REPUBLIC v.

VILLANUEVA
Facts: Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313
square meters and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by INC on January 9, 1953 from
Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church.
The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military
reservation. They are inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau
of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel
exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been
paid therefor. On September 13, 1977, INC filed with the CFI Bulacan an application for the
registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the
land for more than thirty years. The trial court ordered the registration of the two lots.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the registration of two lots.
Held: Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution stated that "no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area". INC, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to
acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain, like the two lots in question, because of the
constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church is not entitled to avail
itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A
corporation sole has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil.
58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law). The contention in the comments of the INC that the two
lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48
Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land
possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212
U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this case
do not fall within that category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under
section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644). As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain
or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71
Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical
incoativo" and that before the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the
juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. The lower court's
judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of INC is dismissed with
costs against said applicant.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August 13, 1976
from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the corresponding
appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments; firstly, the land
in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as
a result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty years
by the original owner, Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing spouses, whom
Meralco acquired the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos
spouses and Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by
virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands of
public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Does the possession tacked
to predecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee its rights to possession and title of
the land. Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant
would be extended to a juridical person.
RULING: No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the
law to hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not
exceeding one thousand hectares. No. The presumption that since they bought the property from
the person who occupied the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public
land for more than thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession. It would
cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen
claiming it under the law. This conclusion is anchored on the principle that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest possess and
occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest. Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of
title before juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until
the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be
confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between the State
and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The court also took notice that the
constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural
public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. IAC

FACTS: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral
lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela donated part of the land as the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES: W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

YES already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.

G.R. NO. L-36731: GODINEZ V. FONG PAK LUEN

Facts: The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to
defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-
defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-
defendant Trinidad S. Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen
is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and
disqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in
said parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to
law and considered non-existent. The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not
state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the
name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of
action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by
Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a
result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code,
an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right
of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was
filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law. The trial court
issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but
was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions
of the Constitution and the Civil Code.

Ruling: No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits.
However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract
of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or
merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is
unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on
imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against
whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. As earlier mentioned, Fong
Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified
to own the subject property.

Philippine Ports Authority vs. Hon. Rafael L. Mendoza,

G.R. No. L-48304, September 11, 1985
Facts: The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one organization
the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. To implement
its policy of integration, PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides that it is necessary
that two or more contractors presently operating within the same port premises who desire to
continue or renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one organization.
Accordingly, the eleven port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United South
Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI). The latter corporation was recognized by PPA and granted a special
permit to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu
pending the eventual award of a management contract. Private respondents Pernito, et al. instituted
an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory
injunction and damages against PPA and USDI. They assail the policy adopted by PPA to grant
only one permit to only one group as violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.

Issue: Whether or not PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional
and void for being violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade.

Ruling: No. Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that “the state shall regulate
or prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.” Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited.
The use of the word "regulate" in the Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly
regulated, are allowed. Regulate means includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain,
but regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit. "Competition can
best regulate a free economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that principle must accommodate
hard practical experience. There are areas where for special reasons the force of competition, when
left wholly free, might operate too destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are
an instance of that consideration." By their very nature, certain public services or public utilities
such as those which supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc. must be given
exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are not violative
of the law against monopolies (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, supra). In the case at
bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in the port of Cebu. The operations there,
particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City of Cebu, the principal port in the
South, but also the economy of the whole country as well. Any prolonged disjunction of the
services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and
commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to
regulation and control for the public good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through
compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a monopoly because
the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in the arrastre and
stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is comprised of the eleven
(11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately
constituted themselves as USDI. But over and above the platter of whether the monopoly has been
created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest. Accordingly, PPA's
policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on monopolies.

SECRETARY OF DENR v. MAYOR JOSE YAP

Facts: The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory
relief filed by Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes for the land they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al
alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to
secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared
their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

Issue: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island.

Ruling: The SC ruled against Yap et al. and Sacay et al. Yes, because the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert ortions of Boracay Island into
an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and,
applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian Doctrine dictates that
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that have
not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill
of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already
alienable and disposable. Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. It is plain error for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable. Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The private claimants cannot apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element
of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay
since June 12, 1945.

