RULE 112
C. Procedure in MM v. outside MM
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG,
complainants, vs. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent.
FACTS: This administrative case arose from a verified
complaint for “gross ignorance of the law and procedures,
gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others,” filed
by Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy and Ma. Consolacion T.
Bascug of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), La Carlotta
District, against Presiding Judge Erwin B. Javellana of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), La Castellana, Negros
Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their
complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and
Bascug cited several occasions as examples: (a) In People v.
Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a
warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section
16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) In People
v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did
not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the
Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said
motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v.
Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the
complaint even when the same was patently without basis
or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her
witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d) In People v.
Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not
apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead,
conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and
pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and
her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material
facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a
ground for dismissal of said case.
Second, Judge Javellana gave the impression that he was a
co-agent in a surety company with a certain Leilani
Manunag. Judge Javellana had conveyed to the public on
several occasions that Manunag was in aspecial position to
influence him in granting provisional liberty to the accused.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of
arrest without propounding searching questions to the
complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity
of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result,
Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the
accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a
warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the
constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set
People v. Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when
the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to
remain silent and to have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in
Villanueva v. Regalado, only stated that the hearing would
be “in the
morning,” without indicating the time. Judge Javellana failed
to arrive for the pre-trial of the case. Judge Javellana was still
a no show
when the pre-trial was reset. Finally, anticipating Judge
Javellana’s tardiness, the pre-trial was rescheduled at 1:30
in the afternoon of another date.
Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently
implemented laws and rules depending on stature of the
parties, persons accompanying the parties, lawyers of the
parties, and his personal relations with the parties/lawyers.
Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the
“litigants are made for the courts” instead of “courts for the
litigants.” In People v. Fermin, the accused, assisted by Public
Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted
homicide. The accused filed a Petition/Application for
Probation, prepared by the PAO but signed only by the
accused. Judge Javellana refused to accept said
Petition/Application and required the father of the accused
to return the Petition/Application all the way from the MTC
in La Castellana to the PAO in La Carlota, despite the great
distance between these two cities.
Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper
procedure in airing his complaints against public attorneys.
In one such Order, Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that
Public Attorney Uy “has already expressed her desire not to
attend today’s hearing,” when Public Attorney Uy actually
waived her personal appearance at said hearing as she had
to attend the hearing of a criminal case at the MTC of
Pontevedra. In another Order, Judge Javellana reported,
prior to confirmation, that the PAO lawyer refused to
prepare the motion for extension of time to file counter-
affidavit, thus, prompting the accused to hire a special
counsel. Additionally, Judge Javellana improperly filed his
complaints against the public attorneys appearing before his
court with the Department of Justice or the District Public
Attorney (DPA) of Bacolod City, instead of the appropriate
authorities, namely, the DPA of La Carlota City or the PAO
Regional Director. Moreover, Judge Javellana had required
Public Attorney Bascug to explain why she allowed the
accused in People v. Earnshaw, to sign the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits, even when she
was the one who prepared said Motion. Judge Javellana did
not verify first whether it was indeed Public Attorney Bascug
who prepared the Motion in question, thus, violating her
right to due process. Also, Judge Javellana was already
encroaching upon the domain of the PAO.
Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and
Bascug attached a hand-written note relating the
observations of an anonymous member of Judge Javellana’s
staff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure provides for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule.
HELD: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not
provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a
criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the
scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following
manner: SEC. 11. How commenced. - The filing of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information, except when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or
information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies
as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court’s files.
If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days
from date of filing, the case may be dismissed.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be
conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for
an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard
to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the
maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in
People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
RULE 113
B. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (sec. 5)
SARAUM v. PEOPLE
781 SCRA
Promulgated: 25 Jan. 2016
FACTS:
On August 17, 2006, PO3 Larrobis received a call regarding
the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega,
Cebu City. Thereafter, a buy-bust team was formed
composed of PO3 Larrobis (perimeter security), PO1
Jumalon (Back-up Operative), PO2 Sta. Ana (Poseur-buyer),
PO1 Cabahug and PO1 Aniñon (both are perimeter
securities) against a certain "Pata. PO1 Aniñon coordinated
with the PDEA regarding the operation and After preparing
all the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation
report and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team
proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run
towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with
a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum
and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug
paraphernaliaw in preparation to have a "shabu" pot
session. They recovered from Saraum’s possession a lighter,
rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3
Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic
pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A" for
Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3
Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia
recovered from Saraum.
By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the
alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to
the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men
with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata,"
both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not
committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He
learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to
the court.
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
charged.
Court of Appeals: affirmed the judgment of conviction
against petitioner Saraum rendered by (RTC), Branch 57,
Cebu City,
ISSUE: Whether the arrest of Saraum deemed to be a valid
warrantless arrest.
