SECOND SYLLABUS RULINGS AND DOCTRINES

RULE 1

PERSONAL ACTIONS AND REAL ACTIONS

1 Far East Bank v. Spouses Plaza | 154489 | July 25, 2003 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE/S: An action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for the consequent cancellation of a
real estate mortgage is a personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage and the mortgagor
is in possession of the premises since neither the mortgagor’s title to nor possession of the property is in
question.

ACTIONS IN REM, IN PERSONAM AND QUASI IN REM

2 Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE/S: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits
—as such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

A petition directed against the “thing” itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

3 Salva v. Magpile Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE/S: Basic is the rule that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
determine the nature of an action. – In order for the trial court to resolve Magpile's petition, the issues regarding
the legality/validity or reasonableness/correctness of the real property tax assessment and collection need not
be dealt with. At bar, the issue of the validity and legality of the tax sale is not essentially related to the issue of
the demandability of the real property tax.

AUTHORS NOTE: The case arose out of respondent alleging that there was lack of due process. Petitioner is
the one who bought the properties of respondent Magpile thru a public auction because of the tax delinquency
the latter had incurred to which Magpile never denied. Magpile alleges that he never received any notices of
demand. Magpile filed for the annulment of the auction which was elevated as the present case, upon which the
Supreme Court ruled that the auction is null and void for violating due process.

4 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp. Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE/S: Courts may exercise their powers validly and with binding effect if they acquire
jurisdiction over: (a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or the res; (c) the
parties; and (d) the remedy.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter refers to the power or authority of courts to hear and decide cases of a
general class. It is conferred by the Constitution or by law. It is not acquired through administrative issuances or
court orders. It is not acquired by agreement, stipulation, waiver, or silence. Any decision by a court, without a
law vesting jurisdiction upon such court, is void. Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court
over an object or thing being litigated. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or
constructively seizing or placing it under the court’s custody. Jurisdiction over the parties refers to the
power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons. The courts acquire jurisdiction over
complainants or petitioners as soon as they file their complaints or petitions. Over the persons of defendants or
respondents, courts acquire jurisdiction by a valid service of summons or through their voluntary submission.
Generally, a person voluntarily submits to the court’s jurisdiction when he or she participates in the trial despite
improper service of summons.

An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title because it challenges the judgment
decree of title.

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

5 Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be
accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.

Where the fees prescribed for the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related damages are not,
the court, although having jurisdiction over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claim for damages.

If there are unspecified claims, the determination of which may arise after the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.

6 Fedman Development Corp. v. Agcaoili | 165025 | 2011 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee
are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. The prevailing rule is that if the correct
amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The
“prescriptive period” that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific action must
be filed.

The principle of estoppel, which is based on equity and public policy, dictates that a party’s active participation
in both Regional Trial Court (RTC) proceedings and its seeking therein affirmative reliefs now precluded it from
denying the RTC’s jurisdiction; The Court abhors the practice of any litigant of submitting a case for decision in
the trial court, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking the judgment for lack of jurisdiction
if it is not.

MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION

7 Turner v. Lorenzo Shipping Corp. | 157479 | 2010 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential
elements of a cause of action are:
(a) The existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(b) A correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and
(c) An act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.

Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last element,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

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A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental
pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action.

TEST OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

8 Belle Corporation v. de Leon-Banks | 174669 | 2012 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines cause of action as the acts or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a
remedial right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its
averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of
the ULTIMATE OR ESSENTIAL FACTS constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. FAILURE TO MAKE A
SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION OF A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE COMPLAINT WARRANTS ITS DISMISSAL.

ULTIMATE FACTS mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s
primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.

*Reiteration of the elements of a Cause of Action – Check Case 7*

9 Santos v. Santos-Gran | 197380 | 2014 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause
of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations,
admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but, importantly, the
statement thereof should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground
is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has
been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of
applying the test.

This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only
allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential
if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined
to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.

*Reiteration of the elements of a Cause of Action – Check Case 7*

10 Guillermo v. Philippine Information Agency | 223751 | 2017 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: To determine the sufficiency of a cause of action in a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in
the complaint should be considered, in relation to whether its prayer may be granted. In Heirs of Maramag v.
Maramag, 588 SCRA 774 (2009): When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should
be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true.

The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged
in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule.

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SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND ITS EFFECTS

11 Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp | 167246 | 2011 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. LITIS PENDENTIA EXISTS WHEN THE FOLLOWING REQUISITES ARE
PRESENT:
(a) Identity of the parties in the two actions;
(b) Substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
(c) The identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

12 Mallion v. Alcantara | 141528 | 2006 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and
matters determined in the former suit.”

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest
of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause.

Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 49 of the Rules of Court outlines the dual aspect of res judicata. Section 47 (b)
pertains to it in its concept as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppel by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment
as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other
hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or otherwise known
as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. Res judicata
in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.

Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is
a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is—between the first and second actions— identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action.

The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.

Party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting his case.

SYNOPSIS: The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance
with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner
raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.

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 13 Marilag v. Martinez | 201892 | 2015 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on
the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once,
in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status
of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not
be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must
be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis
pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).

*Reiteration of the requisites of Res Judicata – See the next preceding case*

*Reiteration of the meaning of Litis Pendencia and its requisites – See Case 11*

ONE SENTENCE SUMMARY: As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the
mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of
whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality.

DAMAGES IN EJECTMENT CASES

14 Progressive Development Corp. Inc. v. CA | 301 SCRA 637 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: All cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial Court which
shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages and costs arising
therefrom. – Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that any person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs. The mandate
under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before
the Municipal Trial Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession BUT ALSO
ALL CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AND COSTS ARISING THEREFROM. Otherwise expressed, no claim for
damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim
for restoration of possession.

*Reiteration of the elements of Res Judicata – See Case 12*

15 Teraña v. de Sagun, 587 SCRA 60 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

DOCTRINE: Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are limited to rentals or reasonable
compensation for the use of the property

An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with the action for ejectment.
The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is
a special civil action which requires a summary procedure.

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action.— A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
(b) THE JOINDER SHALL NOT INCLUDE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS OR ACTIONS GOVERNED BY
SPECIAL RULES;

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 (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides that material allegations in the complaint which are
not specifically denied, other than the amount of unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial made
without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so is
practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.

RULE 2

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

16 Excellent Quality v. Win Multi Rich Builders | 175048 | 2009 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

A sole proprietorship is the oldest, simplest, and most prevalent form of business enterprise. It is an unorganized
business owned by one person. The sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the
business.

As held in the case of Mangila v. Court of Appeals: “A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence
of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires
its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national
government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file
or defend an action in court.”

The original petition was instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a collection of sum of
money suit which involved a construction contract entered into by EQAI and Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship.
The counsel of Win wanted to change the name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The change cannot be
countenanced. The plaintiff in the collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of a sole
proprietorship.

EQAI had continuously contested the legal personality of Win to institute the case. Win was given ample
opportunity to adduce evidence to show that it had legal personality. It failed to do so. In order for a corporation
to be able to file suit and claim the receivables of its predecessor in business, in this case a sole proprietorship,
it must show proof that the corporation had acquired the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship. Win
could have easily presented or attached any document e.g., deed of assignment which will show whether the
assets, liabilities and receivables of Multi-Rich were acquired by Win.

Having been given the opportunity to rebut the allegations made by EQAI, Win failed to use that opportunity.
Thus, we cannot presume that Multi-Rich is the predecessor-in-business of Win and hold that the latter has
standing to institute the collection suit.

17 V-Gent Inc. v. Morning Star Travel | 186305 | 2015 Anyog, Rona Graziela Pauline

Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest – the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit⁠. In suits where an agent represents a party, the principal is
the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf of the principal. Rule 3, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides the exception when an agent may sue or be sued without joining the principal.
Thus an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following
elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal. When these
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elements are present, the agent becomes bound as if the transaction were its own. In such case, the agent is
the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own,
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

In the present case, only the first element is present; the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent
disclosed the names of the passengers to Morning Star — in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the
transaction was paid using the passengers’ money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court cannot
apply.

To define the actual factual situation, V-Gent, the agent, is suing to recover the money of its principals — the
passengers — who are the real parties-in-interest because they stand to be injured or benefited in case Morning
Star refuses or agrees to grant the refund because the money belongs to them. From this perspective, V-Gent
evidently does not have a legal standing to file the complaint.

18 Navarro v. Escobido | 2009 Anyog, Rona

Karen Go is a real party-in-interest. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the
business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was
identified as Karen T. Go doing business under the name Kargo Enterprises. The contract was signed by Glenn
Go, as manager, representing Kargo Enterprises, expressly pointing to Kargo Enterprises as the principal that
Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the
agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease
agreements.

Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined
by Article 44 of the Civil Code. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a
party to a civil action. This legal reality leads to the question: who then is the proper party to file an action based
on a contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises? In Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, it was ruled that the complaint
should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint
would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the
name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words doing business as Juasing Hardware may be added
to the title of the case, as is customarily done. This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules, which states that a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured
by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it
is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear
in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally
sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question
we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits.

Arcelona v. CA – NB: Read case in the SCRA and take note Aserios, Percy
19 of the Errata: Arcelona v. CA | 280 SCRA 20

First Issue: Grounds for Annulment of Final Judgment

We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the ground(s) for annulment of judgment to only one, namely,
extrinsic fraud. It is clear then that to set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available
to a litigant: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court 25 on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake and excusable negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the
judgment but not more than six (6) months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul the judgment
on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment
that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals. To say, then, that petitioners can avail themselves

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only of the ground of extrinsic fraud and no other is to fail to appreciate the true meaning and ramifications of
annulment/nullity.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Its exercise must strictly comply with the legal requisites; otherwise, a challenge
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. Such jurisdiction normally refers to jurisdiction
over the subject. Ineluctably, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.

Jurisdiction over the Persons of Indispensable Parties

Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction over the
persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal
to said defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner
required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance.

As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a
personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void.29 A decision that is null and void for want
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law and, hence, it can never
become final and executory.30

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The
general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary
parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence
being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.31 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before
the court (that) the action should be dismissed."32 The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.33

Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals
did not make any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of
the property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show
over which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil Case
D-7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties.

Considering that private respondent was suing to establish his status as a tenant over the subject fishpond, the
responsibility for impleading all the indispensable parties undeniably rested on him as provided under Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 3 requires that "every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs." Further, Section 7 of the same rule states that "(p)arties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants."

