1

APO Cement Corporation vs. Zaldy E. Baptisma

G.R. No. 176671 – June 20, 2012

FACTS:

1. Zaldy Baptisma was employed by Apo Cement Corporation- a registered

corporation maintaining and operating cement manufacturing plant.
2. In September 2003, Apo Cement received information from Moralda, that
some of its employees including Baptisma- who was the manager of the
Power plant were receiving commissions and kickbacks from suppliers.
3. Because of this, Apo Cement conducted an investigation wherein Jerome
Lobitaña, one of their suppliers corroborated the statement. Baptisma
then received a preventive suspension from Apo Cement and filed an
explanaition denying accusations.
4. On March 22, 2004, Batisma received a Notice of Termination informing
him of his dismissal from employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
5. Later on, Baptisma filed to the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal with claims for non-payment of salaries, 13th month pay, service
incentive leaves, damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is illegally dismissed.

RULING:

1. NO. To validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and

confidence under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
following guidelines must be observed:
a. loss of confidence should not be simulated;
b. it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal or unjustified;
c. it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary; and
d. it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier
action taken in bad faith."
 2

More important, it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded

on clearly established facts.
2. In this case, the termination of respondent on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence was justified. Unlike the Labor Arbiter and the CA, the
court found the testimony of Lobitaña credible and truthful.
3. There appears to be no ill-motive on the part of Lobitaña to falsely accuse
respondent of accepting commissions and/or "kickbacks." In fact, it was
not Lobitaña but Moralda who reported the irregularities to petitioner.
Lobitaña came forward only during petitioner's initial investigation to
confirm the testimony of Moralda that some personnel were indeed
receiving commissions and/or "kickbacks."
4. Moreover, as between the positive testimony of Lobitaña that he gave
respondent commissions and/or "kickbacks" on two separate occasions,
and the negative testimony of respondent's witnesses Cedeño and
Banzon that no such meeting took place, we are more inclined to give
credence to the former. It bears stressing that a positive testimony
prevails over a negative one,[56] more especially in this case where
respondent's witnesses did not even execute affidavits to attest to the
truthfulness of their statements. Thus, it was error on the part of the Labor
Arbiter and the CA to disregard the testimony of Lobitaña.
 3

ASIA BREWERY, INC. vs. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA

ASIA (TPMA)
G.R. Nos. 171594-96 - September 18, 2013

FACTS:
1. TPMA was a legitimate labor organization of all regular rank and file
employees of Asia Brewery, Inc.
2. The parties have been negotiating for a new CBA for the year 2003-2006
since the old expired last July 2003. After 18 negotiations, parties are still
unable to reconcile differences particularly on wages and other
economic benefits. Because of this, TPMA declared a deadlock and filed
a notice of strike with the NCMB. After which, conducted a strike vote,
favoring the holding of strike.
3. Asia Brewery petitioned the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 263 (g) of Labor Code, but was opposed by
TPMA, alleging that the business was not indispensable to national interest,
but was denied.
4. Parties were directed to submit their position papers and required Asia
Brewery to submit complete audited financial statements for 5yrs and
other documents.
5. In the meantime, Secretary of Labor resolved the deadlock between
parties and granted arbitral awards. TPMA moved for reconsideration and
petition for review on certiorari in the Court of Appeals, where the arbitral
award was modified and the issue on salary increases was remanded to
the Secretary of Labor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the modification of CA and remanding the issue on salary
increases to the Secretary of Labor proper.

RULING:
1. YES. The Secretary of Labor’s expertise in the study and settlement of labor
disputes under his power of compulsory arbitration is recognized by the
court.
2. It is well settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if
supported by substantial evidence are not only entitled to great respect
but finality. The court held that Secretary of Labor gravely abused his
discretion when he relied on the unaudited financial statements of the
corporation in determining awards.
3. Not only did this violate the December 19, 2003 Order of the Secretary of
Labor herself to petitioner corporation to submit its complete audited
 4

financial statements, but this may have resulted to a wage award that is
based on an inaccurate and biased picture of petitioner corporation's
capacity to pay — one of the more significant factors in making a wage
award.
4. Petitioner Corporation has offered no reason why it failed and/or refused
to submit its audited financial statements for the past five years relevant to
this case. This only further casts doubt as to the veracity and accuracy of
the unaudited financial statements it submitted to the Secretary of Labor.
Verily, the court cannot countenance this procedure because this could
unduly deprive labor of its right to a just share in the fruits of production
and provide employers with a means to understate their profitability in
order to defeat the right of labor to a just wage.
5. Lastly, in cases of compulsory arbitration before Secretary of Labor
pursuant to Article 263 (3), financial statements of employer must be
properly audited by external and independent auditor in order to be
admissible in evidence for purposes of determining the proper wage
award.
 5

MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE v. BENGSON

G.R. No. 198528 October 13, 2014

FACTS:

1. Since 1986, Juanito Bengson has been working as a seafarer for

Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine. Subsequently in 2007, Bengson entered into
his 22nd contract for the duration of 9 months. He underwent and passed
Pre-employment medical examination and found to be “fit for sea duty”,
then boarded the ship.
2. Two (2) months later, Bengson suddenly experienced difficulty in
breathing and numbness on the half of his body. When he was confined,
his CT Scan showed that a “small hematoma” in his left part crane was
present.
3. Due to his incapacity to work, he was immediately repatriated to the
Philippines, and was brought to the manila Doctors Hospital under the
supervision of a Company- designated physician- Dr. Agbayani.
4. In his out-patient report, Dr. Agbayani stated that Bengson’s illness was
“not work-related”. Bengson, however, continuously took medications
and was unable to return to his work. Because of this, he filed for disability
compensation claim against the company to the LA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bengson is entitled to disability compensation from the

company.

RULING:

1. YES. In the present case, petitioners flatly claim that Bengson's illness is not
compensable on the sole basis of its company-designated physician
Agbayani's declaration that such illness is not work-related.
2. Having worked for petitioners since 1988 under employment contracts
that were continuously renewed, it can be said that respondent spent
much of his productive years with petitioners; his years of service certainly
took a toll on his body, and he could not have contracted his illness
elsewhere except while working for petitioners. It was also shown that prior
 6

barding, Bengson was declared “fit for sea duty” by the company’s own
physicians, and if contracted illness while on board, it can only be caused
by his work and the conditions he was subjected to during his
employment.
3. To be sure, the Court has ruled that "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section
32-A does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being
compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the
possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties." And
equally significant, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is
the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning
capacity."
4. In Alpha Ship Management Corporation v. Calo, an employee's disability
becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-
designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a declaration either
of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120 or 240-
day treatment period under Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code and Rule
X, Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
Commission, while the employee's... disability continues and he is unable
to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the company-
designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the
employee's fitness or disability
 7

EDILBERTO P. ETOM, JR., Petitioner,-versus AROMA LODGING HOUSE through

EDUARDO G. LIM, PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER,Respondent.
G.R. No. 192955 November 9, 2015

FACTS:

1. Edilberto Etom was employed by Aroma Lodging as a room boy, working

from 5am-11pm. On February 24, 2008, Aroma refused to allow Etom to
report for work, wherein Etom alleged that Aroma Lodge did not inform
him of any violation to warrant his dismissal.
2. On the other hand, Aroma asserted that it employed Etom as a room boy
since 2000 and paid the required minimum wage, holiday pay, 13 th month
pay and overtime pay. However, despite beneficence, Etom still showed
adverse attitude in work, when he created trouble within the workplace,
stole items from customers and even charged with rape in 2003.
3. That when Etom was served with memorandum requiring him to explain,
he refused to receive the same. In consideration of his employees and
customers, it terminated Etom on the ground of serious misconduct.
4. LA ruled in favor of Aroma but subjected it to pay petitioner for punitive
damages, which is the amount for the unpaid salary. NLRC concurred
with LA and decreed that Etom was entitled to salary differential. Because
of this, Aroma filed a petition for certiorari insisting that Etom was not
entitled for salary differential, but Etom alleged that the petition was filed
out of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it based its
conclusion in the motion, alleged to be filed out of time.

RULING:

1. NO. As a rule, perfection of appeal within the period required by law is

mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to appeal results in the assailed
decision being final and executory. As to Motions for reconsideration, it
must be filed within 10 days from receipt of the decision.
 8

2. It must be emphasized that NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of

procedure. In deciding labor cases, the NLRC is allowed to liberally apply
its rules.
3. As to the non-payment of wages, as a rule, once the employee has
asserted with particularity in his position paper that his employer failed to
pay his benefits, it becomes incumbent to the employer to prove
payment of employee’s money claims. In fine, burden of proof is on the
employer to prove payment, rather that the employee to establish non-
payment.
 9

