Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M.
VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
(Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs.
Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, 1.
and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the
complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the
NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from
royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged
before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition
seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition 2.
For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork
Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that
the Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be
declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-
enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This
violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role
must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined
to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all
other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the
phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED
PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF
THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE
FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE
PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE
SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY
SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE,
LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
Jose Angara vs The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral
Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said
district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed
Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of
the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of
Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6
of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to
Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua
can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that
EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take
cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be
subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such
matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized
that in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the
final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised
finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source
of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of
the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
Planas v Gil
G.R. No. L-46440 January 18, 1939
Laurel, J.:
Facts:
1. The case stemmed from a statement made by petitioner
which was published in a newspaper (La Guardia) wherein
he criticized certain government officials acts as well as the
election of Assemblyman in 1938. Petitioner was a member
of the municipal board of Manila.
2. An investigation directed by the authority of the President
was conducted by the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service. Hence this petition for prohibition where petitioner
contends that respondent lacks the jurisdiction to investigate
him and that it violates Art. 7, Sec.11 (1) of the Constitution,
as it seeks to remove or suspend him.
ISSUE: W/N the President has the legal authority to
order the investigation
YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with
law.
The constitution grants to the President the powers of control
and supervision. The power to exercise general supervision
over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation
of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein.
Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power.
It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it
must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and
conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.
The President in the exercise of the executive power under
the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive
departments. The heads of the executive departments are
his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of
his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in
the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts.
The power of removal which the President may exercise
directly and the practical necessities of efficient government
brought about by administrative centralization easily make
the President the head of the administration.
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs Social Security System
(1966)
16 SCRA 6 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Coverage of
the Social Security Act
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) is engaged in the
business of stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities of
Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns, maintains and operates
towboats, barges and a drydock. In 1959, it carried in its
payrolls temporary employees of 1,752 and 2,552 stevedores
in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectively, who were
hired on rotation and on vessel-by- vessel basis. They were
paid daily with the understanding of being laid off at the end
of each day. On the average, each stevedore worked for 14
days during the year. In October 1960, LSC petitioned to the
SSS that the temporary employees be exempt from SSS
contributions on the ground that they “work only
intermittently and are not in a position to maintain
membership in the Social Security System long enough to be
fully entitled to the law’s sickness, disability, death and
retirement benefits”. And that the law could not have
intended them to be covered without enjoying the benefits
of the program. SSS however denied LSC’s petition and it
ordered LSC to pay back premiums. LSC countered stating
that the compulsory coverage of the SSS contributions only
covers permanent employees. LSC invoked Section 9 of the
Social Security Act as amended by Republic Act No. 1792
which states that an employee must at least have been with
the company for six months to be covered by the compulsory
coverage. LSC also invoked Sec. 8 of the same law which
defines employment covered by the Social Security Act and
also provides exemption therefrom. Paragraph 10 of that
section would state that services by temporary employees
may be excluded by regulations of the Social Security
Commission. This is interpreted by LSC as a provision that
Congress has delegated to the Social Security Commission
the issuance of regulations bearing on the exemption of
services performed by temporary employees from social
security coverage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the temporary employees are
exempt from the compulsory coverage.
HELD: No. The Social Security Act was amended by Republic
Act No. 2658 on June 18, 1960. The amendment broadened
the coverage of the Social Security System, increased its
benefits and liberalized the terms and conditions for their
enjoyment. Sections 9 and 10 were made to read as follows:
“SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. — Coverage in the System
shall be compulsory upon all employees between the ages of
sixteen and sixty, inclusive, and their employers: . . .”
“SEC. 10. Effective date of coverage. — Compulsory
coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first day of
his operation, and that of the employee on the date of his
employment.”
Eliminated was the six months’ service requirement. Without
such requirement, all employees regardless of tenure, such
as the employees in question, would qualify for compulsory
membership in the SSS; except of course those classes of
employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security
Act. With such removal, it is the intent of Congress to
broaden and include temporary workers to the compulsory
coverage. On the other hand, in regards section 8, paragraph
10 being invoked by LSC, no such regulation has been cited
to buttress the claim for exemption. Perforce, no exemption
could be granted as there is no way of telling whether or not
the employees in question belong to a group or class
designated by regulation of the Social Security Commission
as exempt.