And even conceding arguendo that petitioners had authorized Olanday, et al. to enter into a lease contract with
Tandoc, this fact did not authorize the latter to represent petitioners in the civil case he brought. Under Rule 9,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court, the pleader is required to set forth the names, if known to him, of persons who
ought to be parties, if complete relief is to be accorded to those who are already parties but who are not joined;
and to state why they have been omitted. Surely, he brought suit to establish his status as a tenant. It is thus his
responsibility to state the names of all the persons against whom he wants to establish his status as tenant.

Third, both the private respondent and the trial court knew of the obvious omission of petitioners as party
defendants. He also knew that in executing the lease, Pacita Olanday represented only her sisters (Maria and
Natividad) who were residing in the Philippines.

Despite this knowledge of the apparent defect in the complaint and in its jurisdiction, the trial court did not take
the initiative to implead petitioners as defendants or to order private respondent to do so, contrary to the clear
mandate of Rule 3, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court46 which provides:

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Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.

In sum, we hold that the nullity of a judgment grounded on lack of jurisdiction may be shown not only by what
patently appears on the face of such decision but also by documentary and testimonial evidence found in the
records of the case and upon which such judgment is based.

Second Issue: Estoppel and Laches

No laches attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.

The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on and finds its roots in equity which, broadly defined, is justice according
to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to prevent a clear case of injustice. The term is hardly separable
from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like laches, must be intentional and unequivocal, for when misapplied, it can
easily become a most convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is a principle that, as a rule, can be
invoked only in highly exceptional and legitimate cases.63 In Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,64 we reiterated the
requisites of estoppel:

In Kalalo vs. Luz, [fn: 34 SCRA 337] We held that the essential elements of estoppel in respect to the party
claiming it are: (a) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question; (b)
reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (c) action or inaction
based thereon of such character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his
injury, detriment, or prejudice.

The herein facts ineluctably show the absence of the first element in this case. Inasmuch as there is no proof
that petitioners had knowledge of the pending tenancy case filed by private respondent, it is only fair that they
should not be held in estoppel for failing to intervene in and to question the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil
Case No. D-7240.

Third Issue: Intervention as a Remedy of Petitioners

We hold that intervention is not the only remedy to assail a void final judgment. There is no procedural rule
prescribing that petitioners' intervention in the hearing for the issuance of a writ is the only way to question a void
final judgment. As already stated, petitioners were not aware of such hearing. Besides, as already discussed, a
direct action is available in assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic fraud, while a direct or a collateral
action may be used to show lack of jurisdiction.

20 Carandang v. De Guzman, November 29, 2006 Aserios, Percy

The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were
issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered an indispensable party. Being such,
the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal
of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action."

The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real party in interest" and
"indispensable party." A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is
one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to
those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As

8
they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property
relations. credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.

Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses Carandang are liable, such
credits are presumed to be conjugal property. There being no evidence to the contrary, such presumption
subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is certainly a real party
in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that the suit was allegedly not
brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted.

So now we come to the discussion concerning indispensable and necessary parties. When an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should likewise be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present. On the other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do not result in the
dismissal of the case. Instead, Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides for the consequences of such
non-joinder:

Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. – Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted
a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted.
Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.

The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the
claim against such party.

The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.

Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint. This is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
comply with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the effect of such non-inclusion:
it shall not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the non-joinder of
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of the action.

Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the pro-forma parties, which
are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits by or against another party as may be provided by
the applicable substantive law or procedural rule. An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court:

Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.

Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary. The third case
occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive
property. The wife may have no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be
joined as a party.

In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the general rule under Section 11,
Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action
to recover a sum of money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional defect.
The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a formal requirement which may be cured
by amendment.

Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or necessary parties, the rules
concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is
warranted only if the pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.

9
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly extended to the spouses
Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal
would be proper. If she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there was an
order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.

Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for
petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds,
Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.

Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the
recovery thereof. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-
owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of all co-owners.

We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the action for the recovery of the
allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit,
and dismissal of the suit is not warranted by her not being a party thereto.

PERSONALITY TO SUE; ESTATE OF A DECEDENT

21 Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy | 63277 | 1983 Aserios, Percy

Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and
this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116,
Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the
case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court
on September 16, 1982.

Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the
prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of
PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should
take no more than 60 days.

Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample time indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper
court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us
to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the
Barangay Lupon.

Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or
institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties
is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of
an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration.
Since the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator
may file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

10
 22 Ventura v. Militante | 63145 | 1999 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G

Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have
such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be
denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff
will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a
correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action.

23 Spouses Berot v. Siapno | 188944 | 2014 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G

The Court ruled that when the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint substituting the estate of Macaria Berot in
place of Macaria Berot as party defendant, defendants made no objections thereto. Not even an amended
answer was filed by the defendants questioning the substitution of the estate of Macaria Berot. For these
reasons, the defendants are deemed to have waivedany objection on the personality of the estate of Macaria
Berot. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that, "Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived

24 Boston Equity Resources v. CA | 173946 | 2013 Asuncion, Rogenil Jonathan G

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s
motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as respondent’s motion to
dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED ANSWER. This
circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear
contravention of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this provision,
a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim.

More importantly, respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of its
evidence in the trial court, giving credence to petitioner’s and the trial court’s conclusion that the filing of the
motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case against
her.

25 Heirs of Paciano Labao v. Vand Der Kolk | 207266 | 2014 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.

The MTCC failed to consider the absence of any allegation in the complaint regarding the authority of Remedios
Chan to institute the civil case for the Heirs of Yabao. Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity must be averred in the complaint. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of
the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as
plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. It bears stressing that an unauthorized complaint does not produce any
legal effect.

26 Ang v. Ang, G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.

The CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the orders of the RTC. Atty. Aceron
is not a real party in interest in the case below; thus, his residence is immaterial to the venue of the filing of the
complaint. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is
not a real party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that: Sec. 2. Parties
in interest.―A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
11
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by
curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the
right sought to be enforced.

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he does
not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their
attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents. Such
appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest.

Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to
file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the
petitioners―the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to
the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.

27 Limos v. Spouses Odones | 186979 | 2010 Baquiran, Maria Vanessa D.

The SC denied the petition. It is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action; Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just.—Anent the alleged non- joinder of indispensable parties,
it is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the
trial court.

28 Pacana-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply | 168979 | 2013 Bautista, Rey Matthew

The Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents
which they have waived for failure to invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot
also dismiss the case based on "lack of cause of action" as this would require at least a preponderance of
evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial court. At the inception of the present case, both the spouses
Pacaña were not impleaded as parties-plaintiffs.

The Court notes, however, that they are indispensable parties to the case as the alleged owners of Rovila Water
Supply. Without their inclusion as parties, there can be no final determination of the present case. They possess
such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts
cannot proceed without their presence.

Their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the
other parties. In Galicia, et al. v. Vda. De Mindo, et al.,72the Court ruled that in line with its policy of promoting a
just and inexpensive disposition of a case, it allowed the intervention of the indispensable parties instead of
dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, in Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, 73 the Court cited Salvador, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al.74 and held that the Court has full powers, apart from that power and authority which
are inherent, to amend the processes, pleadings, proceedings and decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the
real party in interest.

The Court has the power to avoid delay in the disposition of this case, and to order its amendment in order to
implead an indispensable party. With these discussions as premises, the Court is of the view that the proper
remedy in the present case is to implead the indispensable parties especially when their non-inclusion is merely
12
a technical defect. To do so would serve proper administration of justice and prevent further delay and multiplicity
of suits. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, then the court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with a lawful court order.

29 Divinagracia v. Parilla | 196750 | 2015 Bautista, Rey Matthew

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without
whom no final determination of the case can be had.

The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with
the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence,
there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.30 Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of
the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court,
that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order.The remedy is to implead
the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987,

30 Bautista, Rey Matthew
156 SCRA 113

Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Necessary parties are those whose
presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without them.

Necessary parties must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid
multiplicity of suits. In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat to be safeguarded if the sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale is held to be
an equitable mortgage.

Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale to him of
the shares of the aforementioned defendants in the property. Said defendants no longer have any interest in the
subject property. However, being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary
in order to settle all the possible issues of tile controversy.

Whether the disputed sale be declared an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants
will have been amply protected. Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against
defendant Marcos Mangubat. In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the complaint and their opposition to the motion to include said
defendants in the complaint as indispensable parties.

It was only because they were ordered by the court a quo that they included the said defendants in the complaint.
The lower court erroneously held that the said defendants are indispensable parties.

31 Pantranco North Express v. Standard Insurance | 453 SCRA 482 Transfiguracion, Alfred Satsatin

13
No. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the following requirements for a permissive joinder of
parties: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question
of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the
provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the
jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a
single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against
petitioners.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary
to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had
respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain
the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order.
Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration
of justice.

There is NO MISJOINDER OF PARTIES if the money sought to be claimed is in favor of the same plaintiff/s and
against the same defendant/s.

On the issue of lumping together the claims of Gicale and Standard, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules
provides:
“Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
xxx
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.”

Further, the Court reiterates the Totality rule exemplified by Sec. 33 (1) of BP 129: “where there are several
claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions.”

Adm. Matter No. No. 88-1-646: Re Request of the Heirs of

32 the Passengers of Dona Paz to set aside the Order of Judge Transfiguracion, Alfred Satsatin
B.V. Chingcuangco | 1988 | 159 SCRA 623

In a class suit, there is only one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not
separately or severally to distinct individuals

To distinguish the rule on class suits from that of permissive joinder of parties is the numerousness of parties
involved in a class suit. For a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so numerous that
it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.

EFFECT OF DEATH OF PARTY LITIGANT

33 Navarra v. Liongson | 217930 | 2016 Did not pass

*See Section 16, Rule 3, ROC*

34 Algura v. LGU of City of Naga, October 30, 2006 Cruz, Joan mae

The Constitution affords litigants moneyed or poor equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides
that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be
14
formulated, interpreted, and implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision. As
such, filing fees, though one of the essential elements in court procedures, should not be an obstacle to poor
litigants opportunity to seek redress for their grievances before the courts.

There were two (2) existing rules on pauper litigants that are compatible with each other, Sec 21 of Rule 3 and
Section 19 of Rule 141. The trial court Rule 3, Section 21 to the application of the Alguras after their affidavits
and supporting documents showed that petitioners did not satisfy the twin requirements on gross monthly income
and ownership of real property under Rule 141.

