Article 21.

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Art. 21 105
Recovery of damages even without positive law. There is a marked distinction between Articles
20 and 21 of the Civil Code, for while the recovery under the former is based on law, the latter is
not based on law. Be that as it may, if the loss or injury was due to a willful act or omission and
the same is contrary to morals, public policy, or good customs, liability would still attach upon
the violator. It cannot be justly denied that laws have sprung up from the fountain of morals and
good customs. Grotius, one of the foremost legal philosophers and writers in the middle ages had
the same conception as our codifiers when he said that law is nothing but “a rule of moral action
obliging to that which is right.” Neither could it be denied that custom is another method of
regulating human conduct which presents much the same problem in relation to law as does
morals. In fact it is said from good authority that mankind has been governed by customs longer
than it has lived under the reign of law. This particular provision was adopted, it is supposed,
with the intention to bring into the realm of law certain good Philippine customs, morals, and
traditions, especially those that concern family and personal relations. This article seems to be
the reflection of the Filipino peoples’ concept of a well-ordered community and a synthesis of
their culture. In the language of the Commission, this insertion is justified when it says, “the
amalgam has been developed throughout the past generation, and its manifestation in the New
Civil Code is therefore natural and unforced.” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 4; cited in
Civil Code of the Phils., Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Alba and Garcia, 1950 ed., pp. 56-
57). To justify an award for moral and exemplary damages under Article 19 to 21 of the Civil
Code (on human relations), the claimants must establish the other party’s malice or bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence. (Solidbank Corp. vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corp., et al., G.R. No.
153535, July 25, 2005). How the law was justified. The codifiers of the Civil Code justified
Article 21 by giving an example, thus: “‘A’ seduces the nineteen-year-old daughter of ‘X.’ A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or cannot be proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
Under the present Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 106
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though a grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages.
But under this article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.’’ But it is always
said that every good law draws its breath of life from morals, hence, the Code Commission
asked: “would not this article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer
is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those
principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premise is
admitted, then the rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of
enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damage. When it is reflected that while codes
of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to
its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may
be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality
which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.’’ (Report of the Code Commission, p. 40.).
Case: Pe, et al. vs. Pe 5 SCRA 200 Facts: An action for damages was filed by the parents,
brothers and sisters of an unmarried woman against a married man who frequently visited her on
the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. They fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine trysts. The relationship was prohibited by plaintiffs, but
suddenly the woman disappeared. An action was filed based on Article 21 of the Civil Code, but
it was dismissed by the lower court. Plaintiffs appealed. Held: The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he
who, Art. 21 107 thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making
her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita
on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency
of his visits to the latter’s family (he was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative
and was considered as a member of a family), the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs. Defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The
wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Breach of promise to marry; when damages can be recovered. By itself, breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. There must be an act independent of such breach in order that
it may give rise to liability. (Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil. 629; Tanjanco vs. CA, 18 SCRA
994). There is no law that allows it. In fact, the intent of Congress is against it. To be actionable,
there must be some act independent of the breach of promise to marry such as: 1) Carnal
knowledge: a) if it constitutes seduction as defined by the Penal Code, moral damages under Art.
2219(3), NCC, may be recovered; b) if it constitutes tort, damages under Arts. 21 and 2219(10),
NCC, may be recovered; c) if the woman becomes pregnant and delivers, compensatory damages
may be recovered; d) if money was advanced and property was given to the defendant, plaintiff
can recover the money and property. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. 2) If
there was no carnal knowledge, but the act resulted in a tort, moral damages may be recovered.
The rule is also Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 108
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS true if money or property were advanced, in which
case the same may be recovered. The case of Bunag, Jr. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 101749, July 10,
1992, started as a criminal case but was dismissed by the City Fiscal’s Office, Pasay City. It
appeared that in the afternoon of September 8, 1973, the petitioner invited his former girlfriend
for a merienda while on her way to school but instead of having merienda at Aristocrat
Restaurant, he brought her to a motel where he raped her. Thereafter, the woman was brought to
the house of his grandmother in Parañaque and lived there for 21 days as husband and wife. The
following day, the father of the petitioner promised that they would get married and even applied
for a marriage license. Petitioner left and never returned, so the woman went home to her
parents. She filed a suit for damages for breach of promise to marry. The lower court ruled for
the plaintiff and against the petitioner, but absolved his father. That portion absolving
petitioner’s father was appealed. Petitioner likewise appealed. The CA dismissed both appeals.
