect does not
cum quodam inquisitionis ordine ad immediately attain the knowledge of the
cognoscendam quidditatem alicuius quiddity of a thing, but with a certain
rei pertingit: sicut cum primo order in the process of inquiry. For
apprehendimus animal, et example, we first apprehend animal,
dividentes per oppositas then we divide it into the opposed
differentias, altera relicta, unam differences, and, leaving one aside, we
generi apponimus, quousque put the other with the genus, until we
perveniamus ad definitionem come to the definition of the species.
speciei. In quo quidem processu Now, falsity may occur in this process if
potest falsitas accidere, si something is taken as a difference in the
accipiatur ut differentia generis genus which is not a difference in the
quod non est generis differentia. Sic genus. Of course, to proceed in this way
autem procedere ad to the quidditative knowledge of
cognoscendum de aliquo quid est, something pertains to an intellect
est intellectus ratiocinando reasoning discursively from one thing to
discurrentis de uno ad aliud. Quod another. This is not proper to separate
non competit substantiis intellectual substances, as we showed
intellectualibus separatis, ut supra above. Hence, it does not seem that any
ostensum est. Non videtur igitur error can occur in the knowledge of
quod possit aliquis error accidere in these substances. Consequently, neither
cognitione huiusmodi can sin occur in their will.
substantiarum. Unde nec in
voluntate earum peccatum accidere
potest.
Praeterea. Cum nullius rei appetitus [6] Furthermore, since in no case does

tendat nisi in proprium bonum, the appetite of a thing tend to anything
impossibile videtur id cuius est other than its proper good, it seems
singulariter unum solum bonum, impossible for that for which there is
quod in suo appetitu erret. Et uniquely but one sole good to err in its
propter hoc, etsi peccatum accidat appetite. For this reason, though
in rebus naturalibus propter something wrong may happen in natural
defectum contingentem in things because of a contingent defect in
executione appetitus, nunquam the working of the appetite, such wrong
peccatum accidit in appetitu never occurs in natural appetite; thus, a
naturali: semper enim lapis tendit stone always tends downward, whether
deorsum, sive perveniat sive it achieves its goal or is stopped. But sin
impediatur. In nobis autem does occur in our act of appetition,
peccatum accidit in appetendo, because, since our nature is composed
quia, cum sit natura nostra of the spiritual and the corporeal, there
composita ex spirituali et corporali, are several goods for us. Our good in
sunt in nobis plura bona: aliud enim regard to understanding is indeed
est bonum nostrum secundum different from what it is according to
intellectum, et aliud secundum sensation, or even according to the
sensum, vel etiam secundum body. Now, there is a certain order of
corpus. Horum autem diversorum these various things that are man’s
quae sunt hominis bona, ordo goods, based on the fact that what is
quidam est, secundum quod id less primary is subordinated to what is
quod est minus principale, ad more primary. Hence, a sin occurs in our
principalius referendum est. Unde will when, failing to observe this order,
peccatum voluntatis in nobis accidit we desire what is only relatively good for
cum, tali ordine non servato, us, in opposition to what is absolutely
appetimus id quod est nobis bonum good. However, such a complexity and
secundum quid, contra id quod est diversity of goods is not found in the
bonum simpliciter. Talis autem separate substances; on the contrary,
compositio et diversitas bonorum every good for them is according to the
non est in substantiis separatis: understanding. Therefore, it is not
quinimmo omne eorum bonum est possible for there to be a sin in the will
secundum intellectum. Non est for them, as it would seem.
igitur in eis possibile quod sit
peccatum voluntatis, ut videtur.
Adhuc. In nobis peccatum [7] Again, in us sin occurs in the will, as

voluntatis accidit ex a result of excess or defect, and virtue
superabundantia vel defectu, in consists in the mean between these. So,
quorum medio virtus consistit. Unde in things which do not admit of excess
in his in quibus non est accipere or defect, but only of the mean, it is not
superabundantiam et defectum, possible for the will to sin. For instance,
sed solum medium, non contingit no one can sin by desiring justice, for
voluntatem peccare: nullus enim justice is itself a certain mean. Now,
peccare potest in appetendo separate intellectual substances cannot
iustitiam, nam ipsa iustitia medium desire anything except intellectual
quoddam est. Substantiae autem goods; indeed, it is ridiculous to say that
intellectuales separatae non those who are incorporeal in their nature
possunt appetere nisi bona desire corporeal goods, or that those
intellectualia: ridiculum enim est without sense power desire sensible
dicere quod bona corporalia goods. But among intellectual goods
appetant qui secundum suam one can find no excess, for these goods
naturam incorporei sunt, aut bona are in themselves means between
sensibilia quibus non est sensus. In excess and defect; just as the true is a
bonis autem intellectualibus non est mean between two errors, one of which
accipere superabundantiam: nam goes too far, the other not far enough.
secundum se media sunt Consequently, both sensible and
superabundantiae et defectus; sicut corporeal goods achieve the mean, to
verum medium est inter duos the extent that they are in accord with
errores, quorum unus est reason. So, it does not seem that
secundum plus, alter secundum separate intellectual substances can sin
minus; unde et sensibilia et by their will.
corporalia bona in medio sunt prout
secundum rationem sunt. Non
videtur igitur quod substantiae
intellectuales separatae secundum
voluntatem peccare possint.
Amplius. Magis a defectibus remota [8] Besides, incorporeal substance

videtur substantia incorporea quam seems farther removed from defects
corporalis. In substantiis autem than is corporeal substance. But, in the
corporeis quae sunt a contrarietate case of corporeal substances that are
remotae, nullus defectus accidere without contrariety, no defect can occur;
potest: scilicet in corporibus for instance, in the celestial bodies.
caelestibus. Multo igitur minus in Much less possible, then, is it for any sin
substantiis separatis, et a to occur in separate substances, which
contrarietate remotis, et a materia, are removed both from contrariety, from
et a motu, ex quibus videtur matter, and from motion, from which
defectus aliquis posse contingere, sources any possible defect would seem
aliquod peccatum contingere to come.
potest.
Quod in Daemonibus possit esse THAT SIN CAN OCCUR IN DEMONS,
peccatum, et qualiter AND IN WHAT WAY
Quod autem in Daemonibus sit [1] However, that there is sin of the will
peccatum voluntatis, manifestum in demons is obvious from the text of
est ex auctoritate sacrae Sacred Scripture. In fact, it is said in 1
Scripturae. Dicitur enim I Ioan. 33, John (3:8) that “the devil sins from the
quod Diabolus ab initio peccat. Et beginning”; and in John (8:44) it is said
Ioan. 844, de Diabolo dicitur quod that “the devil is a liar and the father of
est mendax, et pater mendacii et lies” and that “he was a murderer from
quod homicida erat ab initio. Et the beginning.” And in Wisdom (2:24) it
Sap. 224 dicitur quod invidia is said that “by the envy of the devil,
Diaboli mors introivit in orbem death came into the world.”
terrarum.
Si quis autem sequi vellet [2] Moreover, if anyone wished to follow

Platonicorum positiones, facilis the views of the Platonists, that would
esset via ad solvendum praedicta. be an easy way to answer the
Dicunt enim Daemones esse arguments stated above. For they say
animalia corpore aerea: et sic, cum that demons are animals with an aerial
habeant sibi corpora unita, potest in body; and so, since they have bodies
eis etiam esse pars sensitiva. Unde united to them, there can also be in
et passiones, quae nobis sunt them a sensitive part. Hence, they also
causa peccati, eis attribuunt, scilicet attribute passions to them, which are for
iram, odium, et alia huiusmodi: us a cause of sin; namely, anger, hate,
propter quod dicit Apuleius quod and others of like kind. This is why
sunt animo passiva. Apuleius says that they are passive in
their mind.
Praeter hoc etiam quod uniti [3] Also, apart from this contention that
corporibus esse perhibentur, they are united to bodies according to
secundum positiones Platonis forte the views of Plato, it might perhaps be
posset in eis aliud genus cognitionis possible to claim another kind of
poni quam intellectus. Nam knowledge in them, other than that of
secundum Platonem, etiam anima the intellect. For, according to Plato, the
sensitiva incorruptibilis est. Unde sensitive soul is also incorruptible.
oportet quod habeat operationem Hence, it must have an operation in
cui non communicet corpus. Et sic which the body does not share. Thus,
nihil prohibet operationem nothing is to prevent the operation of the
sensitivae animae inveniri in sensitive soul and, consequently,
substantia aliqua intellectuali, passions from taking place in any
quamvis corpori non unita: et per intellectual substance, even though it is
consequens passiones. Et sic not united with a body. And so, there
manet in eis eadem radix peccandi remains in them the same source of
quae est in nobis. sinful action that is found in us.
Sed utrumque praemissorum est [4] However, both of these foregoing
impossibile. Quod enim non sint views are impossible. As a matter of
aliquae aliae substantiae fact, we showed above that there are no
intellectuales unitae corporibus other intellectual substances united to
praeter animas humanas, ostensum bodies besides human souls. Moreover,
est supra. Quod autem operationes that the operations of the sensitive soul
sensitivae animae non possint esse cannot go on without the body is
sine corpore, hinc apparet quod, apparent from the fact that, with the
corrupto aliquo organo sentiendi, corruption of any organ of sensation, the
corrumpitur operatio una sensus: operation of one sense is corrupted. For
sicut, corrupto oculo, visio deficit. instance, if the eye be destroyed, vision
Propter quod et, corrupto organo fails. For this reason, when the organ of
tactus, sine quo non potest esse touch is corrupted, without which an
animal, oportet quod animal animal cannot exist, the animal must
moriatur. die.
Ad evidentiam igitur praemissae [5] So, for the clarification of the
dubitationis, considerandum est aforesaid difficulty, we must give some
quod, sicut est ordo in causis consideration to the fact that, as there is
agentibus, ita etiam in causis an order in agent causes, so also is
finalibus: ut scilicet secundarius there one in final causes, so that, for
finis a principali dependeat, sicut instance, a secondary end depends on
secundarium agens a principali a principal one, just as a secondary
dependet. Accidit autem peccatum agent depends on a principal one. Now,
in causis agentibus quando something wrong happens in the case
secundarium agens exit ab ordine of agent causes when a secondary
principalis agentis: sicut, cum tibia agent departs from the order of the
deficit propter suam curvitatem ab principal agent. For example, when the
executione motus quem virtus leg bone fails because of its
appetitiva imperabat, sequitur crookedness in the carrying out of the
claudicatio. Sic igitur et in causis motion which the appetitive power has
finalibus, cum finis secundarius non commanded, limping ensues. So, too, in
continetur sub ordine principalis the case of final causes, when a
finis, est peccatum voluntatis, cuius secondary end is not included under the
obiectum est bonum et finis. order of the principal end, there results
a sin of the will, whose object is the

good and the end.
Quaelibet autem voluntas [6] Now, every will naturally wishes what

naturaliter vult illud quod est is a proper good for the volitional agent,
proprium volentis bonum, scilicet namely, perfect being itself, and it
ipsum esse perfectum, nec potest cannot will the contrary of this. So, in
contrarium huius velle. In illo igitur the case of a volitional agent whose
volente nullum potest voluntatis proper good is the ultimate end, no sin
peccatum accidere cuius proprium of the will can occur, for the ultimate end
bonum est ultimus finis, quod non is not included under the order of
continetur sub alterius finis ordine, another end; instead, all other ends are
sed sub eius ordine omnes alii fines contained under its order. Now, this kind
continentur. Huiusmodi autem of volitional agent is God, Whose being
volens est Deus, cuius esse est is the highest goodness, which is the
summa bonitas, quae est ultimus ultimate end. Hence, in God there can
finis. In Deo igitur peccatum be no sin of the will.
voluntatis esse non potest.
In quocumque autem alio volente, [7] But in any other kind of volitional
cuius proprium bonum necesse est agent, whose proper good must be
sub ordine alterius boni contineri, included under the order of another
potest peccatum accidere good, it is possible for sin of the will to
voluntatis, si in sua natura occur, if it be considered in its own
consideratur. Licet enim naturalis nature. Indeed, although natural
inclinatio voluntatis insit unicuique inclination of the will is present in every
volenti ad volendum et amandum volitional agent to will and to love its
sui ipsius perfectionem, ita quod own perfection so that it cannot will the
contrarium huius velle non possit; contrary of this, yet it is not so naturally
non tamen sic est ei inditum implanted in the agent to so order its
naturaliter ut ita ordinet suam perfection to another end, that it cannot
perfectionem in alium finem quod fail in regard to it, for the higher end is
ab eo deficere non possit: cum finis not proper to its nature, but to a higher
superior non sit suae naturae nature. It is left, then, to the agent’s
proprius, sed superioris naturae. choice, to order his own proper
Relinquitur igitur suo arbitrio quod perfection to a higher end. In fact, this is
propriam perfectionem in the difference between those agents
superiorem ordinet finem. In hoc who have a will, and those things which
enim differunt voluntatem habentia are devoid of will: the possessors of will
ab his quae voluntate carent, quod order themselves and their actions to
habentia voluntatem ordinant se et the end, and so they are said to be free
sua in finem, unde et liberi arbitrii in their choice; whereas those devoid of
esse dicuntur: quae autem will do not order themselves to their
voluntate carent, non ordinant se in end, but are ordered by a higher agent,
finem, sed ordinantur a superiori being moved by another being to the
agente, quasi ab alio acta in finem, end, not by themselves.
non autem a seipsis.
Potuit igitur in voluntate substantiae [8] Therefore, it was possible for sin to

separatae esse peccatum ex hoc occur in the will of a separate
quod proprium bonum et substance, because it did not order its
perfectionem in ultimum finem non proper good and perfection to its
ordinavit, sed inhaesit proprio bono ultimate end, but stuck to its own good
ut fini. Et quia ex fine necesse est as an end. And because the rules of
quod regulae actionis sumantur, action must be derived from the end, the
consequens est ut ex seipsa, in qua consequence is that this separate
finem constituit, alia regulari substance tried to arrange for the
disponeret, et ut eius voluntas ab regulation of other beings from himself
alio superiori non regularetur. Hoc wherein he had established his end, and
autem soli Deo debetur. Et thus his will was not regulated by
secundum hoc intelligendum est another, higher one. But this function
quod appetiit Dei aequalitatem: non belongs to God alone. In terms of this,
quidem ut bonum suum esset we should understand that “he desired
divino bono aequale; hoc enim in to be equal to God” (Is. 14:14). Not,
intellectu cadere non poterat; et hoc indeed, that his good would be equal to
appetendo appeteret se non esse, the divine good, for this thought could
cum distinctio specierum secundum not have occurred in his understanding,
diversos gradus rerum proveniat, ut and in desiring such a thing he would
ex supra dictis apparet. have desired not to exist, since the
distinction of species arises from the
different grades of things, as is clear
from previous statements.
Velle autem alios regulare, et However, to will to rule others, and not
voluntatem suam a superiori non to have his will ruled by a higher one, is
regulari, est velle praeesse, et to will to take first place and, in a sense,
quodammodo non subiici, quod est not to be submissive; this is the sin of
peccatum superbiae. Unde pride. Hence, it may appropriately be
convenienter dicitur quod primum said that the first sin of the demon was
peccatum Daemonis fuit superbia. pride. But since a diversified and
Sed quia ex uno errore circa pluralized error results from one error
principium varius et multiplex error concerning the starting point, multiple
consequitur, ex prima inordinatione sin followed in his will as a result of the
voluntatis quae fuit in Daemone, first disorder of the will which took place
consecutum est multiplex peccatum in the demon: sins both of hatred toward
in voluntate ipsius: et odii ad Deum, God, as One Who resists his pride and
ut resistentem suae superbiae, et punishes his fault most justly, and of
punientem iustissime suam culpam; envy toward man, and many other
et invidiae ad hominem; et multa similar sins.
alia huiusmodi.
Considerandum est etiam quod, [9] We should also consider that, when
cum proprium alicuius bonum habet an agent’s proper good is related to
ordinem ad plura superiora, liberum several higher goods, the volitional
est volenti ut ab ordine alicuius agent is free to depart from the order of
superiorum recedat et alterius one superior and free not to abandon
ordinem non derelinquat, sive sit the order of another, whether it be
superior sive inferior: sicut miles, higher or lower. Thus, a soldier who is
qui ordinatur sub rege et sub duce subordinate to the king and to the leader

exercitus, potest voluntatem suam of the army can order his will to the
ordinare in bonum ducis et non leader’s good and not to the king’s, or
regis, aut e converso. Sed si dux ab vice versa. But, if the leader departs
ordine regis recedat, bona erit from the order of the king, the will of the
voluntas militis recedentis a soldier who abandons the will of the
voluntate ducis et dirigentis leader and directs his will to the king is
voluntatem suam in regem, mala going to be good, whereas the will of the
autem voluntas militis sequentis soldier who follows the will of the leader
voluntatem ducis contra voluntatem against the will of the king is going to be
regis: ordo enim inferioris principii bad, for the order of a lower principle
dependet ab ordine superioris. depends on the order of a higher one.
Substantiae autem separatae non Now, separate substances are not only
solum ordinantur sub Deo, sed una subordinated to God, but one of them is
etiam earum ordinatur sub alia, a subordinated to another, from the first to
prima usque ad ultimam, ut in the last, as we showed in Book Two.
secundo ostensum est. Et quia in And since in each volitional agent under
quolibet volente sub Deo potest God there can be a sin of the will, if he
esse peccatum voluntatis, si in sua were considered in his own nature, it
natura consideretur, possibile fuit was possible for some of the higher
quod aliqua de superioribus, aut ones, or even the highest of all, to sin in
etiam suprema inter omnes, his will. And, in fact, this is probably
peccaret secundum voluntatem. Et what happened, for he would not have
hoc quidem satis probabile est: non been satisfied with his own good as an
enim in suo bono quievisset sicut in end unless his good were quite perfect.
fine nisi suum bonum valde So, it possibly happened in this way:
perfectum esset. Potuit igitur fieri some of the lower ones, through their
quod de inferioribus aliquae, per own will, ordered their good to his, and
propriam voluntatem, bonum suum departing from the divine order they
ordinarent in ipsam, recedentes a sinned in like fashion; others, however,
divino ordine, quae similiter observing in the movement of their will
peccaverunt: aliae vero, servantes the divine order, rightly departed from
in motu suae voluntatis divinum the order of the sinful one, even though
ordinem, ab ordine peccantis, he was a superior in the order of nature.
quamvis superioris secundum But how the will of both kinds
naturae ordinem, recte recederent. perseveres immutably in goodness, or
Quomodo vero in bonitate vel in evil, will be shown in Book Four, for
malitia immobiliter utrorumque this has to do with the punishments and
voluntas perseverat, ostendetur in rewards of the good and the evil.
quarto: hoc enim pertinet ad
poenas vel praemia bonorum vel
malorum.
Hoc autem differt inter hominem et [10] But there is this difference between

substantiam separatam, quod in man and a separate substance: in one
uno homine sunt plures appetitivae man there are several appetitive
virtutes, quarum una sub altera powers, one subordinated to the other.
ordinatur. Quod quidem in Now, this is not the case in separate
substantiis separatis non contingit: substances, though one of these
una tamen earum est sub altera. substances stands under another. Now,
Peccatum autem in voluntate sin occurs in the will when in any way
contingit qualitercumque appetitus the lower appetite rebels. So, just as sin
inferior deflectatur. Sicut igitur could occur in the separate substances,
peccatum in substantiis separatis either by being turned away from the
esset vel per hoc quod deflecteretur divine order, or by one of the lower ones
ab ordine divino, vel per hoc quod being turned aside from the order of a
aliqua earum inferior deflecteretur superior one which continues under the
ab ordine alicuius superioris sub divine order, so also, in one man, sin
ordine divino manentis; ita in may occur in two ways. One way is due
homine uno contingit peccatum to the fact that the human will does not
dupliciter: uno modo, per hoc quod order its proper good to God; in fact, this
voluntas humana bonum proprium kind of sin is common both to man
non ordinat in Deum: quod quidem himself and to the separate substance.
peccatum est commune et sibi et Another way is due to the good of the
substantiae separatae. Alio modo, lower appetite not being ruled in accord
per hoc quod bonum inferioris with the higher appetite; for example,
appetitus non regulatur secundum we may desire the pleasures of the flesh
superiorem: puta quando to which the concupiscible appetite
delectabilia carnis, in quae inclines, in discord with the order of
concupiscibilis tendit, volumus non reason. Now, this latter kind of sin
secundum ordinem rationis. cannot occur in separate substances.
Huiusmodi autem peccatum non
contingit in substantiis separatis
esse.
Chapter 110
Caput 110
ANSWER TO THE PREVIOUS
Solutio praemissarum rationum
ARGUMENTS
Sic ergo quae obiecta sunt non [1] So, then, it is not difficult to answer
difficile est solvere. the arguments that have been
presented.
Non enim cogimur dicere quod [2] As a matter of fact, we are not forced

error fuerit in intellectu substantiae to say that there was error in the
separatae iudicando bonum quod understanding of a separate substance,
bonum non sit: sed non in judging a good not to be a good.
considerando bonum superius, ad Instead, it was in not considering the
quod proprium bonum referendum higher good to which its proper good
erat. Cuius quidem should have been directed. Now, the
inconsiderationis ratio esse potuit reason for this lack of consideration
voluntas in proprium bonum could have been that the will was
intense conversa: est enim liberum vehemently turned toward its own good,
voluntati in hoc vel illud converti. for to turn to this or that object is a
characteristic of free will.
Patet etiam quod non appetiit [3] It is evident, also, that he desired only
aliquod bonum nisi unum, quod est one good, that is, his own; but there was
sibi proprium: sed in hoc fuit sin in this, because he set aside the
peccatum, quod praetermisit higher good to which he should have
superius bonum, in quod debuit been ordered. just as sin in us is due to
ordinari. Sicut enim in nobis the fact that we desire lower goods, that
peccatum est ex hoc quod bona is, those of the body, in discord with the
inferiora, scilicet corporis, order of reason, so in the devil there was
appetimus absque ordine rationis, sin, because he did not relate his own
ita in Diabolo peccatum fuit ex hoc good to the divine good.
quod proprium bonum non retulit
ad divinum bonum.
Patet etiam quod medium virtutis [4] Moreover, it is clear that he
praetermisit, inquantum se overlooked the mean of virtue, in so far
superioris ordini non subdidit, et sic as he did not subject himself to the order
sibi plus dedit quam debuit, Deo of a superior; thus, he gave himself more
autem minus quam ei deberetur, importance than was proper, while giving
cui omnia debent esse subiecta ut less to God than was due Him to Whom
primae regulae ordinanti. all should be subject as to the Orderer of
Manifestum igitur est quod in the primary rule. So, it is evident that, in
peccato illo non est praetermissum this sin, the mean was not abandoned
medium per superabundantiam because of an excess of passion, but
passionis, sed solum per simply because of inequity under justice,
inaequalitatem iustitiae, quae est which is concerned with actions. In fact,
circa operationes. In substantiis actions are possible in the case of
enim separatis operationes esse separate substances, but passions are
possunt, passiones vero in no way possible.
nequaquam.
Non etiam oportet, si in [5] Nor, indeed, is it a necessary
superioribus corporibus nullus conclusion that, if no defect can be
potest esse defectus, quod propter present in higher bodies, for this reason
hoc in substantiis separatis sin cannot occur in separate substances.
peccatum esse non possit. Corpora For bodies and all things devoid of
enim, et omnia quae ratione carent, reason are only moved to action; they do
aguntur tantum, non autem agunt not act of themselves, for they do not
seipsa: non enim sui actus have control over their acts.
dominium habent. Unde non Consequently, they cannot depart from
possunt exire a regula prima ipsa the primary rule which actuates and
agentis et moventis, nisi per hoc moves them, except in the sense that
quod rectitudinem primae regulae they cannot adequately receive the
sufficienter suscipere non possunt. regulation of the primary rule. Of course,
Quod quidem contingit ex this is so due to the indisposition of
indispositione materiae. Et propter matter. For this reason, the higher
hoc superiora corpora, in quibus bodies, in which this indisposition of
indispositio materiae locum non matter has no place, never can fall short
habet, nunquam a rectitudine of the rightness of the primary rule. But
primae regulae deficere possunt. rational substances, or intellectual ones,
Substantiae vero rationales, sive are not merely acted upon; rather, they
intellectuales, non tantum aguntur, also move themselves to their proper
sed etiam agunt se ad proprios acts. Indeed, the more perfect their
actus. Quod quidem tanto magis nature is, the more evident is this
invenitur in eis quanto perfectior est characteristic in them, for, the more
ipsarum natura: quorum enim perfect their nature is, the more perfect
natura perfectior est, est et is their power to act. Consequently,
perfectior virtus in agendo. Unde perfection of nature does not preclude
naturae perfectio non impedit quin the possibility of sin occurring in them in
peccatum in eis accidere possit the aforesaid way: namely, because they
modo praedicto: ex hoc scilicet fasten upon themselves, and pay no
quod seipsis inhaerent, ordinem attention to the order of a higher agent.
superioris agentis non attendentes.
Quod speciali quadam ratione THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE
creaturae rationales divinae SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN
providentiae subduntur A SPECIAL WAY
Ex his quidem quae supra [1] From the points which have been
determinata sunt, manifestum est determined above, it is manifest that
quod divina providentia ad omnia divine providence extends to all things. Yet
se extendit. Oportet tamen we must note that there is a special
aliquam rationem providentiae meaning for providence in reference to
specialem observari circa intellectual and rational creatures, over
intellectuales et rationales and above its meaning for other creatures.
naturas, prae aliis creaturis.
Praecellunt enim alias creaturas For they do stand out above other
et in perfectione naturae, et in creatures, both in natural perfection and in
dignitate finis. In perfectione the dignity of their end. In the order of
quidem naturae, quia sola natural perfection, only the rational
creatura rationalis habet creature holds dominion over his acts,
dominium sui actus, libere se moving himself freely in order to perform
agens ad operandum; ceterae his actions. Other creatures, in fact, are
vero creaturae ad opera propria moved to their proper workings rather than
magis aguntur quam agant; ut ex being the active agents of these
supra dictis patet. In dignitate operations, as is clear from what has been
autem finis, quia sola creatura said. And in the dignity of their end, for
intellectualis ad ipsum finem only the intellectual creature reaches the
ultimum universi sua operatione very ultimate end of the whole of things
pertingit, scilicet cognoscendo et through his own operation, which is the
amando Deum: aliae vero knowing and loving of God; whereas other
creaturae ad finem ultimum creatures cannot attain the ultimate end
pertingere non possunt nisi per except by a participation in its likeness.
aliqualem similitudinis ipsius Now, the formal character of every work
participationem. Omnis autem differs according to the diversity of the end
ratio operis variatur secundum and of the things which are subject to the
diversitatem finis, et eorum quae operation; thus, the method of working in
operationi subiiciuntur: sicut ratio art differs according to the diversity of the

operandi per artem diversa est end and of the subject matter. For
secundum diversitatem finis et instance, a physician works in one way to
materiae; aliter enim operatur get rid of illness and in another way to
medicus ad aegritudinem maintain health, and he uses different
pellendam, et ad sanitatem methods for bodies differently constituted.
confirmandam; atque aliter in Likewise, in the government of a state, a
corporibus diversimode different plan of ordering must be followed,
complexionatis. Et similiter depending on the varying conditions of the
oportet in regimine civitatis persons subject to this government and on
diversam rationem ordinis the different purposes to which they are
observari secundum diversas directed. For soldiers are controlled in one
conditiones eorum qui way, so that they may be ready to fight;
subiiciuntur regimini, et while artisans will be managed in another
secundum diversa ad quae way, so that they may successfully carry
ordinantur: oportet enim aliter out their activities. So, also, there is one
disponi milites, ut sint praeparati orderly plan in accord with which rational
ad pugnam; et artifices, ut bene creatures are subjected to divine
se habeant circa sua opera. Sic providence, and another by means of
igitur et alia est ordinis ratio which the rest of creatures are ordered.
secundum quam creaturae
rationales providentiae divinae
subduntur: et alia secundum
quam ordinantur ceterae
creaturae.
Chapter 112
Caput 112
THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE
Quod creaturae rationales
GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKES,
gubernantur propter seipsas,
WHILE OTHERS ARE GOVERNED IN
aliae vero in ordine ad eas
SUBORDINATION TO THEM
Primum igitur, ipsa conditio [1] First of all, then, the very way in which

intellectualis naturae, secundum the intellectual creature was made,
quam est domina sui actus, according as it is master of its acts,
providentiae curam requirit qua demands providential care whereby this
sibi propter se provideatur: creature may provide for itself, on its own
aliorum vero conditio, quae non behalf; while the way in which other things
habent dominium sui actus, hoc were created, things which have no
indicat, quod eis non propter ipsa dominion over their acts, shows this fact,
cura impendatur, sed velut ad alia that they are cared for, not for their own
ordinatis. Quod enim ab altero sake, but as subordinated to others. That
tantum agitur, rationem which is moved only by another being has
instrumenti habet: quod vero per the formal character of an instrument, but
se agit, habet rationem principalis that which acts of itself has the essential
agentis. Instrumentum autem non character of a principal agent. Now, an
quaeritur propter seipsum, sed ut instrument is not valued for its own sake,
eo principale agens utatur. Unde but as useful to a principal agent. Hence it
oportet quod omnis operationis must be that all the careful work that is
diligentia quae circa instrumenta devoted to instruments is actually done for
adhibetur, ad principale agens the sake of the agent, as for an end, but
referatur sicut ad finem: quod what is done for the principal agent, either
autem circa principale agens vel by himself or by another, is for his own
ab ipso vel ab alio adhibetur, sake, because he is the principal agent.
inquantum est principale agens, Therefore, intellectual creatures are so
propter ipsum est. Disponuntur controlled by God, as objects of care for
igitur a Deo intellectuales their own sakes; while other creatures are
creaturae quasi propter se subordinated, as it were, to the rational
procuratae, creaturae vero aliae creatures.
quasi ad rationales creaturas
ordinatae.
Adhuc. Quod dominium sui actus [2] Again, one who holds dominion over
habet, liberum est in agendo, liber his own acts is free in his activity, “for the
enim est qui sui causa est: quod free man is he who acts for his own sake.”
autem quadam necessitate ab But one who is acted upon by another,
alio agitur ad operandum, servituti under necessity, is subject to slavery. So,
subiectum est. Omnis igitur alia every other creature is naturally subject to
creatura naturaliter servituti slavery; only the intellectual creature is by
subiecta est: sola intellectualis nature free. Now, under every sort of
natura libera est. In quolibet government, provision is made for free
autem regimine, liberis providetur men for their own sakes, but for slaves in
propter seipsos: servis autem ut such a way that they may be at the
sint in usum liberorum. Sic igitur disposal of free men. And so, through
per divinam providentiam divine providence provision is made for
intellectualibus creaturis intellectual creatures on their own
providetur propter se, ceteris account, but for the remaining creatures
autem creaturis propter ipsas. for the sake of the intellectual ones.
Amplius. Quandocumque sunt [3] Besides, whenever things are ordered

aliqua ordinata ad finem aliquem, to any end, and some of these things
si qua inter illa ad finem cannot attain the end through their own
pertingere non possunt per efforts, they must be subordinated to
seipsa, oportet ea ordinari ad illa things which do achieve the end and
quae finem consequuntur, quae which are ordered to the end for their own
propter se ordinantur in finem: sakes. Thus, for instance, the end of an
sicut finis exercitus est victoria, army is victory, and this the soldiers may
quam milites consequuntur per achieve through their own act of fighting;
proprium actum pugnando, qui that is why only soldiers are needed for
soli propter se in exercitu their own sake in an army. All others, who
quaeruntur; omnes autem alii, ad are assigned to different tasks—for
alia officia deputati, puta ad instance, caring for the horses and
custodiendum equos, ad supplying the weapons—are needed for
parandum arma, propter milites in the sake of the soldiers in the army. Now,
exercitu quaeruntur. Constat from what has been seen earlier, it is
autem ex praemissis finem established that God is the ultimate end of
ultimum universi Deum esse, the whole of things; that an intellectual
quem sola intellectualis natura nature alone attains to Him in Himself,
consequitur in seipso, eum scilicet that is, by knowing and loving Him, as is

cognoscendo et amando, ut ex evident from what has been said.
dictis patet. Sola igitur Therefore, the intellectual nature is the
intellectualis natura est propter se only one that is required in the universe,
quaesita in universo, alia autem for its own sake, while all others are for its
omnia propter ipsam. sake.
Item. In quolibet toto partes [4] Moreover, in any whole the principal
principales propter se exiguntur parts are needed in themselves in order to
ad constitutionem totius: aliae constitute the whole, but the other parts
vero ad conservationem, vel ad are for the preservation or for some
aliquam meliorationem earum. betterment of the principal ones. Now, of
Inter omnes autem partes all the parts of the universe the more
universi, nobiliores sunt noble are intellectual creatures, since they
intellectuales creaturae: quia come closer to the divine likeness.
magis ad similitudinem divinam Therefore, intellectual creatures are
accedunt. Naturae ergo governed by divine providence for their
intellectuales sunt propter se a own sakes, while all others are for the
divina providentia procuratae, alia intellectual ones.
vero omnia propter ipsas.
Praeterea. Manifestum est partes [5] Furthermore, it is evident that all parts

omnes ordinari ad perfectionem are ordered to the perfection of the whole,
totius: non enim est totum propter since a whole does not exist for the sake
partes, sed partes propter totum of its parts, but, rather, the parts are for
sunt. Naturae autem intellectuales the whole. Now, intellectual natures have
maiorem habent affinitatem ad a closer relationship to a whole than do
totum quam aliae naturae: nam other natures; indeed, each intellectual
unaquaeque intellectualis substance is, in a way, all things. For it
substantia est quodammodo may comprehend the entirety of being
omnia, inquantum totius entis through its intellect; on the other hand,
comprehensiva est suo intellectu: every other substance has only a
quaelibet autem alia substantia particular share in being. Therefore, other
particularem solam entis substances may fittingly be providentially
participationem habet. cared for by God for the sake of
Convenienter igitur alia propter intellectual substances.
substantias intellectuales
providentur a Deo.
Adhuc. Sicut agitur unumquodque [6] Again, as a thing is acted upon in the

cursu naturae, ita natum est agi. course of nature, so is it disposed to
Sic autem videmus res cursu action by its natural origin. Now, we see
naturae currere quod substantia that things do go on in the course of
intellectualis omnibus aliis utitur nature in such a way that intellectual
propter se: vel ad intellectus substance uses all others for itself: either
perfectionem, quia in eis for the perfecting of its understanding,
veritatem speculatur; vel ad suae since it contemplates the truth in them; or
virtutis executionem et scientiae for the exercise of its power and the
explicationem, ad modum quo development of its knowledge, in the
artifex explicat artis suae fashion of an artist who develops his
conceptionem in materia artistic conception in bodily matter; or
corporali; vel etiam ad corporis even for the support of his body which is
sustentationem, quod est unitum united with the intellectual soul, as we see
animae intellectuali, sicut in in the case of men. Therefore, it is clear
hominibus patet. Manifestum est that all things are divinely ruled by
ergo quod propter substantias providence for the sake of intellectual
intellectuales omnia divinitus substances.
providentur.
Amplius. Quod aliquis propter se [7] Besides, what a man desires for its
quaerit, semper illud quaerit: quod own sake is something which he always
enim per se est, semper est; quod desires, for that which is, because of
vero aliquis propter aliud quaerit, itself, always is. On the other hand, what
non oportet quod semper illud a man desires for the sake of something
quaerat, sed secundum quod else is not necessarily always desired;
competit ei propter quod rather, the duration of the desire depends
quaeritur. Esse autem rerum ex on that for which it is sought. Now, the
divina voluntate profluxit, ut ex being of things flows forth from the divine
superioribus est manifestum. will, as is shown in our earlier
Quae igitur semper sunt in considerations. Therefore, those things
entibus, sunt propter se a Deo which always exist among beings are
volita: quae autem non semper, willed by God for their own sake, while
non propter se, sed propter aliud. things which do not always exist are not
Substantiae autem intellectuales for their own sake, but for the sake of
maxime accedunt ad hoc quod something else. Now, intellectual
sint semper, quia sunt substances come closest to existing
incorruptibiles. Sunt etiam always, for they are incorruptible. They
immutabiles, nisi solum are also immutable, excepting only their
secundum electionem. Ergo act of choice. Therefore, intellectual
substantiae intellectuales substances are governed for their own
gubernantur quasi propter se, sake, in a sense, while others are for
aliae vero propter ipsas. them.
Non est autem ei quod praemissis [8] Nor is what was shown in earlier

rationibus est ostensum arguments opposed to this, namely, that
contrarium, quod omnes partes all parts of the universe are ordered to the
universi ad perfectionem totius perfection of the whole. For all parts are
ordinantur: sic enim ad ordered to the perfection of the whole,
perfectionem totius omnes partes inasmuch as one is made to serve
ordinantur, inquantum una another. Thus, in the human body it is
deservit alteri. Sicut in corpore apparent that the lungs contribute to the
humano apparet quod pulmo in perfection of the body by rendering
hoc est de perfectione corporis, service to the heart; hence, it is not
quod deservit cordi: unde non est contradictory for the lungs to be for the
contrarium pulmonem esse sake of the heart, and also for the sake of
propter cor, et propter totum the whole organism. Likewise, it is not
animal. Et similiter non est contradictory for some natures to be for
contrarium alias naturas esse the sake of the intellectual ones, and also
propter intellectuales, et propter for the sake of the perfection of the
perfectionem universi: si enim universe. For, in fact, if the things needed
deessent ea quae requirit for the perfection of intellectual substance
substantiae intellectualis were lacking, the universe would not be
perfectio, non esset universum complete.
completum.
Similiter etiam praedictis non [9] Similarly, too, the foregoing is not
obviat quod individua sunt propter opposed by the fact that individuals are
proprias species. Per hoc enim for the sake of their proper species.
quod ad suas species ordinantur, Because they are ordered to their
ordinem habent ulterius ad species, they possess a further ordination
intellectualem naturam. Non enim to intellectual nature. For a corruptible
aliquod corruptibilium ordinatur ad thing is not ordered to man for the sake of
hominem propter unum one individual man only, but for the sake
individuum hominis tantum, sed of the whole human species. A corruptible
propter totam humanam speciem. thing could not be of use to the whole
Toti autem humanae speciei non human species except by virtue of the
posset aliquod corruptibilium thing’s entire species. Therefore, the
deservire nisi secundum suam order whereby corruptible things are
speciem totam. Ordo igitur quo ordered to man requires the subordination
corruptibilia ordinantur ad of individuals to their species.
hominem, requirit quod individua
ordinentur ad speciem.
Per hoc autem quod dicimus [10] However, we do not understand this
substantias intellectuales propter statement, that intellectual substances are
se a divina providentia ordinari, ordered for their own sake by divine
non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterius providence, to mean that they are not
non referantur in Deum et ad more ultimately referred to God and to the
perfectionem universi. Sic igitur perfection of the universe. In fact, they are
propter se procurari dicuntur et said to be providentially managed for their
alia propter ipsa, quia bona quae own sake, and other things for their sake,
per divinam providentiam in the sense that the goods which they
sortiuntur, non eis sunt data receive through divine goodness are not
propter alterius utilitatem; quae given them for the advantage of another
vero aliis dantur, in eorum usum being, but the things given to other beings
ex divina ordinatione cedunt. must be turned over to the use of
intellectual substances in accord with
divine providence.
Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 419: [11] Hence it is said in Deuteronomy
ne videas solem et lunam et (4:19): “Lest you see the sun and the
cetera astra, et errore deceptus, moon and the other stars, and being
adores ea quae creavit dominus deceived by error, you adore and serve
Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis them, which the Lord Your God created
gentibus quae sub caelo sunt. Et for the service of all the nations that are
in Psalmo dicitur: omnia subiecisti under heaven”; and again in the Psalm
sub pedibus eius; oves et boves (8:8): “You subjected all things under his
universas, insuper et pecora feet, all sheep and oxen, moreover the
campi. Et Sap. 1218 dicitur: tu beasts of the field”; and in Wisdom
autem, dominator virtutis, cum (12:18) it is said: “You, being Master of
tranquillitate iudicas, et cum power, judge with tranquility, and with
magna reverentia disponis nos. great favor dispose of us.”
Per haec autem excluditur error [12] Through these considerations we

ponentium homini esse peccatum refute the error of those who claim that it
si animalia bruta occidat. Ex is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For
divina enim providentia naturali animals are ordered to man’s use in the
ordine in usum hominis natural course of things, according to
ordinantur. Unde absque iniuria divine providence. Consequently, man
eis utitur homo, vel occidendo, vel uses them without any injustice, either by
quolibet alio modo. Propter quod killing them or by employing them in any
et dominus dixit ad Noe, Gen. 93: other way. For this reason, God said to
sicut olera virentia dedi vobis Noah: “As the green herbs, I have
omnem carnem. delivered all flesh to you” (Gen. 9:3).
Si qua vero in sacra Scriptura [13] Indeed, if any statements are found in

inveniantur prohibentia aliquid Sacred Scripture prohibiting the
crudelitatis in animalia bruta commission of an act of cruelty against
committi, sicut de ave cum pullis brute animals, for instance, that one
non occidenda: hoc fit vel ad should not kill a bird accompanied by her
removendum hominis animum a young (Deut. 22:6), this is said either to
crudelitate in homines exercenda, turn the mind of man away from cruelty
ne aliquis, exercendo crudelia which might be used on other men, lest a
circa bruta, ex hoc procedat ad person through practicing cruelty on
homines; vel quia in temporale brutes might go on to do the same to
damnum hominis provenit men; or because an injurious act
animalibus illata laesio, sive committed on animals may lead to a
inferentis sive alterius; vel propter temporal loss for some man, either for the
aliquam significationem, sicut agent or for another man; or there may be
apostolus exponit illud de non another interpretation of the text, as the
alligando ore bovis triturantis. Apostle (1 Cor. 9:9) explains it, in terms of
“not muzzling the ox that treads the corn”
(Deut. 25:4).
Chapter 113
Caput 113
THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS
Quod rationalis creatura dirigitur
DIRECTED BY GOD TO HIS ACTIONS
a Deo ad suos actus non solum
NOT ONLY BY AN ORDERING OF
secundum ordinem ad speciem,
THE SPECIES,
sed etiam secundum quod
BUT ALSO ACCORDING TO WHAT
congruit individuo
BEFITS THE INDIVIDUAL
Ex hoc autem apparet quod sola [1] It is evident, as a result, that only the

rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad rational creature is directed by God to
suos actus non solum secundum his actions, not only in accord with what
congruentiam speciei, sed etiam is suitable to the species, but also in
secundum congruentiam individui. accord with what is suitable to the
Omnis enim res propter suam individual. Each thing appears to exist
operationem esse videtur: operatio for the sake of its operation; indeed,
enim est ultima perfectio rei. Sic operation is the ultimate perfection of a
igitur unumquodque a Deo ad thing. Therefore, each thing is ordered
suum actum ordinatur secundum to its action by God according to the way
quod divinae providentiae substat. in which it is subordinated to divine
Creatura autem rationalis divinae providence. Now, a rational creature
providentiae substat sicut exists under divine providence as a
secundum se gubernata et provisa, being governed and provided for in
non solum propter speciem, ut aliae himself, and not simply for the sake of
corruptibiles creaturae: quia his species, as is the case with other
individuum quod gubernatur solum corruptible creatures. For the individual
propter speciem, non gubernatur that is governed only for the sake of the
propter seipsum; creatura autem species is not governed for its own sake,
rationalis propter seipsam but the rational creature is governed for
gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum his own sake, as is clear from what we
est. Sic igitur solae rationales have said. And so, only rational
creaturae directionem a Deo ad creatures receive direction from God in
suos actus accipiunt non solum their acts, not only for the species, but
propter speciem, sed secundum for the individual.
individuum.
Adhuc. Quaecumque directionem [2] Again, whenever beings are directed

habent in suis actibus solum in their acts, solely on the basis of what
secundum quod pertinent ad pertains to the species, the capacity to
speciem, non est in ipsis agere vel act or not to act is not present in them.
non agere: quae enim For things that are associated with the
consequuntur speciem, sunt species are common and natural to all
communia et naturalia omnibus individuals contained in the species.
individuis sub specie contentis; Now, natural functions are not within our
naturalia autem non sunt in nobis. power to control. So, if man were able to
Si igitur homo haberet directionem direct his acts only in accord with what is
in suis actionibus solum secundum suitable to the species, he would not
congruentiam speciei, non esset in have within him the capacity to act or
ipso agere vel non agere, sed not to act. Rather, he would have to
oporteret quod sequeretur follow the natural inclination common to
inclinationem naturalem toti speciei the whole species, as is the case with all
communem, ut contingit in omnibus irrational creatures. Therefore, it is
irrationalibus creaturis. Manifestum obvious that a rational creature has the
est igitur quod rationalis creaturae ability to direct his acts, not only in
actus directionem habet non solum accord with the species, but also in
secundum speciem, sed etiam accord with the individual.
secundum individuum.
Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, [3] Besides, as we showed above, divine
divina providentia ad omnia providence extends to all singular
singularia se extendit, etiam things, even to the least. In the case of
minima. Quibuscumque igitur sunt those beings, then, whose actions take
aliquae actiones praeter place apart from the inclination
inclinationem speciei, oportet quod appropriate to their species, it is
per divinam providentiam necessary for them to be regulated in
regulentur in suis actibus praeter their acts by divine providence, over and
directionem quae pertinet ad above the direction which pertains to the
speciem. Sed in rationali creatura species. But many actions are evident,
apparent multae actiones ad quas in the case of the rational creature, for
non sufficit inclinatio speciei: cuius which the inclination of the species is
signum est quod non similes sunt in not enough. The mark of this is that
omnibus, sed variae in diversis. such actions are not alike in all, but differ
Oportet igitur quod rationalis in various cases. Therefore, the rational
creatura dirigatur a Deo ad suos creature must be directed by God in his
actus non solum secundum acts, not only specifically, but also
speciem, sed etiam secundum individually.
individuum.
Item. Deus unicuique naturae [4] Moreover, God takes care of each
providet secundum ipsius nature according to its capacity; indeed,
capacitatem: tales enim singulas He created singular creatures of such
creaturas condidit quales aptas kinds that He knew were suited to
esse cognovit ut per suam achieving the end under His
gubernationem pervenirent ad governance. Now, only the rational
finem. Sola autem creatura creature is capable of this direction,
rationalis est capax directionis qua whereby his actions are guided, not only
dirigitur ad suos actus non solum specifically, but also individually. For he
secundum speciem, sed etiam possesses understanding and reason,
secundum individuum: habet enim and consequently he can grasp in what
intellectum et rationem, unde different ways a thing may be good or
percipere possit quomodo bad, depending on its suitability for
diversimode sit aliquid bonum vel various individuals, times, and places.
malum secundum quod congruit Therefore, only the rational creature is
diversis individuis, temporibus et directed in his acts by God, individually
locis. Sola igitur creatura rationalis as well as specifically.
dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus non
solum secundum speciem, sed
etiam secundum individuum.
Praeterea. Creatura rationalis sic [5] Furthermore, the rational creature is

providentiae divinae subiacet quod subject to divine providence in such a
non solum ea gubernatur, sed way that he is not only governed
etiam rationem providentiae thereby, but is also able to know the
utcumque cognoscere potest: unde rational plan of providence in some way.
sibi competit etiam aliis Hence, it is appropriate for him to
providentiam et gubernationem exercise providence and government
exhibere. Quod non contingit in over other things. This is not the case
ceteris creaturis, quae solum with other creatures, for they participate
providentiam participant inquantum in providence only to the extent of being
providentiae subduntur. Per hoc subordinated to it. Through this
autem quod aliquis facultatem possession of the capacity to exercise
providendi habet, potest etiam suos providence one may also direct and
actus dirigere et gubernare. govern his own acts. So, the rational
Participat igitur rationalis creatura creature participates in divine
divinam providentiam non solum providence, not only by being governed
secundum gubernari, sed etiam passively, but also by governing actively,
secundum gubernare: gubernat for he governs himself in his personal
enim se in suis actibus propriis, et acts, and even others. Now, all lower
etiam alia. Omnis autem inferior types of providence are subordinated,
providentia divinae providentiae as it were, to divine providence.
subditur quasi supremae. Therefore, the governing of the acts of a
Gubernatio igitur actuum rationalis rational creature, in so far as they are
creaturae inquantum sunt actus personal acts, pertains to divine
personales, ad divinam providence.
providentiam pertinet.
Item. Actus personales rationalis [6] Again, the personal acts of a rational

creaturae sunt proprie actus qui creature are properly the acts that stem
sunt ab anima rationali. Anima from the rational soul. Now, the rational
autem rationalis non solum soul is capable of perpetual existence,
secundum speciem est not only in function of the species, as is
perpetuitatis capax, sicut aliae the case with other creatures, but also in
creaturae, sed etiam secundum an individual sense. Therefore, the acts
individuum. Actus ergo rationalis of a rational creature are directed by
creaturae a divina providentia divine providence not only for the reason
diriguntur non solum ea ratione qua that they are important to the species,
ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam but also inasmuch as they are personal
inquantum sunt personales actus. acts.
Hinc est quod, licet divinae [7] This is why, though all things are
providentiae omnia subdantur, subject to divine providence, the care of
tamen in Scripturis sacris man is especially attributed to it in
specialiter ei hominum cura Sacred Scripture, in the text of the
attribuitur: secundum illud Psalmi 8 Psalm (8:5): “What is man that You art
5: quid est homo quod memor es mindful of him?” and of 1 Corinthians
eius? Et I Cor. 99: nunquid Deo (9:9): “Does God take care of oxen?”
cura est de bobus? Quae quidem Indeed, these statements have been so
ideo dicuntur, quia de humanis expressed because God takes care of
actibus Deus curam habet non human acts, not only as they pertain to
solum prout ad speciem pertinent, the species, but also inasmuch as they
sed etiam secundum quod sunt are personal acts.
actus personales.
Quod divinitus hominibus leges THAT LAWS ARE DIVINELY GIVEN TO
dantur MAN
Ex hoc autem apparet quod [1] It is apparent, next, that it was
necessarium fuit homini divinitus necessary for law to be divinely given to

legem dari. Sicut enim actus man. just as the acts of irrational
irrationalium creaturarum diriguntur creatures are directed by God through a
a Deo ea ratione qua ad speciem rational plan which pertains to their
pertinent, ita actus hominum species, so are the acts of men directed
diriguntur a Deo secundum quod by God inasmuch as they pertain to the
ad individuum pertinent, ut individual, as we have shown. But the
ostensum est. Sed actus acts of irrational creatures, as pertaining
creaturarum irrationalium, prout ad to the species, are directed by God
speciem pertinent, diriguntur a Deo through natural inclination, which goes
quadam naturali inclinatione, quae along with the nature of the species.
naturam speciei consequitur. Ergo, Therefore, over and above this,
supra hoc, dandum est aliquid something must be given to men
hominibus quo in suis personalibus whereby they may be directed in their
actibus dirigantur. Et hoc dicimus own personal acts. And this we call law.
legem.
Adhuc. Rationalis creatura, ut [2] Again, the rational creature, as we

dictum est, sic divinae providentiae have said, is so subjected to divine
subditur quod etiam similitudinem providence that he even participates in a
quandam divinae providentiae certain likeness of divine providence, in
participat, inquantum se in suis so far as he is able to govern himself in
actibus et alia gubernare potest. Id his own acts, and also others. Now, that
autem quo aliquorum actus whereby the acts of such agents are
gubernantur, dicitur lex. governed is called law. Quite
Conveniens igitur fuit hominibus a appropriately, then, law was given to
Deo legem dari. men by God.
Item. Cum lex nihil aliud sit quam [3] Besides, since law is simply a certain

quaedam ratio et regula operandi, rational plan and rule of operation, it is
illis solum convenit dari legem qui fitting that law be given only to those
sui operis rationem cognoscunt. beings who know the rational character
Hoc autem convenit solum rationali of their work. Now, this is proper only to
creaturae. Soli igitur rationali a rational creature. Therefore, it was
creaturae fuit conveniens dari appropriate that law was given to the
legem. rational creature only.
Praeterea. Illis danda est lex in [4] Moreover, law should be given to
quibus est agere et non agere. Hoc those having the ability to act and not to
autem convenit soli rationali act. Now, this is true of the rational
creaturae. Sola igitur rationalis creature only. Therefore, only the
creatura est susceptiva legis. rational creature is capable of receiving
law.
Amplius. Cum lex nihil aliud sit [5] Furthermore, since law is nothing but

quam ratio operis; cuiuslibet autem a rational plan of operation, and since
operis ratio a fine sumitur: ab eo the rational plan of any kind of work is
unusquisque legis capax suscipit derived from the end, anyone capable of
legem a quo ad finem perducitur; receiving the law receives it from him
sicut inferior artifex ab architectore, who shows the way to the end. Thus

et miles a duce exercitus. Sed does the lower artisan depend on the
creatura rationalis finem suum architect, and the soldier on the leader of
ultimum in Deo et a Deo the army. But the rational creature
consequitur, ut ex superioribus attains his ultimate end in God, and from
patet. Fuit igitur conveniens a Deo God, as we have seen in the foregoing.
legem hominibus dari. Therefore, it is appropriate for law to be
given men by God.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ierem. 3133: [6] Hence it is said in Jeremiah (31:33):

dabo legem meam in visceribus “I will give my law in their bowels”; and in
eorum et Oseae 812: scribam eis Hosea (8:12; Douay modified): “I shall
multiplices leges meas. write my manifold laws for them.”
Quod lex divina principaliter THAT THE DIVINE LAW PRINCIPALLY
hominem ordinat in Deum ORDERS MAN TOWARD GOD
Ex hoc autem sumi potest ad quid [1] From this conclusion we may gather

lex divinitus data principaliter what it is to which the divinely given law
tendat. principally tends.
Manifestum est enim quod [2] It is evident that every lawmaker
unusquisque legislator ad suum intends to direct men by means of laws
finem principaliter per leges toward his own end, principally. Thus,
homines dirigere intendit: sicut dux the leader of an army intends victory
exercitus ad victoriam et rector and the ruler of a state intends peace.
civitatis ad pacem. Finis autem But the end which God intends is God
quem Deus intendit, est ipsemet Himself. Therefore, the divine law
Deus. Lex igitur divina hominem principally looks to the ordering of man
principaliter in Deum ordinare toward God.
intendit.
Adhuc. Lex, sicut dictum est, est [3] Again, as we have said, law is a
quaedam ratio divinae providentiae rational plan of divine providence, in its
gubernantis rationali creaturae governing capacity, proposed to the
proposita. Sed gubernatio rational creature. But the governance of
providentis Dei singula ad proprios God, as providence, conducts individual
fines ducit. Per legem igitur divinitus beings to their own ends. Therefore,
datam homo ad suum finem man is chiefly ordered to his end by the
praecipue ordinatur. Finis autem divinely given law. Now, the end for the
humanae creaturae est adhaerere human creature is to cling to God, for
Deo: in hoc enim felicitas eius his felicity consists in this, as we have
consistit, sicut supra ostensum est. shown above. So, the divine law
Ad hoc igitur principaliter lex divina primarily directs man to this end: that he
hominem dirigit, ut Deo adhaereat. may cling to God.
Amplius. Intentio cuiuslibet [4] Besides, the intention of every

legislatoris est eos quibus legem legislator is to make those to whom he
dat, facere bonos: unde praecepta gives the law good; as a consequence,
legis debent esse de actibus the precepts of law should be
virtutum. Illi igitur actus a lege concerned with acts of virtue. So, those
divina praecipue intenduntur qui acts which are best are chiefly intended
sunt optimi. Sed inter omnes by divine law. But of all human acts,
humanos actus illi sunt optimi those whereby man clings to God are
quibus homo adhaeret Deo, utpote best, in the sense that they are nearer
fini propinquiores. Ergo ad hos to the end. Therefore, the divine law
actus praecipue lex divina homines primarily orders men in regard to those
ordinat. acts.
Item. Illud praecipuum debet esse [5] Moreover, that from which the law
in lege ex quo lex efficaciam habet. derives its efficacy should be the most
Sed lex divinitus data ex hoc apud important thing in the law. But the
homines efficaciam habet quod divinely given law derives its efficacy
homo subditur Deo: non enim among men from the fact that man is
aliquis alicuius regis lege artatur qui subject to God, for no one is bound by
ei subditus non est. Hoc igitur the law of a ruler if he is not subject to
praecipuum in divina lege esse him. Therefore, this should be of
debet, ut mens humana Deo primary importance in divine law: that
adhaereat. the human mind must cling to God.
Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 1012: et [6] Hence it is said in Deuteronomy

nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus (10:3.2): “And now, Israel, what does
tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas the Lord Your God require of You: but
dominum Deum tuum, et ambules that You fear the Lord Your God, and
in viis eius, et diligas eum, ac walk in His ways, and love Him, and
servias domino Deo tuo in toto serve the Lord Your God, with all your
corde tuo et in tota anima tua? heart and with all your soul?”
Quod finis legis divinae est THAT THE END OF DIVINE LAW IS
dilectio Dei THE LOVE OF GOD
Quia vero intentio divinae legis ad [1] Since the intention of divine law is
hoc principaliter est ut homo Deo primarily to this purpose, that man may
adhaereat; homo autem potissime cling to God, and since man is best able
adhaeret Deo per amorem: to cling to God through love, it must be
necesse est quod intentio divinae that the intention of divine law is primarily
legis principaliter ordinetur ad ordered to an act of love.
amandum.
Quod autem per amorem homo [2] Now, it is quite clear that man chiefly

maxime Deo adhaereat, clings to God through love. For there are
manifestum est. Duo enim sunt in two things in man by which he is enabled

homine quibus Deo potest to cling to God, namely, intellect and will.
adhaerere, intellectus scilicet et For by means of the lower parts of his
voluntas: nam secundum inferiores soul he cannot cling to God, but only to
animae partes Deo adhaerere non inferior things. Now, the union which is
potest, sed inferioribus rebus. effected through the intellect is
Adhaesio autem quae est per completed by the union which pertains to
intellectum, completionem recipit the will, because through his will man in
per eam quae est voluntatis: quia some way rests in that which the intellect
per voluntatem homo apprehends. But the will adheres to a
quodammodo quiescit in eo quod thing, either because of love or because
intellectus apprehendit. Voluntas of fear, but not in the same way. For, if
autem adhaeret alicui rei vel one clings to something because of fear,
propter amorem, vel propter he clings because of something else, for
timorem: sed differenter. Nam ei instance, to avoid an evil which threatens
quidem cui inhaeret propter unless he clings to that thing. But, if one
timorem, inhaeret propter aliud: ut clings to a thing because of love, he
scilicet evitet malum quod, si non does so for the sake of that thing. Now,
adhaereat ei, imminet. Ei vero cui what is valued for its own sake is of
adhaeret propter amorem, greater importance than what is for the
adhaeret propter seipsum. Quod sake of something else. Therefore, the
autem est propter se, principalius adherence to God in love is the best
est eo quod est propter aliud. possible way of clinging to Him. So, this
Adhaesio igitur amoris ad Deum is what is chiefly intended in the divine
est potissimus modus ei law.
adhaerendi. Hoc igitur est
potissime intentum in divina lege.
Item. Finis cuiuslibet legis, et [3] Again, the end of every law, and
praecipue divinae, est homines above all of divine law, is to make men
facere bonos. Homo autem dicitur good. But a man is deemed good from
bonus ex eo quod habet his possession of a good will, through
voluntatem bonam, per quam in which he may put into act whatever good
actum reducit quicquid boni in ipso there is in him. Now, the will is good
est. Voluntas autem est bona ex eo because it wills a good object, and
quod vult bonum: et praecipue especially the greatest good, which is the
maximum bonum, quod est finis. end. So, the more the will desires such a
Quanto igitur huiusmodi bonum good, the more does a man advance in
magis voluntas vult, tanto magis goodness. But a man has more desire
homo est bonus. Sed magis vult for what he wills because of love than for
homo id quod vult propter amorem, what he wills because of fear only, for
quam id quod vult propter timorem what he loves only from a motive of fear
tantum: nam quod vult propter is called an object of mixed
timorem tantum, dicitur mixtum involuntariness. Such is the case of the
involuntario; sicut aliquis vult in man who wills to throw his merchandise
mari proiectionem mercium propter into the sea because of fear. Therefore,
timorem. Ergo amor summi boni, the love of the highest good, namely,
scilicet Dei, maxime facit bonos, et God, above all else makes men good,
est maxime intentum in divina lege. and is chiefly intended in the divine law.
Praeterea. Bonitas hominis est per [4] Besides, man’s goodness stems from
virtutem: virtus enim est quae virtue, “for virtue is what makes its
bonum facit habentem. Unde et lex possessor good.” Hence, law also
intendit homines facere virtuosos; intends to make men virtuous, and the
et praecepta legis sunt de actibus precepts of law are concerned with acts
virtutum. Sed de conditione virtutis of the virtues. But it is a condition of
est ut virtuosus et firmiter et virtue that the virtuous man must act with
delectabiliter operetur. Hoc autem firmness and joy. But love is the chief
maxime facit amor: nam ex amore producer of this result, for we do a thing
aliquid firmiter et delectabiliter firmly, and with joy, as a result of love.
facimus. Amor igitur boni est Therefore, love of the good is the
ultimum intentum in lege divina. ultimate object. intended in divine law.
Adhuc. Legislatores imperio legis [5] Moreover, legislators move those to