35 Ayala Land v. The alleged heirs of the late Lucas Lactao | 208213 | 2018 Cruz, Joan mae

The RTC considered respondents as indigent litigants, with no property to cover the additional fees. The RTC
also noted that filing fees, albeit insufficient, were initially paid by respondents and there was no intention on
their part to defraud the government

RULE 3

36 Medrano v. de Vera | 165770 | 2010 Cruz, Joan mae

In cases where the property is transferred by the defendant during the pendency of the litigation, the interest of
the transferee pendente lite cannot be considered independent of the interest of his transferors. If the transferee
files an answer while the transferor is declared in default, the case should be tried on the basis of the transferee’s
answer and with the participation of the transferee.

Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De Vera to participate in the case and requiring him
to file a motion to intervene. De Vera’s interest is not independent of or severable from the interest of the named
defendants. De Vera is a transferee pendente lite of the named defendants. His rights were derived from the
named defendants and he would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res
judicata. What the TC should have done is to treat De Vera (as transferee pendente lite) as having been joined
as a party-defendant, and to try the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s
participation.

Rule 3 Section 19 gives the TC discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or joinder by the transferee.
Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferee’s interest is deemed by law as adequately represented
and protected by the participation of his transferors in the case. In legal contemplation, he is not really denied
protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties to the case.The TC
should have tried the case based on De Vera’s answer, which answer is deemed to have been adopted by the
non-answering defendants.

VENUE

37 Villanueva v. Judge Mosqueda | L-58287 | 1982 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.

No, there was no lack of jurisdiction on Bonifacio’s ejectment suit. The court in Masantol, like other inferior courts,
have exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain ejectment suits. Section 1(a), Rule 4 (now Section 1 (par. 2), Rule
4) of the Rules of Court does not refer to the jurisdiction over the subject matter, but only to the place where the
ejectment suit may be brought.

The case should be distinguished from a case where the parties stipulated the actions of a construction contract
may be institutied in the CFI of Naga City. The Contractor who is from Pampanga sued the other party in the CFI
of Pampanga and not in Naga City. The Court held that the suit was properly filed in Pampanga because the
agreement of the parties on the venue of the actions between them was “simply permissive”. They did not waive
their right to choose the venue provided for in section 2(b), Rule 4 (now Section 2, Rule 4) of the Rules of Court.

15
 38 Union Bank v. Maunlad Homes Inc. | 190071 | 2012 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.

Yes, filing the action in Makati City was proper. Used as basis of Maunlad Homes, Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court states the proper venue for ejectment actions. Section 4 of the same Rule provides otherwise where
the rule shall not apply “where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof.” The parties provided for a different venue. As stated in the stipulation of their contract,
it was stated that “the venue of all suits and actions arising out of or in connection with this Contract to Sell shall
be at Makati City.”

Since the unlawful detained action is connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with
the MeTC of Makati City. The Court granted the petition. Maunlad Homes was ordered to vacate the property
and was ordered to pay the rentals-in arrears, as well as rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the
property.

39 Latorre v. Latorre | 183926 | 2010 | 617 SCRA 88 Del Mundo, Jan Daniel V.

The RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa,
but should be Makati which is the proper venue in this case. Section 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
provided an answer to the issue of venue. The subject property is situated in Makati City hence the venue is the
proper court of Makati City. In this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the principle that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. It is also settled that what
determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. Petitioner’s complaint is a real
action involving the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership. The Court found no merit
in the petition hence denying the petition.

40 Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals | 154096 | 2008 Domalanta, Marc Denver L

The Supreme Court ruled that under Sec. 2 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the Venue of Personal
Actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff resides or where the
defendant or where the principal defendants reside or in the case of non-residents defendants where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff. The law is quite clear that if there are more that one plaintiff, the residence
of the principal plaintiff shall be the basis for determining the proper venue. In the case at bar, Since Irene is the
principle plaintiff in the complaint in light with the said Rule the subject of the civil case should commence at the
residences of Irene at Makati City making it the proper venue and not at Batac, Ilocos Norte.

41 Garces v. CA | 1988 | 162 SCRA504 Domalanta, Marc Denver L

The Supreme Court ruled that determination of Venue under Section 3 of P. D 1508( Establing a System of
Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangal Level) is determined when is dispute between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay or those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality. The phrase “actually residing” and “actual resident” as the Supreme Court ruled does not
refer to one’s legal residence or domicile but it refers to persons where they actually and physically reside. In the
case at bar, despite Escalante legal residence or domicile is in Cavite her actual and physical residence is
located at Malate, Manila at the time the case of ejectment was filed and applying Sec. 3 of the Decree the
proper venue therefore is in Manila.

42 Mangila v. Court of Appeals | 125027 | 2002 Domalanta, Marc Denver L

The Supreme Court ruled that under the Rules of Court parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue
on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from the bringing a case in other venues the parties must be able to show that such stipulation
16
is exclusive absent of such words the courts will allow the filing of the case in any venue as long as the
jurisdictional requirement are followed.

Venue stipulation in a contract, while valid and enforceable, do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth
in Rule 4 of Rules of Court. Absent of qualifying words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on
additional forum, not as limiting the venue of the specified place. In the instance case, the stipulation does not
limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince
the intention of the parties that Makati is the only exclusive venue where the action could be instituted.

43 Hyatt Elevators v. Goldstar Elevators Phils. | 473 SCRA 705 Dulay, Robert Ross

Section 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court:

"Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides, or in the case
of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."

Since both parties to this case are corporations, there is a need to clarify the meaning of "residence." The law
recognizes two types of persons: (1) natural and (2) juridical. Corporations come under the latter in accordance
with Article 44(3) of the Civil Code.

A corporation, however, has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural person.
This is precisely the reason why the Court in Young Auto Supply Company v. Court of Appeals ruled that "for
practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal
office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation."

The residence of a corporation is the place where its principal office is established.

In the present case, there is no question as to the residence of respondent. What needs to be examined is that
of petitioner. the latter’s principal place of business is Makati, as indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. Since
the principal place of business of a corporation determines its residence or domicile, then the place
indicated in petitioner’s articles of incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for this
case.

Jurisprudence has, however, settled that the place where the principal office of a corporation is located,
as stated in the articles, indeed establishes its residence. This ruling is important in determining the
venue of an action by or against a corporation.

44 Golden Arches v. St. Francis Square Holding Inc | 640 SCRA 227 Dulay, Robert Ross

Venue, in essence, concerns a rule of procedure. In personal actions, it is fixed for the greatest possible
convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses,and to promote the ends of justice.

Respondent’s complaint, being one for enforcement of contractual provisions and recovery of damages, is in the
nature of a personal action which, under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, shall be filed at the plaintiffs
residence. Specifically with respect to a domestic corporation, it is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the
place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation.

IN FINE, although respondents Amended Articles of Incorporation of 2007 indicates that its principal business
address is at Metro Manila, venue was properly laid in Mandaluyong since that is where it had actually been
residing (or holding its principal office) at the time it filed its complaint. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
quoted earlier, authorizes the plaintiff (respondent in this case) to make a choice of venue for personal actions
whether to file the complaint in the place where he resides or where defendant resides.Respondents choice must
be respected as [t]he controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said
cases are filed.Respondents purpose in filing the complaint in Mandaluyong where it holds its principal office is
obviously for its convenience and for orderly administration of justice.
17
 45 Ang v. Ang | 186993 | 2012 Dulay, Robert Ross

It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs
and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to
a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum
of money against the respondents is a personal action as it primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract.

The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where
he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found.
The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.

If the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the court of the
place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526 (1916),
this Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no
residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides.

46 Gumabon v. Larin, G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.

Petitioners assert that the relief they seek is not to be declared the owners of the land, but merely to compel
respondent to return the certificate of title back to them.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, under the title "Venue of Actions," provide:
"Section 1. Venue of Real Actions. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein,
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

"Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case
of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."

Real actions, as so opposed to personal actions, are those which affect the title to or possession of real property.
Where a contrary claim to ownership is made by an adverse party, and where the relief prayed for cannot be
granted without the court deciding on the merits the issue of ownership and title, more specifically so as to who,
between the contending parties, would have a better right to the property, the case can only be but a real action.

Jurisdiction, on the other hand, is more substantive than procedural. It refers to the authority of the court to hear
and decide a case, and, it is one that is dictated by law, and the matter ordinarily can be raised at any stage of
the trial, even upon appeal. The rule, of course, deviates from this general rule in criminal cases where locus
criminis itself defines the jurisdiction of the trial court.

The wrong venue in Civil Case No. 97-31709, being merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional impediment,
does not, without timely exception, disallow the RTC of Quezon City to take cognizance of, and to proceed with,
the case. In failing to raise his objection to it either in a motion to dismiss or in his answer, coupled by his having
sought relief from the court and favorable judgment on his demurrer to evidence, respondent has himself evinced
an acceptance on the venue of the action. The court a quo has thus erred in dismissing motu proprio the
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

47 Unimasters Conglomeration Inc. v. CA | 119657 | 1997 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.

18
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed
upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of
the intention of the parties respecting the matter.

This Court construed the venue stipulations involved as merely permissive:

Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco. In this case, the venue stipulation was as follows:
“The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila.”

This Court ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of the plaintiff or the
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive
words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. It simply is
permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. In the
case hereunder mentioned, stipulations on venue were held to be restrictive, or mandatory.Gesmundo v. JRB
Realty Corporation: “. . (V)enue for all suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or any cause between the
LESSOR and LESSEE, and persons claiming under each, . . (shall be) the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in
Pasay City. . .”

This Court held that: "(t)he language used leaves no room for interpretation. It clearly evinces the parties' intent
to limit to the 'courts of appropriate jurisdiction of Pasay City' the venue for all suits between the lessor and the
lessee and those between parties claiming under them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in
the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b)."

In this case at bar, " . . All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of
Quezon City," without mention of Tacloban City. The question is whether this stipulation had the effect
of effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS
and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.

The question should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and
unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated
only at the place selected by them, Quezon City — or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the
same desire and intention — the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the
parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City,
at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).

48 Briones v. CA | 204444 | 2015 Estudillo, Alessandra Sofia E.

Rule 4 VENUE OF ACTIONS

SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply –
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section
4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only
in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suitnot only in the place agreed
upon but also in the places fixed by law.

As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown thatsuch stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any
other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of
similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum,not as limiting
venue to the specified place.

In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that
it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be
emphasized that Briones's complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in their
execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation,
19
as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general
rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property
is located.

49 Ley Construction v. Sedano | 222711 | 2017 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G

Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff
or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof.(Emphases supplied)

Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties
may, through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.

DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON-CONVENIENS

50 HSBC v. Sherman | 72494 | 1989 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in the
absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in
personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the
action here just to harass private respondents.

51 PDIC v. Citibank | 170290 | 2012 Gamboa, Joelyn Marie G

A branch has no separate legal personality. This Court is of the opinion that the key to the resolution of this
controversy is the relationship of the Philippine branches of Citibank and BA to their respective head offices and
their other foreign branches.

The Court begins by examining the manner by which a foreign corporation can establish its presence in the
Philippines. It may choose to incorporate its own subsidiary as a domestic corporation, in which case such
subsidiary would have its own separate and independent legal personality to conduct business in the country.
In the alternative, it may create a branch in the Philippines, which would not be a legally independent unit, and
simply obtain a license to do business in the Philippines.

The Court agrees with the CA ruling that there is nothing in the definition of a “bank” and a “banking institution”
in Section 3(b) of the PDIC Charter which explicitly states that the head office of a foreign bank and its other
branches are separate and distinct from their Philippine branches.

There is no need to complicate the matter when it can be solved by simple logic bolstered by law and
jurisprudence. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the head office of a bank and its branches are considered

20
as one under the eyes of the law. While branches are treated as separate business units for commercial and
financial reporting purposes, in the end, the head office remains responsible and answerable for the liabilities of
its branches which are under its supervision and control. As such, it is unreasonable for PDIC to require the
respondents, Citibank and BA, to insure the money placements made by their home office and other branches.

Deposit insurance is superfluous and entirely unnecessary when, as in this case, the institution holding the funds
and the one which made the placements are one and the same legal entity.
RULE 6

52 Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.

Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or "to be on the safe side." An answer ex abudanti cautela
does not make their answer less of an answer. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his
defenses and the failure to file one within the time allowed may cause a defending party to be declared in default.
Petitioners’ argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of our
ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela. Issues are
joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute are plain before
the court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as well as the other
defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses of the parties have been defined and the
issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down.

FILING FEES FOR COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIMS

53 Korea Technologies v. Judge Lerma | 143581 | 2008 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.

The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, “A compulsory
counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained
therein.” As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping, PGSMC’s Answer is not an initiatory pleading
which requires a certification against forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is a responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying
KOGIES’ motion to dismiss PGSMC’s compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC filed its Answer
incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being
compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended
by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.

54 Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals | 159746 | 2012 Guevarra, Ivan Frasser S.

Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows:

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the
amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim
may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction
or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to
entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
21
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the
issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims
of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?

The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the logical
relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted to secure the payment of petitioners’ credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell.
Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not
validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed
the logical relation between the two actions.

55 Bungcayao Sr. v. Fort Ilocandia | 170483 | 2010 Julian, Jenelyn D.

The court ruled that respondent counterclaim is not compulsory in nature but permissive counterclaim. A
compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected, with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint.

It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not
set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive.

Likewise a positive answer to below questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory: (a) Are issues
of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?; (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the compulsory rule?; (c) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants counterclaim?; (d) Is there any logical relations between
the claim and the counterclaim?

In the case at bar, the only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession of the subject property.
Respondent’s second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is only a
permissive counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of the main case.

The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound
to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment
of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the
judgment by the trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice to
a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.

56 Firaza Sr. v. Ugay | 165838 | 2013 Julian, Jenelyn D.

Section 48 of PD 29 proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of title and allows only a direct attack thereof,
“Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceedings in accordance with law.

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin
its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title
may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void.
22
In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by petitioner against private
respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT No. 10101 on which petitioner
bases its right. To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral
attack.

From the foregoing, it is immediately apparent that the courts a quo erred in their conclusions. The CA
erroneously classified the herein counterclaim as a collateral attack. On the other hand, the RTC correctly
adjudged the same as a direct attack to the respondents’ land title but mistakenly declared it as a prohibited
action.

As clearly pronounced in the above-cited jurisprudence, the petitioner’s counterclaim is a permissible direct
attack to the validity of respondents’ torrens title. As such counterclaim, it involves a cause of action separate
from that alleged in the complaint; it has for its purpose the vindication of a right in as much as the complaint
similarly seeks the redress of one. As the plaintiff in his own counterclaim, the petitioner is equally entitled to the
opportunity granted the plaintiff in the original complaint, to establish his cause of action and to prove the right
he asserts. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.

57 Lafarge Cement Phil. Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp | 155173 | 2004 Julian, Jenelyn D.

Counterclaims against Respondents CCC, Gregory T. Lim and Anthony A. Mariano are compulsory.

Counterclaims are defined in Section 6 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. They are generally allowed in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits and
to facilitate the disposition of the whole controversy in a single action, such that the defendants demand may be
adjudged by a counterclaim rather than by an independent suit. The only limitations to this principle are (1) that
the court should have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim, and (2) that it could acquire
jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is essential for its adjudication.

A counterclaim may either be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. A permissive counterclaim is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.

A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

The petitioners counterclaims for damages were the result of respondents (Lim and Mariano) act of filing the
Complaint and securing the Writ of Attachment in bad faith. In Tiu Po v. Bautista the court ruled counterclaim for
damages fulfills the necessary requisites of a compulsory counterclaim. They are damages claimed to have been
suffered by petitioners as a consequence of the action filed against them.

They have to be pleaded in the same action; otherwise, petitioners would be precluded by the judgment from
invoking the same in an independent action. In Papa vs. Banaag “compensatory, moral and exemplary damages,
allegedly suffered by the creditor in consequence of the debtor’s action, are also compulsory counterclaim barred
by the dismissal of the debtors action. They cannot be claimed in a subsequent action by the creditor against
the debtor.”

Aside from the fact that petitioners counterclaim for damages cannot be the subject of an independent action, it
is the same evidence that sustains petitioners counterclaim that will refute private respondents own claim for
damages. This is an additional factor that characterizes petitioners counterclaim as compulsory.

Since the counterclaim for damages is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it would be
barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a different proceeding, it would be abated on
the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata.

23
 58 Banco de Oro v. CA | 160354 | 2005 Lagasca, James Ellis

The counterclaim must be existing at the time of the filing of the answer, though not at the commencement of
the action—a premature counterclaim cannot be set in the answer; The party who fails to interpose a
counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence of the
plaintiff’s suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from
interposing such claim in a future litigation.

Setting up of an “after-acquired counterclaim” is merely permissive, not compulsorily.

The Court held that until after the Locsins allegedly refused and failed to settle the alleged deficiency amount of
their outstanding obligation, despite BDO‘s letter of demand sent to the Locsins, BDO‘s cause of action had not
arisen. BDO could not, therefore, have set its claim even assuming arguendo that it is a compulsory counterclaim.

59 GSIS v. Heirs of Caballero | 158090 | 2010 Lagasca, James Ellis

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the
issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar
a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC agreed with the CA's view that GSIS's counterclaim for the
recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The issue in
the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is
entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, GSIS did not do so.

60 Sy-Vargas v. Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr. | 221062 | 2016 Lagasca, James Ellis

NO. Based on the above mentioned standards, the Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is
permissive in nature. This is because:
(a) The issue in the main case, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim;
(b) Since petitioner and respondents’ respective causes of action arose from completely different occurrences,
the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim in a separate
proceeding;
(c) The evidence required to prove petitioner’s claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise
different from the evidence required to prove respondents’ counterclaim that petitioner are liable for
damages for performing acts in bad faith; and
(d) The recovery of petitioner’s claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents’ counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the
court and the parties.

It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that:
(a) The fees are paid within a reasonable period; and
(b) There was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Moreover, where a litigant’s non-payment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any
intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess the

24
amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on the amount
awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.

Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc. v. Paras, G.R. No. 161909,

61 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
April 25, 2012

Moral damages may not be recovered in an action on a breach of contract because it is not listed under Art.
2219 of the Civil Code, at the same time it does not fall under the exceptions. However the court ruled that the
third-party complaint was proper and valid and it is in line with Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Apart
from the requirement that the third-party complainant should assert a derivative or secondary claim for relief from
the third-party defendant there are other limitations on said party’s ability to implead.

The rule requires that the third-party defendant is not a party to the action for otherwise the proper procedure for
asserting a claim against one who is already a party to the suit is by means of counterclaim or cross-claim under
sections 6 and 7 of Rule 6. In addition to the aforecited requirement, the claim against the third-party defendant
must be based upon plaintiff's claim against the original defendant (third-party claimant). The crucial
characteristic of a claim under section 12 of Rule 6, is that the original defendant is attempting to transfer to the
third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff.

Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must not yet be a
party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant must belong to the original
defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the third-party defendant must be based upon the
plaintiffs claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, the defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-
party defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff. Paras’ cause of action against Inland
(breach of contract of carriage) did not need to be the same as the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco
and its driver (tort or quasi-delict) in the impleader.

It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants those who may be liable to
him in tort for the plaintiffs claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff. The third-party claim need not be
based on the same theory as the main claim. Impleader also is proper even though the third partys liability is
contingent, and technically does not come into existence until the original defendants liability has been
established.

In addition, the words is or may be liable in Rule 14(a) make it clear that impleader is proper even though the
third-party defendants liability is not automatically established once the third-party plaintiffs liability to the original
plaintiff has been determined. Nor was it a pre-requisite for attachment of the liability to Philtranco and its driver
that Inland be first declared and found liable to Paras for the breach of its contract of carriage with him.

62 Samala v. Judge Victor | 170 SCRA 453 | CDCP v. Cuenca, 466 SCRA 714 Lazaro, Ivan Rei

Quite apparent from these arguments is the misconception entertained by appellants with respect to the nature
and office of a third party complaint. Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party
complaint as a "claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the
action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.” Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be impleaded by the
defendant either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff-, or,
(c) both (a) and (b).

The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase "for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are
subsumed under the catch all "or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim." The case at bar is one in
which the third party defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the plaintiffs upon the allegation
that "the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police investigation of said vehicular collision between
the Above-mentioned three vehicles was the recklessness and negligence and lack of imprudence of the third-
party defendant Virgilio (should be Leonardo) Esguerra y Ledesma then driver of the passenger bus."

25
The effects are that "plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the claim" and "the third
party is bound by the adjudication as between him and plaintiff." It is not indispensable in the premises that the
defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff,
as precisely, the theory of defendant is that it is the third party defendant, and not he, who is directly liable to
plaintiff. The situation contemplated by appellants would properly pertain to situation wherein the third party
defendant is being sued for contribution, indemnity or subrogation, or simply stated, for a defendant's "remedy
over."