Capili v. Phil. National Bank

GR No. 204750 July 11, 2016

FACTS:
1. Susan Capili was the Assistant Vice President - Systems and Methods
Division (AVP-SMD) of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). In 2005, the
President of PNB received information from Hyung Duk Cho, that Capili
was engaged in anomalous transactions.
2. Because of this, PNB created a Fact Finding Committee to verify the
matter, which reported that Capili in fact owned a private company
named Sandino Builders, and the NBI showed that Capili’s name was
listed for liabilities and violations of B.P No. 22.
3. Notice was given to Capili wherein she explained that she met Hyung Duk
Cho during work days, but were made during her personal time during
lunch breaks, and that there were cases against her for BP 22 in Makati
and Bulacan. But according to her, the Makati case was already
dismissed with finality.
4. From PND’s decision, it declared that Hyun’s accusations were without
basis. That the issue on her reasonable integrity lost basis when the Makati
case was already dismissed. However, with respect to the Bulacan case,
decision therein would be necessary in resolving the issue on her
character.
5. Months later, Capili asked that she be excluded from the list of employees
with pending administrative cases and the benefits due to her be paid,
but was denied. Capili now files a complaint against PNB for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of wages and other claims. That her termination
was without cause since all her charges supporting PNB’s loss of
confidence had been dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Capili’s dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is
valid.
 10

RULING:

1. NO. The court ruled that PNB’s assertion that because of the BP 22 cases,
PNB lost its trust and confidence is a mere afterthought considering that in
its decision, PNB resolved that the issue on her questionable character lost
its basis, as regards to Makati Case, and the only matter remaining was
the Bulacan case. When PNB issued its second decision, the Bulacan case
was also dismissed with finality. Thus, PNB’s loss of confidence is simulated
because all the while it represented that the administrative case of Capili
will be contingent on the resolution of the Bulacan case. PNB unjustifiably
changed its position to the detriment and eventual illegal dismissal of
Capili.
2. Capili presented valid defenses for the misconduct imputed against her.
For one, the complaint of Hyun was indeed a personal transaction that
does not involve PNB. For another, her interest in Sandino Builders was, in
fact disclosed, considering her having a PNB bank account for it.
Regarding the BP 22 cases, she already settled them with the parties
involved and these cases were already dismissed with finality by the
courts. Certainly, she did not breach PNB’s trust and confidence on her.
3. In the same vein, the court is unconvinced that PNB lost its confidence in
Capili. As properly pointed out by the LA, PNB gave Capili a “very good”
rating in her work performance. During this time, PNB was well aware of
the BP 22 cases against her, and the administrative case was also then
pending investigation. When PNB gave Capili a very satisfactory rating in
her work performance, it did not consider the pendency of the
administrative case as sufficient to prevent her from performing well in her
work; in the process, she continually enjoyed the trust and confidence of
PNB.
4. As also held in General Bank & Trust Company, “managerial employees
should enjoy the confidence of top management x x x especially x x x in
banks where its officers handle large sum of money and engage in
confidential x x x transactions. However, loss of confidence must not be
simulated. It must not be used as subterfuge x x x for improper, illegal, or
unjustified causes. It must not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Lastly, it must be genuine and
not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.” (Del
Castillo, J.; SC 2nd Division, Susan D. Capili vs. Philippine National Bank,
G.R. No. 204750, July 11, 2016).
 11

GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC. AND REMEGIO M. RAMOS vs. MARINA L. ANGUS

G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014, J. Del Castillo

FACTS:

1. Angus was employed by Goodyear on November 16, 1996 and

occupied the position of Secretary to the Manager of Quality and
technology. To maintain the viability of its operations despite economic
reversals, Goodyear implemented cost-saving measures including the
streamlining of its work force.
2. Later on, Angus received a letter stating that the position of secretary to
the Manager is already redundant and no longer necessary and to be
abolished. That she will be terminated on October 10, 2001, but her last
day would be September 18. And in addition, as a company policy,
termination due to redundancy or retrenchment is paid 45 days pay per
year of service, and they are granting her early retirement benefit at 47
days per year of service.
3. As a reply, Angus accepted the management’s decision to avail of the
early retirement, but does not agree with the terms therein. In turn, she
suggests that she be given additional premium of three (3) days for every
year of service, and the acceptance of her proposal will make her
separation with Goodyear pleasant.
4. Nonetheless, Angus accepted checks from Goodyear but with protest,
since the amount was not acceptable. Angus now claims for a separation
pay and retirement pay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Angus is entitled to both retirement pay and Separation pay.