editae movent eos quibus lex whom the law is given by means of a
datur. In omnibus autem quae command pertaining to the law as it is
moventur ab aliquo primo movente, promulgated. In the case of all who are
tanto aliquid perfectius movetur moved by a first mover, any one of them
quanto magis participat de motione is moved more perfectly when he
primi moventis, et de similitudine participates more fully in the motion of
ipsius. Deus autem, qui est legis the prime mover, and in his likeness.
divinae dator, omnia facit propter Now, God, Who is the giver of divine law,
suum amorem. Qui igitur hoc modo makes all things because of His love. So,
tendit in ipsum, scilicet amando, he who tends toward God in this way,
perfectissime movetur in ipsum. namely, by loving Him, is most perfectly
Omne autem agens intendit moved toward Him. Now, every agent
perfectionem in eo quod agit. Hic intends perfection in the object of his
igitur est finis totius legislationis, ut action. Therefore, this is the end of all
homo Deum amet. legislation: to make man love God.
Hinc est quod dicitur I Tim. 15: [6] Hence it is said in 1 Timothy (1:5):
finis praecepti caritas est. Et Matth. “The end of the commandment is
22, dicitur quod primum et charity”; and in Matthew (22:3738) it is
maximum mandatum in lege est, said that “the first and greatest
diliges dominum Deum tuum. commandment of the law is: Love the
Lord Your God.”
Inde est etiam quod lex nova, [7] As a further consequence, the New
tanquam perfectior, dicitur lex Law, as the more perfect, is called the
amoris: lex autem vetus, tanquam law of love; while the Old Law, as less
imperfectior, lex timoris. perfect, is the law of fear.
Quod divina lege ordinamur ad THAT WE ARE ORDERED BY DIVINE
dilectionem proximi LAW TO THE LOVE OF NEIGHBOR
Ex hoc autem sequitur quod divina [1] The next point after this is that divine
lex dilectionem proximi intendat. law intends the love of neighbor.
Oportet enim esse unionem [2] For there should be a union in
affectus inter eos quibus est unus affection among those for whom there is
finis communis. Communicant one common end. Now, men share in
autem homines in uno ultimo fine common the one ultimate end which is
beatitudinis, ad quem divinitus happiness, to which they are divinely
ordinantur. Oportet igitur quod ordered. So, men should be united with
uniantur homines ad invicem each other by a mutual love.
mutua dilectione.
Adhuc. Quicumque diligit aliquem, [3] Again, whoever loves a person must,

consequens est ut etiam diligat as a consequence, also love those loved
dilectos ab eo, et eos qui coniuncti by that person and those related to him.
sunt ei. Homines autem dilecti sunt Now, men are loved by God, for He has
a Deo, quibus sui ipsius fruitionem prearranged for them, as an ultimate
quasi ultimum finem praedisposuit. end, the enjoyment of Himself.
Oportet igitur ut, sicut aliquis fit Therefore, it should be that, as a person
dilector Dei, ita etiam fiat dilector becomes a lover of God, he also
proximi. becomes a lover of his neighbor.
Amplius. Cum homo sit naturaliter [4] Besides, since “man is naturally a
animal sociale, indiget ab aliis social animal,” he needs to be helped by
hominibus adiuvari ad other men in order to attain his own end.
consequendum proprium finem. This is most fittingly accomplished by
Quod convenientissime fit mutual love which obtains among men.
dilectione mutua inter homines Therefore, by the law of God, which
existente. Ex lege igitur Dei, quae directs men to their ultimate end, mutual
homines in ultimum finem dirigit, love is prescribed for us.
praecipitur in nobis mutua dilectio.
Item. Ad hoc quod homo divinis [5] Moreover, so that man may devote
vacet, indiget tranquillitate et pace. his time to divine matters, he needs
Ea vero quae pacem perturbare tranquility and peace. Now, things that
possunt, praecipue per dilectionem are potential disturbances to peace are
mutuam tolluntur. Cum igitur lex removed principally by mutual love. So,
divina ad hoc ordinet homines ut since the divine law orders men in order
divinis vacent, necessarium est that they may devote themselves to
quod ex lege divina in hominibus divine matters, it is necessary for mutual
mutua dilectio procedat. love to be engendered among men by
divine law.
Praeterea. Lex divina profertur [6] Furthermore, divine law is offered to
homini in auxilium legis naturalis. man as an aid to natural law. Now, it is
Est autem omnibus hominibus natural to all men to love each other. The
naturale ut se invicem diligant. mark of this is the fact that a man, by
Cuius signum est quod quodam some natural prompting, comes to the
naturali instinctu homo cuilibet aid of any man in need, even if he does
homini, etiam ignoto, subvenit in not know him. For instance, he may call
necessitate, puta revocando ab him back from the wrong road, help him
errore viae, erigendo a casu, et up from a fall, and other actions like that:
aliis huiusmodi: ac si omnis homo “as if every man were naturally the
omni homini esset naturaliter familiar and friend of every man.
familiaris et amicus. Igitur ex divina Therefore, mutual love is prescribed for
lege mutua dilectio hominibus men by the divine law.
praecipitur.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ioan. 1512: [7] Hence it is said in John (15:12): “This

hoc est praeceptum meum, ut is my commandment: that you love one
diligatis invicem; et I Ioan. 421: another”; and in 1 John (4:21): “This
hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut commandment we have from God, that
qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem he who loves God love also his brother”;
suum. Et Matth. 2239 dicitur and in Matthew (22:39) it is said that the
secundum mandatum est, diliges second commandment is: “Love Your
proximum tuum. neighbor.”
Caput 118
Chapter 118
Quod per divinam legem
THAT THROUGH DIVINE LAW MEN
homines ad rectam fidem
ARE BOUND TO THE RIGHT FAITH
obligantur
Ex hoc autem apparet quod per [1] From this it becomes clear that men
divinam legem homines ad rectam are bound to the right faith through
fidem obligantur. divine law.
Sicut enim amationis corporalis [2] Indeed, just as the origin of bodily
principium est visio quae est per love lies in the vision accomplished
oculum corporalem, ita etiam through the bodily eye, so also the
dilectionis spiritualis initium esse beginning of spiritual love ought to lie in
oportet visionem intelligibilem the intellectual vision of an object of
diligibilis spiritualis. Visio autem spiritual love. Now, we cannot possess
illius spiritualis diligibilis quod est the vision of God, as an object of
Deus, in praesenti haberi non spiritual vision, in this life except through
potest a nobis nisi per fidem: eo faith, because it exceeds the power of
quod naturalem rationem excedit; natural reason, and particularly because
et praecipue secundum quod in our happiness consists in the enjoyment
eius fruitione nostra beatitudo of Him. Therefore, we must be led to the
consistit. Oportet igitur quod ex right faith by the divine law.
lege divina in fidem rectam
inducamur.
Item. Lex divina ad hoc ordinat [3] Again, the divine law orders man for
hominem ut sit totaliter subditus this purpose, that he may be entirely
Deo. Sed sicut homo subditur Deo subject to God. But, just as man is
amando quantum ad voluntatem, subject to God as far as will is
ita subditur Deo credendo quantum concerned, through loving, so is he
ad intellectum. Non autem subject to God as far as intellect is
credendo aliquid falsum: quia a concerned, through believing; not, of
Deo, qui est veritas, nullum falsum course, by believing anything that is
homini proponi potest; unde qui false, for no falsity can be proposed to
credit aliquod falsum, non credit man by God Who is truth. Consequently,
Deo. Ex lege igitur divina he who believes something false does
ordinantur homines ad fidem not believe in God. Therefore, men are
rectam. ordered to the right faith by the divine
law.
Adhuc. Quicumque errat circa [4] Besides, whoever is in error
aliquid quod est de essentia rei, regarding something that is of the
non cognoscit illam rem: sicut si essence of a thing does not know that
aliquis apprehenderet animal thing. Thus, if someone understood
irrationale aestimans hoc esse irrational animal with the notion that it is
hominem, non cognosceret a man, he would not know man. Now, it
hominem. Secus autem esset si would be a different matter if he erred
erraret circa aliquod accidentium concerning one of man’s accidents.
eius. Sed in compositis, qui errat However, in the case of composite
circa aliquod principiorum beings, the person who is in error
essentialium, etsi non cognoscat concerning one of their essential
rem simpliciter, tamen cognoscit principles does know the thing, in a
eam secundum quid: sicut qui relative way, though he does not know it
existimat hominem esse animal in an unqualified sense. For instance, he
irrationale, cognoscit eum who thinks that man is an irrational
secundum genus suum. In animal knows him according to his
simplicibus autem hoc non potest genus. But this cannot happen in
accidere, sed quilibet error totaliter reference to simple beings; instead, any
excludit cognitionem rei. Deus error at all completely excludes
autem est maxime simplex. Ergo knowledge of the being. Now, God is
quicumque errat circa Deum, non most simple. So, whoever is in error
cognoscit Deum: sicut qui credit concerning God does not know God, just
Deum esse corpus, nullo modo as the man who thinks that God is a
cognoscit Deum, sed apprehendit body does not know God at all, but
aliquid aliud loco Dei. Secundum grasps something else in place of God.
autem quod aliquid cognoscitur, However, the way in which a thing is
secundum hoc amatur et known determines the way in which it is
desideratur. Qui ergo errat circa loved and desired. Therefore, he who is
Deum, nec amare potest Deum, in error about God can neither love God
nec desiderare ipsum ut finem. nor desire Him as an end. So, since the
Cum igitur lex divina ad hoc tendat divine law intends this result, that man
ut homines ament et desiderent love and desire God, man must be
Deum, oportet quod ex lege divina bound by divine law to bold a right faith
homines obligentur ad rectam concerning God.
fidem habendam de Deo.
Amplius. Falsa opinio ita se habet [5] Moreover, false opinion holds the
in intelligibilibus sicut vitium virtuti same place in regard to objects of the
oppositum in moralibus: nam intellect that vice opposed to virtue has
bonum intellectus est verum. Sed in regard to moral matters, “for truth is
ad legem divinam pertinet vitia the good of the intellect.” But it is the
prohibere. Ergo ad eam etiam function of divine law to prohibit vices.
pertinet falsas opiniones de Deo, et Therefore, it also pertains to it to exclude
de his quae sunt Dei, excludere. false opinions about God and matters
concerned with God.
Hinc est quod dicitur Hebr. 116: [6] Thus it is said in Hebrews (11:6):
sine fide impossibile est placere “Without faith it is impossible to please
Deo. Et Exodi 202, antequam alia God.” And in Exodus (20:2) before the
praecepta legis ponantur, other precepts of the law are given, right
praestituitur recta fides de Deo, faith concerning God is put in first place;
cum dicitur: audi Israel: dominus moreover, it is said: “Hear, O Israel: the
Deus tuus unus est. Lord Your God is one” (Deut. 6:4).
Per hoc autem excluditur error [7] Through this consideration we

quorundam dicentium quod nihil exclude the error of those who say that it
refert ad salutem hominis cum makes no difference to the salvation of
quacumque fide serviat Deo. man whatever be the faith with which he
serves God.
Quod per quaedam sensibilia THAT OUR MIND IS DIRECTED TO GOD
mens nostra dirigitur in Deum BY CERTAIN SENSE OBJECTS
Quia vero connaturale est homini [1] Since it is connatural for man to

ut per sensus cognitionem receive knowledge through his senses,
accipiat, et difficillimum est and since it is very difficult to transcend
sensibilia transcendere, provisum sensible objects, divine provision has
est divinitus homini ut etiam in been made for man so that a reminder of
sensibilibus rebus divinorum ei divine things might be made for him, even
commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc in the order of sensible things. The
hominis intentio magis purpose of this is that the intention of man
revocaretur ad divina, etiam illius might be better recalled to divine matters,
cuius mens non est valida ad even in the case of the man whose mind
divina in seipsis contemplanda. is not strong enough to contemplate divine
things in themselves.
Et propter hoc instituta sunt [2] And it was for this reason that sensible

sensibilia sacrificia: quae homo sacrifices were instituted: man offers
Deo offert, non propter hoc quod these to God, not because God needs
Deus eis indigeat, sed ut them, but so that man may be reminded
repraesentetur homini quod et that he ought to refer both his own being
seipsum et omnia sua debet and all his possessions to God as end,
referre in ipsum sicut in finem, et and thus to the Creator, Governor, and

sicut in creatorem et Lord of all.
gubernatorem et dominum
universorum.
Adhibentur etiam homini [3] In fact, certain blessings using sensible

quaedam sanctificationes per things are provided for man, whereby man
quasdam res sensibiles, quibus is washed, or anointed, or fed, or given
homo lavatur aut ungitur, aut drink, along with the expression of
pascitur vel potatur, cum sensible words, so that man may be
sensibilium verborum prolatione: reminded through sensible things that
ut homini repraesentetur per intelligible gifts come to him from without,
sensibilia intelligibilium donorum and from God, Whose name is expressed
processum in ipso ab extrinseco in sensible words.
fieri et a Deo, cuius nomen
sensibilibus vocibus exprimitur.
Exercentur etiam ab hominibus [4] So, certain sensible works are
quaedam sensibilia opera, non performed by man, not to stimulate God
quibus Deum excitet, sed quibus by such things, but to awaken man himself
seipsum provocet in divina: sicut to divine matters by these actions, such as
prostrationes, genuflexiones, prostrations, genuflections, vocal
vocales clamores, et cantus. ejaculations, and hymns. These things are
Quae non fiunt quasi Deus his done not because God needs them, for
indigeat, qui omnia novit, et cuius He knows all things, and His will is
voluntas est immutabilis, et immutable, and the disposition of His mind
affectum mentis, non motum does not admit of movement from a body
corporis propter se acceptat: sed for His own sake; rather, we do these
ea propter nos facimus, ut per things for our sakes, so that our attention
haec sensibilia opera intentio may be directed to God by these sensible
nostra dirigatur in Deum, et deeds and that our love may be aroused.
affectio accendatur. Simul etiam At the same time, then, we confess by
per haec Deum profitemur these actions that God is the author of
animae et corporis nostri soul and body, to Whom we offer both
auctorem, cui et spiritualia et spiritual and bodily acts of homage.
corporalia obsequia exhibemus.
Propter hoc non est mirum si [5] For this reason, it is not astonishing if
haeretici qui corporis nostri Deum heretics who deny that God is the author
esse auctorem negant, huiusmodi of our body condemn such manifestations.
corporalia obsequia Deo exhibita This condemnation shows that they have
reprehendunt. In quo etiam not remembered that they are men when
apparet quod se homines esse they judge that the representation of
non meminerunt, dum sensibilium sensible objects to themselves is not
sibi repraesentationem necessary for inner knowledge and for
necessariam non iudicant ad love. For it is evident from experience that
interiorem cognitionem et the soul is stimulated to an act of
affectionem. Nam experimento knowledge or of love by bodily acts.
apparet quod per corporales Hence, it is obvious that we may quite
actus anima excitatur ad aliquam appropriately use even bodily things to
cogitationem vel affectionem. elevate our mind to God.
Unde manifestum est
convenienter etiam corporalibus
quibusdam nos uti ad mentis
nostrae elevationem in Deum.
In his autem corporalibus Deo [6] Now, the cult of God is said to consist

exhibendis cultus Dei consistere in these bodily manifestations to God. For
dicitur. Illa enim colere dicimur we are said to cultivate those things to
quibus per nostra opera studium which we devote effort through our works.
adhibemus. Circa Deum autem Indeed, we show our zeal in regard to God
adhibemus studium nostro actu, by our activity, not, of course, to benefit
non quidem ut proficiamus ei, Him (as we are said to do, when we
sicut cum alias res nostris cultivate other things by our actions), but
operibus colere dicimur: sed quia because we approach more closely to
per huiusmodi actus proficimur in God by such acts. And since we directly
Deum. Et quia per interiores tend toward God through interior acts, we
actus directe in Deum tendimus, therefore properly give cult to God by
ideo interioribus actibus proprie interior acts. Yet exterior acts also pertain
Deum colimus. Sed tamen et to the cult of God, according as our mind
exteriores actus ad cultum Dei is lifted up to God by such acts, as we
pertinent, inquantum per have said.
huiusmodi actus mens nostra
elevatur in Deum, ut dictum est.
Hinc etiam Dei cultus religio [7] Also, this cult of God is called religion,

nominatur: quia huiusmodi because in some way man binds' himself
actibus quodammodo se homo by such acts, so that he will not wander
ligat, ut ab eo non evagetur. Et away from God, and also because man
quia etiam quodam naturali feels that he is obligated by some sort of
instinctu se obligatum sentit ut natural prompting to pay, in his own way,
Deo suo modo reverentiam reverence to God, from Whom comes the
impendat, a quo est sui esse et beginning of man's being and of all good.
omnis boni principium.
Hinc etiam est quod religio etiam [8] As a consequence, too, religion takes

nomen accipit pietatis. Nam the name piety. For piety is the means
pietas est per quam honorem whereby we pay due honor to our parents.
debitum parentibus impendimus. Hence, the fact that honor is rendered to
Unde convenienter quod Deo, God, the Parent of all beings, seems
parenti omnium, honor appropriately to be attributed to piety. And
exhibeatur, pietatis esse videtur. for this reason, those who are opposed to
Propter quod, qui his quae ad Dei these things concerned with the cult of
cultum pertinent adversantur, God are called impious.
impii dicuntur.
Quia vero Deus non solum est [9] And because God is not only the cause

nostri esse causa et principium, and source of our being, but also because
sed totum nostrum esse in our entire existence is within His power,
potestate ipsius est; et totum and because we owe Him everything that
quod in nobis est, ipsi debemus; is present in us, and as a consequence
ac per hoc vere dominus noster He is truly our Lord, what we offer Him in
est: id quod in honorem Dei homage is called service.
exhibemus, servitium dicitur.
Est autem Deus dominus non per [10] Of course, God is not a lord in the
accidens, sicut hominis homo, accidental sense, as one man is over
sed per naturam. Et ideo aliter another; He is so through nature. And so,
debetur servitium Deo: et aliter service is owed to God in one way, and to
homini, cui per accidens man in another, for we are accidentally
subdimur, et qui habet aliquod subject to a man whose lordship over
particulare in rebus dominium, et things is limited and also derivative from
a Deo derivatum. Unde servitium God. Hence, the service which is owed to
quod Deo debetur, specialiter God is technically called latria among the
apud Graecos latria vocatur. Greeks.
Quod latriae cultus soli Deo est THAT THE CULT PROPER TO LATRIA
exhibendus IS TO BE OFFERED TO GOD ALONE
Fuerunt autem aliqui qui latriae [1] There have been some who have
cultum non solum primo rerum thought that the cult of latria should be
principio exhibendum offered not only to the first principle of
aestimaverunt, sed omnibus etiam things, but even to all creatures which
creaturis quae supra hominem exist above man. Hence, some, though
sunt. Unde quidam, licet of the opinion that God is the one, first,
opinarentur Deum esse unum and universal principle of things, have
primum et universale rerum nevertheless thought that latria should
principium, latriam tamen be offered, first of all, after the highest
exhibendam aestimaverunt, primo God, to celestial intellectual substances
quidem post summum Deum, whom they called gods, whether they
substantiis intellectualibus were substances completely separated
caelestibus, quas deos vocabant: from bodies or whether they were the
sive essent substantiae omnino a souls of the spheres or the stars.
corporibus separatae; sive essent
animae orbium aut stellarum.
Secundo, etiam quibusdam [2] Secondly, they thought that it should
substantiis intellectualibus quas be offered also to certain intellectual
unitas credebant corporibus aereis, substances united, as they believed, to
quas Daemones esse dicebant: et aerial bodies; and these they called
tamen, quia supra homines eas daemons. Yet, because they believed
esse credebant, sicut corpus them to be above men, as an aerial body
aereum est supra terrestre, is above a terrestrial body, they claimed
huiusmodi etiam substantias that even these substances are to be

colendas divino cultu ab hominibus honored with divine cult by men. And in
ponebant; et in comparatione ad relation to men they said that those
homines deos illas esse dicebant, substances are gods, being
quasi medias inter homines et intermediaries between men and the
deos. Et quia animas bonorum, per gods. Moreover, because the souls of
hoc quod a corpore separantur, in good men, through their separation from
statum altiorem quam sit status the body, have passed over into a state
praesentis vitae transire credebant, higher than that of the present life, they
etiam animabus mortuorum, quas held the opinion in their belief that divine
heroas aut Manes vocabant, cult should be offered to the souls of the
divinum cultum exhibendum esse dead, whom they called heroes, or
opinabantur. manes.
Quidam vero, Deum esse animam [3] In fact, some people, holding the view

mundi aestimantes, crediderunt that God is the World Soul, have
quod toti mundo et singulis eius believed that the cult of divinity is to be
partibus esset cultus divinitatis offered to the entire world and to each of
exhibendus: non tamen propter its parts; not, of course, for the sake of
corpus, sed propter animam, quam the bodily part, but for the sake of the
Deum esse dicebant; sicut et “Soul,” which they said was God, just as
homini sapienti honor exhibetur honor is rendered to a wise man, not
non propter corpus, sed propter because of his body, but because of his
animam. soul.
Quidam vero etiam ea quae infra [4] Indeed, some men said that even
hominem sunt secundum naturam, things below man’s level in nature are to
homini tamen colenda esse be honored with divine cult because
dicebant divino cultu, inquantum in some power of a higher nature is
eis participatur aliquid virtutis participated by them. Hence, since they
superioris naturae. Unde, cum believed that certain idols made by men
quasdam imagines per homines receive a supernatural power, either from
factas sortiri crederent aliquam the influence of celestial bodies or from
virtutem supernaturalem, vel ex the presence of certain spirits, they said
influentia caelestium corporum, vel that divine cult should be offered to
ex praesentia aliquorum spirituum, images of this kind. And they even called
dicebant huiusmodi imaginibus these idols gods. For which reason they
divinum cultum esse exhibendum. are also said to be idolaters, since they
Quas etiam imagines deos offer the cult of latria to idols, that is, to
vocabant. Propter quod et images.
idololatrae sunt dicti: quia latriae
cultum idolis, idest imaginibus,
impendebant.
Est autem irrationabile ponentibus [5] Now, it is unreasonable for people
unum tantum primum principium who maintain only one, separate, first
separatum, cultum divinum alteri principle to offer divine cult to another
exhibere. Cultum enim Deo being. For we render cult to God, as we
exhibemus, ut dictum est, non quia have said, not because He needs it, but
ipse hoc indigeat, sed ut in nobis so that a true opinion concerning God
firmetur etiam per sensibilia opinio may be strengthened in us, even by
vera de Deo. Opinio autem de hoc means of sensible things. But an opinion
quod Deus sit unus, supra omnia on the point that God is one, exalted
exaltatus, per sensibilia firmari non above all things, cannot be established
potest in nobis nisi per hoc quod ei in us through sensible things unless we
aliquid separatim exhibemus, quod honor Him with something unique, which
dicimus cultum divinum. Patet ergo we call divine cult. So, it is evident that a
quod vera opinio de uno principio true opinion concerning the one principle
debilitatur si cultus divinus pluribus is weakened if divine cult is offered to
exhibeatur. several beings.
Praeterea. Sicut dictum est supra, [6] Again, as we said above, this kind of

huiusmodi cultus exterior homini exterior worship is necessary to man so
necessarius est ad hoc quod anima that man’s mind may be aroused to a
hominis excitetur in spiritualem spiritual reverence for God. Now, for the
reverentiam Dei. Ad hoc autem mind of man to be moved toward
quod animus hominis ad aliquid something custom plays a great part,
moveatur, multum operatur since we are easily moved toward
consuetudo: nam ad consueta objectives that have become customary.
facilius movemur. Habet autem hoc Of course, human custom supports this
humana consuetudo, quod honor practice, in that the honor which is
qui exhibetur ei qui summum locum offered to the person holding the highest
in republica tenet, puta regi vel office in the state, for example, the king
imperatori, nulli alii exhibetur. Est or emperor, should be offered to no other
igitur animus hominis excitandus person. Therefore, man’s mind ought to
ad hoc quod aestimet esse unum be stimulated so that he will think that
summum rerum principium, per hoc there is but one highest principle of
quod ei aliquid exhibeat quod nulli things by means of his offering
alteri exhibetur. Et hoc dicimus something to this principle which is
latriae cultum. offered to none other. This we call the
cult of latria.
Item. Si cultus latriae alicui [7] Besides, if the cult of latria were owed

deberetur quia est superior, et non to any person because of his superiority
quia est summus; cum hominum and not because he is the highest being,
unus alio sit superior, et etiam then since one man may be superior to
Angelorum, sequeretur quod unus another, and there is the same possibility
homo exhibere latriam alteri among angels, it would follow that one
deberet, et Angelo Angelus. Et cum man ought to offer ]atria to another, and
ille inter homines qui superior est one angel to another angel. And since,
quantum ad unum, sit inferior among men, he who is superior in one
quantum ad aliud, sequeretur quod way may be inferior in another way, it
mutuo sibi homines latriam would follow that men should mutually
exhiberent. Quod est inconveniens. offer latria to each other. This is not
appropriate.
Adhuc. Secundum hominum [8] Moreover, by human custom, special

consuetudinem, pro speciali repayment should be made for special
beneficio specialis retributio benefit. Now, there is a special benefit

debetur. Est autem quoddam which man receives from the highest
speciale beneficium quod homo a God, namely, man’s own creation, for it
Deo summo percipit, scilicet has been shown in Book Two that God
creationis suae: ostensum enim est alone is the Creator. Therefore, man
in secundo libro quod solus Deus ought to return something special to God
creator est. Debet ergo homo in acknowledgment of this special
aliquid Deo speciale reddere in benefit. This is the cult of latria.
recognitionem beneficii specialis.
Et hoc est latriae cultus.
Amplius. Latria servitium dicitur. [9] Furthermore, latria implies service.

Servitium autem domino debetur. But service is owed to a lord. Now, a lord
Dominus autem est proprie et vere is properly and truly one who gives
qui aliis praecepta operandi precepts of action to others and who
dispensat, et a nullo regulam takes his own rule of action from no one
operandi sumit: qui enim exequitur else. On the other hand, one who carries
quod a superiori fuerit dispositum, out what has been ordered by a superior
magis est minister quam dominus. is more a minister than a lord. But God,
Deus autem, qui est summum Who is the highest principle of reality,
rerum principium, per suam disposes all things to their proper actions
providentiam omnia ad debitas through His providence, as we showed
actiones disponit, ut supra above. Hence, in Sacred Scripture both
ostensum est: unde et in sacra angels and celestial bodies are said to
Scriptura et Angeli et superiora minister to God, Whose order they carry
corpora ministrare dicuntur et Deo, out; and also to us, for it is to our
cuius ordinationem exequuntur, et advantage that their actions accrue (Ps.
nobis, in quorum utilitatem eorum 13.2:21; Heb. 1:14). Therefore, the cult
actiones proveniunt. Non est igitur of latria which is owed to the highest
cultus latriae, qui summo debetur Lord is not to be offered except to the
domino, exhibendus nisi summo highest principle of things.
rerum principio.
Item. Inter alia quae ad latriam [10] Again, among other items which
pertinent, singulare videtur esse pertain to latria, sacrifice may be seen to
sacrificium: nam genuflexiones, have a special place, for genuflections,
prostrationes, et alia huiusmodi prostrations, and other manifestations of
honoris indicia, etiam hominibus this kind of honor may also be shown to
exhiberi possunt, licet alia men, though with a different intention
intentione quam Deo; sacrificium than in regard to God. But it is agreed by
autem nullus offerendum censuit any man that sacrifice should be offered
alicui nisi quia eum Deum to no person unless he is thought to be
aestimavit, aut aestimare se finxit. God or unless one pretends to think so.
Exterius autem sacrificium Now, external sacrifice is representative
repraesentativum est interioris veri of true, interior sacrifice, by which the
sacrificii, secundum quod mens human mind offers itself to God. Indeed,
humana seipsam Deo offert. Offert our mind offers itself to God as the
autem se mens nostra Deo quasi principle of its creation, the author of its
suae creationis principio, quasi actions, the end of its happiness. These
suae operationis actori, quasi suae attributes are, in fact, appropriate to the
beatitudinis fini. Quae quidem highest principle of things only. For we
conveniunt soli summo rerum have showed above that the creative
principio: ostensum enim est supra cause of the rational soul is the highest
quod animae rationalis causa God alone; moreover, He alone is able to
creatrix solus Deus summus est; incline the will of man to whatever He
ipse etiam solus voluntatem wishes, as was shown above; so also it
hominis potest inclinare ad is evident from our preceding
quodcumque voluerit, ut supra considerations” that man’s ultimate
ostensum est; patet etiam ex felicity consists solely in the enjoyment
superioribus quod in eius solius of Him. Therefore, man ought to offer
fruitione ultima hominis consistit sacrifice and the cult of latria only to the
felicitas. Soli igitur summo Deo highest God, and not to any other kind of
homo sacrificium et latriae cultum spiritual substances.
offerre debet, non autem
substantiis quibuscumque
spiritualibus.
Licet autem positio quae ponit [11] Now, though the theory which claims

Deum summum non esse aliud that God is nothing but the world soul is
quam animum mundi, a veritate a departure from the truth, as we
recedat, ut supra ostensum est; illa showed above, while the other position
vero quae ponit Deum esse is true which maintains that God is a
separatum, et ab ipso existere separate being and that all other
omnes alias intellectuales intellectual substances depend on Him
substantias, sive separatas sive for their existence, whether separated
corpori coniunctas, sit vera: haec from, or joined to, a body—still, the first
tamen positio rationabilius movetur theory provides a more rational basis for
ad exhibendum latriae cultum offering the cult of latria to different
rebus diversis. Exhibendo enim things. For, in offering the cult of latria to
diversis rebus latriae cultum, a variety of things one appears to be
videtur uni summo Deo latriam offering it to the one highest God, since,
exhibere, ad quem, secundum according to their theory, the different
eorum positionem, diversae partes parts of the world are related to Him as
mundi comparantur sicut ad the different members of the human
animam hominis diversa corporis body are to the human soul. But reason
membra. Sed etiam ei ratio obviat. is also opposed to this view. For they say
Dicunt enim mundo non esse that the cult of latria should not be
exhibendum latriae cultum ratione offered to the world by reason of its
corporis, sed ratione animae, quam body, but because of its soul, which they
Deum esse dicunt. Licet autem assert to be God. Thus, though the
corpus mundi divisibile sit in partes bodily part of the world is divisible into
diversas, anima tamen indivisibilis different parts, the world soul is,
est. Non est igitur divinitatis cultus however, indivisible. So, the cult of
exhibendus diversis rebus, sed uni divinity ought not be offered to a variety
tantum. of things, but to one only.
Adhuc. Si mundus ponitur animam [12] Besides, if the world be supposed to

habere quae totum animet et have a soul which animates the whole
omnes partes ipsius, non potest and all its parts, this cannot be
hoc intelligi de anima nutritiva vel understood as a nutritive or sensitive
sensitiva: quia harum partium soul, because the operations of these
animae operationes non competunt parts of the soul are not suitable to all
omnibus partibus universi. Et dato parts of the universe. And even granting
etiam quod haberet mundus that the world might have a sensitive or
animam sensitivam vel nutritivam, nutritive soul, the cult of latria would not
non propter huiusmodi animam be due it because of such souls, for this
deberet ei latriae cultus: sicut nec cult is not due to brute animals or to
brutis animalibus nec plantis. plants. The conclusion remains, then,
Relinquitur ergo quod hoc quod that their assertion that God, to Whom
dicunt Deum, cui debetur latria, latria is owed, is the world soul must be
esse animam mundi, intelligatur de understood of the intellectual soul. In
anima intellectuali. Quae quidem fact, this soul is not the perfection of
anima non est perfectio individually distinct parts of the body, but
determinatarum partium corporis, in some way has reference to the whole.
sed aliquo modo respicit totum. This is even evident in the case of our
Quod etiam in nostra anima, quae soul which is less noble, for the intellect
est ignobilior, patet: non enim has no corporeal organ, as is proved in
intellectus habet aliquod organum Book III of On the Soul [4]. Therefore,
corporale, ut probatur in III de even on the basis of their theory, the cult
anima. Non igitur exhibendus esset of divinity should not be offered to the
cultus divinitatis diversis partibus various parts of the world, but to the
mundi, sed toti mundo, propter entire world because of its soul.
animam eius, secundum eorum
radicem.
Amplius. Si, secundum eorum [13] Moreover, if in their theory there be

positionem, una tantum sit anima, but one soul which animates the whole
quae totum mundum animat et world and all its parts, and if the world is
partes omnes ipsius; mundus not termed God except on account of the
autem non dicitur Deus nisi propter soul, then there will be but one God. And
animam: erit ergo unus tantum thus the cult of divinity will be owed to
Deus. Et sic cultus divinitatis non one being only. On the other hand, if
debetur nisi uni. Si vero sit una there be but one soul for the whole, and
anima totius, et diversae partes if the different parts, in turn, have
iterum habeant diversas animas, different souls, they have to say that the
oportet eos dicere quod animae souls of the parts are subordinated to the
partium sub anima totius soul of the whole; for the same
ordinentur: eadem enim est proportion holds between perfections as
proportio perfectionum et between perfectible things. Now,
perfectibilium. Existentibus autem supposing that a number of intellectual
pluribus substantiis intellectualibus substances exist in an ordered hierarchy,
ordinatis, illi tantum debetur latriae the cult of latria will be due only to the
cultus quae summum locum in eis one which holds the highest rank among
tenet, ut ostensum est contra aliam them, as we showed in opposing the
positionem. Non erit igitur previous theory. Therefore, the cult of
exhibendus latriae cultus partibus latria should not be offered to the parts
mundi, sed solum toti. of the world, but only to the whole.
Praeterea. Manifestum est [14] Furthermore, it is evident that some

quasdam partes mundi non habere parts of the world have no soul of their
animam propriam. Eis igitur non own. Therefore, this cult should not be
erit exhibendus cultus. Et tamen offered to them. Yet these men had the
ipsi colebant omnia mundi practice of honoring all the elements of
elementa: scilicet terram, aquam, the world, namely, earth, water, fire, and
ignem, et alia huiusmodi inanimata other inanimate bodies of like kind.
corpora.
Item. Manifestum est quod [15] Again, it is obvious that a superior
superius non debet inferiori latriae does not owe the cult of latria to an
cultum. Homo autem superior est inferior. Now, man is superior in the
ordine naturae ad minus omnibus order of nature, at least in regard to all
inferioribus corporibus, quanto lower bodies, to the extent that be has a
perfectiorem habet formam. Non more perfect form. Therefore, the cult of
igitur ab homine esset latriae cultus latria should not be offered by man to
exhibendus inferioribus corporibus, lower bodies, even if some cult were
si propter proprias eorum animas owed them on the supposition that they
eis cultus deberetur. possessed souls of their own.
Eadem autem inconvenientia sequi [16] The same inappropriate conclusion

necesse est si quis dicat quod must follow if someone were to say that
singulae partes mundi habent the individual parts of the world have
proprias animas, non autem totum their own souls but the whole does not
habet aliquam unam communem. possess one common soul. For it will still
Oportebit enim quod suprema pars remain necessary for the highest part of
mundi habeat animam nobiliorem, the world to have a more noble soul, to
cui soli, secundum praemissa, which alone, according to the premises,
debebitur latriae cultus. the cult of latria will be owed.
His autem positionibus [17] But more unreasonable than these

irrationabilior, est illa quae dicit theories is the one which states that the
imaginibus esse latriae cultum cult of latria should be offered to images.
exhibendum. Si enim huiusmodi For, if images of this sort have power or
imagines habent virtutem aut worth of any kind derived from celestial
aliquam dignitatem ex corporibus bodies, then the cult of latria is not due
caelestibus, non propter hoc eis them on this basis, because such
debetur latriae cultus: cum nec worship is not even due to those
ipsis corporibus debeatur, nisi forte celestial bodies, unless, perchance,
propter eorum animas, ut quidam because of their souls, as some have
posuerunt. Hae autem imagines claimed. But these images are claimed
ponuntur virtutem aliquam to have received some power from
consequi ex corporibus caelestibus celestial bodies through the physical
secundum eorum corporalem power of these bodies.
virtutem.
Praeterea. Manifestum est quod [18] Again, it is evident that they do not
non consequuntur ex corporibus obtain from celestial bodies any
caelestibus tam nobilem perfection which is as noble as is the
perfectionem sicut est anima rational soul. So, they are inferior in
rationalis. Sunt ergo infra gradum degree of worth to any man. Therefore,
dignitatis cuiuslibet hominis. Non no cult is owed them by man.
igitur ab homine debetur eis aliquis
cultus.
Amplius. Causa potior est effectu. [19] Besides, a cause is more powerful
Harum autem imaginum factores than its effect. Now, the makers of these
sunt homines. Non igitur homo images are men. So, man owes no cult
debet eis aliquem cultum. to them.
Si autem dicatur, quod huiusmodi [20] But, if it be said that these images
imagines habent aliquam virtutem have some virtue or worth due to the fact
aut dignitatem ex hoc quod eis that certain spiritual substances are
adhaerent aliquae spirituales connected with them, even this will not
substantiae hoc etiam non sufficit: suffice, because the cult of latria is owed
cum nulli spirituali substantiae to no spiritual substance except the
debeatur latriae cultus nisi soli highest.
summae.
Praeterea. Nobiliori modo anima [21] Moreover, the rational soul is

rationalis adhaeret hominis corpori combined with man’s body in a more
quam aliqua spiritualis substantia noble way than that whereby a spiritual
adhaereat praedictis imaginibus. substance might be attached to the
Adhuc igitur homo remanet in aforesaid images. So, man will still
maiori dignitate quam praedictae remain on a higher level of dignity than
imagines. the aforesaid images.
Adhuc. Cum huiusmodi imagines [22] Furthermore, since these images at

interdum ad aliquos noxios effectus times admit of harmful effects, it is
fiant, manifestum est quod, si per evident that, if they derive their result
aliquas spirituales substantias from some spiritual substances, then
effectum sortiantur, quod illae those spiritual substances are vicious.
spirituales substantiae sunt This can also be clearly proved from this
vitiosae. Quod etiam manifestius fact: they are deceptive in their answers
probatur per hoc: in responsionibus and they demand certain actions
decipiunt, et aliqua contraria virtuti contrary to virtue from their devotees.
exigunt a suis cultoribus. Et sic And so, they are inferior to good men.
sunt bonis hominibus inferiores. Therefore, the cult of latria is not owed to
Non ergo eis debetur latriae cultus. them.
Manifestum est ergo ex dictis quod [23] Therefore, it is clear from what we

latriae cultus soli uni summo Deo have said that the cult of latria is due to
debetur. Hinc est quod dicitur the one, highest God only. Thus it is said
Exod. 2220: qui immolat diis in Exodus (22:20): “He who sacrifices to
occidetur, praeter domino soli. Et the gods shall be put to death, save only
Deut. 613: dominum Deum tuum to the Lord”; and in Deuteronomy (6:13):
adorabis, et illi soli servies. Et “You shall fear the Lord Your God, and
Rom. 1, dicitur de gentilibus: shall serve Him only.” And in Romans
docentes enim se esse sapientes, (1:7273) it is said of the Gentiles: “For,
stulti facti sunt, et mutaverunt professing themselves to be wise, they
gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in became fools, and they changed the
similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis glory of the incorruptible God into the
hominis et volucrum et likeness of the image of a corruptible
quadrupedum et serpentum. Et man and of birds, and of fourfooted
infra: qui commutaverunt veritatem beasts and of creeping things”; and later
Dei in mendacium, et coluerunt et (verse 25): “Who changed the truth of
servierunt creaturae potius quam God into a lie and worshiped and served
creatori, qui est super omnia Deus the creature rather than the Creator,
benedictus in saecula. Who is God above all blessed for ever.”
Quia ergo indebitum est quod [24] So, since it is unfitting for the cult of

latriae cultus alteri exhibeatur latria to be offered to any other being
quam primo rerum principio, ad than the first principle of things, and
indebita autem incitare non est nisi since to incite to unworthy deeds can
rationalis creaturae male only be the work of a badly disposed
dispositae: manifestum est quod ad rational creature, it is evident that men
praedictas indebitas culturas have been solicited by the urging of
instinctu Daemonum homines demons to develop the aforesaid
provocati fuerunt, qui se etiam loco unworthy cults, and these demons have
Dei hominibus colendos been presented in place of God as
exhibuerunt, divinum appetentes objects of men’s worship because they
honorem. Hinc est quod dicitur in craved divine honor. Hence it is said in
Psalmo: omnes dii gentium the Psalm (95:5): “All the gods of the
Daemonia. Et I Cor. 1020: quae Gentiles are devils”; and in 1 Corinthians
immolant gentes Daemoniis, et non (10:20): “the things which the heathens
Deo. sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not
to God.”
Quia igitur haec est principalis legis [25] Therefore, since this is the chief

divinae intentio ut homo Deo intent of divine law: that man be subject
subdatur, et ei singularem to God and that he should offer special
reverentiam exhibeat non solum reverence to Him, not merely in his
corde, sed etiam ore et opere heart, but also orally and by bodily
corporali; ideo primitus, Exod. 20, works, so first of all, in Exodus 20, where
ubi lex divina proponitur, interdicitur the divine law is promulgated, the cult of
cultus plurium deorum, ubi dicitur: many gods is forbidden when it is said:
3 non habebis deos alienos coram “You shall not have strange gods before
me, et non facies tibi sculptile, me” and “You shall not make to Yourself
neque omnem similitudinem. a graven thing, nor any likeness” (20:3
Secundo, indicitur homini ne 4). Secondly, it is forbidden man to
irreverenter divinum nomen ore pronounce vocally the divine name
pronuntiet, ad confirmationem without reverence, that is, in order to
scilicet alicuius falsi: et hoc est lend support to anything false; and this is
quod dicitur: 7 non assumes what is said: “You shall not take the
nomen Dei in vanum. Tertio, name of God in vain” (20:7). Thirdly, rest
indicitur requies secundum aliquod is prescribed at certain times from
tempus ab exterioribus exercitiis, ut outward works, so that the mind may be
mens divinae contemplationi vacet: devoted to divine contemplation; and

et ideo dicitur: 8 memento ut diem thus it is stated: “Remember that You
sabbati sanctifices. keep holy the Sabbath day” (20:8).
Chapter 121
Caput 121
THAT DIVINE LAW ORDERS MAN
Quod divina lex ordinat
ACCORDING TO REASON IN REGARD
hominem secundum rationem
TO CORPOREAL AND SENSIBLE
circa corporalia et sensibilia
THINGS
Sicut autem per corporalia et [1] Now, just as man’s mind may be raised

sensibilia mens hominis elevari up to God by means of corporeal and
potest in Deum, si quis eis in sensible things, if one use them in a
reverentiam Dei debito modo proper way to revere God, so, too, the
utatur, ita etiam eorum indebitus improper use of them either completely
usus mentem a Deo vel totaliter distracts the mind from God, and so the
abstrahit, dum in inferioribus end of the will is fixed in inferior things, or
rebus constituitur voluntatis finis; such abuse slows down the inclination of
vel mentis intentionem a Deo the mind toward God so that we become
retardat, dum ultra quam necesse attached to things of this kind to an extent
sit, ad huiusmodi res afficimur. Est greater than is necessary. But the divine
autem divina lex ad hoc law was given for this chief purpose: so
principaliter data ut homo that man might cling to God. Therefore, it
adhaereat Deo. Pertinet igitur ad does pertain to the divine law to order
legem divinam ordinare hominem man in regard to his love and use of
circa corporalium et sensibilium bodily and sensible things.
affectionem et usum.
Adhuc. Sicut mens hominis [2] Again, as man’s mind is subordinated
ordinatur sub Deo, ita corpus sub to God, so is the body subordinated to the
anima ordinatur, et inferiores vires soul, and the lower powers to reason. But
sub ratione. Pertinet autem ad it pertains to divine providence, of which
divinam providentiam, cuius divine law is but a rational plan proposed
quaedam ratio homini a Deo by God to man, to see that individual
proposita divina lex est, ut singula things keep their proper order. Therefore,
suum ordinem teneant. Est igitur man must be so ordered by divine law
sic homo ordinandus lege divina that his lower powers may be subject to
ut inferiores vires rationi reason, and his body to his soul, and so
subdantur; et corpus animae; et that external things may subserve the
exteriores res ad necessitatem needs of man.
homini deserviant.
Amplius. Quaelibet lex recte [3] Besides, any law that is rightly
proposita inducit ad virtutem. established promotes virtue. Now, virtue
Virtus autem in hoc consistit, consists in this: that both the inner
quod tam interiores affectiones, feelings and the use of corporeal things
quam corporalium rerum usus, be regulated by reason. So, this is
ratione regulentur. Est igitur hoc something to be provided for by divine
lege divina statuendum. law.
Praeterea. Ad unumquemque [4] Moreover, it is the function of every
legislatorem pertinet ea lege lawmaker to determine by law the things
statuere sine quibus lex observari without which observation of the law is
non potest. Cum autem lex rationi impossible. Now, since law is proposed to
proponatur, homo legem non reason, man would not follow the law
sequeretur nisi alia omnia quae unless all the other things which belong to
pertinent ad hominem, rationi man were subject to reason. So, it is the
subderentur. Pertinet igitur ad function of divine law to command the
legem divinam praecipere ut submission to reason of all the other
omnia quae sunt hominis, rationi factors proper to man.
subdantur.
Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 121: [5] Thus it is said: “Let your service be
rationabile obsequium vestrum; et reasonable” (Rom. 12:1); and again: “This
I Thess. 43: haec est voluntas is the will of God, your sanctification” (1
Dei, sanctificatio vestra. Thes. 4:3).
Per haec autem excluditur [6] Now, by this conclusion we refute the
quorundam error dicentium illa error of some who say that those acts
solum esse peccata, quibus only are sinful whereby one’s neighbor is
proximus aut offenditur aut offended or scandalized.
scandalizatur.
Qua ratione fornicatio simplex THE REASON WHY SIMPLE
secundum legem divinam sit FORNICATION IS A SIN ACCORDING
peccatum: et quod matrimonium TO DIVINE LAW,
sit naturale AND THAT MATRIMONY IS NATURAL
Ex hoc autem apparet vanam esse [1] From the foregoing we can see the

rationem quorundam dicentium futility of the argument of certain people
fornicationem simplicem non esse who say that simple fornication is not a
peccatum. Dicunt enim: sit aliqua sin. For they say: Suppose there is a
mulier a viro soluta, quae sub woman who is not married, or under the
nullius potestate, ut patris vel control of any man, either her father or
alicuius alterius, existat. Si quis ad another man. Now, if a man performs the
eam accedat ea volente, non facit sexual act with her, and she is willing, he
illi iniuriam: quia sibi placet, et sui does not injure her, because she favors
corporis habet potestatem. Alteri the action and she has control over her
non facit iniuriam: quia sub nullius own body. Nor does he injure any other
potestate ponitur esse. Non videtur person, because she is understood to be
igitur esse peccatum. under no other person’s control. So, this
does not seem to be a sin.
Non videtur autem esse responsio [2] Now, to say that he injures God would

sufficiens si quis dicat quod facit not seem to be an adequate answer. For
iniuriam Deo. Non enim Deus a we do not offend God except by doing
nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod something contrary to our own good, as
contra nostrum bonum agimus ut has been said. But this does not appear
dictum est. Hoc autem non apparet contrary to man’s good. Hence, on this
esse contra hominis bonum. Unde basis, no injury seems to be done to
ex hoc non videtur Deo aliqua God.
iniuria fieri.
Similiter etiam non videtur [3] Likewise, it also would seem an
sufficiens responsio quod per hoc inadequate answer to say that some
fiat iniuria proximo, qui injury is done to one’s neighbor by this
scandalizatur. Contingit enim de action, inasmuch as he may be
aliquo quod secundum se non est scandalized. Indeed, it is possible for him
peccatum, aliquem scandalizari: et to be scandalized by something which is
sic fit peccatum per accidens. not in itself a sin. In this event, the act
Nunc autem non agimus an would be accidentally sinful. But our
fornicatio simplex sit peccatum per problem is not whether simple fornication
accidens, sed per se. is accidentally a sin, but whether it is so
essentially.
Oportet igitur ex superioribus [4] Hence, we must look for a solution in

solutionem quaerere. Dictum est our earlier considerations. We have said
enim quod Deus uniuscuiusque that God exercises care over every
curam habet secundum id quod est person on the basis of what is good for
ei bonum. Est autem bonum him. Now, it is good for each person to
uniuscuiusque quod finem suum attain his end, whereas it is bad for him
consequatur: malum autem eius to swerve away from his proper end.
est quod a debito fine divertat. Now, this should be considered
Sicut autem in toto, ita et in applicable to the parts, just as it is to the
partibus hoc considerari oportet: ut whole being; for instance, each and
scilicet unaquaeque pars hominis, every part of man, and every one of his
et quilibet actus eius, finem acts, should attain the proper end. Now,
debitum sortiatur. Semen autem, though the male semen is superfluous in
etsi sit superfluum quantum ad regard to the preservation of the
individui conservationem, est individual, it is nevertheless necessary in
tamen necessarium quantum ad regard to the propagation of the species.
propagationem speciei. Alia vero Other superfluous things, such as
superflua, ut egestio, urina, sudor, excrement, urine, sweat, and such
et similia, ad nihil necessaria sunt: things, are not at all necessary; hence,
unde ad bonum hominis pertinet their emission contributes to man’s good.
solum quod emittantur. Non hoc Now, this is not what is sought in the
autem solum quaeritur in semine, case of semen, but, rather, to emit it for
sed ut emittatur ad generationis the purpose of generation, to which
utilitatem, ad quam coitus purpose the sexual act is directed. But
ordinatur. Frustra autem esset man’s generative process would be
hominis generatio nisi et debita frustrated unless it were followed by
nutritio sequeretur: quia generatum proper nutrition, because the offspring
non permaneret, debita nutritione would not survive if proper nutrition were

subtracta. Sic igitur ordinata esse withheld. Therefore, the emission of
seminis debet emissio ut sequi semen ought to be so ordered that it will
possit et generatio conveniens, et result in both the production of the proper
geniti educatio. offspring and in the upbringing of this
offspring.
Ex quo patet quod contra bonum [5] It is evident from this that every
hominis est omnis emissio seminis emission of semen, in such a way that
tali modo quod generatio sequi non generation cannot follow, is contrary to
possit. Et si ex proposito hoc the good for man. And if this be done
agatur, oportet esse peccatum. deliberately, it must be a sin. Now, I am
Dico autem modum ex quo speaking of a way from which, in itself,
generatio sequi non potest generation could not result: such would
secundum se: sicut omnis emissio be any emission of semen apart from the
seminis sine naturali coniunctione natural union of male and female. For
maris et feminae; propter quod which reason, sins of this type are called
huiusmodi peccata contra naturam contrary to nature. But, if by accident
dicuntur. Si autem per accidens generation cannot result from the
generatio ex emissione seminis emission of semen, then this is not a
sequi non possit, non propter hoc reason for it being against nature, or a
est contra naturam, nec peccatum: sin; as for instance, if the woman
sicut si contingat mulierem sterilem happens to be sterile.
esse.
Similiter etiam oportet contra [6] Likewise, it must also be contrary to
bonum hominis esse si semen the good for man if the semen be emitted
taliter emittatur quod generatio under conditions such that generation
sequi possit, sed conveniens could result but the proper upbringing
educatio impediatur. Est enim would be prevented. We should take into
considerandum quod in animalibus consideration the fact that, among some
in quibus sola femina sufficit ad animals where the female is able to take
prolis educationem, mas et femina care of the upbringing of offspring, male
post coitum nullo tempore and female do not remain together for
commanent, sicut patet in canibus. any time after the act of generation. This
Quaecumque vero animalia sunt in is obviously the case with dogs. But in
quibus femina non sufficit ad the case of animals of which the female
educationem prolis, mas et femina is not able to provide for the upbringing
simul post coitum commanent of offspring, the male and female do stay
quousque necessarium est ad together after the act of generation as
prolis educationem et long as is necessary for the upbringing
instructionem: sicut patet in and instruction of the offspring.
quibusdam avibus, quarum pulli Examples are found among certain
non statim postquam nati sunt species of birds whose young are not
possunt sibi cibum quaerere. Cum able to seek out food for themselves
enim avis non nutriat lacte pullos, immediately after batching. In fact, since
quod in promptu est, velut a natura a bird does not nourish its young with
praeparatum, sicut in milk, made available by nature as it
quadrupedibus accidit, sed oportet were, as occurs in the case of
quod cibum aliunde pullis quaerat, quadrupeds, but the bird must look
et praeter hoc, incubando eos elsewhere for food for its young, and
foveat: non sufficeret ad hoc sola since besides this it must protect them by
femella. Unde ex divina providentia sitting on them, the female is not able to
est naturaliter inditum mari in do this by herself. So, as a result of
talibus animalibus, ut commaneat divine providence, there is naturally
femellae ad educationem fetus. implanted in the male of these animals a
Manifestum est autem quod in tendency to remain with the female in
specie humana femina minime order to bring up the young. Now, it is
sufficeret sola ad prolis abundantly evident that the female in the
educationem: cum necessitas human species is not at all able to take
humanae vitae multa requirat quae care of the upbringing of offspring by
per unum solum parari non herself, since the needs of human life
possunt. Est igitur conveniens demand many things which cannot be
secundum naturam humanam ut provided by one person alone.
homo post coitum mulieri Therefore, it is appropriate to human
commaneat, et non statim nature that a man remain together with a
abscedat, indifferenter ad woman after the generative act, and not
quamcumque accedens, sicut leave her immediately to have such
apud fornicantes accidit. relations with another woman, as is the
practice with fornicators.
Non autem huic rationi obstat quod [7] Nor, indeed, is the fact that a woman
aliqua mulier suis divitiis potens est may be able by means of her own wealth
ut sola nutriat fetum. Quia rectitudo to care for the child by herself an
naturalis in humanis actibus non obstacle to this argument. For natural
est secundum ea quae per rectitude in human acts is not dependent
accidens contingunt in uno on things accidentally possible in the
individuo, sed secundum ea quae case of one individual, but, rather, on
totam speciem consequuntur. those conditions which accompany the
entire species.
Rursus considerandum est quod in [8] Again, we must consider that in the

specie humana proles non indiget human species offspring require not only
solum nutritione quantum ad nourishment for the body, as in the case
corpus, ut in aliis animalibus; sed of other animals, but also education for
etiam instructione quantum ad the soul. For other animals naturally
animam. Nam alia animalia possess their own kinds of prudence
naturaliter habent suas prudentias, whereby they are enabled to take care of
quibus sibi providere possunt: themselves. But a man lives by reason,
homo autem ratione vivit, quam which he must develop by lengthy
per longi temporis experimentum temporal experience so that he may
ad prudentiam pervenire oportet; achieve prudence. Hence, children must
unde necesse est ut filii a be instructed by parents who are already
parentibus, quasi iam expertis, experienced people. Nor are they able to
instruantur. Nec huius instructionis receive such instruction as soon as they
sunt capaces mox geniti, sed post are born, but after a long time, and
longum tempus, et praecipue cum especially after they have reached the
ad annos discretionis perveniunt. age of discretion. Moreover, a long time
Ad hanc etiam instructionem is needed for this instruction. Then, too,
longum tempus requiritur. Et tunc because of the impulsion of the
etiam, propter impetus passionum, passions, through which prudent
quibus corrumpitur aestimatio judgment is vitiated, they require not
prudentiae, indigent non solum merely instruction but correction. Now, a
instructione, sed etiam woman alone is not adequate to this
repressione. Ad haec autem mulier task; rather, this demands the work of a
sola non sufficit, sed magis in hoc husband, in whom reason is more
requiritur opus maris, in quo est et developed for giving instruction and
ratio perfectior ad instruendum, et strength is more available for giving
virtus potentior ad castigandum. punishment. Therefore, in the human
Oportet igitur in specie humana species, it is not enough, as in the case
non per parvum tempus insistere of birds, to devote a small amount of time
promotioni prolis, sicut in avibus, to bringing up offspring, for a long period
sed per magnum spatium vitae. of life is required. Hence, since among all
Unde, cum necessarium sit marem animals it is necessary for male and
feminae commanere in omnibus female to remain together as long as the
animalibus quousque opus patris work of the father is needed by the
necessarium est proli, naturale est offspring, it is natural to the human being
homini quod non ad modicum for the man to establish a lasting
tempus, sed diuturnam societatem association with a designated woman,
habeat vir ad determinatam over no short period of time. Now, we call
mulierem. Hanc autem societatem this society matrimony. Therefore,
matrimonium vocamus. Est igitur matrimony is natural for man, and
matrimonium homini naturale et promiscuous performance of the sexual
fornicarius coitus, qui est praeter act, outside matrimony, is contrary to
matrimonium, est contra hominis man’s good. For this reason, it must be a
bonum. Et propter hoc oportet sin.
ipsum esse peccatum.
Nec tamen oportet reputari leve [9] Nor, in fact, should it be deemed a
peccatum esse si quis seminis slight sin for a man to arrange for the
emissionem procuret praeter emission of semen apart from the proper
debitum generationis et purpose of generating and bringing up
educationis finem, propter hoc children, on the argument that it is either
quod aut leve aut nullum peccatum a slight sin, or none at all, for a person to
est si quis aliqua sui corporis parte use a part of the body for a different use
utatur ad alium usum quam ad than that to which it is directed by nature
eum ad quem est ordinata (say, for instance, one chose to walk on
secundum naturam, ut si quis, his hands, or to use his feet for
verbi gratia, manibus ambulet, aut something usually done with the hands)
pedibus aliquid operetur manibus because man’s good is not much
operandum: quia per huiusmodi opposed by such inordinate use.
inordinatos usus bonum hominis However, the inordinate emission of
non multum impeditur; inordinata semen is incompatible with the natural
vero seminis emissio repugnat good; namely, the preservation of the
bono naturae, quod est species. Hence, after the sin of homicide
conservatio speciei. Unde post whereby a human nature already in
peccatum homicidii, quo natura existence is destroyed, this type of sin
humana iam in actu existens appears to take next place, for by it the
destruitur, huiusmodi genus generation of human nature is precluded.
peccati videtur secundum locum

tenere, quo impeditur generatio
humanae naturae.
Haec autem quae praemissa sunt, [10] Moreover, these views which have

divina auctoritate firmantur. Quod just been given have a solid basis in
enim emissio seminis ex qua divine authority. That the emission of
proles sequi non potest, sit illicita, semen under conditions in which
patet. Dicitur enim Levit. 1822 offspring cannot follow is illicit is quite
cum masculo non commisceberis clear. There is the text of Leviticus
coitu femineo; et: 23 cum omni (18:2723): “You shall not lie with
pecore non coibis. Et I Cor. 610: mankind as with womankind... and You
neque molles, neque masculorum shall not copulate with any beast.” And in
concubitores, regnum Dei non 1 Corinthians (6:10) : “Nor the
possidebunt. effeminate, nor liers with mankind... shall
possess the kingdom of God.
Quod etiam fornicatio, et omnis [11] Also, that fornication and every
coitus praeter propriam uxorem, sit performance of the act of reproduction
illicitus patet. Dicitur enim Deut. with a person other than one’s wife are
2317: non erit meretrix de filiabus illicit is evident. For it is said: “There shall
Israel, nec scortator de filiis Israel. be no whore among the daughters of
Et Tobiae 413: attende tibi ab Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons
omni fornicatione, et praeter of Israel” (Deut. 23:17); and in Tobit
uxorem tuam, non patiaris crimen (4:13): “Take heed to keep Yourself from
scire. Et I Cor. 618: fugite all fornication, and beside Your wife
fornicationem. never endure to know a crime”; and in 1
Corinthians (6:18): “Fly fornication.”
Per haec autem excluditur error [12] By this conclusion we refute the
dicentium in emissione seminis error of those who say that there is no
non esse maius peccatum quam in more sin in the emission of semen than
aliarum superfluitatum emissione; in the emission of any other superfluous
et dicentium fornicationem non matter, and also of those who state that
esse peccatum. fornication is not a sin.
Quod matrimonium debet esse THAT MATRIMONY SHOULD BE
indivisibile INDIVISIBLE
Si quis autem recte consideret, [1] If one will make a proper
praedicta ratio non solum ad hoc consideration, the preceding reasoning
perducere videtur ut societas maris will be seen to lead to the conclusion not
et feminae in humana natura, only that the society of man and woman
quam matrimonium appellamus, sit of the human species, which we call
diuturna, sed etiam quod sit per matrimony, should be long lasting, but
totam vitam. even that it should endure throughout an
entire life.
Possessiones enim ad [2] Indeed, possessions are ordered to

conservationem naturalis vitae the preservation of natural life, and since
ordinantur: et quia naturalis vita, natural life, which cannot be preserved
quae conservari non potest in perpetually in the father, is by a sort of
patre perpetuo, quasi quadam succession preserved in the son in its
successione, secundum speciei specific likeness, it is naturally fitting for
similitudinem, conservatur in filio, the son to succeed also to the things
secundum naturam est conveniens which belong to the father. So, it is
ut in his quae sunt patris, succedat natural that the father’s solicitude for his
et filius. Naturale est igitur ut son should endure until the end of the
sollicitudo patris ad filium maneat father’s life. Therefore, if even in the
usque ad finem vitae suae. Si igitur case of birds the solicitude of the father
sollicitudo patris de filio causat gives rise to the cohabitation of male and
etiam in avibus commanentiam female, the natural order demands that
maris et feminae, ordo naturalis father and mother in the human species
requirit quod usque ad finem vitae remain together until the end of life.
in humana specie pater et mater
simul commaneant.
Videtur etiam aequitati repugnare [3] It also seems to be against equity if
si praedicta societas dissolvatur. the aforesaid society be dissolved. For
Femina enim indiget mare non the female needs the male, not merely
solum propter generationem, sicut for the sake of generation, as in the case
in aliis animalibus, sed etiam of other animals, but also for the sake of
propter gubernationem: quia mas government, since the male is both more
est et ratione perfectior, et virtute perfect in reasoning and stronger in his
fortior. Mulier vero ad viri powers. In fact, a woman is taken into
societatem assumitur propter man’s society for the needs of
necessitatem generationis. generation; then, with the disappearance
Cessante igitur fecunditate mulieris of a woman’s fecundity and beauty, she
et decore, impeditur ne ab alio is prevented from association with
assumatur. Si quis igitur, mulierem another man. So, if any man took a
assumens tempore iuventutis, quo woman in the time of her youth, when
et decor et fecunditas ei adsunt, beauty and fecundity were hers, and
eam dimittere possit postquam then sent her away after she had
aetate provecta fuerit, damnum reached an advanced age, he would
inferet mulieri, contra naturalem damage that woman contrary to natural
aequitatem. equity.
Item. Manifeste apparet [4] Again, it seems obviously

