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CASE PRINCIPLES IN CIVIL LAW

BOOK 1 – PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Part 1 - Persons

While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die—one need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs. Montaño, 603
SCRA 621, G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

Article 40 of the Civil Code prescribed that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it” and adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb).
This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective. Quimiguing vs. Icao, 34 SCRA 132, No.
26795 July 31, 1970

Any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition, it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Verceles vs. Posada, 522 SCRA 518,
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. Geluz vs.
Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 801, No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special
law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R.
No. 174689 October 19, 2007

To the person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No.
166676 September 12, 2008

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.

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However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof
to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. Catalan vs. Basa, 528 SCRA 645, G.R.
No. 159567 July 31, 2007

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Further, the
distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Muller vs. Muller, 500 SCRA 65, G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the
above constitutional provision. Matthews vs. Taylor, 590 SCRA 394, G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not
be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770,
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that
he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670
December 3, 2012

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. It is also a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as
having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found. Poe-Llamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016

Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the
Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where the
President may on his own issue laws. However, administrative and executive orders and those which affect
only a particular class of persons need not be published. It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of

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its contents. The non-publication of the Presidential decrees and issuances of general application shall have
no force and effect of law. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those of
general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules enforcing a
statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere
interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only. Tañada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a date other
than—even before—the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its own date of
effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is the very essence, of the
phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section 1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only
when a statute does not provide for its own date of effectivity. What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and
what due process requires, as this Court held in Tañada v. Tuvera, is the publication of the law for without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
n[eminem] excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. La Bugal-B’Laan
Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 127882 January 27, 2004

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In
Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule: . . . the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, G.R. No. 147387, G.R. No. 152161 December 10, 2003

The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the
language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her
compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her. DM. Consunji, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However,
the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law
is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. The International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the

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voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent
with claiming it.” F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. vs. HR Construction Corp., 668 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 187521 March 14,
2012

Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute
the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be
differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of
such statute. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority To Continue use of the Firm name “Ozaeta, Romulo,
etc., 92 SCRA 1, July 30, 1979

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals; This provision recognizes that a man’s
house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. Hing vs.
Choachuy, Sr., 699 SCRA 667, G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Ardiente vs. Pastorfide, 701 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58
Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such promise". The breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 109 Phil. 629, No. L-14628
September 30, 1960

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed

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in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals,
219 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which
the erring promissor must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil
Code. Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648, No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly
could mean illegally or unlawfully. Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, 634 SCRA 123,
G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action,
available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is
an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the
principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.” Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, 634
SCRA 123, G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and in-tentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. California Clothing, Inc. vs. Quiñones, 708
SCRA 420, G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

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Part 2 - Family Relations

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a0 person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Añonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420, G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010

In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married
to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission
against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.
People vs. Dela Cruz, 612 SCRA 364, G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010

Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot
therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the
“compelling state interest” test. Estrada vs. Escritor, 408 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious
freedom—may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the
sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Macua Vda. de Avenido vs.
Avenido, 714 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 53851 January 22, 2014

It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of
the marriage between his parents. Calimag vs. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA 620, G.R. No. 191936
June 1, 2016

Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a
man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no

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deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary
action. Abanag vs. Mabute, 647 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011

This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081
October 12, 2011

As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda
is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Documentary evidence — among others, the parties’ respective
marriage contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the primary evidence of a
marital union46 — indicates that Adriano was married to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco
— and both marriages were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and issuance of
the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to
each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently, Banguis
cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse; the right and privilege belonged to
Wenifreda alone. Banguis-Tambuyat vs. Balcom-Tambuyat, 754 SCRA 165, G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

The Supreme Court (SC) has long settled in Republic v. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605 (2014), that as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil
registry, such as those involving the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected. Republic vs.
Tipay, 855 SCRA 419, G.R. No. 209527 February 14, 2018

The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a
partition of properties. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang vs. Sy, 603 SCRA 534, G.R. No. 114217 October 13, 2009

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject
the officiating official to administrative liability. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Arañes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402,
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

A marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the
point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29; or 3.] upon the request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his
hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case only tend to degrade the revered position enjoyed by
marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondent’s cavalier
proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended period of
engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions. Beso vs.
Daguman, 323 SCRA 566, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000

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The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Perez-Ferraris vs. Ferraris, 495 SCRA 396, G.R. No. 162368
July 17, 2006

Jurisprudence has recognized that psychological incapacity “is a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.” A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to
comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. The requirement that psychological incapacity must
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Antonio vs. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353, G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193, G.R. No.
161793 February 13, 2009

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.” Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment
in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent
marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. x x x
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the
Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee
and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. Social Security System
vs. Jarque Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid
marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a

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subsequent amendment of the governing law. Ablaza vs. Republic, 628 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 158298 August 11,
2010