Held: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. (De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of
said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. (Ford vs. CA, 186 SCRA 21 [1990]). Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. (Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corp., et al. vs. CA, et al., 176 SCRA 778). Art. 21 109 The act of the defendant in
promising to marry plaintiff to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and
2234 of the Civil Code. Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were
awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with
rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the
Pasay City Fiscal’s Office. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.
(Calalang, et al. vs. IAC, et al., 194 SCRA 514). Hence, extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Faraon, et al. vs.
Prieta, 24 SCRA 582). Breach of promise to marry; when actionable; defense of pari delicto. In
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA and Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993,
petitioner courted Marilou Gonzales, who also fell in love with him. He promised and proposed
to marry her and they agreed to get married after the school semester, then visited the girl’s
parents to secure their approval to the marriage. On August 20, 1987, petitioner forced her to live
with him at his apartment. She was a virgin at that time but later on, his attitude towards her
became different to the extent of maltreating her thus, she sustained injuries. At the confrontation
before the representative of the barangay chairman, he repudiated their agreement to marry and
worse, he was already married to someone living in Bacolod City. In his answer, he denied
having proposed marriage to Marilou; that he never sought the approval of her parents to the
marriage. He Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 110
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS further alleged that he never forced her to live with
him and maltreated her. After trial, he was held liable for damages, requiring him to pay
P20,000.00 as moral damages and P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The decision is anchored on the
trial court’s findings and conclusions that: (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b)
private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit, and false pretenses, promised to
marry private respondent, (d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself
to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her, and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine
hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent’s testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to
public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. The lower court’s decision was affirmed by
the CA, hence, this petition. The basic issues raised were: (1) Whether he was liable for damages
for breach of promise to marry; (2) Whether Marilou was in pari delicto, hence, he should not be
liable. Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. (Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., 109 Phil. 640
[1960]). It is petitioner’s thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her.
He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture and
ignoring the fact that since Art. 21 111 he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure
to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to
the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that
on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial “common law wife” is now his legal wife as their marriage had been
solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the
live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. (citing Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648; Hermosisima vs. CA, 109
Phil. 629; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., 109 Phil. 640). It was further said that where a man’s promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. In the instant case, the SC said respondent Court found that it was
the petitioner’s “fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him, and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception
on appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s parents agree to their daughter living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the private respondent surrenArt. 21 THE
CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 112 PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS dered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because
of lust, but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction. Prior decisions of
this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
allowed recovery of damages to the woman because: “x x x we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
englightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but also because the
court of first instance found that, complainant ‘surrendered herself’ to petitioner because,
‘overwhelmed by her love’ for him, she ‘wanted to bind’ him ‘by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.’ ” In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,
while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery
was eventually denied because we were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case: “The Court of Appeals
seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission’s memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law
is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage, it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of
the seducer to which the woman has yielded. (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). Art. 21 113 “It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra), that — ‘To
constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust, and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. (43 Cent. Dig. tit
Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her ultimately submitting her reason to the sexual embraces of her seducer.’’ (27
Phil. 121). “And in American Jurisprudence, we find: ‘On the other hand, in an action by the
woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.’ ‘Accordingly, it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would
be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.’ (47 Am.
Jr. 662). ‘Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant
been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions, and
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that the
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.” In his annotations on the Civil Code,
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach
Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 114 PERSONS AND
FAMILY RELATIONS of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered: “x x x if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, September 30,
1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, September 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 156;
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, January 29, 1962). (In other words, if the
CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance
that there was criminal or moral seduction; hence, recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it
be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). x x x.” Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is also of the same persuasion: “It is
submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 156, still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article (Art. 21, NCC) in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar
sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity. “But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman
under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law, and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the
criminal case for that reason.” We are unable to agree with the petitioner’s alternative
proposition to the effect that granting, for argument’s sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in
pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid Art. 21
115 down in Batarra vs. Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover damages from the
petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had sustained any
injury or damage in their relationship, it is, primarily because of her own doing, for: “x x x She is
also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that
she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee. . . . (Annex ‘C’) or a waitress (TSN, p.
51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette, and without a doubt, is in need of a man who can give
her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
offered by the petitioner.” These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner.
It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on
account of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived
by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not
have even remotedly occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were
empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life’s partner. It was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his
offer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s consent of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to
make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto rule does not apply in this
case, for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN
RELATIONS 116 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode, for as soon as she found out that the petitioner
was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means, “in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. “Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the party on whom
the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was
itself procured by fraud.” (34 Am. Jur. 2d. 401). In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 11 SCRA 158, We
declared: “Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by
one against the other. (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where
one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (cf. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil.