inconveniens esse si mulier virum inappropriate for a woman to be able to
dimittere possit: cum mulier put away her husband, because a wife is
naturaliter viro subiecta sit naturally subject to her husband as
tanquam gubernatori; non est governor, and it is not within the power of
autem in potestate eius qui alteri a person subject to another to depart
subiicitur, ut ab eius regimine from his rule. So, it would be against the
discedat. Contra naturalem igitur natural order if a wife were able to
ordinem esset si mulier virum abandon her husband. Therefore, if a
deserere posset. Si ergo vir husband were permitted to abandon his
deserere posset mulierem, non wife, the society of husband and wife
esset aequa societas viri ad would not be an association of equals,
mulierem, sed servitus quaedam but, instead, a sort of slavery on the part
ex parte mulieris. of the wife.
Praeterea. Hominibus naturalis [5] Besides, there is in men a certain
quaedam sollicitudo inest de natural solicitude to know their offspring.
certitudine prolis: quod propter hoc This is necessary for this reason: the
necessarium est, quia filius child requires the father’s direction for a
diuturna patris gubernatione long time. So, whenever there are
indiget. Quaecumque igitur obstacles to the ascertaining of offspring
certitudinem prolis impediunt, sunt they are opposed to the natural instinct
contra naturalem instinctum of the human species. But, if a husband
humanae speciei. Si autem vir could put away his wife, or a wife her
posset mulierem dimittere, vel husband, and have sexual relations with
mulier virum, et alteri copulari, another person, certitude as to offspring
impediretur certitudo prolis, dum would be precluded, for the wife would
mulier a primo cognita, postmodum be united first with one man and later
a secundo cognosceretur. Est igitur with another. So, it is contrary to the
contra naturalem instinctum natural instinct of the human species for
speciei humanae quod mulier a a wife to be separated from her husband.
viro separetur. Sic igitur non solum And thus, the union of male and female
diuturnam, sed etiam individuam in the human species must be not only
oportet esse in humana specie lasting, but also unbroken.
maris et feminae coniunctionem.
Amplius. Amicitia, quanto maior, [6] Furthermore, the greater that

tanto est firmior et diuturnior. Inter friendship is, the more solid and long
virum autem et uxorem maxima lasting will it be. Now, there seems to be
amicitia esse videtur: adunantur the greatest friendship between husband
enim non solum in actu carnalis and wife, for they are united not only in
copulae, quae etiam inter bestias the act of fleshly union, which produces a
quandam suavem societatem facit, certain gentle association even among
sed etiam ad totius domesticae beasts, but also in the partnership of the
conversationis consortium; unde, whole range of domestic activity.
in signum huius, homo propter Consequently, as an indication of this,
uxorem etiam patrem et matrem man must even “leave his father and
dimittit, ut dicitur Gen. 224. mother” for the sake of his wife, as is
Conveniens igitur est quod said in Genesis (2:24). Therefore, it is
matrimonium sit omnino fitting for matrimony to be completely
indissolubile. indissoluble.
Ulterius autem considerandum est [7] It should be considered, further, that
quod inter naturales actus sola generation is the only natural act that is
generatio ad bonum commune ordered to the common good, for eating
ordinatur: nam comestio, et and the emission of waste matters
aliarum superfluitatum emissio, ad pertain to the individual good, but
individuum pertinent; generatio generation to the preservation off the

vero ad conservationem speciei. species. As a result, since law is
Unde, cum lex instituatur ad established for the common good, those
bonum commune, ea quae matters which pertain to generation
pertinent ad generationem, prae must, above all others, be ordered by
aliis oportet legibus ordinari et laws, both divine and human. Now, laws
divinis et humanis. Leges autem that are established should stem from
positae oportet quod ex naturali the prompting of nature, if they are
instinctu procedant, si humanae human; just as in the demonstrative
sunt: sicut etiam in scientiis sciences, also, every human discovery
demonstrativis omnis humana takes its origin from naturally known
inventio ex principiis naturaliter principles. But, if they are divine laws,
cognitis initium sumit. Si autem they not only develop the prompting of
divinae sunt, non solum instinctum nature but also supplement the
naturae explicant, sed etiam deficiency of natural instinct, as things
defectum naturalis instinctus that are divinely revealed surpass the
supplent: sicut ea quae divinitus capacity of human reason. So, since
revelantur, superant naturalis there is a natural prompting within the
rationis capacitatem. Cum igitur human species, to the end that the union
instinctus naturalis sit in specie of man and wife be undivided, and that it
humana ad hoc quod coniunctio be between one man and one woman, it
maris et feminae sit individua, et was necessary for this to be ordered by
quod sit una unius, oportuit hoc human law. But divine law supplies a
lege humana ordinatum esse. Lex supernatural reason, drawn from the
autem divina supernaturalem symbolism of the inseparable union
quandam rationem apponit ex between Christ and the Church, which is
significatione inseparabilis a union of one spouse with another (Eph.
coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, 5:2432). And thus, disorders connected
quae est una unius. Sic igitur with the act of generation are not only
inordinationes circa actum opposed to natural instinct, but are also
generationis non solum instinctui transgressions of divine and human
naturali repugnant, sed etiam leges laws. Hence, a greater sin results from a
divinas et humanas disorder in this area than in regard to the
transgrediuntur. Unde circa hoc use of food or other things of that kind.
magis ex inordinatione peccatur
quam circa sumptionem cibi, aut
alterius huiusmodi.
Quia vero necesse est ad id quod [8] Moreover, since it is necessary for all

est optimum in homine, alia omnia other things to be ordered to what is best
ordinari, coniunctio maris et in man, the union of man and wife is not
feminae non solum sic ordinata est only ordered in this way because it is
legibus secundum quod ad prolem important to the generating of offspring,
generandam pertinet, ut est in aliis as it is in the case of other animals, but
animalibus, sed etiam secundum also because it is in agreement with
quod convenit ad bonos mores, good behavior, which right reason directs
quos ratio recta disponit vel either in reference to the individual man
quantum ad hominem secundum in himself, or in regard to man as a
se, vel secundum quod homo est member of a family, or of civil society. In
pars domesticae familiae, aut fact, the undivided union of husband and
civilis societatis. Ad quos quidem wife is pertinent to good behavior. For
bonos mores pertinet individua thus, when they know that they are
coniunctio maris et feminae. Sic indivisibly united, the love of one spouse
enim erit fidelior amor unius ad for the other will be more faithful. Also,
alterum, dum cognoscunt se both will be more solicitous in their care
indivisibiliter coniunctos. Erit etiam for domestic possessions when they
utrique sollicitior cura in rebus keep in mind that they will remain
domesticis, dum se perpetuo continually in possession of these same
commansuros in earundem rerum things. As a result of this, the sources of
possessione existimant. disagreements which would have to
Subtrahuntur etiam ex hoc come up between a man and his wife’s
discordiarum origines, quas relatives, if he could put away his wife,
oporteret accidere, si vir uxorem are removed, and a more solid affection
dimitteret, inter eum et propinquos is established among the relatives.
uxoris: et fit firmior inter affines Removed, also, are the occasions for
dilectio. Tolluntur etiam adultery which are presented when a
adulteriorum occasiones, quae man is permitted to send away his wife,
darentur si vir uxorem dimittere or the converse. In fact, by this practice
posset, aut e converso: per hoc an easier way of arranging marriage with
enim daretur via facilior sollicitandi those outside the family circle is
matrimonia aliena. provided.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 532, [9] Hence it is said in Matthew (5:31) and

et 196, et I Cor. 710: ego autem in 1 Corinthians (7:10): “But I say to you
dico vobis, uxorem a viro non ... that the wife depart not from her
discedere. husband.”
Per hoc autem excluditur [10] By this conclusion, moreover, we

consuetudo dimittentium uxores. oppose the custom of those who put
Quod tamen in veteri lege away their wives, though this was
permissum fuit Iudaeis propter permitted the Jews in the old Law, “by
eorum duritiam: quia scilicet proni reason of the hardness of their hearts”
erant ad occisionem uxorum. (Mat. 19:8); that is, because they were
Permissum ergo fuit minus malum, ready to kill their wives. So, the lesser
ad excludendum maius malum. evil was permitted them in order to
prevent a greater evil.
Chapter 124
Caput 124
THAT MATRIMONY SHOULD BE
Quod matrimonium debeat
BETWEEN ONE MAN AND ONE
esse unius ad unam
WOMAN
Considerandum etiam videtur [1] It seems, too, that we should consider
quod innatum est mentibus bow it is inborn in the minds of all animals
omnium animalium quae coitu accustomed to sexual reproduction to
utuntur, quod consortium in allow no promiscuity; hence, fights occur
compari non compatiuntur: unde among animals over the matter of sexual
propter coitum pugnae in reproduction. And, in fact, among all
animalibus existunt. Et quidem animals there is one common reason, for
quantum ad omnia animalia est every animal desires to enjoy freely the
una communis ratio, quia pleasure of the sexual act, as he also does
quodlibet animal desiderat libere the pleasure of food; but this liberty is
frui voluptate coitus, sicut et restricted by the fact that several males
voluptate cibi: quae quidem may have access to one female, or the
libertas impeditur per hoc quod converse. The same situation obtains in
ad unam plures accedunt, aut e the freedom of enjoying food, for one
converso; sicut et in libertate animal is obstructed if the food which he
fruendi cibo impeditur aliquod desires to eat is taken over by another
animal si cibum quem ipsum animal. And so, animals fight over food
sumere cupit, aliud animal and sexual relations in the same way. But
usurpet. Et ideo similiter propter among men there is a special reason, for,
cibum et propter coitum animalia as we said, man naturally desires to know
pugnant. In hominibus autem est his offspring, and this knowledge would be
ratio specialis: quia, ut dictum completely destroyed if there were several
est, homo naturaliter desiderat males for one female. Therefore, that one
certus esse de prole; quae female is for one male is a consequence of
quidem certitudo omnino natural instinct.
tolleretur si plures essent unius.
Ex naturali igitur instinctu
procedit quod sit una unius.
Sed in hoc differentia [2] But a difference should be noted on this

consideranda est. Quantum enim point. As far as the view that one woman
ad hoc quod una femina a should not have sexual relations with
pluribus maribus non several men is concerned, both the
cognoscatur, utraque aforementioned reasons apply. But, in
praedictarum rationum concurrit. regard to the conclusion that one man
Sed quantum ad hoc quod unus should not have relations with several
mas plures feminas non females, the second argument does not
cognoscat, non facit ratio work, since certainty as to offspring is not
secunda: non enim certitudo precluded if one male has relations with
prolis impeditur si unus mas several women. But the first reason works
plures feminas cognoscat. Facit against this practice, for, just as the
autem contra hoc ratio prima: freedom of associating with a woman at
nam sicut libertas utendi femina will is taken away from the husband, when
ad libitum a mare tollitur si the woman has another husband, so, too,
femina habeat alium, ita et the same freedom is taken away from a
eadem libertas a femina tollitur si woman when her husband has several
mas habeat plures. Et ideo, quia wives. Therefore, since certainty as to
certitudo prolis est principale offspring is the principal good which is
bonum quod ex matrimonio sought in matrimony, no law or human
quaeritur, nulla lex aut custom has permitted one woman to be a
consuetudo humana permisit wife for several husbands. This was even
quod una esset plurium uxor. Fuit deemed unfitting among the ancient
etiam hoc inconveniens Romans, of whom Maximus Valerius
reputatum apud antiquos reports that they believed that the conjugal
Romanos, de quibus refert bond should not be broken even on
maximus Valerius quod account of sterility.
credebant nec propter

sterilitatem coniugalem fidem
debere dissolvi.
Item. In omni animalis specie in [3] Again, in every species of animal in
qua patri inest aliqua sollicitudo which the father has some concern for
de prole, unus mas non habet offspring, one male has only one female;
nisi unam feminam, sicut patet in this is the case with all birds that feed their
omnibus avibus quae simul young together, for one male would not be
nutriunt pullos: non enim able to offer enough assistance to bring up
sufficeret unus mas auxilium the offspring of several females. But in the
praestare in educatione prolis case of animals among whom there is no
pluribus feminis. In animalibus concern on the part of the males for their
autem in quibus maribus nulla offspring, the male has promiscuous
est sollicitudo de prole, relations with several females and the
indifferenter mas habet plures female with plural males. This is so among
feminas, et femina plures mares: dogs, chickens, and the like. But since, of
sicut in canibus, gallinis, et all animals, the male in the human species
huiusmodi. Cum autem masculo has the greatest concern for offspring, it is
inter omnia animalia maior sit obviously natural for man that one male
cura de prole in specie humana, should have but one wife, and conversely.
manifestum est quod naturale est
homini quod unus mas unam
feminam habeat, et e converso.
Adhuc. Amicitia in quadam [4] Besides, friendship consists in an

aequalitate consistit. Si igitur equality. So, if it is not lawful for the wife to
mulieri non licet habere plures have several husbands, since this is
viros, quia hoc est contra contrary to certainty as to offspring, it
certitudinem prolis; liceret autem would not be lawful, on the other hand, for
viro habere plures uxores: non a man to have several wives, for the
esset liberalis amicitia uxoris ad friendship of wife for husband would not be
virum, sed quasi servilis. Et haec free, but somewhat servile. And this
etiam ratio experimento argument is corroborated by experience,
comprobatur: quia apud viros for among husbands having plural wives
habentes plures uxores, uxores the wives have a status like that of
quasi ancillariter habentur. servants.
Praeterea. Amicitia intensa non 15] Furthermore, strong friendship is not
habetur ad multos: ut patet per possible in regard to many people, as is
philosophum in VIII Ethicorum. Si evident from the Philosopher in Ethics VIII
igitur uxor habet unum virum [5]. Therefore, if a wife has but one
tantum, vir autem habet plures husband, but the husband has several
uxores, non erit aequalis amicitia wives, the friendship will not be equal on
ex utraque parte. Non igitur erit both sides. So, the friendship will not be
amicitia liberalis, sed free, but servile in some way.
quodammodo servilis.
Amplius. Sicut dictum est, [6] Moreover, as we said, matrimony
matrimonium in hominibus among humans should be ordered so as to

oportet ordinari secundum quod be in keeping with good moral customs.
competit ad bonos mores. Est Now, it is contrary to good behavior for one
autem contra bonos mores quod man to have several wives, for the result of
unus habeat plures uxores: quia this is discord in domestic society, as is
ex hoc sequitur discordia in evident from experience. So, it is not fitting
domestica familia, ut for one man to have several wives.
experimento patet. Non est igitur
conveniens quod unus homo
habeat plures uxores.
Hinc est quod dicitur Gen. 224: [7] Hence it is said: “They shall be two in
erunt duo in carne una. one flesh” (Gen. 7.: 24).
Per hoc autem excluditur [8] By this, the custom of those having
consuetudo habentium plures several wives is set aside, and also the
uxores; et opinio Platonis qui opinion of Plato who maintained that wives
posuit uxores debere esse should be common. And in the Christian
communes. Quem in nova lege period he was followed by Nicolaus, one of
secutus est Nicolaus, unus ex the seven deacons.
septem diaconibus.
Chapter 125
Caput 125
THAT MATRIMONY SHOULD NOT
Quod matrimonium non debet
TAKE PLACE BETWEEN CLOSE
fieri inter propinquos
RELATIVES
Propter huiusmodi etiam causas [1] Moreover, because of reasonable

rationabiles ordinatum est legibus considerations of this kind it has been
quod certae personae a ordered by the laws that certain persons,
matrimonio excludantur, quae sunt related by their origin, are excluded from
secundum originem coniunctae. matrimony.
Nam cum in matrimonio sit [2] In fact, since there is in matrimony a
diversarum personarum union of diverse persons, those persons
coniunctio, illae personae quae se who should already regard themselves as
debent reputare quasi unum one because of having the same origin
propter eandem originem, are properly excluded from matrimony, so
convenienter a matrimonio that in recognizing themselves as one in
excluduntur, ut, dum se per hoc this way they may love each other with
unum esse recognoscunt, greater fervor.
ferventius se diligant.
Item. Cum ea quae inter virum et [3] Again, because the acts performed by

uxorem aguntur, quandam husband and wife are associated with a
naturalem verecundiam habeant, certain natural shame, it is necessary that
ab his mutuo agendis illas those persons to whom respect is due
personas prohiberi oportuit because of the bond of blood should be
quibus, propter coniunctionem prohibited from performing such actions
sanguinis, reverentia debetur. with each other. Indeed, this reason
Quae quidem ratio videtur in veteri seems to have been suggested in the Old
lege inducta per hoc quod dicitur: Testament law, in the text which states:
turpitudinem sororis tuae non “You shall not uncover the nakedness of
discooperias, et similiter de aliis. your sister” (Lev. 18:9), and also in other
texts.
Praeterea. Ad corruptionem [4] Besides, for man to be much given to

bonorum morum pertinet quod sexual pleasures contributes to the
homines sint nimis dediti dissolution of good moral behavior;
voluptatibus coitus: quia, cum because, since this pleasure greatly
haec voluptas maxime mentem occupies the mind, reason is withdrawn
absorbeat, impediretur ratio ab his from things which should be done rightly.
quae recte agenda essent. Now, if a man were permitted sexual
Sequeretur autem nimius relations with those persons with whom
voluptatis usus si liceret homini he must live, such as sisters and other
per coitum coniungi illis personis relatives, excessive indulgence in this
quibus commorandi habet pleasure would result, for the occasion for
necessitatem, sicut sororibus et sexual relations with such persons could
aliis propinquis: quia talibus not be removed. Therefore, it was
occasio coitus subtrahi non suitable to good moral behavior for such
posset. Conveniens igitur fuit union to be prohibited by laws.
bonis moribus ut talis coniunctio
legibus inhiberetur.
Adhuc. Delectatio coitus maxime [5] Furthermore, the enjoyment of sexual

corrumpit existimationem relations “greatly corrupts the judgment of
prudentiae. Multiplicatio igitur talis prudence.” So, the multiplication of such
delectationis repugnat bonos pleasure is opposed to good behavior.
mores. Talis autem delectatio Now, such enjoyment is increased
augetur per amorem personarum through the love of the persons who are
quae coniunguntur. Esset igitur thus united. Therefore, intermarriage
contrarium bonis moribus between relatives would be contrary to
propinquis coniungi: quia in eis good behavior, for, in their case, the love
adiungeretur amor qui est ex which springs from community of origin
communione originis et and upbringing would be added to the
connutritione, amori love of concupiscence, and, with such an
concupiscentiae; et, multiplicato increase of love, the soul would
amore, necesse esset animam necessarily become more dominated by
magis delectationibus subdi. these pleasures.
Amplius. In societate humana hoc [6] Moreover, in human society it is most
est maxime necessarium ut sit necessary that there be friendship among
amicitia inter multos. Multiplicatur many people. But friendship is increased
autem amicitia inter homines dum among men when unrelated persons are
personae extraneae per bound together by matrimony. Therefore,
matrimonia colligantur. it was proper for it to be prescribed by
Conveniens igitur fuit legibus laws that matrimony should be contracted

ordinari quod matrimonia with persons outside one’s family and not
contraherentur cum extraneis with relatives.
personis, et non cum propinquis.
Adhuc. Inconveniens est ut illis [7] Besides, it is unfitting for one to be
personis aliquis socialiter iungatur conjugally united with persons to whom
quibus naturaliter debet esse one should naturally be subject. But it is
subiectus. Naturale autem est natural to be subject to one’s parents.
quod aliquis parentibus sit Therefore, it would not be fitting to
subiectus. Ergo inconveniens contract matrimony with one’s parents,
esset quod cum parentibus aliquis since in matrimony there is a conjugal
matrimonium contraheret: cum in union.
matrimonio sit quaedam
coniunctio socialis.
Hinc est quod dicitur Levit. 186: [8] Hence it is said: “No man shall
omnis homo ad proximam approach to her that is near of kin to him”
sanguinis sui non accedat. (Lev. 18:6).
Per haec autem excluditur [9] By these arguments the custom of
consuetudo eorum qui propinquis those who practice carnal relations with
suis se carnaliter commiscent. their relatives is refuted.
Sciendum est autem quod, sicut [10] Moreover, we should note that just as

naturalis inclinatio est ad ea quae natural inclination tends toward things
sunt ut in pluribus, ita et lex posita which happen in most cases, so also
est secundum id quod in pluribus positive law depends on what happens in
accidit. Non est praedictis most cases. It is not contrary to the
rationibus contrarium si in aliquo foregoing arguments if in a particular
aliter possit accidere: non enim case the outcome might be otherwise, for
propter bonum unius debet the good of many should not be sacrificed
praetermitti bonum multorum, cum for the sake of one person’s good,
bonum multitudinis semper sit because “the good of many is always
divinius quam bonum unius. Ne more divine than the good of one
tamen defectus qui in aliquo uno person.” However, lest the disadvantage
posset accidere, omnino absque which could occur in the individual case
medela remaneat, residet apud be altogether without remedy, there
legislatores, et eis similes, remains with lawmakers and others of
auctoritas dispensandi in eo quod similar function the authority to grant a
communiter est statutum, dispensation from what is generally
secundum quod est necessarium required by law, in view of what is
in aliquo casu particulari. Et si necessary in any particular case. For, if
quidem lex sit humana, per the law be a human one, it can be
homines similem potestatem dispensed by men who have such power.
habentes dispensari potest. Si But, if the law be divinely given,
autem lex sit divinitus posita, dispensation can be granted by divine
auctoritate divina dispensatio fieri authority; as, in the Old Law, permission
potest: sicut in veteri lege ex seems to have been granted by
dispensatione indultum videtur dispensation to have several wives and
uxores plures habere et concubines and to put away one’s wife.
concubinas, et uxoris repudium.
Quod non omnis carnalis commixtio THAT NOT ALL SEXUAL
est peccatum INTERCOURSE IS SINFUL
Sicut autem contra rationem est ut [1] Now, just as it is contrary to
aliquis carnali coniunctione utatur reason for a man to perform the act
contra id quod convenit proli of carnal union contrary to what
generandae et educandae, ita etiam befits the generation and upbringing
secundum rationem est quod aliquis of offspring, so also is it in keeping
carnali coniunctione utatur secundum with reason for a man to exercise
quod congruit ad generationem et the act of carnal union in a manner
educationem prolis. Lege autem divina which is suited to the generation
haec solum prohibita sunt quae rationi and upbringing of offspring. But only
adversantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. those things that are opposed to
Inconveniens est igitur dicere quod reason are prohibited by divine law,
omnis carnalis coniunctio sit peccatum. as is evident from what we said
above. So, it is not right to say that
every act of carnal union is a sin.
Adhuc. Cum membra corporis sint [2] Again, since bodily organs are
quaedam animae instrumenta, the instruments of the soul, the end
cuiuslibet membri finis est usus eius: of each organ is its use, as is the
sicut et cuiuslibet alterius instrumenti. case with any other instrument.
Quorundam autem membrorum Now, the use of certain bodily
corporis usus est carnalis commixtio. organs is carnal union. So, carnal
Carnalis igitur commixtio est finis union is the end of certain bodily
quorundam membrorum corporis. Illud organs. But that which is the end of
autem quod est finis aliquarum certain natural things cannot be evil
naturalium rerum, non potest esse in itself, because things that exist
secundum se malum: quia ea quae naturally are ordered to their end by
naturaliter sunt, ex divina providentia divine providence, as is plain from
ordinantur ad finem, ut ex supra dictis what was said above. Therefore, it
patet. Impossibile est igitur quod is impossible for carnal union to be
carnalis commixtio sit secundum se evil in itself.
mala.
Amplius. Naturales inclinationes insunt [3] Besides, natural inclinations are

rebus a Deo, qui cuncta movet. present in things from God, Who
Impossibile est igitur quod naturalis moves all things. So, it is impossible
inclinatio alicuius speciei sit ad id quod for the natural inclination of a
est secundum se malum. Sed omnibus species to be toward what is evil in
animalibus perfectis inest naturalis itself. But there is in all perfect
inclinatio ad coniunctionem carnalem. animals a natural inclination toward
Impossibile est igitur quod carnalis carnal union. Therefore, it is

commixtio sit secundum se mala. impossible for carnal union to be evil
in itself.
Item. Illud sine quo non potest esse [4] Moreover, that without which a
aliquid quod est bonum et optimum, thing cannot be what is good and
non est secundum se malum. Sed best is not evil in itself. But the
perpetuitas speciei non conservatur in perpetuation of the species can only
animalibus nisi per generationem, quae be preserved in animals by
est ex commixtione carnali. Impossibile generation, which is the result of
est igitur quod commixtio carnalis sit carnal union. So, it is impossible for
secundum se mala. carnal union to be evil in itself.
Hinc est quod dicitur I Cor. 728: mulier [5] Hence it is said in 1 Corinthians

non peccat si nubat. (7:28): “if a virgin marry, she has not
sinned.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [6] Now, this disposes of the error of

quorundam dicentium omnem carnalem those who say that every act of
coniunctionem esse illicitam: unde carnal union is illicit, as a
totaliter matrimonium et nuptias consequence of which view they
damnant. Quorum quidam hoc ideo entirely condemn matrimony and
dicunt quia credunt corporalia non a marriage arrangements. In fact,
bono, sed a malo principio esse. some of these people say this
because they believe that bodily
things arise, not from a good, but
from an evil, source.
Quod nullius cibi usus est THAT THE USE OF FOOD IS NOT A
peccatum secundum se SIN IN ITSELF
Sicut autem venereorum usus [1] just as the exercise of sexual
absque peccato est, si secundum capacities is without sin, provided it be
rationem fiat, ita etiam et usus carried on with reason, so also in the
ciborum. Fit autem unumquodque case of the use of food. Now, any action
secundum rationem quando is performed in accord with reason when
ordinatur secundum quod congruit it is ordered in keeping with what befits
debito fini. Finis autem debitus its proper end. But the proper end of
sumptionis ciborum est conservatio taking food is the preservation of the
corporis per nutrimentum. body by nutrition. So, whatever food can
Quicumque igitur cibus hoc facere contribute to this end may be taken
potest, absque peccato potest without sin. Therefore, the taking of food
sumi. Nullius igitur cibi sumptio is not in itself a sin.
secundum se est peccatum.
Adhuc. Nullius rei usus secundum [2] Again, no use of a thing is evil in
se malus est nisi res ipsa itself unless the thing itself is evil in
secundum se mala sit. Nullus itself. Now, no food is by nature evil, for
autem cibus secundum naturam everything is good in its own nature, as
malus est: quia omnis res we showed above. But a certain article
secundum suam naturam bona est, of food may be bad for a certain person
ut supra ostensum est. Potest because it is incompatible with his bodily
autem aliquis cibus esse alicui state of health. So, no taking of food is a
malus inquantum contrariatur sin in itself, by virtue of the type of thing
salubritati ipsius secundum corpus. that it is; but it can be a sin if in
Nullius igitur cibi sumptio, opposition to reason a person uses it in
secundum quod est talis res, est a manner contrary to his health.
peccatum secundum se: sed potest
esse peccatum si praeter rationem
aliquis ipso utatur contra suam
salutem.
Amplius. Uti rebus ad hoc ad quod [3] Besides, to use things for the

sunt, non est secundum se malum. purpose for which they exist is not evil in
Sunt autem plantae propter itself. But plants exist for the sake of
animalia; animalium vero quaedam animals; indeed, some animals exist for
propter alia; et omnia propter the sake of others, and all exist for the
hominem, sicut ex superioribus sake of man, as is evident from earlier
patet. Uti igitur vel plantis vel considerations. Therefore, to use either
animalium carnibus vel ad esum, plants or the flesh of animals for eating
vel ad quicquid aliud sunt homini or for whatever other utility they may
utilia, non est secundum se have for man is not a sin in itself.
peccatum.
Item. Defectus peccati ab anima [4] Moreover, a sinful defect may be
derivatur ad corpus, et non e transferred from the soul to the body, but
converso: peccatum enim dicimus not conversely, for we call something
secundum quod deordinatur sinful according as there is a
voluntas. Cibi autem immediate ad deordination of the will. Now, food
corpus pertinent, non ad animam. pertains immediately to the body, not to
Non igitur ciborum sumptio the soul. So, the taking of food cannot
secundum se potest esse be a sin in itself unless, of course, it be
peccatum, nisi quatenus repugnat incompatible with rectitude. It could be
rectitudini voluntatis. Quod quidem so, in one way, by virtue of
contingit uno modo, propter incompatibility with the proper end of
repugnantiam ad proprium finem food: thus, for the sake of the pleasure
ciborum: sicut cum aliquis, propter associated with eating food a man might
delectationem quae est in cibis, eat food which works against the health
utitur cibis contrariantibus corporis of his body, either because of the kind of
saluti, vel secundum speciem food or the quantity. This could be so in
ciborum, vel secundum another way, because it is opposed to
quantitatem. Alio modo, secundum the situation of the person who uses the
quod repugnat conditioni eius qui food or of those with whom he lives; for
utitur cibis, vel eorum cum quibus instance, a man might eat finer foods
conversatur: puta cum quis than his circumstances could well
accuratius cibis utitur quam sua provide and in a manner different from
facultas sustineat; et aliter quam the customs of the people with whom he

eorum mores habeant cum quibus lives. It is possible in a third way, by
convivit. Tertio modo, secundum virtue of food being prohibited by law for
quod cibi sunt aliqua lege prohibiti some special reason: thus, in the Old
propter aliquam causam specialem: Law, certain kinds of food were
puta in veteri lege quidam cibi prohibited for a symbolic reason; and in
prohibebantur propter Egypt the eating of the flesh of the ox
significationem; et in Aegypto was prohibited in olden times so that
prohibebatur antiquitus comestio agriculture would not be hindered; or
carnis bovinae, ne agricultura even because certain rules prohibit the
impediretur. Vel etiam secundum use of certain foods, with a view to the
quod aliquae regulae prohibent restraint of concupiscence.
aliquibus cibis uti, ad
concupiscentiam refraenandam.
Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Matth. [5] Hence, the Lord says: “What goes

1511: quod intrat in os, non into the mouth does not defile a man”
coinquinat hominem. Et I Cor. 10 (Mat. 15:11). And in 1 Corinthians
25 dicitur: omne quod in macello (10:25) it is said: “Whatever is sold in the
venit manducate, nihil interrogantes meat market, eat; asking no question for
propter conscientiam. Et I Tim. 44 conscience’ sake.” And in 1 Timothy
dicitur: omnis creatura Dei bona (4:4) it is said: "Every creature of God is
est, et nihil reiiciendum quod cum good, and nothing to be rejected that is
gratiarum actione percipitur. received with thanksgiving.”
Per hoc autem excluditur [6] By this conclusion we refute the error

quorundam error qui usum of some people who say that the use of
quorundam ciborum secundum se certain foods is illicit in itself. Of these
dicunt esse illicitum. De quibus the Apostle speaks in the same place (1
apostolus dicit ibidem: in novissimis Tim. 4:13): “in the last times some shall
temporibus discedent quidam a depart from the faith forbidding to marry,
fide: prohibentium nubere, to abstain from meats which God
abstinere a cibis, quos Deus creavit created to be received with
ad percipiendum cum gratiarum thanksgiving.”
actione.
Quia vero usus ciborum et [7] Now, since the use of food and
venereorum non est secundum se sexual capacities is not illicit in itself, but
illicitus, sed solum secundum quod can only be illicit when it departs from
exit ab ordine rationis illicitus esse the order of reason, and since external
potest; ea vero quae exterius possessions are necessary for the
possidentur, necessaria sunt ad taking of food, for the upbringing of
sumptionem ciborum, ad offspring and the support of a family, and
educationem prolis et for other needs of the body, it follows
sustentationem familiae, et ad alias also that the possession of wealth is not
corporis necessitates: consequens in itself illicit, provided the order of
est quod nec secundum se etiam reason be respected. That is to say, a
divitiarum possessio est illicita, si man must justly possess what he has;
ordo rationis servetur; ita scilicet he must not set the end of his will in
quod iuste homo possideat quae these things, and he must use them in a
habet; quod in eis finem voluntatis fitting way for his own and others’
suae non constituat; quod eis benefit. Hence, the Apostle does not
debito modo utatur, ad suam et condemn the rich, but he gives them a
aliorum utilitatem. Hinc est quod definite regulation for the use of their
apostolus, I Tim. ult., divites non wealth, when he says: “Charge the rich
condemnat, sed eis certam of this world not to be highminded, nor
regulam divitiis utendi tradit, dicens: to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but...
divitibus huius saeculi praecipe non to be rich in good works, to give easily,
alta sapere, neque sperare in to communicate to others” (1 Tim. 6:17
incerto divitiarum: bene agere, 18); and in Ecclesiasticus (31:8):
divites fieri in operibus bonis, facile “Blessed is the rich man that is found
tribuere, communicare. Et Eccli. 31 without blemish, and that hath not gone
8: beatus dives qui inventus est after gold, nor put his trust in money nor
sine macula, et qui post aurum non in treasure.”
abiit, nec speravit in pecunia et
thesauris.
Per hoc etiam excluditur [8] By this we also set aside the error of

quorundam error qui, ut Augustinus those who, as Augustine says in his
dicit in libro de haeresibus, book On Heresies, “most arrogantly call
apostolicos se arrogantissime themselves Apostolics, because they
vocaverunt, eo quod in suam refuse to accept into their communion
communionem non acciperent those who practice marriage, and who
utentes coniugibus, et res proprias possess goods of their own (practices
possidentes, quales habet which the Catholic Church has), and
Catholica Ecclesia, et monachos et also many monks and clerics. But these
clericos plurimos. Sed ideo isti men are thereby heretics, for, in
haeretici sunt, quoniam, se ab separating themselves from the Church,
Ecclesia separantes, nullam spem they think that there is no hope for those
putant eos habere qui utuntur his who use these things which they do
rebus quibus ipsi carent. without.”
Chapter 128
Caput 128
HOW MAN IS ORDERED BY THE LAW
Quomodo secundum legem Dei
OF GOD IN REGARD TO HIS
homo ordinatur ad proximum
NEIGHBOR
Ex his ergo quae dicta sunt, [1] From the things that we have said it is

manifestum est quod secundum clear that man is directed by the divine
legem divinam homo inducitur ut law to observe the order of reason in
ordinem rationis servet in omnibus regard to all things that can come to his
quae in eius usum venire possunt. use. Among all those things which come
Inter omnia autem quae in usum within the use of man, the most important
hominis veniunt, praecipua sunt are other men. “For man is by nature a
etiam alii homines. Homo enim social animal,” because he needs many
naturaliter est animal sociale: things which cannot be provided by one
indiget enim multis quae per man alone. Therefore, it is necessary for
unum solum parari non possunt. man to be instructed by divine law, so that
Oportet igitur quod ex lege divina he may five in relation to other men,
instituatur homo ut secundum according to the order of reason.
ordinem rationis se habeat ad
alios homines.
Adhuc. Finis divinae legis est ut [2] Again, the end of divine law is for man

homo Deo adhaereat. Iuvatur to cling to God. But one man may be
autem unus homo in hoc ex alio aided to this end by another man, both in
tam quantum ad cognitionem, regard to knowledge and to love. For men
quam etiam quantum ad are of mutual assistance to each other in
affectionem: iuvant enim se the knowing of truth, and one man may
homines mutuo in cognitione stimulate another toward the good, and
veritatis; et unus alium provocat also restrain him from evil. Hence it is
ad bonum, et retrahit a malo. said: “Iron sharpens iron, so a man
Unde Prov. 2717 dicitur: ferrum sharpens the countenance of his friend”
ferro acuitur, et homo exacuit (Prov. 27:17). And it is said in
faciem amici sui. Et Eccle. 4 Ecclesiastes (4:912): “It is better
dicitur: 9 melius est duos esse therefore that two should be together than
quam unum: habent enim one, for they have the advantage of their
emolumentum societatis; si unus society; if one fall, he shall be supported
ceciderit, ab altero fulcietur. Vae by the other. Woe to him who is alone; for,
soli: qui cum ceciderit, non habet when he falls, he has no one to lift him up.
sublevantem. Et si dormierint duo, And if two lie together, they shall warm
fovebunt se mutuo: unus one another. How shall one alone be
quomodo calefiet? Et si quis warmed? And if a man prevails against
praevaluerit contra unum, duo one, the two shall withstand him.”
resistunt ei. Oportuit igitur lege Therefore, it was necessary for the
divina ordinari societatem society of men, in their mutual
hominum ad invicem. interrelations, to be ordered by divine law.
Amplius. Lex divina est quaedam [3] Besides, divine law is a certain plan of

ratio divinae providentiae ad divine providence for the purpose of
homines gubernandos. Ad governing men. Now, it is the function of
divinam autem providentiam divine providence to maintain the
pertinet singula quae ei subsunt, individuals subject to it under proper
sub debito ordine continere: ut order, in such a way that each may take
scilicet suum locum et gradum its proper place and level. Therefore,
teneat unumquodque. Lex igitur divine law so orders men in regard to
divina sic homines ad invicem each other that each man may keep his
ordinat ut unusquisque suum order. This is for men to be at peace with
ordinem teneat. Quod est each other, for “peace among men is
homines pacem habere ad nothing but ordered concord,” as
invicem: pax enim hominum nihil Augustine says.
aliud est quam ordinata
concordia, ut Augustinus dicit.
Item. Quandocumque aliqua [4] Moreover, whenever certain things are

ordinantur sub aliquo, oportet illa subordinated to another, they must be
concorditer esse ordinata ad ordered in a manner concordant to each
invicem: alias se invicem other; otherwise, they might hinder each
impedirent in consecutione finis other in the attaining of their common
communis; sicut patet in exercitu, end. This is clear in the case of an army
qui concorditer ordinatur ad which is concordantly ordered to victory,
victoriam, quae est finis ducis. the end of the commander. Now, each
Unusquisque autem homo per man is ordered to God by divine law, so
legem divinam ordinatur ad there must be among men, according to
Deum. Oportuit igitur per legem divine law, an ordered concord, peace
divinam inter homines, ne se that is, so that they may not hinder each
invicem impedirent, ordinatam other.
concordiam esse, quod est pax.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: [5] Hence it is said in the Psalm (147:14):

qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Et “Who hath placed peace in Your borders.”
dominus dicit, Ioan. 1633: haec And the Lord said: “These things I have
locutus sum vobis ut in me pacem spoken to you, that in Me you may have
habeatis. peace” (John 16:33).
Tunc autem ordinata concordia [6] Now, an ordered concord is preserved

inter homines servatur, quando among men when each man is given his
unicuique quod suum est redditur: due, for this is justice. And so, it is said in
quod est iustitiae. Et ideo dicitur Isaiah (32:17): “the work of justice shall
Isaiae 3217: opus iustitiae pax. be peace.” Therefore, by divine law
Oportuit igitur per legem divinam precepts had to be given, so that each
iustitiae praecepta dari, ut man would give his neighbor his due and
unusquisque alteri redderet quod would abstain from doing injuries to him.
suum est, et abstineret a
nocumentis alteri inferendis.
Inter homines autem maxime [7] Moreover, among men a person is

aliquis est parentibus debitor. Et most in debt to his parents. And so,
ideo inter praecepta legis quae among the precepts of the law ordering us
nos ad proximum ordinant, Exod. in regard to our neighbor, Exodus (20:12
20, primo ponitur, honora patrem 17) Puts first: “Honor Your father and Your
tuum et matrem tuam: in quo mother.” In this text it is understood to be
intelligitur praecipi ut tam commanded that each man must render
parentibus quam etiam aliis what he owes, both to his parents and to
unusquisque reddat quod debet, other persons, in accord with another text:
secundum illud Rom. 137: reddite “Render to all men their dues” (Rom.
omnibus debita. Deinde ponuntur 13:7). Next to be put down are the
praecepta quibus praecipitur precepts commanding abstinence from
abstinendum esse a nocumentis causing various sorts of harm to one’s
proximo inferendis. Ut neque neighbor. For instance, that we must not
factis eum offendamus in persona offend him by any deeds against his
propria, quia dictum est, non person; thus it was said: “You shall not
occides; neque in persona kill”; nor against a person associated with
coniuncta, quia scriptum est, non him, for it was written: “You shall not
moechaberis; neque etiam commit adultery”; nor against his external

exterioribus rebus, quia scriptum goods, for it was written: “You shall not
est, non furtum facies. steal.” We are also prohibited from
Prohibemur etiam ne contra offending our neighbor by words that are
iustitiam proximum verbo contrary to justice, for it was written: “You
offendamus: quia scriptum est, shall not bear false witness against Your
non loqueris contra proximum neighbor.” And since God is the judge,
tuum falsum testimonium. Et quia even of our hearts, we are prohibited from
Deus etiam cordium iudex est, offending our neighbor in our heart, “by
prohibemur ne corde proximum desiring his wife” or any of his goods.
offendamus, concupiscendo
scilicet uxorem, aut aliquam rem
eius.
Ad huiusmodi autem iustitiam [8] Now, that he may observe this kind of

observandam, quae lege divina justice which is prescribed by divine law
statuitur, dupliciter homo man is impelled in two ways: in one, from
inclinatur: uno modo, ab interiori; within; in the other way, from without.
alio modo, ab exteriori. Ab interiori From within, of course, man is voluntary
quidem, dum homo voluntarius in regard to observing what divine law
est ad observandum ea quae prescribes. In fact, this is accomplished
praecipit lex divina. Quod quidem by man’s love of God and his neighbor,
fit per amorem hominis ad Deum for he who loves a person gives him his
et proximum: qui enim diligit due spontaneously and joyfully, and he
aliquem, sponte et delectabiliter ei even adds something in excess by way of
reddit quod debet, et etiam liberality. So, the complete fulfillment of
liberaliter superaddit. Unde tota the law depends on love, according to the
legis impletio ex dilectione text of the Apostle: “Love is the fulfilling of
dependet: secundum illud apostoli the law” (Rom. 13:10). And the Lord says
Rom. 1310: plenitudo legis est that, “on these two commandments,” that
dilectio. Et dominus dicit, Matth. is, on the love of God and of neighbor,
2240, quod in duobus praeceptis, “depends the whole law” (Mat. 22:40). But
scilicet in dilectione Dei et proximi, since some people are not so disposed
universa lex pendet. Sed quia internally that they will do spontaneously
aliqui interius non sunt sic what the law orders, they must be forced
dispositi ut ex seipsis sponte from without to fulfill the justice of the law.
faciant quod lex iubet, ab exteriori Of course, since this is done only from
trahendi sunt ad iustitiam legis fear of punishments, they do not fulfill the
implendam. Quod quidem fit dum law in freedom, but in servility. Hence it is
timore poenarum, non liberaliter, said in Isaiah (26:9): "When You make
sed serviliter legem implent. Unde Your judgments on the earth," that is, by
dicitur Isaiae 269: cum feceris punishing the wicked, "all the inhabitants
iudicia tua in terra, scilicet of the world shall learn justice."
puniendo malos, iustitiam discent
omnes habitatores orbis.
Primi igitur sibi ipsi sunt lex, [9] The first, then, “are a law unto
habentes caritatem, quae eos themselves” (Rom. 2:14), for they have
loco legis inclinat et liberaliter charity which impels them in place of law
operari facit. Lex igitur exterior and makes them act with liberality. So, it
non fuit necessarium quod propter was not necessary to promulgate an
eos poneretur: sed propter illos external law for their sake, but for the
qui ex seipsis non inclinantur ad sake of those who are not inclined of
bonum. Unde dicitur I Tim. 19: themselves toward the good. Hence it is
iusto lex non est posita, sed said in 1 Timothy (1:9): “The law is not
iniustis. Quod non est sic made for the just man, but for the unjust.”
intelligendum quasi iusti non This should not be understood as if the
teneantur ad legem implendam, ut just were not obliged to obey the law, as
quidam male intellexerunt: sed some have badly understood it, but that
quia isti inclinantur ex seipsis ad these people are inclined of themselves to
iustitiam faciendam, etiam sine do what is just, even without a law.
lege.
Chapter 129
Caput 129
THAT SOME HUMAN ACTS ARE
Quod in humanis actibus sunt
RIGHT ACCORDING TO NATURE
aliqua recta secundum naturam,
AND NOT MERELY BECAUSE THEY
et non solum quasi lege posita
ARE PRESCRIBED BY LAW
Ex praemissis autem apparet quod [1] From the foregoing it is apparent that
ea quae divina lege praecipiuntur, things prescribed by divine law are right,
rectitudinem habent non solum quia not only because they are put forth by
sunt lege posita, sed etiam law, but also because they are in accord
secundum naturam. with nature.
Ex praeceptis enim legis divinae [2] Indeed, as a result of the precepts of

mens hominis ordinatur sub Deo; et divine law, man's mind is subordinated
omnia alia quae sunt in homine, to God, and all other things that arc in
sub ratione. Hoc autem naturalis man's power are ordered under reason.
ordo requirit, quod inferiora Now, the natural order requires that
superioribus subdantur. Sunt igitur lower things be subject to higher things.
ea quae lege divina praecipiuntur, Therefore, the things prescribed by
secundum se naturaliter recta. divine law are naturally right in
themselves.
Praeterea. Homines ex divina [3] Again, men receive from divine
providentia sortiuntur naturale providence a natural capacity for rational
iudicatorium rationis ut principium judgment, as a principle for their proper
propriarum operationum. Naturalia operations. Now, natural principles are
autem principia ad ea ordinantur ordered to natural results. So, there are
quae sunt naturaliter. Sunt igitur certain operations that are naturally
aliquae operationes naturaliter suitable for man, and they are right in
homini convenientes, quae sunt themselves, not merely because they
secundum se rectae, et non solum are prescribed by law.
quasi lege positae.
Praeterea. Quorumcumque est [4] Besides, there must be definite kinds

natura determinata, oportet esse of operations which are appropriate to a
operationes determinatas, quae illi definite nature, whenever things have
naturae conveniant: propria enim such a definite nature. In fact, the
operatio uniuscuiusque naturam operation appropriate to a given being is
ipsius sequitur. Constat autem a consequent of that nature. Now, it is
hominum naturam esse obvious that there is a determinate kind
determinatam. Oportet igitur esse of nature for man. Therefore, there must
aliquas operationes secundum se be some operations that are in
homini convenientes. themselves appropriate for man.
Adhuc. Cuicumque est aliquid [5] Moreover, whenever a certain thing is

naturale, oportet esse naturale id natural to any being, that without which
sine quo illud haberi non potest: this certain thing cannot be possessed
natura enim non deficit in must also be natural, "for nature is not
necessariis. Est autem homini defective in regard to necessary things."
naturale quod sit animal sociale: But it is natural for man to be a social
quod ex hoc ostenditur, quia unus animal, and this is shown by the fact that
homo solus non sufficit ad omnia one man alone does not suffice for all
quae sunt humanae vitae the things necessary to human life. So,
necessaria. Ea igitur sine quibus the things without which human society
societas humana conservari non cannot be maintained are naturally
potest, sunt homini naturaliter appropriate to man. Examples of such
convenientia. Huiusmodi autem things are: to preserve for each man
sunt, unicuique quod suum est what is his own and to refrain from
conservare, et ab iniuriis abstinere. injuries. Therefore, there are some
Sunt igitur aliqua in humanis things among human acts that are
actibus naturaliter recta. naturally right.
Amplius. Supra ostensum est quod [6] Furthermore, we showed above that

homo naturaliter hoc habet, quod man has this natural endowment, he
utatur rebus inferioribus ad suae may use lower things for the needs of
vitae necessitatem. Est autem his life. Now, there is a definite measure
aliqua mensura determinata according to which the use of the
secundum quam usus aforesaid things is proper to human life,
praedictarum rerum humanae vitae and if this measure is set aside the
est conveniens, quae quidem result is harmful to man, as is evident in
mensura si praetermittatur, fit the immoderate eating of food.
homini nocivum: sicut apparet in Therefore, there are some human acts
sumptione inordinata ciborum. Sunt that are naturally fitting and others that
igitur aliqui actus humani naturaliter are naturally unfitting.
convenientes, et aliqui naturaliter
inconvenientes.
Item. Secundum naturalem [7] Again, according to the natural order,

ordinem corpus hominis est propter the body of man is for the sake of his
animam, et inferiores vires animae soul and the lower powers of the soul
propter rationem: sicut et in aliis are for the sake of reason, just as in
rebus materia est propter formam, other things matter is for the sake of
et instrumenta propter principalem form and instruments are for the sake of

agentem. Ex eo autem quod est ad the principal agent. But, because of one
aliud ordinatum, debet ei auxilium thing being ordered to another, it ought
provenire, non autem aliquod to furnish help to that other, and not offer
impedimentum. Est igitur naturaliter it any hindrance. So, it is naturally right
rectum quod sic procuretur ab for the body and the lower powers of the
homine corpus, et etiam inferiores soul to be so managed by man that
vires animae, quod ex hoc actus thereby his activity of reason, and his
rationis et bonum ipsius minime good, are least hindered and are,
impediatur, magis autem iuvetur: si instead, helped. But, if it happens
autem secus acciderit, erit otherwise, the result will naturally be
naturaliter peccatum. Vinolentiae sinful. Therefore, drinking bouts and
igitur et comessationes; et feastings, and inordinate sexual
inordinatus venereorum usus, per activities through which rational activity
quem actus rationis impeditur; et is hindered, and domination by the
subdi passionibus, quae liberum passions which do not permit free
iudicium rationis esse non sinunt, judgment of reason—these are naturally
sunt naturaliter mala. evil things.
Praeterea. Unicuique naturaliter [8] Besides, those acts by which he

conveniunt ea quibus tendit in inclines toward his natural end are
suum finem naturalem: quae autem naturally appropriate to an agent, but
e contrario se habent, sunt ei those that have the contrary effect are
naturaliter inconvenientia. naturally inappropriate to the agent.
Ostensum est autem supra quod Now, we showed above that man is
homo naturaliter ordinatur in Deum naturally ordered to God as his end.
sicut in finem. Ea igitur quibus Therefore, the things by which man is
homo inducitur in cognitionem et brought to the knowledge and love of
amorem Dei, sunt naturaliter recta: God are naturally right, but whatever
quae autem e contrario se habent, things have the contrary effect are
sunt naturaliter homini mala. naturally evil for man.
Patet igitur quod bonum et malum [9] Therefore, it is clear that good and
in humanis actibus non solum sunt evil in human activities are based not
secundum legis positionem, sed only on the prescription of law, but also
secundum naturalem ordinem. on the natural order.
Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur, [10] Hence it is said in the Psalm
quod iudicia domini sunt vera, (18:10): “the judgments of the Lord are
iustificata in semetipsis. true, justified in themselves.”
Per haec autem excluditur positio [11] By this conclusion we set aside the

dicentium quod iusta et recta sunt position of those who say that things are
solum lege posita. just and right only because they are
prescribed by law.
De consiliis quae dantur in lege ON THE COUNSELS THAT ARE
divina GIVEN IN DIVINE LAW
Quia vero optimum hominis est ut [1] Since the best thing for man is to
mente Deo adhaereat et rebus become attached in his mind to God
divinis; impossibile autem est quod and divine things, and since it is
homo intense circa diversa impossible for man intensively to busy
occupetur: ad hoc quod liberius himself with a variety of things in order
feratur in Deum mens hominis, that man’s mind may be applied to God
dantur in divina lege consilia, quibus with greater liberty, counsels are given
homines ab occupationibus in the divine law whereby men are
praesentis vitae retrahantur, withdrawn from the busy concerns of
quantum possibile est terrenam the present life as far as is possible for
vitam agenti. Hoc autem non est ita one who is living an earthly life. Now,
necessarium homini ad iustitiam ut this detachment is not so necessary to
sine eo iustitia esse non possit: non man for justice that its absence makes
enim virtus et iustitia tollitur si homo justice impossible; indeed, virtue and
secundum ordinem rationis justice are not removed if man uses
corporalibus et terrenis rebus utatur. bodily and earthly things in accord with
Et ideo huiusmodi divinae legis the order of reason. And so, divine law
admonitiones dicuntur consilia, non admonitions of this kind are called
praecepta, inquantum suadetur counsels, not precepts, inasmuch as
homini ut, propter meliora, minus man is urged to renounce lesser goods
bona praetermittat. for the sake of better goods.
Occupatur autem humana [2] Moreover, in the general mode of

sollicitudo, secundum communem human life, human concern is devoted
modum humanae vitae, circa tria: to three items: first, to one’s own
primo quidem, circa propriam person, what he should do, or where he
personam, quid agat, aut ubi should spend his time; second, to the
conversetur; secundo autem, circa persons of those connected with him,
personas sibi coniunctas, praecipue chiefly his wife and children; and third,
uxorem et filios; tertio, circa res to the acquisition of external things,
exteriores procurandas, quibus which a man needs for the maintenance
homo indiget ad sustentationem of life. So, to cut off solicitude for
vitae. Ad amputandam igitur external things the counsel of poverty is
sollicitudinem circa res exteriores, given in the divine law, that is to say, so
datur in lege divina consilium that one may cast off the things of this
paupertatis: ut scilicet res huius world with which his mind could be
mundi abiiciat, quibus animus eius involved with some concern. Hence, the
sollicitudine aliqua implicari posset. Lord says: “If You would be perfect, go
Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Matth. sell what you have and give to the
1921: si vis perfectus esse, vade, poor... and come, follow me” (Mat.
vende omnia quae habes et da 19:21). And to cut off concern for wife
pauperibus, et veni, sequere me. Ad and children there is given man the
amputandam autem sollicitudinem counsel of virginity or continence.
uxoris et filiorum, datur homini Hence, it is said in 1 Corinthians (7:25):
consilium de virginitate vel “Now, concerning virgins, I have no
continentia. Hinc est quod dicitur I commandment of the Lord, but I give
Cor. 725: de virginibus autem counsel.” And giving the reason for this

praeceptum domini non habeo, counsel, he adds: “He who is without a
consilium autem do. Et huius consilii wife is solicitous for the things that
rationem assignans, subdit: qui sine belong to the Lord: how he may please
uxore est, sollicitus est quae sunt God. But he who is with a wife is
domini, quomodo placeat Deo: qui solicitous for the things of the world:
autem cum uxore est, sollicitus est how he may please his wife, and he is
quae sunt mundi, quomodo placeat divided” (1 Cor. 7:3233). Finally, to cut
uxori, et divisus est. Ad off man’s solicitude even for himself
amputandam autem sollicitudinem there is given the counsel of obedience,
hominis etiam circa seipsum, datur through which man hands over the
consilium obedientiae, per quam control of his own acts to a superior.
homo dispositionem suorum actuum Concerning which it is said: “Obey your
superiori committit. Propter quod prelates and be subject to them. For
dicitur Hebr. ult.: obedite praepositis they watch as being ready to render an
vestris et subiacete eis: ipsi enim account of your souls” (Heb. 13:17).
pervigilant, quasi rationem reddituri
pro animabus vestris.
Quia vero summa perfectio [3] But, since the highest perfection of
humanae vitae in hoc consistit quod human life consists in the mind of man
mens hominis Deo vacet; ad hanc being detached from care, for the sake
autem mentis vacationem praedicta of God, and since the three counsels
tria maxime videntur disponere: mentioned above seem most definitely
convenienter ad perfectionis statum to prepare one for this detachment, they
pertinere videntur; non quasi ipsae appear to belong quite appropriately to
sint perfectiones, sed quia sunt the state of perfection; not as if they
dispositiones quaedam ad were perfections themselves, but that
perfectionem, quae consistit in hoc they are dispositions to perfection,
quod Deo vacetur. Et hoc expresse which consists in being detached from
ostendunt verba domini care, for the sake of God. And the
paupertatem suadentis, cum dicit, si words of our Lord, when He advises
vis perfectus esse, vade et vende poverty, definitely show this, for He
omnia quae habes et da says: “If you would be perfect, go sell
pauperibus, et sequere me, quasi in what you have and give to the poor...
sua sequela perfectionem vitae and follow me” (Mat. 19:21), thus
constituens. putting the perfection of life in the
following of Him.
Possunt etiam dici perfectionis 14] They may also be called the effects

effectus et signa. Cum enim mens and signs of perfection. When the mind
vehementer amore et desiderio becomes attached to a thing with
alicuius rei afficitur, consequens est intense love and desire, the result is
quod alia postponat. Ex hoc igitur that it sets aside other things. So, from
quod mens hominis amore et the fact that man’s mind is fervently
desiderio ferventer in divina fertur, in inclined by love and desire to divine
quo perfectionem constare matters, in which it is obvious that
manifestum est, consequitur quod perfection is located, it follows that he
omnia quae ipsum possunt casts aside everything that might hold
retardare quominus feratur in Deum, him back from this inclination to God:

abiiciat: non solum rerum curam, et not only concern for things, for wife, and
uxoris et prolis affectum, sed etiam the love of offspring, but even for
sui ipsius. Et hoc significant verba himself. And the words of Scripture
Scripturae. Dicitur enim Cant. 87: si suggest this, for it is said in the Canticle
dederit homo omnem substantiam of Canticles (8:7): “if a man should give
domus suae ad mercandam all the substance of his house for love,
dilectionem, quasi nihil computabit he will account it as nothing”; and in
eam. Et Matth. 1345 simile est Matthew (13:45): “the kingdom of
regnum caelorum homini negotiatori heaven is like to a merchant seeking
quaerenti bonas margaritas: inventa good pearls, who, when he found one
autem una pretiosa margarita, abiit pearl of great price, went his way and
et vendidit omnia quae habuit, et sold all that he had and bought it”; and
comparavit eam. Et Philipp. 37 also in Philippians (3:78): “the things
quae mihi aliquando fuerunt lucra, that were gain to me... I counted as
arbitratus sum ut stercora ut dung, that I might gain Christ.”
Christum lucrifacerem.
Quia igitur praedicta tria [5] So, since the aforesaid three
dispositiones ad perfectionem sunt, counsels are dispositions to perfection,
et perfectionis effectus et signa, and are the effects and signs of
convenienter qui praedicta tria Deo perfection, it is fitting that those who
vovent, in statu perfectionis esse pledge themselves to these three by a
dicuntur. vow to God should be said to be in the
state of perfection.
Perfectio autem ad quam praedicta [6] Now, the perfection to which these
disponunt, in vacatione mentis circa three counsels give a disposition
Deum consistit. Unde et consists in detachment of the mind for
praedictorum professores religiosi God. Hence, those who profess the
dicuntur, quasi se Deo et sua in aforesaid vows are called religious, in
modum cuiusdam sacrificii dicantes: the sense that they offer themselves
et quantum ad res, per and their goods to God, as a special
paupertatem; et quantum ad corpus, kind of sacrifice: as far as goods are
per continentiam; et quantum ad concerned, by poverty; in regard to their
voluntatem, per obedientiam. body, by continence; and in regard to
Religio enim in cultu divino consistit, their will, by obedience. For religion
ut supra dictum est. consists in a divine cult, as was said
above.
Chapter 131
Caput 131
ON THE ERROR OF THE
De errore impugnantium
ATTACKERS OF VOLUNTARY
voluntariam paupertatem
POVERTY
Fuerunt autem aliqui paupertatis [1] There have been some people who,

propositum improbantes, contra in opposition to the teaching of the
evangelicam doctrinam. Quorum Gospel, have disapproved the practice
primus Vigilantius invenitur: quem of voluntary poverty. The first of these
tamen postmodum aliqui sunt secuti to be found is Vigilantius, whom,
dicentes se esse legis doctores, non however, some others have followed
intelligentes neque quae loquuntur later, calling themselves teachers of the
neque de quibus affirmant. Qui ad law, understanding neither the things
hoc his et similibus rationibus sunt they say, nor whereof they affirm” (1
inducti. Tim. 1:7). They were led to this view by
these and similar arguments.
Naturalis enim appetitus requirit ut [2] Natural appetite requires every

unumquodque animal sibi provideat animal to provide for itself in regard to
in necessariis suae vitae: unde the necessities of its life; thus, animals
animalia quae non quolibet tempore that are not able to find the necessities
anni necessaria vitae invenire of life during every period of the year,
possunt, quodam naturali instinctu, by a certain natural instinct gather the
ea quae sunt vitae suae necessaria things needed for life during the season
congregant illo tempore quo inveniri when they can be found, and they keep
possunt, et ea conservant; sicut them; this practice is evident in the
patet de apibus et formicis. Homines case of bees and ants. But men need
autem ad suae vitae many things for the preservation of life
conservationem multis indigent quae which cannot be found in every season.
non omni tempore inveniri possunt. So, there is a natural tendency in man
Inest igitur naturaliter homini quod to gather and keep things necessary to
congreget et conservet ea quae sunt him. Therefore, it is contrary to natural
sibi necessaria. Est igitur contra law to throw away, under the guise of
legem naturalem omnia congregata poverty, all that one has gathered
dispergere per paupertatem. together.
Adhuc. Naturalem affectum habent [3] Again, all have a natural predilection

omnia ad ea quibus esse suum for the things whereby their being may
conservatur, inquantum omnia esse be preserved, because all things desire
appetunt. Sed per substantiam to be. But man’s life is preserved by
exteriorum bonorum vita hominis means of the substance of external
conservatur. Sicut igitur ex naturali goods. So, just as each man is obliged
lege unusquisque suam vitam by natural law to preserve his life, so is
conservare tenetur, ita et exteriorem he obliged to preserve external
substantiam. Sicut igitur est contra substance. Therefore, as it is contrary
legem naturae quod aliquis sibi to the law of nature for a man to injure
manus iniiciat, ita et quod aliquis himself, so, too, is it for a man to
necessaria vitae sibi subtrahat per deprive himself by voluntary poverty of
voluntariam paupertatem. the necessities of life.
Amplius. Homo naturaliter est 14] Besides, “man is by nature a social

animal sociale, ut supra dictum est. animal,” as we said above. But society
Societas autem inter homines could not be maintained among men
conservari non posset nisi unus unless one man helped another. So, it
alium iuvaret. Est igitur naturale is natural to men for one to help
hominibus quod unus alium in another in need. But those who discard
necessitatibus iuvet. Ab hoc autem external substance, whereby most help
auxilio ferendo se faciunt impotentes can be given others, render themselves
qui exteriorem substantiam abiiciunt, by this practice unable to give help.
per quam plurimum aliis auxilium Therefore, it is against natural instinct,
fertur. Est igitur contra naturalem and against the good of mercy and
instinctum, et contra misericordiae charity, for a man to discard all worldly
et caritatis bonum, quod homo per substance by voluntary poverty.
voluntariam paupertatem omnem
substantiam mundi abiiciat.
Item. Si habere substantiam huius [5] Moreover, if it be evil to possess the

mundi malum est; bonum est autem substance of this world, but if it be good
proximos liberare a malo, malum to deliver one’s neighbors from evil and
autem eos in malum inducere: bad to lead them into evil, the
consequens est quod dare alicui conclusion is that to give the substance
indigenti substantiam huius mundi of this world to a needy person is an
sit malum, auferre autem habenti sit evil and to take from an owner is a
bonum. Quod inconveniens est. Est good. Now, this is not right. So, it is a
igitur bonum habere substantiam good thing to possess the substance of
huius mundi. Eam igitur per this world. Therefore, to throw it away
voluntariam paupertatem totaliter entirely is an evil thing.
abiicere malum est.
Praeterea. Occasiones malorum [6] Furthermore, occasions of evil are to

vitandae sunt. Est autem paupertas be avoided. But poverty is an occasion
occasio mali: quia propter eam ad of evil, since some are induced, as a
furta, adulationes et periuria, et his result of it, to acts of theft, of false
similia, aliqui inducuntur. Non est praise and perjury, and the like.
igitur paupertas voluntate Therefore, poverty should not be
assumenda, sed magis ne adveniat embraced voluntarily; rather, should
vitanda. care be taken to avoid its advent.
Adhuc. Cum virtus consistat in [7] Again, since virtue lies in a middle
medio, utroque extremo corrumpitur. way, corruption comes from both
Est autem virtus liberalitas, quae dat extremes. Now, there is a virtue of
danda et retinet retinenda. Vitium liberality, which gives what should be
autem est in minus illiberalitas, quae given and retains what should be
retinet retinenda et non retinenda. retained. But the vice of defect is
Est autem et vitium in plus quod illiberality, which retains both the things
omnia dentur. Quod faciunt qui that should and should not be retained.
voluntarie paupertatem assumunt. So, too, it is a vice of excess, for all
Est ergo hoc vitiosum, et things to be given away. This is what
prodigalitati simile. the people do who assume poverty
voluntarily. Therefore, this is vicious,
and similar to prodigality.
Hae autem rationes auctoritate [8] Moreover, these arguments seem to