Anent appellant's claim that plaintiff who sued on contractual breach cannot recover on the basis of quasi-delict,
suffice it to say that as the primary purpose of this rule is to avoid circuity of action and to dispose of in one
litigation, the entire subject matter arising from a particular set of fact it is immaterial that the third-party plaintiff
asserts a cause of action against the third party defendant on a theory different from that asserted by the plaintiff
against the defendant. It has likewise been held that "a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party
defendants those liable to him in tort for the plaintiff s claim against him or directly to the plaintiff.

Paramount Life & General Insurance v. Castro, G.R. No.

63 Lazaro, Ivan Rei
195728, April 19, 2016

In allowing the inclusion of the PPSBI as a third-party defendant, the Court recognizes the inseparable interest
of the bank (as policyholder of the group policy) in the validity of the individual insurance certificates issued by
Paramount. The PPSBI need not institute a separate case, considering that its cause of action is intimately
related to that of Paramount as against the Castro’s.

The soundness of admitting a third-party complaint hinges on causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff
in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party
defendant. In this case, the Castro’s stand to incur a bad debt to the PPSBI - the exact event that is insured
against by Group Master Policy No. G-086 - in the event that Paramount succeeds in nullifying Virgilio's Individual
Insurance Certificate.

Paramount further argues that the propriety of a third-party complaint rests on whether the possible third-party
defendant (in this case PPSBI) can raise the same defenses that the third-party plaintiffs (the Castro’s) have
against the plaintiff. However, the Rules do not limit the third-party defendant's options to such a condition. Thus:

Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. – A third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant may allege in
his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.)-party
plaintiff may have against the original plaintiffs claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against
the original plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff.

The CA correctly ruled that to admit the Castro’s Third-Party Complaint, in which they can assert against the
PPSBI an independent claim they would otherwise assert in another action, would prevent multiplicity of suits.
Considering also that the original case from which these. Present Petitions arose has not yet been resolved, the
Court deems it proper to have all the parties air all their possible grievances in the original case still pending with
the RTC.

INTERVENTION

64 Bon-Mar Realty v. Spouses de Guzman | 182136-37 | 2008; Manliclic, Marianne P.

BON-MAR as successor-in-interest of the DE GUZMANS. Thus, BON-MAR is not a mere stranger to the
litigation, it is a necessary party who must be joined in the suit if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. It is clear that
BON-MAR has acquired legal interest over the subject lots by virtue of the final and executory decision in Civil
Case No. 67315, which adjudged it as the owner of the disputed lots.

26
The Rules of Court provide that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action.

To warrant intervention, two requisites must concur:

(a) The movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(b) Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties nor should the
claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.

Proceedings to resolve the possession of third-party claimants may proceed independently of the action which
said claimants may bring to enforce or protect their claim of ownership over the property. The propriety of DE
GUZMANS intervention in SCA No. 2988-SJ, this Court finds that contempt is not the proper remedy available
to BON-MAR for the Registrar of Deeds denial of its request for issuance of titles pursuant to the judgment in
Civil Case No. 67315.

65 Republic v. CA | 174385 | 2013 Manliclic, Marianne P.

Due process of law is a constitutionally guaranteed right reserved to every litigant. Even the Republic as a litigant
is entitled to this constitutional right, in the same manner and to the same extent that this right is guaranteed to
private litigants.

A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the
rights of the other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless piece of paper
that cannot and should not be acted upon. The reason for this is plain: a movant asks the court to take a specific
course of action, often contrary to the interest of the adverse party and which the latter must then be given the
right and opportunity to oppose.

The notice of hearing to the adverse party thus directly services the required due process as it affords the adverse
party the opportunity to properly state his agreement or opposition to the action that the movant asks for.
Consequently, our procedural rules provide that a motion that does not afford the adverse party this kind of
opportunity should simply be disregarded

An original complaint must be served on the defendant, a copy of the complaint-in-intervention must be served
on the adverse party with the requisite proof of service duly filed prior to any valid court action. Absent these or
any reason duly explained and accepted excusing strict compliance, the court is without authority to act on such
complaint; any action taken without the required service contravenes the law and the rules, and violates the
adverse party’s basic and constitutional right to due process.

In the present case, records show that the OSG had never received – contrary to the private respondents’ claim
– a copy of the motions and complaints-in-intervention. The Republic duly and fully manifested the irregularity
before the respondent judge. Thus, the mere statement in the assailed orders that the parties were duly notified
is insufficient on the face of the appropriate manifestation made and the supporting proof that the Republic
submitted. In these lights, the motions and complaints-in-intervention cannot but be mere scraps of paper that
the respondent judge had no reason to consider; in admitting them despite the absence of prior notice, the
respondent judge denied the Republic of its right to due process.

RULE 7, RULES OF COURT

66 Vda. de Formoso v. PNB | 2011 Manliclic, Marianne P.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of

27
right; the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. The failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for
certiorari, it does so only:
(1) When the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the
government; or
(2) When there are procedural errors, like violations of the rules of court or Supreme Court circulars.

We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties.
With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such
document.

67 Bank of Philippine Islands v. CA | 2010 Mercado, Ralph Louie

TOPIC: Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

This Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements
it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping are
requirements that as pointed out by the Court, time and again are basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural
orderliness.

Thus, we cannot simply and in a general way apply given the factual circumstances of this case the liberal
jurisprudential exception in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPIs failure to submit a board resolution.
While we may have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds
that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum
shopping. In other words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping, proper in form and
substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule.

68 Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v. Soliman | 178952 | 2013 Mercado, Ralph Louie

In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association, it
was held that the signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complied with rules because all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action
or defense.

In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right
not to be dispossessed of the subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents’ construction of a family
home and occupation thereof for more than 10 years.

The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave petitioners x x
x authority to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they have not commenced any
action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action
or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues.

69 Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Cebrero | 222737 | 2018 Mercado, Ralph Louie

There was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Cafiiza's supposed authority to file and
prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The Court cannot consider the mere mention in the December 15, 1993
Decision that he was Gabriel's attorney-in-fact as evidence that he was indeed authorized and empowered to
initiate the instant action against respondents. There was also no evidence of substantial compliance with the
rules or even an attempt to submit an SPA after filing of the complaint.
28
Considering that the complaint was filed by Cafiiza, who has failed to prove that he was validly authorized to do
so, the complaint does not produce any legal effect. The RTC never validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Thus, the instant petition must be dismissed.

70 Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank | 193415 | 2012 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.

The Court denied the petition for review. The issue of the applicability to this case of the requirement to pay 12%
interest per annum before the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending foreclosure sale is moot. The
Court rules that upon dismissal of the First Complaint by the trial court on 27 October 2009, the issue of whether
the writ of injunction should issue has become moot.

A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or useful
purpose that can be served in passing upon the merits. There remains no actual controversy in the instant
Petition because the First Complaint has already been dismissed by the trial court. Upon its dismissal, the
question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction necessarily died with it.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to the outcome
of the main case. Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any
appeal therefrom notwithstanding, as this Court emphasized in Buyco v. Baraquia from which we quote: The writ
is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is
ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action.

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there
is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the
immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy
before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.

71 Argana v. Republic | 147227 | 2004 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.

The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners contention that the Motion to Rescind filed by the
lawyers of the PCGG and of the OSG should have been treated by the Sandiganbayan as a mere scrap of paper
because the motion was filed without the authority of the PCGG En Banc and of the President of the Republic
has no legal basis.

There is no requirement under the law that pleadings and motions filed by lawyers of the government or the
PCGG must first be approved by the PCGG En Banc and by the President of the Philippines. More importantly,
R.A. No. 1379 expressly authorizes the OSG to prosecute cases of forfeiture of property unlawfully acquired by
any public officer or employee.

It must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the forfeiture of petitioners
allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent was an
amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on
extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed
unlawfully by the late Mayor Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa.

The Motion to Rescind was filed precisely because the PCGG, as respondents authorized representative in the
compromise, discovered that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought
the help of the OSG which in turn is the duly authorized government agency to represent respondent in forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379.

The Court also finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in granting
the Motion to Rescind, which it treated as a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure.
29
Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed. A petition provided for
in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after
such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

72 de Guzman v. Chico | 195445 | 2016 Odiña, Danisse Anne M.

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision. No certificate against forum shopping is required
in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The non-initiatory nature of an ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is best explained
in Arquiza v. Court of Appeals. In that case we ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or
other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or
consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings.

As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled. The court also cannot subscribe to
petitioners' narrow view that only cases covered by foreclosure sales under Act No. 3135 are excused from the
requirement of a certificate against forum shopping.

Based on jurisprudence, a writ of possession may be issued in the following instances:

(a) Land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration
Act;
(b) Judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not
a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened;
(c) Extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118; and
(d) In execution sales.

We note that there is no law or jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession depends on the nature of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no logical reason for
petitioners' contention that only cases covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the requirement of a certificate
against forum shopping.

73 Brown-Araneta v. Araneta | 190814 | 2013; Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.

Michelle committed forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would come out with a favorable disposition.

Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, such that the second cause of action becomes vexatious and unnecessary.

Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of the adverse
ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.

74 Clark Development Corp. v. Mondragon Leisure | 150986 | 2007 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.

30
We defined forum shopping as the "institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition" or "the act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable)
opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari."

In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, we held that the test to determine whether forum
shopping exists is whether the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.

Res judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment.
Its requisites are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) The judgment or order must be one on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(4) Between the first and second actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

RULE 8, RULES OF COURT

75 Tumpag v. Tumpag, G.R. No. 199133, September 29, 2014 Ponce, Edward John Jr., C.

SC granted the petition, stating that the general rule is that the court should only look into the facts alleged in the
complaint to determine whether or not it is within its jurisdiction, however, in instances where rigid application of
the rule would defeat substantial justice, the rule may be relaxed, especially in the instant case, considering that
a mere reference to the attached document would resolve the question of the value of the property involved and
which court had proper jurisdiction.

The defendant, in filing a motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth of the factual and material allegations
in the complaint, as well as the documents attached to a complaint whose due execution and genuineness are
not denied under oath by the defendant; these attachments must be considered as part of the complaint without
need of introducing evidence thereon. —In his comment to the present petition, the respondent contends that
the assessed value of the property subject of the case is actually much below than the value stated in the
attached Declaration of Real Property.