The four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows: 1. That
the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Republic vs. Granada, 672 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy. Capili vs. People, 700 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Chi
Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last
during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family,
reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. Patricio vs. Dario III, 507 SCRA
438, G.R. No. 170829 November 20, 2006

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Patricio vs. Dario III, 507 SCRA 438, G.R. No.
170829 November 20, 2006

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home
from the time of its occupation as a family residence without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial
processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of
Court. Arriola vs. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666, G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008

Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. Lam vs. Chua, 426 SCRA 29, G.R.
No. 131286 March 18, 2004

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Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513,
G.R. No. 165016 June 17, 2008

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed
by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support, and contextually, the resulting juridical relationship is a quasi-
contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching at the expense of another. Lacson vs.
Lacson, 499 SCRA 677, G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to
the wife–as long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to
be conjugal in nature. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes,
and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ayala Investment
& Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 272, G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998

In the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that the certification of the Local
Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA
646, G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of
the same Code. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Go-
Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702, G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or
their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. Mercado-Fehr vs., 414 SCRA 288,
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

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As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Atienza vs. De
Castro, 508 SCRA 593, G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006

The registration of the trade name in the name of one person—a woman—does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law,
all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted
or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

The conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in this chapter or by spouses in their marriage settlement. In other words,
the property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27,
2009

In a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court. Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178, G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) The man and the
woman must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. Diño vs. Diño, 640
SCRA 178, G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of
the parties. Diño vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178, G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved—where it is proven that one spouse inherited the residential lot from a parent, the same
sufficiently rebuts the presumption of conjugal ownership; Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family
Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from
the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. Muñoz, Jr. vs. Ramirez, 629 SCRA
38, G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010

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The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child
who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals,
468 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the
rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The presumption of legitimacy
does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice
and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005

An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage. Concepcion vs. Court of Appeals, 468 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 123450 August
31, 2005

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to
be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a
husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who
can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Benitez-Badua vs.
Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 468, G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994

Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and
separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. Geronimo vs. Santos, 771 SCRA 508, G.R. No.
197099 September 28, 2015

There was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the
eyes of the law, never married. Morigo vs. People, 422 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged “blessing” by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage
ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. Ronulo vs. People, 728 SCRA 675,
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

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A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Republic
vs. Olaybar, 715 SCRA 605, G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio. Under said Article
2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
“freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage
Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound; Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. Republic vs. Albios, 707 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such
change. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang, 454 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005

The main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on
whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules “that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No. 206220
August 19, 2015

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would
be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not
incapacitated from getting married. The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No.
206220 August 19, 2015

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She
filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to
affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt.—The following may adopt: x x x Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: x x x The use of the word “shall” in the above-
quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in

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consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. The law is clear. There is no room for
ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall
under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98, G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim, Monina P. Lim,
588 SCRA 98, G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of
the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Salientes vs. Abanilla, 500 SCRA 128, G.R. No.
162734 August 29, 2006

The so-called “tenderage presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child.
All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Gamboa-
Hirsch vs. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 380, G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007

Illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother, regardless of whether the father
admits paternity. The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the
latter to give support to, but not custody of the child. Briones vs. Miguel, 440 SCRA 455, G.R. No. 156343
October 18, 2004

The award of temporary custody is provisional and subject to change as circumstances may warrant—even
the award of child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not permanent as it may be
reexamined and adjusted if and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit. The general rule
that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’être in the
basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care. Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461 SCRA 450,
G.R. No. 154994, G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence—to deprive the
wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the

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welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. It is not
enough for a father to show merely that a mother is a lesbian—he must also demonstrate that she carried
on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto V, 461
SCRA 450, G.R. No. 154994, G.R. No. 156254 June 28, 2005

In all cases involving the care, custody and control of minor children, the sole and foremost consideration is
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents; In the continual
evolution of legal-institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of
life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a
radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. Laxamana vs. Laxamana,
388 SCRA 296, G.R. No. 144763 September 3, 2002

The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Parental authority over minor children is lodged by
Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to
the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer be the
subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship. Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas, 734 SCRA
625, G.R. No. 188773 September 10, 2014

Nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that “legitimate parents” pertain to those who exercise
parental authority over the employee enrolled under the Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
Moreover, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. Bartolome vs. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78, G.R. No. 192531
November 12, 2014

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation. Noveras vs. Noveras, 733 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 188289 August 20,
2014

TN: In Noveras Case, the Supreme Court awarded presumptive legitimes to the children of the parties even
if it is for legal separation case.

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Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, “(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.” The children are
therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which
shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the
net proceeds from the sale ofthe Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the
amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00
as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. Noveras vs. Noveras, 733 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 188289 August 20,
2014

Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines
(R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. Quiao
vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent’s marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in
relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article
256 of the Family Code “[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.” Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642,
G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners
of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
common mass of the couple’s properties. Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.”72  Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute
community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime under Article 129 of the Family Code. Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642, G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

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