Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.

American Express ISSUE:

International, Inc., G.R. No. 152609, June 29, 2005 Is American Express International subjected to zero-rated tax?

Verba legis or plain meaning rule RULING:

Yes. The law is very clear. Under Section 102 of the Tax Code 11,
services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines
FACTS:
(other than the processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods for
"[Respondent] is a Philippine branch of American Express
persons doing business outside the Philippines), when paid in
International, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A., with office
the rules and regulations of the BSP, are zero-rated. Respondent is
in the Philippines at the Ground Floor, ACE Building, corner Rada
a VAT-registered person that facilitates the collection and payment
and de la Rosa Streets, Legaspi Village, Makati City. It is a servicing
of receivables belonging to its non-resident foreign client, for which it
unit of American Express International, Inc.-Hongkong Branch
gets paid in acceptable foreign currency inwardly remitted and
(Amex-HK) and is engaged primarily to facilitate the collections of
accounted for in conformity with BSP rules and regulations. Certainly,
Amex-HK receivables from card members situated in the Philippines
the service it renders in the Philippines is not in the same category
and payment to service establishments in the Philippines. Amex
as "processing, manufacturing or repacking of goods" and should,
Philippines registered itself with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
therefore, be zero-rated.
Revenue District Office No. 47 (East Makati) as a value-added tax
(VAT) taxpayer. For the period January 1, 1997 to December 31,
In the present case, respondent's role in the consumer credit process
1997, [respondent] filed with the BIR its quarterly VAT returns. Amex
described above primarily consists of gathering the bills and credit
filed with the BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess
card drafts of different service establishments located in the
input taxes in the amount of P3,751,067.04, which amount was
Philippines and forwarding them to the ROCs outside the country.
arrived at after deducting from its total input VAT paid of
Servicing the bill is not the same as billing. For the former type of
P3,763,060.43 its applied output VAT liabilities only for the third and
service alone, respondent already gets paid
fourth quarters of 1997. From the foregoing, the [CTA], through the
Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta rendered a decision 7 in favor of
Gratia argumenti that the sending of drafts and bills by service
the herein respondent holding that its services are subject to zero-
establishments to respondent is equivalent to the act of sending them
rate pursuant to Section 108(b) of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 and
directly to its parent company abroad, and that the parent company's
Section 4.102-2 (b)(2) of Revenue Regulations 5-96, the decretal
subsequent redemption of these drafts and billings of credit card
portion of which reads as follows:
holders is also attributable to respondent, then with greater reason
should the service rendered by respondent be zero-rated under our
VAT system. The service partakes of the nature of export sales as
applied to goods, especially when rendered in the Philippines by a
VAT-registered person that gets paid in acceptable foreign currency
accounted for in accordance with BSP rules and regulations.
ground that only Congress may tread upon. The Court may not
construe a statute that is free from doubt. "[W]here the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application." The Court
has no choice but "see to its mandate is obeyed."

As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as
a basis for the jurisdictional reach of the tax. Goods and services are
taxed only in the country where they are consumed. Exports are zero-
rated, while imports are taxed.
Thus, for the supply of service to be zero-rated as an exception, the
law merely requires that first , the service be performed in the
Philippines; second, the service fall under any of the categories in
Section 102(b) of the Tax Code; and, third, it be paid in acceptable
foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP rules and
regulations.
In sum, having resolved that transactions of respondent are zero-
rated, the Court upholds the former's entitlement to the refund as
determined by the appellate court. Furthermore, under a zero-rating
scheme, the sale or exchange of a particular service is completely
freed from the VAT, because the seller is entitled to recover, by way
of a refund or as an input tax credit, the tax that is included in the cost
of purchases attributable to the sale or exchange.

Indeed, these three requirements for exemption from the destination

principle are met by respondent. Its facilitation service is performed
in the Philippines. It falls under the second category found in Section
102(b) of the Tax Code, because it is a service other than "processing,
manufacturing or repacking of goods" as mentioned in the provision.
Undisputed is the fact that such service meets the statutory condition
that it be paid in acceptable foreign currency duly accounted for in
accordance with BSP rules. Thus, it should be zero-rated.

As mentioned at the outset, Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax Code is

very clear. Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation
is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be introduced
where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, Congress has given it is unfair to the equal power given to branches
2012 of government.

Verba legis or plain meaning rule

Ruling: No. Based on the Latin principle of verba legis non est
recedendum or that words should not depart from their meaning that
Doctrine: Based on Latin principle of verbal egis non est recedendum
the Constitution,it is clear that the number of the composition of JBC
or that words should not depart from their meaning that the
is limited to 7 and the use of “a” before the “representative of
Constitution,it is clear that the number of the composition of JBC is
Congress” speaks a lot of the raison d’ etre of the framers of the
limited to 7 and the use of “a” before the “representative of Congress”
Constitution.
speaks a lot of the raison d’ etre of the framers of the Constitution.