209).” We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the
solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher
values of morality and dignity. When not a case of breach of promise to marry. In Wassmer vs.
Velez, 12 SCRA 648, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer formally set their wedding on
September 4, 1954. On September 2, 1954, however, he left a note for his bride-to-be postponing
the marriage because his mother was opposed to the wedding. Since then, he has never been
heard of. Wassmer filed a suit for damages. Held: Surely this is not a case of breach of promise
to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to Art. 21
117 formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity, only to walk out of
it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21. No breach of promise to marry. In Tanjanco vs. CA, 18 SCRA
994, Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. They were both of adult age. In consideration of
defendant’s promise of marriage, plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant’s pleas for carnal
knowledge, as a consequence of which, the plaintiff conceived a child. To avoid embarrassment,
she resigned from her job. A suit for damages for breach of promise to marry was filed by the
plaintiff when defendant refused to marry and support her and her baby. Held: The facts stand
out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness and mutual passion;
for had the plaintiff been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of deceit, artful
persuasions, and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promise of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code. There can
be no possible basis, therefore, for an award of moral damages. In U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121, it was said that: “To constitute seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust, and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction. She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which
result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE
CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 118 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
embraces of her seducer. (See also U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).’’ Article 21, applied. In Loreta
Serrano vs. CA, et al., L-45125, April 22, 1991, petitioner bought some pieces of jewelry. When
she needed money, she instructed her secretary to pledge the same, but the latter absconded with
the amount and the pawn ticket. The pawnshop ticket stipulated that it was redeemable on
presentation by the bearer. Three months later, Gloria and Amalia informed the former owner
that a pawnshop ticket was being offered for sale and told her that the ticket probably covered
jewelry once owned by her and pawned by one Josefina Rocco. Necita then informed Loreta,
hence, she went to the pawnshop and verified that the missing jewelry was pledged there and
told the owner not to permit anyone to redeem the jewelry. The owner agreed but allowed the
redemption. An action for damages was filed where the trial court decided for the plaintiff. The
CA reversed the decision, stating that there was no negligence on the part of the pawnshop
owner. Held: Having been notified by petitioner and the police that the jewelry pawned to it was
either stolen or involved in an embezzlement of the proceeds of the pledge, private respondent
pawnbroker became duty-bound to hold the things pledged and to give notice to petitioner and
the police of any effort to redeem them. Such a duty was imposed by Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides: “Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
The circumstance that the pawn ticket stated that the pawn was redeemable by the bearer, did not
dissolve that duty. The pawn ticket was not a negotiable instrument under the Negotiable
Instruments Law nor a negotiable document of title under Articles 1507, et. seq. of the Civil
Code. If the third person Tomasa de Leon, who redeemed the things pledged a day after
petitioner and the police had notified Long Life, claimed to be the owner thereof, the prudent
recourse of the pawnbroker was to file an interpleader suit, impleading both petitioner and
Tomasa de Leon. The respondent pawnbroArt. 21 119 ker was, of course, entitled to demand
payment of the loan extended on the security of the pledge before surrendering the jewelry, upon
the assumption that it had given the loan in good faith and was not a “fence” for stolen articles
and had not conspired with the faithless Josefina Rocco or with Tomasa de Leon. Respondent
pawnbroker acted in reckless disregard of that duty in the instant case and must bear the
consequences, without prejudice to its right to recover damages from Josefina Rocco. Forcible
taking of franchise is violative of Art. 21, NCC. In Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Assn.
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No 100727, March 18, 1992, private respondent was granted a franchise to
operate jeepneys. Petitioner, however, formed a human barricade and assumed the dispatching of
passenger jeepneys, hence, this suit for damages. The Supreme Court said that a certificate of
public convenience is included in the term “property’’ which represents the right and authority to
operate its facilities for public service, which cannot be taken or interfered with without due
process of law. The act of petitioner in forcibly taking over the operation of the jeepney service
in the Cogeo-Cubao route without any authorization from the PSC is in violation of the
corporation’s right to operate its services. Article 21 of the NCC governs the situation in the case
at bar, hence, the SC said: “It is clear from the facts of this case that petitioner formed a
barricade and forcibly took over the motor units and personnel of the respondent corporation.
This paralyzed the usual activities and earnings of the latter during the period of ten days and
violated the right of respondent Lungsod Corp. to conduct its operations thru its authorized
officers. Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage. The provision covers a situation where a person has a legal right which
was violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. It
presupposes loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such
violation.’’ (See also PCIB vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 97785, March 29, 1996, 69 SCAD 707). Art.