Scripturae confirmari videntur. be confirmed by the text of Scripture.
Dicitur enim Prov. 308 For it is said: “Give me neither beggary
mendicitatem et divitias ne dederis nor riches; give me only the
mihi, tribue tantum victui meo necessaries of life, lest perhaps being
necessaria: ne forte, satiatus, illiciar filled, I should be tempted to deny, and
ad negandum, et dicam: quis est say: Who is the Lord? Or being
dominus? Et egestate compulsus, compelled by poverty, I should steal,
furer, et periurem nomen Dei mei. and forswear the name of my God”
(Prov. 30:89).
De modis vivendi eorum qui ON THE WAYS OF LIFE OF THOSE
voluntariam paupertatem WHO PRACTICE VOLUNTARY
sequuntur POVERTY
Videtur autem haec quaestio [1] Now, it seems that this problem may be

magis urgeri si quis specialius better treated if we examine in greater
exsequatur modos quibus detail the ways in which those who
necesse est vivere eos qui practice voluntary poverty must live.
voluntariam paupertatem
sectantur.
Est enim unus modus vivendi [2] The first way of so living is for each
quod possessiones singulorum person to sell his possessions, and for all
vendantur, et de pretio omnes to live in common on the proceeds. This
communiter vivant. Quod quidem appears to have been the practice under
sub apostolis observatum videtur the Apostles in Jerusalem, for it is said:
in Ierusalem: dicitur enim Act. 4 “As many as were owners of lands or
34 quotquot possessores houses sold them and brought the price of
agrorum aut domorum, the things they sold, and laid it down
vendentes afferebant pretia before the feet of the Apostles. And
eorum quae vendebant, et distribution was made to every one as he
ponebant ante pedes had need” (Acts 4:3435). But it does not
apostolorum: dividebant autem seem that effective provision is made for
singulis prout cuique opus erat. human life, according to this way.
Hoc autem modo non videtur
efficienter provideri humanae
vitae.
Primo quidem, quia non est facile [3] First, because it is not easy to get a
quod plures habentes magnas number of persons who have large
possessiones hanc vitam possessions to adopt this life. So, if
assumant. Et si conferatur inter distribution is made among many of the
multos pretium quod ex proceeds derived from a few rich people,
possessionibus paucorum the amount will not be sufficient for any
divitum assumptum est, non length of time.
sufficiet in multum tempus.
Deinde, quia possibile et facile [4] Next, because it is possible and easy
est huiusmodi pretium, vel fraude for such a fund to disappear, either
dispensatorum, vel furto aut through fraud on the part of the managers

rapina, deperire. Remanebunt or by theft or robbery. So, those who follow
igitur illi qui paupertatem talem this kind of poverty will be left without
sectantur, absque sustentatione support for life.
vitae.
Item. Multa accidentia sunt [5] Again, many things happen whereby
quibus homines coguntur locum men are forced to change their location. It
mutare. Non igitur erit facile will not be easy, then, to provide from the
providere his quos oportet forte common fund gathered from such sale of
per diversa loca dispergi, de possessions for those who will perhaps be
pretio sumpto ex possessionibus scattered in various places.
in commune redacto.
Est autem alius modus vivendi ut [6] Then, there is a second way of so

possessiones habeant living: this is to hold common possessions,
communes, ex quibus singulis from which provision is made for individual
provideatur prout eis opus fuerit persons, according to their needs, as is
sicut in monasteriis plurimis the practice in many monasteries. But
observatur. Sed nec hic modus even this way of living does not seem
videtur conveniens. appropriate.
Possessiones enim terrenae [7] In fact, earthly possessions are the
sollicitudinem afferunt: et propter source of worry, both in regard to taking
procurationem fructuum; et care of their revenues and in regard to
propter defensionem earum their protection against frauds and attacks.
contra fraudes et violentias; et Moreover, the larger they are, the more
tanto maiorem, et a pluribus people are required to take care of them,
oportet habere sollicitudinem, and, so, the larger must these possessions
quanto maiores possessiones be to give adequate support to all these
esse oportet quae sufficiant ad people. And thus, in this way, the very
plurium sustentationem. Deperit purpose of voluntary poverty vanishes, at
igitur in hoc modo finis least in regard to the many men who must
voluntariae paupertatis: ad minus concern themselves with the management
quantum ad multos, quos oportet of the possessions.
circa procurandas possessiones
esse sollicitos.
Item. Communis possessio solet [8] Again, common possession is usually a

esse causa discordiae. Non enim cause of disagreement. People who hold
videntur litigare qui nihil habent nothing in common, such as the Spaniards
commune, ut Hispani et Persae, and Persians, do not seem to get into legal
sed qui simul aliquid habent disputes, but, rather, those who do bold
commune: propter quod etiam something in common. This is why there
inter fratres sunt iurgia. Discordia are disagreements even among brothers.
autem maxime impedit Now, discord is the greatest impediment to
vacationem mentis circa divina, giving over one’s mind to divine matters,
ut supra dictum est. Videtur igitur as we said above. So, it seems that this
modus iste vivendi impedire way of living obstructs the end of voluntary

finem voluntariae paupertatis. poverty.
Adhuc autem est tertius modus [9] There is still a third way of living: that is

vivendi, ut de laboribus manuum for those who practice voluntary poverty to
suarum vivant qui voluntariam live from the labor of their hands. Indeed,
paupertatem sectantur. Quem this was the way of life followed by the
quidem vivendi modum Paulus Apostle Paul, and he recommended his
apostolus sequebatur, et aliis practice to others by his example and by
observandum suo exemplo et his teaching. For it is stated in 2
institutione dimisit. Dicitur enim II Thessalonians (3:810): “Neither did we
Thess., 38 non gratis panem eat any man’s bread for nothing, but in
manducavimus ab aliquo, sed in labor and toil we worked night and day,
labore et fatigatione, nocte et die lest we should be chargeable to any of
operantes, ne quem vestrum you. Not as if we had not power, but that
gravaremus: non quasi non we might give ourselves a pattern unto
habuerimus potestatem, sed ut you, to imitate us. For also, when we were
nosmetipsos formam daremus with you, this we declared to you, that, if
vobis ad imitandum nos. Nam et any man will not work, neither let him eat.”
cum essemus apud vos, hoc But even this way of living does not seem
denuntiabamus vobis: quoniam si to be appropriate.
quis non vult operari, non
manducet. Sed nec iste modus
vivendi videtur esse conveniens.
Labor enim manualis [10] As a matter of fact, manual labor is
necessarius est ad necessary for the support of life, because
sustentationem vitae secundum by it anything may be acquired. Now, it
quod per ipsum aliquid acquiritur. seems foolish for a man to give away what
Vanum autem videtur quod quis, is needed and then to work to get it again.
relinquens illud quod If, then, it is necessary after the adoption
necessarium est, iterum of voluntary poverty again to acquire by
acquirere laboret. Si igitur post manual labor that by which a man may
voluntariam paupertatem support himself, it was useless to give up
necessarium est iterum acquirere all that he had for the support of life.
unde aliquis sustentetur per
laborem manualem, vanum fuit
illa dimittere omnia quae quis
habebat ad sustentationem vitae.
Adhuc. Voluntaria paupertas ad [11] Again, voluntary poverty is counseled,

hoc consulitur ut per eam aliquis so that a person may be disposed by it to
disponatur ad expeditius follow Christ in a better way, because be is
sequendum Christum, per hoc freed by it from worldly concerns. But it
quod a sollicitudinibus seems to require greater concern for a
saecularibus liberat. Maiorem person to get his food by his own labor
autem sollicitudinem requirere than for him to use what he possesses for
videtur quod aliquis proprio the support of his life, and especially if he
labore victum acquirat, quam has possessions of modest size, or that
quod his quae habuit utatur ad are capable of being moved, from which
sustentationem vitae: et something would be available to provide
praecipue si habuit possessiones for the needs of life. Therefore, to live by
moderatas, aut etiam aliqua the labor of one’s hands does not seem to
mobilia, ex quibus in promptu be suitable to the intention of those
erat ut sumeret victus embracing voluntary poverty.
necessaria. Non igitur vivere de
laboribus manuum videtur esse
conveniens proposito
assumentium voluntariam
paupertatem.
Ad hoc autem accedit quod etiam [12] Added to this is the fact that even our
dominus, sollicitudinem Lord, while taking away from his disciples
terrenorum a discipulis removens solicitude for earthly things, in the parable
sub similitudine volucrum et of the birds and the lilies of the field seems
liliorum agri, videtur eis laborem to forbid them manual labor. For He says:
interdicere manualem. Dicit enim: “Behold the birds of the air, for they neither
respicite volatilia caeli, quae sow, nor do they reap nor gather into
neque serunt neque metunt barns”; and again: “Consider the lilies of
neque congregant in horrea. Et the field, how they grow: they labor not,
iterum: considerate lilia agri neither do they spin” [Mat. 6:2628].
quomodo crescunt: non laborant
neque nent.
Videtur etiam hic modus vivendi [13] Moreover, this way of life seems
insufficiens. Nam multi sunt inadequate. In fact, there are many who
perfectionem vitae desiderantes desire perfection of life, for whom neither
quibus non suppetit facultas aut the ability nor the skill is available to
ars, ut possint labore manuum enable them to spend their lives in manual
vitam transigere, quia non sunt in labor, because they are neither brought
his nutriti nec instructi. Sic enim up, nor informed, in such pursuits. Indeed,
melioris conditionis essent ad in this case, country people and workmen
perfectionem vitae capessendam would be in a better position to embrace
rustici et opifices, quam qui perfection of life than those who have
sapientiae studio vacaverunt, et devoted themselves to the pursuit of
in divitiis et deliciis, quas propter wisdom, but who have been reared in
Christum deserunt, sunt nutriti. wealth and comfort, which they have left
Contingit etiam aliquos behind for the sake of Christ. It is also
voluntariam paupertatem possible for some who embrace voluntary
assumentes infirmari, aut alias poverty to become disabled or to be
impediri quominus operari otherwise prevented from the possibility of
possent. Sic ergo remanerent working. So, in such a case, they would
destituti necessariis vitae. become destitute of the necessities of life.
Item. Non modici temporis labor [14] Again, the labor of no small amount of

sufficit ad necessaria vitae time is requisite for gaining the necessities
quaerenda: quod patet in multis of life; this is obvious in the case of many
qui totum tempus ad hoc who devote all their time to it, yet hardly
expendunt, vix tamen manage to make an adequate living. Now,

sufficientem sustentationem if it were necessary for followers of
acquirere possunt. Si autem voluntary poverty to make their living by
voluntariam paupertatem manual labor, the result would be that they
sectantes oporteret labore might take up the greater part of their lives
manuali victum acquirere, in this kind of work; consequently, they
sequeretur quod circa huiusmodi would be kept away from other, more
laborem maius tempus suae necessary activities, such as the pursuit of
vitae consumerent; et per wisdom, and teaching, and other such
consequens impedirentur ab aliis spiritual exercises. In this way, voluntary
magis necessariis actionibus, poverty would be an impediment to
quae etiam magnum tempus perfection of life rather than a disposition
requirunt, sicut sunt studium helpful to it.
sapientiae, et doctrina, et alia
huiusmodi spiritualia exercitia. Et
sic paupertas voluntaria magis
impediret perfectionem vitae
quam ad ipsam disponeret.
Si quis autem dicat quod labor [5] Moreover, if someone says that manual

manualis necessarius est ad labor is necessary in order to avoid
tollendum otium: hoc non sufficit idleness, this is not an adequate objection
ad propositum. Melius enim to the argument. For it would be better to
esset tollere otium per avoid idleness by occupations under the
occupationes in virtutibus moral virtues, in which riches serve an
moralibus, quibus deserviunt instrumental role, for instance, in giving
organice divitiae, puta in alms and things like that, rather than by
eleemosynis faciendis et aliis manual labor. Besides, it would be futile to
huiusmodi, quam per laborem counsel poverty simply because men who
manualem. Praeterea. Vanum have become poor would refrain from
esset dare consilium de idleness and devote their lives to manual
paupertate ad hoc solum quod labors, unless it were done in such a way
homines pauperes facti that they could devote themselves to more
abstinerent ab otio, vitam suam noble activities than those which are
laboribus manualibus customary in the ordinary lives of men.
occupantes, nisi ad hoc daretur
quod nobilioribus exercitiis
vacarent quam illa quae sunt
secundum vitam hominum
communem.
Si vero aliquis dicat quod [16] But, if someone says that manual
necessarius est labor manualis labor is necessary for the mastering of
ad carnis concupiscentias fleshly concupiscences, this is not a
domandas: hoc non est ad pertinent objection. Our question is:
propositum. Quaerimus enim whether it is necessary for followers of
utrum sit necessarium quod voluntary poverty to make their living by
victum per manualem laborem manual labor. Besides, it is possible to
voluntariam paupertatem control the concupiscences of the flesh in
sectantes acquirant. Praeterea. many other ways, namely, by fasting,
Possibile est multis aliis modis vigils, and other such practices. Moreover,

concupiscentias carnis domare: they could use manual labor for this
scilicet per ieiunia, vigilias, et alia purpose even if they were rich and did not
huiusmodi. Labore etiam manuali need to work to gain a living.
ad hunc finem uti possent etiam
divites, qui non habent necesse
laborare propter victum
quaerendum.
Invenitur autem et alius modus [17] Then, there is still a fourth way of
vivendi: ut scilicet voluntariam living: that is, the followers of voluntary
paupertatem sectantes vivant de poverty may live on the goods which are
his quae ab aliis inferuntur qui ad offered them by others, who, while keeping
hanc perfectionem voluntariae their own wealth, wish to make a
paupertatis proficere volunt contribution to this perfection of voluntary
divitias retinentes. Et hunc poverty. And it seems that our Lord and
modum videtur dominus cum His disciples practiced this way of life, for
suis discipulis observasse: legitur we read in Luke (8:23) that certain women
enim Lucae 8, quod mulieres followed Christ and “ministered to Him out
quaedam sequebantur Christum, of their substance.” However, even this
et ministrabant illi de facultatibus way of life does not seem proper.
suis. Sed iste etiam modus
vivendi non videtur conveniens.
Non enim videtur rationabile [18] For it does not seem reasonable for a

quod aliquis dimittat sua, et vivat person to part with his own goods and
de alieno. then live off another man.
Praeterea. Inconveniens videtur [19] Besides, it seems improper for a

quod aliquis ab aliquo accipiat, et person to take from another and make no
nihil ei rependat: in dando enim repayment to him, for, in giving and
et recipiendo aequalitas iustitiae receiving, the equality of justice should be
servatur. Potest autem sustineri observed. But it can be maintained that
quod illi de his quae ab aliis some of those recipients who live on the
inferuntur vivant, qui eis serviunt bounty of others may render some sort of
in aliquo officio. Propter quod service to these others. This is why
ministri altaris et praedicatores, ministers of the altar, and preachers who
qui doctrinam et alia divina supply the people with teaching and other
populo dant, non inconvenienter divine services, are observed accepting,
videntur ab eis sustentationem not inappropriately, the means of livelihood
vitae accipere: dignus enim est from them. “For the workman is worthy of
operarius cibo suo, ut dominus his meat,” as the Lord says in Matthew
dicit, Matth. 1010. Propter quod (10:10). For which reason, the Apostle
apostolus dicit, I Cor. 9, quod says in 1 Corinthians (9:1314) that “the
dominus ordinavit his qui Lord ordained that they who preach the
Evangelium annuntiant, ut de gospel should live by the gospel... just as
Evangelio vivant; sicut et qui they who work in the holy place eat the
altari deserviunt, cum altario things that are of the holy place.” So, it
participantur. Illi ergo qui in nullo seems improper for those who serve the
officio populo ministrant, people in no special function to take the
inconveniens videtur si a populo necessities of life from the people.
necessaria vitae accipiant.
Item. Iste modus vivendi videtur [20] Again, this way of living seems to be a

esse aliis damnosus. Sunt enim source of loss to others. For there are
quidam quos ex necessitate people who, of necessity, must be
oportet aliorum beneficiis supported by the benefactions of others
sustentari, qui propter and who cannot provide for themselves
paupertatem et infirmitatem sibi because of poverty and sickness. The
non possunt sufficere. Quorum alms received by them must be decreased
beneficia oportet quod minuantur, if those who embrace poverty voluntarily
si illi qui voluntarie paupertatem have to be supported on the gifts of others,
assumunt, ex his quae ab aliis because there are not enough men, nor
dantur debeant sustentari: cum are men much inclined, to support a great
homines non sufficiant, nec sint number of poor people. Consequently, the
prompti ad subveniendum Apostle commands in 1 Timothy (5:16)
magnae multitudini pauperum. that, if anyone have a widow related to
Unde et apostolus, I Tim. 4, him, “let him minister to her, that the
mandat quod, si quis habet Church may be sufficient for them that are
viduam ad se pertinentem, eam widows indeed.” So, it is improper for men
sustentet, ut Ecclesia sufficiat his who choose poverty to take over this way
quae vere viduae sunt. Est igitur of living.
inconveniens ut homines
paupertatem eligentes hunc
modum vivendi assumant.
Adhuc. Ad perfectionem virtutis [21] Besides, freedom of mind is

maxime requiritur animi libertas: absolutely necessary for perfection in
hac enim sublata, de facili virtue, for, when it is taken away, men
homines alienis peccatis easily become “partakers of other men’s
communicant: vel expresse sins” (see 1 Tim. 5:22), either by evident
consentiendo, aut per consent, or by flattering praise, or at least
adulationem laudando, vel by pretended approval. But much that is
saltem dissimulando. Huic autem prejudicial to this freedom of mind arises
libertati magnum praeiudicium from the aforesaid way of life; indeed, it is
generatur ex praedicto modo not possible for a man not to shrink from
vivendi: non enim potest esse offending a person on whose bounty be
quin homo vereatur offendere lives. Therefore, the way of life under
eum cuius beneficiis vivit. discussion is a hindrance to perfection of
Praedictus igitur modus vivendi virtue, which is the purpose of voluntary
impedit perfectionem virtutis, poverty. Thus, it does not seem to suit
quae est finis voluntariae those who are voluntarily paupers.
paupertatis. Et ita non videtur
competere voluntarie pauperibus.
Amplius. Eius quod ex alterius [22] Moreover, we do not control what
voluntate dependet, facultatem depends on the will of another person. But
non habemus. Sed ex voluntate what a giver gives of his own goods
dantis dependet quod ex propriis depends on his will. So, insufficient
det. Non igitur sufficienter provision is made for the control of their
providetur in facultate means of livelihood by voluntary paupers
sustentationis vitae voluntariis living in this way.
pauperibus per hunc modum
vivendi.
Praeterea. Necesse est quod [23] Furthermore, paupers who are

pauperes qui ex his quae ab aliis supported by the gifts of others have to
dantur sustentari debent, reveal their needs to others and beg for
necessitates suas aliis exponant, necessities. Now, this kind of begging
et necessaria petant. Huiusmodi makes mendicants objects of contempt,
autem mendicitas reddit and even nuisances. In fact, men think
contemptibiles mendicantes, et themselves superior to those who have to
etiam graves: homines enim be supported by them, and many give with
superiores se aestimant illis qui reluctance. But those who embrace
per eos sustentari necesse perfection of life should be held in
habent; et cum difficultate dant reverence and love, so that men may more
plurimi. Oportet autem eos qui readily imitate them and emulate their
perfectionem vitae assumunt, in state of life. Now, if the opposite happens,
reverentia haberi et diligi, ut sic even virtue itself may be held in contempt.
homines eos facilius imitentur, et Therefore, to live by begging is a harmful
virtutis statum aemulentur: si way of life for those who embrace poverty
autem contrarium accidat, etiam voluntarily for the sake of perfect virtue.
virtus ipsa contemnitur. Est igitur
nocivus modus ex mendicitate
vivendi in his qui propter
perfectionem virtutis voluntarie
paupertatem assumunt.
Praeterea. Perfectis viris non [24] Besides, for perfect men, not only
solum sunt vitanda mala, sed evils must be avoided, but even things that
etiam ea quae mali speciem have an appearance of evil, for the Apostle
habent: nam apostolus dicit, says in Romans 12:17 (1 Thes. 5:22):
Rom. 12: ab omni specie mali “From all appearance of evil refrain
abstinete vos. Et philosophus yourselves.” And the Philosopher says
dicit, quod virtuosus non solum [Ethics IV, 9] that the virtuous man should
debet fugere turpia, sed etiam not only avoid disgraceful actions, but also
quae turpia videntur. Mendicitas those which appear disgraceful. Now,
autem habet speciem mali: cum mendicancy has the appearance of an evil,
multi propter quaestum since many people beg because of greed.
mendicent. Non est igitur hic Therefore, this way of life should not be
modus vivendi perfectis viris adopted by perfect men.
assumendus.
Item. Ad hoc datur consilium de [25] Moreover, the counsel of voluntary
paupertate voluntaria ut mens poverty was given in order that man’s mind
hominis, a sollicitudine might be withdrawn from solicitude for

terrenorum retracta, liberius Deo earthly things and more freely devoted to
vacet. Hic autem modus ex God. But this way of living by begging
mendicitate vivendi habet requires a great deal of solicitude; in fact,
plurimam sollicitudinem: maioris there seems to be greater solicitude
enim esse videtur sollicitudinis involved in getting things from others than
acquirere aliena quam propriis in using what is one’s own. So, this way of
uti. Non ergo videtur esse living does not seem appropriate for those
conveniens hic modus videndi taking on voluntary poverty.
paupertatem voluntariam
assumentibus.
Si quis autem mendicitatem [26] Now, if anyone wants to praise
laudare velit propter humilitatem mendicancy because of its humility, he
videtur omnino irrationabiliter would seem to be speaking quite
loqui. Laudatur enim humilitas unreasonably. For humility is praised
secundum quod contemnitur because earthly exaltation is held in
terrena altitudo, quae consistit in contempt, and it consists in riches, honors,
divitiis, honoribus, fama, et renown, and things like that; but it is not
huiusmodi: non autem secundum praised for contemning the loftiness of
quod contemnitur altitudo virtutis, virtue, in regard to which we should be
respectu cuius oportet nos magnanimous. So, it would contribute to
magnanimos esse. Esset igitur the bad repute of humility if anyone in the
vituperanda humilitas si quis name of humility did anything derogatory
propter humilitatem aliquid to the higher character of virtue. But
faceret quod altitudini virtutis mendicancy is derogatory to it: both
derogaret. Derogat autem ei because “it is better to give than to
mendicitas: tum quia virtuosius receive” (Acts 20:35) and because it has
est dare quam accipere; tum quia the appearance of something disgraceful,
habet speciem turpis, ut dictum as we said. Therefore, mendicancy should
est. Non est igitur propter not be praised because of its humility.
humilitatem mendicitas laudanda.
Fuerunt etiam aliqui qui [27] There have been some, finally, who
perfectionem vitae sectantibus asserted that followers of perfection in life
dicebant nullam sollicitudinem should have no concern at all, either to
esse habendam neque beg, or to work, or to keep anything for
mendicando, neque laborando, themselves, but that they should look to
neque sibi aliquid reservando, God alone for the support of lifebecause
sed oportere eos a solo Deo of what is said in Matthew (6:25): “Be not
sustentationem vitae expectare: solicitous for your life, what you shall eat
propter hoc quod dicitur Matth. 6 or drink, nor for your body, what you shall
25: nolite solliciti esse animae put on”; and later: “Be not solicitous for
vestrae, quid manducetis aut tomorrow” (Mat. 6:24). Now, this seems
bibatis, aut corpori vestro, quid completely unreasonable.
induamini et iterum: nolite in
crastinum cogitare. Hoc autem
videtur omnino irrationabile.
Stultum enim est velle finem, et [28] Indeed, it is foolish to wish for an end,

praetermittere ea quae sunt and then to neglect the things that are
ordinata ad finem. Ad finem related to the end. But human solicitude is
autem comestionis ordinatur related to the end of eating, for by it one
sollicitudo humana, per quam sibi obtains food for oneself. So, those who
victum procurat. Qui igitur cannot live without eating ought to have
absque comestione vivere non some concern about obtaining food.
possunt, aliquam sollicitudinem
de victu quaerendo debent
habere.
Praeterea. Sollicitudo terrenorum [29] Besides, solicitude for earthly things

non est vitanda nisi quia impedit need not be avoided, unless it hinders the
contemplationem aeternorum. contemplation of eternal matters. But a
Non potest autem homo man endowed with mortal flesh cannot live
mortalem carnem gerens vivere unless he does many things whereby
quin multa agat quibus contemplation is interrupted, things like
contemplatio interrumpatur: sicut sleeping, eating, and other such actions.
dormiendo, comedendo, et alia Therefore, solicitude for the necessities of
huiusmodi faciendo. Neque igitur life is not to be set aside on this basis, that
praetermittenda est sollicitudo it is an impediment to contemplation.
eorum quae sunt necessaria ad
vitam, propter impedimentum
contemplationis.
Sequitur etiam mira absurditas. [30] Moreover, there is a marvelously

Pari enim ratione potest dicere absurd consequence. For, on the same
quod non velit ambulare, aut reasoning, one could say that he does not
aperire os, ad edendum aut wish to walk, or to open his mouth to eat,
fugere lapidem cadentem aut or to avoid a falling stone or a Plunging
gladium irruentem, sed expectare sword, but would rather wait for God to do
quod Deus operetur. Quod est something. This is to tempt God.
Deum tentare. Non est igitur Therefore, solicitude for the means of
sollicitudo victus totaliter living is not to be rejected entirely.
abiicienda.
Quomodo paupertas sit bona IN WHAT WAY POVERTY IS GOOD
Ut autem circa praemissa veritas [1] So, then, in order to show the truth in

manifestetur, quid de paupertate regard to the foregoing arguments, and
sentiendum sit, ex divitiis what view we should take regarding
consideremus. Exteriores quidem poverty, we shall make a consideration of
divitiae sunt necessariae ad riches. As a matter of fact, external riches
bonum virtutis: cum per eas are necessary for the good of virtue; since
sustentemus corpus, et aliis by them we support our body and give
subveniamus. Oportet autem assistance to other people. Now, things
quod ea quae sunt ad finem, ex that are means to an end must derive
fine bonitatem accipiant. Necesse their goodness from the end. So, external
ergo est quod exteriores divitiae riches must be a good for man; not, of
sint aliquod bonum hominis, non course, the principal one, but as a
tamen principale, sed quasi secondary good. For the end is the
secundarium: nam finis principal good, while other things are
principaliter bonum est, alia vero good because they are ordered to the
secundum quod ordinantur in end. This is why it has seemed to some
finem. Propter hoc quibusdam people that the virtues are the greatest
visum est quod virtutes sint goods for man, while external riches are
maxima bona hominis, exteriores his least important goods. Now, things
autem divitiae quaedam minima that are means to an end must be
bona. Oportet autem quod ea measured in accord with the requirements
quae sunt ad finem, modum of the end. Therefore, riches are good, to
accipiant secundum exigentiam the extent that they advance the practice
finis. In tantum igitur divitiae of virtue, but if this measure is departed
bonae sunt, in quantum proficiunt from, so that the practice of virtue is
ad usum virtutis: si vero iste hindered by them, then they are not to be
modus excedatur, ut per eas numbered among goods, but among evils.
impediatur usus virtutis, non iam Hence, it happens to be a good thing for
inter bona sunt computanda, sed some people to possess riches, for they
inter mala. Unde accidit use them for the sake of virtue, but for
quibusdam bonum esse habere others it is a bad thing to have them, for
divitias, qui eis utuntur ad these people are taken away from virtue
virtutem: quibusdam vero malum by them, either through too much
esse eas habere, qui per eas a solicitude or affection for them, or also
virtute retrahuntur, vel nimia because of mental pride resulting from
sollicitudine, vel nimia affectione them.
ad ipsas, vel etiam mentis
elatione ex eis consurgente.
Sed, cum sint virtutes activae [2] However, since there are virtues of the

vitae et contemplativae, aliter active and the contemplative life, both
utraeque divitiis exterioribus types have a different need for external
indigent. Nam virtutes riches. For the contemplative virtues need
contemplativae indigent ad solam them only for the support of nature, but
sustentationem naturae: virtutes the active virtues need them for this, and
autem activae indigent et ad hoc, also for the helping of others with whom
et ad subveniendum aliis, cum one must live. Hence, the contemplative
quibus convivendum est. Unde et life is more perfect, even on this point, for
contemplativa vita etiam in hoc it needs fewer things. Now, it seems
perfectior est, quod paucioribus proper to this kind of life for a man to
indiget. Ad quam quidem vitam devote himself entirely to divine things,
pertinere videtur quod totaliter which perfection the teaching of Christ
homo divinis rebus vacet: quam urges on man. Hence, for followers of this
perfectionem doctrina Christi type of perfection a very small amount of
homini suadet. Unde hanc external riches suffices, that is, just the
perfectionem sectantibus amount needed to support nature. And
minimum de exterioribus divitiis so, the Apostle says, in 1 Timothy (6:8):
sufficit, quantum scilicet necesse “Having food and wherewith to be
est ad sustentationem naturae. covered, with these we are content.”

Unde et apostolus dicit, I Timoth.
68: habentes alimenta et quibus
tegamur, his contenti simus.
Paupertas igitur laudabilis est [3] So, poverty is praiseworthy according
inquantum hominem liberat ab illis as it frees man from the vices in which
vitiis quibus aliqui per divitias some are involved through riches.
implicantur. Inquantum autem Moreover, in so far as it removes the
sollicitudinem tollit quae ex divitiis solicitude which arises from riches, it is
consurgit, est utilis quibusdam, useful to some, namely, those disposed to
qui scilicet sunt ita dispositi ut busy themselves with better things.
circa meliora occupentur: However, it is harmful to others, who,
quibusdam vero nociva, qui, ab being freed from this solicitude, fall into
hac sollicitudine liberati, in peiores worse occupations. Hence, Gregory says:
occupationes cadunt. Unde “Often, those who have lived a life of
Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral.: human activities have been well occupied,
saepe qui, occupati bene, but have been killed by the sword of their
humanis usibus viverent, gladio own retirement.” However, in so far as
suae quietis extincti sunt. poverty takes away the good which
Inquantum vero paupertas aufert results from riches, namely, the assisting
bonum quod ex divitiis provenit, of others and the support of oneself, it is
scilicet subventionem aliorum et purely an evil; except in the case where
sustentationem propriam, the temporal help that is offered to
simpliciter malum est: nisi neighbors can be compensated for by a
inquantum subventio qua in greater good, that is, by the fact that a
temporalibus proximis subvenitur, man who lacks riches can more freely
per maius bonum potest devote himself to divine and spiritual
recompensari, scilicet per hoc matters. But the good of supporting
quod homo, divitiis carens, oneself is so necessary that it can be
liberius potest divinis et compensated for by no other good, since
spiritualibus vacare. Bonum no man should take away from himself
autem sustentationis propriae the support of life, under the pretext of
adeo necessarium est quod nullo obtaining another good.
alio bono recompensari potest:
nullius enim boni obtentu debet
homo sibi sustentationem vitae
subtrahere.
Paupertas igitur talis laudabilis est [4] And so, such poverty is praiseworthy

cum homo, per eam a when a man is freed by it from earthly
sollicitudinibus terrenis liberatus, concerns and devotes himself more freely
liberius divinis et spiritualibus to divine and spiritual things, provided, of
vacat: ita tamen quod cum ea course, that the ability remains along with
remaneat facultas homini per it in man to support himself in a lawful
licitum modum sustentandi manner, for which support not many
seipsum, ad quod non multa things are needed. Thus, the less one’s
requiruntur. Et quanto modus way of living in poverty requires of
vivendi in paupertate minorem solicitude, the more praiseworthy it is. For
sollicitudinem exigit, tanto poverty in itself is not good, but only in so

paupertas est laudabilior: non far as it liberates from those things
autem quanto paupertas fuerit whereby a man is hindered from intending
maior. Non enim paupertas spiritual things. Hence, the measure of its
secundum se bona est: sed goodness depends on the manner in
inquantum liberat ab illis quibus which man is freed by means of it from
homo impeditur quominus the aforementioned obstacles. And this is
spiritualibus intendat. Unde generally true of all external things: they
secundum modum quo homo per are good to the extent that they contribute
eam liberatur ab impedimentis to virtue, but not in themselves.
praedictis, est mensura bonitatis
ipsius. Et hoc est commune in
omnibus exterioribus, quod in
tantum bona sunt in quantum
proficiunt ad virtutem, non autem
secundum seipsa.
Chapter 134
Caput 134
ANSWERS TO THE ARGUMENTS
Solutio rationum supra
BROUGHT FORWARD ABOVE
inductarum contra paupertatem
AGAINST POVERTY
His autem visis, rationes [1] Now that these things have been
praemissas quibus paupertas seen, it is not difficult to answer the
impugnatur, dissolvere non difficile foregoing arguments by which poverty is
est. attacked.
Quamvis enim homini naturaliter [2] Although there is naturally present in

insit appetitus congregandi ea man a desire to gather the things
quae sunt necessaria ad vitam, ut necessary for life, as the first argument
prima ratio proponebat, non tamen suggested, it is not, however, such that
hoc modo quod oporteat quemlibet every man must be occupied with this
circa hoc opus occupari. Nec enim work. Indeed, not even among the bees
in apibus omnes eidem vacant do all have the same function; rather,
officio: sed quaedam colligunt mel, some gather honey, others build their
quaedam ex cera domos homes out of wax, while the rulers are
constituunt, reges etiam circa haec not occupied with these works. And the
opera non occupantur. Et similiter same should hold in the case of man. In
necesse est in hominibus esse. fact, since many things are needed for
Quia enim multa necessaria sunt man’s life, for which one man could not
ad hominis vitam, ad quae unus suffice of himself, it is necessary for
homo per se sufficere non posset, different jobs to be done by different
necessarium est per diversos people. For some should be farmers,
diversa fieri: puta, ut quidam sint some caretakers of animals, some
agricultores, quidam animalium builders, and so on for the other tasks.
custodes, quidam aedificatores, et And since the life of man requires not
sic de aliis. Et quia vita hominum only corporeal but, even more, spiritual
non solum indiget corporalibus, sed goods, it is also necessary for some men
magis spiritualibus, necessarium to devote their time to spiritual things, for

est etiam ut quidam vacent the betterment of others; and these must
spiritualibus rebus, ad be freed from concern over temporal
meliorationem aliorum: quos matters. Now, this division of various
oportet a cura temporalium tasks among different persons is done
absolutos esse. Haec autem by divine providence, inasmuch as some
distributio diversorum officiorum in people are more inclined to one kind of
diversas personas fit divina work than to another.
providentia, secundum quod
quidam inclinantur magis ad hoc
officium quam ad alia.
Sic ergo patet quod qui temporalia [3] In this way, then, it is clear that those

relinquunt, non sibi subtrahunt who abandon temporal things do not
sustentationem vitae: ut secunda take away from themselves their life
ratio procedebat. Remanet enim support, as the second argument
eis spes probabilis suae vitae implies. For there remains with them a
sustentandae, vel ex labore good expectation of supporting their
proprio, vel ex aliorum beneficiis, lives, either from their own labors, or
sive accipiant ea in possessionibus from the benefactions of others, whether
communibus, sive in victu they take them as common possessions
quotidiano. Sicut enim quod per or for daily need. Thus, indeed, “what we
amicos possumus, per nos can do through our friends, we do by
aliqualiter possumus, ut ourselves, in a sense,” as the
philosophus dicit, ita et quod ab Philosopher says [Ethics III, 3], and so,
amicis habetur, a nobis aliqualiter what is possessed by friends is
habetur. possessed by us, in a way.
Oportet autem inter homines ad [4] Moreover, there should be mutual
invicem esse amicitiam secundum friendship among men, in accord with
quod sibi invicem subserviunt, vel which they assist each other either in
in spiritualibus vel terrenis officiis. spiritual or in earthly functions. Of
Est autem maius subvenire alteri in course, it is a greater thing to help
spiritualibus quam in temporalibus: another in spiritual matters than in
quanto spiritualia sunt temporalibus temporal affairs, as much greater as
potiora, et magis necessaria ad spiritual things are more important than
finem beatitudinis consequendum. temporal ones, and more necessary for
Unde qui subtrahit sibi facultatem the attainment of the end which is
subveniendi aliis in temporalibus beatitude. Hence, he who gives up,
per voluntariam paupertatem ut through voluntary poverty, the possibility
acquirat spiritualia, per quae utilius of succoring others in temporal things,
potest aliis subvenire, non facit so that he may acquire spiritual goods
contra bonum societatis humanae: whereby he may more beneficially help
ut tertia ratio concludebat. others, he does not work against the
good of human society, as the third
argument concludes.
Patet autem ex praedictis quod [5] It is clear from things said earlier that

divitiae quoddam bonum hominis riches are a definite good for man, when
sunt secundum quod ordinantur ad they are ordered to the good of reason,

bonum rationis, non autem though not in themselves. Hence,
secundum se. Unde nihil prohibet nothing prevents poverty from being a
paupertatem melius esse, si per greater good, provided one is ordered to
hoc ad perfectius bonum aliquis a more perfect good by it. And thus, the
ordinetur. Et sic solvitur ratio fourth argument is answered.
quarta.
Et quia neque divitiae, neque [6] And since neither riches, nor poverty,

paupertas, neque aliquid nor any external thing is in itself man's
exteriorum est secundum se good, but they are only so as they are
hominis bonum, sed solum ordered to the good of reason, nothing
secundum quod ordinantur ad prevents a vice from arising out of any of
bonum rationis; nihil prohibet ex them, when they do not come within
quolibet eorum aliquod vitium oriri, man's use in accord with the rule of
quando non veniunt in usum reason. Yet they are not to be judged evil
hominis secundum regulam in themselves; rather, the use of them
rationis. Nec tamen propter hoc may be evil. And so, neither is poverty to
sunt simpliciter mala iudicanda, be cast aside because of certain vices
sed malus usus eorum. Et sic which may be at times occasioned by it,
neque paupertas est abiicienda as the fifth argument tried to show.
propter aliqua vitia quae
occasionaliter ex ea quandoque
procedunt: ut quinta ratio
ostendere nitebatur.
Hinc etiam considerandum est [7] Hence, we must consider that the
quod medium virtutis non accipitur mean of virtue is not taken according to
secundum quantitatem exteriorum the amount of exterior goods that come
quae in usum veniunt, sed into use, but according to the rule of
secundum regulam rationis. Unde reason. So, it sometimes happens that
quandoque contingit quod illud what is excessive in relation to the
quod est extremum secundum quantity of an external thing may be
quantitatem rei exterioris, moderate in relation to the rule of
secundum regulam rationis est reason. For no one inclines to greater
medium. Neque enim est aliquis things than does the magnanimous man;
qui ad maiora tendat quam nor is there anyone who surpasses in
magnanimus, vel qui in sumptibus greatness of expenditures the
magnificum magnitudine superet. magnificent man. So, they adhere to a
Medium ergo tenent non quantitate mean that does not consist in the
sumptus, aut alicuius huiusmodi, amount of expense, or anything like that,
sed inquantum non transcendunt but in so far as they neither exceed the
regulam rationis, nec ab ea rule of reason, nor fall short of it. Indeed,
deficiunt. Quae quidem regula non this rule measures not only the size of a
solum metitur quantitatem rei quae thing that is used, but also the
in usum venit, sed conditionem circumstances of the person, and his
personae, et intentionem eius, intention, the fitness of place and time,
opportunitatem loci et temporis, et and other such things that are necessary
alia huiusmodi quae in actibus in acts of virtue. So, no one runs counter
virtutum requiruntur. Non igitur to virtue through voluntary poverty, even

aliquis per voluntariam if he abandons everything. Nor does he
paupertatem contrariatur virtuti, do this wastefully, since he does it with a
quamvis omnia deserat. Nec hoc proper end, and with due attention to
prodigaliter facit: cum hoc faciat other circumstances. For it is a greater
debito fine, et aliis debitis thing to risk one's life, which, of course,
conditionibus servatis. Plus enim a person may do under the virtue of
est seipsum morti exponere, quod fortitude if he observes the proper
tamen aliquis per virtutem circumstances, than to abandon all his
fortitudinis operatur debitas goods for a due end. And so, the sixth
circumstantias servans, quam argument is answered.
omnia sua relinquere debito fine. Et
sic solvitur ratio sexta.
Quod autem ex verbis Salomonis [8] What is suggested on the basis of the

inducitur, non est contrarium. words of Solomon is not to the contrary.
Manifestum enim est quod loquitur For it is evident that he speaks of forced
de coacta paupertate, quae furandi poverty, which is often the occasion for
solet esse occasio. thievery.
Solutio eorum quae obiiciebantur ANSWER TO THE OBJECTIONS
contra diversos modos vivendi AGAINST THE DIFFERENT WAYS OF
eorum qui assumunt voluntariam LIFE OF THOSE WHO EMBRACE
paupertatem VOLUNTARY POVERTY
Post haec autem considerandum est [1] After these answers, we must make
de modis quibus oportet vivere eos a consideration of the ways in which
qui paupertatem voluntariam devotees of voluntary poverty must
sectantur. live.
Et quidem primus modus, ut scilicet [2] Now, the first way, that is, for all to
de pretio possessionum venditarum live in common on the proceeds of
omnes communiter vivant, sufficiens possessions that are sold, is one which
est, non tamen ad longum tempus. will work, but not for a long time. So,
Et ideo apostoli hunc modum vivendi the Apostles instituted this way of living
fidelibus in Ierusalem instituerunt, for the faithful in Jerusalem, because
quia praevidebant per spiritum they foresaw through the Holy Spirit
sanctum quod non diu in Ierusalem that they would not remain together for
simul commorari deberent, tum long in Jerusalem, both because of the
propter persecutiones futuras a persecutions to come from the Jews,
Iudaeis, tum etiam propter instantem and because of the imminent
destructionem civitatis et gentis: destruction of the city and its people.
unde non fuit necessarium nisi ad As a result, it was not necessary to
modicum tempus fidelibus providere. provide for the faithful, except for a
Et propter hoc, transeuntes ad short time. Consequently, when they
gentes, in quibus firmanda et went out to other peoples, among
perduratura erat Ecclesia, hunc whom the Church was to be
modum vivendi non leguntur established and to continue to endure,
instituisse. there is no account of their establishing
this mode of living.
Non est autem contra hunc modum [3] But the fraud which can be
vivendi fraus quae potest per committed by the distributors is no
dispensatores committi. Hoc enim argument against this way of life. For,
est commune in omni modo vivendi this is common to all modes of living in
in quibus aliqui ad invicem which people dwell together—less so,
convivunt: in hoc autem tanto minus, in this way, since it seems more difficult
quanto difficilius contingere videtur for followers of perfection in life to
quod perfectionem vitae sectantes commit fraud. Also, a remedy is
fraudem committant. Adhibetur provided against this, in the prudent
etiam contra hoc remedium per selection of trustworthy distributors.
providam fidelium dispensatorum Thus, under the Apostles, Stephen and
institutionem. Unde sub apostolis others were chosen who were deemed
electi sunt Stephanus et alii, qui ad worthy of this office (Acts 6:3ff).
hoc officium idonei reputabantur.
Est autem et secundus modus [4] Then, the second way is also
vivendi conveniens paupertatem suitable for those who embrace
voluntariam assumentibus: ut scilicet voluntary poverty: that is, for them to
de possessionibus communibus live on common possessions.
vivant.
Nec per hunc modum aliquid deperit [5] Nor is any of the perfection to which
perfectioni ad quam tendunt devotees of voluntary poverty tend lost
paupertatem voluntariam by this way. For it is possible for it to be
assumentes. Potest enim fieri per arranged that possessions be obtained
unius eorum vel paucorum in a proper manner through the effort of
sollicitudinem ut possessiones modo one of them, or of a small number of
debito procurentur, et sic alii, absque men, and so the others who remain
temporalium sollicitudine without solicitude for temporal things
remanentes, libere possunt may freely give their time to spiritual
spiritualibus vacare, quod est fructus matters, which is the fruit of voluntary
voluntariae paupertatis. Nec etiam poverty. Nor, in fact, do those who take
illis deperit aliquid de perfectione over this solicitude for the others lose
vitae qui hanc sollicitudinem pro aliis anything of their perfection of life,
assumunt: quod enim amittere because what they appear to lose by a
videntur in defectu quietis, lack of free time they gain in the
recuperant in obsequio caritatis, in service of charity, in which perfection of
quo etiam perfectio vitae consistit. life also consists.
Nec etiam per hunc modum vivendi [6] Nor, indeed, in this way of life, is
concordia tollitur occasione concord taken away as a result of
communium possessionum. Tales common possessions. People should
enim debent paupertatem embrace voluntary poverty who are of
voluntariam assumere qui the type that hold temporal things in
temporalia contemnant; et tales pro contempt, and such people cannot
temporalibus communibus disagree about temporal goods that are
discordare non possunt; praesertim common, especially since they ought to
cum ex temporalibus nihil praeter look for nothing from these temporal
necessaria vitae debeant expectare; things except the necessities of life,
et cum dispensatores oporteat esse and, besides, the distributors ought to
fideles. Nec propter hoc quod aliqui be trustworthy. Nor can this way of life
hoc modo vivendi abutuntur, hic be disapproved because certain people
modus vivendi potest improbari: cum abuse it, for bad men use even good
etiam bonis male utantur mali, sicut things badly, just as good men use bad
et malis bene utuntur boni. things in a good way.
Tertius etiam modus vivendi [7] Moreover, the third way of living is
paupertatem voluntariam appropriate to those who embrace
assumentibus convenit: ut scilicet de voluntary poverty; namely, they may
labore manuum vivant. live by the labor of their hands.
Non enim vanum est temporalia [8] Indeed, it is not foolish to give away

dimittere ut iterum acquirantur per temporal things so that they may again
laborem manuum: sicut prima ratio be acquired by manual labor, as the
in contrarium proponebat. Quia first argument to the contrary
divitiarum possessio et suggested, because the possession of
sollicitudinem requirebant in riches required solicitude in getting
procurando, vel saltem custodiendo, them, or even in keeping them, and
et affectum hominis ad se trahebant: they attracted the love of man to them;
quod non accidit dum aliquis per and this does not happen when a
laborem manuum quotidianum person applies himself to the gaining of
victum acquirere studet. his daily bread by manual labor.
Patet autem quod ad acquirendum [9] Besides, it is clear that but a little
per laborem manuum victum time is enough for the acquisition of
quantum sufficit ad naturae food sufficient for the support of nature
sustentationem, modicum tempus by means of manual labor, and not
sufficit, et modica sollicitudo much solicitude is needed. However, to
necessaria est. Sed ad divitias amass riches or to acquire a large
congregandas, vel superfluum amount of supplies, as worldly
victum conquirendum per laborem workmen propose, requires the
manuum, sicut saeculares artifices spending of much time and the
intendunt, oportet multum tempus application of great care. In this, the
impendere et magnam sollicitudinem answer to the second argument is
adhibere. In quo patet solutio evident.
secundae rationis.
Considerandum autem quod [10] However, we should bear in mind
dominus in Evangelio non laborem that the Lord in the Gospel did not
prohibuit, sed sollicitudinem mentis prohibit labor, but only mental solicitude
pro necessariis vitae. Non enim dixit, for the necessities of life. For He did
nolite laborare: sed, nolite solliciti not say: “Do not work,” but, rather: “Be
esse. Quod a minori probat. Si enim not solicitous.” This He proves from a

ex divina providentia sustentantur weaker case. For, if birds and lilies are
aves et lilia, quae inferioris sustained by divine providence, things
conditionis sunt, et non possunt which are of lower estate and unable to
laborare illis operibus quibus labor at those tasks whereby men gain
homines sibi victum acquirunt; multo their living, it is much more likely that
magis providebit hominibus, qui sunt He will provide for men who are of
dignioris conditionis, et quibus dedit more worthy estate and to whom He
facultatem per proprios labores has given the capacity to seek their
victum quaerendi; ut sic non livelihood through their own labors.
oporteat anxia sollicitudine de Thus, it is not necessary to be afflicted
necessariis huius vitae affligi. Unde by anxious concern for the needs of
patet quod per verba domini quae this life. Hence, it is evident that there
inducebantur, huic modo vivendi non is nothing derogatory to this way of life
derogatur. in the words of the Lord which were
cited.
Nec etiam iste modus vivendi potest [11] Nor, in fact, can this way of living
reprobari propter hoc quod non be rejected because it is inadequate.
sufficiat. Quia hoc ut in paucioribus The fact that in a few cases a man may
accidit, quod aliquis non possit be unable to gain what suffices for the
tantum labore manuum acquirere needs of life by manual labor alone is
quod sufficiat ad necessarium due either to sickness or some like
victum, vel propter infirmitatem, vel disability. However, an arrangement is
propter aliquid huiusmodi. Non est not to be rejected because of a defect
autem, propter defectum qui in which occurs rarely, for such things
paucioribus accidit, aliqua ordinatio happen in nature and in the order of
repudianda: hoc enim et in voluntary acts. Nor is there any way of
naturalibus et in voluntariis living whereby things may be so
ordinationibus accidit. Nec est arranged that failure cannot occur at
aliquis modus vivendi per quem ita times, for even riches can be taken
provideatur homini quin quandoque away by theft or robbery; so, also, the
possit deficere: nam et divitiae furto man who lives from the work of his
aut rapina possunt auferri, sicut et hands can grow feeble. Yet there is a
qui de labore manuum vivit potest remedy in connection with the way of
debilitari. Remanet tamen aliquod life that we are talking about; namely,
remedium circa dictum modum that help be given him whose labor is
vivendi: ut scilicet ei cuius labor ad not enough to provide his living, either
proprium victum non sufficit, by other men in the same society who
subveniatur vel per alios eiusdem can do more work than is necessary for
societatis, qui plus possunt laborare them or else by those who have riches.
quam eis necessarium sit; vel etiam This is in accord with the law of charity
per eos qui divitias possident, and natural friendship whereby one
secundum legem caritatis et man comes to the assistance of
amicitiae naturalis, qua unus homo another who is in need. Hence, while
alteri subvenit indigenti. Unde et, the Apostle said, in 2 Thessalonians
cum apostolus dixisset, II Thess. 3 (3:10): “if any man will not work, neither
10, qui non vult operari, non let him eat”—for the sake of those who
manducet; propter illos qui sibi non are not able to gain a living by their
sufficiunt ad victum quaerendum own labor—he adds a warning to
proprio labore, subdit admonitionem others, saying: “But you, brethren, be

ad alios, dicens: vos autem nolite not weary in well doing” (2 Thes. 3:13).
deficere benefacientes.
Cum etiam ad necessarium victum [12] Moreover, since a few things
pauca sufficiant, non oportet eos qui suffice for the needs of life, those who
modicis sunt contenti, magnum are satisfied with little need not spend a
tempus occupare in necessariis great deal of time in gaining what is
quaerendis labore manuum. Et ita necessary by manual labor. So, they
non impediuntur multum ab aliis are not much hindered from the
operibus spiritualibus, propter quae spiritual works on account of which
paupertatem voluntariam they embraced voluntary poverty,
assumpserunt: et praecipue cum, especially since, while working with
manibus operando, possint de Deo their hands, they may think about God
cogitare et eum laudare, et alia and praise Him and do other practices
huiusmodi facere quae singulariter like this which people living alone
sibi viventes observare oportet. Sed should do. However, so that they may
et, ne omnino in spiritualibus not altogether be precluded from
operibus impediantur, possunt etiam spiritual works, they can also be helped
aliorum fidelium beneficiis adiuvari. by the benefactions of the rest of the
faithful.
Licet autem voluntaria paupertas [13] Now, although voluntary poverty is

non assumatur propter otium not adopted for the purpose of getting
tollendum aut carnem macerandam rid of idleness or controlling the flesh
opere manuali, quia hoc etiam by manual work, since this even
divitias possidentes facere possent; possessors of riches could do, there is
non est tamen dubium quin labor no doubt that manual labor is useful for
manualis ad praedicta valeat, etiam that purpose, even without the need of
submota victus necessitate. Tamen gaining a living. However, idleness can
otium per alias occupationes be avoided by other more useful
utiliores potest auferri, et carnis occupations, and concupiscence of the
concupiscentia validioribus remediis flesh conquered by stronger remedies.
edomari. Unde propter huiusmodi Hence, the need to work does not
causas non imminet necessitas apply, for these reasons, to people who
laborandi his qui alias habent, vel have, or can have, other means on
habere possunt, unde licite vivant. which they may properly live. For, only
Sola enim necessitas victus cogit the necessity of livelihood forces one to
manibus operari: unde et apostolus work with his hands, and thus the
dicit, II Thess. 310: qui non vult Apostle says, in II Thessalonians
operari, non manducet. (3:10): “if any man will not work, neither
let him eat.”
Quartus etiam modus vivendi, de his [34] The fourth way of living, from those
quae ab aliis inferuntur, est things that are offered by others, is also
conveniens illis qui paupertatem suitable for those who embrace
voluntariam assumunt. voluntary poverty.
Non enim hoc est inconveniens, ut [15] For, it is not inappropriate that he
qui sua dimisit propter aliquid quod who has given away his own goods for
in utilitatem aliorum vergit, de his the sake of an objective which
quae ab aliis dantur sustentetur. Nisi contributes to the benefit of others
enim hoc esset, societas humana should be supported by the gifts of
permanere non posset: si enim these others. Indeed, unless this were
aliquis circa sua propria tantum so, human society could not endure,
sollicitudinem gereret, non esset qui because, if every man took care of his
communi utilitati deserviret. own possessions only, there would be
Opportunum est igitur humanae no one to serve the common welfare.
societati quod illi qui, praetermissa So, it is quite fitting to human society
propriorum cura, utilitati communi that those who have set aside concern
deserviunt, ab his quorum utilitati for their own goods, and who serve the
deserviunt, sustententur: propter hoc common welfare, should be supported
enim et milites de stipendiis aliorum by those whose welfare they serve.
vivunt, et rectoribus reipublicae de Indeed, it is for this same reason that
communi providetur. Qui autem soldiers live on stipends paid by others
voluntariam paupertatem assumunt and that the rulers of a republic are
ut Christum sequantur, ad hoc utique provided for from the common funds.
omnia dimittunt ut communi utilitati As a matter of fact, those who adopt
deserviant, sapientia et eruditione et voluntary poverty in order to follow
exemplis populum illustrantes, vel Christ renounce all things so that they
oratione et intercessione may serve the common welfare,
sustentantes. enlightening the people by their
wisdom, learning, and examples, or
strengthening them by prayer and
intercession.
Ex quo etiam patet quod non turpiter [16] As a result, it is clear that there is
vivunt de his quae ab aliis dantur, ex nothing disgraceful in their living on the
quo ipsi maiora rependunt, ad gifts of others, because they make a
sustentationem temporalia greater return: on their part, receiving
accipientes, et in spiritualibus aliis temporal support; but in regard to
proficientes. Unde et apostolus dicit, others, contributing to progress in
II Cor. 814: vestra abundantia, spiritual matters. Hence, the Apostle
scilicet in temporalibus, illorum says, in 2 Corinthians (8:14): “Let your
inopiam suppleat, in eisdem: ut et abundance,” that is, in temporal things,
illorum abundantia, scilicet in “supply their want,” of the same things,
spiritualibus, vestrae inopiae sit “that their abundance,” that is, in
supplementum. Qui enim alterum spiritual goods, “also may supply your
iuvat, particeps fit operis eius et in want.” For he who helps another
bono et in malo. shares in his work, both in its good and
in its evil.
Dum autem exemplis suis alios [17] Now, by their examples they incite

provocant ad virtutem, fit ut hi qui others to virtue, for it develops that
eorum exemplis proficiunt, minus ad those who profit by their examples
divitias afficiantur, dum vident alios become less attached to riches when
propter perfectionem vitae divitias they observe other people completely
omnino deserere. Quanto autem abandoning their wealth for the sake of

aliquis minus divitias amat, et est perfection in life. But the less a man
virtuti magis intentus, tanto facilius loves riches, and the more intent on
divitias in aliorum etiam necessitates virtue he is, the more readily, also,
distribuit. Unde qui, paupertatem does he distribute his wealth for the
voluntariam assumentes, de his needs of others. As a result, those who
quae ab aliis dantur vivunt, magis embrace voluntary poverty and live on
fiunt aliis pauperibus utiles, alios ad the gifts of others, rather than causing
misericordiae opera verbis et loss to the poor by taking the
exemplis provocando, quam fiant benefactions which would support the
damnosi, ad sustentationem vitae lives of others, become more beneficial
aliorum beneficia accipientes. to other poor people, because they by
words and examples stimulate other
men to works of mercy.
Patet etiam quod homines in virtute [18] Moreover, it is clear that men of
perfecti, quales esse oportet qui perfect virtue, such as they must be
voluntariam paupertatem sectantur, who adopt voluntary poverty, since they
divitias contemnentes, libertatem hold riches in contempt, do not lose
animi non perdunt propter aliqua their freedom of mind because of the
modica quae ad sustentationem petty amount that they accept from
vitae ab aliis accipiunt: cum homo others for the maintenance of life. As a
libertatem animi non perdat nisi matter of fact, a man does not lose his
propter ea quae in affectu suo independence of mind unless it be
dominantur. Unde propter ea quae because of things which are dominant
homo contemnit, si sibi dentur, in his affections. Hence, a man does
libertatem non perdit. not lose his independence because of
things he despises, even if they are
given to him.
Licet autem sustentatio eorum qui [19] Now, although the maintenance of

vivunt de his quae ab aliis dantur, ex those who live on the gifts of others
voluntate dantium dependeat, non depends on the will of the givers, this is
tamen propter hoc insufficiens est ad not, for that reason, an inadequate way
sustentandam vitam pauperum of supporting the life of Christ’s poor.
Christi. Non enim dependet ex For it does not depend on the will of
voluntate unius, sed ex voluntate one man but on the will of many.
multorum. Non est autem probabile Hence, it is not probable that, among
quod in multitudine fidelis populi non the vast number of the faithful, there
sint multi qui prompto animo would not be many people who would
subveniant necessitatibus eorum readily supply the needs of those
quos in reverentia habent propter whom they hold in reverence because
perfectionem virtutis. of the perfection of their virtue.
Non est autem inconveniens si etiam [20] Nor is it unfitting for them to

necessitates suas exponant et declare their needs and ask for what is
necessaria petant, vel pro aliis vel necessary, whether for others or for
pro se. Hoc enim apostoli fecisse themselves. Indeed, we read that even
leguntur: non solum ab illis quibus the Apostles did this: not only did they
praedicabant necessaria receive what was necessary from those