REPUBLIC v CA

Facts: This is a petition for review of the May 21, 2001 and Sept. 25, 2001 decision of the
CA.On June 2, 1930, the CFI of Cagayan issued Decree No. 381938 in favor of spouses Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio
Carag and Victoria Turingan, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151,
containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters, situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. The Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the names of spouses
Carag. On May 19, 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
Regional Office No. 2 of the DENR, Tuguegarao, Cagayan a letter-petition requesting the DENR
to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the
trial court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property wich was
allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928. The
Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground
verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The investigating team reported that:
(a) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad -151 was found to be still within timber land area at the time of
the issuance of the Decree and OCT of the spouses Carag, and the same was only released as
alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982; (b) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De
Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-
interest a portion of Lot 2472 Cd 151 since time immemorial. Thus, the investigating team
claimed that a portion of the said lot was only released and alienable and disposable on Feb. 22,
1982. In a memorandum dated Sept. 9, 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management
Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No.
11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands
approved the recommendation. On June 10, 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No.
381928, petitioner filed with the CA a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and
declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consist of 2,640,000 square meters
(disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
issuance of Decree No. 381928 and therefore, was not alienable and disposable until February
22, 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable. The CA dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Issue: Whether the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract
of timber land in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan.
Ruling: Petitioner argues that the power to declassify or classify lands of public domain os only
the Executive Branch of the Government. The Supreme Court said that under the Spanish
regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, SC ruled that
“...with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
the State or by sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they
are not destine to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance
with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person.” Thus, unless specifically
declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in
accordance with the law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not
alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for
some public purpose in accordance with the law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The
land classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint also do not shoe that in 1930 the
disputed portion was part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority, dated May 27, 1994,
contained no statement that the disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land. The
law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:
Section 6: The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain to: (1)
alienable or disposable; (2) Timer; and (3) Mineral lands, and may at any time and in a like
manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition. Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed
portion of the subject property timber or mineral and pursuant to Section 6, of Act No. 2874. It is
true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 pens to disposition only those lands which have been
declared alienable or disposable. However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already
private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not
covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion
in Section8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands where per se alienable
unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in
accordance with the law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification
requirement in Section8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties.
Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land
on which a private right ma be claimed under any existing law at that time.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF,
thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the
crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists
of three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect.
Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5,
2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in
addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign
countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides
for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With
regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was described as ―associative.
With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of
the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as
mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it
violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the
Constitution and the laws.
HELD: The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is
the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides
that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of
full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure
establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom
of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing
of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for
―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory
nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to
information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the
State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an
excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be
corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback
mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is
evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is
manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is
a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three underlying principles of the
comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments,
values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government
alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and
empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of
people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct
of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that
plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National
Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments,
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the
principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both
national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as
for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda,
as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections
against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would
be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of
the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD
explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it
in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on
RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision,
however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between
the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and
the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a
concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of
international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that
concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative
in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter
into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central
Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral
domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted
by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the
MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is
not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires
for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions
of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation
of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by
the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte
which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan,
Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview.
That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for
inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the
Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the
MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may
be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to
national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not
cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the
Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the
necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process
is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

ALCANTARA v. DENR

FACTS: Petitioner is a lessee under FLGLA No. 542, issued by the DENR, of nine hundred
twenty-three (923) hectares of public forest land (subject land) located in the vicinity of Sitio
Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City.The subject land, however, is being claimed as the
ancestral land of the indigenous B'laan and Maguindanao people, who maintain that they and
their predecessors have been cultivating, possessing and occupying it since time immemorial.
They claim that Christian settlers (settlers) started occupying the area only after World War II.
As a result, there was constant friction between the indigenous inhabitants and the settlers, with
the disputes, at times, erupting in violence. Overpowered, the indigenous people eventually lost
physical control of much of the land. Petitioner, a son of one of the settlers, used to hold a
pasture permit over the subject land, which was later on converted into FLGLA No. 542
covering the subject property. Petitioner claims that FLGLA No. 542 has been subsisting since
1983. On April 10, 1990, private respondents, representing the B'laan and Maguindanao tribes,
filed a complaint against petitioner before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the land to the
indigenous communities. Private respondents, the Heirs of Datu Abdul B. Pendatun and the
Heirs of the Sabal Mula Gawan Clan (respondents-intervenors), claiming to represent the Blaan
and Maguindanaoan tribes, aver that they have always possessed the land until the first settlers
occupied the area They claim that among those who took the land by force was petitioners
predecessor, Conrado Alcantara. They narrate that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried to
re-take the land, but failed because the well-armed settlers repelled them. The incident, in fact,
led to the killing of two of their leaders. Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning
the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it was the secretary of the DENR who should have
jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. Petitioner also contended that the
COSLAP should suspend the hearing of the case, as the DENR was then hearing a similar
controversy. In 1993, despite the pendency of the COSLAP case, and despite opposition from
private respondents, petitioner was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 when it expired that year. The
renewal given to petitioner was for another 25 years, or until December 31, 2018. Meanwhile, on
October 29, 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous People's Rights
Act (IPRA), which was intended to recognize and promote all the rights of the country's
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) within the framework of the
Constitution
ISSUES: 1. WON the petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of
FLGA No. 542, or December 31, 2018, based on his alleged residual rights.
2. Whether respondents DENR officials committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing
the COSLAP's decision, which has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