However, the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts alleged,
the court can render a valid judgment upon the complaint in accordance with the plaintiff’s prayer. The defendant,
in filing a motion to dismiss, hypothetically admits the truth of the factual and material allegations in the complaint,
as well as the documents attached to a complaint whose due execution and genuineness are not denied under
oath by the defendant; these attachments must be considered as part of the complaint without need of
introducing evidence thereon.

Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC.

76 Santos v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014
III

Spouses Santos failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
acknowledgement in their answer. The effect of this as provided for by section 8 Rule 8 of the Rules of court is
that the genuineness and due execution of the acknowledgement is deemed admitted. By the admission of the
genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that
he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a forgery, or that it was unauthorized,
or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting
it out, or that it was never delivered are cut off by the admission of its genuineness and due execution.

31
77 Heirs of Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco | 175291 | 2011 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel DC. III

The first mode of appeal, the ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the
RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The second mode of appeal, the petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA
from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law.

The third mode of appeal, the appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme
Court and resolves only questions of law. Where a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with
the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal
outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that court.

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law
and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

78 Heirs of Andres Naya v. Naya | 215759 | 2016 Quirolgico, Bienvenido Miguel

The complaint filed by petitioners is one for quieting of title, reconveyance of ownership, damages, and attorney's
fees. To make out an action to quiet title, the initiatory pleading has only to set forth allegations showing that (1)
the plaintiff has title to real property or any interest therein and (2) the defendant claims an interest therein
adverse to the plaintiffs arising from an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. In
Mendizabel v. Apao where the case was one for annulment of titles, reconveyance and damages, we were also
confronted with an argument that the complaint must be dismissed because the circumstances constituting the
allegations of fraud or mistake were not stated with particularity. We ruled against this argument, holding that in
an action for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to be
true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the plaintiff was the owner .of
the land or possessed the land in the concept of owner, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed
him of the land.

RULE 11, RULES OF COURT

79 Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco, Inc. | 179594 | 2013 Gañas, Evangeline

Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Defenses and objections not pleaded whether
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim.

Upon review of the case, the Court finds that respondent had been served a notice of the notarial rescission of
the conditional deeds of sale when it was furnished with the petitioner's Answer to the first Complaint five years
before it filed this case. Consequently, respondent is not entitled to the relief granted by the Court of Appeals.
Gicano v. Gegato held that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do
so on the basis of a motion to dismiss or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense, or
even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the
defense has not been asserted.

Also, petitioner raised the defense of prescription for the first time before this Court, and respondent had the
opportunity to oppose it in its Comment to the petition.
32
Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of prescription as both parties were afforded the opportunity to ventilate
their respective positions on the matter. Dino v. Court of Appeals held that even if the defense of prescription
was raised for the first time on appeal in respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate
court's decision, this does not militate against the due process right of the petitioners.

80 Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank | 2006 Gañas, Evangeline

Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them. To
begin with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant
fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the
presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the
relief that may be granted. In particular, the courts judgment shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind
from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The Court explained that the proscription against the award of unliquidated damages is significant because it
means that the damages must be proved convincingly in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in
civil cases.

Regarding judgments by default, it was explained in Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only
after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the
presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if
every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-
defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it
sanctioned by the due process clause.

81 Lina v. CA | 135 SCRA 637 Gañas, Evangeline

The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court’s affirmance of the questioned order of the trial court.
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the
sound decision of the trial court.

In this case, it was two (2) days before the expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary period given to defendant
to file his responsive pleading when petitioner moved for an extension of twenty (20) days to file his answer.
Upon motion of private respondent and over the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order
declaring petitioner in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41).

Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court
on certiorari/prohibition.

33
82 Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma Corp. | 193494 | 2014 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

After declaration of default but before the court renders judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion
to set aside order of default. The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. (Rule 9, Sec. 3, (b), ROC) The defendant must also have a
meritorious defense. In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the RTC rendered judgment.
Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable negligence.

However, excusable negligence is "one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against."
The circumstances should be properly alleged and proved. Here, Lui Enterprises’ failure to answer within the
required period is inexcusable. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises blamed its counsel for
the late filing of the answer without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not excusable negligence under
Rule 9, Sec. 3, (b), ROC. Thus, the RTC did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.

The general rule is that courts should proceed with deciding cases on the merits and set aside orders of default
as default judgments are "frowned upon." As much as possible, cases should be decided with both parties "given
every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open, without resort to technicality."

However, the basic requirements of Rule 9, Sec. 3, (b), ROC must first be complied with. The defendant’s motion
to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions:
 First is the time element. The defendant must challenge the default order before judgment.
 Second, the defendant must have been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence.
 Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its counsel
failed to file the motion to dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders
of default.

Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This, Lui Enterprises did not do.

83 Arquero v. CA | 168053 | 2011 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

The Supreme Court held that the appeal was correctly filed in the CA. The remedies of a party declared in
default are (as held in Martinez vs Republic):
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)

The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion
of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the Supreme Court held that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the
judgment rendered against him (the Lina Doctrine).

Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary
to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default except that he does not
regain his right to adduce evidence. The appellate court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is not
precluded from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.

34
84 Benedicto-Muñoz v. Cacho-Olivarez | 179121 | 2015 Reyes, Yna Adrielle

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and held that the amended and supplemental complaint
must be dismissed. The dismissal of the case as against the Cuaycong brothers benefits the other defendants.
The Original Complaint and the Amended and Supplemental Complaint allege the same cause of action against
the Cuaycong brothers and the petitioners, that is: stock market fraud. The Amended and Supplemental
Complaint failed to allege "different and separable acts" committed by the remaining defendants independent of
the acts and omissions of Cuaycong. It also dropped the Cuaycongs as defendants (but referred to them as
“erstwhile defendants”) as well as the cause of action for actual damages.

It added an enumeration of the provisions of the Securities Regulation Code. But beyond these, it retained
essentially the same factual allegations and narration of the Original Complaint. Each of the petitioners
performed an indispensable act that aided the illegal activities of the Cuaycong brothers, without which the latter
would not be able to successfully consummate their fraudulent scheme. Since the Cuaycong brothers and the
petitioners, as indispensable parties, had played various interconnected roles that led to the singular injury and
loss of the respondents, their liabilities cannot be separately determined.

Further, the approved Compromise Agreement between the respondents and the Cuaycong brothers operates
as res judicata. To have the effect of res judicata, a compromise between parties must meet two (2) tests. First,
the new litigation must involve the same subject matter and second, the issue should be between the same
parties. These two elements are present in this case. Though the compromise was effected in the former suit,
they have the same subject matter or object, which is the payment of the claims sought by respondents. There
is also identity of parties in both cases. Absolute identity of parties is not required, substantial identity of
parties suffices. The principle of res judicata may not be evaded by the expedient of adding or eliminating some
parties to the first and second action.

RULE 13, RULES OF COURT

85 Gagoomal v. Villacorta | 1092813 | 2012 | 663 SCRA 444 Santiago, Melody R.

A writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to a place a person in possession of a real
or personla property. The sec 3r of rule 39 states the deed and possession tobe given at the expiration of
redemption period. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title and interest and claim of judgment obligor to the property as of the
time of levy. The possession of the proprtt shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same
officer u less a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

86 Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Felonia | 189477 | 2014 Santiago, Melody R.

Supreme Court ruled that the HSLB is no longer entitled to have its mortgage lien annotated in TCT 402. In the
case at bar, since at the time the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated notice of lis
pendens, it can be concluded that HSLB is mortgagee in good faith. In the case, HSLB is not a purchaser in
good faith is defined as one who buys a property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest.

At the time HSLB purchased the subject property, the notice of lis pendens was already annotated on the title.
Therefore, there is no doubt that at the time appellant purchase the subject property, it was aware of pending
litigation concerning the same property thus the title is the outcome of the litigation.

87 J. Casim Construction v. Registrar of Deeds | 168655 | 2010 Santiago, Melody R.

The petition is utterly unmeritorious. Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the jurisdiction,
power or control which a court acquires over the property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the

35
action, and until final judgment. A notice of lis pendens, once duly registered, may be cancelled by the trial court
before which the action involving the property is pending.

This power is said to be inherent in the trial court and is exercised only under express provisions of law.
Accordingly, Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the trial court to cancel a notice
of lis pendens where it is properly shown that the purpose of its annotation is for molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be annotated. The RTC of Las Piñas
City, Branch 253 has committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction the petition for cancellation of notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner, and in denying
reconsideration.

88 Valderama v. Arguelles | 223660 | 2018 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica

A subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens on a certificate of title does not necessarily render a petition
for cancellation of adverse claim on the same title moot and academic

A notice of lis pendens is a mere incident of an action which does not create any right nor lien. It may be cancelled
without a court hearing. In contrast, an adverse claim constitutes a lien on a property.

Further, upholding the right of an opposing party to the outright cancellation of adverse claim on the sole basis
of a subsequent notice of lis pendens on the same title would not achieve any sound purpose. It may even
encourage a party to not avail the remedy of annotation of a notice of lis pendens if an adverse claim was already
registered and annotated in the same party's favor. Furthermore, such ruling would result to a situation where
the subject case of the notice of lis pendens may be dismissed on grounds not attributable to the adverse
claimant. An example of which is, as pointed out by the petitioner, deliberate forum-shopping of the other party
who filed the related case. Thus, the adverse claimant will be left with no other remedy in law to protect his or
her rights.

The RTC erred in ordering the cancellation of the petitioner's adverse claim on the mere basis of a subsequent
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the same certificate of title.

RULE 10, RULES OF COURT

89 Siasoco v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo | 132753 | 1999 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica

It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a
responsive-pleading is filed.Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its
Answer did not bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against
herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants,
but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
after a responsive pleading has been filed, and an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially
altered.

In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were prejudiced by private respondent's Amended
Complaint. True, Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any.
Moreover, they do not allege that their defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondent's
claims against the latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the subject
parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter is suing for specific performance
and damages for breach of contract.

36
Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its Complaint against Carissa, it could
do so against petitioners who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer. The amendment did not prejudice the
petitioners or delay the action.It simplified the case and tended to expedite its disposition. The Amended
Complaint became simply an action for damages, since the claims for specific performance and declaration of
nullity of the sale have been deleted. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

90 Citystate Savings Bank v. Aguinaldo | 200018 | 2015 Siman, Don Johnson Dela Chica

Under Section 3. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings
is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as
possible on its merits without regard to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action and needless expense.