HELD AND RATIO: The SC in affirming the appealed decision
ruled that Saraum was arrested during the commission of a
crime, which instance does not require a warrant in
accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.l In arrest in flagrante delicto, the
accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed
an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To
constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they
were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a
disposable lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled
tissue paper in his left hand, while they were in the course
of arresting somebody.
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to
search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize
the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug
paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police
officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum’s arrest was legal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the
shanty are admissible in evidence for having proceeded from
a valid search and seizure.
Even if it be considered that the arrest is invalid, Saraum is
deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did
not raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established
rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of
the Information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the
objection is deemed waived." In this case, counsel for
Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the
seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and search,
only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.
Rule 113
COMERCIANTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 205296 July 22, 2015
Facts:
Alvin Comerciante (COMERCIANTE) and Erick Dasilla
(DASILLA) was arrested for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs by PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 CALAG) and Agent
Eduardo Radan (AGENT RADAN) at around 10pm on July 30
2003 in Private Road, Brgy Hulo, Mandaluyong City. During
the arrest, 2 packs of sealed plastic containing shabu was
recovered from them.
PO3 CALAG and AGENT RADAN were conducting
their patrol on the said area, while in their motorcycle which
was driven by AGENT RADAN while cruising at around
30KPH, they spotted COMERCIANTE and DASILLA at a
distance of 10 meters standing and showing improper and
unpleasant movements, with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that these sachets may
contain shabu, they stopped and about 5 meters away from
COMERCIANTE and DASILLA. PO3 CALAG introduced himself
as a police officer, arrested them and confiscated the
sachets and was confirmed as shabu after conducting lab
tests.
DASILLA was acquitted by way of demurrer to
evidence in the RTC, COMERCIANTE failed to file demurrer
to evidence hence, his waiver to file. COMERCIANTE in his
defense claims that PO3 CALAG and AGENT RADAN were
looking for a notorious drug pusher in the area, and that he
and DASILLA were just standing in front of a jeepney when
they were arrested and taken to the police station. There
they were asked for money for their release, and after they
failed to accede to the demand, they were taken to another
police station where they went for an inquest proceeding
and charged with the said crime.
The RTC and the CA found COMERCIANTE guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. The RTC found that PO3 CALAG and AGENT RADAN
conducted a valid warrantless arrest as there is probable
cause to justify the arrest and because in plain view PO3
CALAG saw COMERCIANTE carrying the said sachets. The CA
affirmed the RTC that the arrest was valid because it was in
flagrante delicto, that PO3 CALAG personally saw
COMERCIANTE and DASILLA exchanging plastic sachets.
COMMERCIANTE appealed to the SC claiming that
PO3 CALAG did not made a valid warrantless arrest, and as
such the evidence gathered is inadmissible, necessarily
resulting in his acquittal.
ISSUES:
a. WON the warrantless arrest was valid?
b. WON the search can be a valid “stop and frisk”
search?
HELD:
There was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid
"stop and frisk" search made on COMERCIANTE. As such, the
shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, COMERCIANTE must necessarily be
acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
a. The SC decided that it was not a valid warrantless
arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on
lawful warrantless arrests. The officer's personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is absolutely required. Under in flagrante
delicto, the officer himself witnesses the crime;
while in hot pursuit, he knows for a fact that a crime
has just been committed.
1. The Court notes that no overt act could be
properly attributed to COMERCIANTE as
to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3
CALAG that the former had just
committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts
of standing around with a companion
and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if COMERCIANTE
and his companion were showing
"improper and unpleasant movements"
as put by PO3 CALAG, the same would
not have been sufficient in order to
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
2. The instant case failed to show that PO3
CALAG had personal knowledge that a
crime had been indisputably committed by
COMERCIANTE. Verily, it is not enough
that the arresting officer had
 reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had just committed a crime; a
crime must, in fact, have been committed
first, which does not obtain in this case.
b. The SC decided that it was not a valid “stop and
frisk” search. "Stop and frisk" searches are
necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to
prevent the commission of offenses. However, this
should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in
the concept of "suspiciousness" present where
the police officer finds himself or herself in. This
may be undoubtedly based on the experience of
the police officer. Experienced police officers
have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an individual is
acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with
his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
1. Probable cause is not required to
conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed
about him.
2. Police officers must not rely on a
single suspicious circumstance. There
should be "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable
inference of criminal activity.
Luz vs People GR No. 197788
PO 2 Emmanuel Alteza, who was assigned at the substation
1 of the Naga City Police station, testified that, at around 3
am, he saw the accused, Rodel Luz, driving without a helmet,
a violation of a municipal ordinance. This prompted him to
flag the accused down. Thereafter, Alteza invited the
accused to come inside their substation, since the place was
near where the accused was flagged.