HELD: Petitioner may not enjoy possession and use of the land up to the expiration of FLGLA
No. 542, or December 31, 2018, based on his alleged residual rights. The question whether
FLGLA No. 542 is valid has been settled conclusively in G.R. No. 145838 in which the Court
made the final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and that it was made in
violation of prevailing laws; and that it was proper for it to be cancelled. The Court ruled, thus:
The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the land area being claimed by
private respondents belongs to the Blaan indigenous cultural community since they have been in
possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact
which has not been disputed by petitioner. It was likewise declared by the appellate court that
FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410 which
states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared
part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands
are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members
of the indigenous cultural group concerned. There was no grave abuse of discretion in public
respondents' implementation of the COSLAP decision. It must be emphasized that FLGLA No.
542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of
natural resources and public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under the
Regalian Doctrine.[56] Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a
mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires.[57] The determination of what
is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural
resources.[58] Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection
under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.[59] In cases in which the
license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to
the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State FLGLA No. 542 has not
only been withdrawn by executive action to further the public welfare, it has also been declared
illegal or unlawful by judicial authorities for clearly violating actual provisions of law. Thus, the
DENR was under obligation to effect the cancellation accordingly. It is clear from the
investigation report that petitioner's FLGLA No. 542 is not only illegal per se, for having been
issued contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 410; it has also been rendered illegal by petitioner's
blatant violations of DENR regulations and the FLGLA's very own terms and conditions. Thus,
the DENR had compelling reasons to cancel the FLGLA. In conclusion, the Court, in G.R. No.
145838, recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land from outsiders
and usurpers. Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long and
costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in
the resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.

OROPORT CARGOHANDLING SERVICES v. PHIVIDEV INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY

Facts: In 2003, Oroport participated in a bidding for the management and operation of Mindanao
Container Terminal (MCT). No bidder won in the two public biddings conducted so Phividec
Industrial Authority (PIA) took over MCT operations. Oroport then sued PIA and Phividec in the
RTC for injunction and damages. It accused PIA of illegally operating MCT without a license
from PPA or a franchise from Congress. It also alleged unfair competition since PIA handled
cargoes of the general public. It further invoked unlawful deprivation of property as it stands to
incur investment losses with PIA’s take over of MCT operations. RTC ruled in Oroport’s favor.
In a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by PIA with the CA, CA annulled the orders of
the RTC ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari filed by Oroport.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA err in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writ
of preliminary injunction? 2. Whether or not PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-
handler upon agreement with PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) sans a franchise or a license?

Ruling: 1. No. CA did not err in annulling the writ of preliminary injunction and in ruling that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of this multi-billion government
infrastructure project. Rep. Act No. 8975 is clear that it is not within the RTC’s jurisdiction to
issue an injunctive writ against the operation of a government infrastructure project. Since
Oroport failed to specify what property was robbed of it, the CA ruled that PIA does not need a
license from PPA to operate because the MOA (Check case.) and its amendment granted PIA
exclusive control and supervision of MCT on all cargo-handling services, including the
discretion to impose rates and charges not higher than those PPA-prescribed. Rep. Act No. 8975
reserves the power to issue injunctive writs on government infrastructure projects exclusively
with this Court and the RTC cannot issue an injunctive writ to stop the cargo-handling operations
at MCT. The issues presented by Oroport can hardly be considered constitutional, much more
constitutional issues of extreme urgency. 2. Yes. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a
franchise or license as it was necessary, temporary and beneficial to the public. The decision to
bid out cargo-handling services is within the province and discretion of PPA which necessarily
required prior study and evaluation. This task is best left to the judgment of PPA and cannot be
set aside absent grave abuse of discretion on its part. As long as the standards are set in
determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose for
which they are used, courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA’s choice. After the two
public biddings failed, PIA was left with no other option but to take over MCT operations so that
it could earn, pending the award to a qualified bidder, some amount to pay the loan to JBIC and
to avoid being declared in default. The law authorizing PPA to take over arrastre and stevedoring
services in government- owned ports and cancel permits issued to private operators is a valid
exercise of police power; it does not violate due process of law as the exercise of police power is
paramount over the right against non-impairment of contracts. Moreover, a regulated monopoly
is not proscribed in industries affected with public interest such as in port rendition of
arrastre/stevedoring services in Philippine ports.