The amended complaint effected no change in the cause of action, defense, or theory of the case since it
remained to be an action for the nullity of a title that was erroneously issued in another's name. While additional
reliefs were sought in the amended complaint, these are merely remedies to which [Aguinaldo] is entitled as a
result of the supervening events which rendered the relief sought in the original complaint inadequate. In any
case, a substantial alteration in the cause of action or defense is not a bar to amend the original complaint so
long as the amendment is not meant for delay. Therefore, petition of Citystate is denied.

91 Dela Cruz v. Concepcion | 2012 Songco, Ken Felix C

When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be treated with all respects as if it had been
raised in the pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be admitted where its
admission will not prejudice him.

Thus, while respondent judicially admitted in her answer that she only paid 2 million and that she still owed
petitioners 200,000, respondent claimed later and in fact, submitted an evidence to show that she already paid
the whole amount of her unpaid obligation. It is noteworthy what when respondent presented evidence of
payment, petitioners did not object thereto.

To be sure, petitioners were given ample opportunity to refute the fact of and present evidence to prove payment.

92 Diona v. Balangue | 173559 | 2013 Songco, Ken Felix C

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought
by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof.
Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and
evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of
relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must
provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared
in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence
presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is
declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that
may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the
defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff
37
will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason
behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due process against
unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due
process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant
was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the
pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any
provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed
from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum" and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither
did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per
annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents
were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the
complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for
"other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x." To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is
limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered
by the party’s cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest
was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence.

SUMMONS

93 Onstott v. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association | 221047 | 2016 Songco, Ken Felix C

FACTS: Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the Province of
Rizal. Due to non- payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal sold the subject property at public
auction to Amelita A. De Serra, the highest bidder, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated June 29, 2004.
Respondent UTNAI, an association representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently
redeemed the same from De Sena.

Thereafter, UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation and for the issuance of a new title in its name before the
RTC against Albert and Federico M. Cas, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. It alleged, among
others, that it became the owner of the subject property upon redemption thereof from De Sena and that,
consequently, it must be issued a new title. Moreover, Albert was an American citizen who, under Philippine law,
is not allowed to own a parcel of land in the Philippine.

Efforts to serve summons upon Albert proved futile as he was not a resident of the Philippines. Thus, summons
was served through publication. Nonetheless, Albert still failed to file his answer. Hence, upon the motion of
UTNAI, Albert was declared in default and UTNAI was allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Herein petitioner Michael Onstott, claiming to be the legitimate son of Albert with a certain Josephine Arrastia
Onstott filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, alleging that UTNAI, in its complaint, impleaded only Albert,
notwithstanding knowledge of the latter's death.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN DIRECTING THE ISSUANCE OF A TITLE IN FAVOR OF
UTNAI NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF ALBERT, THE
REGISTERED OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WHO HAS BEEN DEAD PRIOR TO THE
INSTITUTION OF UTNAI'S COMPLAINT?

RULING: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or

38
through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. In Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, t was ruled that "[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.

In this case, records show that Albert, the defendant in UTNAI's complaint, died in the United States of America
in 2004. Thus, on the strength of his right as Albert's compulsory heir who has an interest in the subject property,
Michael filed the Petition for Relief before the RTC, assailed the proceedings therein for failure to implead him
and his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party, and sought affirmative relief, i.e., the reversal of the RTC's
March 30, 2009 Decision and the reinstatement of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556. The RTC, holding that its own
Decision never attained finality for failure to publish the same, treated the Petition for Relief as a motion for
reconsideration and after due proceedings, ruled upon its merits.

94 Sansio Philippines Inc. v. Mogol Jr. | 177007 | 2009 Sy, Exequiel

FACTS: Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against respondent
spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. MeTC of Manila served the summons and the copy of the complaint
on respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the MeTC as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of
the criminal cases for violations of BP 22. After being informed of the summons and the complaint, respondent
spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in the courtroom. The counsel of
respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same.
Thereafter, he pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the complaint should be
served only at the address that was stated in both documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The
counsel of respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the copy of the complaint to the
process server and advised his clients not to obtain a copy and sign for the same.

The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not specify where service is to be effected
and validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing to file any responsive pleading, a
Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner was declared to be meritorious. Respondent
spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Injunction before the RTC of Manila. Respondent
spouses insisted there was no valid service of summons per return of the process server,. The RTC of Manila
issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not mandate that
summons be served strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Petitioner filed an MR
thereon, but the same was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO THE RESPONDENT
SPOUSES?

HELD: YES, in the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons
of respondent spouses Mogol. The act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons
and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with
the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons
to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was
already acquired by the MeTC of Manila. That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent
spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer
material.Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person
must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal
clear that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant; or if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is required

The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected
to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied and due process is served.

39
RULE 14, RULES OF COURT

95 Atiko Trans v. Prudential Guarantee | 167545 | 2011 Sy, Exequiel

FACTS: Prudential filed a case for sum of money against Cheng Lie Navigation and Atiko Trans, Inc. Cheng Lie
is a foreign shipping company doing business in the Philippines thru its duly authorized shipagent Atiko Trans
Inc. which is a domestic corporation duly established and created under the laws of the Philippines. The
summons upon Cheng Lie and Atiko was received by Atiko's cashier, Cristina Figueroa. Both corporations did
not file an Answer. After the MeTC rendered its judgment by default, Atiko filed a Notice of Appeal and later a
Memorandum of Appeal arguing that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person as the summons was
received by its cashier, Cristina Figueroa. Cheng Lie also filed its own Memorandum of Appeal maintaining that
the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER CHENG LIE AND ATIKO?

HELD: The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over Atiko but not over Cheng Lie. When the defendant is a domestic
corporation, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service
of summons but also by defendants voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the courts jurisdiction.

1. When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsideration to the RTC, and
Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing of these pleadings
seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction
moot.

2. SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. When the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by law
to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

No summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed above. It should be recalled that Atiko was
not properly served with summons as the person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina Figueroa,
is not one of the corporate officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The MeTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Atiko not thru valid service of summons but by the latters voluntary appearance.
Thus, there being no proper service of summons upon Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. Where service of summons upon the defendant principal is coursed
thru its co-defendant agent, and the latter happens to be a domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons
upon a domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of both defendants. And insofar as the principal is concerned, such
jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the agent’s subsequent voluntary appearance.

De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp. NM Rothschild &

96 Sy, Exequiel
Sons (Australia) Ltd. v. Lepanto | 175799 | 2011

FACTS: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint
against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging
contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for
damages. Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to personally bring the
summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect
service of summons on petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the
grounds that the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper
service of summons. The trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss providing that there was a
proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs that the defendant has neither applied for
40
a license to do business in the Philippines, The trial court also held that the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause
of action.

Petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS ON ACCOUNT OF
ITS FAILURE TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT?

HELD: NO, The Court therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed
to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court
cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with the service of summons on a
defendant which does not reside and is not found in the Philippines.

Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four instances wherein a defendant who
is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service,
to wit:
(1) When the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs;
(2) When the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
(3) When the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the philippines; and
(4) When the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the philippines.

In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the parties
void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the
defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such
contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property within the
Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.

A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC: new rule on service of summons on

97 Esquilona, Veniflor
foreign juridical entities

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON FOREIGN
PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY.

As amended, said provision of the Rules of Court now reads:

SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a foreign private juridical
entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated
in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated by
law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident agent, service
may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of the following means:
41
 a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the
Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be found
and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-registered mail at the last known address of
the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.

98 Imelda Imee Marcos Manotoc v. CA | 499 SCRA 21 Esquilona, Veniflor

Topic: Substituted Service of Summons: Rule 14

FACTS: The trial court issued a Summon addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29
Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky
de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit. When petitioner failed to file her Answer,
the trial court declared her in default. Petitioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

The grounds to support the motion were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra
Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee,
nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of
summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident of Singapore.

Trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON PETITIONER FOR
THE TRIAL COURT TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an
effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to
demonstrate that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Sec 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure)

Sec 8 Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provides for the requirements for a valid substituted services
which must be faithfully, strictly and fully complied with:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
(2) Specific Details in the Return
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
(4) A Competent Person in Charge.

In this case, there was an absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner
Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to
reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable. Furthermore, apart from the
allegation of petitioner’s address in the Complaint, it has not been shown that private respondent Trajano or
Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner.

99 Constantino Pascual v. Lourdes Pascual | 171916 | 2009 Esquilona, Veniflor

Topic: Substituted Service of Summons: Rule 14

FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction with Damages before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The undersigned Process Server of the Honorable
Court allegedly served the original summons and copy of the Complaint to the respondent on three separate
occasions but failed to do so because respondent was not at her house.
42
On the fourth attempt, only the respondent’s housemaid was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same
to the latter who is at the age of reason but refused to sign the same. Thereafter, the undersigned returned the
service of summons duly served for information and guidance of the Honorable Court.

Due to failure of the respondent to file a responsive pleading, the RTC declared respondent in default.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default with the argument of non-service of summons upon
her, but such motion was denied. Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion before the CA to which the CA ruled in
favor of the respondent.

However, petitioner insists that there was a valid substituted service of summons and that there should be a
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. He points out that the absence in the officer's
return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service was
invalid

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER AND VALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF
SUMMONS?

HELD: NO. In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Court. A plain and simple reading of the said provisions indicates that personal service of
summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served
within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service.

(See Manotoc Vs CA for the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons).

Herein, the Court ruled that: The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step
taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents.

At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details
of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that
such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service
of summons.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not apply in cases where
there is an absence of even the barest compliance with the procedure for a substituted service of
summons outlined in the Rules of Court.

100 Yuk Ling Ong v. Co. | 206653 | 2015 Viran, Archimedes John

Topic: Rule 14 / Substituted service of summons

FACTS: Petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of CA for
denying her petition for annulment of judgment made by the RTC for declaring her marriage with the Respondent
void ab initio. Petitioner claimed that she was never notified of the cases filed against her and that the process
server failed to do a valid substituted service of summons upon her. Thus, acquiring no jurisdiction over her
person.

ISSUE: WON THE RTC ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER?

HELD: NO. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner for the failure of validly serving
summons upon her. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can
be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
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In the case, the summons in Civil Case No. 02-030629 was issued on July 29, 2002. In his server’s return, the
process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server
immediately opted for substituted service of summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons.
Also, the server’s return failed to meet the requirements of a valid substituted service of summons as thoroughly
discussed in the case of Manotoc v. CA, to wit:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service -there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally
serve the summons within a reasonable period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least
two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful;
(2) Specific Details in the Return -The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the
attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of
the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons
on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service;
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion -The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and
his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to uphold the CA's
denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner because there
was an invalid substituted service of summons. The decision of the RTC must be declared null and void.