accipientes, quod magis potestatis to whom they preached, which was
erat quam mendicitatis, propter rather a matter of rightful authority than
ordinationem domini ut qui of mendicancy, because of the rule of
Evangelio deserviunt, de Evangelio the Lord that they who serve, “the
vivant; sed etiam pro pauperibus qui gospel should live by the gospel” (1
erant in Ierusalem, qui sua Cor. 9:1314), but they also did it for
dimittentes, in paupertate vivebant, the poor who were in Jerusalem (Acts
nec tamen gentibus praedicabant; 9:27ff .; 2 Cor. 8 and 9) and who,
sed eorum spiritualis conversatio having given up their possessions,
poterat illis valere a quibus were living in poverty, yet were not
sustentabantur. Unde apostolus preaching to the Gentiles; rather, their
talibus, non ex necessitate sed ex spiritual manner of living entitled them
voluntate dantium, persuadet in to such support. Hence, the Apostle
eleemosynis subveniendum: quod urges, not as a matter of obligation but
nihil est aliud quam mendicare. of good will on the part of the givers (2
Haec autem mendicitas non reddit Cor. 9:7), the aiding of such people by
homines contemptibiles si moderate means of alms; and this is nothing but
fiat, ad necessitatem, non ad begging. Now, this begging does not
superfluitatem, et sine importunitate: make men objects of contempt,
considerata conditione personarum provided it is done with moderation, for
a quibus petitur, et loci et temporis; need and not to excess, and without
quod necesse est observari ab his undue insistence, with consideration for
qui perfectionem vitae sectantur. the circumstances of the persons from
whom the request is made, and for the
place and time—all of which must be
observed by those devoted to
perfection in life.
Ex quo etiam patet quod talis [21] As a result, it is clear that such
mendicitas non habet aliquam begging has no appearance of the
speciem turpis. Quam haberet si disgraceful. It would have, if it were
cum importunitate et indiscrete done with insistence and lack of
fieret, ad voluptatem vel discretion for the sake of pleasure or
superfluitatem. superfluity.
Manifestum est autem quod [22] Of course, it is evident that
mendicitas cum quadam abiectione mendicancy is associated with a
est. Sicut enim pati ignobilius est certain humiliation. For, as to suffer an
quam agere, ita accipere quam dare, action is less noble than to do it, so to
et regi et obedire quam gubernare et receive is less noble than to give, and
imperare: quamvis, propter aliquid to be ruled and obedient is less noble
adiunctum, possit recompensatio than to govern and command, although
fieri. by virtue of some added circumstance
this evaluation may be reversed.
Ea vero quae abiectionis sunt [23] However, it is the mark of humility

sponte assumere, ad humilitatem to accept humiliations without
pertinet: non quidem simpliciter, sed hesitation; not in all cases, of course,
secundum quod necessarium est. but when it is necessary. For, since
Cum enim humilitas sit virtus, nihil humility is a virtue, it does not work
indiscrete operatur. Non est igitur without discretion. So, it is not proper to
humilitatis, sed stultitiae, si quis humility, but to stupidity, for a man to
quodcumque abiectum assumpserit: accept every kind of humiliation, but
sed si id quod necessarium est fieri what must be done for the sake of
propter virtutem, aliquis propter virtue a person does not reject because
abiectionem non recusat; puta si of humiliation. For example, if charity
caritas, exigit quod proximis aliquod demands that some humiliating duty be
abiectum officium impendatur, hoc performed for a neighbor, one will not
per humilitatem aliquis non recuset. refuse it through humility. Therefore, if it
Si igitur necessarium est ad is necessary for the adoption of the
perfectionem pauperis vitae perfection of the life of poverty that a
sectandam quod aliquis mendicet, man beg, then to suffer this humiliation
hanc abiectionem ferre humilitatis is proper to humility. Sometimes, too, it
est. Quandoque etiam abiecta is virtuous to accept humiliations even
assumere virtutis est, etsi nostrum though our job does not require it, in
officium non requirat, ut alios nostro order by our example to encourage
exemplo provocemus quibus others who have such a burden, so that
incumbit, ut id facilius ferant: nam et they may bear it readily. For, a general
dux interdum militis officio fungitur ut may at times serve like an ordinary
alios provocet. Quandoque etiam soldier, in order to spur on others.
abiectis utimur secundum virtutem ut Sometimes, moreover, we use
medicina quadam. Puta, si alicuius humiliations virtuously for their
animus ad immoderatam medicinal value. For instance, if a
extollentiam sit pronus, utiliter, man’s mind is prone to undue pride, he
debita moderatione servata, abiectis may make beneficial use, in due
utitur, vel sponte vel ab aliis moderation, of humiliations, either self
impositis, ad elationem animi imposed or caused by others, in order
comprimendam: dum per haec quae to restrain this tendency to pride,
gerit, sibi ipsi quodammodo parificat provided that through bearing these
etiam infimos homines, qui circa vilia things he puts himself on a level, as it
officia occupantur. were, with even the lowliest men who
perform lowgrade tasks.
Est autem omnino irrationabilis error [24] Now, the error of those who regard
illorum qui putant omnem sibi all solicitude for the gaining of a living
sollicitudinem a domino interdictam for oneself as forbidden by God is
de victu quaerendo. Omnis enim altogether unreasonable. Indeed, every
actus sollicitudinem requirit. Si igitur act requires solicitude. So, if a man
homo nullam sollicitudinem de rebus ought to have no concern for corporeal
corporalibus habere debet, sequitur things, then it follows that he ought not
quod nihil corporale agere debeat: to be engaged in corporeal action, but
quod neque possibile, neque this is neither possible nor reasonable.
rationabile est observari. Deus enim In fact, God has ordained activity for
unicuique rei ordinavit actionem each thing in accord with the proper
secundum proprietatem suae perfection of its nature. Now, man was
naturae. Homo autem ex spirituali et made with a spiritual and bodily nature.
corporali natura conditus est. So, he must by divine disposition both
Necessarium est igitur, secundum perform bodily actions and keep his
divinam ordinationem, ut et mind on spiritual things. However, this

corporales actiones exerceat et way of human perfection is not such
spiritualibus intendat: et tanto that one may perform no bodily actions,
perfectior est quanto plus because, since bodily actions are
spiritualibus intendit. Non est tamen directed to things needed for the
hic modus perfectionis humanae preservation of life, if a man fail to
quod nihil corporale agatur quia, perform them he neglects his life which
cum corporales actiones ordinentur every man is obliged to preserve. Now,
ad ea quae sunt necessaria ad to look to God for help in those matters
conservationem vitae, si quis eas in which a man can help himself by his
praetermittit, vitam suam negligit, own action, and to omit one’s own
quam quilibet conservare tenetur. action, is the attitude of a fool and a
Expectare autem a Deo subsidium in tempter of God. Indeed, this is an
his in quibus aliquis se potest per aspect of divine goodness, to provide
propriam actionem iuvare, things not by doing them directly, but by
praetermissa propria actione, est moving others to perform their own
insipientis et Deum tentantis. Hoc actions, as we showed above. So. one
enim ad divinam bonitatem pertinet, should not look to God in the hope that,
ut rebus provideat, non immediate without performing any action by which
omnia faciendo, sed alia movendo one might help oneself, God will come
ad proprias actiones, ut supra to one’s aid, for this is opposed to the
ostensum est. Non ergo est divine order and to divine goodness.
expectandum a Deo ut, omni actione
qua sibi aliquis subvenire potest
praetermissa, Deus ei subveniat:
hoc enim divinae ordinationi
repugnat, et bonitati ipsius.
Sed quia, licet in nobis sit agere, non [25] But since, in spite of our having the
tamen in nobis est ut actiones power to act, we do not have the power
nostrae debitum finem sortiantur, to guarantee the success of our actions
propter impedimenta quae possunt in attaining their proper end, because
contingere; hoc dispositioni divinae of impediments which may occur, this
subiacet, quid cuique ex actione sua success that may come to each man
proveniat. Praecipit ergo dominus from his action lies within the
nos non debere esse sollicitos de eo disposition of divine providence.
quod ad Deum pertinet, scilicet de Therefore, the Lord commands us not
eventibus nostrarum actionum: non to be solicitous concerning what
autem prohibuit nos esse sollicitos pertains to God, namely, the outcome
de eo quod ad nos pertinet, scilicet of our actions. But He has not
de nostro opere. Non igitur contra forbidden us to be concerned about
praeceptum domini agit qui de iis what pertains to us, namely, our own
quae ab ipso agenda sunt work. So, he who is solicitous about
sollicitudinem habet: sed ille qui things that he can do does not act
sollicitus est de his quae possunt against the Lord’s precept. Rather, he
emergere etiam si ipse proprias does who is solicitous concerning the
actiones exequatur, ita quod debitas things which can result, even if he
actiones praetermittat ad obviandum carries out his own actions, so that he
huiusmodi eventibus, contra quos omits the actions that are required to
debemus in Dei providentia sperare, avoid these eventualities, against
per quam etiam aves et herbae which we must rather place our hope in

sustentantur; talem enim God’s providence, by which even the
sollicitudinem habere, videtur birds and the flowers are supported. To
pertinere ad errorem gentilium, qui have solicitude of this kind seems to
divinam providentiam negant. pertain to the error of the Gentiles who
Propter quod dominus concludit deny divine providence. This is why the
quod non simus solliciti in crastinum. Lord concludes that we must not be
Per quod non prohibuit quin “solicitous for tomorrow.” He did not
conservemus ea quae sunt nobis in forbid us, by this injunction, from taking
crastinum necessaria suo tempore, care in time of the things necessary for
sed ne de futuris eventibus the future, but, rather, from being
sollicitaremur, cum quadam concerned about future events in
desperatione divini auxilii: vel ne despair of divine help. Or, perhaps, He
praeoccupet hodie sollicitudinem forbade preoccupation today with the
quae erit habenda in crastino, quia solicitude which one should have
quilibet dies suam sollicitudinem tomorrow, for each day has its own
habet; unde subditur, sufficit diei concerns; hence, He adds: “Sufficient
malitia sua. for the day is the evil thereof” (Mat.
6:34).
Sic igitur patet quod diversis modis [26] And thus, it is clear that those who

convenientibus vivere possunt qui adopt voluntary poverty can live in
voluntariam paupertatem sectantur. various appropriate ways. Among
Inter quos tanto aliquis laudabilior these ways, that is more praiseworthy
est, quanto magis a sollicitudine which makes man’s mind free, to a
temporalium, et occupatione circa greater degree, from solicitude about
ea, hominis animum reddit temporal matters and from activity in
immunem. connection with them.
Caput 136
Chapter 136
De errore eorum qui
ON THE ERROR OF THOSE WHO
perpetuam continentiam
ATTACK PERPETUAL CONTINENCE
impugnant
Sicut autem contra paupertatis [1] Now, just as in the case of the
perfectionem, ita et contra opposition to the perfection of poverty, so
continentiae bonum quidam also have some perverseminded men
perversi sensus homines sunt spoken against the good of continence.
locuti. Quorum quidam bonum Some of them try to destroy the good of
continentiae his et similibus continence by these and like arguments.
rationibus excludere nituntur.
Viri enim et mulieris coniunctio [2] In fact, the union of husband and wife is

ad bonum speciei ordinatur. directed to the good of the species. For the
Divinius autem est bonum good of the species is more godlike than
speciei quam bonum individui. the good of the individual. Therefore, he
Magis ergo peccat qui omnino who completely abstains from the act
abstinet ab actu quo conservatur whereby the species is preserved commits
species quam peccaret si a greater sin than he would if he abstained

abstineret ab actu quo from an act by which the individual is
conservatur individuum, sicut preserved, such as eating and drinking
sunt comestio et potus, et alia and the like.
huiusmodi.
Adhuc. Ex divina ordinatione [3] Again, by the divine order, organs are
dantur homini membra ad given man that are suited for procreation,
generationem apta; et etiam vis and so are the concupiscible power that
concupiscibilis incitans; et alia stimulates him and also other similar
huiusmodi ad hoc ordinata. endowments related to it. Hence, he who
Videtur igitur contra divinam completely abstains from the act of
ordinationem agere qui omnino generation seems to act against the divine
ab actu generationis abstinet. ordinance.
Item. Si bonum est quod unus [4] Besides, if it is a good thing for one
contineat, melius est quod multi, man to be continent, it is better for many,
optimum autem quod omnes. and best for all to do so. But the
Sed ex hoc sequitur quod genus conclusion of this would be the extinction
humanum deficiat. Non igitur of the human race. So, it is not good for
bonum est quod aliquis homo any man to be completely continent.
omnino contineat.
Amplius. Castitas, sicut et aliae [5] Moreover, chastity, like the other
virtutes, in medietate consistunt. virtues, lies in a mean. Therefore, just as a
Sicut igitur contra virtutem agit man acts against virtue and is intemperate
qui omnino concupiscentias if he devotes himself entirely to matters of
insequitur, et intemperatus est; concupiscence, so also does he act
ita contra virtutem agit qui against virtue and is he without feeling
omnino a concupiscentiis who totally abstains from matters of
abstinet, et insensibilis est. concupiscence.
Praeterea. Non est possibile quin [6] Furthermore, it is impossible for some

in homine concupiscentiae feelings of sexual concupiscence to fail to
venereorum aliquae oriantur: arise in a man, for they are natural. Now,
cum naturales sint. Resistere to resist these feelings of concupiscence
autem omnino concupiscentiis, et fully and, as it were, to wage a continuous
quasi continuam pugnam habere, fight against them produces more
maiorem inquietudinem animo disturbance than if a man indulges
tribuit quam si aliquis moderate moderately in concupiscent activities.
concupiscentiis uteretur. Cum Therefore, since mental disturbance is
igitur inquietudo animi maxime most incompatible with perfection of virtue,
perfectioni virtutis repugnet, it appears to be opposed to virtue for a
videtur perfectioni virtutis man to observe perpetual continence.
adversari quod aliquis perpetuam
continentiam servet.
Haec igitur contra perpetuam [7] Such, then, seem to be the objections
continentiam obiici videntur. against perpetual continence. It is also

Quibus etiam adiungi potest possible to add to them the command of
praeceptum domini, quod primis the Lord which, we read, was given to our
parentibus legitur esse datum, first parents in Genesis (1:28; 9:1):
Genesis 128 et 91: crescite et “Increase and multiply, and fill the earth.”
multiplicamini, et replete terram. This was not revoked, but seems rather to
Quod non est revocatum, sed have been confirmed by the Lord in the
magis videtur esse a domino in Gospel, where it is said: “What therefore
Evangelio confirmatum, Matth. God has joined together, let no man put
196, ubi dicitur: quod Deus asunder” (Mat. 19:6), when He speaks of
coniunxit, homo non separet, de the matrimonial union. But those who
coniunctione matrimonii loquens. observe perpetual continence clearly act
Contra hoc autem praeceptum against this precept. So, it seems to be
expresse faciunt qui perpetuam illicit to observe perpetual continence.
continentiam servant. Videtur
igitur esse illicitum perpetuam
continentiam servare.
Haec autem non difficile est [8] However, it is not difficult to answer
solvere secundum ea quae these objections in terms of the things that
praemissa sunt. were established above.
Considerandum enim est quod [9] For we should keep in mind that one
alia ratio est habenda in his quae type of rational explanation is to be used
ad necessitatem uniuscuiusque for things which belong to the needs of the
hominis pertinent: atque alia in individual man, while a different one
his quae pertinent ad multitudinis applies to the things that pertain to the
necessitatem. In his enim quae needs of the group. In regard to things
ad uniuscuiusque hominis pertinent to the needs of the individual
necessitatem pertinent, oportet man, it is necessary to make provision for
quod cuilibet provideatur. each person. Now, of this type are food
Huiusmodi autem sunt cibus et and drink, and other goods having to do
potus, et alia quae ad with the maintenance of the individual.
sustentationem individui Hence, each man must make use of food
pertinent. Unde necessarium est and drink. But, in the case of things that
quod quilibet cibo et potu utatur. are necessary for the group, it is not
In his autem quae necessaria necessary for the assignment to be given
sunt multitudini, non oportet quod to each person in the group; indeed, this is
cuilibet de multitudine attribuatur: not even possible. For it is clear that many
neque etiam est possibile. Patet things are needed by a group of men, such
enim multa esse necessaria as food, drink, clothing, housing and the
multitudini hominum, ut cibus, like, which cannot all be procured by one
potus, vestimentum, domus, et man. And so, different tasks must be given
alia huiusmodi, quae impossibile to different persons, just as different
est quod per unum procurentur. organs of the body are directed to different
Et ideo oportet diversorum esse functions. So, since procreation is not a
diversa officia: sicut et in corpore matter of the need of the individual but of
diversa membra ad diversos the need of the whole species, it is not
actus ordinantur. Quia ergo necessary for all men to devote
generatio non est de necessitate themselves to acts of generation; instead,
individui, sed de necessitate certain men, refraining from these acts,
totius speciei, non est undertake other functions, such as the
necessarium quod omnes military life or contemplation.
homines actibus generationis
vacent; sed quidam, ab his
actibus abstinentes, aliis officiis
mancipentur, puta militiae vel
contemplationi.
Ex quo patet solutio ad [10] From this the answer to the second
secundum. Ex divina enim argument is clear. Indeed, the things that
providentia dantur homini ea are necessary for the entire species are
quae sunt toti speciei necessaria: given man by divine providence, but it is
nec tamen oportet quod quilibet not necessary for each man to use every
homo quolibet illorum utatur. one of them. For man has been given skill
Data est enim homini industria in building and strength for fighting,
aedificandi, virtus ad however, this does not mean that all men
pugnandum: nec tamen oportet must be builders or soldiers. Likewise,
quod omnes sint aedificatores though the generative power and things
aut milites. Similiter, licet homini related to its act have been divinely
divinitus sint provisa virtus provided, it is not necessary for each man
generativa et ea quae ad actum to direct his intention to the generative act.
eius ordinantur, non tamen
oportet quod quilibet actui
generationis intendat.
Unde etiam patet solutio ad [11] As a result, the answer to the third
tertium. Ab his enim quae objection is also evident. Though it is
multitudini sunt necessaria, better for some individuals to abstain from
quamvis quantum ad singulos the things that are necessary for the
melius sit quod abstineat, group, it is not good for all to abstain. The
melioribus deditus; non tamen same situation is apparent in the order of
est bonum quod omnes the universe, for, although spiritual
abstineant. Sicut et in ordine substance is better than the corporeal, that
universi apparet: quamvis enim universe in which there are spiritual
substantia spiritualis sit melior substances only would not be better but
quam corporalis, non tamen more imperfect. And even though an eye
esset melius universum in quo is better than a foot in the body of an
essent solae substantiae animal, the animal would not be perfect
spirituales, sed imperfectius. Et unless it had both eye and foot. So, too,
quamvis sit melior oculus pede in the community of mankind would not be in
corpore animalis, non tamen a perfect state unless there were some
esset perfectum animal nisi people who direct their intention to
haberet et oculum et pedem. Ita generative acts and others who refrain
etiam nec multitudo humani from these acts and devote themselves to
generis haberet statum contemplation.
perfectum nisi essent aliqui
intendentes generationis actibus,
et aliqui ab his abstinentes et
contemplationi vacantes.
Quod autem quarto obiicitur, [12] Moreover, what is objected fourthly,
quod necesse est virtutem in that virtue must lie in the mean, is
medio esse: solvitur per id quod answered by what was said above in
supra iam de paupertate dictum regard to poverty. For the mean of virtue is
est. Medium enim virtutis non not always taken according to the quantity
accipitur semper secundum of the thing that is ordered by reason, but,
quantitatem rei quae ordinatur rather, according to the rule of reason
ratione, sed secundum regulam which takes in the proper end and
rationis, quae debitum finem measures the appropriate circumstances.
attingit, et circumstantias And so, to abstain from all sexual
convenientes metitur. Et sic, ab pleasures, without a reason, is called the
omnibus venereorum vice of insensibility. But, if it be done in
delectationibus abstinere praeter accord with reason, it is a virtue which
rationem, vitium insensibilitatis surpasses man’s ordinary way of life, for it
dicitur. Si autem secundum makes men share somewhat in the divine
rationem fiat, virtus est, quae likeness; hence, virginity is said to be
communem hominis modum related to the angels (Mat. 22:30).
excedit: facit enim homines esse
in quadam divinae similitudinis
participatione; unde virginitas
Angelis dicitur esse cognata.
Ad quintum dicendum quod [13] In regard to the fifth argument, it
sollicitudo et occupatio quam should be said that the solicitude and
habent hi qui coniugio utuntur, de occupation which encumber those who are
uxoribus, filiis, et necessariis married, concerning their wives, children
vitae acquirendis, est continua. and the procuring of the necessities of life,
Inquietatio autem quam homo are continuous. But the disturbance which
patitur ex pugna a man suffers in the fight against
concupiscentiarum, est ad concupiscent tendencies is for a limited
aliquam horam. Quae etiam time. For this decreases as a result of a
minoratur per hoc quod ei aliquis man refusing to consent to it; in fact, the
non consentit: nam quanto more a person indulges in pleasures, the
aliquis magis delectabilibus utitur, more does the desire for pleasure grow in
tanto magis crescit in eo him. Thus, concupiscent feelings are
delectabilis appetitus. weakened by acts of abstinence and other
Debilitantur etiam corporeal practices suitable to those who
concupiscentiae per abstinentias, have the vow of continence. Moreover, the
et alia exercitia corporalia quae enjoyment of corporeal delights distracts
conveniunt his qui continentiae the mind from its peak activity and hinders
propositum habent. Usus etiam it in the contemplation of spiritual things
corporalium delectabilium magis much more than the disturbance that
abducit mentem a sua altitudine results from resisting the concupiscent
et impedit a contemplatione desires for these pleasures, because the
spiritualium, quam inquietudo mind becomes very strongly attached to
quae provenit resistendo carnal things through the enjoyment of
concupiscentiis horum such pleasures, especially those of sex.
delectabilium: quia per usum For enjoyment makes the appetite become
delectabilium, et maxime fixed on the thing that is enjoyed. And so,

venereorum, mens maxime for those people who devote their attention
carnalibus inhaeret; cum to the contemplation of divine things and of
delectatio faciat quiescere every kind of truth, it is especially harmful
appetitum in re delectabili. Et to have been addicted to sexual pleasures
ideo his qui ad contemplationem and particularly beneficial to abstain from
divinorum, et cuiuscumque them. Now, this is not to suggest that,
veritatis, intendunt, maxime although it is generally better for the
nocivum est venereis deditos individual man to observe continence than
esse, et maxime utile ab eis to engage in matrimony, the latter may not
abstinere. Nihil autem prohibet, be better in a particular case. Hence, the
quamvis universaliter dicatur uni Lord, having mentioned continence, says:
homini melius esse continentiam “All men take not this word, but they to
servare quam matrimonio uti, whom it is given” (Mat. 19:11).
quin alicui illud melius sit. Unde
et dominus, facta de continentia
mentione, dicit: non omnes
capiunt verbum hoc, sed qui
potest capere capiat.
Ad id etiam quod de praecepto [14] To what is asserted in the last
primis parentibus dato ultimo objection, on the ground of the precept
positum est, patet responsio per given to our first parents, the reply is
ea quae dicta sunt. Praeceptum evident from what has been said. Indeed,
enim illud respicit inclinationem that precept is concerned with the natural
naturalem quae est in hominibus inclination in man to preserve the species
ad conservandum speciem per by the act of generation; however, this
actum generationis: quod tamen need not be carried out by all men, but by
non est necessarium per omnes some, as we said.
exequi, sed per aliquos, ut
dictum est.
Sicut autem non expedit cuilibet [15] Now, just as it is not expedient for
a matrimonio abstinere, ita etiam every man to abstain from matrimony, so
nec expedit omni tempore, also it is not a good thing to do so at all
quando necessaria est times, if the increase of the race requires
multiplicatio generis: vel propter matrimony: whether because of a lack of
hominum paucitatem, sicut in men, as in the beginning when the human
principio quo humanum genus race began to multiply; or because of the
coepit multiplicari; sive propter small number of the faithful, in which
paucitatem fidelis populi, quando situation they should multiply by carnal
oportebat ipsum per carnalem generation, as was the case in the Old
generationem multiplicari, ut fuit Testament. Thus, the counsel of practicing
in veteri testamento. Et ideo perpetual continence was reserved to the
consilium de continentia New Testament, when the faithful are
perpetua observanda reservatum multiplied by a spiritual generation.
est temporibus novi testamenti,
quando fidelis populus per
spiritualem generationem
multiplicatur.
Chapter 137
Caput 137 ANOTHER ERROR CONCERNING
PERPETUAL CONTINENCE
Fuerunt autem et alii qui, licet [1] Moreover, there have been some
continentiam perpetuam non others who, though not disapproving
improbarent, tamen ei statum perpetual continence, have, however, put
matrimonii adaequabant: quod est the state of matrimony on the same level
haeresis Ioviniani. Sed huius with it. This is the heresy of the Jovinians.
erroris falsitas satis ex praedictis But the falsity of this error is quite
apparet: cum per continentiam apparent from the foregoing, since by
homo reddatur habilior ad mentis continence man is made more skillful in
elevationem in spiritualia et divina; raising his mind to spiritual and divine
et quodammodo supra statum matters, and so he is placed, in a way,
hominis ponatur, in quadam above the level of a man and in a certain
similitudine Angelorum. likeness to the angels.
Nec obstat quod aliqui [2] Nor is it any objection that some men

perfectissimae virtutis viri of most perfect virtue have practiced
matrimonio usi sunt, ut Abraham, matrimony, such as Abraham, Isaac, and
Isaac et Iacob: quia quanto virtus Jacob, for, the stronger the power of the
mentis est fortior, tanto minus mind is, the less likely is it to be cast
potest per quaecumque a sua down from its heights by any things
altitudine deiici. Nec tamen, quia whatsoever. So, though they were
ipsi matrimonio usi sunt, minus married, they did not love the
contemplationem veritatis et contemplation of truth and divine things
divinorum amaverunt: sed, any less. Rather, as the state of their
secundum quod conditio temporis times demanded, they embraced
requirebat, matrimonio utebantur matrimony for the sake of increasing the
ad multiplicationem populi fidelis. numbers of the faithful.
Nec tamen perfectio alicuius [3] Nor, in fact, is the perfection of one
personae est sufficiens person a sufficient argument for the
argumentum ad perfectionem perfection of a state of life, since. one
status: cum aliquis perfectiori man can use a minor good with a more
mente possit uti minori bono quam perfect intention than another man could
alius maiori. Non igitur, quia use a greater good. Therefore, the fact
Abraham vel Moyses perfectior that Abraham or Moses was more perfect
fuit multis qui continentiam than many men who observe continence
servant, propter hoc status does not mean that the state of
matrimonii est perfectior quam matrimony is more perfect than the state
status continentiae, vel ei of continence, or even equal to it.
aequalis.
Contra eos qui vota impugnant AGAINST THOSE WHO ATTACK VOWS
Quibusdam autem visum est [1] It has seemed foolish to some people

stultum esse obligare se voto ad to bind oneself by a vow to obey anyone,
obediendum alicui, aut ad or to any kind of practice. In fact, the more
quodcumque servandum. freely any good action is done, the more
Unumquodque enim bonum, virtuous it seems to be. On the other
quanto liberius agitur, tanto hand, the more and the greater the
virtuosius esse videtur. Quanto necessity whereby a man is constrained
autem e maiori necessitate quis to a certain practice, the less freely does it
ad aliquid observandum seem to be performed. So, it appears
adstringitur, tanto minus libere id derogatory to the praiseworthy character
agi videtur. Videtur igitur derogari of virtuous acts for them to be done under
laudabilitati virtuosorum actuum the necessity of obedience or a vow.
per hoc quod ex necessitate
obedientiae vel voti fiunt.
Videntur autem huiusmodi [2] Now, these men seem to ignore the
homines necessitatis rationem meaning of necessity. In fact, there are
ignorare. Est enim duplex two kinds of necessity. One is that of
necessitas. Quaedam coactionis. coaction. This kind decreases the value of
Et haec laudem virtuosorum virtuous acts, because it is contrary to the
actuum diminuit, quia voluntario voluntary, for what is done under coaction
contrariatur: coactum enim est is what is against the will. But there is
quod est voluntati contrarium. Est another necessity that results from interior
autem quaedam necessitas ex inclination. This does not diminish the
interiori inclinatione proveniens. Et value of a virtuous act, but increases it,
haec laudem virtuosi actus non for it makes the will incline more intensely
minuit, sed auget: facit enim toward an act of virtue. Indeed, it is
voluntatem magis intense tendere evident that the more perfect a habit of
in actum virtutis. Patet enim quod virtue is, I the more forcefully does it
habitus virtutis, quanto fuerit make the will tend to the good of virtue,
perfectior, tanto vehementius and less likely to fall short of it. So that, if
voluntatem facit tendere in bonum it reaches the end of perfection, it confers
virtutis, et minus ab eo deficere. a certain necessity of acting well, as in the
Quod si ad finem perfectionis case of the blessed who are not able to
devenerit, quandam necessitatem sin, as will appear later. Yet, because of
infert ad bene agendum, sicut est this, neither is any freedom of will lost, nor
in beatis, qui peccare non goodness of the act.
possunt, ut infra patebit: nec
tamen propter hoc aut libertati
voluntatis aliquid deperit, aut
actus bonitati.
Est autem et alia necessitas ex [3] However, there is still another
fine: sicut cum dicitur alicui necessity resulting from the end, as when
necesse esse habere navem ut we say that someone must have a ship in
transeat mare. Patet autem quod order to cross the sea. Again it is evident

nec haec necessitas libertatem that this necessity does not decrease
voluntatis diminuit, nec actuum freedom of will or the goodness of the
bonitatem. Quin potius quod quis acts. Rather, the fact that a man does
agit quasi necessarium ad finem, something that is necessary for an end is
ex hoc ipso laudabile est: et tanto praiseworthy in itself; and the better the
laudabilius, quanto finis fuerit end, the more praiseworthy it is.
melior.
Patet autem quod necessitas [4] Now, it is clear that the necessity of
observandi quae quis vovit, aut practicing what one has vowed to do, or
obediendi ei cui se supposuit, non of obeying a person to whom one has
est necessitas coactionis; nec subjected himself, is not the necessity of
etiam ex interiori inclinatione coaction or even that resulting from
proveniens, sed ex ordine ad interior inclination, but it is from a relation
finem: est enim necessarium to the end. For it is necessary for a
voventi hoc vel illud agere, si person who takes a vow to do this or that
debet votum impleri, aut thing if he is to fulfill the vow or practice
obedientia servari. Cum igitur hi obedience. So, since these ends are
fines laudabiles sint, utpote praiseworthy, inasmuch as by them man
quibus homo Deo se subiicit, subjects himself to God, the aforesaid
necessitas praedicta nihil diminuit necessity in no way diminishes the value
de laude virtutis. of virtue.
Est autem ulterius considerandum [5] We should further consider that the

quod, dum implentur aliqua quae carrying out of things which a person has
quis vovit, vel quae sibi vowed, or the fulfilling of the orders of a
praecipiuntur ab eo cui se subdidit man to whom the person has subjected
propter Deum, maiori laude et himself for God’s sake, are actions worthy
remuneratione sunt digna. of greater praise and reward. It is
Contingit enim unum actum possible, of course, for one act to pertain
duorum vitiorum esse, dum actus to two vices, provided the act of one vice
unius vitii ad finem alterius vitii be directed to the end of another vice. For
ordinatur: ut, cum quis furatur ut instance, when a man steals so that he
fornicetur, actus quidem may fornicate, the act is specifically one
secundum speciem suam est of avarice, but by its intention it belongs to
avaritiae, secundum intentionem lust. In the same way, it also happens in
vero luxuriae. Eodem autem the case of virtues that the act of one
modo et in virtutibus contingit virtue is ordered to another virtue. Thus,
quod actus unius virtutis ad aliam when one gives away his possessions so
virtutem ordinatur: sicut, cum quis that he may enjoy the friendship of charity
sua dat ut cum altero amicitiam with another man, this act specifically
habeat caritatis, actus quidem ex belongs to liberality, but from its end it
sua specie est liberalitatis, ex fine pertains to charity. Now, acts of this kind
autem caritatis. Huiusmodi autem acquire greater value from the greater
actus maiorem laudem habet ex virtue, that is, from charity rather than
maiore virtute, scilicet ex caritate, from liberality. Hence, though it loses its
quam ex liberalitate. Unde, etsi character as an exclusive act of liberality
remittatur in eo quod liberalitatis by virtue of its ordination to charity, it will
est ex eo quod ad caritatem be more praiseworthy and worthy of
ordinatur, laudabilior, et maiori greater reward than if it were done
mercede dignus erit quam si liberally, with no relation to charity.
liberalius ageretur non in ordine
ad caritatem.
Ponamus ergo aliquem opus [6] So, let us suppose a man performing
aliquod virtutis agentem, puta some work of a definite virtue, say a man
ieiunantem, vel continentem se a who is fasting or restraining himself
venereis: et quidem si absque continently from sexual pleasure—now, if
voto haec faciat, erit actus vel he does this without a vow it will be an act
castitatis vel abstinentiae; si of chastity or of abstinence, but if he does
autem ex voto, referetur ulterius it as a result of a vow it is referred further
ad aliam virtutem, cuius est Deo to another virtue whose scope includes
aliquid vovere, scilicet ad the vowing of something to God; that is, to
religionem, quae potior est the virtue of religion which is better than
castitate vel abstinentia, utpote chastity or abstinence, inasmuch as it
faciens nos recte habere ad makes us rightly disposed in relation to
Deum. Erit ergo actus God. So, the act of abstinence or
abstinentiae vel continentiae continence will be more praiseworthy in
laudabilior in eo qui ex voto facit, the case of the man who performs it
etiam si non ita delectetur in under a vow, even though he does not
abstinentia vel continentia, ex eo take so much delight in abstinence or
quod delectatur in potiori virtute, continence due to the fact that he is
quae est religio. taking his delight in a higher virtue, that is,
religion.
Item. Id quod potissimum est in [7] Again, what is most important in virtue

virtute, est debitus finis: nam ex is a proper end, for the rational character
fine principaliter ratio boni manat. of a good act stems chiefly from the end.
Si ergo finis fuerit eminentior, So, if the end is more eminent, then, even
etiam si in actu aliquis se if one is somewhat less than perfect in the
remissius habeat, erit eius actus act, it will be for him a more virtuous act.
virtuosior: sicut, si aliquis For example, take the case of a man who
proponat propter bonum virtutis proposes to make a long journey for a
longam viam agere, alius autem virtuous purpose, while another man
brevem, laudabilior erit qui maius undertakes a short one; he who proposes
aliquid propter virtutem intendit, to do more for the sake of virtue will be
licet in progressu viae lentius more praiseworthy, even though he
procedat. Si autem aliquis facit makes slower progress on the trip. But
aliquid propter Deum, illum actum suppose a man does something for God’s
Deo offert: sed si ex voto hoc sake, offering this act to God: if he does
faciat, non solum actum, sed this under a vow he offers God not only
etiam potentiam offert Deo. Et sic the act, but also his power. Thus, it is
patet quod propositum suum est evident that his intention is to offer
ad aliquid maius Deo something greater to God. So, his act will
exhibendum. Erit ergo actus eius be more virtuous by reason of his
virtuosior ratione maioris boni intention for a greater good, even if, in the
intenti, etiam si in executione alius execution of it, another man might appear
videatur ferventior. more fervent.
Praeterea. Voluntas praecedens [8] Besides, the act of will which precedes

actum manet virtute in tota an act continues in its power through the
prosecutione actus, et ipsum whole performance of the act, and
laudabilem reddit, etiam quando renders it worthy of praise, even when the
de proposito voluntatis propter agent is not thinking during the execution
quod actum incipit, in executione of the work of the commitment of will from
operis non cogitabit: non enim which the act began. In fact, it is not
oportet ut qui propter Deum necessary for a man who undertakes a
aliquod iter arripit, in qualibet journey for God’s sake actually to think
parte itineris de Deo cogitet actu. about God during every part of the trip.
Patet autem quod ille qui vovet se Now, it is clear that the man who vows
aliquid facturum, intensius illud that he will do a certain thing wills it more
voluit quam qui simpliciter facere intensely than one who simply decides to
disponit: quia non solum facere do it, for the first man not only wills to do
voluit, sed voluit se firmare ut non it, but he wills to strengthen himself so
deficeret a faciendo. Ex hac igitur that he will not fail to act. So, by this act of
voluntatis intentione redditur voluntary intention there is produced a
executio voti cum intensione praiseworthy execution of the vow
quadam laudabilis, etiam quando accompanied by a certain fervor, even
voluntas vel non actu fertur in when the willact is not actually continued
opus, vel fertur remisse. during the operation, or is continued in a
slack way.
Sic ergo laudabilius fit quod e voto [9] And so, what is done as a result of a

fit, quam quod fit sine voto: ceteris vow becomes more praiseworthy than
tamen paribus. what is done without a vow, provided
other conditions are equal.
Quod neque merita neque THAT NEITHER MERITORIOUS ACTS
peccata sint paria NOR SINS ARE EQUAL
Ex his autem manifestum est quod [1] Next, it is plain that neither all good
neque omnia bona opera, neque works, nor all sins, are equal. Indeed,
omnia peccata sunt paria. counsel is given only in regard to the
Consilium enim non datur nisi de better good. Now, counsels are given in
meliori bono. Dantur autem consilia the divine law concerning poverty,
in lege divina de paupertate, continence, and other like things, as we
continentia, et aliis huiusmodi, ut said above. So, these are better than
supra dictum est. Haec igitur the practice of matrimony and the
meliora sunt quam matrimonio uti et possession of temporal things, but it is
temporalia possidere: secundum possible to act virtuously according to
quae tamen contingit virtuose these latter, provided the order of
agere, ordine rationis servato, ut reason be observed, as we showed
supra ostensum est. Non igitur above. Therefore, not all acts of the
omnes actus virtutum sunt pares. virtues are equal.
Adhuc. Actus speciem recipiunt ex [2] Again, acts get their species from
obiectis. Quanto igitur obiectum est their objects. So, the better the object is,
melius, tanto et actus erit virtuosior the more virtuous the act will be in its
secundum speciem suam. Finis species. Now, the end is better than the
autem melior est his quae sunt ad means to the end; and of the means, the
finem: quorum tanto aliquid melius closer one is to the end, the better it is.
est, quanto est fini propinquius. Hence, among human acts, that one is
Inter actus igitur humanos ille est best which is directed immediately to the
optimus qui in ultimum finem, ultimate end, namely, God. After that, an
scilicet Deum, immediate fertur. act is better in its species the closer its
Post quem, tanto actus melior est object is to God.
secundum suam speciem, quanto
obiectum est Deo propinquius.
Amplius. Bonum in actibus humanis [3] Besides, the good in human acts is

est secundum quod ratione dependent on their being regulated by
regulantur. Contingit autem aliquos reason. But it happens that some acts
aliis ad rationem magis accedere: come nearer to reason than others. The
quanto actus qui sunt ipsius more definitely these acts pertain to
rationis, magis habent de bono reason itself, the more they share in the
rationis quam actus inferiorum good of reason, in comparison with the
virium, quibus ratio imperat. Sunt acts of the lower powers which reason
igitur inter actus humanos aliqui commands. Therefore, there are some
aliis meliores. human acts that are better than others.
Item. Praecepta legis optime ex [4] Moreover, the precepts of the law are

dilectione implentur, ut supra best fulfilled as a result of love, as we
dictum est. Contingit autem aliquem said above . But it happens that one
alio ex maiori dilectione quod man does what is prescribed for him to
faciendum est facere. Erit igitur do with greater love than another man.
virtuosorum actuum unus alio So, one virtuous act will be better than
melior. another.
Praeterea. Si ex virtute actus [5] Furthermore, while man’s acts are
hominis boni redduntur; contingit rendered good as a result of virtue, it is
autem intensiorem esse eandem in possible for the same virtue to be more
uno quam in alio: oportet quod intensified in one man than in another.
humanorum actuum sit unus alio So, one human act must be better than
melior. another.
Item. Si ex virtutibus actus humani [6] Again, if human acts are made good

boni redduntur, oportet meliorem by the virtues, then that act must be
esse actum qui est melioris virtutis. better which belongs to the better virtue.
Contingit autem virtutem unam But it is possible for one virtue to be
altera meliorem esse: puta better than another; for instance,
magnificentiam liberalitate, et magnificence than liberality, and
magnanimitatem moderantia. Erit magnanimity than moderation. So, one
igitur humanorum actuum unus alio human act will be better than another.
melior.
Hinc est quod dicitur I Cor. 738: qui [7] Hence, it is said, 1 Cor. (7:38): “He

matrimonio iungit virgines suas, who gives his virgins in marriage does
bene facit: qui autem non iungit, well: and he does not give them does
melius facit. better.”
Ex eisdem etiam rationibus apparet [8] Moreover, it is apparent for the same
quod non omnia peccata sunt paria: reason that not all sins are equal, since
cum per unum peccatum magis one gets farther away from the end
discedatur a fine quam per aliud; et through one sin than through another,
magis pervertatur ordo rationis; et and the order of reason may be more
maius nocumentum proximo perverted, and more harm may be done
inferatur. one’s neighbor.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ezech. 1647: [9] Hence, it is said, in Ezekiel (16:47):

sceleratiora fecisti illis in omnibus “You have done almost more wicked
viis tuis. things than they in all your ways.”
Per hoc autem excluditur [10] Now, by this consideration we refute

quorundam error dicentium omnia the error of those who say that all
merita et peccata paria esse. meritorious acts and all sins are equal.
Quod tamen omnes virtuosi actus [11] As a matter of fact, the view that all

sint aequales, ex hoc videbatur virtuous acts are equal seems to have a
aliquam rationem habere, quia certain reasonableness, since every act
omnis actus virtuosus est ex fine is virtuous as a result of the goodness of
boni. Unde, si omnium bonorum its end. Hence, if there is some end of
actuum est idem finis boni, oportet goodness for all good acts, then all must
omnes aequaliter bonos esse. be equally good.
Licet autem sit unus finis ultimus [12] However, although there is but one

boni, actus tamen qui ex illo ultimate end for the good, the acts that
bonitatem habent, diversum derive their goodness from it receive
bonitatis gradum accipiunt. Est different degrees of goodness. For,
enim in his bonis quae ad ultimum there is in the goods that are ordered to
finem ordinantur, differentia gradus, the ultimate end a difference of degree,
secundum quod quaedam sunt aliis in so far as some are better and nearer
meliora, et fini ultimo propinquiora. to the ultimate end than others. Hence,
Unde et in voluntate et actibus eius there will be degrees of goodness both
gradus bonitatis erit, secundum in the will and in its acts, depending on
diversitatem bonorum ad quae the diversity of goods in which the will
terminatur voluntas et eius actus, and its act terminate, even though the
licet ultimus finis sit idem. ultimate end be the same.
Similiter etiam quod omnia peccata [13] Similarly, also, the notion that all

sint paria, videtur ex hoc habere sins are equal seems to have some
rationem, quia peccatum in actibus reasonableness, since sin occurs in
humanis accidit ex hoc solo quod human acts solely because a person
aliquis praeterit regulam rationis. Ita overlooks the rule of reason. But a man
autem praeterit regulam rationis qui who departs a little from reason
in modico a ratione recedit, sicut overlooks its rule, just as one who
qui in magno. Videtur igitur misses it by a wide margin. So, it would
peccatum esse aequale sive in seem that a sin is equal whether the
modico sive in magno peccetur. wrong done was small or great.
Huic autem rationi videtur suffragari [14] Now, support for this argument

quod in humanis iudiciis agitur. seems to come from the practice in
Nam si alicui statuatur limes quem human courts of law. In fact, if a
non transgrediatur, nihil refert apud boundary line is set up which a certain
iudicem sive multum sive modicum man is not to cross, it makes no
sit transgressus: sicut non refert, ex difference to the judge whether he
quo pugil limites campi exivit, utrum trespassed for a large distance or a
longius progrediatur. Ex quo igitur small one; just as it is unimportant,
aliquis regulam rationis pertransiit, when a fighter goes over the ropes,
non refert utrum in modico vel in whether he goes very far. So, in the
magno ipsam transiverit. case of a man overstepping the rule of
reason, it makes no difference whether
he bypasses it a little or a great deal.
Sed si quis diligenter inspiciat, in [15] However, if one takes a more
omnibus quorum perfectio et careful look at it, in all matters in which
bonum in quadam the perfect and the good consists in
commensuratione consistit, quanto some sort of commensuration, the
magis a debita commensuratione greater the departure from the proper
receditur, tanto maius erit malum. measurement, the worse will it be. Thus,
Sicut sanitas consistit in debita health consists in a properly measured
commensuratione humorum; et amount of humors, and beauty in a due
pulchritudo in debita proportione proportion of bodily members, while
membrorum; veritas autem in truth lies in a measured relation of the
commensuratione intellectus vel understanding, or of speech, to the
sermonis ad rem. Patet autem quod thing. Now, clearly, the more inequality
quanto est maior inaequalitas in there is in the humors, the greater the
humoribus, tanto est maior sickness; and the greater the disorder in
infirmitas; et quanto est maior the members of the body, the greater is
inordinatio in membris, tanto est the ugliness; and the farther one departs
maior turpitudo; et quanto magis a from the truth, the greater is the falsity.
veritate receditur, tanto est maior For instance, the man who thinks that
falsitas; non enim est tam magna three is five is not as wrong as the one
falsitas aestimantis tria esse who thinks three is a hundred. Now, the
quinque, sicut eius qui aestimat tria good pertaining to virtue consists in a
esse centum. Bonum autem virtutis certain commensuration, for there is a
in quadam commensuratione mean that is set up between opposed
consistit: est enim medium, vices according to a proper judgment of
secundum debitam limitationem the limiting circumstances. Therefore,
circumstantiarum, inter contraria the more it departs from this harmonious
vitia constitutum. Quanto igitur balance, the greater the evil is.
magis ab hac harmonia receditur,
tanto est maior malitia.
Non est autem simile virtutem [16] Moreover, it is not the same thing to

transgredi, et terminos a iudice transgress virtue and to trespass over
positos transire. Nam virtus est boundaries set up by a judge. Virtue is,
secundum se bonum: unde virtutem in fact, good in itself, and so to depart
transgredi est secundum se malum. from virtue is an evil in itself. Hence, to
Et ideo oportet quod magis a virtute go farther away from virtue is a greater
recedere sit maius malum. evil. But to pass over a boundary line
Transgredi autem terminum hunc a set up by a judge is not essentially evil,
iudice positum, non est secundum but accidentally so—to the extent, that
se malum, sed per accidens, is, that it is prohibited. But in the case of
inquantum scilicet est prohibitum. In events that are accidental, it is not
his autem quae sunt per accidens, necessary that “if one event taken
non est necessarium quod, si without qualification follows another
simpliciter sequitur ad simpliciter, et event without qualification, then an
magis sequatur ad magis, sed increase in the first event is followed by
solum in his quae sunt per se: non an increase in the second.” This only
enim sequitur, si album est follows in things which exist of
musicum, quod magis album sit themselves. For instance, it does not
magis musicum; sequitur autem, si follow that, if a white man is musical,
album est disgregativum visus, then a whiter man will be more musical,
quod magis album sit magis but it does follow that, if a white thing is
disgregativum visus. a distinctive object of sight, a whiter
thing is a more distinctive object for
sight.
Est autem hoc inter peccatorum [17] Yet there is this point to be noted
differentias attendendum, quod regarding the differences among sins:
quoddam est mortale, et quoddam that one kind is mortal and another
veniale. Mortale autem est quod venial. Now, the mortal is that which
animam spirituali vita privat. Cuius deprives the soul of spiritual life. The
quidem vitae ratio ex duobus sumi meaning of this life may be taken from
potest, secundum similitudinem two points in the comparison with
vitae naturalis. Vivit enim corpus natural life. In fact, a body is naturally
naturaliter per hoc quod animae alive because it is united to a soul which
unitur, quae est ei principium vitae. is the source of life for it. Moreover, a
Corpus autem, vivificatum per body that is made alive by a soul moves
animam, ex seipso movetur: sed by itself, but a dead body either remains
corpus mortuum vel immobile without movement or is only moved from
manet, vel ab exteriori tantum outside. So, too, the will of man, when
movetur. Sic igitur et voluntas united by a right intention to its ultimate
hominis, cum per rectam end, which is its object and, in a sense,
intentionem ultimo fini coniungitur, its form, is also enlivened. And when it
quod est eius obiectum et adheres to God and neighbor through
quodammodo forma, et vivida est; love, it moves from an interior principle
et, cum per dilectionem Deo et to do the right things. But when the
proximo inhaeret, ex interiori intention and love of the ultimate end
principio movetur ad agendum are removed, the soul becomes, as it
recta. Intentione autem ultimi finis were, dead, since it does not move of
et dilectione remota, anima fit velut itself to do right actions, but either

mortua: quia non movetur ex seipsa entirely ceases to do them or is led to do
ad agendum recta, sed vel omnino them solely by something external,
ab eis agendis desistit, vel ad ea namely, the fear of punishments. So,
agenda solum ab exteriori inducitur, whatever sins are opposed to the
scilicet metu poenarum. intending and loving of the ultimate end
Quaecumque igitur peccata are mortal. But, if a man is properly
intentioni ultimi finis et dilectioni disposed in regard to them, yet falls
opponuntur, mortalia sunt. Si vero, somewhat short of the right order of
his salvis, aliquis in aliquo recto reason, his sin will not be mortal but
ordine rationis deficiat, non erit venial.
mortale peccatum, sed veniale.
Quod actus hominis puniuntur THAT A MAN’S ACTS ARE
vel praemiantur a Deo PUNISHED OR REWARDED BY GOD
Ex praemissis autem manifestum [1] It is apparent from the foregoing that

est quod actus hominis puniuntur man’s acts are punished or rewarded
vel praemiantur a Deo. by God.
Eius enim est punire vel praemiare [2] For the function of punishing and
cuius est legem imponere: legis rewarding belongs to him whose office
enim latores per praemia et poenas it is to impose the law; indeed,
ad observantiam legis inducunt. Sed lawmakers enforce observance of the
ad divinam providentiam pertinet ut law by means of rewards and
legem hominibus poneret, ut ex punishments. But it belongs to divine
supra dictis patet. Ergo ad Deum providence to lay down the law for men,
pertinet homines punire vel as is clear from the previous
praemiare. statements. Therefore, it belongs to
God to punish and reward men.
Praeterea. Ubicumque est aliquis [3] Again, wherever there is a proper
debitus ordo ad finem, oportet quod order to an end, this order must lead to
ordo ille ad finem ducat, recessus the end, while a departure from this
autem ab ordine finem excludat: ea order prevents the attainment of the
enim quae sunt ex fine, end. For things which depend on the
necessitatem sortiuntur ex fine; ut end derive their necessity from the end;
scilicet ea necesse sit esse, si finis that is to say, this means is necessary if
debeat sequi; et eis absque the end is to be attained—and under
impedimento existentibus, finis these conditions, if there be no
consequatur. Deus autem imposuit impediment, the end is achieved. Now,
actibus hominum ordinem aliquem God has imposed on men’s acts a
in respectu ad finem boni, ut ex certain order in relation to the final
praedictis patet. Oportet igitur quod, good, as is evident from preceding
si ordo ille recte positus est, quod statements. So, it must be, if this order
incedentes per illum ordinem finem is rightly laid down, that those who
boni consequantur, quod est proceed according to this order will
praemiari: recedentes autem ab illo attain the final good, and this is to be
ordine per peccatum, a fine boni rewarded; but those who depart from
excludi, quod est puniri. this order by means of sin must be cut
off from the final good, and this is to be
punished.
Adhuc. Sicut res naturales ordini [4] Besides, as things in nature are
divinae providentiae subduntur, ita subject to the order of divine
et actus humani, ut ex praedictis providence, so are human acts, as is
patet. Utrobique autem contingit clear from what was said earlier. In both
debitum ordinem servari, vel etiam cases, however, it is possible for the
praetermitti: hoc tamen interest, proper order to be observed or
quod observatio vel transgressio overlooked. Yet there is this difference:
debiti ordinis est in potestate the observance or transgression of the
humanae voluntatis constituta; non due order is put within the control of the
autem in potestate naturalium rerum human will, but it is not within the power
est quod a debito ordine deficiant of things in nature to fall short of or to
vel ipsum sequantur. Oportet autem follow the proper order. Now, effects
effectus causis per convenientiam must correspond in an appropriate way
respondere. Sicut igitur res with their causes. Hence, just as when
naturales, cum in eis debitus ordo natural things adhere to a due order in
naturalium principiorum et actionum their natural principles and actions, the
servatur, sequitur ex necessitate preservation of their nature and the
naturae conservatio et bonum in good in them necessarily follows, while
ipsis, corruptio autem et malum cum corruption and evil result when there is
a debito et naturali ordine receditur; a departure from the proper and natural
ita etiam in rebus humanis oportet order—so also, in human affairs, when
quod, cum homo voluntarie servat a man voluntarily observes the order of
ordinem legis divinitus impositae, divinely imposed law, good must result,
consequatur bonum, non velut ex not as if by necessity, but by the
necessitate, sed ex dispensatione management of the governor, and this
gubernantis, quod est praemiari; et is to be rewarded. On the contrary, evil
e converso malum, cum ordo legis follows when the order of the law has
fuerit praetermissus, et hoc est been neglected, and this is to be
puniri. punished.
Amplius. Ad perfectam Dei [5] Moreover, to leave nothing

bonitatem pertinet quod nihil in unordered among things pertains to the
rebus inordinatum relinquat: unde in perfect goodness of God; as a result,
rebus naturalibus videmus we observe that every evil in things of
contingere quod omne malum sub nature is included under the order of
ordine alicuius boni concluditur; something good. So, the corruption of
sicut corruptio aeris est ignis air is the generation of fire and the
generatio, et occisio ovis est pastus killing of a sheep is the feeding of a
lupi. Cum igitur actus humani wolf. Hence, since human acts are
divinae providentiae subdantur, sicut subject to divine providence, just as
et res naturales; oportet malum things in nature are, the evil which
quod accidit in humanis actibus, sub occurs in human acts must be
ordine alicuius boni concludi. Hoc contained under the order of some
autem convenientissime fit per hoc good. Now, this is most suitably
quod peccata puniuntur. Sic enim accomplished by the fact that sins are
sub ordine iustitiae, quae ad punished. For in that way those acts
aequalitatem reducit, which exceed the due measure are
comprehenduntur ea quae debitam embraced under the order of justice
quantitatem excedunt. Excedit which reduces to equality. But man
autem homo debitum suae exceeds the due degree of his measure
quantitatis gradum dum voluntatem when he prefers his own will to the
suam divinae voluntati praefert, divine will by satisfying it contrary to
satisfaciendo ei contra ordinationem God’s ordering. Now, this inequity is
Dei. Quae quidem inaequalitas removed when, against his will, man is
tollitur dum, contra voluntatem forced to suffer something in accord
suam, homo aliquid pati cogitur with divine ordering. Therefore, it is
secundum ordinationem divinam. necessary that human sins be given
Oportet igitur quod peccata humana punishment of divine origin and, for the
puniantur divinitus: et, eadem same reason, that good deeds receive
ratione, bona facta remunerationem their reward.
accipiant.
Item. Divina providentia non solum [6] Furthermore, divine providence not
disponit rerum ordinem, sed etiam only arranges the order of things, it also
movet omnia ad ordinis ab eo moves all things to the execution of the
dispositi executionem, ut supra order thus arranged, as we showed
ostensum est. Voluntas autem a suo above. Now, the will is moved by its
obiecto movetur, quod est bonum object, which is a good or bad thing.
vel malum. Ad divinam igitur Therefore, it is the function of divine
providentiam pertinet quod providence to offer men good things as
hominibus bona proponat in a reward, so that their will may be
praemium, ut voluntas ad recte moved to make right progress, and to
procedendum moveatur: et mala set forth evil things as punishment, so
proponat in poenam, ad hoc quod that their will may avoid disorder.
inordinationem vitet.
Praeterea. Divina providentia hoc [7] Besides, divine providence has so

modo res ordinavit quod una alteri ordered things that one will be useful to
prosit. Convenientissime autem another. But it is most appropriate for
homo proficit ad finem boni tam ex man to derive profit for his final good,
bono alterius hominis quam ex both from another man’s good and
malo, dum excitatur ad bene another man’s evil, in the sense that he
agendum per hoc quod videt bene may be stimulated to good action by
operantes praemiari; et dum seeing that others who do good are
revocatur a male agendo per hoc rewarded, and that he may be turned
quod videt male agentes puniri. Ad back from evil action by observing that
divinam igitur providentiam pertinet those who do evil are punished. So, it is
quod mali puniantur, et boni proper to divine providence that evil
praemientur. men be punished and good men
rewarded.
Hinc est quod dicitur Exod. 205 ego [8] Hence, it is said, in Exodus (20:56):
sum Deus tuus, visitans iniquitatem “I am Your God... visiting the iniquity of
patrum in filios, et faciens the fathers upon the children ... and
misericordiam his qui diligunt me et showing mercy... to them who love me
custodiunt praecepta mea. Et in and keep my commandments.” And
Psalmo: tu reddes unicuique iuxta again, in the Psalm (61:13): “For You
opera sua. Et Rom. 26 reddet will render to every man according to
unicuique secundum opera sua: his his works.” And in Romans (2:68):
quidem qui sunt secundum “Who will render to every man
patientiam boni operis, gloriam et according to his works; to those indeed
honorem; his autem qui non who, according to patience in good
acquiescunt veritati, credunt autem work, glory and honor... but to those...
iniquitati, iram et indignationem. who do not obey the truth but give
credit to iniquity, wrath and indignation.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [9] Now, by this we set aside the error
quorundam dicentium quod Deus of some people who assert that God
non punit. Dicebant enim Marcion et does not punish. In fact, Marcion and
Valentinus alium esse Deum Valentine said that there is one good
bonum: et alium esse Deum iustum, God, and another God of justice Who
qui punit. punishes.
De differentia et ordine ON THE DIVERSITY AND ORDER OF
poenarum PUNISHMENTS
Quia vero, sicut ex dictis patet, [1] As we have just seen, since a reward

praemium est quod voluntati is what is set before the will as an end
proponitur quasi finis quo excitatur whereby one is stimulated to good
ad bene agendum; e contrario action, punishment, on the contrary, in
poena voluntati proponitur ut a the guise of some evil that is to be
malo retrahatur, quasi aliquid avoided, is set before the will to restrain
fugiendum malum: sicut de ratione it from evil. So, just as it is essential to a
praemii est quod sit bonum reward that it be a good that is
voluntati consonum, ita de ratione agreeable to the will, so is it essential to
poenae est quod sit malum et punishment that it be an evil and
contrarium voluntati. Malum autem contrary to will. Now, evil is a privation of
est privatio boni. Unde oportet quod the good. Hence, the diversity and order
secundum differentiam et ordinem of punishments must depend on the
bonorum, sit etiam differentia et diversity and order of goods.
ordo poenarum.
Est autem summum bonum [2] Now, felicity is the highest good for
hominis felicitas, quae est ultimus man, for it is his ultimate end, and the
finis eius: quantoque aliquid est nearer anything is to this end, the higher
huic fini propinquius, tanto the place that it occupies among man’s
praeeminet inter hominis bonum. goods. But the nearest thing to it is
Huic autem propinquissimum est virtue, and any other thing, if there be
virtus, et si quid est aliud quod ad such, which helps man in good action
bonam operationem hominem whereby he attains happiness. Next
proficiat, qua pervenitur ad comes the proper disposition of his

beatitudinem. Consequitur autem et reason and of the powers subject to it.
debita dispositio rationis, et virium After this comes soundness of body,
ei subiectarum. Post hoc autem et which is needed for ready action. In final
corporis incolumitas, quae place are external things which we use
necessaria est ad expeditam as aids to virtue.
operationem. Demum autem ea
quae exterius sunt, quibus quasi
adminiculantibus utimur ad
virtutem.
Erit igitur maxima poena hominem [3] So, the greatest punishment will be
a beatitudine excludi. Post hanc for man to be cut off from happiness.
autem, virtute privari, et perfectione After this ranks deprivation of virtue and
quacumque naturalium virtutum of any perfection of the natural powers
animae ad bene agendum. Dehinc of the soul that is related to good action.
autem, naturalium potentiarum Next comes the disorder of the natural
animae deordinatio. Post hoc powers of the soul; then, bodily injury;
autem, corporis nocumentum. and finally, the taking away of exterior
Demum autem, exteriorum goods.
bonorum sublatio.
Sed quia de ratione poenae est non [4] However, because it is essential not