While they were issuing a citation ticket for the violation of
the city ordinance (issued by SPO 1 Rayford Brillante), they
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. The police were alerted and they
asked the accused to empty his pocket, as there may be a
weapon hidden inside it.
The accused obliged, and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket hich was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including
two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled
out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu
The RTC convicted the accused of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It found that the prosecution’s evidence is
sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation, and then subject to a valid search, which led
to the discovery of the illegal drugs. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC with some modifications.
Issue: Whether or not the arrest is valid?
Held:
No, when the accused was flagged down for committing the
violation, he was not properly arrested. Under RA 4136 of
the Land Transportation and Traffic code,
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for
any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant
thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary
to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the
driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued
by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-
two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle
his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension
will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
The general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is
not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter.
At the time the accused was waiting for the citation ticket
for the violation he committed, he could not have been said
to be under arrest. At that moment, there was no intention
on the part of PO 2 Alteza to arrest him or to take him to
custody, such may only be considered as waiting time.
Hence, the subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible.
42 - GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
FACTS: PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan,
P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian
operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were
conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay
City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a
house and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a
crime had been committed, the police officers approached
the house from where the men came and peeked through
the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink
lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was
holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat
facing each other at the living room. This prompted the
police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and
arrest Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the immediate
surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box
atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok,
scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of
white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven
unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers
confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in
Pasay City for further investigation and testing. A forensic
chemical officer examined the confiscated drug
paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu.”
The RTC and CA rendered a decision that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught
accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and
having drug paraphernalia in their possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in
finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the
evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in
the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
HELD: Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a “peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the
arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned
rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and
seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are
inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice
but to acquit the accused. Moreover, the failure of the
accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
Notes: For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to
operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. (Miclat, Jr. vs. People, 656 SCRA 539 [2011])
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent
search is one that is carried out under the parameters of
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which requires
that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.
(Martinez vs. People, 690 SCRA 656 [2013])
RULE 113
B. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS (sec. 5)
PEOPLE v. VASQUEZ
714 SCRA
Promulgated: 15 Jan. 2014
FACTS:
In the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant
went to the office of P/Insp. Fajardo and reported that a
certain Donald Vasquez alias Don was engaged in illegal drug
and claiming further that he was an employee of the NBI.
According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good
commission if he would present a potential buyer of drugs.
P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to P/Supt. Pepito
Domantay, who then instructed him to form a team and
conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a
team on the same day, which consisted of herself as a team
leader, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1
Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa. With the help of the informant,
she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don at around
9:00 p.m. at Cindy’s Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda.
For security reasons, she brought the team along. At about
9:00 p.m., P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting
place with the informant. The members of her team
positioned themselves strategically inside the restaurant.
The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the
buyer of shabu and Fajardo asked the latted he was indeed
an employee of the NBI to which he replied in the
affirmative. They agreed that she would buy 250 grams of
shabu for ₱250,000.00 and that they will meet the following
day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team
went back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already
waiting for her when she arrived. He asked for the money
and she showed the money which includes five genuine
₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of
play money to make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with
her.
Afterwhich, he suggested that they go to a more secure
place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30
to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of Don’s apartment at
765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila.
The team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD)
Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards,
they proceeded to the area and agreed that that the pre-
arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair,
which would signify that the deal had been consummated
and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene.
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m.
on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked
along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the apartment of Don and stood
in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., Don came
out of the apartment with a male companion. He demanded
to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she
wanted to see the drugs first; as such, Don gave her a brown
envelope. Upon checking its contents, she found therein a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and
assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the
buy-bust money to Don and scratched her hair to signal the
rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo
identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried
to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing
so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she
asked Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu,
he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials
"JSF" on the genuine ₱500.00 bills. After the arrest of the
two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police
station. The suspects’ rights were read to them and they
were subsequently booked.
In his defense, Vasquez contended that neither was there a
warrant of arrest nor search warrant which thus makes his
arrest illegal and further avers that the evidence obtained as
a result thereof was inadmissible in court.
RTC: Convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The
trial court held that the appellant did not present any
evidence that would show that the police officers in this case
were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious
crimes and falsely testify against him.
Court of Appeals: affirmed with modification (as to the
penalty for viol. Of sec 16) the Joint Decision of RTC Manila,
Branch 41, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan of the crimes charged (Sections 15 and 16 Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
ISSUE: whether the arrest of accused-apellant is illegal.
HELD and RATIO: In affirming the decision of the appellate
court, the SC ruled that the appellant can no longer assail the
validity of his arrest. In People v. Tampis, the court
pronounced that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters
his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the
quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon
their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."
Further, appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section
5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. As held in
People v. Cabugatan “This interdiction against warrantless
searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of
moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs
searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful
arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while
as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of
escaped prisoners.”
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking
belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent
search upon his person.