During the analysis of the Constitutional Commission also, it cannot

Issue: Whether Congress is given 2 seats in the JBC which is one for
be excused that just because the framers of the Constitution did not
the HOR and another for the Senate.
pre-empt the bicameral creation of Congress it is a complete
oversight since it would be safer to assume that the 7 is an ideal odd
Facts: The issue came about during the selection process after CJ
number to prevent a deadlock.
Corona was impeached. The petitioner is the Solicitor General
The single representation of each branch is also a recognition of the
Chavez as he was among the individuals being considered by
co-equal nature of each branch of government through a single ex-
Judicial Bar Council (JBC). The case historically narrated that the
officio members in the JBC.
JBC is an institution established in 1986 in order to mitigate political
influences that may breach or politicize the Judicial appointment
The reference of Congress to a bicameral character is only during
process as seen in the time of Marcos. Under Sec. 8 Art. VIII of the
limited moments in its exercise of its power like legislation
Constitution the JBC will have seven members namely the CJ as
ex-officio Chairman, the Justice Secretary, and a representative (suggestion of tax increases or debt ceilings), impeachment,
canvassing of electoral return for Pres and Vice-Pres. Since these
of the Congress as ex officio Members, private businessman,
ex-member of Supreme Court, IBP member, professor of law. functions have clearly specified different mandates for the houses in
the Congress while in the case there is no mention of a specific role
The issue started when the Congress questions whether the said
of either house as they are taken as one together.
article allows the double representation for Congress seeing that
starting the year 2000 each one from the House Of Representatives
(HOR) and Senate were sent to JBC, each with their own voting
power. The petitioner questions the double representation that
Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. L-29658, November 29, 1968
C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
Doctrine: Courts may not, in the guise of an interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. Courts are not authorized to insert the
law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think should
be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have
supplied if its attention had been called to the omission. Nor may they
interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe.
Where a statute contains no limitations in its operation or scope,
courts should not engraft any.
Facts:
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of detective bureau of
the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel.
He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his
present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa
on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was designated acting chief of
police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional
appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968, the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the petitioner
but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position." Instead, the respondent certified other persons as qualified
for the post. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the
metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of Manila
was vacant and listed the qualifications which applicants should
possess. The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a
demand that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and
qualified applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief
of police of the city.
He contended that his service alone as captain for more than three
years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for appointment.
The demand was contained in a letter which he wrote to the
respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter
favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence
this petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the
petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
Issue: Is the petitioner qualified for appointment as chief of police? /
Within the meaning and intendment of the law, should one have a
bachelor’s degree in addition to service qualification for the
appointment of chief of police?
Ruling: No. The petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for
appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. — No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record, or has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer
 in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher."
In other words, an applicant who is a holder of a bachelor's degree
from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation would make the grade, in the same manner as would
another applicant with a similar bachelor's degree who has served as
chief of police with exemplary record, etc.
Petitioner argues he has served successively as captain, major and
lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954. He contends that a
bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it will
make a good policeman, but that, on the other hand, one who, like
the petitioner, has risen from patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets
the test of professionalism." Even if we concede the correctness of
the petitioner's view, still we do not see how the requirement of a
college degree as additional qualification can run counter to the
avowed policy of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the
requirement of such additional qualification will best carry out that
policy.
Petitioner also argues that "if a high school graduate who had served
as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight years can
be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as Chief of the
Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the successive ranks of
Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to mention the fact that he was
awarded three Presidential Awards and was given the Congressional
Commendation — the highest award ever conferred in the history of
the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to concede
its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in the law because
it is not there. The inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute
is addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless such
enlargements are by it accepted courts are without power to make
them

The petitioner's argument is fallacious. It fails to distinguish between

eligibility and qualification. For the statute may allow the
compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility but not
necessarily for his lack of educational qualification.

Section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is

clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and service
qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is
evident
People v. Garcia y Madrigal, G.R. No. L-2873, February 28, 1950 Ruling:

LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE ● Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2,
Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes as it now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no
incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15
Doctrine: All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the
so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a
conflicting intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or reformatory institution. All parts of a statute are to be
so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to
language each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the
same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded,
Facts: unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language.
● The lower court, ignoring Garcia's minority, sentenced him to
- An amended act is ordinarily construed as if the original
an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of
prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime statute has been repealed and a new and independent act in
of robbery the amendment form had been adopted in its stead
● RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the RPC by reducing from
18 to 16 the age below which Garcia has to be committed to
the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or
charitable institution, instead of being convicted and
sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy
● The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by
implication has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC,
which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under
18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Issue: Whether or not Garcia was entitled to the privileged mitigating