RULING:

1. YES. The court ruled that Angus is entitled to both early Retirement benefit
and Separation Pay, due to the absence of a specific provision in the CBA
prohibiting the recovery of both.
 12

2. Angus presented Goodyear’s 2001-2004 CBA and upon examination, it

does not contain any restriction on the availment of benefits under
company’s Retirement Plan and Separation pay.
3. In Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission, citing Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company v. Court of Appeals and University of the East v.
Hon. Minister of Labor, the Court held that an employee is entitled to
recover both separation pay and retirement benefits in the absence of a
specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or CBA. Concomitantly, the
Court ruled that an employee's right to receive separation pay in addition
to retirement benefits depends upon the provisions of the company's
Retirement Plan and/or CBA.
4. It is worthy to mention at this point that retirement benefits and separation
pay are not mutually exclusive. Retirement benefits are a form of reward
for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and are earned
under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company
policies. On the other hand, separation pay is that amount which an
employee receives at the time of his severance from employment,
designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period
that he is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in
instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in
illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible. In the case at
bar, Article 283 clearly entitles Angus to separation pay apart from the
retirement benefits she received from petitioners.
 13

Int'l. Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 80770, 10 August 1989

FACTS:

1. Bonifacio Pedroso was employed by International Hardware as a truck

helper and driver with Php 900 monthly salary from 1966-1984. However,
his number of working days was reduced to two (2) days per week, due to
financial losses. Because of this, Pedroso filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and payment of Separation Pay to the Labor Arbiter.
2. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Pedroso, entitling him the payment of
Separation Pay, as if he was retrenched. In the NLRC, LA’s decision was
affirmed and held that there was in effect “constructive dismissal”,
considering the rotation of work without the employee’s consent.
3. In the CA, International hardware alleged that there was a grave abuse
of discretion on the part of NLRC, affirming the payment of Separation
Pay when he had not been actually dismissed from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pedroso who had been retrenched or separated from service
due to financial losses entitled to Separation Pay.

RULING:

1. YES. Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the
employment of any employee due to:
a. Installation of labor-saving devices;
b. Redundancy;
c. Retrenchment to prevent losses; and
d. Closing or cessation of operation of establishment or undertaking.

Employer must serve written notice on the workers and DOLE within 1
month before the intended date thereof.
 14

2. As to the entitlement of separation pay, in case of termination due to

installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy—worker is entitled to a
separation pay at least one (1) month pay for every year of service. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses or closure of operations,
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-
half month pay every year of service.
3. Here, since Pedroso had been rotated by petitioner for over six (6) months
due to serious losses, Pedroso had been effectively deprived of his gainful
occupation and had been constructively dismissed or retrenched from
employment, entitling him to 1 month or at least ½ month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher.
 15

ESSENCIA MANARPIIS v. TEXAN PHILS. INC (TPI)

FACTS:

1. Texan Phils Inc. (TPI) was a corporation engaged in the importation,

distribution and marketing of imported fragrances. TPI hired Essencia as Sales &
Marketing Manager. However, due to losses, Essencia was served with notice
that TPI will cease its operations and was notified that she was barred from
reporting. She then served with notice of dismissal.

2. The grounds for her dismissal were for dishonesty, loss of confidence based
on the collusion in defrauding company finances and for abandonment of
work. Essencia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of OT pay,
holiday pay, SIL and other damages.

3. Believing that her dismissal was without just cause, Essencia prayed for
reinstatement and the award of separation pay with back wages. However, TPI
alleged that the requisite notices of business closure to government authorities
and employees were complied, notwithstanding TPI’s continued operations.
Petitioner was found to have committed infraction resulting to loss of
confidence which was the ground for the termination of her employment.

4. In the LA, it was declared that Essencia was illegally dismissed. It was
affirmed by NLRC. However, CA reversed the same, ruling that Essencia was
validly dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Essencia was illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes.

1. Essencia was dismissed without just or authorized cause and that the
announced cessation of business operations was a mere subterfuge for
getting rid of the petitioner. CA’s decision finding serious business losses
is not born by the evidence on record.
 16

2. In addition, the non-compliance with Article 283, gains relevance in this

case not for the purpose of providing the illegality of the company
closure or cessation of business, but indication of bad faith on the part
of respondents in hastily terminating the petitioner’s employment.
3. The subsequent investigation and termination on the grounds of
dishonesty, loss of confidence and abandonment, clearly appears as
an afterthought as it was done only after the petitioner filed an illegal
dismissal case and respondents have been summoned for hearing.
4. As to the ground for abandonment, the elements for valid
abandonment are:
a. Failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and
b. Clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires deliberate,
unjustified refusal of employee to perform his employment
responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to
return is not tantamount to abandonment.
5. In addition, the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement is a proof of his desire to return to work,
negating the employer’s charge of abandonment. An employee who
took steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have
abandoned his work.
 17

STANLEY FINE FURNITURE v. VICTOR GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO SIAREZ

FACTS:

1. Stanley Fine Furniture hired Victor and Enriquito in 1995 as painters/

carpenters with Php215 as salary. On May 26, 2005, Victor and Enriquito
filed a complaint for underpayment/ non-payment of salaries, wages,
emergency, cost of living allowance and 13th month pay. However, in the
same day, they claimed to be dismissed and scolded for filing a
complaint for money claims. Later on, they were not allowed to work.
2. LA ruled in favor of Victor and Enriquito that they were illegally dismissed
and awarded moral and exemplary damages, finding malice and ill-will in
their dismissal. However, in the NLRC, LA’s decision was reversed, that the
respondent were merely required to explain the unauthorized absences
they committed.
3. MR was filed by Victor and Enriquito wherein CA found out that Stanley
Fine Furniture failed to show any valid cause for Victor and Enriquito’s
termination and to comply with the two-notice-rule. CA also noted that
the statements of Stanley Fine were admissions against interest and
binding upon Stanley Fine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Victor and Enriquito were illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes.
1. The court ruled that the respondents were illegally dismissed because
no valid cause for dismissal was shown and no compliance with the
two-notice-rule.
2. Grounds of termination of employment are provided under the Labor
Code and the just causes for termination are provided for under Article
282. Abandonment was not included in the enumeration, but court
held such as a form of neglect of duty. And to prove such, two
elements must concur:
a. Failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and
b. Clear intention to severe the employer – employee relationship.
 18

3. Absence must be accompanied with overt acts unerringly pointing to

the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore and
the burden of proof to show there was unjustified refusal rests on the
employer. Here, absence or abandonment was negated by the
immediate filing of complaint for illegal dismissal on May 31, 2005.
4. Considering the circumstances, respondents are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages. They incurred malice when, as a retaliatory
measure the petitioner dismissed respondents because they filed labor
complaint.
5. To terminate the employment of workers, simply because they asserted
their legal right by filing a complaint is illegal and it violates their right
to security of tenure and should not be tolerated.
 19

HACIENDA LEDDY v. PAQUITO VILLEGAS

FACTS:
1. Paquito Villegas is an employee at the Hacienda Leddy as early as
1960. During his employment, up to the time of his dismissal, Villegas
performed sugar farming jobs 8 hours a day, 6 days a week for not less
than 302 days a year, and for such services he was paid P15 a day. He
likewise worked in petitioner’s coconut lumber business where he was
paid P34 a day for 8 hours.
2. On June 19, 1993, Gamboa, the owner went to Villegas’ house and
told him that his services were no longer needed, without prior notice
or valid reason. Hence, Villegas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Gamboa on the other hand, denied having dismissed Villegas and
admitted that Villegas indeed worked in the farm owned by his father,
doing odd jobs until the latter’s death. And that he was given the
benefit of occupying a portion of the land were his house was
erected.
3. Petition disputed that there exists an employer-employee relationship
between him and Villegas. He claimed that Villegas was paid on a
piece-rate basis without supervision. That since his job was not
necessary/ desirable in the usual business/ trade of the hacienda, he
cannot be considered as a regular employee.
4. Gamboa further alleged that Villegas filed the complaint to gain
leverage so he would not be evicted from the land he is occupying. LA
found that there is indeed an illegal dismissal, but the NLRC reversed
and set aside the same. On the appellate court, CA reinstated the LA’s
decision that there was illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:
WON Villegas was a regular employee of the petitioner and was illegally
dismissed.

HELD: Yes.
1. Records show that respondent, having been employed in the
Hacienda while the same was still being managed by petitioner’s
father until the latter’s death is undisputed as the same was even
admitted by Gamboa in his earlier pleadings. He failed to
categorically deny Villegas was indeed employed in their hacienda,
instead he insisted that Villegas was merely a casual employee doing
odd jobs.
2. Villegas’ length of service is an indication of regularity of his
employment. Even assuming that he was doing odd jobs around the
farm, such long period is indicative that the same was either necessary
 20

or desirable to petitioner’s trade/ business. Owing to the length of

service alone, he became a regular employee, by operation.
3. Article 280 of the LC describes a regular employee as one who is
either:
a. Engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer; and
b. Those casual employees who have rendered atleast 1 years of
service whether continuous/ broken, which respect to the activity in
which he is employed.
4. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, what determines
whether certain employment, regular/ casual is not the will and word
of the employer which the desperate worker accedes, much less the
procedure of living the employee or manner of paying his salary. It is
the nature of the relation to the particular business/ trade considering
all circumstances and in the same cases the length of its performance
and its continued existence.
5. As a regular employee, Villegas is entitled to security of tenure. Under
Article 279 of the Labor Code and can only be removed for cause.
Court found no valid cause attending to his dismissal and found also
that his dismissal was without due process.