solum quod sit privativa boni, sed only that punishment by a privation of
etiam quod sit contraria voluntati; the good, but also that it be contrary to
non autem cuiuslibet hominis the will, for not every man’s will regards
voluntas existimat bona secundum good things as they really are, it
quod sunt: contingit interdum quod happens at times that what deprives one
id quod est maioris boni privativum, of the greater good is less repugnant to
est minus contrarium voluntati, et the will and thus seems to be less
propter hoc minus poenale esse punishing. Hence it is that a good many
videtur. Et inde est quod plures men who think better of and know more
homines, qui bona sensibilia et about sensible and corporeal things
corporalia magis aestimant et than they do about intellectual and
cognoscunt quam intellectualia et spiritual goods have a greater fear of
spiritualia, plus timent corporales bodily punishments than of spiritual
poenas quam spirituales. ones. In the opinion of these people the
Secundum quorum aestimationem, order of punishments seems the reverse
contrarius ordo videtur poenarum of the abovementioned ranking. With
ordini supradicto. Apud hos enim them, injuries of the body are deemed
maxima poena aestimantur the greatest punishment, together with
laesiones corporis, et damna rerum the loss of external things; whereas they
exteriorum: deordinatio autem regard disorder of soul, loss of virtue,
animae, et damnum virtutis, et and the deprivation of the divine
amissio fruitionis divinae, in qua enjoyment, in which man’s ultimate
consistit ultima hominis felicitas, aut felicity consists, as of slight or no
modicum aut nihil reputatur ab eis. importance.
Hinc autem procedit quod hominum [5] Now, the result of this is that they do
peccata a Deo puniri non not think that men’s sins are punished
aestimant: quia vident plerumque by God, for they see many sinners
peccatores incolumitate corporis enjoying bodily vigor, highly favored by
vigere, et exteriori fortuna potiri, external good fortune, of which goods
quibus interdum homines virtuosi virtuous men are sometimes deprived.
privantur.
Quod recte considerantibus mirum [6] To people who consider the matter
videri non debet. Cum enim bona rightly this should not seem astonishing.
exteriora ad inferiora ordinentur, For, since external goods are
corpus autem ad animam; in subordinated to internal goods, and
tantum exteriora et corporalia bona body to soul, external and bodily goods
sunt homini bona, in quantum ad are good for man to the extent that they
bonum rationis proficiunt; contribute to the good of reason, but to
secundum vero quod bonum the extent that they hinder the rational
rationis impediunt, homini vertuntur good they turn into evils for man. Now,
in mala. Novit autem rerum God, the disposer of things, knows the
dispositor Deus mensuram virtutis measure of human virtue. Hence, He at
humanae. Unde interdum homini times provides corporeal and external
virtuoso corporalia et exteriora goods for the virtuous man as an aid to
bona ministrat in adiutorium virtutis: his virtue, and in this He confers a
et in hoc ei beneficium praestat. benefit on him. At other times, however,
Interdum vero ei praedicta He takes away these things from man,
subtrahit, eo quod considerat because He considers such things to be
huiusmodi esse sibi ad for him a hindrance to virtue and divine
impedimentum virtutis et fruitionis enjoyment. Indeed, from the fact that
divinae: ex hoc enim exteriora bona external goods may turn into evils for
vertuntur homini in mala, ut dictum man, as we said, their loss may
est; unde et eorum amissio, eadem consequently become, by the same
ratione, homini vertitur in bonum. reasoning, a good thing for man.
Si ergo omnis poena malum est; So, if every punishment is an evil, and if

non est autem malum hominem it is not a bad thing for a man to be
exterioribus et corporalibus bonis deprived of external and corporeal
privari secundum quod expedit ad goods in accord with what is helpful to
profectum virtutis: non erit hoc progress in virtue, then it will not be a
homini virtuoso poena si privetur punishment for a virtuous man if he be
exterioribus bonis in adiumentum deprived of external goods as an aid to
virtutis. E contrario autem erit malis virtue. On the contrary, however, it will
in poenam si eis exteriora bona be for the punishment of evil men if
conceduntur, quibus provocantur ad external goods are granted them, for by
malum. Unde et Sap. 1411 dicitur them they are incited to evil. Hence it is
quod creaturae Dei in odium factae said in Wisdom (14:11) that “the
sunt, et in tentationem animae creatures of God are turned to an
hominum, et in muscipulam abomination, and a temptation to the
pedibus insipientium. souls of men, and a snare to the feet of
the unwise.”
Quia vero de ratione poenae est However, since it is essential to
non solum quod sit malum, sed punishment that it be not only an evil but

quod sit contrarium voluntati; that it be against the will, the loss of
amissio corporalium et exteriorum corporeal and external things, even
bonorum, etiam quando est homini when it helps man toward virtue and not
in profectum virtutis et non in toward evil, is called a punishment, in an
malum, dicitur poena abusive, ex improper sense, because it is contrary
eo quod est contra voluntatem. to will.
Ex inordinatione autem hominis [7] Still, as a result of the disorder in
contingit quod homo non aestimet man, it happens that a man may not
res secundum quod sunt, sed judge things as they are, but may set
corporalia spiritualibus praeferat. corporeal things above spiritual ones.
Inordinatio autem talis aut est Now, such a disorder is either a fault or
culpa, aut ex aliqua culpa it stems from some preceding fault.
praecedente procedit. Unde Consequently, it is evident that there is
consequenter patet quod poena no punishment for man, even in the
non sit in homine, etiam secundum sense of being contrary to will, without a
quod est contra voluntatem, nisi prior fault.
culpa praecedente.
Hoc etiam ex alio patet. Quia ea [8] This is also clear from another fact:
quae sunt secundum se bona, non these things that are good in themselves
verterentur homini in malum per would not turn into evils for man,
abusum, nisi aliqua inordinatione in because of their abuse, unless some
homine existente. disorder were present within man.
Item, quod oporteat ea quae [9] Besides, the fact that the things
voluntas acceptat eo quod sunt which the will favors because they are
naturaliter bona, homini subtrahi ad naturally good must be taken away from
profectum virtutis, provenit ex man for the advancement of virtue
aliqua hominis deordinatione, quae arises from a disorder in man which is
vel est culpa, vel sequitur culpam. either a fault or the result of a fault.
Manifestum enim est quod per Indeed, it is obvious that some disorder
peccatum praecedens fit quaedam in the affections of man is caused by a
inordinatio in affectu humano, ut previous sin, and so afterwards he is
facilius postmodum ad peccatum more easily inclined to sin. So, man is
inclinetur. Non ergo est absque not without fault, also, in the fact that he
culpa etiam quod oportet hominem must be helped to the good of virtue by
adiuvari ad bonum virtutis per id what is for him something of a
quod est ei quodammodo poenale, punishment, inasmuch as it is absolutely
inquantum est absolute contra against his will, even though it be
voluntatem ipsius, licet quandoque desired sometimes, in a relative way,
sit volitum secundum quod ratio because reason looks to the end. But,
respicit finem. Sed de hac we shall talk later about this disorder in
inordinatione in natura humana human nature which results from
existente ex peccato originali, original sin. However, it is now evident
posterius dicetur. Nunc autem to what extent God punishes men for
intantum manifestum sit quod Deus their sins, and that He does not punish
punit homines pro peccatis: et quod unless there be some fault.
non punit absque culpa.
Quod non omnia praemia et THAT NOT ALL REWARDS AND
poenae sunt aequales PUNISHMENTS ARE EQUAL
Cum autem divina iustitia id [1] Since divine justice requires, for the
exigat quod, ad aequalitatem in preservation of equality in things, that
rebus servandam, pro culpis punishments be assigned for faults and
poenae reddantur, et pro bonis rewards for good acts, then, if there are
actibus praemia; oportet, si est degrees in virtuous acts and in sins, as we
gradus in virtuosis actibus et in showed, there must also be degrees
peccatis, ut ostensum est, quod among rewards and punishments.
sit etiam gradus praemiorum et Otherwise, equality would not be
poenarum. Aliter enim non preserved, that is, if a greater punishment
servaretur aequalitas, si non plus were not given to one who sins more, or a
peccanti maior poena, aut melius greater reward to one who acts better.
agenti maius praemium Indeed, the same reasoning seems to
redderetur: eiusdem enim rationis require different retribution on the basis of
esse videtur quod differenter the diversity of good and evil, and on the
retribuatur secundum differentiam basis of the difference between the good
boni et mali, et secundum and the better, or between the bad and the
differentiam boni et melioris, vel worse.
mali et peioris.
Praeterea. Talis est aequalitas [2] Again, the equality proper to distributive

distributivae iustitiae, ut justice is such that unequal things are
inaequalia inaequalibus assigned to unequal persons. Therefore,
reddantur. Non ergo esset iusta there would not be a just compensation by
recompensatio per poenas et punishments and rewards if all rewards
praemia, si omnia praemia et and all punishments were equal.
omnes poenae essent aequales.
Adhuc. Praemia et poenae a [3] Besides, rewards and punishments are

legislatore proponuntur ut set up by a lawmaker so that men may be
homines a malis ad bona drawn away from evil things and toward
trahantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. good things, as is evident from what was
Oportet autem homines non said above. But it is not only necessary for
solum trahi ad bona et retrahi a men to be attracted to goods and drawn
malis, sed etiam bonos allici ad away from evils, but also good men must
meliora, et malos retrahi a be encouraged to better things and evil
peioribus. Quod non fieret si men discouraged from worse things. This
praemia et poenae essent could not be done if rewards and
aequalia. Oportet igitur et poenas punishments were equal. Therefore,
et praemia inaequalia esse. punishments and rewards must be
unequal.
Amplius. Sicut per dispositiones [4] Moreover, just as a thing is disposed
naturales aliquid disponitur ad toward a form by natural dispositions, so is
formam, ita per opera bona et a man disposed toward punishments and
mala aliquis disponitur ad poenas rewards by good and bad works. But the
et praemia. Sed hoc habet ordo order which divine providence has
quem divina providentia statuit in established in things has this feature:
rebus, quod magis disposita things that are better disposed obtain a
perfectiorem formam more perfect form. Therefore, depending
consequuntur. Ergo, secundum on the diversity of good or bad works,
diversitatem bonorum operum vel there must be a diversity of punishments
malorum, oportet quod sit and rewards.
diversitas poenarum et
praemiorum.
Item. Contingit excessum esse in [5] Furthermore, it is possible for variations
operibus bonis et malis dupliciter: of degree to apply to good and bad works
uno modo, secundum numerum, in two ways: in one way, numerically, in the
prout unus alio plura habet opera sense that one man has more good or bad
bona vel mala; alio modo, works than another; in a second way,
secundum qualitatem operum, qualitatively, in the sense that one man
prout unus alio vel melius vel accomplishes a better or worse work than
peius opus habet. Oportet autem another. Now, to the increase which
quod excessui qui est secundum depends on the number of works there
numerum operum, respondeat must be a corresponding increase in
excessus praemiorum vel rewards and punishments; otherwise,
poenarum: alias non fieret there would not be a compensation under
recompensatio in divino iudicio divine justice for all the things that a
pro omnibus quae quis agit, si person does, if some evils remained
aliqua mala remanerent impunita unpunished and some goods unrewarded.
et aliqua bona irremunerata. Pari So, by equivalent reasoning, for the
ergo ratione, excessui qui est increase which depends on the different
secundum inaequalitatem quality of the works there must be a
operum, inaequalitas praemiorum corresponding inequality of rewards and
et poenarum respondet. punishments.
Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 252: [6] Hence, it is said in Deuteronomy (25:7):

pro mensura peccati erit et “According to the measure of the sin shall
plagarum modus. Et Isaiae 278: the measure also of the stripes be.” And in
in mensura contra mensuram, Isaiah (27:8): “In measure against
cum abiecta fuerit, vindicabo measure, when it shall be cast off, I shall
eam. judge it.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [7] By this we dispose of the error of those

quorundam dicentium in futuro who say that in the future all rewards and
omnia praemia et poenas esse punishments will be equal.
aequales.
De poena quae debetur peccato ON THE PUNISHMENT DUE TO
mortali et veniali per respectum MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN IN
ad ultimum finem RELATION TO THE ULTIMATE END
Est autem ex praedictis [1] Now, it is obvious from the foregoing
manifestum quod dupliciter that it is possible to sin in two ways. One
contingit peccare. Uno modo, sic way is such that the mental intention is
quod totaliter intentio mentis entirely broken away from the order to
abrumpatur ab ordine ad Deum, God, Who is called the ultimate end of all
qui dicitur ultimus finis bonorum: good people; and this is mortal sin. The
et hoc est peccatum mortale. Alio second way is such that, while the
modo, sic quod, manente ordine ordering of the human mind to the
humanae mentis ad ultimum ultimate end remains, some impediment is
finem, impedimentum aliquod brought in whereby one is held back from
afferatur quo retardatur ne libere freely tending toward the end; and this is
tendat in finem: et hoc dicitur called venial sin. So, if there must be a
peccatum veniale. Si ergo difference of punishments depending on a
secundum differentiam difference of sins, it follows that he who
peccatorum oportet esse commits a mortal sin must be punished in
differentiam poenarum, such a way that he may be cut off from
consequens est quod ille qui the end of man, but he who sins venially
mortaliter peccat, sit puniendus must not be punished so that he is cut off
sic quod excidat ab hominis fine: but so that he is retarded or made to
qui autem peccat venialiter, non suffer difficulty in acquiring the end. For,
ita quod excidat, sed ita quod thus is the equality of justice preserved: in
retardetur, aut difficultatem whatever way man voluntarily turns away
patiatur, in adipiscendo finem. Sic from his end by sinning, in the same way
enim iustitiae servatur aequalitas: in the order of punishment, involuntarily,
ut quo modo homo peccando he is impeded in regard to the attainment
voluntarie a fine divertit, ita of his end.
poenaliter, contra suam
voluntatem, in finis adeptione
impediatur.
Adhuc. Sicut est voluntas in [2] Again, as will is in men, so is natural
hominibus, ita est inclinatio inclination in the things of nature. Now, if
naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Si the inclination toward its end be taken
autem ab aliqua re naturali tollatur away from a natural thing, it becomes
inclinatio eius ad finem, omnino altogether unable to reach its end. For
finem illum consequi non potest: example, when a heavy body loses its
sicut corpus grave, cum weight through corruption and becomes
gravitatem amiserit per light, it will not reach its proper place. But,
corruptionem et factum fuerit leve, if there be an impediment to its motion,
non perveniet ad medium. Si while its inclination to the end remains,
autem fuerit in suo motu then, when the obstacle is removed, it will
impeditum, inclinatione ad finem reach its end. Now, in the man who
manente, remoto prohibente, commits a mortal sin, the intention of his
perveniet ad finem. In eo autem will is completely turned away from his
qui peccat mortaliter, omnino ultimate end; while in the man who
avertitur intentio voluntatis a fine commits a venial sin, his intention
ultimo: in illo autem qui venialiter continues to be fixed on the end, but he is
peccat, manet intentio conversa somewhat hindered in that he improperly
ad finem, sed aliqualiter impeditur, fixes his intention on the means to the
ex hoc quod plus debito inhaeret end. Therefore, for the one who sins
his quae sunt ad finem. Igitur ei mortally, this is the proper punishment: to
qui peccat mortaliter, haec poena be completely cut off from the attainment
debetur, ut omnino excludatur a of the end. But for the one who sins
consecutione finis: ei autem qui venially, he must suffer some difficulty
peccat venialiter, quod before he reaches the end.
difficultatem aliquam patiatur
antequam ad finem perveniat.
Amplius. Cum aliquis consequitur [3] Besides, when a person obtains some

aliquod bonum quod non good that he did not intend, this is due to
intendebat, est a fortuna et casu. fortune and chance. So, if he whose
Si igitur ille cuius intentio est intention is turned away from the ultimate
aversa a fine ultimo, finem end is to attain the ultimate end, this will
ultimum assequatur, erit hoc a be due to fortune and chance. But this is
fortuna et casu. Hoc autem est not right. In fact, the ultimate end is a
inconveniens. Quia ultimus finis good of the understanding. Now, fortune
est bonum intellectus. Fortuna is repugnant to understanding, since
autem intellectui repugnat: quia fortuitous events occur apart from the
fortuita absque ordinatione ordering of understanding. Moreover, it is
intellectus proveniunt. not appropriate for the understanding to
Inconveniens autem est quod attain its end in an unintelligent manner.
intellectus suum finem Therefore, he will not attain his ultimate
consequatur non per viam end who, by sinning mortally, has his
intelligibilem. Non ergo intention turned away from the ultimate
consequetur finem ultimum qui, end.
peccans mortaliter, habet
intentionem aversam ab ultimo
fine.
Item. Materia non consequitur [4] Moreover, matter does not get its form

formam ab agente nisi fuerit ad from the agent unless it be disposed to
formam disposita. Finis autem et the form. Now, the end or the good is a
bonum est perfectio voluntatis perfection of the will, just as form is for
sicut forma materiae. Voluntas matter. Hence, the will is not going to
igitur non consequetur ultimum obtain its ultimate end unless it be
finem nisi fuerit disposita appropriately disposed. But the will is
convenienter. Disponitur autem ad disposed toward its end by the intention
finem voluntas per intentionem et and desire for the end. Therefore, he
desiderium finis. Non igitur whose intention is averted from the end
consequetur finem cuius intentio a will not obtain that end.
fine avertitur.
Praeterea. In his quae sunt [5] Furthermore, in the case of things
ordinata ad finem, talis habitudo ordered to an end, the relationship is such

invenitur quod, si finis est vel erit, that, if the end occurs or will occur, then
necesse est ea quae sunt ad the means to the end must also be
finem fore; si autem ea quae sunt available, but if the means to the end are
ad finem non sunt, nec finis erit: si not available, then the end will not occur.
enim finis esse potest etiam non For, if the end can occur even without the
existentibus illis quae sunt ad presence of the means to the end, it is
finem, frustra per huiusmodi futile to seek the end by such means. But
media quaeritur finis. Confessum it is admitted by all men that man, through
est autem apud omnes quod works of virtue, among which the chief
homo per opera virtutum, in one is the intention of the proper end, may
quibus praecipuum est intentio attain his ultimate end which is felicity. So,
finis debiti, consequitur ultimum if a person acts against virtue, with his
finem suum, qui est felicitas. Si intention turned away from the ultimate
ergo aliquis contra virtutem agat, end, it is fitting that he be deprived of his
ab intentione ultimi finis aversus, ultimate end.
conveniens est quod ultimo fine
privetur.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 723: [6] Hence, it is said, Matthew (7:23):
discedite a me, omnes qui “Depart from me, all you who work
operamini iniquitatem. iniquity.”
Quod per peccatum mortale THAT BY MORTAL SIN A MAN IS
ultimo fine aliquis in aeternum ETERNALLY DEPRIVED OF HIS
privatur ULTIMATE END
Oportet autem hanc poenam qua [1] This punishment by which a person is

quis privatur ultimo fine, esse deprived of the ultimate end should be
interminabilem. interminable.
Privatio enim alicuius non est nisi [2] For there is no privation of a thing

quando natum est haberi: non unless one is born to possess that thing;
enim catulus mox natus dicitur in fact, a newborn puppy is not said to be
visu privatus. Ultimum autem deprived of sight. But man is not born with
finem consequi non est homo a natural aptitude to attain his end in this
aptus natus in hac vita, ut life, as we have proved. So, the privation
probatum est. Privatio ergo of this kind of end must be a punishment
huiusmodi finis oportet quod sit after this life. But after this life there
poena post hanc vitam. Sed post remains in man no capacity to acquire the
hanc vitam non remanet homini ultimate end. The soul needs a body for
facultas adipiscendi ultimum the obtaining of its end, in so far as it
finem. Anima enim indiget acquires perfection through the body, both
corpore ad consecutionem sui in knowledge and in virtue. But the soul,
finis: inquantum per corpus after it has been separated from its body,
perfectionem acquirit et in will not again return to this state in which it
scientia et in virtute. Anima receives perfection through the body, as
autem, postquam a corpore fuerit the reincarnationists claimed. We have

separata, non redit iterum ad argued against them above. Therefore, he
hunc statum quod per corpus who is punished by this punishment, so
perfectionem accipiat, sicut that he is deprived of the ultimate end,
dicebant transcorporationem must remain deprived of it throughout
ponentes, contra quos superius, eternity.
disputatum est. Necesse est igitur
quod ille qui hac poena punitur ut
ultimo fine privetur, in aeternum
privatus remaneat.
Adhuc. Si aliquid privatur eo quod [3] Again, if there is a privation of

est in natura eius ut habeatur, something which is naturally required, it is
impossibile est illud reparari nisi impossible for this to be restored unless
fiat resolutio in praeiacentem there be a breaking down of the subject to
materiam, ut iterum aliud de novo the underlying matter, so that another
generetur: sicut cum animal subject may again be generated anew, as
amittit visum aut alium sensum. is the case when an animal loses the
Impossibile est autem quod id power of sight or any other sense power.
quod iam generatum est, iterum Now, it is impossible for what has been
generetur, nisi prius corrumpatur: already generated to be again generated,
et tunc ex eadem materia poterit unless it is first corrupted. In that case,
aliud integrum generari, non idem from the same matter it is possible for
numero, sed specie. Res autem another whole being to be generated, not
spiritualis, ut anima vel Angelus, the same numerically but in species. But
non potest resolvi per spiritual things, such as a soul or an
corruptionem in aliquam angel, cannot be broken down by
praeiacentem materiam, ut iterum corruption into an underlying matter so
generetur aliud idem specie. Si that another member of the same species
igitur privetur eo quod est in may in turn be generated. So, if such a
natura ipsius ut habeat, oportet being is deprived of what it must have in
quod in perpetuum maneat talis its nature, then such a privation has to
privatio. Est autem in natura continue perpetually. But there is in the
animae et Angeli ordo ad ultimum nature of a soul and of an angel an
finem, qui est Deus. Si ergo ab ordering toward the ultimate end Who is
hoc ordine decidat per aliquam God. So, if it departs from this order by
poenam, in perpetuum talis virtue of some punishment, this
poena manebit. punishment will endure perpetually.
Item. Naturalis aequitas hoc [4] Besides, natural equity seems to

habere videtur, quod demand that each person be deprived of
unusquisque privetur bono contra the good against which he acts, for by this
quod agit: ex hoc enim reddit se action he renders himself unworthy of
tali bono indignum. Et inde est such a good. So it is that, according to
quod, secundum civilem iustitiam, civil justice, he who offends against the
qui contra rempublicam peccat, state is deprived completely of association
societate reipublicae privatur with the state, either by death or by
omnino, vel per mortem vel per perpetual exile. Nor is any attention paid
exilium perpetuum: nec attenditur to the extent of time involved in his
quanta fuerit mora temporis in wrongdoing, but only to what he sinned
peccando, sed quid sit contra against. There is the same relation
quod peccavit. Eadem autem est between the entirety of our present life
comparatio totius vitae praesentis and an earthly state that there is between
ad rempublicam terrenam, et the whole of eternity and the society of the
totius aeternitatis ad societatem blessed who, as we showed above, share
beatorum, qui, ut supra ostensum in the ultimate end eternally. So, he who
est, ultimo fine aeternaliter sins against the ultimate end and against
potiuntur. Qui ergo contra ultimum charity, whereby the society of the blessed
finem peccat, et contra caritatem, exists and also that of those on the way
per quam est societas beatorum toward happiness, should be punished
et tendentium in beatitudinem, in eternally, even though he sinned for but a
aeternum debet puniri, quamvis short space of time.
aliqua brevi temporis mora
peccaverit.
Praeterea. Apud divinum iudicium [5] Moreover, “before the divine seat of

voluntas pro facto computatur: judgment the will is counted for the deed,”
quia, sicut homines vident ea since, “just as man sees those things that
quae exterius aguntur, ita Deus are done outwardly, so does God see the
inspicit hominum corda. Qui heart of men” (1 Sam. 16:7). Now, he who
autem propter aliquod temporale has turned aside from his ultimate end for
bonum aversus est ab ultimo fine, the sake of a temporal good, when he
qui in aeternum possidetur, might have possessed his end throughout
praeposuit fruitionem temporalem eternity, has put the temporal enjoyment
illius boni temporalis aeternae of this temporal good above the eternal
fruitioni ultimi finis. Unde patet enjoyment of the ultimate end. Hence, it is
quod multo magis voluisset in evident that he much preferred to enjoy
aeternum illo bono temporali frui. this temporal good throughout eternity.
Ergo, secundum divinum Therefore, according to divine judgment,
iudicium, ita puniri debet ac si he should be punished in the same way
aeternaliter peccasset. Nulli as if he had sinned eternally. But there is
autem dubium est quin pro no doubt that an eternal punishment is
aeterno peccato aeterna poena due an eternal sin. So, eternal punishment
debeatur. Debetur igitur ei qui ab is due to him who turns away from his
ultimo fine avertitur, poena ultimate end.
aeterna.
Adhuc. Eadem iustitiae ratione [6] Furthermore, by the same principle of
poena peccatis redditur, et bonis justice, punishments are assigned to
actibus praemium. Praemium wrongdoings and rewards to good acts.
autem virtutis est beatitudo. Quae “Now, the reward for virtue is happiness.”
quidem est aeterna, ut supra And this is, of course, eternal, as we
ostensum est. Ergo et poena qua showed above. Therefore, the punishment
quis a beatitudine excluditur, whereby one is cut off from happiness
debet esse aeterna. should be eternal.
Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 25 [7] Hence, it is said, in Matthew (25:46):
46: ibunt hi in supplicium “And these shall go into everlasting
aeternum, iusti autem in vitam punishment, but the just, into life
aeternam. everlasting.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [8] Now, by this conclusion we set aside
dicentium poenas malorum the error of those who say that the
quandoque esse terminandas. punishments of the wicked are to be
Quae quidem positio ortum ended at some time. In fact, this view
habuisse videtur a positione seems to have originated from the theory
quorundam philosophorum, qui of certain philosophers who said that all
dicebant omnes poenas punishments are for purposes of
purgatorias esse, et ita purification and so are to terminate at
quandoque terminandas. some time.
Videbatur autem hoc [9] This view seemed persuasive on the
persuasibile: tum ex humana basis of human custom. Indeed, the
consuetudine. Poenae enim punishments under human law are applied
humanis legibus inferuntur ad for the remedy of vices, and so they are
emendationem vitiorum: unde like medicines. On the basis of reason,
sicut medicinae quaedam sunt. also, if a punishment were assigned by a
Tum etiam ratione. Si enim poena punishing agent, not for the sake of
non propter aliud infertur a something else, but for its own sake
puniente, sed propter se tantum, alone, it would follow that the agent takes
sequitur quod in poenis propter pleasure in punishments for their own
se delectetur: quod bonitati sake, which is not in keeping with divine
divinae non congruit. Oportet goodness. So, punishments must be
igitur poenas propter aliud inferri. inflicted for the sake of something else.
Nec videtur alius convenientior And there seems to be no other more
finis quam emendatio vitiorum. suitable end than the correction of vices.
Videtur igitur convenienter dici So, it seems that all punishments may
omnes poenas purgatorias esse, fittingly be said to be purgatorial and,
et per consequens quandoque consequently, requiring termination at
terminandas: cum illud quod est some time, since what can be purged out
purgabile, accidentale sit rationi is accidental to a rational creature and
creaturae, et possit removeri may be removed without consuming the
absque consumptione substance.
substantiae.
Est autem concedendum quod [10] Now, we have to concede that
poenae inferuntur a Deo non punishments are not inflicted by God for
propter se, quasi Deus in ipsis their own sake, as if God delighted in
delectetur, sed propter aliud: them, but they are for something else;
scilicet propter ordinem namely, for the imposing of order on
imponendum creaturis, in quo creatures, in which order the good of the
bonum universi consistit. Exigit universe consists. Now, this order of
autem hoc ordo rerum, ut things demands that all things be divinely
proportionaliter omnia divinitus arranged in a proportionate way. This is
dispensentur: propter quod dicitur why it is said in the Book of Wisdom
in libro sapientiae, quod Deus (11:21) that God made all things, “in
omnia facit in pondere, numero et weight, number and measure.” Now, just
mensura. Sicut autem praemia as rewards are in proportional
proportionaliter respondent correspondence with the acts of the

actibus virtuosis, ita poenae virtues, so are punishments with sins. And
peccatis. Et quibusdam peccatis to some sins are proportioned eternal
proportionantur poenae punishments, as we showed. So, God
sempiternae, ut ostensum est. inflicts eternal punishments for certain sins
Infligit igitur Deus pro quibusdam so that due order may be observed in
peccatis poenas aeternas, ut things, which order manifests His wisdom.
debitus ordo servetur in rebus,
qui eius sapientiam demonstrat.
Si quis tamen concedat omnes [11] However, if one concede that all
poenas ad emendationem morum punishments are applied for the correction
induci, et non propter aliud: non of behavior and not for anything else, one
tamen propter hoc cogitur ponere is still not forced by this admission to
omnes poenas purgatorias et assert that all punishments are purgatorial
terminabiles esse. Nam et and terminable. For even according to
secundum leges humanas aliqui human laws some people are punished
morte puniuntur, non quidem ad with death, not, of course, for their own
emendationem sui, sed aliorum. improvement, but for that of others.
Hinc est quod Prov. 1925 dicitur: Hence, it is said in Proverbs (19:75): “the
pestilente flagellato, stultus wicked man being scourged, the fool shall
sapientior erit. Quidam etiam, be wiser.” Then, too, some people, in
secundum humanas leges, a accord with human laws, are perpetually
civitate perpetuo exilio exiled from their country, so that, with
excluduntur, ut, eis subtractis, them removed, the state may be purer.
civitas purior reddatur. Unde Hence, it is said in Proverbs (22:10): “Cast
dicitur Prov. 2210: eiice out the scoffer, and contention shall go
derisorem, et exibit cum eo with him, and quarrels and reproaches
iurgium, cessabuntque causae et shall cease.” So, even if punishments are
contumeliae. Nihil igitur prohibet, used only for the correction of behavior,
etiam si poenae non nisi ad nothing prevents some people, according
emendationem morum to divine judgment, from having to be
adhibeantur, quin, secundum separated perpetually from the society of
divinum iudicium, aliqui debeant a good men and to be punished eternally, so
societate bonorum perpetuo that men may refrain from sinning, as a
separari et in aeternum puniri, ut result of their fear of perpetual
ex perpetuae poenae timore punishment, and thus the society of good
homines peccare desistant, et men may be made purer by their removal.
bonorum societas purior ex As it is said in the Apocalypse (21:27):
eorum separatione reddatur: sicut “There shall not enter it,” that is, into the
dicitur Apoc. 2227: non intrabit in heavenly Jerusalem, by which the society
eam, idest in Ierusalem of good men is designated, “anything
caelestem, per quam designatur defiled or that works abomination or
societas bonorum, aliquid falsehood.”
coinquinatum, aut faciens
abominationem et mendacium.
Chapter 145
Caput 145 THAT SINS ARE PUNISHED ALSO
Quod peccata puniuntur etiam BY THE EXPERIENCE OF
per experientiam alicuius nocivi SOMETHING PAINFUL
Non solum autem qui contra Deum [1] Those who sin against God are not
peccant, puniendi sunt per hoc quod only to be punished by their exclusion
a beatitudine perpetuo excluduntur, from perpetual happiness, but also by
sed per experimentum alicuius the experience of something painful.
nocivi. Poena enim debet Punishment should proportionally
proportionaliter culpae respondere, correspond to the fault, as we said
ut supra ostensum est. In culpa above. In the fault, however, the mind is
autem non solum avertitur mens ab not only turned away from the ultimate
ultimo fine, sed etiam indebite end, but is also improperly turned
convertitur in alia quasi in fines. Non toward other things as ends. So, the
solum ergo puniendus est qui sinner is not only to be punished by
peccat per hoc quod excludatur a being excluded from his end, but also
fine, sed etiam per hoc quod ex aliis by feeling injury from other things.
rebus sentiat nocumentum.
Amplius. Poenae inferuntur pro [2] Again, punishments are inflicted for

culpis ut timore poenarum homines faults so that men may be restrained
a peccatis retrahantur, ut supra from sins by the fear of these
dictum est. Nullus autem timet punishments, as we said above. But no
amittere id quod non desiderat one fears to lose what he does not
adipisci. Qui ergo habent voluntatem desire to obtain. So, those who have
aversam ab ultimo fine, non timent their will turned away from the ultimate
excludi ab illo. Non ergo per solam end do not fear to be cut off from it.
exclusionem ab ultimo fine a Thus, they cannot be restrained from
peccando revocarentur. Oportet sinning simply by exclusion from the
igitur peccantibus etiam aliam ultimate end. Therefore, another
poenam adhiberi, quam timeant punishment must also be used for
peccantes. sinners, which they may fear while they
are sinners.
Item. Si quis eo quod est ad finem [3] Besides, if a man makes inordinate
inordinate utitur, non solum fine use of a means to the end, he may not
privatur, sed etiam aliud only be deprived of the end, but may
nocumentum incurrit: ut patet in cibo also incur some other injury. This is
inordinate assumpto, qui non solum exemplified in the inordinate eating of
firmitatem non confert, sed etiam food, which not only fails to maintain
aegritudinem inducit. Qui autem in strength, but also leads to sickness.
rebus creatis finem constituit, eis Now, the man who puts his end among
non utitur secundum quod debet, created things does not use them as he
referendo scilicet ad ultimum finem. should, namely, by relating them to his
Non ergo solum debet puniri per hoc ultimate end. So, he should not only be
quod beatitudine careat, sed etiam punished by losing happiness, but also
per hoc quod aliquod nocumentum by experiencing some injury from them.
ab ipsis experiatur.
Praeterea. Sicut recte agentibus [4] Moreover, as good things are owed
debentur bona, ita perverse to those who act rightly, so bad things
agentibus debentur mala. Sed illi qui are due to those who act perversely.
recte agunt, in fine ab eis intento But those who act rightly, at the end
percipiunt perfectionem et gaudium. intended by them, receive perfection
E contrario ergo debetur haec and joy. So, on the contrary, this
poena peccantibus, ut ex his in punishment is due to sinners, that from
quibus sibi finem constituunt, those things in which they set their end
afflictionem accipiant et they receive affliction and injury.
nocumentum.
Hinc est quod divina Scriptura [5] Hence, divine Scripture not only
peccatoribus comminatur non solum threatens sinners with exclusion from
exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam glory, but also with affliction from other
afflictionem ex aliis rebus. Dicitur things. For it is said, in Matthew
enim Matth. 2541: discedite a me, (25:41): “Depart from me you cursed
maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui into everlasting fire, which was
paratus est Diabolo et Angelis eius. prepared for the devil and his angels.”
Et in Psalmo 107: pluet super And in the Psalm (10:7), “He shall rain
peccatores laqueos: ignis, sulphur, snares upon sinners, fire and brimstone
et spiritus procellarum pars calicis and storms of winds shall be the portion
eorum. of their cup.”
Per hoc autem excluditur opinio [6] By this we refute the error of Al
Algazelis, qui posuit quod Ghazali, who claimed that this
peccatoribus haec sola poena punishment only is applied to sinners,
reddetur, quod affligentur amissione that they are afflicted with the loss of
ultimi finis. their ultimate end.
Quod iudicibus licet poenas THAT IT IS LAWFUL FOR JUDGES TO
inferre INFLICT PUNISHMENTS
Quia vero poenas a Deo inflictas [1] Since some people pay little attention
aliqui parvipendunt, propter hoc to the punishments inflicted by God,
quod, sensibilibus dediti, solum because they are devoted to the objects of
ea quae videntur curant; ideo per sense and care only for the things that are
divinam providentiam ordinatum seen, it has been ordered accordingly by
est ut in terris sint homines qui divine providence that there be men in
per poenas sensibiles et various countries whose duty it is to
praesentes aliquos ad compel these people, by means of
observantiam iustitiae cogant. sensible and present punishments, to
Quos manifestum est non respect justice. It is obvious that these
peccare dum malos puniunt. men do not sin when they punish the
Nullus enim peccat ex hoc quod wicked, for no one sins by working for
iustitiam facit. Iustum autem est justice. Now, it is just for the wicked to be
malos puniri: quia per poenam punished, since by punishment the fault is
culpa ordinatur, ut ex supra dictis restored to order, as is clear from our

patet. Non igitur iudices peccant statements above. Therefore, judges do
malos puniendo. no wrong in punishing the wicked.
Adhuc. Homines qui in terris [2] Again, in various countries, the men
super alios constituuntur, sunt who are put in positions over other men
quasi divinae providentiae are like executors of divine providence;
executores: Deus enim, per suae indeed, God through the order of His
providentiae ordinem, per providence directs lower beings by means
superiora inferiora exequitur, ut of higher ones, as is evident from what we
ex supra dictis patet. Nullus said before. But no one sins by the fact
autem ex hoc quod exequitur that he follows the order of divine
ordinem divinae providentiae, providence. Now, this order of divine
peccat. Habet autem hoc ordo providence requires the good to be
divinae providentiae, ut boni rewarded and the evil to be punished, as
praemientur et mali puniantur, ut is shown by our earlier remarks.
ex supra dictis patet. Non igitur Therefore, men who are in authority over
homines qui aliis praesunt, others do no wrong when they reward the
peccant ex hoc quod bonos good and punish the evil.
remunerant et puniunt malos.
Amplius. Bonum non indiget [3] Besides, the good has no need of evil,

malo, sed e converso. Illud igitur but, rather, the converse. So, what is
quod est necessarium ad needed to preserve the good cannot be
conservationem boni, non potest evil in itself. Now, for the preservation of
esse secundum se malum. Ad concord among men it is necessary that
conservationem autem punishments be inflicted on the wicked.
concordiae inter homines Therefore, to punish the wicked is not in
necessarium est quod poenae itself evil.
malis infligantur. Punire igitur
malos non est secundum se
malum.
Item. Bonum commune melius [4] Moreover, the common good is better
est quam bonum particulare than the particular good of one person.
unius. Subtrahendum est igitur So, the particular good should be removed
bonum particulare ut conservetur in order to preserve the common good.
bonum commune. Vita autem But the life of certain pestiferous men is an
quorundam pestiferorum impedit impediment to the common good which is
commune bonum, quod est the concord of human society. Therefore,
concordia societatis humanae. certain men must be removed by death
Subtrahendi igitur sunt huiusmodi from the society of men.
homines per mortem ab hominum
societate.
Praeterea. Sicut medicus in sua [5] Furthermore, just as a physician looks
operatione intendit sanitatem, to health as the end in his work, and
quae consistit in ordinata health consists in the orderly concord of
concordia humorum, ita rector humors, so, too, the ruler of a state
civitatis intendit in sua operatione intends peace in his work, and peace

pacem, quae consistit in civium consists in “the ordered concord of
ordinata concordia. Medicus citizens.” Now, the physician quite properly
autem abscindit membrum and beneficially cuts off a diseased organ
putridum bene et utiliter, si per if the corruption of the body is threatened
ipsum immineat corruptio because of it. Therefore, the ruler of a
corporis. Iuste igitur et absque state executes pestiferous men justly and
peccato rector civitatis homines sinlessly in order that the peace of the
pestiferos occidit, ne pax civitatis state may not be disrupted.
turbetur.
Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, I [6] Hence, the Apostle says, in 1
Cor. 56: nescitis quia modicum Corinthians (5:6): “Know you not that a
fermentum totam massam little leaven corrupts the whole lump?” And
corrumpit? Et post pauca subdit: a little later he adds: “Put away the evil
auferte malum ex vobis ipsis. Et one from among yourselves” (1 Cor. 5:13).
Rom. 134, dicitur de potestate And in Romans (13:4) it is said of earthly
terrena quod non sine causa power that “he does not carry the sword in
gladium portat: Dei enim minister vain: for he is God’s minister, an avenger
est, vindex in iram ei qui male to execute wrath upon him who does evil.”
agit. Et I Petr. 2, dicitur: subiecti And in 1 Peter (2:1314) it is said: “Be
estote omni humanae creaturae subject therefore to every human creature
propter Deum: sive regi, quasi for God’s sake: whether it be to the king as
praecellenti; sive ducibus, quasi excelling, or to governors as sent by him
Missis ad vindictam for the punishment of evildoers and for the
malefactorum, laudem vero praise of the good.”
bonorum.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [7] Now, by this we set aside the error of
quorundam dicentium vindictas some who say that corporeal punishments
corporales non licite fieri. Qui ad are illicit to use. These people adduce as
sui fulcimentum erroris inducunt a basis for their error the text of Exodus (
quod dicitur Exod. 2013: non 20:13) : “You shall not kill,” which is
occides. Quod etiam Matth. 521 mentioned again in Matthew (5:21). They
resumitur. Inducunt etiam quod also bring up what is said in Matthew
dicitur Matth. 1330, quod (13:30), that the Lord replied to the
dominus ministris volentibus stewards who wanted to gather up the
zizaniam colligere de medio tritici, cockle from amidst the wheat: “Let both
respondit: sinite utraque crescere grow until the harvest.” By the cockle we
usque ad messem. Per zizaniam understand the children of the wicked one,
autem filii nequam intelliguntur, whereas by the harvest we understand the
per messem autem saeculi finis, end of the world, as is explained in the
ut ibidem dicitur. Non igitur mali same place (Mat. 13:3840). So, the
subtrahendi sunt de medio wicked are not to be removed from among
bonorum per occisionem. the good by killing them.
Inducunt etiam quod homo [8] They also allege that so long as a man

quandiu in mundo est, potest in is existing in this world he can be changed
melius transmutari. Non ergo est for the better. So, he should not be
per occisionem subtrahendus a removed from the world by execution, but
mundo, sed ad poenitentiam kept for punishment.
reservandus.
Haec autem frivola sunt. Nam in [9] Now, these arguments are frivolous.
lege quae dicit, non occides, Indeed, in the law which says “You shall
postmodum subditur: maleficos not kill” there is the later statement: “You
non patieris vivere. Ex quo datur shall not allow wrongdoers to live” (Exod.
intelligi occisionem hominum 22: 18). From this we are given to
iniustam prohibitam esse. Quod understand that the unjust execution of
etiam ex verbis domini apparet men is prohibited. This is also apparent
Matth. 5. Nam cum dixisset, from the Lord’s words in Matthew 5. For,
audistis quia dictum est antiquis, after He said: “You have heard that it was
non occides, subiunxit: 22 ego said to them of old: You shall not kill” (Mat.
autem dico vobis, qui irascitur 5:21), He added: “But I say to you that
fratri suo et cetera. Ex quo dat whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc.
intelligere illam occisionem esse From this He makes us understand that
prohibitam quae procedit ex ira, the killing which results from anger is
non autem illam quae procedit ex prohibited, but not that which stems from a
zelo iustitiae. Quod etiam zeal for justice. Moreover, how the Lord’s
dominus dicit, sinite utraque statement, “Let both grow until the
crescere usque ad messem, harvest,” should be understood is
qualiter intelligendum sit, apparet apparent through what follows: “lest
per id quod sequitur: ne forte, perhaps, gathering up the cockle, you root
colligentes zizania, eradicetis up the wheat also together with it” (Mat.
simul et triticum. Ibi ergo 13: 29). So, the execution of the wicked is
interdicitur malorum occisio ubi forbidden wherever cannot be done
hoc sine periculo bonorum fieri without danger to the good. Of course, this
non potest. Quod plerumque often happens when the wicked are not
contingit quando mali nondum clearly distinguished from the good by
discernuntur a bonis per their sins, or when the danger of the evil
manifesta peccata; vel quando involving many good men in their ruin is
timetur periculum ne mali multos feared.
bonos post se trahant.
Quod vero mali, quandiu vivunt, [10] Finally, the fact that the evil, as long
emendari possunt, non prohibet as they live, can be corrected from their
quin iuste possint occidi: quia errors does not prohibit the fact that they
periculum quod de eorum vita may be justly executed, for the danger
imminet, est maius et certius which threatens from their way of life is
quam bonum quod de eorum greater and more certain than the good
emendatione expectatur. Habent which may be expected from their
etiam in ipso mortis articulo improvement. They also have at the
facultatem ut per poenitentiam critical point of death the opportunity to be
convertantur ad Deum. Quod si converted to God through repentance.
adeo sunt obstinati quod etiam in And if they are so stubborn that even at
mortis articulo cor eorum a the point of death their heart does not
malitia non recedit, satis draw back from evil, it is possible to make
probabiliter aestimari potest quod a highly probable judgment that they

nunquam a malitia resipiscant. would never come away from evil to the
right use of their powers.
Quod homo indiget divino auxilio THAT MAN NEEDS DIVINE HELP TO
ad beatitudinem consequendam ATTAIN HAPPINESS
Quia vero ex superioribus [1] Since it is plain from earlier
manifestum est quod divina chapters that divine providence
providentia aliter disponit creaturas controls rational creatures in a different
rationales quam res alias secundum way from other things, because they
quod in conditione naturae propriae differ from other things in the way that
ab aliis differunt, restat ostendendum their own nature was established, it
quod etiam ex dignitate finis altior remains to be shown that, by virtue of
gubernationis modus a divina the dignity of their end, a higher mode
providentia eis adhibetur. of governance is used by divine
providence in their case.
Manifestum est autem quod [2] Now, it is obvious that, according to

secundum convenientiam suae what befits their nature, they achieve a
naturae, ad altiorem participationem higher participation in the end. In fact,
finis perveniunt. Quia enim since they have an intellectual nature,
intellectualis naturae sunt, per suam they are able by its operation to attain
operationem intelligibilem veritatem to intelligible truth, and this is not
attingere possunt: quod aliis rebus possible for other things that are
non competit, quae intellectu carent. devoid of understanding. And, of
Et quidem secundum quod ad course, because they can reach
intelligibilem veritatem naturali intelligible truth by their natural
operatione perveniunt, manifestum operation, it is clear that divine
est eis aliter provideri divinitus quam provision is made for them in a
aliis rebus: inquantum homini datus different way than for other things.
est intellectus et ratio, per quae Inasmuch as man is given
veritatem et discernere et investigare understanding and reason, by which
possit; datae sunt etiam ei vires he can both discern and investigate the
sensitivae, et interiores et exteriores, truth; as he is also given sensory
quibus ad investigandam veritatem powers, both internal and external,
adiuvetur; datus est etiam ei whereby he is helped to seek the truth;
loquelae usus, per cuius officium as he is also given the use of speech,
veritatem quam aliquis mente by the functioning of which he is
concipit, alteri manifestare possit; ut enabled to convey to another person
sic homines seipsos iuvent in the truth that he conceives in his mind
cognitione veritatis, sicut et in aliis —thus constituted, men may help
rebus necessariis vitae, cum sit themselves in the process of knowing
homo animal naturaliter sociale. the truth, just as they may in regard to
the other needs of life for man is “a
naturally social animal.”
Sed ulterius ultimus finis hominis in [3] But, beyond this, man’s ultimate
quadam veritatis cognitione end is fixed in a certain knowledge of
constitutus est quae naturalem truth which surpasses his natural
facultatem ipsius excedit: ut scilicet capacity: that is, he may see the very
ipsam primam veritatem videat in First Truth in Itself, as we showed
seipsa, sicut supra ostensum est. above. Now, this is not granted to
Hoc autem inferioribus creaturis non lower creatures, that is, the possibility
competit, ut scilicet ad finem of their reaching an end which exceeds
pervenire possint qui eorum their natural capacity. So, the different
facultatem naturalem excedat. mode of governance in regard to men
Oportet igitur ut etiam ex hoc fine and in regard to other, lower creatures
attendatur diversus gubernationis must be noted as a result of this end.
modus circa homines, et alias For, the things that are related to an
inferiores creaturas. Ea enim quae end must be proportionate to that end.
sunt ad finem, necesse est fini esse So, if man is ordered to an end which
proportionata. Si igitur homo exceeds his natural capacity, some
ordinatur in finem qui eius facultatem help must be divinely provided for him,
naturalem excedat, necesse est ei in a supernatural way, by which he may
aliquod auxilium divinitus adhiberi tend toward his end.
supernaturale, per quod tendat in
finem.
Adhuc. Res inferioris naturae in id [4] Again, a thing of an inferior nature
quod est proprium superioris naturae cannot be brought to what is proper to
non potest perduci nisi virtute illius a higher nature except by the power of
superioris naturae: sicut luna, quae that higher nature. For example, the
ex se non lucet, fit lucida virtute et moon, which does not shine by its own
actione solis; et aqua, quae per se light, becomes luminous by the power
non calet, fit calida virtute et actione and action of the sun, and water, which
ignis. Videre autem ipsam primam is not hot of itself, becomes hot by the
veritatem in seipsa ita transcendit power and action of fire. Now, to see
facultatem humanae naturae, quod the very First Truth in Itself so
est proprium solius Dei, ut supra transcends the capacity of human
ostensum est. Indiget igitur homo nature that it is proper to God alone, as
auxilio divino ad hoc quod in dictum we showed above. Therefore, man
finem perveniat. needs divine help so that he may reach
this end.
Item. Unaquaeque res per [5] Besides, each thing attains its
operationem suam ultimum finem ultimate end by its own operation. Now,
consequitur. Operatio autem virtutem operation gets its power from the
sortitur ex principio operante: unde operating principle; thus, by the action
per actionem seminis generatur of the semen there is generated a
aliquid in determinata specie, cuius being in a definite species, whose
virtus in semine praeexistit. Non power preexists in the semen.
potest igitur homo per operationem Therefore, man is not able by his own
suam pervenire in ultimum finem operation to reach his ultimate end,
suum, qui transcendit facultatem which transcends the capacity of his
naturalium potentiarum, nisi eius natural powers, unless his operation
operatio ex divina virtute efficaciam acquires from divine power the efficacy

capiat perducendi ad finem to reach the aforesaid end.
praedictum.
Amplius. Nullum instrumentum [6] Moreover, no instrument can

secundum virtutem propriae formae achieve its ultimate perfection by the
perducere potest ad ultimam power of its own form, but only by the
perfectionem, sed solum secundum power of the principal agent, although
virtutem principalis agentis: quamvis by its own power it can provide a
secundum propriam virtutem aliquam certain disposition to the ultimate
dispositionem facere possit ad perfection. Indeed, the cutting of the
ultimam perfectionem. A serra enim lumber results from the saw according
secundum rationem propriae formae to the essential character of its own
est sectio ligni, sed forma scamni est form, but the form of the bench comes
ab arte, quae utitur instrumento: from the skilled mind which uses the
similiter resolutio et consumptio in tool. Likewise, the breaking down and
corpore animalis est a calore ignis, consumption of food in the animal body
sed generatio carnis, et determinatio is due to the heat of fire, but the
augmenti, et alia huiusmodi, sunt ab generation of flesh, and controlled
anima vegetabili, quae utitur calore growth and similar actions, stem from
igneo sicut instrumento. Sub Deo the vegetative soul which uses the
autem, qui est primus intellectus et heat of fire as an instrument. Now, all
volens, ordinantur omnes intellectus intellects and wills are subordinated as
et voluntates sicut instrumenta sub instruments under a principal agent to
principali agente. Oportet igitur quod God, Who is the first intellect and will.
eorum operationes efficaciam non So, their operations must have no
habeant respectu ultimae efficacy in regard to the ultimate
perfectionis, quae est adeptio finalis perfection which is the attainment of
beatitudinis, nisi per virtutem final happiness, except through the
divinam. Indiget igitur rationalis divine power. Therefore, a rational
natura divino auxilio ad nature needs divine help to obtain the
consequendum ultimum finem. ultimate end.
Praeterea. Homini adsunt [7] Furthermore, there are many

impedimenta plurima perveniendi ad impediments presented to man in the
finem. Impeditur enim debilitate attaining of his end. For he is hindered
rationis, quae de facili trahitur in by the weakness of his reason, which
errorem, per quem a recta via is easily drawn into error by which he is
perveniendi in finem excluditur. cut off from the right way of reaching
Impeditur etiam ex passionibus his end. He is also hindered by the
partis sensitivae, et ex affectionibus passions of his sensory nature, and by
quibus ad sensibilia et inferiora the feelings whereby he is attracted to
trahitur, quibus quanto magis sensible and lower things; and the
inhaeret, longius ab ultimo fine more he attaches himself to these, the
distat: haec enim infra hominem farther he is removed from his ultimate
sunt, finis autem hominis superior eo end, for these things are below man,
existit. Impeditur etiam plerumque whereas man’s end is above him. He is
corporis infirmitate ab executione further hindered by frequent bodily
virtuosorum actuum, quibus ad illness from the carrying out of his
beatitudinem tenditur. Indiget igitur virtuous activities whereby he may

auxilio divino homo ne per huiusmodi tend toward happiness. Therefore,
impedimenta totaliter ab ultimo fine man needs divine help, but he may fall
deficiat. completely short of the ultimate end as
a result of these obstacles.
Hinc est quod dicitur Ioan. 644: [8] Hence, it is said, in John (6:44): “No

nemo potest venire ad me nisi pater, man can come to Me, except the
qui misit me, traxerit illum; et 154: Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him,”
sicut palmes non potest ferre fructum and again: “As the branch cannot bear
a semetipso nisi manserit in vite, sic fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine,
nec vos nisi in me manseritis. so neither can you, unless you abide in
Me” (John 15:4).
Per hoc autem excluditur error [9] By this we set aside the error of the

Pelagianorum qui dixerunt quod per Pelagians, who said that man could
solum liberum arbitrium homo merit the glory of God by his free
poterat Dei gloriam promereri. choice alone.”
Quod per auxilium divinae THAT BY THE HELP OF DIVINE
gratiae homo non cogitur ad GRACE MAN IS NOT FORCED
virtutem TOWARD VIRTUE
Posset autem videri alicui quod per [1] Now, it might seem to someone that
divinum auxilium aliqua coactio by divine help some external
homini inferatur ad bene agendum, compulsion to good action is exercised
ex hoc quod dictum est, nemo on man, because it has been said: “No
potest venire ad me nisi pater, qui man can come to Me, except the Father,
misit me, traxerit eum; et ex hoc Who hath sent Me, draw him” (John
dicitur Rom. 814, qui spiritu Dei 6:44); and because of the statement in
aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt et II Cor. 5 Romans (8:14): “Whosoever are led by
14, caritas Christi urget nos. Trahi the Spirit of God, they are the sons of
enim, et agi, et urgeri, coactionem God”; and in 2 Corinthians (5:14): “the
importare videntur. charity of Christ presses us.” Indeed, to
be drawn, to be led, and to be pressed
seem to imply coaction.
Hoc autem non esse verum [2] But that this is not true is clearly
manifeste ostenditur. Divina enim shown. For divine providence provides
providentia rebus omnibus providet for all things according to their measure,
secundum modum eorum, ut supra as we have shown above. But it is
ostensum est. Est autem proprium proper to man, and to every rational
homini, et omni rationali naturae, nature, to act voluntarily and to control
quod voluntarie agat et suis actibus his own acts, as it is clear from what we
dominetur, ut ex supra dictis patet. have said before. But coaction is
Huic autem coactio contrariatur. contrary to this. Therefore, God by His
Non igitur Deus suo auxilio help does not force men to right action.

hominem cogit ad recte agendum.
Adhuc. Divinum auxilium sic [3] Again, that divine help is provided
intelligitur ad bene agendum homini man so that he may act well is to be
adhiberi, quod in nobis nostra understood in this way: it performs our
opera operatur, sicut causa prima works in us, as the primary cause
operatur operationes causarum performs the operations of secondary
secundarum, et agens principale causes, and as a principal agent
operatur actionem instrumenti: performs the action of an instrument.
unde dicitur Isaiae 2612: omnia Hence, it is said in Isaiah (26:1213):
opera nostra operatus es in nobis, “You have wrought all our works for us,
domine. Causa autem prima causat O Lord.” Now, the first cause causes the
operationem causae secundae operation of the secondary cause
secundum modum ipsius. Ergo et according to the measure of the latter.
Deus causat in nobis nostra opera So, God also causes our works in us in
secundum modum nostrum, qui est accord with our measure, which means
ut voluntarie, et non coacte that we act voluntarily and not as forced.
agamus. Non igitur divino auxilio Therefore, no one is forced to right
aliquis cogitur ad recte agendum. action by the divine help.
Amplius. Homo per voluntatem [4] Besides, man is ordered to his end
ordinatur in finem: obiectum enim by his will, for the object of the will is the
voluntatis est bonum et finis. good and the end. Now, divine help is
Auxilium autem divinum nobis ad chiefly afforded us so that we may
hoc praecipue impenditur ut obtain our end. So, this help does not
consequamur finem. Eius ergo exclude from us the act of our will, but,
auxilium non excludit a nobis actum rather, in a special way, produces this
voluntatis, sed ipsum praecipue in act in us. Hence, the Apostle says, in
nobis facit: unde et apostolus dicit, Philippians (2:13): “it is God Who works
Philipp. 213: Deus est qui operatur in you, both to will and to accomplish,
in nobis velle et perficere, pro bona according to good will.” But coaction
voluntate. Coactio autem excludit in excludes the act of the will in us, since
nobis actum voluntatis: coacte enim we do under force that whose contrary
agimus cuius contrarium volumus. we will. Therefore, God does not force
Non ergo Deus suo auxilio nos us by His help to act rightly.
cogit ad recte agendum.
Item. Homo pervenit ad ultimum [5] Moreover, man reaches his ultimate
suum finem per actus virtutum: end by acts of the virtues, for felicity is
felicitas enim virtutis praemium assigned as a reward for virtue. Now,
ponitur. Actus autem coacti non forced acts are not acts of the virtues,
sunt actus virtutum: nam in virtute since the main thing in virtue is choice,
praecipuum est electio, quae sine which cannot be present without
voluntario esse non potest, cui voluntariness to which violence is
violentum contrarium est. Non igitur opposed. Therefore, man is not divinely
divinitus homo cogitur ad recte compelled to act rightly.
agendum.
Praeterea. Ea quae sunt ad finem, [6] Furthermore, the means to the end
debent esse fini proportionata. Finis should be in proportion to the end. But
autem ultimus, qui est felicitas, non the ultimate end which is felicity is
competit nisi voluntarie agentibus, appropriate only to voluntary agents,
qui sunt domini sui actus: unde who are masters of their acts. Hence,
neque inanimata, neque bruta we call neither inanimate things nor
animalia felicia dicimus, sicut nec brute animals, happy, just as they are
fortunata aut infortunata, nisi neither fortunate nor unfortunate, except
secundum metaphoram. Auxilium metaphorically. Therefore, the help that
igitur quod homini datur divinitus ad is divinely given men to attain felicity is
felicitatem consequendam, non est not coercive.
coactivum.
Hinc est quod Deut. 30 dicitur: [7] Hence, it is said in Deuteronomy
considera quod hodie proposuerit (30:1518): “Consider that the Lord has
dominus in conspectu tuo vitam et set before you this day life and good,
bonum, et e contrario mortem et and on the other hand death and evil;
malum: ut diligas dominum Deum that you may love the Lord your God,
tuum, et ambules in viis eius. Si and walk in His ways... But if your heart
autem aversum fuerit cor tuum et turns away so that you will not hear... I
audire nolueris, praedico tibi hodie foretell you this day that you shall
quod pereas. Et Eccli. 1518 dicitur: perish.” And in Sirach (1518): “Before
ante hominem est vita et mors, man is life and death, good and evil;
bonum et malum. Quod placuerit ei, what he chooses shall be given him.”
dabitur illi.
Quod divinum auxilium homo THAT MAN CANNOT MERIT DIVINE
promereri non potest HELP IN ADVANCE
Ex dictis autem manifeste [1] From what has been said it is quite
ostenditur quod auxilium divinum manifest that man cannot merit divine
homo promereri non potest. help in advance. For everything is related
Quaelibet enim res ad id quod as matter to what is above it. Now, matter
supra ipsam est, materialiter se does not move itself to its own perfection;
habet. Materia autem non movet rather, it must be moved by something
seipsam ad suam perfectionem else. So, man does not move himself so
sed oportet quod ab alio moveatur. as to obtain divine help which is above
Homo igitur non movet seipsum ad him; rather, he is moved by God to obtain
hoc quod adipiscatur divinum it.” Now, the movement of the mover
auxilium, quod supra ipsum est, precedes the movement of the movable
sed potius ad hoc adipiscendum a thing in reason and causally. Therefore,
Deo movetur. Motio autem divine help is not given to us by virtue of
moventis praecedit motum mobilis the fact that we initially move ourselves
ratione et causa. Non igitur propter toward it by good works; instead, we
hoc nobis datur auxilium divinum make such progress by good works
quia nos ad illud per bona opera because we are preceded by divine help.
promovemus, sed potius ideo nos
per bona opera proficimus, quia

divino auxilio praevenimur.
Adhuc. Agens instrumentale non [2] Again, an instrumental agent is not
disponit ad perfectionem disposed to he brought to perfection by
inducendam a principali agente the principal agent, unless it acts by the
nisi secundum quod agit ex virtute power of the principal agent. Thus, the
principalis agentis: sicut calor ignis heat of fire no more prepares matter for
non magis praeparat materiam ad the form of flesh than for any other form,
formam carnis quam ad aliam except in so far as the heat acts through
formam, nisi inquantum agit in the power of the soul. But our soul acts
virtute animae. Sed anima nostra under God, as an instrumental agent
operatur sub Deo sicut agens under a principal agent. So, the soul
instrumentale sub principali cannot prepare itself to receive the
agente. Non igitur potest se anima influence of divine help except in so far
praeparare ad suscipiendum as it acts from divine power. Therefore, it
effectum divini auxilii nisi is preceded by divine help toward good
secundum quod agit ex virtute action, rather than preceding the divine
divina. Praevenitur igitur divino help and meriting it, as it were, or
auxilio ad bene operandum, magis preparing itself for it.
quam divinum auxilium praeveniat,
quasi merendo illud vel se
praeparando ad illud.
Amplius. Nullum agens particulare [3] Besides, no particular agent can
potest universaliter praevenire universally precede the action of the first
actionem primi universalis agentis: universal agent, because the action of a
eo quod omnis actio particularis particular agent takes its origin from the
agentis originem habet ab universal agent, just as in things here
universali agente; sicut in istis below, all motion is preceded by celestial
inferioribus omnis motus motion. But the human soul is
praevenitur a motu caelesti. Sed subordinated to God as a particular agent
anima humana ordinatur sub Deo under a universal one. So, it is
sicut particulare agens sub impossible for there to be any right
universali. Impossibile est ergo movement in it which divine action does
esse aliquem rectum motum in not precede. Hence, the Lord says, in
ipsa quem non praeveniat actio John (15:5): “without Me you can do
divina. Unde et Ioan. 155, nothing.”
dominus dicit: sine me nihil
potestis facere.
Item. Merces proportionatur [4] Moreover, compensation is in

merito: cum in retributione proportion to merit, because in the
mercedis aequalitas iustitiae repaying of compensation the equality of
observetur. Effectus autem divini justice is practiced. Now, the influence of
auxilii, qui facultatem naturae divine help which surpasses the capacity
excedit, non est proportionatus of nature is not proportionate to the acts
actibus quos homo ex naturali that man performs by his natural ability.
facultate producit. Non igitur per Therefore, man cannot merit the
huiusmodi actus potest homo aforesaid help by acts of that kind.