Paz Garcia vs Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
39 SCRA 106 – Political Law – Separation of Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the
CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The
court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had
to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February
28, 1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and
functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can
not be properly established due to problems as to location
and as to appropriations to make his Court up and
running. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time
before he could actually preside over his court, he applied
for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in
the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties,
never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all
the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten
months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice,
however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead
to assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of
his court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that
Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation
of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not
submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And
that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is
fully aware that he has not been performing the duties of a
judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the
judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the
executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with
incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraig’s inability to perform his judicial duties
under the circumstances mentioned above does not
constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer
who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume
his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being ‘a
judge without a sala’, but forces and circumstances beyond
his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning
that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to
assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with
his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he
may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously
observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public
service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check
and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary
under our present constitutional scheme of government that
no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to
review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before
they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.
Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best
that this practice is discontinued.
Emigdio Bondoc vs Marciano Pineda
201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a
Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4thDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda
was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party
(NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was
subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito
Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even
though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that
he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the
election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the
LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from
the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held
and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the
HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in
the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then
removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera.
Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the
Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s
removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the
doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire
upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating
the doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at
bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial
question. It must be noted that what is being complained of
is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has
already been made, members of the tribunal have already
voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and
Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their
representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already
reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since
the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change the outcome
of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his
removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to
party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in
the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from
the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1
coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of
the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs COMELEC
March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a
“Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then,
upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary
publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to
assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special
civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on
people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such
law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed
provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on
the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two
latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in
Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically
made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law – as pointed out by
former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include
initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative
on amendments to the constitution but is unfortunately
inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of the
Constitution provides: “Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least there per centum of
the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide
for the implementation of the exercise of this right” This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an
enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Con-Con stated “without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although
this mode of amending the constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last
analysis is still dependent on Congressional action.” Bluntly
stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason
does not provide for its implementation.
***Note that this ruling has been “reversed” on November
20, 2006 when ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is
adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER, this
was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as
shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735
is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a
people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not
become stare decisis. See discussion here
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty
and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor
of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native
habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in
Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there,
or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes
had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered
to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi
and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue
of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their
liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a
better position to determine whether or not to execute the
law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the
provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may
arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should
not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but
that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The
term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.
In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in
the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down
where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot
hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it
is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
People vs Vera
undue delagation of power; equal protection of the
law
Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting
new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is
innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of
the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11
Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated
that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is
only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And
even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes
undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law
may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue
delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection
of the laws
Discussions:
1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid
if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be
 guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the
force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise
of their discretionary power. What is granted, as
mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of
Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which
enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does
not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits
of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality
leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. The classification of equal
protection, to be reasonable, must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class.
Rulings:
1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation.
The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of
the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of
equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged
section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer.
2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the
provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. Adopting the example given by one of the
counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral
argument, one province may appropriate the necessary
fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while
another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the
former province but not in the latter. This means that a
person otherwise coming within the purview of the law
would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in
one province while another person similarly situated in
another province would be denied those same benefits.
This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the
necessary funds for the salaries of the probation
officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that
probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by
all the provincial boards.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
Posted by kaye lee on 1:31 PM
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non
Delegation of Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial
court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and
four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review,
which was also denied. The SC denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new
trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of
origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred
the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch
of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming
that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of
the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this
reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a
careful examination of the whole context, is to make the
application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through
appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates
not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without
such action on the part of the various boards, no probation
officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to
act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to
show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the
actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for
the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without
a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer
without the probation system.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs Auditor General
15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and
Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders
creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary…
of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer,
filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been
impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides
that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez
argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is
composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress
has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power
to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the
delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy,
which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as
the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place,
what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies
is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs Blas
Ople
137 SCRA 117 – Political Law – Delegation of Power –
Administrative Bodies – Manner of Election and Selection
of Representatives
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU)
are unions representing the agricultural and industrial
sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers
all over the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg.
697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision
which states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth,
agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon,
one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These
sectors can submit their nominees to the President for
approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS
however questions the constitutionality of the said BP
because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on
accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor
representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of
BlasOple, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain
nominations provided by other industrial labor groups.
TUPAS claims that since there are no rules clearly stated in
the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said
law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor
and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the
duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit
their nomination within the given 20 day period of
nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to
question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality
of the acts of Ople. Because of their failure to submit their
nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power
to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is
an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious.