21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN RELATIONS 120 PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS Article 21 applied to justify moral damages awarded to agricultural lessees.
Petitioners obtained a judgment from the Court of Agrarian Relations declaring them as
agricultural lessees of the private respondents’ land and awarding them moral and exemplary
damages for the latter’s act of diverting the flow of water from the farm lots in dispute, causing
portions of the landholdings to dry up, in an effort to force petitioners to vacate their
landholdings. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by deleting the award for said
damages as well as for attorney’s fees. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that
petitioners were entitled to a measure of moral damages. Art. 2219 of the Civil Code permits the
award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Art. 21, which stipulates that “any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.” Petitioners were denied irrigation
water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants
violated petitioners’ rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the unjustified diversion of
water. Petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the defendants acted in an
oppressive manner. (Art. 2232, Civil Code). It follows that they are also entitled to attorney’s
fees, but the size of the fees, as well as the damages, is subject to the sound discretion of the
court. (Magbanua, et al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., L66870-72, June 29,
1985). Liability in case a wife deserts her husband. X and Y are married. Y went to the United
States and obtained a decree of divorce. When she came back to the Philippines, she got married
to another man. In an action for damages, the Supreme Court held that she is liable. The act is
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. There was failure to comply with her wifely
duties, deserting her husband without justifiable reasons. (Tenchavez vs. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355).
The action can also be based on Article 72 of the Family Code since the act of the woman gave
dishonor to the family. The law says: “When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the
conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to
the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.” Art. 21 121 Declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity with award of moral damages.
Case: There was a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Noel Buenaventura
against his wife Isabel Singh Buenaventura on the ground of psychological incapacity. After
trial, the court declared the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity and awarded
moral damages citing Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code. Is the award correct? Why? Held:
No, because the signs of psychological incapacity may become manifest only after the
solemnization of the marriage. It is not correct to consider acts of a spouse after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage yet consider these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of
psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the
same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and
with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the
same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.” “For the same reason, since
psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent
was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of
moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.” (Noel Buenaventura vs. CA, et al., G.R.
Nos. 127358, 127449, March 31, 2005). Art. 21 THE CIVIL CODE CHAPTER II — HUMAN
RELATIONS 122 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS When liability arises in case of
abuse of right. The case of Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. vs. Roberto Reyes, alias “Amay
Bisaya,” G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005 is a case of a gate-crasher at a birthday party. It
appears that he was at the lobby of the hotel when a friend saw him and allegedly invited him to
the party. He carried the basket full of fruits being carried by his friend while they were going up
the penthouse of the hotel where the party was being held. When the coordinator saw him, she
asked him to just leave the place after eating as he was not invited but he did not. Instead, he
shouted at the coordinator. His version was that, in a loud voice, the coordinator shouted at him
telling him to leave. He refused as he was allegedly invited by one of the guests who later on
denied having invited him. Instead, the guest testified that he carried the basket but warned him
not to join as he was not invited, but still he went into the place. He sued the hotel, the
coordinator and the guest for damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to lack of cause of
action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the manner he was asked to leave exposed
him to ridicule, thus, held the defendants liable for damages. They appealed, contending that
pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as he
assumed the risk of being asked to leave and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process, as
he was a gate-crasher. Is the contention correct? Why? The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury (Garciano
vs. CA, 212 SCRA 436) or to the consent to injury (Servicewide Specialists, Inc. vs. IAC, 174
SCRA 80) which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. This doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the
party, the defendants, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under
obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. Thus,
the threshold issue is whether or not the coordinator acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes,
a.k.a. “Amay Bisaya,” to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant, thus,
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if she were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her. Upon a scrutiny
of the evidence, the Supreme Court said that the version of the coordinator was more credible
considering that Art. 21 123 she has been in the hotel business for 20 years wherein being polite
and discreet are virtues to be emulated that she acted politely in asking Reyes to leave. It was
held that the coordinator did not abuse her right in asking Reyes to leave the party to which he
was not invited, hence, he cannot be made liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code. The employer cannot likewise be liable. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social
grievances. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s right but also in performance
of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is
violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. Article 21
refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it
is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the
act complained of must be intentional. The act of the coordinator of approaching Reyes without
first verifying from the guest who allegedly invited him cannot give rise to a cause of action
predicated on mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Without proof of ill-motive on her part,
her act cannot amount to abuse of right. She may be guilty of bad judgment which, if done with
good intention, cannot amount to bad faith.