praedictum auxilium mereri.
Praeterea. Cognitio praecedit [5] Furthermore, knowledge precedes the

voluntatis motum. Cognitio autem movement of the will. But the knowledge
supernaturalis finis est homini a of the supernatural end comes to man
Deo: cum per rationem naturalem from God, since man could not attain it
in ipsum attingere homo non by natural reason because it exceeds his
possit, eo quod facultatem natural capacity. So, divine help must
naturalem excedit. Oportet ergo precede the movements of our will
quod motus voluntatis nostrae in toward the ultimate end.
ultimum finem auxilium divinum
praeveniat.
Hinc est quod dicitur Tit. 35: non [6] Hence, it is said in Titus (3:5): “Not by

ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus the works of justice which we have done,
nos, sed secundum suam but according to His mercy, He saved
misericordiam salvos nos fecit. Et us.” And in Romans (9: 16) the action of
Rom. 916: non est volentis, willing is “not his who wills,” nor is the
scilicet velle, nec currentis scilicet action of running “his who runs,” but both
currere, sed miserentis Dei: quia are “of God who shows mercy.” For, to
scilicet oportet quod ad bene perform a good act of willing and of
volendum et operandum homo doing, man must be preceded by divine
divino praeveniatur auxilio; sicut help. For instance, it is customary to
consuetum est quod effectus attribute an effect not to the proximate
aliquis non attribuitur proximo agent of. operation, but to the first mover;
operanti, sed primo moventi; thus, the victory is ascribed to the
attribuitur enim victoria duci, quae general even though it is accomplished
labore militum perpetratur. Non by the work of the soldiers. Not that free
ergo per huiusmodi verba choice of the will is excluded by these
excluditur liberum voluntatis words, as some have wrongly
arbitrium, sicut quidam male understood them, as if man were not the
intellexerunt, quasi homo non sit master of his own internal and external
dominus suorum actuum acts; the text shows that man is subject
interiorum et exteriorum: sed to God. And it is said in Lamentations
ostenditur Deo esse subiectum. Et (5:21): “Convert us, O Lord, to You, and
Thren. 4 dicitur: converte nos, we shall be converted.” From which it is
domine, ad te, et convertemur: per clear that our conversion to God is
quod patet quod conversio nostra preceded by God’s help which converts
ad Deum praevenitur auxilio Dei us.
nos convertentis.
Legitur tamen Zach. 13, ex [7] However, we read in Zechariah (3:3) a

persona Dei dictum, convertimini statement made in the name of God:
ad me, et convertar ad vos: non “Turn to me... and we shall turn to you.”
quin Dei operatio nostram Not, of course, that the working of God
conversionem praeveniat, ut fails to precede our conversion, as we
dictum est, sed quia conversionem said, but that He subsequently assists
nostram, qua ad ipsum our conversion, whereby we turn to Him,

convertimur, adiuvat by strengthening it so that it may reach
subsequenter, eam roborando ut its result and by confirming it so that it
ad effectum perveniat, et may obtain its proper end.
stabiliendo ut finem debitum
consequatur.
Per hoc autem excluditur error [8] Now, by this we set aside the error of

Pelagianorum, qui dicebant the Pelagians, who said that this kind of
huiusmodi auxilium propter merita help is given us because of our merits,
nobis dari; et quod iustificationis and that the beginning of our justification
nostrae initium ex nobis sit, is from ourselves, though the completion
consummatio autem a Deo. of it is from God.
Quod praedictum divinum THAT THE AFORESAID DIVINE HELP
auxilium gratia nominatur, et IS CALLED GRACE, AND WHAT
quid sit gratia gratum faciens SANCTIFYING GRACE IS
Quia vero hoc quod datur alicui [1] Since what is given a person, without

absque suis meritis any preceding merit on his part, is said to
praecedentibus, gratis ei dicitur be given to him gratis, and because the
dari; cum divinum auxilium homini divine help that is offered to man
exhibitum omne meritum precedes all human merit, as we showed,
humanum praeveniat ut ostensum it follows that this help is accorded gratis
est, consequitur quod hoc to man, and as a result it quite fittingly
auxilium gratis homini impendatur, took the name grace. Hence, the Apostle
et ex hoc convenienter gratiae says, in Romans (11:6): “And if by grace,
nomen accepit. Unde et apostolus it is not now by works: otherwise grace is
dicit, Rom. 116: si gratia est, iam no more grace.”
non ex operibus: alioquin gratia
iam non est gratia.
Est autem et alia ratio propter [2] But there is another reason why the
quam praedictum Dei auxilium aforesaid help of God has taken the
gratiae nomen accepit. Dicitur name grace. In fact, a person is said to
enim aliquis alicui esse gratus, be in the “good graces” of another
quia est ei dilectus: unde et qui ab because he is well liked by the other.
aliquo diligitur, dicitur gratiam eius Consequently, he who is loved by another
habere. Est autem de ratione is said to enjoy his grace. Now, it is of the
dilectionis ut diligens bonum velit essence of love that the ]over wishes
ei quem diligit, et operetur. Et good and does what is good for the
quidem Deus bona vult et operatur object of his love. Of course, God wishes
circa omnem creaturam: ipsum and does good things in regard to every
enim esse creaturae, et omnis creature, for the very being of the
eius perfectio, est a Deo volente creature and all his perfection result from
et operante, ut supra ostensum God’s willing and doing, as we showed
est; unde dicitur Sap. 1125: diligis above. Hence, it is said in Wisdom

omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti (11:25): “For You love all things that are,
eorum quae fecisti. Sed specialis and hate none of the things which You
ratio divinae dilectionis ad illos have made.” But a special mark of divine
consideratur quibus auxilium love is observable in the case of those to
praebet ad hoc quod whom He offers help so that they may
consequantur bonum quod attain a good which surpasses the order
ordinem naturae eorum excedit, of their nature, namely, the perfect
scilicet perfectam fruitionem non enjoyment, not of some created good, but
alicuius boni creati, sed sui ipsius. of Himself. So, this help is appropriately
Hoc igitur auxilium convenienter called grace, not only because it is given
gratia dicitur, non solum quia gratis, as we showed, but also because
gratis datur, ut ostensum est: sed by this help man is, through a special
etiam quia hoc auxilio homo prerogative, brought into the good graces
speciali quadam praerogativa of God. Hence, the Apostle says, in
redditur Deo gratus. Unde et Ephesians (1:56): “Who predestinated us
apostolus dicit, Ephes. 15 to the adoption of children... according to
praedestinavit nos in adoptionem the purpose of His will, to the praise of
filiorum, secundum propositum the glory of His grace, in which He hath
voluntatis suae, in laudem gloriae graced us in His beloved Son.”
gratiae suae, in qua gratificavit
nos in dilecto filio suo.
Oportet autem hanc gratiam [3] Now, this grace, within the man who is

aliquid in homine gratificato esse, graced by it, must be something, a sort of
quasi quandam formam et form and perfection for that man. For, a
perfectionem ipsius. Quod enim in thing that is directed toward an end must
aliquem finem dirigitur, oportet have a continual relation to it, because
quod habeat continuum ordinem the mover continually moves the moved
in ipsum: nam movens continue object, until the object comes to its end
mutat quousque mobile per as a result of the motion. Therefore, since
motum finem sortiatur. Cum igitur man is directed to the ultimate end by the
auxilio divinae gratiae homo help of divine grace, as we showed, man
dirigatur in ultimum finem, ut must continually enjoy this help until he
ostensum est, oportet quod reaches his end. Now, this would not be if
continue homo isto auxilio potiatur, man participated in the aforesaid help as
quousque ad finem perveniat. Hoc a motion or passion and not as an
autem non esset si praedictum enduring form which is, as it were, at rest
auxilium participaret homo in him. In fact, a motion and a passion
secundum aliquem motum aut would not be present in man except when
passionem, et non secundum he was actually converted to the end, and
aliquam formam manentem, et this act is not continually performed by
quasi quiescentem in ipso: motus man, as is especially evident in the case
enim et passio talis non esset in of sleeping man. Therefore, sanctifying
homine nisi quando actu grace is a form and perfection remaining
converteretur in finem; quod non in man even when he is not acting.
continue ab homine agitur, ut
praecipue patet in dormientibus.
Est ergo gratia gratum faciens
aliqua forma et perfectio in homine
manens, etiam quando non

operatur.
Adhuc. Dilectio Dei est causativa [4] Again, God’s love is causative of the
boni quod in nobis est: sicut good which is in us, just as a man’s love
dilectio hominis provocatur et is called forth and caused by some good
causatur ex aliquo bono quod in thing which is in the object of his love. But
dilecto est. Sed homo provocatur man is aroused to love someone in a
ad specialiter aliquem diligendum special way because of some special
propter aliquod speciale bonum in good which preexists in the person
dilecto praeexistens. Ergo ubi loved. Therefore, wherever there is found
ponitur specialis dilectio Dei ad a special love of God for man, there must
hominem, oportet quod consequently be found some special
consequenter ponatur aliquod good conferred on man by God. Hence,
speciale bonum homini a Deo since in accord with the preceding
collatum. Cum igitur, secundum explanation sanctifying grace marks a
praedicta, gratia gratum faciens special love of God for man, it must be
designet specialem dilectionem that a special goodness and perfection is
Dei ad hominem, oportet quod marked, as being present in man, by this
aliqua specialis bonitas et term.
perfectio per hoc homini inesse
designetur.
Amplius. Unumquodque ordinatur [5] Besides, everything is ordered to an

in finem sibi convenientem end suitable to it by the rational character
secundum rationem suae formae: of its form, for there are different ends for
diversarum enim specierum different species. But the end to which
diversi sunt fines. Sed finis in man is directed by the help of divine
quem homo dirigitur per auxilium grace is above human nature. Therefore,
divinae gratiae, est supra naturam some supernatural form and perfection
humanam. Ergo oportet quod must be superadded to man whereby he
homini superaddatur aliqua may be ordered suitably to the aforesaid
supernaturalis forma et perfectio, end.
per quam convenienter ordinetur
in finem praedictum.
Item. Oportet quod homo ad [6] Moreover, man must reach his
ultimum finem per proprias ultimate end by his own operations. Now,
operationes perveniat. everything operates in accord with its
Unumquodque autem operatur own form. So in order that man may be
secundum propriam formam. brought to his ultimate end by his own
Oportet igitur, ad hoc quod homo operations, a form must be superadded
perducatur in ultimum finem per to him from which his operations may get
proprias operationes, quod a certain efficacy in meriting his ultimate
superaddatur ei aliqua forma, ex end.
qua eius operationes efficaciam
aliquam accipiant promerendi
ultimum finem.
Praeterea. Divina providentia [7] Furthermore, divine providence makes

omnibus providet secundum provision for all things in accord with the
modum suae naturae, ut ex supra measure of their nature, as is evident
dictis patet. Est autem hic modus from preceding statements. Now, this is
proprius hominum, quod ad the measure proper for man: for the
perfectionem suarum operationum perfection of their operations there must
oportet eis inesse, super naturales be present in them, above their natural
potentias, quasdam perfectiones potencies, certain perfections and habits
et habitus, quibus quasi whereby they may operate well and do
connaturaliter et faciliter et the good, connaturally, easily and
delectabiliter bonum et bene enjoyably, as it were. Therefore, the help
operentur. Igitur auxilium gratiae, of grace which man obtains from God in
quod homo a Deo consequitur ad order to reach the ultimate end
perveniendum in ultimum finem, designates a form and perfection present
aliquam formam et perfectionem in man.
homini inesse designat.
Hinc est quod gratia Dei in [8] Hence, in Scripture, the grace of God

Scriptura quasi lux quaedam is signified by some sort of light, for the
designatur: dicit enim apostolus Apostle says in Ephesians (5:8): “ you
Ephes. 58: eratis aliquando were heretofore darkness, but now, light
tenebrae: nunc autem lux in in the Lord.” Properly enough, then, the
domino. Decenter autem perfectio perfection whereby man is initially moved
per quam homo promovetur in to his ultimate end, which consists in the
ultimum finem, quae in Dei visione vision of God, is called light, for this is the
consistit, dicitur lux, quae est principle of the act of seeing.
principium videndi.
Per hoc autem excluditur opinio [9] By this we set aside the opinion of
quorundam dicentium quod gratia certain men who say that the grace of
Dei nihil in homine ponit: sicut nihil God places nothing within man, just as
in aliquo ponitur ex hoc quod something is not put into a person as a
dicitur gratiam regis habere, sed result of the statement that he has the
solum in rege diligente. Patet ergo good graces of a king, but only in the king
eos fuisse deceptos ex hoc quod who likes him. It is clear, then, that they
non attenderunt differentiam inter were deceived by their failure to note the
dilectionem divinam et humanam. difference between divine and human
Divina enim dilectio est causativa love. For divine love is causative of the
boni quod in aliquo diligit: non good which He loves in anything, but
semper autem humana. human love is not always so.
Quod gratia gratum faciens THAT SANCTIFYING GRACE CAUSES
causat in nobis dilectionem Dei THE LOVE OF GOD IN US
Ex praemissis autem manifestum fit [1] From the foregoing it becomes
quod per auxilium gratiae divinae evident that man achieves this result
gratum facientis hoc homo through the help of divine sanctifying
consequitur, quod Deum diligat. grace: the fact that he loves God.
Gratia enim gratum faciens est in [2] For sanctifying grace is an effect in
homine divinae dilectionis effectus. man of divine love. But the proper effect
Proprius autem divinae dilectionis in man of divine love seems to be the
effectus in homine esse videtur fact that he loves God. Indeed, this is
quod Deum diligat. Hoc enim est the principal thing in the lover’s
praecipuum in intentione diligentis, intention: to be loved in turn by the
ut a dilecto reametur: ad hoc enim object of his love. To this, then, the
praecipue studium diligentis tendit, lover’s main effort inclines, to attract his
ut ad sui amorem dilectum attrahat; beloved to the love of himself; unless
et nisi hoc accidat, oportet this occurs, his love must come to
dilectionem dissolvi. Igitur ex gratia naught. So, this fact that he loves Cod is
gratum faciente hoc in homine the result in man of sanctifying grace.
sequitur, quod Deum diligat.
Adhuc. Eorum quorum est unus [3] Again, there must be some union of
finis, oportet aliquam unionem esse things for which there is one end, as a
inquantum ordinantur ad finem: result of their being ordered to this end.
unde et in civitate homines per Thus, in a state men are unified by a
quandam concordiam adunantur ut certain concord, so that they may be
possint consequi reipublicae able to attain the public good, and
bonum; et milites in acie oportet soldiers in combat must be united and
uniri et concorditer agere ad hoc act with one accord, so that victory, the
quod victoriam, quae est communis common end, may be achieved. Now,
finis, consequantur. Finis autem the ultimate end, to which man is
ultimus, ad quem homo per brought with the help of divine grace, is
auxilium divinae gratiae perducitur, the vision of God in His essence, which
est visio Dei per essentiam, quae is proper to God Himself. Thus, this final
propria est ipsius Dei: et sic hoc good is shared with man by God. So,
finale bonum communicatur homini man cannot be brought to this end
a Deo. Non potest igitur homo ad unless he be united with God by the
hunc finem perduci nisi uniatur Deo conformation of his will. And this is the
per conformitatem voluntatis. Quae proper effect of love, for “it is proper to
est proprius effectus dilectionis: friends to approve and disapprove the
nam amicorum proprium est idem same things, and to be delighted in and
velle et nolle, et de eisdem gaudere to be pained by the same things.”Hence,
et dolere. Per gratiam ergo gratum by sanctifying grace man is established
facientem homo constituitur Dei as a lover of God, since man is directed
dilector: cum per eam homo by it to the end that has been shared
dirigatur in finem ei communicatum with him by God.
a Deo.
Amplius. Cum finis et bonum sit [4] Besides, since the end and the good

proprium obiectum appetitus sive are the proper object of the appetite or
affectus, oportet quod per gratiam affection, man’s affections must be
gratum facientem, quae hominem chiefly perfected by sanctifying grace,

dirigit in ultimum finem, affectus which directs man to his ultimate end.
hominis principaliter perficiatur. But the chief perfection of the affections
Principalis autem perfectio affectus is love. The mark of this is that every
est dilectio. Cuius signum est, quod movement of feeling is derived from
omnis motus affectus ab amore love, for no one desires, hopes, or
derivatur: nullus enim desiderat, aut rejoices except because of a good
sperat, aut gaudet, nisi propter which is loved. Likewise, neither does
bonum amatum; similiter autem anyone experience repugnance, fear,
neque aliquis refugit, aut timet, aut sorrow, or anger except because of
tristatur, aut irascitur, nisi propter id what is opposed to the good that is
quod contrariatur bono amato. loved. Therefore, the principal effect of
Principalis ergo effectus gratiae sanctifying grace is for man to love God.
gratum facientis est ut homo Deum
diligat.
Item. Forma per quam res ordinatur [5] Moreover, the form whereby a thing

in aliquem finem, assimilat is ordered to an end makes the thing
quodammodo rem illam fini: sicut somewhat like the end. For instance, a
corpus per formam gravitatis body acquires through the form of
acquirit similitudinem et weight a likeness and conformity to the
conformitatem ad locum ad quem place toward which it is moved naturally.
naturaliter movetur. Ostensum est But we showed that sanctifying grace is
autem quod gratia gratum faciens a certain form in man whereby he is
est forma quaedam in homine per ordered to his ultimate end, Who is God.
quam ordinatur ad ultimum finem, So, man achieves the likeness to God
qui Deus est. Per gratiam ergo through grace. Now, likeness is the
homo Dei similitudinem cause of love, for everything loves its
consequitur. Similitudo autem est like (See Sirach 13:19). Therefore, by
dilectionis causa: omne enim simile grace man is made a lover of God.
diligit sibi simile. Per gratiam ergo
homo efficitur Dei dilector.
Praeterea. Ad perfectionem [6] Furthermore, it is required for

operationis requiritur quod aliquis perfection of operation that a person act
constanter et prompte operetur. steadily and promptly. Now, love
Hoc autem praecipue facit amor: produces this result especially; because
propter quem etiam difficilia levia of it, even difficult things are lightly
videntur. Cum igitur ex gratia regarded. So, since man’s operations
gratum faciente oporteat hominis must become perfect as a result of
operationes perfectas fieri, ut ex sanctifying grace, as appears from what
dictis patet, necessarium est quod we have said, it is necessary for the love
per eandem gratiam Dei dilectio of God to be established in us through
constituatur in nobis. this grace.
Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. [7] Hence, the Apostle says, in Romans
55: caritas Dei diffusa est in (5:5): “the charity of God is poured forth
cordibus nostris per spiritum in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who has
sanctum, qui datus est nobis. been given to us.” Moreover, the Lord
Dominus etiam dilectoribus suis has promised His vision to those who
visionem suam repromittit, dicens, love Him, saying in John (14:21): “he
Ioan. 1421: qui diligit me, diligetur who loves Me shall be loved by My
a patre meo: et ego diligam eum, et Father; and I will love him and will
manifestabo ei meipsum. manifest Myself to him.”
Unde patet quod gratia, quae ad [8] Thus, it is clear that grace, which
finem divinae visionis dirigit, directs us to the final divine vision,
dilectionem Dei causat in nobis. causes the love of God in us.
Quod divina gratia causat in THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES FAITH
nobis fidem IN US
Ex hoc autem quod divina gratia [1] Now, as a result of divine grace
caritatem in nobis causat, causing charity in us, it is also necessary
necessarium est quod etiam in for faith to be caused in us by grace.
nobis fides per gratiam causetur.
Motus enim quo per gratiam in [2] Indeed, the movement whereby we
ultimum finem dirigimur, est are directed by grace to our ultimate end
voluntarius, non violentus, ut supra is voluntary, not violent, as we showed
ostensum est. Voluntarius autem above. Now, there cannot be a voluntary
motus in aliquid esse non potest movement toward something unless it is
nisi sit cognitum. Oportet igitur known. So, the knowledge of the ultimate
quod per gratiam in nobis cognitio end must be accorded us by grace, so
ultimi finis praestituatur, ad hoc that we may be voluntarily directed to it.
quod voluntarie dirigamur in ipsum. But this knowledge cannot be by means
Haec autem cognitio non potest of open vision in this life, as we showed
esse secundum apertam visionem above. Therefore, this knowledge must
in statu isto, ut supra probatum est. be through faith.
Oportet igitur quod sit cognitio per
fidem.
Amplius. In quolibet cognoscente [3] Again, in every knowing being the
modus cognitionis consequitur mode of knowledge depends on the
modum propriae naturae: unde mode of its proper nature; hence, the
alius modus cognitionis est Angeli, mode of knowing is different for an
hominis, et bruti animalis, angel, a man, and a brute animal,
secundum quod eorum naturae inasmuch as their natures are different,
diversae sunt, ut ex praemissis as is clear from things said earlier. But to
patet. Sed homini, ad man, in order that he may attain his
consequendum ultimum finem, ultimate end, there is added a perfection
additur aliqua perfectio super higher than his own nature, namely,
propriam naturam, scilicet gratia, ut grace, as we have shown. Therefore, it is
ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod necessary that, above man’s natural
etiam super cognitionem naturalem knowledge, there also be added to him a
hominis, addatur in eo aliqua knowledge which surpasses natural
cognitio quae rationem naturalem reason. And this is the knowledge of
excedat. Et haec est cognitio fidei, faith, which is of the things that are not
quae est de his quae non videntur seen by natural reason.
per rationem naturalem.
Item. Quandocumque ab aliquo [4] Besides, whenever something is

agente movetur aliquid ad id quod moved by an agent to what is proper to
est proprium illi agenti, oportet the agent, the thing moved must be, at
quod a principio ipsum mobile the start, imperfectly subject to the
subdatur impressionibus agentis impulsions of the agent, impulsions that
imperfecte, quasi alienis et non remain somewhat foreign and improper
propriis sibi, quousque fiant ei to it, until at the end of the movement
propriae in termino motus: sicut they do become proper to it. For
lignum ab igne primo calefit, et ille example, wood is first heated by fire, and
calor non est proprius ligno, sed that heat does not belong to the wood
praeter naturam ipsius; in fine but is apart from its nature; at the end,
autem, quando iam lignum ignitum however, when the wood is now ignited,
est, fit ei calor proprius et the heat becomes proper and connatural
connaturalis. Et similiter, cum to it. Likewise, when a person is being
aliquis a magistro docetur, oportet taught by a teacher, he must at the start
quod a principio conceptiones accept the teacher’s conceptions, not as
magistri recipiat non quasi eas per one who understands them by himself,
se intelligens, sed per modum but by way of belief, as things which are
credulitatis, quasi supra suam beyond his capacity; but at the end,
capacitatem existentes: in fine when he has become learned, he can
autem, quando iam edoctus fuerit, understand them. Now, as is clear from
eas poterit intelligere. Sicut autem what we have said, we are directed by
ex dictis patet, auxilio divinae the help of divine grace to our ultimate
gratiae dirigimur in ultimum finem. end. But the ultimate end is an open
Ultimus autem finis est manifesta vision of the First Truth in Itself, as we
visio primae veritatis in seipsa: ut showed above. Therefore, before it
supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur comes to this end, man’s intellect must
quod, antequam ad istum finem be subject to God by way of belief, under
veniatur, intellectus hominis Deo the influence of divine grace which
subdatur per modum credulitatis, accomplishes this.
divina gratia hoc faciente.
Praeterea. In principio huius operis [5] Moreover, at the beginning of this

positae sunt utilitates propter quas work we indicated the advantages which
necessarium fuit divinam veritatem made it necessary for divine truth to be
hominibus per modum credulitatis offered to men by way of belief. It is also
proponi. Ex quibus etiam concludi possible to conclude from these reasons
potest quod necessarium fuit fidem that it was necessary for faith to be a
esse divinae gratiae effectum in product in us of divine grace.
nobis.
Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, ad [6] Hence, the Apostle says to the
Ephes. 28: gratia salvati estis per Ephesians (2:8): “by grace you are
fidem. Et hoc non ex vobis: Dei saved through faith; and that not of
enim donum est. yourselves, for it is the gift of God.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [7] By this conclusion we set aside the
Pelagianorum, qui dicebant quod error of the Pelagians, who said that the
initium fidei in nobis non erat a beginning of faith in us was not from God
Deo, sed a nobis. but from ourselves.
Quod divina gratia causat in THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES HOPE
nobis spem IN US
Ex eisdem etiam ostendi potest [1] On the same premises it can be
quod oportet in nobis per gratiam shown that the hope of future happiness
spem futurae beatitudinis causari. must be caused in us by grace.
Dilectio enim quae est ad alios, [2] In fact, the love that a man has for
provenit in homine ex dilectione others arises in man from the love that
hominis ad seipsum, inquantum ad he has for himself, for a man stands in
amicum aliquis se habet sicut ad se. relation to a friend as he does to
Diligit autem aliquis seipsum himself. But a person loves himself
inquantum vult sibi bonum: sicut inasmuch as he wishes the good for
alium diligit inquantum vult ei himself, just as he loves another person
bonum. Oportet igitur quod homo, by wishing him good. So, by the fact
per hoc quod circa proprium bonum that a man is interested in his own good
afficitur, perducatur ad hoc quod he is led to develop an interest in
afficiatur circa bonum alterius. Per another person’s good. Hence, because
hoc igitur quod aliquis ab alio sperat a person hopes for good from some
bonum, fit homini via ut illum diligat other person, a way develops for man
a quo bonum sperat, secundum to love that other person in himself,
seipsum: diligitur enim aliquis from whom he hopes to attain the good.
secundum seipsum quando diligens Indeed, a person is loved in himself
bonum eius vult, etiam si nihil ei when the lover wishes the good for him,
inde proveniat. Cum igitur per even if the lover may receive nothing
gratiam gratum facientem causetur from him. Now, since by sanctifying
in homine quod Deum propter se grace there is produced in man an act
diligat, consequens fuit ut etiam per of loving God for Himself, the result was
gratiam homo spem de Deo that man obtained hope from God by
adipisceretur. Amicitia vero, qua means of grace. However, though it is
quis alium secundum se diligit, etsi not for one’s own benefit, friendship,
non sit propter propriam utilitatem, whereby one loves another for himself,
habet tamen multas utilitates has of course many resulting benefits,
consequentes, secundum quod in the sense that one friend helps
unus amicorum alteri subvenit ut another as he helps himself. Hence,
sibi ipsi. Unde oportet quod, cum when one person loves another, and
aliquis alium diligit, et cognoscit se knows that he is loved by that other, he
ab eo diligi, quod de eo spem must get hope from him. Now, by grace
habeat. Per gratiam autem ita man is so established as a lover of God,

constituitur homo Dei dilector, through the love of charity, that he is
secundum caritatis affectum, quod also instructed by faith that he is first
etiam instruitur per fidem quod a loved by God: according to the passage
Deo praediligatur: secundum illud found in 1 John (4:10): “In this is charity:
quod habetur 1 Ioan. 410: in hoc not as though we had loved God, but
est dilectio, non quasi nos because He hath first loved us.” It
dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam follows, then, from the gift of grace that
ipse prior dilexit nos. Consequitur man gets hope from God. It is also clear
igitur ex dono gratiae quod homo de from this that just as hope is a
Deo spem habeat. Ex quo etiam preparation of man for the true love of
patet quod, sicut spes est God, so also man is conversely
praeparatio hominis ad veram Dei strengthened in hope by charity.
dilectionem, ita et e converso ex
caritate homo in spe confirmatur.
Amplius. In omni diligente causatur [3] Again, in every lover there is caused

desiderium ut uniatur suo dilecto a desire to be united with his beloved, in
inquantum possibile est: et hinc est so far as that is possible; as a result, it
quod delectabilissimum est amicis is most enjoyable to live with friends.
convivere. Si ergo per gratiam homo So, if by grace man is made a lover of
Dei dilector constituitur, oportet God, there must be produced in him a
quod in eo causetur desiderium desire for union with God, according as
unionis ad Deum, secundum quod that is possible. But faith, which is
possibile est. Fides autem, quae caused by grace, makes it clear that the
causatur ex gratia, declarat union of man with God in the perfect
possibilem esse unionem hominis enjoyment in which happiness consists
ad Deum secundum perfectam is possible. Therefore, the desire for this
fruitionem, in qua beatitudo fruition results in man from the love of
consistit. Huius igitur fruitionis God. But the desire for anything bothers
desiderium in homine consequitur the soul of the desirer, unless there be
ex Dei dilectione. Sed desiderium present some hope of attainment. So, it
rei alicuius molestat animam was appropriate that in man, in whom
desiderantis nisi adsit spes de God’s love and faith are caused by
consequendo. Conveniens igitur fuit grace, there should also be caused a
ut in hominibus in quibus Dei hope of acquiring future happiness.
dilectio et fides causatur per
gratiam, quod etiam causetur spes
futurae beatitudinis adipiscendae.
Item. In his quae ordinantur ad [4] Besides, if some difficulty should
aliquem finem desideratum, si emerge among things ordered to a
aliqua difficultas emerserit, solatium desired end, hope of attaining the end
affert spes de fine consequendo: provides solace. For instance, a person
sicut amaritudinem medicinae suffers but slightly from the bitterness of
aliquis leviter fert propter spem medicine because of his hope for good
sanitatis. In processu autem quo in health. But in our process of working
beatitudinem tendimus, quae est toward happiness, which is the end of
finis omnium desideriorum all our desires, many difficulties present
nostrorum, multa difficilia imminent burdens to be borne, because virtue, by

sustinenda: nam virtus, per quam which one advances toward happiness,
ad beatitudinem itur, circa difficilia “is concerned with difficulties.”
est. Ad hoc igitur ut levius et Therefore, in order that man may tend
promptius homo in beatitudinem toward happiness smoothly and readily,
tenderet, necessarium fuit ei spem it was necessary to provide him with the
de obtinenda beatitudine adhibere. hope of obtaining happiness.
Praeterea. Nullus movetur ad finem [5] Moreover, no one is moved toward

ad quem aestimat esse impossibile an end that he judges impossible to
perveniri. Ad hoc igitur quod aliquis attain. So, in order that a person may
pergat in finem aliquem, oportet push forward toward the end, he must
quod afficiatur ad finem illum have a feeling toward the end as toward
tanquam possibilem haberi: et hic something possible of attainment, and
est affectus spei. Cum igitur per this is the feeling of hope. Therefore,
gratiam dirigatur homo in ultimum since man is directed toward his
finem beatitudinis, necessarium fuit ultimate end of happiness by grace, it
ut per gratiam imprimeretur humano was necessary for the hope of attaining
affectui spes de beatitudine happiness to be impressed on man’s
consequenda. power of feeling by means of grace.
Hinc est quod dicitur 1 Petri 13 [6] Hence, it is said in 1 Peter (1:34):
regeneravit nos in spem vivam, in “He hath regenerated us unto a lively
hereditatem immarcescibilem, hope... unto an inheritance
conservatam in caelis. Et Rom. 824 incorruptible, reserved for heaven.” And
dicitur: spe salvi facti sumus. again in Romans (8:24) it is said: “we
are saved by hope.”
Chapter 154
Caput 154
ON THE GIFTS OF GRATUITOUS
De donis gratiae gratis datae; in
GRACE,
quo de divinationibus
INCLUDING A CONSIDERATION OF
Daemonum
THE DIVINATIONS OF DEMONS
Quia vero ea quae homo per se [1] Since man can only know the things

non videt, cognoscere non potest that he does not see himself by taking
nisi ea recipiat ab eo qui videt; fides them from another who does see them,
autem est de his quae non and since faith is among the things we
videmus: oportet cognitionem do not see, the knowledge of the objects
eorum de quibus est fides, ab eo of faith must be handed on by one who
derivari qui ea ipse videt. Hic autem sees them himself. Now, this one is
Deus est, qui seipsum perfecte God, Who perfectly comprehends
comprehendit, et naturaliter suam Himself, and naturally sees His
essentiam videt: de Deo enim fidem essence. Indeed, we get faith from God.
habemus. Oportet igitur ea quae So, the things that we hold by faith must
per fidem tenemus, a Deo in nos come to us from God. But, since the
pervenire. Cum autem quae a Deo things that come from God are enacted
sunt, ordine quodam agantur, ut in a definite order, as we showed above,

supra ostensum est, in a certain order had to be observed in
manifestatione eorum quae sunt the manifestation of the objects of faith.
fidei, ordinem quendam observari That is to say, some persons had to
oportuit: scilicet ut quidam receive them directly from God, then
immediate a Deo reciperent, alii others from them, and so on in an
vero ab his, et sic per ordinem orderly way down to the lowest persons.
usque ad ultimos.
In quibuscumque autem est aliquis [2] Now, wherever there is an order
ordo, oportet quod, quanto aliquid among things, it is necessary that, the
est propinquius primo principio, nearer one thing is to the first principle,
tanto virtuosius inveniatur. Quod in the stronger it must be. This is apparent
hoc ordine manifestationis divinae in the order of divine manifestation. For
apparet. Invisibilia enim, quorum invisible things whose vision is
visio beatos facit, de quibus fides beatifying, and to which faith applies,
est, primo a Deo revelantur Angelis are first revealed by God to the blessed
beatis per apertam visionem, ut ex angels through open vision, as is clear
supra dictis patet. from our previous statements.
Deinde, Angelorum interveniente [3] In turn, by the intermediary ministry
officio, manifestantur quibusdam of the angels they are manifested to
hominibus, non quidem per certain men; not, of course, through
apertam visionem, sed per open vision, but through a kind of
quandam certitudinem certitude resulting from divine
provenientem ex revelatione divina. revelation.
Quae quidem revelatio fit quodam [4] This revelation, then, is

interiori et intelligibili lumine accomplished by means of a certain
mentem elevante ad percipiendum interior and intelligible light, elevating
ea ad quae per lumen naturale the mind to the perception of things that
intellectus pertingere non potest. the understanding cannot reach by its
Sicut enim per lumen naturale natural light. For, just as the
intellectus redditur certus de his understanding by its natural light is
quae lumine illo cognoscit, ut de made certain concerning things that it
primis principiis; ita et de his quae knows by that light (for instance,
supernaturali lumine apprehendit, concerning first principles), so also does
certitudinem habet. Haec autem it acquire certitude concerning things
certitudo necessaria est ad hoc which it apprehends by supernatural
quod aliis proponi possint ea quae light. Now, this latter certitude is needed
divina revelatione percipiuntur: non so that the things that are grasped by
enim cum securitate aliis proferimus divine revelation may be offered to
de quibus certitudinem non others, for we cannot present things to
habemus. Cum praedicto autem others with assurance if we have not
lumine mentem interius illustrante, certain knowledge of them. Now,
adsunt aliquando in divina accompanying this light that we have
revelatione aliqua exteriora vel mentioned, which illumines the mind
interiora cognitionis auxilia: utpote from within, there are at times in divine
aliquis sermo, vel exterius revelation other external or internal aids
sensibiliter auditus, qui divina to knowledge; for instance, a spoken

virtute formetur; aut etiam interius message, or something heard by the
per imaginationem, Deo faciente, external senses which is produced by
perceptus; sive etiam aliqua divine power, or something perceived
corporaliter visa exterius a Deo internally through imagination due to
formata, vel etiam interius in God's action, or also some things
imaginatione descripta; ex quibus produced by God that are seen by
homo, per lumen interius menti bodily vision, or that are internally
impressum, cognitionem accipit pictured in the imagination. From these
divinorum. Unde huiusmodi auxilia presentations, by the light internally
sine interiori lumine ad cognitionem impressed on the mind, man receives a
divinorum non sufficiunt: lumen knowledge of divine things.
autem interius sufficit sine istis. Consequently, without the interior light,
these aids do not suffice for a
knowledge of divine things, but the
interior light does suffice without them.
Haec autem invisibilium Dei [5] However, this revelation of the
revelatio ad sapientiam pertinet, invisible things of God belongs to
quae proprie est cognitio divinorum. wisdom, which is properly the
Et ideo dicitur Sap. 7 quod knowledge of divine things. Thus, it is
sapientia Dei per nationes in said in Wisdom (7:2728) that the
animas sanctas se transfert: wisdom of God “conveys herself through
neminem enim diligit Deus nisi eum nations into holy souls... for God loves
qui cum sapientia inhabitat. Et no one but him who dwells with
Eccli. 155 dicitur: implevit eum wisdom.” And again in Sirach (15:5) it is
dominus spiritu sapientiae et said: “the Lord has filled him with the
intellectus. spirit of wisdom and understanding.”
Sed quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae [6] But, since “the invisible things of God
facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, ... are clearly seen, being understood by
per divinam gratiam non solum the things that are made,” not only
revelantur hominibus divina, sed divine things are revealed to men by
etiam aliqua de rebus creatis: quod divine grace, but also some created
ad scientiam pertinere videtur. things, and this seems to pertain to
Unde dicitur Sap. 717: ipse dedit knowledge. Hence, it is said in Wisdom
mihi horum quae sunt scientiam (7:17): "For He has given me the true
veram: ut sciam dispositionem orbis knowledge of the things that are: to
terrarum, et virtutes elementorum. know the disposition of the whole world,
Et II Paralip. 112, dominus dixit ad and the virtues of the elements.” And in
Salomonem: scientia et sapientia 2 Chronicles (1:12) the Lord said to
data sunt tibi. Solomon: “Knowledge and wisdom are
granted to you.”
Ea vero quae homo cognoscit, in [7] But the things that man knows he
notitiam alterius producere cannot properly convey to the
convenienter non potest nisi per knowledge of another man, except by
sermonem. Quia igitur illi qui a Deo speech. So, since those who receive a
revelationem accipiunt, secundum revelation from God, according to the
ordinem divinitus institutum, alios divinely established order, should

instruere debent; necessarium fuit instruct others, it was necessary for
ut etiam his gratia locutionis them also to be given the grace of
daretur, secundum quod exigeret speech, in keeping with what the benefit
utilitas eorum qui erant instruendi. of those who were to be instructed
Unde dicitur Isaiae 504: dominus demanded. Hence, it is said in Isaiah
dedit mihi linguam eruditam, ut (50:4): “The Lord hath given me a
sciam sustentare eum qui lapsus learned tongue, that I should know how
est verbo. Et dominus discipulis to uphold by word him that is weary.”
dicit, Luc. 2115: ego dabo vobis os And the Lord says to the disciples, in
et sapientiam, cui non poterunt Luke (21:15): “I will give you a mouth
resistere et contradicere omnes and wisdom, which all your adversaries
adversarii vestri. Et propter hoc shall not be able to resist and gainsay.”
etiam, quando oportuit per paucos And also for this reason, when it was
veritatem fidei in diversis gentibus necessary for the truth of the faith to be
praedicari, instructi sunt quidam preached by a few men to different
divinitus ut linguis variis peoples, some were divinely instructed
loquerentur: sicut dicitur Act. 24: to “speak with divers tongues,” as is
repleti sunt omnes spiritu sancto, et said in Acts (2:4): “They were all filled
coeperunt loqui variis linguis, prout with the Holy Spirit: and they began to
spiritus sanctus dabat eloqui illis. speak with divers tongues, according as
the Holy Spirit gave them to speak.”
Sed quia sermo propositus [8] But because oral teaching that is
confirmatione indiget ad hoc quod offered requires confirmation so that it
recipiatur, nisi sit per se manifestus; may be accepted, unless it be evident in
ea autem quae sunt fidei, sunt itself, and because things that are of
humanae rationi immanifesta: faith are not evident to human reason, it
necessarium fuit aliquid adhiberi was necessary for some means to be
quo confirmaretur sermo provided whereby the words of the
praedicantium fidem. Non autem preachers of the faith might be
confirmari poterat per aliqua confirmed. Now, they could not be
principia rationis, per modum confirmed by any rational principles in
demonstrationis: cum ea quae sunt the way of demonstration, since the
fidei, rationem excedant. Oportuit objects of faith surpass reason. So, it
igitur aliquibus indiciis confirmari was necessary for the oral teaching of
praedicantium sermonem quibus the preachers to be confirmed by certain
manifeste ostenderetur huiusmodi signs, whereby it might be plainly shown
sermonem processisse a Deo, dum that this oral teaching came from God;
praedicantes talia operarentur, so, the preachers did such things as
sanando infirmos, et alias virtutes healing the sick, and the performance of
operando, quae non posset facere other difficult deeds, which only God
nisi Deus. Unde dominus, could do. Hence, the Lord, sending forth
discipulos ad praedicandum His disciples to preach, said in Matthew
mittens, dixit, Matth. cap. 108: (10:8): “Heal the sick, raise the dead,
infirmos curate, mortuos suscitate, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils.” And
leprosos mundate, Daemones it is said at the end of Mark (16:20): “But
eiicite. Et Marci ult. dicitur: illi autem they going forth preached everywhere:
profecti praedicaverunt ubique, the Lord working withal, and confirming
domino cooperante, et sermonem the word with signs that followed.”

confirmante sequentibus signis.
Fuit autem et alius confirmationis [9] But there was still another way of
modus: ut, dum praedicatores confirmation, in so far as the preachers
veritatis vera invenirentur dicere de of truth were found to speak true things
occultis quae postmodum about hidden events which could be
manifestari possunt, eis crederetur made evident later, so that credit was
vera dicentibus de his quae given them as speakers of truths about
homines experiri non possunt. matters which men were not able to
Unde necessarium fuit donum experience. Hence, the a gift of
prophetiae, per quod futura, et ea prophecy was necessary, whereby they
quae communiter homines latent, might know and reveal to others,
Deo revelante, possent cognoscere through God’s revelation, future events
et aliis indicare: ut sic, dum in his and things generally concealed from
invenirentur vera dicere, in his quae men. Thus, in this way, when they were
sunt fidei eis crederetur. Unde discovered to tell about true events,
apostolus dicit I Cor. 1424 si belief would be accorded them in regard
omnes prophetent, intret autem to matters of faith. Hence, the Apostle
quis infidelis vel idiota convincitur says, in 1 Corinthians (14:2425): “If all
ab omnibus, diiudicatur ab prophesy, and an unbeliever or an
omnibus: occulta enim cordis eius unlearned person comes in, he is
manifesta fiunt, et ita cadens in convinced by all, he is judged by all; the
faciem adorabit Deum, pronuntians secrets of his heart are made manifest;
quod Deus vere in vobis sit. and so, falling down on his face, he will
adore God, affirming that God is among
you indeed.”
Non autem per hoc prophetiae [10] However, an adequate testimony to

donum sufficiens testimonium fidei the faith is not supplied by this gift of
adhiberetur, nisi esset de his quae prophecy unless it were concerned with
a solo Deo cognosci possunt: sicut things that can be known by God alone,
et miracula talia sunt quod solus just as miracles are of such nature that
Deus ea potest operari. Huiusmodi God alone can work them. Now, these
autem praecipue sunt in rebus things are especially, in the affairs of this
inferioribus occulta cordium, quae world, the secrets of our hearts, which
solus Deus cognoscere potest, ut God alone can know, as we showed
supra ostensum est; et futura above, and contingent future events
contingentia, quae etiam soli which also come only under divine
divinae cognitioni subsunt, quia ea cognition, for He sees them in
in seipsis videt, cum sint ei themselves because they are present to
praesentia ratione suae aeternitatis, Him by reason of His eternity, as we
ut supra ostensum est. showed above.
Possunt tamen aliqua futura [11] Of course, some contingent future
contingentia etiam ab hominibus events can also be foreknown by men;
praecognosci: non quidem not, indeed, according as they are
inquantum futura sunt, sed future, but inasmuch as they preexist in
inquantum in causis suis their causes. When these latter are
praeexistunt; quibus cognitis, vel known, either in themselves or through
secundum seipsas, vel per aliquos some of their evident effects, which are
effectus earum manifestos, quae called signs, a foreknowledge of some
signa dicuntur, de aliquibus future effects may be acquired by man.
effectibus futuris potest ab homine Thus, a physician foreknows future
praecognitio haberi; sicut medicus death or good health ,from the condition
praecognoscit mortem vel of natural strength, which he knows
sanitatem futuram ex statu virtutis from the pulse, the urine, and signs of
naturalis, quam cognoscit pulsu, this kind. Now, this kind of knowledge of
urina, et huiusmodi signis. future matters is partly certain, but partly
Huiusmodi autem cognitio uncertain. In fact, there are some pre
futurorum partim quidem certa est: existing causes from which future
partim vero incerta. Sunt enim events follow of necessity; for instance,
quaedam causae praeexistentes ex if there be a preexisting composition of
quibus futuri effectus ex necessitate contraries in an animal, death results
consequuntur: sicut, praeexistente necessarily. But, from some preexisting
compositione ex contrariis in causes future effects do not follow
animali, ex necessitate sequitur necessarily, but usually. For instance, in
mors. Quibusdam vero causis most cases a perfect human being
praeexistentibus, sequuntur futuri results from the insemination of a
effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut mother by a man’s semen; sometimes,
frequenter: sicut ex semine hominis however, monsters are generated,
in matricem proiecto, ut in pluribus, because of some obstruction which
sequitur homo perfectus; overcomes the operation of the natural
quandoque tamen monstra capacity. So, there is certain
generantur, propter aliquod foreknowledge of the first kind of effects,
impedimentum superveniens but of those mentioned in the second
operationi naturalis virtutis. case there is no infallibly certain
Primorum igitur effectuum foreknowledge. However, the
praecognitio certa habetur: horum foreknowledge that is acquired
autem qui posterius dicti sunt, non concerning future events from divine
est praecognitio infallibiliter certa. revelation, according to prophetic grace,
Praecognitio autem quae de futuris is altogether certain, just as divine
habetur ex revelatione divina, foreknowledge is also certain. Indeed,
secundum gratiam prophetalem, est God does not merely foreknow future
omnino certa: sicut et divina events as they are in their causes, but
praecognitio est certa. Non enim infallibly, as they are in themselves, as
Deus praecognoscit futura solum we showed earlier. And so, prophetic
prout sunt in suis causis, sed knowledge of future things is given man
infallibiliter, secundum quod sunt in in the same way, with perfect certitude.
seipsis, sicut superius ostensum Nor is this certitude opposed to the
est. Unde et cognitio prophetica per contingency of future events, any more
eundem modum datur homini de than the certitude of divine knowledge
futuris cum certitudine perfecta. is, as we showed above.
Nec tamen haec certitudo repugnat
contingentiae futurorum, sicut nec
certitudo scientiae divinae, ut supra
ostensum est.
Revelantur tamen aliquando aliqui [12] However, some future events are at

futuri effectus prophetis, non times revealed to prophets, not as they
secundum quod sunt in seipsis, sed are in themselves, but as they are in
secundum quod sunt in causis suis. their causes. In that case, if the causes
Et tunc nihil prohibet, si causae are obstructed from achieving their
impediantur ne perveniant ad suos effects, nothing prevents the prophetic
effectus, quin etiam prophetae forecast from being modified. Thus,
praenuntiatio immutetur: sicut Isaiah foretold to the ailing Hezekiah:
Isaias praenuntiavit Ezechiae “take order with Your house, for You
aegrotanti, dispone domui tuae, shall die, and not live” (Is. 38:1), but be
quia morieris et non vives, qui was restored to health; and Jonah the
tamen sanatus est; et Ionas Prophet foretold that “after forty days,
propheta praenuntiavit quod post Nineveh shall be destroyed” (Jonah
quadraginta dies Ninive 3:4), Yet it was not overturned. Hence,
subverteretur, nec tamen est Isaiah made his prophecy of the coming
subversa. Praenuntiavit igitur Isaias death of Hezekiah according to the
mortem futuram Ezechiae order of his bodily condition and of the
secundum ordinem dispositionis lower causes in relation to this result,
corporis et aliarum causarum and Jonah prophesied the disruption of
inferiorum ad istum effectum; et Nineveh according to the demands of its
Ionas subversionem Ninive merits; however, in both cases, it turned
secundum exigentiam meritorum; out differently, in accord with the
utrobique tamen aliter evenit working of a free and healthgiving God.
secundum operationem Dei
liberantis et sanantis.
Sic igitur prophetica denuntiatio de [13] And so, prophetic prediction of

futuris sufficiens est fidei future events is an adequate argument
argumentum: quia, licet homines for the faith, since, though men do know
aliqua de futuris praecognoscant, some things in advance about future
non tamen de futuris contingentibus matters, their knowledge of future
est praecognitio cum certitudine, contingencies is not accompanied by
sicut est praecognitio prophetiae. certitude, as is the foreknowledge of
Etsi enim aliquando fiat prophetae prophecy. For, though prophetic
revelatio secundum ordinem revelation is sometimes accomplished
causarum ad aliquem effectum, on the basis of the order of causes to a
simul tamen, vel postea, fit eidem given effect, yet at the same time, or
revelatio de eventu futuri effectus, later, a revelation may be made to the
qualiter sit immutandus: sicut Isaiae same prophet concerning the outcome
revelata fuit sanatio Ezechiae, et of the future event, as to how it is to be
Ionae liberatio Ninivitarum. modified. For example, the healing of
Hezekiah was revealed to Isaiah (Isa.
38:5), and the saving of the Ninevites to
Jonah (Jonah 4:5ff.).
Maligni autem spiritus, veritatem [14] But malign spirits strive to corrupt
fidei corrumpere molientes, sicut the truth of the faith, just as they make
abutuntur operatione miraculorum bad use of the working of wonders, in
ut errorem inducant et argumentum order to lead to error and weaken the
verae fidei debilitent, tamen non proof of the true faith, even though they
vere miracula faciendo, sed ea do not perform miracles in the proper
quae hominibus miraculosa sense, but things that appear wonderful
apparent, ut supra ostensum est: ita to men, as we showed above—so also
etiam abutuntur prophetica they abuse prophetic prediction, not, of
praenuntiatione, non quidem vere course, prophesying, but foretelling
prophetando, sed praenuntiando certain things according to the order of
aliqua secundum ordinem causes hidden to man, so that they
causarum homini occultarum, ut seem to know in advance future events
videantur futura praecognoscere in in themselves. Now, though contingent
seipsis. Et licet ex causis effects come from natural causes, these
naturalibus effectus contingentes spirits, as a result of the subtlety of their
proveniant, praedicti tamen spiritus, understanding, can know more than
subtilitate intellectus sui, magis men as to when and bow the effects of
possunt cognoscere quam homines natural causes may be obstructed. So,
quando et qualiter effectus in foretelling future things, they appear
naturalium causarum impediri to be more astonishing and more
possint: et ideo in praenuntiando truthful than men, no matter how
futura mirabiliores et veraciores learned the latter may be. Of course,
apparent quam homines among natural causes, the highest and
quantumcumque scientes. Inter farthest removed from our knowledge
causas autem naturales, supremae, are the powers of ,the celestial bodies.
et a cognitione nostra magis That these are known to the spirits
remotae, sunt vires caelestium under discussion, in accord with what is
corporum: quas praedictis spiritibus proper to their nature, is evident from
cognitas esse secundum earlier explanations. Therefore, since all
proprietatem suae naturae, ex lower bodies are controlled through the
superioribus patet. Cum ergo omnia powers and motions of the higher
inferiora corpora secundum vires et bodies, these spirits are far more able
motum superiorum corporum than any astronomer to foretell future
disponantur, possunt praedicti winds and storms, changing conditions
spiritus multo magis quam aliquis of the atmosphere, and other such
astrologus, praenuntiare ventos et things which occur in the changing of
tempestates futuras, corruptiones lower bodies as a result of the motion of
aeris, et alia huiusmodi quae circa the higher bodies. Also, though celestial
mutationes inferiorum corporum bodies can make no impression directly
accidunt ex motu superiorum on the intellectual part of the soul, as we
corporum causata. Et licet caelestia showed above, a good many men follow
corpora super partem intellectivam the impulse of their bodily passions and
animae directe non possint tendencies, on which we have shown
imprimere, ut supra ostensum est, that the celestial bodies do have an
plurimi tamen sequuntur impetus influence. In fact, it is only possible for
passionum et inclinationes wise men, of whom the number is small,
corporales, in quas efficaciam to resist this kind of passion by using
habere caelestia corpora their reason. So, the result is that many
manifestum est: solum enim predictions can be made concerning
sapientum, quorum parvus est man’s acts, although even these spirits
numerus, est huiusmodi fail at times in their predictions because
passionibus ratione obviare. Et inde of freedom of choice.
est quod etiam de actibus hominum
multa praedicere possunt: licet
quandoque et ipsi in praenuntiando
deficiant, propter arbitrii libertatem.
Ea vero quae praecognoscunt, [15] However, they do not make their
praenuntiant quidem non mentem predictions of what they foreknow by
illustrando, sicut fit in revelatione enlightening the mind, as is done in the
divina: non enim eorum intentio est case of divine revelation. Indeed, it is
ut mens humana perficiatur ad not their intention that the human mind
veritatem cognoscendam, sed be perfected in order to know the truth,
magis quod a veritate avertatur. but, rather, that it be turned away from
Praenuntiant autem quandoque the truth. Now, they sometimes predict,
quidem secundum imaginationis indeed, by impressing the imagination,
immutationem, vel in dormiendo, either during sleep, as when they show
sicut cum per somnia aliquorum the signs of certain future events
futurorum indicia monstrant; sive in through dreams, or while one is awake,
vigilando, sicut in arreptitiis et as is apparent in the case of people in a
phreneticis patet, qui aliqua futura trance or frenzy who foretell future
praenuntiant; aliquando vero per events. At other times, too, they do it
aliqua exteriora indicia, sicut per through external signs, for instance, by
motus et garritus avium, et per ea the movement and chirping of birds, and
quae apparent in extis animalium, by means of the appearances of the
et in punctorum quorundam inner parts of animals, and by the
descriptione, et in similibus, quae drawing of certain kinds of mathematical
sorte quadam fieri videntur; figures, and in other like ways which
aliquando autem visibiliter seem to work by some kind of lot. At still
apparendo, et sermone sensibili other times, they do it by visual
praenuntiando futura. apparitions and by predicting future
events in speech that can be heard.
Et licet horum ultimum manifeste [16] Although the last of these ways is
per malignos spiritus fiat, tamen alia obviously the work of evil spirits, some
quidam reducere conantur in people have made efforts to explain the
aliquas causas naturales. Dicunt other ways in terms of natural causes.
enim quod, cum corpus caeleste They say, in fact, that when a celestial
moveat ad aliquos effectus in istis body moves toward definite effects in
inferioribus, ex eiusdem corporis these things here below, some signs of
impressione in aliquibus rebus illius the result of the influence of the same
effectus signa quaedam apparent: body appear, because different things
caelestem enim impressionem receive the celestial influence in
diversae res diversimode recipiunt. different ways. On this basis, then, they
Secundum hoc ergo dicunt quod say that the change that is produced in
immutatio quae fit a corpore a thing by the celestial body can be
caelesti in aliqua re, potest accipi ut taken as a sign of the change in another
signum immutationis alterius rei. Et thing. Hence, they say that movements
ideo dicunt quod motus qui sunt that are apart from rational deliberation,
praeter deliberationem rationis, ut such as visions in people who are
visa somniantium et eorum qui sunt dreaming and in those who are out of
mente capti, et motus et garritus their mind, and the flight and crying of
avium, et descriptiones punctorum birds, and the drawing of figures, when
cum quis non deliberat quot puncta a person does not deliberate on how

debeat describere, sequuntur many points he should draw, are all the
impressionem corporis caelestis. Et results of the influence of a celestial
ideo dicunt quod huiusmodi possunt body. So, they say that things like these
esse signa effectuum futurorum qui can be the signs of future effects that
ex motu caeli causantur. are caused by the motion of the
heavens.
Sed quia hoc modicam rationem [17] However, since this has little
habet, magis aestimandum est reason, it is better to think that the
quod praenuntiationes quae ex predictions that are made from signs of
huiusmodi signis fiunt, ab aliqua this kind take their origin from some
intellectuali substantia originem intellectual substance, by whose power
habeant, cuius virtute disponuntur the aforesaid motions occurring without
praedicti motus praeter deliberation are controlled, in accord
deliberationem existentes, with what befits the observation of future
secundum quod congruit events. And while these movements are
observationi futurorum. Et licet sometimes controlled by the divine will,
quandoque haec disponantur through the ministry of good spirits,
voluntate divina, ministerio since many things are revealed by God
bonorum spirituum, quia et a Deo through dreams—as to Pharaoh (Gen.
multa per somnia revelantur, sicut 41:25), and to Nebuchadnezzar (Dan.
Pharaoni et Nabuchodonosor; et 2:28), and “lots that are cast into the lap,
sortes quae mittuntur in sinu, that are also at times disposed of by the
quandoque etiam a domino Lord,” as Solomon says (Prov.
temperantur, ut Salomon dicit: 16:33).Yet most of the time they happen
tamen plerumque ex operatione as a result of the working of evil spirits,
spirituum malignorum accidunt; ut as the holy Doctors say, and as even
et sancti doctores dicunt, et etiam the Gentiles themselves agree. For
ipsi gentiles censuerunt; dicit enim Maximus Valerius says that the practice
maximus Valerius quod observatio of auguries and dreams, and that sort of
auguriorum et somniorum et thing, belongs to the religion in which
huiusmodi ad religionem pertinent, idols were worshiped. And so, in the Old
qua idola colebantur. Et ideo in Law, along with idolatry, all these
veteri lege, simul cum idololatria, practices were prohibited. Indeed, it is
haec omnia prohibebantur: dicitur said in Deuteronomy (18:911): “beware
enim Deut. 189 ne imitari velis lest you have a mind to imitate the
abominationes illarum gentium, abominations of those nations,” that is,
quae scilicet idolis serviebant; nec those that serve idols; “neither let there
inveniatur in te qui lustret filium be found among you anyone who
suum aut filiam ducens per ignem; expiates his son or daughter, making
aut qui ariolos sciscitetur, et them to pass through the fire; or who
observet somnia atque auguria; nec consults soothsayers, or observes
sit maleficus neque incantator; dreams and omens; neither let there be
neque qui Pythones consulat nec any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone
divinos, et quaerat a mortuis who consults pythonic spirits, or fortune
veritatem. tellers, or who seeks the truth from the
dead.”
Attestatur autem praedicationi fidei [18] Moreover, prophecy attests to the
prophetia per alium modum: preaching of the faith in another way,
inquantum scilicet aliqua fide namely, in so far as some tenets of the
tenenda praedicantur quae faith are preached which took place in
temporaliter aguntur, sicut nativitas time, such as the birth of Christ, His
Christi, passio et resurrectio, et passion and resurrection, and events of
huiusmodi; et ne huiusmodi ficta a that kind. And lest these be thought
praedicantibus esse credantur, aut fictions made by the preachers, or to
casualiter evenisse, ostenduntur have come about by chance, they are
longe ante per prophetas praedicta. shown to have been preached long
Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. 11 beforehand by the Prophets.
Paulus, servus Iesu Christi, vocatus Consequently, the Apostle says in
apostolus, segregatus in Romans (1:1): “Paul, a servant of Jesus
Evangelium Dei, (quod ante Christ, called to be an apostle,
promiserat per prophetas suos in separated unto the gospel of God,
Scripturis sanctis) de filio suo, qui which He had promised before, by His
factus est ei ex semine David prophets in the holy scriptures,
secundum carnem. concerning His Son, Who was made to
Him of the seed of David, according to
the flesh.”
Post gradum autem illorum qui [19] Following the degree of those who
immediate revelationem a Deo receive revelation directly from God,
recipiunt, est necessarius alius another degree of grace is necessary. In
gratiae gradus. Quia enim homines fact, since men receive revelation from
revelationem a Deo accipiunt non God not only for their own time, but also
solum pro praesenti tempore, sed for the instruction of all men that are to
etiam ad instructionem omnium come, it was necessary that the things
futurorum, necessarium fuit ut non revealed to them not only be recounted
solum ea quae ipsis revelantur, orally to their contemporaries, but also
sermone narrarentur praesentibus; that they be written down for the
sed etiam scriberentur ad instruction of men to come.
instructionem futurorum. Unde et Consequently, there had to be some
oportuit aliquos esse qui huiusmodi who would interpret this kind of writings.
scripta interpretarentur. Quod divina Now, this should be a divine grace, just
gratia esse oportet, sicut et ipsa as revelation was accomplished by the
revelatio per gratiam Dei fuit. Unde grace of God. Hence, it is said in
et Gen. 408 dicitur: numquid non Genesis (40:8): “Does not interpretation
Dei est interpretatio? belong to God?”
Sequitur autem ultimus gradus: [20] Then there follows the last degree:
eorum scilicet qui ea quae aliis sunt of those, namely, who faithfully believe
revelata, et per alios interpretata, the things that are revealed to others,
fideliter credunt. Hoc autem Dei and interpreted by still others. But that
donum esse superius ostensum this is a gift of God was shown earlier.
est.
Quia vero per malignos spiritus [21] But, since some things are done by

aliqua similia fiunt his quibus fides evil spirits similar to the things whereby
confirmatur, tam in signorum the faith is confirmed, both in the
operatione quam in futurorum working of wonders and in the revelation
revelatione, ut supra dictum est, ne of future events, as we said above, lest
per huiusmodi homines decepti men that have been deceived by such
mendacio credant, necessarium est things believe in a lie, it is necessary
ut adiutorio divinae gratiae that they be instructed by the help of
instruantur de huiusmodi spiritibus divine grace concerning the
discernendis: secundum quod discernment of this kind of spirits, in
dicitur I Ioan. 41: nolite omni accord with what is said in 1 John (4:1):
spiritui credere, sed probate “do not believe every spirit, but try the
spiritus, si ex Deo sunt. spirits if they are of God.”
Hos autem gratiae effectus, ad [22] Now, the Apostle enumerates these

instructionem et confirmationem effects of grace, that are directed to the
fidei ordinatos, apostolus enumerat instruction and confirmation of the faith,
I ad Cor. 12, dicens: alii per spiritum in 1 Corinthians (12:810), saying: “To
datur sermo sapientiae, alii autem one indeed, by the Spirit is given the
sermo scientiae, secundum word of wisdom; and to another, the
eundem spiritum; alteri fides, in word of knowledge, according to the
eodem spiritu; alii gratia sanitatum, same Spirit; to another, faith in the same
in uno spiritu; alii operatio virtutum; Spirit; to another, the grace of healing in
alii prophetia; alii discretio one Spirit; to another, the working of
spirituum; alii genera linguarum; alii miracles; to another, prophecy; to
interpretatio sermonum. another, the discerning of spirits; to
another, divers kinds of tongues; to
another, the interpretation of speeches.”
Per hoc autem excluditur error [23] By this conclusion we set aside the

quorundam Manichaeorum, qui error of certain Manicheans, who say
dicunt corporalia miracula non esse that corporeal miracles are not
a Deo facta. Simul etiam excluditur performed by God. At the same time we
eorum error quantum ad hoc quod exclude the error of those men, in so far
dicunt prophetas non esse spiritu as they assert that the Prophets did not
Dei locutos. Excluditur etiam error speak by the Spirit of God. We also
Priscillae et Montani, qui dicebant dispose of the error of Prisca and
prophetas, tanquam arreptitios, non Montanus, who said that the Prophets,
intellexisse quae loquebantur. Quod like epileptics, did not understand what
divinae revelationi non congruit, they spoke about. For this does not
secundum quam mens principalius agree with divine revelation, whose
illuminatur. chief effect is the illumination of the
mind.
In praemissis autem gratiae [24] Among the effects of grace that
effectibus consideranda est have been noted above there is a
quaedam differentia. Nam etsi difference which must be observed.
omnibus gratiae nomen competat, Though the name grace is suitable to
quia gratis, absque praecedenti all, since it is conferred gratis, without
merito, conferuntur; solus tamen preceding merit, only the effect of love is
dilectionis effectus ulterius nomen further entitled to the name grace by
gratiae meretur ex hoc quod gratum virtue of the fact that it makes one in the
Deo facit: dicitur enim Proverb. 8 good graces of God. For it is said in
17: ego diligentes me diligo. Unde Proverbs (8:17): “I love them that love
fides et spes, et alia quae ad fidem me.” Thus, faith and hope, and other
ordinantur, possunt esse in things related to faith, can be present in
peccatoribus, qui non sunt Deo sinners who are not in the good graces
grati: sola autem dilectio est of God. But love alone is the special gift
proprium donum iustorum, quia qui of the just, for “he who abides in charity
manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et abides in God, and God in him,” as is
Deus in eo, ut dicitur I Ioan. 416. said in 1 John (4:16).
Est autem et alia differentia in [25] Moreover, there is still another
praedictis effectibus gratiae difference to be considered in the
consideranda. Nam quidam eorum preceding effects of grace. Some of
sunt ad totam vitam hominis them are necessary during the whole
necessarii, utpote sine quibus salus life of man, for without them he cannot
esse non potest: sicut credere, be saved: for example, to believe, hope,
sperare, diligere, et praeceptis Dei love, and obey the commandments of
obedire. Et ad hos effectus necesse God. So, in regard to these effects,
est habituales quasdam there must be certain habitual
perfectiones hominibus inesse, ut perfections present in men, so that they
secundum eas agere possint cum may perform these acts when the
fuerit tempus. Alii vero effectus sunt occasion demands. But other effects are
necessarii, non per totam vitam, necessary, not for a whole life, but for
sed certis temporibus et locis: sicut definite times and places; for example,
facere miracula, praenuntiare to work miracles, to foretell future
futura, et huiusmodi. Et ad hos non events, and such actions. So, for these
dantur habituales perfectiones, sed actions habitual perfections are not
impressiones quaedam fiunt a Deo given, but certain impressions are made
quae cessant actu cessante, et eas by God, which cease to exist as soon as
oportet iterari cum actus iterari the act stops, and these impressions
fuerit opportunum: sicut prophetae have to be repeated when the act is
mens in qualibet revelatione novo again to be repeated. Thus, the mind of
lumine illustratur; et in qualibet the Prophet is illumined for each
miraculorum operatione oportet revelation by a new light, and in each
adesse novam efficaciam divinae case of the working of miracles there
virtutis. must be a new influence of divine
power.
Caput 155
Chapter 155
Quod homo indiget auxilio
THAT MAN NEEDS THE HELP OF
gratiae ad perseverandum in
GRACE TO PERSEVERE IN THE GOOD
bono
Indiget etiam homo divinae [1] Man also needs the help of divine
gratiae auxilio ad hoc quod grace so that he may persevere in the
perseveret in bono. good.
Omne enim quod de se est [2] Indeed, everything that is variable in
variabile, ad hoc quod figatur in itself needs the help of an immovable
uno, indiget auxilio alicuius mover so that it may be fixed on one
moventis immobilis. Homo autem objective. But man is subject to variation,
variabilis est et de malo in bonum, both from evil to good and from good to
et de bono in malum. Ad hoc igitur evil. So, in order that he may immovably
quod immobiliter perseveret in continue in the good, which is to
bono, quod est perseverare, persevere, he needs divine help.
indiget auxilio divino.
Adhuc. Ad illud quod excedit vires [3] Again, for that which surpasses the

liberi arbitrii, indiget homo auxilio powers of free choice, man needs the
divinae gratiae. Sed virtus liberi help of divine grace. But the power of free
arbitrii non se extendit ad hunc choice does not extend to the effect of
effectum qui est perseverare final perseverance in the good. This is
finaliter in bono. Quod sic patet. evident as follows. In fact, the power of
Potestas enim liberi arbitrii est free choice applies to those things which
respectu eorum quae sub fall within the scope of election. Now,
electione cadunt. Quod autem what is chosen is some particular
eligitur, est aliquod particulare operation that can be performed. But such
operabile. Particulare autem a particular operation is what is here and
operabile est quod est hic et nunc. now present. Hence, that which falls
Quod igitur cadit sub potestate under the power of free choice is
liberi arbitrii, est aliquid ut nunc something that is to be done now. But to
operandum. Perseverare autem persevere does not mean something as
non dicit aliquid ut nunc operabile, now operable, but the continuation of an
sed continuationem operationis operation throughout time. Now, this
per totum tempus. Iste igitur effect, of persevering in the good, is
effectus qui est perseverare in beyond the power of free choice.
bono, est supra potestatem liberi Therefore, man needs the help of divine
arbitrii. Indiget igitur homo ad grace to persevere in the good.
perseverandum in bono auxilio
divinae gratiae.
Amplius. Licet homo per [4] Besides, though man is the master of
voluntatem et liberum arbitrium sit his action through will and free choice, he
dominus sui actus, non tamen est is not the master of his natural powers.
dominus suarum naturalium So, while he is free to will or not to will
potentiarum. Et ideo, licet liber sit something, he cannot by willing produce
ad volendum vel ad non volendum such a result that his will, by the very fact
aliquid, non tamen volendo facere of willing, would be immovably fixed on
potest quod voluntas in eo quod what be wills or chooses. But this is what
vult, ad id quod vult vel eligit is required for perseverance; that is, the
immobiliter se habeat. Hoc autem will must endure immovably in the good.
requiritur ad perseverantiam: ut So, perseverance is not within the scope
scilicet voluntas in bono of free choice. Therefore, the help of
immobiliter permaneat. divine grace must be available to man so
Perseverantia igitur non est in that he may persevere.