101 Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp. | 184333 | 2013 Viran, Archimedes John

FACTS: Petitioner Sixto N. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator, one (1) motorgrader and
one (1) payloader from the Respondent who is engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy equipments.
Petitioner made down payments with the balance payable in 12 monthly installments through postdated checks.
However, upon presentment of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason
of “closed account,” “drawn against insufficient funds,” or “payment stopped.” Respondent filed a complaint
before the RTC of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorney’s fees and damages against the petitioner.

The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments. Sheriff
Cortes proceeded at petitioner’s given address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the
complaint, writ of replevin and bond.

However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there.
The Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by Rolando
Bonayon, a security guard of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading. Upon motion the
RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence
ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: WON substituted service of summons to the security guard considered valid as to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of Petitioner?

HELD: NO. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot
be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.”

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It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who
received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summon. Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who
received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that
petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law.

Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if
defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment
rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null and void.

102 Ang v. Chinatrust | 200693 | 2016 Viran, Archimedes John

FACTS: Respondent filed a money claim with an application for the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment
against the petitioners. A summons was issued against them. The process server of the court together with the
assisting sheriff and the plaintiff’s counsel and its representative served the summons upon the petitioners, thru
Mr. Ricky Ang but refused to sign the original copy thereof. and the receptionist of the said firm informed that the
other defendants have not yet arrived, and it would be better if we will return in the afternoon. That in the
afternoon on even date, said processes were served thru Ms. MELINDA ANG, Corporate Secretary of defendant
NATION PETROLEUM CORPORATION and instructed Ms. Charlotte Magpayo, Administrative Assistant of the
said corporation to receive the same.

That despite diligent efforts to locate the whereabouts of the other defendants MARIO ANG, NENA ANG,
RENATO ANG, PAULINE ANG, GUILLERMO SY, ALISON ANG-SY and NELSON ANG outside the premises
of their office, considering that said process server and his group were not allowed to enter, substituted service
was made by leaving their respective court processes at their office or regular place of business through the
same Ms. Charlotte Magpayo by affixing the “receiving stamp” of Nation Petroleum and her notation, as shown
in the original copy of summons. The petitioners entered a special appearance with a motion to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion contending that RTC had jurisdiction over the person of the
accused as there was a valid substituted service of summons. Petitioners raised it to CA but CA denied.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS A VALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS?

HELD: NO. A serving officer’s failure to comply with the elements provided in MAnotoc results in the court’s
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. However, proof that the defendant actually
received the summons in a timely manner or his failure to deny the same (which amounts to voluntary
appearance) would satisfy the requirements of due process.

The constitutional requirement of due process requires that the service be such as may be reasonably expected
to give the notice desired. Once the service reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is
answered, traditional notions of fair play are satisfied, and due process is served. In the present case, the return
failed to establish the impossibility of prompt personal service. While defendants are expected to avoid and
evade service of summons, a serving officer is likewise expected to be resourceful persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on a defendant.

With respect to petitioner Ricky Ang, we sustain the lower courts’ conclusion that he was personally served
summons. Personal service may be effected by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person or,
if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. The return indicates that Ricky Ang personally
received a copy of the summons and the complaint despite his refusal to sign the original copy. This constitutes
valid tender of the summons and the complaint.

103 Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. v. CA | 203298 | 2018 Navarro, Bryan Christopher

TOPIC: RULE 14

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FACTS: Petitioner Interlink Movie Houses filed before the R TC a complaint for sum of money and damages
against respondents Expressions Stationery ShopInter for the latter's unpaid rentals and damages resulting from
its alleged breach of their lease contract.

In the service of summons, Sheriff Benedict R. Muriel served it at the defendant company’s office.Interlink then
filed a motion to declare herein respondents in default for their failure to file their answer. Respondents entered
a special appearance alleging that the service of the summons was defective and, as such, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over them.

RTC denied Interlink's motion to declare defendants in default. The trial court agreed that the summons was not
served in accordance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court rendering such service defective.
Again in the Sheriff’s return, an order of issuance of summons was delivered to the respondents through a certain
Amee Ochotorina, who introduced herself as a secretary.

Interlink filed another motion to declare defendants in default. To this motion, respondent again entered a special
appearance and alleged that the second service of the summons was still defective because Ochotorina did not
work for nor was connected with the office of the president of Expressions.

The RTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default and allowed Interlink to present evidence ex parte.
The trial court was convinced that there was sufficient compliance with the rules on service of summons to a
juridical entity considering that the summons was received by the assistant/secretary of the president.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS?

RULING: NO. There was no valid service of summons. It is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil
case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to
its authority. In the absence of service or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant is
defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and
void.

In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons.

RULE 15, RULES OF COURT

104 De los Reyes v. Ramnani | 169135 | 2010 Navarro, Bryan Christopher

FACTS: A judgment debt is enforced by the levy and sale of the debtor’s property. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent Josephine Anne B. Ramnani. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the
trial court. Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a certificate of
sale was executed in her favor on even date.

Respondent filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final
certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not
accompanied by a notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be
executed as it is barred by prescription.

The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE FATALLY DEFECTIVE MOTION?

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RULING: NO. Decision was not timely executed because of respondent’s failure to secure the final certificate of
sale within 10 years from the entry of said judgment. This is erroneous. It is not disputed that shortly after the
trial court rendered the aforesaid judgment, respondent moved for execution which was granted by the trial court.
The subject property was sold on execution sale. Respondent emerged as the highest bidder, thus, a certificate
of sale was executed by the sheriff in her favor on the same day.

Although the certificate of sale was annotated on the transfer certificate title, petitioner did not exercise his right
to redeem the subject property within one year from said registration. Thus, what remains to be done is the
issuance of the final certificate of sale which was, however, not promptly accomplished at that time due to the
demise of the trial court’s sheriff.

Decision was already enforced when the subject property was levied and sold on June 6, 1978 which is within
the five-year period for the execution of a judgment by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

105 Ramos v. Teves, A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012 Navarro, Bryan Christopher

FACTS: Atty. Edward Anthony B. Ramos filed a complaint for money in his client’s behalf in which complaint he
sought the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

Since the MTCC already served summons on the defendant but did not yet act on his ex parte request for
preliminary attachment, Atty. Ramos went to the court personally file an urgent ex parte motion to resolve the
pending incident. But respondent Reynaldo S. Teves, the branch clerk of court, refused to receive the motion for
the reason that it did not bear proof of service on the defendant. Atty. Ramos explained that ex parte motions
did not require such service. A heated argument between Atty. Ramos and Teves ensued, prompting the
presiding judge who heard it to intervene and direct the clerk in charge of civil cases to receive the ex parte
motion.

Atty. Ramos charged Teves before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with arrogance and discourtesy
in refusing to receive his motion despite his explanation. Teves claimed that he was neither arrogant nor
discourteous and that his argument with Atty. Ramos had been cordial and professional. Citing Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, Teves asserted that he acted correctly in refusing to accept Atty. Ramos non pro forma motion
for failure to furnish the adverse party with a copy of the notice of hearing.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT MAY REFUSE TO RECEIVE A PLEADING THAT
DOES NOT CONFORM WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES OF COURT?

RULING: NO. Clearly Teves erred in refusing to receive Atty. Ramos motion on the ground that it did not bear
proof of service on the defendant. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court have no authority to
pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court.
Compliance with the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels.And whether these conform to
the rules concerning substance and form is an issue that only the judge of the court has authority to determine.

The duty of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial.
Although they may on inspection advise the parties or their counsels of possible defects in the documents they
want to file, which may be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party refuse
to receive the same.

106 Pojas v. Gozo-Dadole, 192 SCRA 575 Manalili, Mart

FACTS: Private respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession against herein petitioner.
Respondent judge, after trial, in her decision of March 1, 1986, ruled in favor of private respondents. The said
decision was received by petitioner's counsel on April 15, 1986. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the Order of May 8, 1986 for failure to mention the day the motion is to be resolved, which was
considered violative of Section 5, Rule 15 of the New Rules of Court and therefore, a mere scrap of paper. His

47
second motion for reconsideration dated April 25, 1986 was denied in respondent judge's order of June 20, 1986
for lack of merit.

On July 2, 1986, petitioner, after receipt of said order of June 20, 1986, on July 1, 1986 filed a Notice of Appeal;
but the same was denied in an order dated July 15, 1986, for being filed out of time on the ground that the motion
for reconsideration which the Court ruled as pro-forma did not stop the running of the 15-day period to appeal.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S
NOTICE OF APPEAL?

RULING: NO. Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that not of motion be served by the movant on
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before its hearing. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered
a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon.
Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said motion is a mandatory
requirement and the failure of the movant to comply with said requisites renders his motion fatally defective.

Hence, petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on April 23, 1986 which failed to mention the day the motion
is asked to be resolved, is a mere scrap of paper, being violative of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, and
as such, did not stop the running of the period of appeal. Without such notice, the motion is pro-forma, and
hence, does not suspend the running of the period of appeal.

107 Victory Liner Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007 Manalili, Mart

FACTS: This case finds its origin from a vehicular collision between a bus owned by petitioner Victory Liner, Inc.
and an Isuzu Truck used by respondent Michael Malinias. A complaint for sum of money and damages was
instituted by respondent against petitioner and the bus driver. The MTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Notice of Hearing therein stated: "Please submit
the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for hearing before the Honorable Court at a schedule and time
convenient to this Honorable Court and the parties." The MTC ruled that the notice did not conform with the
mandatory requirements of Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the motion was
thus a mere scrap of paper which did not suspend the period to appeal. Accordingly, the MTC declared that its
earlier judgment dated 13 January 1998 had become final and executory. What then followed was a series of
unsuccessful attempts by petitioner to have the lower courts set aside or stay the now-final judgment against it.
What the petitioner undertook instead was to pursue the notice of appeal, despite the unequivocal statement in
the MTC Order of 23 February 1998 that "the Judgment [sought to be reconsidered] has now become final and
executor.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGEMENT HAS ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY?

RULING: A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period
to appeal, and upon the expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or decision becomes final and
executory. The rationale behind this rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court
will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.

Not only did the defect render the motion for reconsideration itself unworthy of reconsideration, it more crucially
failed to toll the period to appeal. While the period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for
reconsideration, the MTC deemed, with legal basis, that the motion interposed by petitioner could not have been
deemed filed and should instead be treated as "a mere scrap of paper.

48