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act
involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then is
not a legislative power but the exercise of competence
intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could
make the recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter
ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is
an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any
persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard
to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be
spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth
with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the
functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said
provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to
the President by merely writing a letter coursed through
respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted
to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30,
1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a
letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not
submitting any nomination and informing him that they were
questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697.
Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee
they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law
cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.
United States vs Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1 – Political Law – Delegation of Power –
Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and
Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued
Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20,
1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a
ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6thof August
1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the
said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced
to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed
the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of
an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and
the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails
to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not
possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its
terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature,
so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One
Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need
to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects
to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the
movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if
videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a
30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that
it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross
receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter
of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the
VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the
VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which
a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned
provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of
the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through
the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and
title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory
and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the
VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek
assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of
the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the
deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction
and control of the [VRB].”
Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor
108 SCRA 757 – Political Law – Delegation of Power
– Completeness Test
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the
Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the
Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister
of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue
pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed
the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue
delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor.
They averred that by granting discretion to the Minister of
Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it
also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the
law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue
delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for
adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the
entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there
is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of
legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows
compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise
of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental
principle and state policy that the state should afford
protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an
unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a
factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is
complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be
any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest.”
CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside
an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered
to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive
Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix
rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
making power and even the power to fix rates- when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains
all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost
is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner
and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however,
insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court
said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of
notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to
rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC
didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner
People of the Philippines vs Jacob Rosenthal
68 Phil. 328 – Political Law – Delegation of Power –
Administrative Bodies – Public Interest as Sufficient Test
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and
shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later, Rosenthal and
Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to
individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were
merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in
violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.
Section 2 provides that every person, partnership,
association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the
Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the
Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers
enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-
pesos.
Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the
said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either
with or without the examination herein provided, that any
person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to
the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided
for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such
person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate
or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association
or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act,
and that such person, partnership, association or
corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the
securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that
“said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever
in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said
certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision
of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of
thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because
no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said
official in determining the cases in which a certificate or
permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the
sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result
that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular
Treasurer.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power
to the Internal Treasurer.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes
a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of
a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued
under the Act must recite that the person, partnership,
association or corporation applying therefor “has complied
with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law,
means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the
Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have
been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of
the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is
expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation
“is in the public interest.”
In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to
protect the public against “speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against
the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”,
— the SC held that “public interest” in this case is a
sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in
reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits.
Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the
Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is
uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken
assumption that this is a mere general reference to public
welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The
purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the
context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ”
United States vs Aniceto Barrias
11 Phil. 327 – Political Law – Delegation of Power –
Administrative Bodies
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized
the Collector of Customs to regulate the business of
lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of
goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats). The
said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate
such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136
provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not
exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector
promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig
River using a lighter which is manually powered by bamboo
poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397
because under said Circular, only steam powered ships
should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in
the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the
imposable penalty against him should be a fine not
exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court – this was
pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations,
the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the
court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the
Circular as it is entirely different from the penal provision
of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of
not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-
dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is
valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different
range of penalty different from that specified by Congress. If
the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he
is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to anybody or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can
not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can
its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of
any other body for those to which alone the people have
seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation
and not through the intervening mind of another. The
Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in
Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance
to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case,
the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is
$25.00.
Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens
from being employed or engage or participate in any position
or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the
same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates
the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or
refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means
of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003
Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator
Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004
synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said
law.
Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional
qualification on candidates for Senator?
Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all
candidates for public office whether appointed or elected
both in the national or local government undergo a
mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for
Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship,
(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or
alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution,
that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments
of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed.
Rogelio Bagabuyo vs Commission on Elections
573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government –
Reapportionment
Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But
in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a
bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law
was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said
law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin
the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming
elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was
created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case
at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay;
in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative
district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12
city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the
Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation
of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
– this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats
even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941
is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is
it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible
to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall
be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-
list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats
in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more
than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership
of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be
seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of
the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is
no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of
55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase
the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the
maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for
every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the
two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for
the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used
in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional
number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat
limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total
vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered)
x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so
2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it
has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total
of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the
votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from
RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified
and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution
precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong
Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified
by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against
COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set
in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-
defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong
to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-
defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed,
as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit
indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack
well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in
order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized
that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the
1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be
reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The
common denominator however is that all of them cannot,
they do not have the machinery – unlike major political
parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative
districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national
election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat
in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among
others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.