potestate liberi arbitrii. Oportet
igitur adesse homini auxilium
divinae gratiae ad hoc ut
perseveret.
Praeterea. Si sunt plura agentia [5] Moreover, suppose that there are
successive, quorum scilicet unum several agents in succession, such that
agat post actionem alterius; one of them acts after the action of
continuitas actionis istorum non another: the continuation of the action of
potest causari ex aliquo uno these agents cannot be caused by any
ipsorum, quia nullum eorum one of them, for no one of them acts
semper agit; nec ex omnibus, quia forever; nor can it be caused by all of
non simul agunt; unde oportet them, since they do not act together.
quod causetur ab aliquo superiori Consequently, the continuity must be
quod semper agat: sicut caused by some higher agent that always
philosophus probat, in VIII Phys., acts, just as the Philosopher proves, in
quod continuitas generationis in Physics VIII, that the continuity of the
animalibus causatur ab aliquo generative process in animals is caused
superiori sempiterno. Ponamus by some higher, external agent. Now, let
autem aliquem perseverantem in us suppose the case of someone who is
bono. In eo igitur sunt multi motus persevering in the good. There are, then,
liberi arbitrii tendentes in bonum, in his case many movements of free
sibi invicem succedentes usque choice tending toward the good,
ad finem. Huius igitur successively following each other up to
continuationis boni, quod est the end. So, for this continuation in the
perseverantia, non potest esse good, which is perseverance, no one of
causa aliquis istorum motuum: these movements can be the cause, since
quia nullus eorum semper durat. none of them lasts forever. Nor can all of
Nec omnes simul: quia non simul them together, for they are not together,
sunt, non possunt igitur simul and so they cannot cause something
aliquid causare. Relinquitur ergo together. It remains, then, that this
quod ista continuatio causetur ab continuation is caused by some higher
aliquo superiori. Indiget igitur being. Therefore, man needs the help of
homo auxilio superioris gratiae ad higher grace to persevere in the good.
perseverandum in bono.
Item. Si sint multa ordinata ad [6] Furthermore, if many things are
unum finem, totus ordo eorum ordered to one end, their entire order until
quousque pervenerint ad finem, they reach the end comes from the first
est a primo agente dirigente in agent directing them to the end. Now, in
finem. In eo autem qui perseverat the case of a man who perseveres in the
in bono, sunt multi motus et good there are many movements and
multae actiones pertingentes ad many actions reaching to the end. So, the
unum finem. Oportet igitur quod entire order of these movements and
totus ordo istorum motuum et actions must be caused by the first agent
actionum causetur a primo directing them to the end. But we showed
dirigente in finem. Ostensum est that they are directed by the help of divine
autem quod per auxilium divinae grace to the ultimate end. Therefore, the
gratiae diriguntur in ultimum entire order and continuity of good works,

finem. Igitur per auxilium divinae in him who perseveres in the good, is due
gratiae est totus ordo et to the help of divine grace.
continuatio bonorum operum in eo
qui perseverat in bono.
Hinc est quod dicitur ad Philipp. 1 [7] Hence, it is said to the Philippians

6: qui coepit in vobis opus bonum, (1:6): “He who hath begun a good work in
perficiet usque in diem Iesu you will perfect it unto the day of Christ
Christi; et I Petri ult.: Deus omnis Jesus”; and in 1 Peter (5:10): “the God of
gratiae, qui vocavit nos in all grace, Who has called us to His eternal
aeternum gloriam suam, modicum glory... after you have suffered a little, will
passos ipse perficiet, confirmabit Himself perfect you and confirm you and
solidabitque. establish you.”
Inveniuntur etiam in sacra [8] There are also found in Sacred
Scriptura multae orationes quibus Scripture many prayers in which
a Deo petitur perseverantia: sicut perseverance is sought from God: thus, in
in Psalmo, perfice gressus meos the Psalm (16:5): “Perfect You my goings
in semitis tuis, ut non moveantur in Your paths, that my footsteps be not
vestigia mea; et II ad Thess. 216, moved”; and in 2 Thessalonians (2:15
Deus, pater noster, exhortetur 16): “May God, our Father, exhort your
corda vestra, et confirmet in omni hearts and confirm you in every work and
opere et sermone bono. Hoc word.” This is also what is asked in the
etiam ipsum in oratione dominica Lord’s Prayer, especially when one says,
petitur, maxime cum dicitur, “Your kingdom come”; indeed, the
adveniat regnum tuum: non enim kingdom of God will not come for us
nobis adveniet regnum Dei nisi in unless we have persevered in the good.
bono fuerimus perseverantes. Now it would be ridiculous to ask
Derisorium autem esset aliquid a something from God if He were not the
Deo petere cuius ipse dator non giver of it. So, man’s perseverance is from
esset. Est igitur perseverantia God.
hominis a Deo.
Pelagianorum, qui dixerunt quod Pelagians, who said that free choice is
ad perseverandum in bono sufficit sufficient for man to persevere in the
homini liberum arbitrium, nec ad good, and that he does not need the help
hoc indiget auxilio gratiae. of grace for this purpose.
Sciendum tamen est quod, cum [10] However, we should note that even
etiam ille qui gratiam habet, petat he who possesses grace asks God that
a Deo ut perseveret in bono; sicut he may persevere in the good. just as free
liberum arbitrium non sufficit ad choice is not sufficient without the
istum effectum qui est external help of God, for this effect of
perseverare in bono, sine exteriori persevering in the good, so neither is a
Dei auxilio, ita nec ad hoc sufficit habit infused in us enough for this
aliquis habitus nobis infusus. purpose. For habits that are divinely
Habitus enim qui nobis infused in us during the present state of
infunduntur divinitus, secundum life do not take away entirely from free
statum praesentis vitae, non choice the possibility of being moved
auferunt a libero arbitrio totaliter toward evil, even though free choice is
mobilitatem ad malum: licet per somewhat fixed in the good by means of
eos liberum arbitrium aliqualiter them. And so, when we say that man
stabiliatur in bono. Et ideo, cum needs the help of grace to persevere unto
dicimus hominem indigere ad the end, we do not understand that, in
perseverandum finaliter auxilio addition to habitual grace previously
gratiae, non intelligimus quod, infused to assure good operation, another
super gratiam habitualem prius must further be infused for persevering;
infusam ad bene operandum, alia what we do understand is that, once
desuper infundatur ad possessed of all the gratuitous habits, a
perseverandum: sed intelligimus man still needs the help of divine
quod, habitis omnibus habitibus providence externally governing him.
gratuitis, adhuc indiget homo
divinae providentiae auxilio
exterius gubernantis.
Quod ille qui decidit a gratia per THAT HE WHO FALLS FROM GRACE
peccatum, potest iterum per THROUGH SIN MAY AGAIN BE
gratiam reparari RESTORED THROUGH GRACE
Ex his autem apparet quod per [1] From these considerations it is
auxilium gratiae homo, etiam si non apparent that man, even if he does not
perseveraverit, sed in peccatum persevere but falls into sin, may be
ceciderit, potest reparari ad bonum. restored to the good by the help of
grace.
Eiusdem enim virtutis est continuare [2] Indeed, it pertains to the same

salutem alicuius, et interruptam power to maintain the continued
reparare: sicut enim per virtutem salvation of a person and to restore it
naturalem continuatur sanitas in when it has been interrupted, just as
corpore, ita per eandem virtutem health is continually maintained by
naturalem sanitas interrupta natural power in the body, and an
reparatur. Homo autem perseverat interruption of health is repaired by that
in bono auxilio divinae gratiae, ut same natural power. Now, man
ostensum est. Igitur, si per perseveres in the good by means of
peccatum lapsus fuerit, eiusdem divine grace, as we showed. Therefore,
gratiae auxilio poterit reparari. if one has fallen as a result of sin, he
may be restored by means of the same
grace.
Adhuc. Agens quod non requirit [3] Again, an agent that does not
dispositionem in subiecto, potest require a disposition in its subject can
suum effectum imprimere in impress its effect on the subject, no
subiectum qualitercumque matter how the subject be disposed. For
dispositum: et propter hoc Deus, qui this reason, God, Who does not require
in agendo non requirit subiectum a subject that is disposed for His action,

dispositum, potest absque can produce a natural form without a
dispositione subiecti formam disposition of the subject; for example,
naturalem inducere; utpote dum when He enlightens the blind, revives
caecum illuminat, mortuum vivificat, the dead, and so on for similar cases.
et sic de similibus. Sed sicut non But, just as He requires no natural
requirit dispositionem naturalem in disposition in a corporeal subject, He
subiecto corporeo, ita non requirit does not need merit in the will in order
meritum in voluntate ad gratiam to grant grace, for it is given without
conferendam: quia sine meritis there being any merits, as we showed.
datur, ut ostensum est. Ergo gratiam Therefore, God can grant a person
gratum facientem, per quam sanctifying grace, through which sins
peccata tolluntur, Deus alicui are removed, even after he has fallen
conferre potest etiam postquam a from grace by sin.
gratia cecidit per peccatum.
Amplius. Haec sola homo [4] Besides, the only things that man
recuperare amissa non potest quae cannot recover when they are lost are
per generationem ei adveniunt, sicut those which come to him through
potentias naturales et membra: eo generation, such as his natural
quod homo non potest iterum potencies and organs, and the reason
generari. Auxilium autem gratiae for this is that man cannot be generated
datur homini non per generationem, a second time. Now, the help of grace is
sed postquam iam est. Potest igitur not given man through generation, but
post amissionem gratiae per after he already exists. Therefore, he
peccatum, iterum reparari ad can again be restored in order to
peccata delenda. destroy sin after the loss of grace.
Item. Gratia est quaedam habitualis [5] Moreover, grace is a habitual

dispositio in anima, ut ostensum est. disposition in the soul, as we showed.
Sed habitus acquisiti per actus, si But habits that are acquired by activity,
amittantur, possunt iterum reacquiri if lost, can again be acquired through
per actus per quos acquisiti sunt. the acts suitable for their acquisition.
Multo igitur magis gratia Deo So, it is much more likely that, if it be
coniungens et a peccato liberans, si lost, grace uniting one to God and
amittatur, divina operatione reparari freeing one from sin can be restored by
potest. divine working.
Praeterea. In operibus Dei non est [6] Furthermore, among the works of
aliquid frustra, sicut nec in operibus God, none is futile, as none is futile
naturae: hoc enim et natura habet a among the works of nature, for nature
Deo. Frustra autem aliquid gets this characteristic from God. Now,
moveretur, nisi posset pervenire ad it would be futile for something to be
finem motus. Necessarium est ergo moved if it could not reach the end of its
quod id quod natum est moveri ad motion. It must be, then, that what is
aliquem finem, sit possibile venire in naturally moved toward an end is able
finem illum. Sed homo postquam in to come to that end. But, after man has
peccatum cecidit, quandiu status fallen into sin, for as long as he
huius vitae durat, remanet in eo continues in the present state of life,
aptitudo ut moveatur ad bonum: there remains in him an aptitude to be
cuius signa sunt desiderium de moved toward the good. The signs of
bono, et dolor de malo, quae adhuc this are the desire for the good and
in homine remanent post peccatum. sorrow for evil which still continue in
Est igitur possibile hominem post man after sin. So, it is possible for man
peccatum iterum redire ad bonum to again return after sin to the good
quod gratia in homine operatur. which grace works in man.
Amplius. Nulla potentia passiva [7] Again, no passive Potency is found
invenitur in rerum natura quae non in the nature of things which cannot be
possit reduci in actum per aliquam reduced to act by some natural active
potentiam activam naturalem. Multo potency. Much less, then, is it possible
igitur minus est aliqua potentia in for there to be a potency in the human
anima humana quae non sit soul which is not reducible to act by
reducibilis in actum per potentiam divine active potency. But there remains
activam divinam. Manet autem in in the human soul, even after sin, a
anima humana, etiam post potency toward the good; for the natural
peccatum potentia ad bonum: quia potencies are not removed by sin, and
per peccatum non tolluntur by means of them the soul is directed
potentiae naturales, quibus anima toward its good. So, it can be restored
ordinatur ad suum bonum. Potest to the good by divine potency. Thus,
igitur per divinam potentiam reparari man can obtain the remission of sins by
in bono. Et sic auxilio gratiae homo means of grace.
potest consequi remissionem
peccatorum.
Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 118, si [8] Hence, it is said in Isaiah (1:18): “If
fuerint peccata vestra ut coccinum, your sins be as scarlet, they shall be
quasi nix dealbabuntur; et Proverb. made as white as snow”; and in
1012, universa delicta operit Proverbs (10:12): “charity covers all
caritas. Hoc etiam quotidie a sins.” This, too, we ask daily of the
domino non frustra petimus, Lord, and not in vain, for we say:
dicentes: dimitte nobis debita “Forgive us our trespasses.”
nostra.

Novatianorum, qui dixerunt quod de Novatians, who said that man could not
peccatis quae homo post obtain pardon for sins which he
Baptismum peccat, homo veniam commits after baptism.
consequi non potest.
Quod homo a peccato liberari THAT MAN CANNOT BE FREED FROM
non potest nisi per gratiam SIN EXCEPT THROUGH GRACE
Ex eisdem etiam ostendi potest [1] On the same basis, it can be shown
quod homo a peccato mortali that man cannot revive from mortal sin
resurgere non potest nisi per except through grace.

gratiam.
Per peccatum enim mortale homo [2] For by mortal sin man is turned away

ab ultimo fine avertitur. In ultimum from his ultimate end. But man is not
autem finem homo non ordinatur ordered to his ultimate end except by
nisi per gratiam. Per solam igitur grace. Therefore, by grace alone can
gratiam homo potest a peccato man revive from sin.
resurgere.
Adhuc. Offensa non nisi per [3] Again, an offense can be removed
dilectionem tollitur. Sed per only by love. But through mortal sin man
peccatum mortale homo Dei offends God, for it is said that “God hates
offensam incurrit: dicitur enim sinners” (see Wis. 14:9; Sirach 12:3, 7),
quod Deus peccatores odit, inasmuch as He wills to deprive them of
inquantum vult eos privare ultimo the ultimate end which He makes ready
fine, quem his quos diligit for those whom He loves. So, man
praeparat. Non ergo homo potest cannot revive from mortal sin except
a peccato mortali resurgere nisi through grace, whereby a certain
per gratiam, per quam fit quaedam friendship is developed between God and
amicitia inter Deum et hominem. man.
Ad hoc etiam induci possunt [4] For this purpose, also, all the
omnes rationes superius positae arguments given above for the necessity
de gratiae necessitate. of grace could be brought forward.
Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 4325: [5] Hence, it is said in Isaiah (43:25): “I

ego sum ipse qui deleo iniquitates am He who blots out your iniquities for
tuas propter me; et in Psalmo: My own sake”; and in the Psalm (84:3):
remisisti iniquitatem plebis tuae: “You have forgiven the iniquity of Your
operuisti omnia peccata eorum. people; You have covered all their sins.”
Pelagianorum, qui dixerunt Pelagians, who said that man can rise
hominem posse a peccato from sin by his free will.
resurgere per liberum arbitrium.
Caput 158
Chapter 158
Qualiter homo a peccato
HOW MAN IS FREED FROM SIN
liberatur
Quia vero homo non potest ad [1] Since man cannot return to one
unum oppositorum redire nisi member of a pair of contraries without
recedat ab alio, ad hoc quod homo moving away from the other extreme, he
auxilio gratiae ad statum rectitudinis must, in order to return to the state of
redeat, necessarium est quod a rectitude by means of grace, move away
peccato, per quod a rectitudine from the sin whereby he had swerved
declinaverat, recedat. Et quia homo from rectitude. And because man is
in ultimum finem dirigitur et ab eo chiefly directed toward the ultimate end,
avertitur praecipue per voluntatem, and also turned away from it, through
non solum necessarium est quod his will, it is not only necessary for man
homo exteriori actu a peccato to abandon sin in the external act, but
recedat, peccare desinens, sed also to renounce it in his will, for the
etiam quod recedat voluntate, ad purpose of rising again from sin. Now,
hoc quod per gratiam a peccato man renounces sin in his will provided
resurgat. Voluntate autem homo a he repents his past sin and forms the
peccato recedit dum et de intention of avoiding it in the future. So,
praeterito poenitet, et futurum vitare it is necessary that a man who is rising
proponit. Necessarium est igitur again from sin both repent for past sin
quod homo a peccato resurgens et and intend to avoid future sin. Indeed, if
de peccato praeterito poeniteat, et he would not make up his mind to
futura vitare proponat. Si enim non refrain from sin, then sin in itself would
proponeret desistere a peccato, not be against his will. But, if he did will
non esset peccatum secundum se to refrain from sin, but was not sorry for
contrarium voluntati. Si vero vellet past sin, then this sin that he had
desistere a peccato, non tamen committed would not be against his will.
doleret de peccato praeterito, non Now, the movement whereby one
esset illud idem peccatum quod moves away from something is contrary
fecit, contrarium voluntati. Est to the movement whereby one
autem contrarius motus quo ab approaches it; thus, whitening is
aliquo receditur, motui quo ad illud contrary to blackening. Consequently,
pervenitur: sicut dealbatio contraria the will must abandon sin by moving in a
est denigrationi. Unde oportet quod contrary direction from those
per contraria voluntas recedat a movements whereby it was inclined
peccato his per quae in peccatum toward sin. Now, it was inclined toward
inclinata fuit. Fuit autem inclinata in sin by appetition and enjoyment in
peccatum per appetitum et regard to lower things. Therefore, it
delectationem circa res inferiores. must move away from sin by means of
Oportet igitur quod a peccato certain penances whereby it suffers
recedat per aliqua poenalia, quibus some injury because of the sin that it
affligatur propter hoc quod peccavit: has committed. For, just as the will was
sicut enim per delectationem tracta drawn toward consent to the sin by
fuit voluntas ad consensum peccati, means of pleasure, so is it strengthened
sic per poenas confirmatur in in the detestation of sin by means of
abominatione peccati. penances.
Item. Videmus quod etiam bruta [2] Again, we observe that even brute
animalia a maximis voluptatibus animals may be drawn back from the
retrahuntur per dolores verberum. greatest pleasures by means of painful
Oportet autem eum qui a peccato blows. But he who rises again from sin
resurgit, non solum detestari must not only detest past sin, but also
peccatum praeteritum, sed etiam avoid future sin. So, it is fitting that he
vitare futurum. Est igitur conveniens suffer some affliction for his sin so that
ut affligatur pro peccato, ut sic in this way he may be strengthened in
magis confirmetur in proposito his resolution to avoid sins.
vitandi peccata.
Praeterea. Ea quae cum labore et [3] Besides, the things that we gain as a

poena acquirimus, magis amamus, result of labor and suffering we love
et diligentius conservamus: unde illi more and preserve more carefully. Thus,
qui per proprium laborem acquirunt those who amass wealth by their own
pecunias, minus eas expendunt labor spend less money than those who
quam qui sine labore accipiunt, vel get it without work—say, from their
a parentibus, vel quocumque alio parents or in any other way. But for the
modo. Sed homini resurgenti a man who is rising again from sin, it is
peccato hoc maxime necessarium most necessary that he maintain the
est ut statum gratiae et Dei amorem state of grace and the love of God
diligenter conservet, quem carefully, for he lost them by sinning
negligenter peccando amisit. Est through negligence. Therefore, it is
ergo conveniens ut laborem et proper for him to endure labor and
poenam sustineat pro peccatis suffering for the sins that he has
commissis. committed.
Adhuc. Ordo iustitiae hoc requirit ut [4] Moreover, the order of justice

peccato poena reddatur. Ex hoc demands that a punishment be
autem quod ordo servatur in rebus, assigned for a sin. Now, the wisdom of
sapientia Dei gubernantis apparet. the governance of God becomes
Pertinet igitur ad manifestationem evident from the fact that order is
divinae bonitatis et Dei gloriam preserved in things. So, it belongs to the
quod pro peccato poena reddatur. manifestation of the divine goodness,
Sed peccator peccando contra and of the glory of God, for punishment
ordinem divinitus institutum facit, to be the payment for sin. But the sinner,
leges Dei praetergrediendo. Est by sinning, acts against the order that is
igitur conveniens ut hoc divinely established, thus trespassing
recompenset in seipso puniendo against the laws of God. So, it is fitting
quod prius peccaverat: sic enim that he should pay for this action by
totaliter extra inordinationem punishing himself because he had
constituetur. formerly sinned; indeed, in this way, he
dissociates himself entirely from
disorder.
Per hoc ergo patet quod, postquam [5] By this, then, it becomes evident

homo per gratiam remissionem that, after a man has secured remission
peccati consecutus est, et ad of his sin by grace and has been
statum gratiae reductus, remanet brought back to the state of grace, he
obligatus, ex Dei iustitia, ad remains under an obligation, as a result
aliquam poenam pro peccato of God’s justice, to some penalty for the
commisso. Quam quidem poenam sin that he has committed. Now, if he
si propria voluntate a se exegerit, imposes this penalty on himself by his
per hoc Deo satisfacere dicitur: own will, he is said to make satisfaction
inquantum cum labore et poena to God by this: inasmuch as he attains
ordinem divinitus institutum with labor and punishment the divinely
consequitur, pro peccato se established order by punishing himself
puniendo, quem peccando for the sin, which order he had
transgressus fuerat propriam transgressed by sinning through
voluntatem sequendo. Si autem a following his own will. But, if he does not

se hanc poenam non exigat, cum exact this penalty of himself, then, since
ea quae divinae providentiae things subject to divine providence
subiacent, inordinata remanere non cannot remain disordered, this penalty
possint, haec poena infligetur ei a will be inflicted on him by God. Such a
Deo. Nec talis poena satisfactoria punishment is not called one of
dicetur, cum non fuerit ex electione satisfaction, since it is not due to the
patientis: sed dicetur purgatoria, choice of the one who suffers it; but it
quia, alio puniente, quasi will be called purificatory, because
purgabitur, dum quicquid through being punished by another he
inordinatum fuit in eo, ad debitum will be cleansed, as it were, until
ordinem reducetur. Hinc est quod whatever disorder there was in him is
apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 1131 si brought back to proper order. Hence,
nosmetipsos diiudicaremus, non there is this statement of the Apostle in
utique iudicaremur: cum autem 1 Corinthians (11:3132): “if we would
iudicamur, a domino corripimur, ut judge ourselves, we should not be
non cum hoc mundo damnemur. judged, but whilst we are judged, we are
chastised by the Lord, that we be not
condemned with this world.”
Considerandum tamen quod, cum [6] It should be kept in mind, however,
mens a peccato avertitur, tam that when the mind is turned away from
vehemens potest esse peccati sin the displeasure with sin can be so
displicentia, et inhaesio mentis ad forceful, and the attachment of the mind
Deum, quod non remanebit to God so strong, that no obligation to
obligatio ad aliquam poenam. Nam, punishment will remain. For, as may be
ut ex praedictis colligi potest, poena gathered from things said earlier, the
quam quis patitur post peccati punishment that a person suffers after
remissionem, ad hoc necessaria the remission of sin is necessary so that
est ut mens firmius bono inhaereat, the mind may adhere more firmly to the
homine per poenas castigato, good; since man is chastised by
poenae enim medicinae quaedam punishments, these punishments are,
sunt; et ut etiam ordo iustitiae then, like remedies. It is also necessary
servetur, dum qui peccavit, sustinet so that the order of justice may be
poenam. Dilectio autem ad Deum observed, in the sense that he who has
sufficit mentem hominis firmare in sinned must stand the penalty. But love
bono, praecipue si vehemens fuerit: for God is enough to set the mind of
displicentia autem culpae man firmly in the direction of the good,
praeteritae, cum fuerit intensa, especially if this love be strong; and
magnum affert dolorem. Unde per displeasure for a past fault, when
vehementiam dilectionis Dei, et odii intense, brings great sorrow.
peccati praeteriti, excluditur Consequently, through the strength of
necessitas satisfactoriae vel one’s love for God, and of one’s hatred
purgatoriae poenae: et, si non sit of past sin, there is removed the need
tanta vehementia quod totaliter for punishments of satisfaction or of
poenam excludat, tamen, quanto purification. Moreover, if this strength be
vehementius fuerit, tanto minus de not great enough to set aside
poena sufficiet. punishments entirely, nevertheless, the
stronger it is, the smaller will be the
punishment that suffices.
Quae autem per amicos facimus, [7] “But the things that we can
per nos ipsos facere videmur: quia accomplish through the efforts of our
amicitia ex duobus facit unum per friends we seem to do ourselves,” for
affectum, et praecipue dilectio friendship makes two persons one in
caritatis. Et ideo, sicut per seipsum, love, and especially in the love of
ita et per alium potest aliquis charity. And so, just as a person can
satisfacere Deo: praecipue cum make satisfaction to God by himself, so
necessitas fuerit. Nam et poenam also can he do it through another
quam amicus propter ipsum patitur, person, especially in case of necessity.
reputat aliquis ac si ipse pateretur: Indeed, the punishment that a friend
et sic poena ei non deest, dum suffers for oneself one regards as if it
patienti amico compatitur; et tanto were suffered by oneself. Thus, one
amplius, quanto ipse est ei causa does not escape punishment provided
patiendi. Et iterum affectio caritatis one suffer along with a suffering friend—
in eo qui pro amico patitur, facit and all the more so, the more one is the
magis satisfactionem Deo cause of his suffering. Besides, the love
acceptam quam si pro se pateretur: of charity in the person who suffers for a
hoc enim est promptae caritatis, friend makes his satisfaction more
illud autem est necessitatis. Ex quo acceptable to God than if he suffered for
accipitur quod unus pro alio himself, for in the one case it is
satisfacere potest, dum uterque in prompted by charity; in the other, by
caritate fuerit. Hinc est quod necessity. It may be taken from this that
apostolus dicit, Galat. 62: alter one person can make satisfaction for
alterius onera portate, et sic another provided both abide in charity.
adimplebitis legem Christi. Hence, the Apostle says in Galatians
(6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens,
and so you shall fulfill the law of Christ.”
Chapter 159
Caput 159
THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO HOLD
Quod rationabiliter homini
A MAN RESPONSIBLE IF HE DOES
imputatur si ad Deum non
NOT TURN TOWARD GOD,
convertatur, quamvis hoc sine
EVEN THOUGH HE CANNOT DO
gratia non possit
THIS WITHOUT GRACE
Cum autem, sicut ex praemissis [1]I As we gather from the foregoing,
habetur, in finem ultimum aliquis since one cannot be directed to the
dirigi non possit nisi auxilio divinae ultimate end except by means of divine
gratiae; sine qua etiam nullus potest grace, without which no one can
habere ea quae sunt necessaria ad possess the things needed to work
tendendum in ultimum finem, sicut toward the ultimate end, such as faith,
est fides, spes, dilectio, et hope, love, and perseverance, it might
perseverantia: potest alicui videri seem to some person that man should
quod non sit homini imputandum si not be held responsible for the lack of
praedictis careat; praecipue cum such aids. Especially so, since he
auxilium divinae gratiae mereri non cannot merit the help of divine grace,
possit, nec ad Deum converti nisi nor turn toward God unless God convert
Deus eum convertat; nulli enim him, for no one is held responsible for
imputatur quod ab alio dependet. what depends on another. Now, if this is

Quod si hoc concedatur, plura granted, many inappropriate
inconvenientia consequi conclusions appear. In fact, it follows
manifestum est. Sequetur enim that he who has neither faith, hope, nor
quod ille qui fidem non habet, nec love of God, nor perseverance in the
spem, nec dilectionem Dei, nec good, is not deserving of punishment;
perseverantiam in bono, non sit whereas, it is clearly stated in John
poena dignus: cum expresse (3:36): “He who does not believe the
dicatur, Ioann. 336: qui incredulus Son shall not see life, but the wrath of
est filio, non videbit vitam, sed ira God abides on him.” And since no one
Dei manet super eum. Et cum reaches final happiness without the aids
nullus ad beatitudinis finem sine that we have mentioned, it follows that
praemissis perveniat, sequetur there are certain men who neither attain
ulterius quod aliqui homines sint qui happiness nor suffer punishment from
nec beatitudinem consequantur, God. The contrary of this is shown from
nec poenam patiantur a Deo. Cuius the statement in Matthew (25:34, 41)
contrarium ostenditur ex eo quod that to all who are present at the divine
dicitur Matth. 25, quod omnibus in judgment, it will be said: “Come...
divino iudicio existentibus dicetur, possess you the kingdom prepared for
venite, possidete paratum vobis you” or “Depart ... into everlasting fire.”
regnum; vel, discedite in ignem
aeternum.
Ad huius dubitationis solutionem [2] To settle this difficulty, we ought to
considerandum est quod, licet consider that, although one may neither
aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii merit in advance nor call forth divine
divinam gratiam nec promereri nec grace by a movement of his free choice,
advocari possit, potest tamen he is able to prevent himself from
seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat: receiving this grace: Indeed, it is said in
dicitur enim de quibusdam, Iob 21 Job(21:34): “Who have said to God:
14, dixerunt Deo: recede a nobis, Depart from us, we desire not the
scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus; knowledge of Your ways”; and in Job
et Iob 2413, ipsi fuerunt rebelles (24:13): “They have been rebellious to
lumini. Et cum hoc sit in potestate the light.” And since this ability to
liberi arbitrii, impedire divinae impede or not to impede the reception
gratiae receptionem vel non of divine grace is within the scope of
impedire, non immerito in culpam free choice, not undeservedly is
imputatur ei qui impedimentum responsibility for the fault imputed to
praestat gratiae receptioni. Deus him who offers an impediment to the
enim, quantum in se est, paratus reception of grace. In fact, as far as He
est omnibus gratiam dare, vult enim is concerned, God is ready to give
omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad grace to all; “indeed He wills all men to
cognitionem veritatis venire, ut be saved, and to come to the
dicitur I ad Tim. 24: sed illi soli knowledge of the truth,” as is said in 1
gratia privantur qui in seipsis gratiae Timothy (2:4).But those alone are
impedimentum praestant; sicut, sole deprived of grace who offer an obstacle
mundum illuminante, in culpam within themselves to grace; just as,
imputatur ei qui oculos claudit, si ex while the sun is shining on the world,
hoc aliquod malum sequatur, licet the man who keeps his eyes closed is
videre non possit nisi lumine solis held responsible for his fault, if as a
praeveniatur. result some evil follows, even though he
could not see unless he were provided
in advance with light from the sun.
Caput 160
Chapter 160
Quod homo in peccato
THAT MAN IN THE STATE OF SIN,
existens sine gratia peccatum
WITHOUT GRACE, CANNOT AVOID SIN
vitare non potest
Quod autem dictum est, in [1] Now, this statement of ours, that it is
potestate liberi arbitrii esse ne within the power of free choice not to offer
impedimentum gratiae praestet, an impediment to grace, is applicable to
competit his in quibus naturalis those persons in whom natural potency is
potentia integra fuerit. Si autem integrally present. But if, through a
per inordinationem preceding disorder, one swerves toward
praecedentem declinaverit ad evil, it will not at all be within his power to
malum, non erit omnino in offer no impediment to grace. For, though
potestate eius nullum at any definite instant he may be able to
impedimentum gratiae praestare. refrain from a particular act of sin by his
Etsi enim, ad aliquod momentum, own power, however, if long left to himself,
ab aliquo peccati actu particulari he will fall into sin, whereby an impediment
possit abstinere propria is offered to grace.
potestate: si tamen diu sibi
relinquitur, in peccatum cadet,
per quod gratiae impedimentum
praestatur.
Cum enim mens hominis a statu Indeed, whenever man’s mind swerves
rectitudinis declinaverit, away from the state of rectitude it is
manifestum est quod recessit ab evident that he has departed from the
ordine debiti finis. Illud igitur quod order of his proper end. So, what should
deberet esse in affectu be the most important thing in his affection,
praecipuum, tanquam ultimus the ultimate end, becomes a less
finis, efficitur minus dilectum illo important object of love than that object to
ad quod mens inordinate which his mind is inordinately turned, as if
conversa est sicut in ultimum to an ultimate end. So, whenever anything
finem. Quandocumque igitur comes up that is in agreement with the
occurrerit aliquid conveniens inordinate end but incompatible with his
inordinato fini, repugnans autem proper end, it will be chosen, unless he is
fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur brought back to his proper end, so that be
ad debitum ordinem, ut finem favors the proper end above all things, and
debitum omnibus praeferat, quod this is the effect of grace. However, in so
est gratiae effectus. Dum autem far as he chooses something that is
eligitur aliquid quod repugnat incompatible with his ultimate end, he
ultimo fini, impedimentum offers an impediment to grace, for grace
praestat gratiae, quae dirigit in gives the direction to the end. It is
finem. Unde manifestum est consequently obvious that after sin a man
quod, post peccatum, non potest cannot refrain from all sin during the period
homo abstinere ab omni peccato, preceding his being brought back to the

antequam per gratiam ad proper order by grace.
debitum ordinem reducatur.
Praeterea. Cum mens inclinata [2] Besides, when the mind is inclined
fuerit ad aliquid, non se iam toward some object it does not stand in a
habet aequaliter ad utrumque relation of impartiality toward contrary
oppositorum, sed magis ad illud alternatives, but, instead, is more
ad quod est inclinata. Illud autem favorable to the object to which it is
ad quod mens magis se habet, inclined. But unless it be drawn away from
eligit, nisi per rationis it by a certain concern arising from rational
discussionem ab eo quadam examination, the mind chooses the object
sollicitudine abducatur: unde et in to which it is more favorable; hence, in
repentinis signum interioris sudden actions, an indication of one’s
habitus praecipue accipi potest. inner state of character may be especially
Non est autem possibile mentem found. But it is not possible for a man’s
hominis continue in ea vigilantia mind continually to maintain such vigilance
esse ut per rationem discutiat that it can make a rational investigation of
quicquid debet velle vel agere. whatever he ought to will or do. Thus, it
Unde consequitur quod mens follows that the mind at times chooses
aliquando eligat id ad quod est what it is inclined to, provided the
inclinata, inclinatione manente. inclination be undisturbed, And so, if it be
Et ita, si inclinata fuerit in inclined toward sin, it will not long stay
peccatum, non stabit diu quin without sinning, thus offering an
peccet, impedimentum gratiae impediment to grace, unless it is brought
praestans, nisi ad statum back to the state of rectitude.
rectitudinis reducatur.
Ad hoc etiam operantur impetus [3] The impulsion of the bodily passions
corporalium passionum; et also works toward this result, as also do
appetibilia secundum sensum; et the things that are attractive on the sense
plurimae occasiones male level, and most occasions for bad action
agendi; quibus de facili homo whereby man is easily stimulated to sin,
provocatur ad peccandum, nisi unless one be drawn back by means of a
retrahatur per firmam firm attachment to the ultimate end, which
inhaesionem ad ultimum finem, grace produces.
quam gratia facit.
Unde apparet stulta [4] Consequently, the opinion of the

Pelagianorum opinio, qui Pelagians is evidently stupid, for they said
dicebant hominem in peccato that man in the state of sin is able to avoid
existentem sine gratia posse sin, without grace. The contrary to this is
vitare peccata. Cuius contrarium apparent from the petition in the Psalm
apparet ex hoc quod Psalmus (70:9): “When my strength shall fail, do not
petit: dum defecerit virtus mea, forsake me.” And the Lord teaches us to
ne derelinquas me. Et dominus pray: “And lead us not into temptation, but
orare nos docet: et ne nos deliver us from evil.”
inducas in tentationem, sed
libera nos a malo.
Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato [5] However, although those who are in sin
sunt, vitare non possint per cannot avoid by their own power putting an
propriam potestatem quin impediment in the way of grace, as we
impedimentum gratiae ponant, ut showed, unless they be helped in advance
ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae by grace, nevertheless, this is regarded as
praeveniantur; nihilominus tamen their fault, because this defect is left in
hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, them as a result of a previous fault. Thus,
quia hic defectus ex culpa for example, an intoxicated man is not
praecedente in eis relinquitur; excused from homicide committed in the
sicut ebrius ab homicidio non state of intoxication which he got into
excusatur quod per ebrietatem through his own fault.
committit, quam sua culpa
incurrit.
Praeterea, licet ille qui est in [6] Besides, although he who is in sin does

peccato, non habeat hoc in not have, of his own power, the ability
propria potestate quod omnino entirely to avoid sin, he has it in his power
vitet peccatum, habet tamen in at present to avoid this or that sin, as we
potestate nunc vitare hoc vel illud said. Hence, whatever one he does
peccatum, ut dictum est. Unde commit, he does so voluntarily. And so, not
quodcumque committat, undeservedly, he is held responsible for
voluntarie committit. Et ita non his fault.
immerito ei imputatur ad culpam.
Caput 161
Chapter 161
Quod Deus aliquos a peccato
THAT GOD FREES SOME MEN FROM
liberat, et aliquos in peccato
SIN AND LEAVES OTHERS IN SIN
relinquit
Licet autem ille qui peccat [1] Now, although the man who sins puts
impedimentum gratiae praestet, an impediment in the way of grace, and as
et, quantum ordo rerum exigit, far as the order of things requires he ought
gratiam non deberet recipere: not to receive grace, yet, since God can
tamen, quia Deus praeter act apart from the order implanted in
ordinem rebus inditum operari things, as He does when He gives sight to
potest, sicut cum caecum the blind or life to the dead—at times, out
illuminat vel mortuum resuscitat; of the abundance of His goodness, He
interdum, ex abundantia bonitatis offers His help in advance, even to those
suae, etiam eos qui who put an impediment in the way of
impedimentum gratiae praestant, grace, turning them away from evil and
auxilio suo praevenit, avertens toward the good. And just as He does not
eos a malo et convertens ad enlighten all the blind, or heal all who are
bonum. Et sicut non omnes infirm, in order that the working of His
caecos illuminat, nec omnes power may be evident in the case of those
languidos sanat, ut et in illis quos whom He heals, and in the case of the
curat, opus virtutis eius appareat, others the order of nature may be
et in aliis ordo naturae servetur; observed, so also, He does not assist with
ita non omnes qui gratiam His help all who impede grace, so that
impediunt, auxilio suo praevenit they may be turned away from evil and
ut avertantur a malo et toward the good, but only some, in whom
convertantur ad bonum, sed He desires His mercy to appear, so that
aliquos, in quibus vult suam the order of justice may be manifested in
misericordiam apparere, ita quod the other cases. Hence, the Apostle says,
in aliis iustitiae ordo manifestetur. in Romans (9:2223): “What if God, willing
Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, to show His wrath and to make His power
Rom. 922: volens Deus known, endured with much patience
ostendere iram, et notam facere vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that
potentiam suam, sustinuit in He might show the riches of His glory on
multa patientia vasa irae apta in the vessels of mercy which He has
interitum, ut ostenderet divitias prepared unto glory?”
gloriae suae in vasa
misericordiae, quae praeparavit
in gloriam.
Cum autem Deus hominum qui in [2] However, while God does indeed, in

eisdem peccatis detinentur, hos regard to men who are held back by the
quidem praeveniens convertat, same sins, come to the assistance of and
illos autem sustineat, sive convert some, while He suffers others or
permittat secundum ordinem permits them to go ahead in accord with
rerum procedere, non est ratio the order of things—there is no reason to
inquirenda quare hos convertat et ask why He converts the former and not
non illos. Hoc enim ex simplici the latter. For this depends on His will
voluntate eius dependet: sicut ex alone; just as it resulted from His simple
simplici eius voluntate processit will that, while all things were made from
quod, cum omnia fierent ex nothing, some were made of higher
nihilo, quaedam facta sunt aliis degree than others; and also, just as it
digniora; et sicut ex simplici depends on the simple will of the artisan
voluntate procedit artificis ut ex that, from the same material uniformly
eadem materia, similiter disposed, he forms some vessels for noble
disposita, quaedam vasa format uses and others for ignoble purposes.
ad nobiles usus, et quaedam ad Hence, the Apostle says, in Romans
ignobiles. Hinc est quod (9:21): “Or does not the potter have power
apostolus dicit, ad Rom. 921: an over the clay, of the same lump to make
non habet potestatem figulus luti one vessel unto honor and another unto
ex eadem massa facere aliud dishonor?”
quidem vas in honorem, aliud
vero in contumeliam?
Per hoc autem excluditur error [3] By this we set aside the error of Origen,

Origenis, qui dicebat hos ad who said that certain men are converted to
Deum converti et non alios, God, and not others, because of some
propter aliqua opera quae works that their souls had done before
animae eorum fecerant being united to their bodies. In fact, this
antequam corporibus unirentur. view has been carefully disproved in our
Quae quidem positio in secundo Book Two.
libro diligentius improbata est.
Quod Deus nemini est causa THAT GOD IS NOT THE CAUSE OF SIN
peccandi FOR ANY PERSON
Quamvis autem quosdam [1] Although God does not convert certain

peccatores Deus ad se non sinners to Himself, but leaves them in
convertat, sed in peccatis, their sins according to their merits, He
secundum eorum merita, eos does not lead them into sinful action.
relinquat, non tamen eos ad
peccandum inducit.
Homines enim peccant per hoc [2] In fact, men sin because they turn
quod deviant ab ipso, qui est away from Him Who is their ultimate end,
ultimus finis, ut ex superioribus as is evident from our earlier statements.
patet. Cum autem omne agens But, when every agent acts for an end
agat ad proprium finem et sibi that is proper and suitable to it, it is
convenientem, impossibile est impossible by the action of God for any of
quod, Deo agente, aliqui them to be turned away from the ultimate
avertantur ab ultimo fine, qui end, Who is God. So, it is impossible for
Deus est. Impossibile igitur est God to cause any persons to sin.
quod Deus aliquos peccare faciat.
Item. Bonum causa mali esse non [3] Again, good cannot be the cause of

potest. Sed peccatum est hominis evil. But sin is an evil for man, since it is
malum: contrariatur enim proprio opposed to man’s proper good which is to
hominis bono, quod est vivere live in accord with reason. Therefore, it is
secundum rationem. Impossibile impossible for God to be the cause of
est igitur quod Deus sit alicui sinful action for anyone.
causa peccandi.
Praeterea. Omnis sapientia et [4] Besides, all wisdom and goodness in

bonitas hominis derivatur a man are derived from the wisdom and
sapientia et bonitate divina, sicut goodness of God, as a certain likeness of
quaedam similitudo ipsius. Him. But it is incompatible with human
Repugnat autem sapientiae et wisdom and goodness to cause anyone to
bonitati humanae quod aliquem sin; much more, then, is it incompatible
peccare faciat. Igitur multo magis with these divine qualities.
divinae.
Adhuc. Peccatum omne ex aliquo [5] Moreover, every sin stems from a

defectu provenit proximi agentis, defect in the proximate agent, and not
non autem ex influentia primi from the influence of the primary agent: as
agentis: sicut peccatum the defect of limping results from the
claudicationis provenit ex condition of the leg bone and not from the
dispositione tibiae, non autem ex motor power, for, in fact, whatever
virtute motiva; cum tamen ex ea perfection of motion is apparent in the act
sit quicquid de perfectione motus of limping, it is due to this power. But the

in claudicatione apparet. proximate agent of human sin is the will.
Proximum autem agens peccati Therefore, the defect of sin comes from
humani est voluntas. Est igitur the will of man and not from God Who is
defectus peccati ex voluntate the primary agent; from Him, however,
hominis, non autem a Deo, qui est comes whatever pertains to perfection of
primus agens: a quo tamen est action in the sinful act.
quicquid ad perfectionem actionis
pertinet in actu peccati.
Hinc est quod dicitur Eccli. 1512: [6] Hence, it is said in Sirach (15:12): “Say
non dicas, ille me implanavit. Non not: He caused me to err. For He has no
enim necessarii sunt ei homines need of wicked men.” And later: “He
impii. Et infra: 21 nemini mandavit commanded no man to act wickedly, and
impie agere, et nemini dedit He has given no man license to sin”
spatium peccandi. Et Iac. 113 (Sirach 15:,21). And in James (1:13) it is
dicitur: nemo, cum tentatur, dicat said: “Let no man, when he is tempted,
quoniam a Deo tentetur: Deus say that he is tempted by God: for God is
enim intentator malorum est. not a tempter of evils.”
Inveniuntur tamen quaedam in [7] However, some passages are found in

Scripturis ex quibus videtur quod Scripture, from which it seems that God is
Deus sit aliquibus causa the cause of sinning for certain men.
peccandi. Dicitur enim Exodi 101, Indeed, it is said in Exodus (10:1) : “I have
ego induravi cor Pharaonis et hardened Pharaoh’s heart, and the heart
servorum illius et Isaiae 610, of his servants”; and in Isaiah (6:10):
excaeca cor populi huius, et aures “Blind the heart of this people, and make
eius aggrava: ne forte videant their ears heavy... lest they see with their
oculis suis et convertantur, et eyes... and be converted, and I heal
sanem eos et Isaiae 6317, errare them”; and in Isaiah (63:17): “You made
nos fecisti de viis tuis, indurasti us err from Your ways; You have
cor nostrum, ne timeremus te. Et hardened our heart, lest we fear You.”
Rom. 128, dicitur: tradidit illos Again, in Romans (1:28) it is said: “God
Deus in reprobum sensum, ut delivered them up to a reprobate sense,
faciant quae non conveniunt. to do those things which are not
Quae omnia secundum hoc convenient.” All these texts are to be
intelligenda sunt, quod Deus understood in this way: God does not
aliquibus non confert auxilium ad grant to some people His help in avoiding
vitandum peccatum, quod aliis sin, while to others He does grant it.
quibusdam confert.
Hoc autem auxilium non solum [8] Moreover, this help is not only the
est infusio gratiae, sed etiam infusing of grace, but also external
exterior custodia, per quam guardianship, whereby the occasions of
occasiones peccandi homini ex sinning are taken away from man by
divina providentia tolluntur, et divine providence and whereby
provocantia ad peccatum provocations to sin are suppressed. God
comprimuntur. Adiuvat etiam also helps man in opposing sin by the
Deus hominem contra peccatum natural light of reason and by the other
per naturale lumen rationis, et alia natural goods which He accords man. So,
naturalia bona quae homini when He takes away these aids from
confert. Cum ergo haec auxilia some, according to the merit of their
aliquibus subtrahit, pro merito action, as His justice demands, He is said
suae actionis, secundum quod to harden or to blind them, or to do any of
eius iustitia exigit, dicitur eos the other things mentioned.
obdurare vel excaecare, vel
aliquid eorum quae dicta sunt.
Chapter 163
Caput 163
ON PREDESTINATION,
De praedestinatione,
REPROBATION, AND DIVINE
reprobatione, et electione divina
ELECTION
Quia ergo ostensum est quod [1] So, since we have shown that some
divina operatione aliqui diriguntur men are directed by divine working to
in ultimum finem per gratiam their ultimate end as aided by grace,
adiuti, aliqui vero, eodem auxilio while others who are deprived of the
gratiae deserti, ab ultimo fine same help of grace fall short of their
decidunt; omnia autem quae a ultimate end, and since all things that are
Deo aguntur, ab aeterno per eius done by God are foreseen and ordered
sapientiam provisa et ordinata from eternity by His wisdom, as we
sunt, ut supra ostensum est: showed above, the aforementioned
necesse est praedictam hominum differentiation of men must be ordered by
distinctionem ab aeterno a Deo God from eternity. According, then, as He
esse ordinatam. Secundum ergo has preordained some men from eternity,
quod quosdam ab aeterno so that they are directed to their ultimate
praeordinavit ut dirigendos in end, He is said to have predestined
ultimum finem, dicitur eos them. Hence, the Apostle says, in
praedestinasse. Unde apostolus Ephesians (1:5): “Who predestinated us
dicit ad Ephes. 15: qui unto the adoption of children... according
praedestinavit nos in adoptionem to the purpose of His will.” On the other
filiorum, secundum propositum hand, those to whom He has decided
voluntatis suae. Illos autem quibus from eternity not to give His grace He is
ab aeterno disposuit se gratiam said to have reprobated or to have hated,
non daturum, dicitur reprobasse, in accord with what we find in Malachi
vel odio habuisse: secundum illud (1:23): “I have loved Jacob, but have
quod habetur Malach. 12 Iacob hated Esau.” By reason of this distinction,
dilexi, Esau odio habui. Ratione according to which He has reprobated
vero ipsius distinctionis, secundum some and predestined others, we take
quod quosdam reprobavit et note of divine election, which is
quosdam praedestinavit, attenditur mentioned in Ephesians (1:4): “He chose
divina electio: de qua dicitur us in Him, before the foundation of the
Ephes. 14: elegit nos in ipso ante world.”
mundi constitutionem.
Sic igitur patet quod praedestinatio [2] Thus, it appears that predestination,

et electio et reprobatio est election, and reprobation constitute a

quaedam pars divinae certain section of divine providence,
providentiae, secundum quod according as men are ordered to their
homines ex divina providentia ultimate end by divine providence.
ordinantur in ultimum finem. Unde Hence, it is possible to show that
per eadem manifestum esse predestination and election impose no
potest quod praedestinatio et necessity, by the same reasoning
electio necessitatem non inducunt, whereby we showed above that divine
quibus et supra ostensum est providence does not take away
quod divina providentia contingency from things.
contingentiam a rebus non aufert.
Quod autem praedestinatio et [3] Moreover, that predestination and

electio causam non habent ex election do not find their cause in any
aliquibus humanis meritis, potest human merits can be made clear, not
fieri manifestum, non solum ex hoc only from the fact that God’s grace which
quod gratia Dei, quae est is the effect of predestination is not
praedestinationis effectus, meritis preceded by merits but rather precedes
non praevenitur, sed omnia merita all human merits, as we showed, but it
praecedit humana, ut ostensum can also be shown from this, that the
est: sed etiam manifestari potest divine will and providence is the first
ex hoc quod divina voluntas et cause of things that are done, but that
providentia est prima causa eorum there can be no cause of the divine will
quae fiunt, nil autem potest esse and providence, although, among the
causa voluntatis et providentiae effects of providence, and likewise of
divinae, licet effectuum predestination, one may be the cause of
providentiae, et similiter another.
praedestinationis, unus possit
alterius esse causa.
Quis enim, ut apostolus dicit, prior “For who,” as the Apostle says (Rom.

dedit illi, et retribuetur ei? 11:3536), “has first given to Him, and
Quoniam ex ipso, et in ipso, et per who shall make recompense to Him? For
ipsum sunt omnia. Ipsi honor et of Him, and in Him, and by Him, are all
gloria in saecula saeculorum. things. To Him be honor and glory for
Amen. ever. Amen.”

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Amplius. Si nihil causatur ab [3] Besides, if nothing is caused by a body

Adhuc. Propria operatio rei 15] Furthermore, the proper operation of a

Item. Secundum illud quo aliquid [8] Moreover, a being cannot be subject to

autem nostra, secundum quod united to the intellectual substances,

Praeterea. Huic rei fidem faciet si [9] Furthermore, our confidence in this

sententiam sequebatur quod from the celestial bodies. Hence, the

Omnes autem sequentes [11] Now, all the philosophers who

Ex his omnibus est accipere quod [12] From all these views we may gather

Sciendum est tamen quod, licet [14] However, we should note that, though

Dispositio autem corporis humani Now, the condition of the human body

constituunt. Et ideo indirecte condition of understanding. Thus, just as

Amplius. Omnis electio et actualis [3] Again, every choice and act of will is

neque electionis nostrae possunt our act of understanding. Therefore,

Item. Quaecumque ex impressione [4] Besides, whatever events occur in

Amplius. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, ut [6] Furthermore, things that are done

Item. Ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, [7] Again, things that belong to the

Adhuc. Corpora caelestia non [9] Moreover, celestial bodies make no

Similiter etiam non sufficit ad might take place in our body as a result

electiones nostrae ex acts of choice arose from impressions

ex hoc instinctu eligit malum. person who makes a bad choice as a

Amplius. Nulla virtus activa se [16] Moreover, no active power extends

autem humanae ordinantur ad that end. But human choices are

Per haec autem excluditur positio [19] By this conclusion the theory of the

Non solum autem corpora caelestia [1] Not only is it impossible for the

Impressiones enim causarum [2] For the impressions of universal

Item. A causa remota non sequitur [3] Again, an effect does not result from

Hoc autem possibile non est [9] As a matter of fact, we do not have to

Haec autem ratio, ut Aristoteles in [11] But this way of arguing, as Aristotle

effectus est aliqua causa there is a definite cause for every effect.

Hanc autem rationem ipse solvit in [12] He answers this argument, in

Sic igitur, proposito aliquo effectu, [13] And thus, given a certain effect, we

concurrentem sit reducere in conflicting cause back to a higher cause,

Haec autem positio irrationabilis est. [2] But this theory is not reasonable.

Amplius. Causa agens particularis [3] Again, a particular agent cause,

immutationem corporis sequitur Therefore, celestial motion, by virtue of

Praeterea. Secundum positionem [5] Moreover, according to the theory of

Non est autem aestimandum quod [1] Now, we must not think that the souls

Item. Ab illo agente aliquid natum [3] Again, a thing is by nature capable of

Hoc autem solius Dei est, sicut ex nature. Now, this is proper to God alone,

Adhuc. Violentum opponitur [6] Furthermore, violent movement is

Quidam vero, non intelligentes [1] Some people, as a matter of fact, not

Quibus quidem auctoritatibus [3] To these people, of course,

Amplius. Perfectius invenitur ordo [6] Moreover, a more perfect order is

Adhuc. Superius est ostensum [7] Furthermore, we showed somewhat

Item. Argumentatur ad hoc [8] Besides, an argument that is

Item. Quanto aliqua sunt nobiliora [4] Besides, the more noble things are in

Adhuc. Gubernatio providentiae ex [6] Furthermore, the governance of

cadunt earum voluntates et their acts of will and choice fall under His

Videntur autem quaedam in sacra [8] However, certain passages in Sacred

eorum quae non sunt in nobis, non our power, but not with those that are in

Ex his ergo quae supra ostensa [1] From the things shown above we can

Patet enim quod electiones [4] It is clear that our acts of choice have

nostrae multiplicitatem habent: the character of multiplicity, since choices

Similiter autem intelligentia nostra [5] Likewise, our understanding has the

entium. Sic igitur aliquod bonum good thing may happen to a man which

Quia vero fortuita sunt quae sunt [7] But, since fortuitous events are those

Consequitur autem homo ex [8] Moreover, man may obtain from

aliquid eligendum per caelestia to choose something, or he is

autem eventu, oportet quod uterque agents must be directed to choose the

per se inclinare ad hoc totum, quod should be done at the place where the

Quidam vero ea in aliquas altiores [3] But others have attempted to reduce

inhaerens rebus mobilibus “fate is a disposition inherent in mutable