circumstance in article 68, paragraph 2 of the RPC?
People v. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143, August 31, 1988
C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
Doctrine: As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Facts:
● Eusebio Nazario operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio
of Pinagbayanan, of said municipality in the Municipality of
Pagbilao, Quezon, Philippines.
● Nazario refuse and fail to pay the municipal taxes from 1964-
1966 in the total amount of P362.62 required of him as
fishpond operator as provided for under Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1955, as amended, in spite of repeated demands
made upon him by the Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao,
Quezon.
● The Trial Court finds him guilty for the violation of the
Ordinance.
● Nazario’s Contentions:
○ The ordinances are "ambiguous and uncertain." He
contends that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he
is not covered since the said ordinances speak of
"owner or manager." He likewise maintains that they
are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment.
○ The ordinances is an ex post facto measures since it
penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage.
○ The power of the municipal council of Pagbilao to tax
does not extend to forest products or concessions
under Republic Act No. 2264.
Issue:
● Whether or not the municipal ordinance is
unconstitutional for being vague - No
● Whether or not the municipal ordinance is an ex post facto
law - No
● Whether or not the municipal ordinance imposes a property
tax on the forest land - No
Ruling:
1. The municipal ordinance is not vague thus it is constitutional
● From the very provisions, the appellant falls within its
coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he
comes within the term "manager." He does not deny
the fact that he financed the construction of the
fishponds, introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and
had employed laborers to maintain them.
● While it appears that it is the National Government
which owns them, the Government never shared in
the profits they had generated. Aside from that the
Government is immune from taxes and for another,
since it is not the Government that had been making
money from the venture.
● As the actual operator of the fishponds in question,
and as the recipient of profits brought about by the
 business, the appellant is clearly liable for the 3. The municipal ordinance is not a tax on the forest land but a
municipal taxes in question. privilege tax on the business of fishpond
● Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of ● The tax in question is not a tax on property, although
payment. The dates of payment have been definitely the rate thereof is based on the area of fishponds
established. The fact that the appellant has been ● Fishponds are not forest lands, although they were
allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as held to be agricultural lands. By definition, "forest" is
far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 "a large tract of land covered with a natural growth of
is concerned — presents a mere problem in trees and underbush; a large wood."
computation, but it does not make the ordinances ● They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the
vague. business of fishpond maintenance. They are not
● As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on charged against sales but rather on occupation, which
January 1, 1964 for fishponds in operation prior is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264.
thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new fishponds,
three years after their approval by the Bureau of
Fisheries (Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the
amendatory act (Ordinance No. 12) merely granted
amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators.
2. The ordinance is not an ex post facto law
● "Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14,
1955. Hence, it cannot be said that the amendment
(under Ordinance No. 12) is being made to apply
retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is
1955 (date of enactment)
● Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the
nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and
enhance the collection of revenues the original act,
Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed
● Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had
been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be
said that Ordinance No. 12 imposes a retroactive
penalty
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936 the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly. Angara
filed a Motion to dismiss arguing that by virtue of the National
C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE Assembly proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
Courts may not be influenced by questions of wisdom back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be
Doctrine: Although it is not included in the tripartite system it is acting
subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The power
Petitioner here then wants to Prohibit the Electoral Commission
vested in the Electoral Commission is complete and unimpaired as if
(respondent) from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by a
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Pedro Ynsua (another respondent) against the election of the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
power by the National Assembly.
district of Tayabas. The controversy lies on the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over the Electoral Commission and the subject
Issue: Issue: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
matter of controversy.
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative.
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
Facts:
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents,
constitutional grant to the Electoral commission as the “sole judge”
Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
the members of the National Assembly.
Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district. On November 15, 1935,
The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been
he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests
of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
had thus far been filed.
the National Assembly". Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission (EC) a
conform to their own prescribed rules and the National Assembly
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
cannot divest them of any such powers.
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding
with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for
purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other
two departments of the government. The Electoral Commission is
also the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly. BUT as far as
the Electoral Commission is concerned the constitution invests in it
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the
limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not included in the tripartite system it is acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. The
power vested in the Electoral Commission is complete and
unimpaired as if originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
Wherefore, petition is DENIED.
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is

to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
Courts may not be influenced by questions of wisdom
DOCTRINE: The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the
law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial
legislation and in such application or construction, it should not make
or supervise legislation, or, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel,
or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant
to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would
give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as
to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away
from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
FACTS: Tangcoy was engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players. Upon hearing that had some pieces of jewelry for
sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City and offered to sell the jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and turned over: an
18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; a men's necklace and
bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of
the sale, and return the unsold items, within a period of 60 days. The
period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able
to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the
value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail. Thus,
Tangcoy filed a complaint for estafa against him. The RTC and CA
both found Corpuz guilty, and he was sentenced to 4-14 years
imprisonment. Hence, Corpuz filed a petition to the SC raising
procedural and substantive issues.
ISSUE: Does the Court have the power to amend punishments of
certain crimes, like estafa, should it find it excessive?
RATIO: No, the Court has no power to amend punishments of certain
crimes should it find it to be excessive. However, as stated in Art. 5
of RPC, the Court has the duty to “submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Secretary of Justice, such statement as may be deemed
proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a
strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.”
After affirming the findings of the lower court, and that Corpuz is
indeed guilty of estafa, the Court finds that the punishment for such
crime seems to be excessive. The question of the continued validity
of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came
up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of
the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal
Code . Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on
this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution.
Definitely, there seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by
the range of penalties imposed on crimes against property committed
today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify
the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through
this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power
of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render
the whole situation without any remedy. The Revised Penal Code in
Article 5 provides the right thing to do. The remedy wherein an act is
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the
Court as excessive is not to suspend the execution of the sentence
but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act
committed. The court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this
time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.